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STUDIA CLASSICA

ναυσὶ δ' οὔτε πεζὸς ἰὼν κεν εὗροις
ἐς Ὑπερβορέων ἀγῶνα θαυμαστὰν ὁδόν

(Pind. *Pyth.* 10. 29–30)

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GEFÖRDERT DURCH EINE ZUWENDUNG DER FRITZ THYSEN STIFTUNG

DAS GESCHENK EINES RHAPSODEN: ÜBER EINE WEIHINSCHRIFT AUS DODONA

Die Existenz des Rhapsoden Terpsikles, welcher in dem *RE*-Artikel “Ῥαψῳδός” von Wolf Aly neben Homer und Xenophanes aufgelistet ist,¹ wurde erst vor relativ kurzer Zeit enthüllt. Sein Name ist rund um den in Dodona ausgegrabenen bronzenen Gefäßuntersatz eingestochen, *SGDI* 5786 (Lazzarini 142):

Τερψικλῆς τῶι Δὶ Ναίῳι ῥαψωιδὸς ἀνέθηκε.

Terpsikles, der Rhapsode, hat [das] Zeus Naios geweiht.²

In anderen Quellen ist dieser Terpsikles nicht anzutreffen (vgl. *LGPV* V3a-49629). Kurz nachdem C. Carapanos im Jahr 1877 den Fund gemacht hatte, vermutete C. Bursian, dass der hübsche kleine Dreifuß (12 cm. im Durchmesser) mit drei fein geformten Löwenfüßen als Preis für den Sieg im Rhapsodenwettkampf (dafür spricht in der Tat die Berufsbezeichnung)³ an dem dodonischen Fest der Naia angesetzt war und errungen wurde.⁴ Terpsikles soll demnach seinen Siegespreis dem Gott geweiht haben, dem die Feier gewidmet war. Der Dreifuß von Terpsikles erinnert an die Weihgabe Hesiods, hat aber keine Ohrhenkel (cf. *OD* 656–658: ἔνθα μέ φημι / ὕμνω νικήσαντα φέρειν τρίποδ’ ὠτῶεντα. / τὸν μὲν ἐγὼ Μούσῃσ’ Ἑλικωνιάδεσσ’ ἀνέθηκα).⁵

¹ Aly 1914, 246.

² Bild: Lazzarini Taf. 2, fig. 1; Cabanes Abb. 8; Zeichnung: Carapanos 1878, 40, Taf. 23, 2 u. 2 bis. (Nachdruck: Roehl *IGA* 502; Roberts 1887, 92). Das Artefakt befindet sich im Arch. Nationalmuseum zu Athen.

³ Vgl. Lazzarini 1976, 69: “Forse il tripode offerto dal rapsodo potrebbe essere un oggetto vinto in una gara di poesia”.

⁴ Bursian 1878, 7: “Weihgeschenk an Zeus Naios, als dessen Veranlassung doch am ehesten ein Sieg in den Naia zu denken ist”. Dasselbe: Roberts 1881, 105.

⁵ Die Inschrift, die der Dichter laut *Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi* 213–214 auf diesem Gegenstand anbringen ließ: Ἡσίοδος Μούσαις Ἑλικωνίσι τόνδ’ ἀνέθηκεν / ὕμνω νικήσας ἐν Χαλκίδι θεῖον Ὀμηρον, ist aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach fiktiv.

Die Terpsikles-Inschrift wurde zunächst von Carapanos selbst und ein Dezennium nach ihm von A. Kirchhoff in seinem fundamentalen Werk zum griechischen Alphabet nach der Buchstabenform in die Mitte des 5. Jh. datiert.⁶ Das der Inschrift zugrunde liegende Alphabet ist gewiss ionisch, denn sowohl Omega als auch Eta werden benutzt. So in nachweisbarer Weise auch der Name des Schenkenden: In Milet wurde zu archaischer Zeit ein Bildhauer desselben seltenen Namens bekannt.⁷ Dass dies ein Künstlername war (wie bspw. die Namen der Musiker Olympos und Marsyas; Phemios und Demodokos sind auch sprechende Namen), bleibt eine glaubwürdige Vermutung:⁸ Ein Bildhauer, ein Rhapsode und ein Verfasser von $\pi\epsilon\rho\iota$ Ἀφροδισίων (Athen. VII, 325 D)⁹ waren alle ihres

Pausanias, welcher „den ältesten“ unter den im Musenheiligtum auf Helikon geweihten Dreifüßen bewundert hat (IX, 31, 3), erwähnt weder die Inschrift noch die Certamen-Geschichte mit einem einzigen Wort. Für die unabhängige Existenz des Epigramms s. Bassino 2013, 194; sie erwähnt die Terpsikles-Inschrift, meint dabei allerdings, dass auf dem Dreifuß, welchen Pausanias sah, eben dieses Gedicht eingraviert wurde. Auf jeden Fall konnte der Dreifuß von Hesiod unmöglich dem von Terpsikles gleichdimensional sein. Sonst hätte der Graveur weder auf dem Dreifußkranz noch auf den Füßen ausreichend Platz für zwei lesbar große hexametrische Zeilen finden können.

⁶ Carapanos 1878, 40; Kirchhoff 1887, 22: „ersichtlich im ionischen Alphabet etwa der Mitte des 5. Jahrhunderts“; Lazzarini 1976, 175–176: „fin dall’età arcaica“. Laut Quantin (2008, 23 Anm. 87) „la forme du ρ n’est pas ancienne“. Das trifft nicht zu. Das „R“ ist in den archaischen Inschriften neben dem einfacheren „P“ oftmals anzutreffen (u.a. in Euboia, Boötien, Thessalien, Achaia, Aitolia und Epeiros, Phokis, Lokris, Syrakus und auf vielen Inseln, s. bspw. „Table of Letters“ bei Jeffery 1961). Auch in Ionien, wo man in der Regel „P“ schrieb, wurde gelegentlich „R“ gebraucht. Das beweist die berühmte auf den Säulenwülsten des Artemistempels zu Ephesos fragmentarisch erhaltene Weihinschrift von Kroesos (so die allgemein anerkannte Interpretation E. L. Hicks’, vgl. *IGA* 493, *IEph* 1518), welche von Kirchhoff (1887, 21–22) gerade in Hinsicht auf „die komplizierte Gestalt des Rho gegenüber der einfacheren ‘P’“ auseinandergesetzt und mit der Terpsikles-Inschrift verglichen wird. Die Einschätzung von Quantin, die Inschrift wäre nach der Orthographiereform von 403/2, will sagen nach der Einführung ionischer Buchstaben in Athen, verfasst (*ebd.*, mit Verweis auf Guarducci 1987, 26–27), ist überflüssig. Richtig dagegen ist der Urteil von Graziosi 2002, 25: „The earliest occurrence of the term ‘rhapsode’“. Graziosi vermutet dabei, dass nicht nur die Schrift, sondern auch das Dialekt der Inschrift ionisch ist („in the word ῥαψῳδός the sequence α + οι is contracted to ω“). Das scheint jedoch zu weit gegriffen zu sein: Das kontrahierte -ωδός ist ja auch im Attischen durchaus präsent.

⁷ Nach seiner eigenen Signatur: ἐποίησε δὲ Τερψικλῆς (*SGDI* 5505). Erste Hälfte des 6. Jh. nach Lippold 1934, 790; vgl. Laubscher 1974, 505.

⁸ Hornblower 2013, 200: „Terpsikles means ‘famed for giving pleasure’ and may be a professionally assumed name“. Vgl. Graziosi 2002, 25–26: Die Verf. riskiert anzunehmen, dass Terpsikles einer Rhapsoden-Familie angehörte, und seinen Namen als Mitglied der Gilde erhielt.

⁹ Über ihn: Spanoudakis 1999, 637.

Namens würdig. Die Beurteilung von Kirchhoff ist nicht anzufechten: Die Weihgabe wurde „aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach von einem Rhapsoden aus dem kleinasiatischen Ionien“ dargebracht.¹⁰ Das Artefakt selbst könnte allerdings sowohl ionischer (d.i. aus den ionischen Küstenstädten Kleinasiens) als auch bspw. attischer Provenienz gewesen sein: Es ist ja davon auszugehen, dass der Dreifuß ein Siegespreis war und erst nach der Verleihung an den Sieger beschrieben wurde. Daher ist auf Basis der Inschrift, streng genommen, kein sicheres Urteil darüber möglich, wo der Wettbewerb stattfand. Nähere Aussagen zum Datum als die von Carapanos und Kirchhoff lassen sich ebenfalls kaum fällen.

Bezüglich der dodonischen Naia ergibt sich jedoch aus der Forschung eine viel spätere Datierung. Sich stützend auf den Bericht bei Athenaios (V, 203 A) sowie auf das epigraphische Material und die allgemeinen Beobachtungen über die politischen Verhältnisse zwischen Epiros und Alexandrien hat P. Cabanes nachgewiesen, dass die Naia als Föderalfest der Epiroten zur Zeit des Ptolemaios Soter ins Leben gerufen wurden. Erst zu Beginn des 2. Jh. v. Chr. erhielten sie den Status von ἄγων στεφανίτης.¹¹ F. Quantin nimmt an, ein Lokalfest in Dodona feierten die Einwohner der angrenzenden Gebiete bereits seit der archaisch-klassischen Zeit.¹² Wenn auch an sich möglich, kann diese Annahme schwerlich bekräftigt werden: Die Zeugnisse reichen nicht über das 3. Jh. zurück. Die Erwägungen Quantins stimmen allerdings insoweit, dass der Kultname Νᾱῖος dem dodonischen Zeus womöglich viel früher beigegeben wurde, als das Fest Νᾱῖα entstand. Für frühe Datierung des letzteren wäre demnach die Terpsikles-Inschrift kein Beweis.

Cabanes hat die Aufmerksamkeit auch auf eine Parallelinschrift gelenkt, die merkwürdigerweise von keinem Forscher weder in Bezug auf die Rhapsoden noch auf Dodona erörtert worden ist, Robert, *Coll. Froehner* 44, Nr. 39:

¹⁰ Kirchhoff 1887, 22. Man bedenke, dass auch der Rhapsode Ion im Dialog Platons aus Ephesos kommt und die Homeriden aus Chios stammen: Die Rhapsodik ist durchaus als ein ionisches Phänomen anzusehen.

¹¹ Cabanes 1988, 54–55; vgl. Dakaris 1971, 70; 90–91; Mylonopoulos 2006, 203: „In der Forschung wird einheitlich von einer Gründung der Naia zu Beginn des 3. Jhs. v. Chr. ausgegangen. Die in einer tegeatischen Inschrift aus der Zeit um 219–167 v. Chr. überlieferten tragischen Agone im Rahmen der Naia machten die Entstehung einer Theateranlage unabdingbar. Offensichtlich wurden die Naia erst um 192 v. Chr. in den Status eines *stephanites agon* erhoben, wie eine Inschrift aus dem Poseidonheiligtum auf Tenos, dem Zentralheiligtum des Nesiotenbundes, belegt“. Hierzu noch: Meyer 2013, 36–37 Anm. 82.

¹² Quantin 2008, 26–35. Auch Tzouvara-Souli 2004, 518 plädiert für die frühe Datierung, jedoch lediglich auf Basis der Terpsikles-Inschrift.

Κλέαρχος Διομέδοντος ῥαψωιδός μ' ἀνέθ<η>κε.

Klearchos, Sohn des Diomedon, ein Rhapsode, hat mich geweiht.

Bei dieser Inschrift ist der Text auf dem 25 cm langen bronzenen Fuß eines Dreifußes eingestochen. Froehner, in dessen Sammlung das Artefakt aufbewahrt wurde, hatte den Verdacht, der Gegenstand wäre in Dodona gefunden worden. Man hat ihm diesen für "olympisch" verkauft. Aufgrund der Parallelfälle vermutet jedoch L. Robert, der Herausgeber der Inschriften aus Froener'scher Sammlung, sehr plausibel, dass es zu Froehner von einem bestimmten Kaufmann kam, der alles für "olympisch" ausgab. Die wahre Herkunft des Fundes hätte er nicht verraten wollen. Denn nach dem Abschluss der Arbeit von Karapanos und bevor die Ausgrabungen von der Griechischen Archäologischen Gesellschaft wiederaufgenommen wurden, stellte Dodona viele Bronzen auf dem Schwarzmarkt her; zu dieser Zeit soll Froehner den Klearchos-Dreifuß gekauft haben. Robert schreibt: "l'objet vient d'un sanctuaire où il y avait des fêtes musicales".¹³ Allerdings wurde in Dodona keine Votivgabe gefunden, die als Stiftung von einem Sieger an den dort veranstalteten Spielen gelten könnte.

Möglicherweise ist diese Inschrift, wie die des Terpsikles, hochklassisch: Das Chi in Form eines Pluszeichens weist auf eine Abfassungszeit kaum später als gegen Anfang des 4 Jh. v.Chr. hin.¹⁴ Cabanes hebt hervor, dass in der Klearchos-Inschrift Zeus Naïos nicht erwähnt wird: Somit sei auch die Terpsikles-Inschrift für die Datierung der Naia irrelevant.¹⁵ Auch das kann weder bewiesen noch widerlegt werden, ist jedoch für unser Thema völlig belanglos. Denn auch wenn die beiden Rhapsoden ihre Preise in Dodona gewonnen haben, so ist dadurch noch nicht erklärt, warum sie sich dazu entschieden haben, diese auch in Dodona zu weihen. Kein Sieger musste zwangsläufig den Siegespreis den im Ort seines Sieges verehrten Göttern schenken. Vielmehr würde die Dankweihe seinen heimischen Göttern gebühren (wie im Falle von Hesiod). Die Sieger-Inschriften findet man auch in den Ortschaften, wo keine Spiele veranstaltet wurden. Das betrifft auch die Naia-Sieger: Die einschlägigen Weihinschriften aus hellenistischer Zeit wurden in Sikyon, Priene, Tegea und auf Delos entdeckt.¹⁶ Keine derartige Inschrift, wie bereits artikuliert, stammt aus

¹³ Robert 1936, 44.

¹⁴ *LGPV* IIIA (1997) 128 gibt als Datum 4.–3. Jh. an, jedoch mit Fragezeichen. Der Name Κλέαρχος, sowie der seines Vaters Διομέδων, war etwa seit dem 6. Jh. v. Chr. beinahe überall in der griechisch sprechenden Welt verbreitet; im Prinzip konnte ein Rhapsode dieses Namens aus jeder Stadt Griechenlands stammen.

¹⁵ Cabanes 1988, 53.

¹⁶ *Ebd.* 62–73.

Dodona selbst. Dass in Dodona bereits in der Epoche von Terpsikles die rhapsodischen Wettbewerbe organisiert wurden, darf man zwar nicht durch das *argumentum ex silentio* ausschließen. Doch ein Sieger hätte seinen Preis nicht deswegen in einem bestimmten Ort weihen wollen, weil er ihn eben in diesem Ort errungen hatte. Man darf somit mit gleicher oder sogar mit größerer Sicherheit annehmen, dass Terpsikles in einer der Städte oder Kultzentren Griechenlands aufführte, wo die rhapsodischen Wettbewerbe zu seiner Zeit nachweislich stattfanden, z.B. in Delphi, Chios, Epidauros, Syrakus, Argos oder Athen. Es bleibt jedoch offen, warum die Weihgabe des Terpsikles (sowie wahrscheinlich auch die des Klearchos) an Zeus von Dodona erbracht wurde.

Ein Rezitator hat an den musischen Spielen gesiegt und einen teuren Preis davongetragen. Es stellt sich die Frage, weswegen dieser Dreifuß in einem am Rande der hellenischen Welt liegenden Heiligtum, das mit den rhapsodischen Angelegenheiten sonst keine Beziehung aufweist, geweiht werden sollte. Möglicherweise war Terpsikles ein wohlhabender Mensch: Schließlich ist seine Inschrift in tiefen kontinuierlichen Linien eingestochen, eine Arbeit, die teurer als die bei der Klearchos-Inschrift war, welche nur in Punkttechnik untief ziseliert wurde und daher viel schlechter erhalten ist; der Handwerker hat auch einen Schreibfehler gemacht, indem er ANEΘNKE statt ANEΘHKE schrieb. Doch aus welchem Grund wollte auch Klearchos (angenommen, seine Inschrift stamme tatsächlich aus Dodona) sein Geschenk eben diesem, dem dodonischen, Zeus weihen? Unmöglich kann das Orakel zu Dodona den beiden Rhapsoden einst den Sieg vorhergesagt haben. Freilich sahen alle Homer-Vorträger Zeus als ihren Schutzpatron an (vgl. Pind. *N.* 2, 1–6 et *Sch.*). Diesem konnte man allerdings das Weihgeschenk an jedem der Zeus-Tempel von Peloponnes oder Mittelgriechenland oder auch Ionien darbringen. Das einzige, was den beiden Weihenden sicherlich gemeinsam war, war ihr Beruf. Wenn aber zwei Rhapsoden demselben Gott schenken, so liegt die Annahme nahe, dass auch die anderen Vertreter des Berufs diesem Gott ihre Weihgaben darbrachten. Was machte gerade den Zeus zu Dodona für sie so attraktiv?

Einige stilistische Besonderheiten lassen sich noch vermerken. Zeus Naios ist wohl nicht aus bloßer Frömmigkeit von Terpsikles genannt. Klearchos verzichtet darauf, den Gott zu nennen, zweifelsohne wegen der Ökonomie: Wem würde man hier sonst weihen?¹⁷ Die Erwähnung des Gottes lässt möglichenfalls einen besonderen Nachdruck erkennen. Die Wortstellung gibt weiteren Anlass dazu, zu glauben, dass die Terpsikles-Inschrift nicht allein in Bezug auf die bildliche Seite, sondern

¹⁷ Hierzu: Jessen 1903, 1261.

auch hinsichtlich ihrer Formulierung anspruchsvoll ist. Maria Lazzarini hat bemerkt, dass die Stellung der (an sich nicht gerade sehr oft in den Weihinschriften anzutreffenden) Berufsbezeichnung vor dem Wort des Weihens nur hier vorkommt.¹⁸ Gibt der Spender seinen Beruf in der Weihinschrift an, so spielt dieser Beruf beim Akt der Spende allemal eine besondere Rolle. Doch Terpsikles will seinen beruflichen Status noch nachdrücklicher akzentuieren, indem er das Wort ῥαψωιδός in der Position einer prädikativen Bestimmung vor ἀνέθηκε stellt. Damit hat er wohl äußern wollen, dass er gerade als Rhapsode keinem anderen als Zeus von Dodona die Weihgabe für seinen Sieg schuldet.

Über die Intention von Terpsikles sowie über die der anderen Rhapsoden, die dem dodonischen Zeus ihre Siegespreise geweiht haben könnten, lässt sich urteilen, wenn man darauf Rücksicht nimmt, für welche Leistungen sie diese Preise erhielten. Die Schule, die darauf beharrt, dass diese Leute Träger von *oral poetry* und selbst im 5. Jh. noch Improvisatoren gewesen seien, welche von dem Text der Gedichte, die sie rezitierten, nach Belieben hätten ablenken dürfen, wird wohl behaupten, sie hätten das Publikum und die Richter vor allem durch den Erzählstoff beeindruckt.¹⁹ Das lehrreichste Zeugnis jedoch, das uns über die rhapsodische Aufführung im 5. Jh. belehrt, d.i. jener Abschnitt des platonischen *Ion*, wo der Held sich beiläufig über seine Belohnung äußert, weist in die andere Richtung hin, 535 c 5–8; d 8 – e 6:

ΙΩΝ. <...> ἐγὼ γὰρ ὅταν ἐλαινόν τι λέγω, δακρύων ἐμπίμπλανταί μου οἱ ὀφθαλμοί· ὅταν τε φοβερὸν ἢ δεινόν, ὄρθαι αἱ τρίχες ἴστανται ὑπὸ φόβου καὶ ἡ καρδίᾳ πηδᾷ. <...>

ΣΩ. Οἴσθα οὖν ὅτι καὶ τῶν θεατῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ταῦτ᾽ αὐτὰ ὑμεῖς ἐργάζεσθε;

ΙΩΝ. Καὶ μάλα καλῶς οἶδα· καθορῶ γὰρ ἐκάστοτε αὐτοὺς ἄνωθεν ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος κλάοντάς τε καὶ δεινὸν ἐμβλέποντας καὶ συνθαμβοῦντας τοῖς λεγομένοις. δεῖ γάρ με καὶ σφόδρ' αὐτοῖς τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν· ὥς ἐάν μὲν κλάοντας αὐτοὺς καθίσω, αὐτὸς γελάσομαι ἀργύριον λαμβάνων, ἐάν δὲ γελῶντας, αὐτὸς κλαύσομαι ἀργύριον ἀπολλύς.

ION. ... Denn wenn ich etwas Jämmerliches vortrage, füllen sich meine Augen mit Tränen, und wenn Fürchterliches oder Schreckhaftes, stehen mir die Haare zu Berge vor Furcht und das Herz pocht. ...

¹⁸ Lazzarini 1976, 113.

¹⁹ Bspw. Collins 2001, 129–131 *et passim*. Der Verf. geht sogar so weit zu behaupten, dass Pl. *Ion* 530 d 6–7: ὥς εἶδ' ἐκεκόσμηκα τὸν Ὅμηρον, unter anderem auf den improvisatorischen Charakter der Aufführung hinweise, obwohl der Kontext eine solche Deutung für ἐκεκόσμηκα nicht zulässt.

SOKR. Weißt du aber, dass ihr auch vielen eurer Zuschauer dasselbe einflößt?

ION. Sehr gut sogar weiß ich das. Denn ich beobachte sie jedes Mal von oben, wie sie weinen und erschrocken zuschauen und mitstaunen über das, was vorgetragen wird. Ich muss nämlich große Aufmerksamkeit auf sie richten: Bringe ich sie zum Weinen, so lache ich dann meinerseits, weil ich Geld einnehme; bringe ich sie aber zum Lachen, so weine ich künftig selbst deswegen, weil ich Geld einbüße.

Zu beachten ist, dass diese Äußerungen einzig und allein die Darstellung der homerischen Szenen betreffen: Zunächst wird auf den Anfang des 22. Gesangs der *Odyssee* hingewiesen, und zwar darauf, wie der Held „auf die Schwelle springt, sich den Freiern offenbart und die Pfeile vor den Füßen ausschüttet“ (535 b 3–5: τὸν Ὀδυσσεύα ὅταν ἐπὶ τὸν οὐδὸν ἐφαλλόμενον ᾄδῃς, ἐκφανῇ γιγνόμενον τοῖς μνηστήρσι καὶ ἐκχέοντα τοὺς οἰστοὺς πρὸ τῶν ποδῶν);²⁰ danach folgen die *Ilias*-Szenen, „oder wie Achilles Hektor angreift, oder auch etwas Klägliches über Andromache oder Hekabe oder Priamos“ (b 5–7: ἢ Ἀχιλλεὺς ἐπὶ τὸν Ἑκτορα ὀρμῶντα, ἢ καὶ τῶν περὶ Ἀνδρομάχην ἐλεινῶν τι ἢ περὶ Ἑκάβην ἢ περὶ Πρίαμον). Die Kunst des Ion ist die eines Vorlesers.²¹ Durch Stimmenmodulation ist er bestrebt, bestimmte für die Aufführung ausgewählte Szenen aus den Gedichten Homers am eindrucksvollsten vorzutragen. Sein Publikum hat diese Gedichte mehrmals gehört oder auch gelesen. Es kennt sie sehr gut, und, wie die Dichtungskenner aller Zeiten, kommt es zum Konzert, um die eigenartige Aufführung zu genießen. Der Preis wird eben dafür verliehen, wie stoffgemäß der Schauspieler die Szene übermittelt hat.

Der Bestand an solchen erlesenen Homer-Szenen konnte zwar groß sein, jedoch durchaus überschaubar: Die an sich besonders erschütternden Abschnitte wie bspw. ἡ τοῦ Ἑκτορος δίωξις oder der Kampf um des Patroklos Leiche oder die heiteren Kampfszenen aus dem 13. Gesang,

²⁰ Eigentlich sollte es umgekehrt lauten: Erst nachdem er Antinoos erschossen hat, gibt sich Odysseus den verwirrten Freiern zu erkennen; die Umstellung bedeutet jedoch sicherlich nicht, dass in den rhapsodischen Variationen die Ereignisse manchmal in umgekehrter Ordnung vorkamen; bei der Wiedergabe der berühmten Szene berücksichtigt Platon nicht die Feinheit der Erzählordnung bzw. Erzähllogik; allein das Ereignisschema sitzt ihm fest im Kopf, nach welchem die Selbstoffenbarung allenfalls vor der Ermordung der Freier erfolgen soll. Einen ähnlichen Fehler machen Aristoteles (*Poet.* 1455 a 4: Elektra soll ihren Bruder ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ erkannt haben) und Horaz (*Ep.* I, 2, 23–26: Ulixes soll nicht aus den Schalen der Circe getrunken haben).

²¹ Mit aller Deutlichkeit werden die Rhapsoden von den Dichtern abgegrenzt und mit den Schauspielern gleichgestellt, 532 d 6–8: σοφοὶ μὲν ποῦ ἔστε ὑμεῖς οἱ ῥαψῳδοὶ καὶ ὑποκριταὶ καὶ ὧν ὑμεῖς ᾄδετε τὰ ποιήματα („gewandt seid wohl ihr, Rhapsoden und Schauspieler, so wie diejenigen, deren Gedichte ihr vorsingt“).

welche der Ilias-Schöpfer selbst im *Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi* (191–204) als Herzstück seiner Poesie rezitiert, aber auch die rührenden Szenen, wie das letzte Treffen Hektors mit seiner Familie, der Besuch von Priamos bei Achilles und ähnliches mehr. Die Titel der *Ilias*- und *Odyssee*-Gesänge (die “Rhapsodien”) spiegeln das rhapsodische Konzertprogramm wieder; vielleicht gehen einige davon sogar auf dieses Programm zurück. Ersichtlich wird das, wenn man bedenkt, dass diese Titel gelegentlich nur relativ kurze Szenen wiedergeben (Τειχοσκοπία, Ὀρκίων σύγχυσις), die nicht unbedingt ausschlaggebend für das Sujet sind (Διάπειρα, Ἑκτορος καὶ Ἀνδρομάχης ὁμιλία, Ἀγαμέμνωνος ἀριστεία²²). Die benannten Episoden liefern größtenteils den leidenschaftlichsten, für die öffentliche Darstellung tauglichsten Erzählstoff.

Nun gehörten zu den homerischen Szenen, welche die Rhapsoden gerne aufführten, zweifelsohne auch die Zentralepisoden der Πατρόκλεια: Wie Patroklos seinen Freund anfleht, wie dieser ihn schließlich in den Kampf schickt, seine Heldentaten und sein Tod – all das ist nicht allein sujetimmanent, sondern gehört zu den dramatischsten Momenten der *Ilias*. Eine der Kernstellen der *Patroklie* ist das Gebet, welches Achilles ausspricht, als die achäischen Schiffe schon brennen und Patroklos mit dem Myrmidonenherr bereit ist, den Feind zurückzudrängen. Die Szene hat dreißig Verse (XIV, 220–249), ist detailliert ausgearbeitet und recht eindrucksvoll. Achilles holt sich aus dem Kasten einen kostbaren Becher, reinigt ihn mit Schwefel und Wasser, wäscht sich die Hände, schöpft den Wein, tritt in die Mitte des Hofes und blickt gen Himmel. Erst dann fängt das Gebet an (233–248): Ζεῦ ἄνα Δωδωναίε Πελασγικὴ τηλόθι ναίων / Δωδώνης μεδέων δυσχειμέρου, ἅμφι δὲ Σελλοὶ / σοὶ ναίουσ' ὑποφῆται ἀνιπτόποδες χαμαιεῦναι κτλ. Das sechzehnzeilige Gebet, das längste bei Homer, wird an den “fern wohnenden dodonischen Zeus, den pelasgischen” gerichtet, den Gott, der “über die frostige Dodona herrscht”, neben dem seine Priester, die Selloi, wohnen, “die auf der nackten Erde schlafenden Orakeldeuter mit ungewaschenen Füßen”. Der Gott habe auch früher schon die Bitte des Betenden erhört und ihm dadurch Ehre erwiesen, dass er die Achäer für Achilles schlug (236–237): ἡμὲν δὴ ποτ' ἐμὸν ἔπος ἔκλυες εὖξαμένοιο, / τίμησας μὲν ἐμέ, μέγα δ' ἵψαο λαὸν Ἀχαιῶν.²³ Möge

²² Wodurch nur der erste Teil des 11. Gesangs beschrieben wird. Die Gespräche im Zelt von Nestor bleiben titellos, für das Sujet sind sie jedoch zentral; s. Schadewaldt 1966, 85–95.

²³ Das ist keine wirkliche Analepse, denn von der früheren Anrede Achills an Zeus Dodonaios erfahren wir erst hier. Dies kann ein rhapsodischer Einschub gewesen sein: Die aufgeführte Einzelszene wird dadurch in Kontext der ganzen *Ilias* gestellt und dem dodonischen Gott die handlungsorientierte Funktion zuerkannt.

Zeus auch Patroklos helfen, der anstelle seines Freundes die Myrmidonen jetzt in die Schlacht führt. Lasse er selbst Hektor erfahren, welch ein mächtiger Krieger Patroklos auch dann ist, wenn er allein kämpft, und nicht bloß seinem Waffengenossen beisteht. Möge der Held samt den ihm anvertrauten Waffen und dem Kriegsvolk unverletzt zurückkehren (238–249). Die Stelle ist derart eigenartig, dass N. Wecklein sie als “die epischste Stelle in unserem Epos” zu bezeichnen wagt. Denn “wie der Gott selbst ist hier alles episch altertümlich, der Becher, welcher in der von der Mutter Thetis mitgegebenen Truhe bewahrt wird und nur für eine Spende an Vater Zeus dient, die Priester Σελλοὶ ἀνιπτόποδες χαμαιεῖναι, welche sozusagen von dem Gottesdienst der ersten Menschen herkommen”.²⁴ Außerdem gab das Gebet, welches Achilles an den dodonischen Zeus adressiert, einem Schauspieler die beste Gelegenheit dazu, durch leidenschaftliche Aufführung die Zuhörer von seinem Talent zu überzeugen. Denn Achilles, der seinen Freund in diesem Kampf nicht beschützen wird, legt nun sein ganzes Herz in sein Gebet hinein. Gerade solche Stücke gehören seit jeher zum klassischen Repertoire der Berufsrezitatoren.

Warum die Rhapsoden ihre Preise in dem weit von ihrer Heimat entfernten Heiligtum von Dodona stifteten, kann unter Berücksichtigung der zitierten *Ilias*-Episode beantwortet werden. Wichtig ist dabei, dass der Gott zu Dodona sowohl zu homerischer Zeit als auch vor und nach dieser gleichermaßen verehrt wurde, wenn auch selbstverständlich mehrheitlich von den Bewohnern Westgriechenlands. Dodona kommt noch im Schiffskatalog, *Il.* II, 750, vor. In der *Odyssee* wird das dodonische Orakel vom Hauptheld zweimal in den gleichlautenden Versen und in ähnlichen Kontexten erwähnt (XIV, 27–31 = XIX, 296–299). Die frühesten Inschriftentäfelchen und Votivgaben von Dodona gehören ins 6. Jh., die Mehrheit der Gaben datiert man ins 5.–4. Jh., d.i. die Zeit von Terpsikles und Klearchos.²⁵ Wenn nun einem Rhapsoden der meisterhafte Vortrag der *Patroklie* den Sieg an dem musischen Wettkampf und somit den Preis eingebracht hat, so konnte er bedenkenlos, ja vielleicht sogar zur Erfüllung eines Gelöbnisses, dem gleichen Gott weihen, den der homerische Achilles anredet.

Die Inschrift von Terpsikles ist nicht der einzige dodonische Weihetext, der implizit auf das Gebet des Achilles zurückverweist. Auf

²⁴ Wecklein 1914, 14–15. Hierzu noch: Cappelletto 1999, 241–252; Quantin 2008, 21 Anm. 86. Warum der letztgenannte Forscher glaubt, Achilles wolle *selbst* in die Schlacht zurückzukehren (“enfin convaincu de la nécessité de combattre lui-même les Troyens, Achille prend une coupe” usw.), ist unerfindlich.

²⁵ Ausführliche Hinweise bei Dieterle 2007, 85–97.

dieselbe Homerstelle wird in der gegen Ende des 4. Jh. v. Chr. datierten Inschrift eines gewissen Agathon, Sohn des Ekhephylos angespielt. Nach dem formelhaften θεός, τύχα läuft der auf der Bronzetafel eingestochene Text folgendermaßen weiter: Ζεῦ Δωδώνης μεδέων, τόδε σοι δῶρον πέμπω παρ' ἑμοῦ Ἀγάθων Ἐχεφύλου καὶ γενεᾶ, πρόξενοι Μολοσσῶν καὶ συμμάχων, ἐν τριάκοντα γενεαῖς ἐκ Τροίας Κασσάνδρας γενεᾶ, Ζακύνθιοι.²⁶ “Zeus, der über Dodona herrscht” gibt die Anrufung des Achilles genau wieder. Dass dies kein Zufall ist,²⁷ sondern eine überlegte Reminiszenz, beweist der seltsame Ursprungshinweis: Agathon meldet voller Stolz, dass sein zakynthisches Geschlecht nicht nur die Mollosser und ihre Verbündeten bewirtete (und mithin in Dodona besonders willkommen sein muss), sondern “dreißig Generationen nach Troja” von Cassandra abstammt.²⁸ Auf die Welt Homers wird mit ἐκ Τροίας verwiesen. Als vermeintlicher Nachkomme der homerischen Heldin erlaubt sich Agathon diese Flüchtigkeit, ja eine gewisse Familiarität. Es sei, meint er, auch seine Welt.

²⁶ Die Übersetzung von Carapanos 1878, I, 41: “Dieu; Fortune. Jupiter souverain de Dodone, je t’envoie ce présent de ma part, moi Agathon, fils d’Échéphylos, et ma famille, proxènes des Molosses et de leurs alliés durant trente générations depuis Troie; génération de Cassandre; Zacynthiens”. Egger 1878, 196–197 schlägt vor, γενεᾶ(ι) Ζακύνθιοι zu lesen. Dieterle 2007, 89 druckt den Text von Egger, versteht jedoch anscheinend Κασσάνδρας als *gen. originis* und ἐν τριάκοντα γενεαῖς ἐκ Τροίας als darauf bezogen (was m.E. syntaktisch schon fraglich wäre). γενεᾶι ist sicherlich möglich, denn für das Iota bleibt nur wenig Platz auf der Tafel übrig; für Abbildung s. Carapanos 1878, II, Taf. 22. Andererseits kann der Graveur den Raum auch richtig berechnet haben. Roberts 1881, 103–104 will γενεᾶ behalten; seine Übersetzung stimmt im Wesentlichen mit der von Carapanos überein: “...we being a family derived from Trojan Cassandra during thirty generations, Zakynthians”.

²⁷ So etwa Dieterle 2007, 89: “Interessant ist die Anrufung des Zeus als Δωδώνης μεδέων – ein Ausdruck, der sich genauso im Gebet des Achill wiederfindet”. Vgl. das ausgewogenere Urteil von Roberts (1881, 103): “The invocation to Ζεὺς as Δωδώνης μεδέων reminds us of the *Iliad* (xvi. 234). This poetical opening, the use of the first person in πέμπω παρ' ἑμοῦ, the position of σοι and the order of the words generally, all mark deviations from the normal type of dedicatory inscriptions”.

²⁸ Was recht merkwürdig ist, bedenkt man, dass sie keine Nachkommen hatte. Nach einer lokalen Geschichte soll Cassandra die Zwillingssöhne von Agamemnon gehabt haben, doch diese wurden gleich mit ihr noch als Säuglinge getötet (Paus. II, 16, 6; dazu: Rathmayr 2000, 26). Egger 1878, 198–199 versucht Κασσάνδρας auf πρόξενοι zu beziehen: Die Vorfahren von Agathon sollen zu trojanischen Zeiten Gastfreunde der Prophetin gewesen sein, welche “était aussi adorée dans le voisinage de Dodone”. Diese äußerst fragliche Deutung hat keine Nachfolger gefunden. Die Inschrift hat einen der bekanntesten modernen Cassandra-Romane, “The Firebrand” von M. Z. Bradley, mitinspiert und wird von der Autorin etwa als Historizitätsnachweis im Postscript zitiert.

Die Weihgabe des Rhapsoden Terpsikles fand mutmaßlich deswegen statt, weil er die *Patroklie* oder einen Teil davon, der den besagten Passus enthielt, sehr stoffgetreu aufführte und dafür belohnt wurde. Es wird daher verständlich, warum Terpsikles, welcher jedes Wort seiner Weihung sorgfältig gewählt zu haben scheint, sie explizit an den dodonischen Zeus richtete und dabei seinen Beruf hervorhob. Auch lässt sich eine Vermutung darüber anstellen, warum er Zeus den Beinamen “Naïos” hinzugefügt hat. Der Kultname wurde vielleicht zu seiner Zeit noch eine Neuigkeit.²⁹ Bemerkenswert ist indes, wie sich in der homerischen Schlüsselstelle das Wort ναῖω wiederholt (ναίων, ναίουσι). Man hat längst eingesehen, dass das “Wohnen” hier betont ist: Die Selloi lagern auf dem Boden, sie sind, wie ihre heilige Eiche und die prophetische Gottheit selbst, an den Ort gebunden.³⁰ Der Rhapsode hielt es für angemessen, die Epiklese zu ergänzen, von der er dachte, sie sei durch die relevanten Verse begründet. Terpsikles meinte, Zeus von Dodona sei wirklich ναῖος, nämlich, gemäß homerischer Schilderung, an diesem entfernten Ort “wohnhaft”.³¹

Abschließend lässt sich eine Vermutung aufstellen, warum das sich auf Dodona beziehende Vorlesungsstück gerade in der Zeit von Terpsikles und Klearchos für die Rezipitoren besonders attraktiv sein konnte. F. Quantin vermutet nicht ohne Grund, dass etwa in der zweiten Hälfte des 5. Jh. der Kult von Dione in Dodona begründet wurde. Als Beweis dient das Papyrusfragment des Archelaos von Euripides (II, 20–23 Austin): Es handelt sich um die Prophezeiung, welche Temenos, die Hauptfigur, von der Priesterin der Dione (τῆς δ' ὁμονύμου Διὸς πρόπολος Διώνης) in Dodona erhielt. Das Stück wird 408/7 datiert.³² Ungefähr zweieinhalb Jahrhunderte später, als die Naia bereits im großen Stil gefeiert wurden und die Tragödienaufführungen im neugebauten prachtvollen Theater miteinschlossen, wurde der euripideische Archelaos dort gespielt (dies ist bezeugt durch die Siegesinschrift aus Tegea: *IG* V, 2, 118).³³ Das geschah zweifelsfrei wegen der Bezugnahme des Oeuvres auf Dodona. Nun

²⁹ Hierzu: Quantin 2008, 21–26.

³⁰ Weniger 1919, 15.

³¹ Die Etymologie des Ναῖος von νάω (‘fließen’), die den großen homerischen Götterherrscher auf einen bescheidenen lokalen Quellgott reduziert (bspw. Kruse 1935, 1586), kann dem Namenszusatz unmöglich zugrunde liegen. Laut herrschender Meinung ist die Epiklese von ναῖω (im mykenischen Griechisch *na-wi-jo*, also ‘wohnen’) abzuleiten; Ζεὺς Ναῖος wird von Quantin richtig als “Zeus Résidant” übersetzt. Dazu: Lhôte 2006, 409; 418–420; für weitere Hinweise s. Quantin 2008, 22.

³² Jouan – Van Looy 1998, 281.

³³ Hierzu: Cabanes 1988, 62–64. Der Weihender hat an den dodonischen Naia noch in dem Achill von Chairemon gespielt, der Tragödie, welche auch eine Verbindung zu Dodona aufweisen konnte.

signalisierte die Gründung des Dione-Kults sowie des Kults von Zeus mit dem Beinamen Ναῖος (hierzu vgl. Soph. F 455 Radt: Δωδώνι ναίων Ζεύς) den Anfang der neuen Blütezeit des dodonischen Heiligtums. Es darf vermutet werden, dass nicht allein die Tragiker, sondern auch die Rhapsoden darauf reagierten, indem sie den sich auf Dodona beziehenden Abschnitt besonders gern vorlasen. Dies wusste ihr frommes Publikum zu schätzen. Als Ergebnis verfügen wir heute über ein, wenn nicht sogar über zwei frühe außerliterarische Zeugnisse, die abermals bestätigen, worin die Aufgabe eines Rhapsoden wirklich bestand.

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The inscription on the rim of a small tripod found during the excavations in the sanctuary of Dodona in 1878, reads: ‘Terpsicles, the rhapsode, dedicated this to Zeus *Naios*’. It is dated by C. Carapanos and A. Kirchhoff into the 5th cent. BC, and can thus be considered the earliest non-literary source on the Homeric rhapsodes. It also served as a proof that the musical festivals were carried on at Dodona as early as the Classical age. However, no winner should necessarily dedicate his prize at the place where he had won it. The evidence proves just the contrary: Hesiod dedicated his tripod, which he won at Chalcis, to the Muses of Helicon, and the inscriptions of the winners at the *Naia* festival celebrated at Dodona since the Hellenistic age are all found elsewhere. Whether Terpsicles competed at Dodona or at some other place better known for its connection with rhapsodic performances, it should be answered why he chose this particular sanctuary, far from his homeland (since he probably was a Milesian), as the most suitable for his donation. The attractiveness of Dodona for rhapsodic offerings might be further confirmed by another votive inscription, that of Klearchos, previously not discussed in the Dodonian context because of its uncertain provenance. What was it, then, that made the Homeric reciters dedicate their awards to the Zeus *Naios* of Dodona? Their ‘concert program’ certainly included the *Patrocleia* and hence the prayer of

Achilles to Ζεὺς Δωδωναῖος. The masterly recitation of this scene could bring them victory. Moreover, the Athenian tragedy reflected the revival of interest in Dodona, caused presumably by the establishment of the cult of Dione and the cult of Zeus Naios. Consequently, the rhapsodes gladly included the prayer of Achilles in their repertoire, and won prizes which they dedicated to the deity whom they also prayed to.

Надпись на ободке треножника, обнаруженного при раскопках Додонского святилища в 1878 г. (*SGDI* 5786 = Lazzarini 142), гласит: “Терпсикл, рапсод, посвятил Зевсу Найосу”. Надпись датирована К. Карапаносом и А. Кирхгофом V в. до н. э. и, таким образом, дает самое раннее эпиграфическое свидетельство о гомеровских рапсодах. Текст привлекался в контексте дискуссии об истории Додоны: надпись Терпсикла использовалась как указание на то, что в додонском святилище уже в классическую эпоху устраивались мусические состязания. Ничто, однако, не побуждало рапсода, как и любого победителя в любых греческих играх, дарить свой приз богам тех мест, где он одержал победу. Гесиод посвятил треножник, полученный в Халкиде, музам на Геликоне. Посвящения победителей, отличившихся на додонском празднике Ναῖα (свидетельства о котором не древнее III в. до н. э.), найдены в Тегее, Сикионе, Приене и на Делосе. Состоялись ли игры в святилище додонского Зевса или в другом, более известном месте проведения рапсодических агонов – требуется понять, почему Терпсикл счел нужным посвятить награду именно в Додоне. О привлекательности Додоны для рапсодов свидетельствует и другая древняя надпись – посвящение рапсода Клеарха (Robert, Coll. Froehner 44, nr. 39), – редко цитируемая исследователями ввиду сомнительности ее додонского происхождения. Между тем новейшая история артефакта позволяет с большой долей вероятности соотнести надпись Клеарха с Додоной. Что побудило рапсодов, один из которых, судя по его имени, происходил из Ионии, дарить свои призы в Додонское святилище, лежащее на окраине греческого мира? Предположительно, их репертуар включал *Патроклию*, а значит и молитву, с которой Ахилл обращается к Додонскому Зевсу (*Il.* 16, 233–248). Мастерское исполнение этой сцены могло принести успех. Оживление интереса поэтов и исполнителей к Додоне в конце V в., связанное, вероятно, с учреждением там культов Зевса Найоса и Дионы, засвидетельствовано папирусным фрагментом “Архелая” Еврипида. Очевидно, и рапсоды, и их публика приветствовали новый расцвет древнего святилища. Чтецы включали в свою “концертную программу” связанный с Додоной сюжет, одерживали победы и приносили дары богу, в чье покровительство они верили.

AND WHAT WERE *YOU* LIKE IN HADES? EUR. *HF* 1410–1417

Θη. οὕτω πόνων σῶν οὐκέτι μνήμην ἔχεις; 1410
 Ηρ. ἅπαντ' ἐλάσσω κείνα τῶνδ' ἔτλην κακά.
 Θη. εἴ σ' ὄψεταιί τις θῆλυν ὄντ' οὐκ αἰνέσει.
 Ηρ. ζῶ σοι ταπεινός; ἀλλὰ πρόσθεν οὐ δοκῶ.
 Θη. ἄγαν γ' · ὁ κλεινός Ἡρακλῆς οὐκ εἶ νοσῶν.
 Ηρ. σὺ ποῖος ἦσθα νέρθεν ἐν κακοῖσιν ὦν; 1415
 Θη. ὥς ἐς τὸ λῆμα παντὸς ἦν ἥσσω ἀνήρ.
 Ηρ. πῶς οὖν ἔτ' εἶπης ὅτι συνέσταλμαι κακοῖς;
 Θη. πρόβαινε.¹

1410–1417 suspectos habet Diggle (1404–1428 iam Wecklein), post 1253 trai. Bond.

Theseus: Have you forgotten your valorous labours so completely?
Heracles: All I suffered is less than this. *Thes.*: If anybody sees you now being womanish, he won't approve. *Her.*: You think I live humbly? But I am sure it wasn't so before (you surely didn't think so just before). *Thes.*: Yes, indeed. Now that you are sick you are no longer Heracles the hero. *Her.*: And what were you like down there, when in trouble? *Thes.*: If you mean courage, I was a coward no one could match. *Her.*: How then can you say I waste myself in sorrows? *Thes.*: Now, let's go.²

Turning to these much-discussed lines again, I hope to prove they do make sense exactly where the tradition has them – or else, at least to argue against the attempted transposition and excision.

¹ In the course of the discussion, I cite Diggle's text every time, if not otherwise mentioned. The apparatus I give here is essentially Diggle's, but made more concise. The three recent editions of *Heracles* – of Diggle (OCT), Lee (Teubner) and Kovacs (Loeb) – virtually unanimously voice doubt.

² This translation differs from D. Kovacs' variant in Loeb on two points – the quality the lack of which Theseus displayed in Hades (was it 'pride' [Kovacs] or, rather, 'courage'?) and his words in 1418. It is Heracles who has the last word, and Theseus rather acknowledges this with "Now, let's go", than commands "March on" (Kovacs).

Theseus arrives with his men to give a helping hand only to find Heracles' family miserably dead and Heracles himself awake from his mental wanderings and mad killings to his real ruinous condition revealed to him by Amphitryon. Rigid with grief, he is resolved to kill himself in a way (he considers three ways) the heroic ἀρετή code demands it.³ On seeing Theseus, whose approach is an obstacle to his immediate will to take his life, he covers his head with his cloak. Theseus, who is quick to grasp the situation, at once sets to talk Heracles out of suicide by first expressing his gratitude for Heracles' recent benefaction in Hades (1221–1222: ἐκεῖς ἀνοιστέον / ὅτ' ἐξέσωσάς μ' ἐς φάος νεκρῶν πάρα ("It goes back to the time when you saved me and brought me back to the light from the dead")) and expanding on true friendship. Heracles pulls (or lets Theseus do it) the cloak off his head, but conventionally (still very much as an epic hero) insists that Theseus keep away from pollution, to which Theseus promptly responds, "friends are not there to avenge".⁴ Heracles, like one gravely ill and no longer responsive to such trifles, waves him off with polite reserve (1235: ἐπήνεσ'· εἶ δὲ δράσας δέ σ' οὐκ ἀναίνομαι).⁵ Theseus goes on working within distinctively unheroic scope of emotions, expressing pity for the (now has been) hero, for whom pity is a novel feeling: "am I pitiable, having killed my children?", Heracles asks.⁶ At this point he does not believe it. Death is the only match for such a deed, but Theseus (at some point afraid that Heracles might be planning another ruinous deed)⁷ does not think so. He touches Heracles to the quick saying that a suicide is a way of an ἐπιτυχόντος ἀνθρώπου, stupidity, devoid of any heroism (these two friends have very different notions of what is

³ Sophocles' Ajax – with all probability an earlier play – is believed to have been on Euripides' mind throughout. Cf. his motive for suicide: ἀλλ' ἢ καλῶς ζῆν ἢ καλῶς τεθνηκέναι / τὸν εὐγενῆ χρῆ (479–480). Ajax lives and 'dies up' to this demanding standard. Euripides' Heracles does not.

⁴ What Theseus means is that he will not be a vehicle for vengeance, it will not come on Heracles through him.

⁵ What does Heracles mean to say? Wilamowitz took these words to mean "ich kann deine ansicht nicht teilen, aber ich danke dir dafür, und wenn du mich gemahnt hast das geschehene ohne murren zu tragen, so lasse ich das wenigstens von deiner rettung gelten" (Wilamowitz ²1895, 251). Bond's "psychological truth" that "a man loves the person he benefits, and gets less love in return" (see Bond 1981, 377) seems to be wide of the mark, needlessly making Heracles even more miserable, a frustrated friend giving himself to friends who just will not appreciate it. These words may simply mean: "Well done, I won't deny that I helped you, [but, seeing what I have done, you cannot hope to help me in your turn]".

⁶ Through M. L. West (see West 1973, 148). It is equally good as an ironic affirmative.

⁷ "Er [Heracles] spricht mit finsterem stoltze", observes Wilamowitz *ad loc.*

heroic), while Heracles is the protector and glory of Hellas (1252, 1254). Heracles retorts that “it is easy to judge when you are not afflicted” (1249), but he is far from unimpressed. He grows to feel pity for himself and going through details of his biography reviews his whole life,⁸ while trying to argumentatively⁹ prove to Theseus that to live has always been hard for him and he is not dying ἀμαθής: ἀβίωτον ἡμῖν νῦν τε καὶ πάροιθεν ὄν (“To live for me was and is unlivable”, 1257). Childishly¹⁰ (rather than rhetorically) exaggerating the number of labours and subdued beasts (1271–1273), Heracles breaks into a long monologue, drawing with bitter irony the sad story of his πολύπονος life to its culmination, the “last and worst labour” – the killing of his wife and children (1279–1280). Along with this, he vividly imagines how, should he live on, people in the street would recognise him and exercise their sharp tongues (1289–1290), and Hera, of whose jealousy he has been an innocent victim, will dance with joy seeing the ἄνδρ’ Ἑλλάδος τὸν πρῶτον (him) and τοὺς εὐεργέτας Ἑλλάδος (again him) perish (1303–1310). At this point, Theseus reminds Heracles that he is a common mortal, and seeing that gods also breed and suffer injustice and crime, it is not for a mortal to defy their lot, but to accept it. Pious (and idealistic) Heracles at the same time refuses to believe that gods are what Theseus says them to be: αἰδῶν οἶδε δύστηνοι λόγοι (“These are the wretched tales of poets”, 1346),¹¹ but he has taken his mind off suicide, not because he is afraid to be called boorish (the “gods do” argument of enlightened Theseus is an irritating πάρεργον), but for fear of being condemned as a coward: μὴ δειλίαν ὄφλω τιν’ ἐκλιπὼν φάος (“so that, having killed myself, I would not bring upon myself the charge of cowardice”, 1348).

Having thus decided to live on and endure the hardships, Heracles breaks into tears and says he is crying for the first time in his whole life (1355–1356). Theseus almost leads him away, when Heracles suddenly wishes to see the bodies of his children once again and embrace his father. This must have brought new tears, for we see Theseus resort to the

⁸ Wilamowitz ²1895, 252: “Es ist das erste was Thes. erreicht, daß Her. überhaupt von sich spricht”.

⁹ Theseus, who throughout this scene must have been afraid, at this point can feel relief, for he, together with Wilamowitz, seems to be quite aware that “Wer mit gründen ficht, wird nicht mehr nach dem impulse der leidenschaft handeln”, see Wilamowitz ²1895, 256.

¹⁰ “See how you’d have managed without me – nohow!”

¹¹ D. Mastronarde offers an attractive explanation of this outburst: “[these words] express a willful (and wishful) rejection, what I would interpret as the psychological reflex of a good man defiantly insisting on imposing an ideal order and morality on experience”. See Mastronarde 1986, 209.

once-so-effective way to brace Heracles up by reminding him of his past valorous deeds. Heracles answers that his former sufferings are nothing compared to this last one. But Theseus is strangely persistent, drawing on *opinio communis* and saying that Heracles is no longer the hero he used to be. It might seem that Heracles would remain indifferent to such words, since he has experienced the vanity of earthly glory to the full. Far from it, he hits back pointedly: σὺ ποῖος ἦσθα νέρθεν ἐν κακοῖσιν ὦν; (1415). Theseus readily admits he behaved cowardly,¹² which is not left unanswered just as well: “why then blame me?”

Such an undignified finale of the tragedy of Heracles (the farewell scene with Amphitryon is very brief: the outcome is clear, there remain only a few arrangements to be made for the burial) leaves the editors at a loss. Wilamowitz (not at a loss)¹³ sees Theseus’ intrusion (1410 ff.) as yet another manifestation of friendship: Theseus cannot suffer to see a prolonged painful leave-taking;¹⁴ the *tu quoque*, in its turn, shows the moral superiority of Heracles who, unlike Theseus, “selbst seinen endgültigen entschluß gefasst hat”. G. Bond finds the scene “petty” and “not edifying”: Heracles is smartly acrimonious, and Theseus displays inhumanity.¹⁵ Since such an exchange coming after the conclusive generous praise of Theseus as friend (and a useful Athenian connection) is uncemely, Bond suggests transposing these verses to the end of suicide stichomythia 1229–1254, arguing that what Theseus says in 1410, 1412 and 1414 is incongruous: “1410–17 *in situ* are primarily an argument about delay <...> He [Theseus] complains not about delay but about the effeminacy of Heracles’ embracing his father and seeing the children once again. <...> This dialogue is barely tolerable if it refers to an excess of (hypothetical) lamentation. It would make good sense if it refers to Heracles’ decision to kill himself”, where after 1253 it “fits well with Theseus’ reproach that Heracles speaks like an ἐπιτυχών and maintains the slightly acrimonious tone of that passage”.¹⁶ Bond never really explains how the transposed lines would fit in the context:

¹² Wilamowitz ²1895, 255: “das leben nimmt sich der erste beste, aber nicht der σοφός, es ist eine dummheit <...> eine gesellschaft, die das individuum so hoch schätzt, opfert eher die ehre als das leben. das sind die verbreiteten keineswegs edlen motive: Herakles zeigt uns freilich unten tiefere und wahrhaft sittliche”.

¹³ Wilamowitz ²1895, 279: “Thes. wendet den streit so, daß der kranke freund zum schein recht behält, aber an den aufbruch mit erfolg gemahnt wird”. Theseus may not be so omniscient, and Heracles may well be right, though.

¹⁴ Wilamowitz ²1895, 279: “er will dem freunde den peinlichen abschied kürzen”. Bond, *ad loc.*, argues against this “psychological” explanation.

¹⁵ Bond 1981, 417.

¹⁶ Bond 1981, 418.

Θη. εἴρηκας ἐπιτυχόντος ἀνθρώπου λόγους.
 Ηρ. σὺ δ' ἐκτὸς ὧν γε συμφορᾶς με νουθετεῖς.
 Θη. ὁ πολλὰ δὴ τλὰς Ἡρακλῆς λέγει τάδε; 1250
 Ηρ. οὐκ οὖν τοσαυτά γ' ἐν μέτρῳ μοχθητέον.
 Θη. εὐεργέτης βροτοῖσι καὶ μέγας φίλος;
 Ηρ. οἱ δ' οὐδὲν ὠφελοῦσί μ', ἀλλ' Ἡρα κρατεῖ.
 < Θη. οὕτω πόνων σῶν οὐκέτι μνήμην ἔχεις; 1410
 Ηρ. ἅπαντ' ἐλάσσω κεῖνα τῶνδ' ἔτλην κακά.
 Θη. εἴ σ' ὄψεται τις θῆλυν ὄντ' οὐκ αἰνέσει.
 Ηρ. ζῶ σοι ταπεινός; ἀλλὰ πρόσθεν οὐ δοκῶ.
 Θη. ἄγαν γ' ὁ κλεινός Ἡρακλῆς οὐκ εἰ νοσῶν.
 Ηρ. σὺ ποῖος ἦσθα νέρθεν ἐν κακοῖσιν ὧν;
 Θη. ὡς ἐς τὸ λῆμα παντὸς ἦν ἥσσω ἀνήρ.
 Ηρ. πῶς οὖν ἴξ' εἴπῃς ὅτι συνέσταλμαι κακοῖς; >
 Θη. οὐκ ἄν <σ> ἀνάσχοιθ' Ἑλλὰς ἀμαθίᾳ θανεῖν. 1254

Theseus, seeing that the argument ‘this is stupid’ (he himself thinks it to be a gross stupidity) leaves Heracles cold, decides to remind him that he is the much-enduring hero and friend of man (1250, 1252). Heracles does not deny it, but says, “there should be a limit to suffering”, adding bitterly that those for whom he performed his labours are of little benefit now. How could Theseus after such words still insist that Heracles is forgetful of his labours? He is in fact very much aware of them and will shortly be enumerating them, saying that they have been in vain, not simply repeating that his former sufferings are nothing compared to this last one. Moreover, 1412 sits ill in this context: why should Heracles wishing death be womanish (soft)?¹⁷ If he is already weeping, there should be something to that effect in the text, but there is nothing until 1353–1356, when Heracles, having just decided ἐγκαρτερήσω βίοντον (1351),¹⁸ complains: ἀτὰρ πόνων δὴ μυρίων ἐγευσάμην· / ὧν οὐτ' ἀπείπον οὐδέν' οὐτ' ἀπ' ὀμμάτων /

¹⁷ Certainly not because with Euripides suicide is often the way of a woman. However, with the exception of Phaedra, who hangs herself in misery, and Medea, who, though in pain and incision, ends superhuman and triumphant, Euripidean females (Euadne, Macaria, Iphigenia, Polyxena, Cassandra, even Alcestis) face death heroically and manfully.

¹⁸ βίοντον Wecklein, Palmer, Wilamowitz : θάνατον L : πότμον Heimsoeth, Wecklein thus adding yet another instance to the repository of ‘polar’ errors. Is the reading of L so easily expendable? After Wilamowitz (who did not, however, think it to be ‘polar’, but rather based on the vulgar notion that to die is the worst thing ever) and his powerful assertion “man vermißt in der ganzen rede die praecise äußerung des entschlusses zu leben. somit war θάνατον in βίοντον zu ändern. das ist keine schreibfehler: da hat vielmehr die gemeine menschenansicht geändert, die es zwar für schwer hält zu sterben, aber nicht begreift, daß zu leben unendlich viel schwerer ist”

ἔσταξα πηγᾶς, οὐδ' ἄν ὥμην ποτὲ / ἐς τοῦθ' ἰκέσθαι, δάκρυ' ἅπ' ὀμμάτων βαλεῖν (“Although I experienced numerous labours, I never wearied, nor did tears ever gush forth from my eyes, and I never thought I would be reduced to shedding tears”, 1353–1356). At 1253, before his great speech on labours (1255–1310) and final succumbing to Theseus (1351), his eyes seem to have been dry. When in 1204 Amphitryon asks Heracles to uncover his head and talk to Theseus, he goes down on his knees and, making his supplication more poignant, says that he is crying: βάρος ἀντίπαλον δακρύοις συναμιλλᾶται / ἰκετεύομεν... πολλὸν / δάκρυον ἐκβάλων· ἰὼ παῖ, κατὰ-/σχεθε λέοντος ἀγρίου θυμόν (“The weight [of my grief] wrestling against [your grief] is helped by tears; I beg you, an old man as I am shedding tears, please, child, subdue your savage spirit of a lion [and cry together with me]”).¹⁹ Would Amphitryon,

(see Wilamowitz ²1895, 273) βίοντον is accepted straight into the text by all the recent editors. Following in the steps of Nauck, who read [ὑποστῆναι βέλος] ἐγκαρτερήσων θάνατον, and Bremer, who simply, and reasonably, believes ἐγκαρτερήσω θάνατον to mean “ich werde der Versuchung des Todes nicht erliegen” (see Bremer 1977, 199), J. Gibert defends the ms. reading on the grounds that “the change requires attributing to the word [ἐγκαρτερεῖν] a meaning that it did not have in the fifth century”, but taking θάνατον one step further to mean “an opponent”: “Heracles pictures a face-to-face combat in which he must prove his courage; his adversary, as in some of his mythical exploits, is Death itself, and Heracles must “endure”, that is, withstand him. <...> the commonplace “endure life” is unendurably banal compared to Euripides’ expression”. See Gibert 1995, 140, expanded in Gibert 1997. But is not this ‘braving Death again’ a trifle too much for a man who has recently killed his wife and children in a fit of mad bravery? Despite this, the ms. reading θάνατον is indeed defensible and yields the satisfactory “I will be strong against death”.

¹⁹ The turn of phrase is wrought, but the idea is clear: “See, your aged father is down on his knees and in tears, begging you!” Wilamowitz believes that Heracles is crying too, explaining in the commentary: “Amph. sagt also: καὶ ἐνθάδε βάρος ἐστὶν ἰσόρροπον τοῖς σοῖς δακρύοις· ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ ἰκέτης εἰμὶ καὶ δακρύω καὶ αὐτός”, and translating: “Schämst du der Thränen dich? schau mein Flehen, wiegt es nicht mehr als die Scham?” (see Wilamowitz ²1895, I, 255; II, 246–247). Murray prints in his OCT βάρος ἀντίπαλον, δακρύοις συναμιλλᾶται, which is unintelligible, though in his *app. crit.* he lists Hermann’s δακρύοισι ἀμιλλᾶται “quod si verum, hiat oratio, supplendaque ex. gr. σοῖσι τάδ’ ἀμέτερά”, intending the meaning to be the same as Wilamowitz’ “my tears against your tears”. J. Jackson suggested to alter the order and put the ‘teary’ lines together: δάκρυον ἐκβάλλον / βάρος ἀντίπαλον δακρύοις ἴν’ ἀμιλλᾶται (see Jackson 1941, 182 n. 2), thus achieving the desired clarity (Heracles is crying): “the counterpoise to the tears of Hercules is the tear of Amphitryon and no omission [Murray] need be postulated”. Bond, following M. L. West’s “His [Amphitryon’s] physical weight and his tears combine to press home his appeal” (see West 1973, 147), explains neatly: “he [Amph.] is using them [tears] as an aid in his contest against Heracles”. He pays little attention to whether Heracles is crying at this point too, or not.

who is evidently very much afraid of his son, be speaking of “the savage spirit”,²⁰ seeing Heracles already reduced to tears? Heracles most certainly begins to cry only when he has overcome his suicidal despair in 1351.²¹ Before that, the tears would have been out of keeping with his mood.

The exchange of 1413–1414 “You think I live humbly?”²² But I am sure it wasn’t so before. – Yes, indeed. Now that you are sick you are no longer Heracles the hero” is hardly tolerable in its new context. At that time Heracles spurns life, it has been ἀβίωτον (1257) for him, while the words “But I am sure it wasn’t so before” ring with hurt pride of a person far from uninterested in life and its attractions. What is more, Theseus, now so willingly acknowledging Heracles’ “lapse from heroism”, was busy proving the opposite in 1250, 1252, and will go on promising a carefree life in Athens and posthumous honours (1332–1333). As for the *tu quoque* repartee, Bond tentatively suggests it being caused by a “rebuke (?) by Theseus that Heracles is ‘reduced’ by his woes <...> [with Heracles] stung perhaps by the repeated argument and the sanctimonious tone”,²³ as well as by his general “slightly acrimonious” mood of σὺ δ’ ἐκτὸς ὧν γε συμφορᾶς με νουθετεῖς. But the weight these words carry is unequal: “it’s easy to judge when the sorrow is not your own” is a natural (and neutral) reaction of a person whose overwhelming grief is measured by somebody else, be it even a close friend. At that point (1249) Heracles might not even remember that Theseus acted cowardly at some time in the past. He remembers that he saved him in Hades, as well as he remembers the whole multitude of his own (useless) labours. “And what were you like in Hades?” is, on the contrary, a calculated vigorous blow²⁴ dealt by one who is no longer absorbed in attempting suicide. Equally so, Theseus may venture (he is evidently relieved) his ὁ κλεινὸς Ἡρακλῆς οὐκ εἶ νοσῶν only when Heracles has grown more stable and resolved to live (the emphatic proud ἐσκεψάμην of 1347, the point of no return, is turned

²⁰ Kovacs’ remark ad v. 1213 “Heracles keeps an obdurate silence” is good and reflects the hero’s mute with grief state (Kovacs 1998, 431).

²¹ Bond *ad loc.*: “Tears at 1354 are introduced as abruptly as the labours were at 1353. Kroeker is surely right in explaining them as a Sophoclean reminiscence”. But why should such a powerful scene be written off as a reminiscence?

²² Bond takes ζῶ to be deliberative subjunctive meaning “Am I to live on in humility” which suits (at a stretch) the suicide context of 1250 ff. more than the indicative.

²³ Bond 1981, 418.

²⁴ Both dramatically and psychologically pointed. The plot offers ample material for tragic irony in which Euripides, often not without *Schadenfreude*, indulges. τίνων δ’ ἀμοιβὰς ὧν ὑπῆρξεν Ἡρακλῆς / σῶσας με νέρθεν, ἦλθον (1169–1170), says Theseus on arrival.

as an expression of his own free will, but Theseus has done his bit too) and his condition can no longer be aggravated by this homely truth. Any transposition of the kind suggested by Bond would thus ruin the carefully crafted and psychologically truthful representation of the emotional lability²⁵ of the newly regained assertive readiness to fight against odds (1349–1352, then at 1382–1385 firmly stepping back into life again, keeping his weapons and asking Theseus to help with Cerberus), but repeatedly slipping back into despair (1367–1382, again at 1406–1417²⁶) and finally regaining resolution (1418 ff.).

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²⁵ Reviewing Bond, D. Mastronarde suggests that “the dramatic point of the passage is to display the common humanity of Theseus and Heracles and to show that judging and learning can work both ways – there can be no facile judgement of the proper amount of tears of grief nor of how ‘low’ a hero may feel and act. Theseus has ‘cured’ Heracles by reminding him of his bravery, but in this scene Heracles reasserts that he cannot just return to the status quo ante in his feelings of self-sufficiency. The fact that the argument used to ‘cure’ Heracles at 1250 recurs in a failing effort at 1410 is not a problem, but a deliberate effect ... which underscores the lability of man’s understanding of his place in the world” (Mastronarde 1983, 111–112). Cf. a rather indiscriminating retelling of this scene in Garrison 1995, 75–76.

²⁶ Diggle most probably suspects these lines to be an (actors’) interpolation, hence *suspectos habet* of his apparatus. D. L. Page, however (in *Heracles* heavily relying on the opinion of Wilamowitz), does not even discuss this scene among the interpolations in the play.

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The much-maligned lines Eur. HF 1410–1417 are treated in this article as a psychologically veritable conclusion – should we not wish to follow N. Wecklein and bluntly round off at 1404 – of the Amphitryon–Heracles–Theseus scene in which they are most at home where the tradition has them, at the very end, and not, as G. Bond would attempt to prove, immediately after 1253. Along the way to 1417 certain minor critical comments are offered.

В статье предпринята попытка опровергнуть предложенную Г. Бондом транс-позицию ст. Eur. HF 1410–1417. Стремясь спасти стихи, которые издатели считают неподлинными, Бонд предлагает перенести их из конца трагедии, где они создают “диссонанс”, в конец стихомифии 1229–1253, что, на наш взгляд, нарушает психологически достоверное развитие этой важной для трагедии сцены.

ON THE “UNDYING OLD AGE” OF CLEONICUS (MATRO FR. 7 O.–S.)*

This article discusses an enigmatic bit of parody by Matro of Pitane (4th–3rd cc. BC) transmitted at Athenaeus 15. 697 f – 698 a.

Matro fr. 7 O.–S. (= Lloyd-Jones – Parsons *SH* 540; Brandt fr. 6):

- 1 οἱ μὲν γὰρ δὴ πάντες, ὅσοι πάρος ἦσαν ἄριστοι,
- 2 Εὐβοίος τε καὶ Ἑρμογένης δῖοί τε Φίλιπποι,
- 3 οἱ μὲν δὴ τεθνᾶσι καὶ εἰν Ἀΐδαο δόμοισιν.
- 4 ἔστι δέ τις Κλεόνικος, ὃς **ἀθάνατον** λάχε **γῆρυν**,
- 5 οὔτε πονητάων ἀδαήμων οὔτε θεάτρων,
- 6 ᾧ καὶ τεθνειῶτι λαλεῖν πόρε Φερσεφόνεια.

4 ὃς ἀθάνατον λάχε γῆρυν Stadtmüller, Casaubono ducente: ὃν ἀθάνατον λάχε γῆρας **ACE**: ὃν ἀθάνατος λάχε γῆρυς Stadtmüller: ὃς ἀθάνατον λάχε γῆρας Brunck¹

For all who were outstanding men of old,
Euboeus and Hermogenes and the brilliant Philips,
they are dead and in the house of Hades;
but there is a certain Cleonicus, who has got **an immortal voice**,
a man unknown neither to poets nor to audiences,
to whom Persephone has given the ability to chatter even after he is dead.

My questions are: what appears to be more convincing in line 4, the manuscript reading ἀθάνατον γῆρας or the emendation ἀθάνατον γῆρυν? And in consequence: what does the puzzling expression ἀθάνατον γῆρας mean? Did Cleonicus pass away, like his fellows Euboeus, Hermogenes, and two Philips, or is he still alive? Why is the most detailed characterization given to Cleonicus?

* My thanks go to B. Seidensticker, who read this article in draft and made helpful comments, and to S. D. Olson for stylistic improvements.

¹ The *apparatus criticus* for line 4, which is important for my argument, and the translation I offer, are those of S. D. Olson and A. Sens (1999, 70–71). See the commentary by P. Brandt (1888, 95) and the recent and comprehensive commentary by Olson and Sens (1999, 151–153).

We should begin by looking at the versions of fr. 7, 4 in various editions:

ὄν ἀθάνατον λάχε γῆρας Pelzer 1855, Meineke 1859, Kaibel 1890, Gulick 1951;

ὅς ἀθάνατον λάχε γῆρας Casaubon 1597, Brunck 1772, Schweighäuser 1802;

ὄν ἀθάνατος λάχε γῆρυσ Brandt 1888;

ὅς ἀθάνατον λάχε γῆρυν SH 540 (Lloyd-Jones – Parsons 1983), Olson–Sens 1999; Olson 2012.

Brandt approved and accepted into his edition Stadtmüller’s ὄν ἀθάνατος λάχε γῆρυσ, which is clearer and fits better with λαλεῖν (Brandt: “egregie emendavit”)² than does the odd reading ὄν ἀθάνατον λάχε γῆρας in Athenaeus.

Lloyd-Jones and Parsons³ and Olson and Sens⁴ prefer Stadtmüller’s ὅς ἀθάνατον λάχε γῆρυν (“almost certainly right”),⁵ with Casaubon’s ὅς in the subordinate clause. On this reading of the text, the verses become flattering praise of Cleonicus. Scholars have attempted to give an ironic sound to the verses. Already Brandt, who was sure that Matro was mocking a rival (“Cleonicum quendam insectetur adversarium artis-que suae aemulum”),⁶ assumed that the joke consisted in the fact that Cleonicus was unknown (ἔστι δέ τις) and too garrulous (λαλεῖν); he understood γῆρυσ as ‘loquacity’: “cui vox, i.e. loquacitas non interitura contigit”.⁷ Lloyd-Jones and Parsons (SH 540) also seem to take the verses with a pinch of salt, giving γῆρυσ the same meaning: “Horum optimi jam diem obierunt; restat unus, in aeternum **garrulus**, **cui maledicunt** tam poetae, quam auditores”. The translation by Olson and Sens is in the same vein, but with no explicit irony.

The word γῆρυσ, however, can scarcely have the meaning ‘loquacity’.⁸

It therefore seems better to return to the manuscript reading or to the text as emended by Casaubon ὄν / ὅς ἀθάνατον λάχε γῆρας (“who(m)

² Brandt 1888, 95.

³ Lloyd-Jones – Parsons 1983 (henceforth SH).

⁴ Olson–Sens 1999, 70; Olson 2012, 180.

⁵ Olson–Sens 1999, 152.

⁶ Brandt 1888, 56.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 95.

⁸ According to *LSJ* and *Diccionario Grieco-Español* (Adrados 1994), γῆρυσ is ‘voice, speech’, γῆρῶν ‘to sing or say, speak, cry’. According to *Lfgre*, it is attested only once in early Greek epic poetry, at *Il.* 4. 437 in the meaning of ‘voice’: ὥς Τρώων ἀλαλητὸς ἀνὰ στρατὸν εὐρὺν ὀρώρει / οὐ γὰρ πάντων ἦεν ὁμὸς θρόος οὐδ’ ἰα γῆρυσ.

too old an age reached”). The interpretation offered by Schweighäuser is particularly convincing: “Nobis prorsus videbatur, ridentem Matronem de illo homine dixisse, **ad extremam usque senectutem adeo esse loquacem, ut post mortem quoque loqui non desiturus videatur**. Atque etiam de molesta et tumultuosa loquacitate verba fecerat Clearchus, quum istos Matronis versus adponeret. Et Matron ipse, cum ait ἔστι δέ τις, satis significare videtur, non admodum nobilem hominem esse, quem dicat”.⁹ Ch. B. Gulick’s, A. Rimedio’s and C. Friedrich’s translations are in the same vein.¹⁰

I would like to suggest an additional argument supporting the manuscript text *resp.* Casaubonus’ change in it.

Matro’s hexameters in fr. 7 have the character of a *cento*: verses 1, 3, 5, 6 are almost purely Homeric,¹¹ while verse 2 has nothing to do with Homer because it consists of non-Homeric names. Homeric *versus detorti* can be identified for all these lines except line 4 after ἔστι δέ τις:¹²

1. οἱ μὲν γὰρ δὴ πάντες, ὅσοι πάρος ἦσαν ἄριστοι *Il.* 11. 825 = 16. 23
2. δῖοί τε *Il.* 10. 429; *Od.* 19. 177
3. εἰ δ’ ἤδη τεθνᾶσι καὶ εἰν Ἀΐδαο δόμοισιν *Il.* 22. 52; *Od.* 15. 350
4. ἔστι δέ τις *Il.* 2. 811; 11. 711, 722; *Od.* 3. 293; 4. 844
5. οὐ γάρ τι πληγέων ἀδαήμων οὐδὲ βολάων *Od.* 17. 283
6. τῷ καὶ τεθνηῶτι νόον πόρε Περσεφόνεια *Od.* 10. 494

I suggest a possible source of Matro’s ὄν ἀθάνατον λάχε γῆρας in line 4 in a recurrent pattern, marked by J. B. H. Hainsworth as a formula in his commentary on the *Odyssey*.¹³ The following versions are preserved:

- ...ἄγῆρων ἀθάνατόν/ἀθανάτην τε *Il.* 2. 447; *HH, In Cer.* 242
 ...ἄγῆρω τ’ ἀθανάτω τε *Il.* 12. 323; 17. 444

⁹ Schweighäuser 1802, 305.

¹⁰ Gulick 1951, 241: “All who were aforetime the bravest, Euboeus and Hermogenes and the godlike Philips, they all are dead and dwell in the halls of Hades. But there is one Cleonicus, **to whose lot undying old age has fallen**. Well acquainted with poets and with audiences, to whom, even when dead, Persephone gave the gift of gabble”; Rimedio 2001, 1799: “Ma vive un tale Cleonico, che **ebbe in sorte vecchiaia immortale**, non inesperto di poeti né di spettatori: a lui anche morto concesse di ciarlare Persefone”; Friedrich 2001, 508: “Doch da ist einer, Kleonikos, der **ein unsterbliches Alter** erlost hat...”.

¹¹ Matro uses the technique of *cento*: e.g., fr. I. 19–21 are almost entirely *cento* (Ermolaeva 2015, 119–141).

¹² Brandt 1888, 93; Olson–Sens 1999, 70–71.

¹³ Hainsworth 1988, 272–273, 267–268.

...ἄθάνατον καὶ ἀγήραον ἡματα πάντα *Il.* 5. 136, 7. 257, 23. 336

ἄθανάτους ὄντας καὶ ἀγήρως ἡματα πάντα *Il.* 7. 94

...ἄθανάτους καὶ ἀγήρως ἡματα πάντα *Il.* 8. 539

ἄθάνατόν κέν τοι καὶ ἀγήραον ἡματα πάντα *HH, In Cer.* 242

ἡ μὲν γὰρ βροτός ἐστι, σὺ δ' ἄθάνατος καὶ ἀγήρως *Od.* 5. 218

ἡ μὲν ἔην θνητή, αἱ δ' ἄθάνατοι καὶ ἀγήρῳ *Hes. Th.* 277

This formula, especially in the *clausula* σὺ δ' ἄθάνατος καὶ ἀγήρως, might be the source of Matro's line 4: ..., ὃν ἄθάνατον λάχε γήρας (○ – ○ ○ – ○ ○ – ×).

But if ὃν/ὃς ἄθάνατον λάχε γήρας is right, what does this odd expression mean?

Matro could have used the widespread Homeric formula “undying and not old aged” to produce the idiosyncratic phrase “undying old age”, which means simply “a very long old age”.¹⁴ Expressed in such a paradoxical way, this exaggerating hyperbole fits the style of parody better than the ordinary compliment “undying voice” does, provided that the character of the parody can be briefly summarized with Wilamowitz' words: “Es störte sie (sc. Hörer) nicht, wenn's auch Unsinn war, denn lachen kann man auch über Unsinn”.¹⁵

Line 5 οὐτε πονητῶν ἀδαήμων οὐτε θεάτρων does not contradict this interpretation and might in fact have expressed another aspect of the joke, perhaps with a touch of reprimand or even blame.

The adjective ἀδαήμων with *gen. rei* has an active meaning ἄπειρος, ἀνεπιστήμων (*Etym. Magn.* s.v.), ‘unknowing’, ‘ignorant’ (*LSJ*⁹) of something (e.g. *Od.* 5. 634 μάχης ἀδαήμονι φωτί), like δαήμων with *gen. rei* ‘knowing’, ‘experienced’ in something. The adjective ἀδαήμων with *gen. personae* is attested more rarely, e.g., *Pind.* fr. 198 a 2 οὐτοί με ξένον / οὐδ' ἀδαήμονα Μοισᾶν ἐπαίδευσαν κλυταί / Θῆβαι...

Some differences accordingly arise among the existing interpretations. Lloyd-Jones and Parsons interpret it in the **passive** sense and *in malam partem*: “horum optimi iam diem obierunt; restat unus, in aeternum garulus, **cui maledicunt tam poetae quam auditores**” (*SH* 540). Gulick

¹⁴ It can be also a hint to the popular motive “undying old age” of Tithonus (e.g., *Sappho P. Köln* 21351). There are examples of Matro's *vis parodica* proving that he could use such or similar literary techniques, amusingly reusing Homeric formulas (Olson–Sens 1999, 33–40); for a thorough analysis of meaning and comic effects of parodic elements in Greek literature, see Degani 1983, in particular 5–33. On Matro's reuse of Homeric formulae, see Degani 1991, 147–163. On typology and patterns of parody in Matro, see also Condello 2002, 133–150.

¹⁵ See in Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1962, 331 (= 1923, 175).

assumes that it has an **active** meaning and adds an ironic remark: “Whoever Cleonicus was, he is here mockingly said to be acquainted with the theatre, **back stage and front**”.¹⁶

Olson and Sens’ commentary suggests what some might take to be over-interpretation, since they suppose a complex allusion to Homer, but their interpretation actually seems quite plausible: “Verse 5 is modeled on *Od.* 17. 283, where the disguised Odysseus tells Eumaeus that his bitter experiences in war and in the seas have accustomed him to being struck and pelted with missiles. There is thus a mocking implication that Cleonicus’ poetry is so bad that objects were thrown at him as well as in the theater”.¹⁷ In this case, Cleonicus’ professional reputation in v. 5 can also be interpreted *in malam partem*.

Finally, had Cleonicus already passed away, like his famous colleagues, or is he still alive?¹⁸

The most obvious way of interpreting line 6 ᾧ καὶ τεθνειῶτι λαλεῖν πόρε Φερσεφόνεια might seem to be that Cleonicus too is already dead.¹⁹ This appears to have been one of the motivations for Stadtmüller’s emendation γῆρον and of its wide acceptance.

There are two objections, however, to this understanding. First, in v. 4 Cleonicus (ἔστι δέ) is clearly opposed to the dead poets in v. 3 (οἱ μὲν). Second, Cleonicus’ old age would be irrelevant if he had already died.

¹⁶ Gulick 1951, 241.

¹⁷ Olson–Sens 1999, 152.

¹⁸ Euboeus is presumably Euboeus of Paros (*fl.* c. 359–336 BC). Athenaeus knew four books of his parodies (15. 698 a–b), only two lines of which have come down to us (*SH* 411; 412); additional testimonia regarding Eubeus are discussed in Olson–Sens 1999, 10. Others – Hermogenes, two Philips and Cleonicus – are only names for us, because their texts are completely lost (Olson–Sens 1999, 151–152 note how common these names were in the 4th c. BC). Matro praises as ἄριστοι those who passed away. At first sight, it seems that his hexameters do not belong to gastronomic parodies like his *Symposium Atticum* (fr. 1 O.–S.) and all other surviving fragments (fr. 2–6 O.–S.). Alternatively, we might assume that gastronomic parody could include passages of a personal character or even invective against the author’s colleagues, contemporary rivals or predecessors, as Old Comedy did. Note for example an anonymous hexametrical parody fragment of the 4th BC with similar content, *Adespota parod.* fr. 6 O.–S. = *incert.* fr. 4 Brandt, ap. Ath. 13. 571 b: οὗς ἐδίδαξαν ἀριστερὰ γράμματα Μοῦσαι, “Whom the Muses taught left-handed letters” (Olson–Sens 1999, 155).

¹⁹ Olson–Sens 1999, 152: “The point of the μὲν–δέ contrast in vv. 3–4 is that, whereas Euboeus and other poets of the recent past are now confined to the ‘house of Hades’ and thus permanently out of contact with the upper world, Cleonicus’ voice continues to be heard, despite the fact that he too is dead (v. 6)”. An anonymous reviewer suggests: “Or perhaps, the point is a contrast between poets whose works ‘died with them’ and someone like Cleonicus, who left poems behind to be read by others”.

Consequently, it is worth considering the possibility that he is still alive. Irony and invective directed against a contemporary person is apparently more biting and laughable than when the target is dead. Matro seems to follow Old Comedy here.²⁰ If Cleonicus, perhaps Matro’s opponent, is alive, the punning parody of him, modelled on Homeric patterns, recalls moments when a comic poet praises the older generation of poets and blames his contemporaries;²¹ for example, lines 551–560 of the parabasis of the second *Clouds*.

Granted that Cleonicus is still alive, line 6 may imply that he is so long-lived that he should be dead long ago, and he is so garrulous that even death will be unable to shut him up (while the ἄριστοι, like Euboeus, Hermogenes and the godlike Philips, are dead and silent).²²

Comparison with Ar. *Eq.* 533 ff. ἀλλὰ γέρων ὦν περιέρρει ... (snide remarks about Aristophanes’ rival Cratinus, who has allegedly had the misfortune to live past his prime, thus embarrassing himself) might be productive for imagining what Matro is saying about Cleonicus.

The verb λαλεῖν is to be interpreted here *in malam partem* ‘endless talking’, ‘babbling’, ‘not speaking to the point’, as it is often the case in the comic dramatists²³ (e.g., in Eup. fr. 116 K.–A. λαλεῖν ἄριστος, ἀδυνατώτατος λέγειν; in Aristophanes’ *Frogs* 91 in regard to new poets who compose tragedies Εὐριπίδου πλεῖν ἢ σταδίῳ λαλίστερα; in Theophrastus’ *Character* 7 *Lalias*, etc.)

Cleonicus obtains a gift from Persephone like Teiresias. But unlike Teiresias, Cleonicus receives loquacity, not insight: verse 6 is modeled on τῷ καὶ τεθνηῶτι νόον πόρε Περσεφόνηια (*Od.* 10. 494) with λαλεῖν instead of νόον.

It seems that, if Cleonicus composed his own epitaph, it might be similar to that of Meleager, who later wrote (*AP* 7. 417. 7–10):

πουλυετής δ’ ἐχάραξα τάδ’ ἐν δέλτοισι πρὸ τύμβου·
γῆρως γὰρ γείτων ἐγγύθεν Ἰάιδεω.
ἀλλὰ με τὸν λαλιὸν καὶ πρεσβύτην σὺ προσειπὼν
χαίρειν εἰς γῆρας καὐτὸς ἵκοιο λάλον.

²⁰ See, e.g., *Vilification and Ridicule of Individuals* in Dover 1974, 30–33.

²¹ E.g., Ar. *Ra.* 72–97: Οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐκέτ’ εἰσὶν, οἱ δ’ ὄντες κακοί...

²² Nina Almazova suggested a rather witty interpretation in her discussion of the text (emphasis hers): “Presumably Matro speaks of Cleonicus’ conditions metaphorically: he mockingly claims that – since a person *cannot* live that long – actually his rival is already dead, and if in spite of this he can still be seen in the theatres and goes on with his performances, it is only because of a special favour of Persephone”.

²³ See Ussher 1993, 82.

“Here Meleager characterizes himself as an old man who is still a charming ‘chatterer’, i.e. singer...; and adapts the traditional χαῖρε-formula to wish the reader / passer-by similarly ‘garrulus’ old age”.²⁴

In sum: I defend the manuscript reading γῆρας *versus* the emendation γῆρυν accepted in recent editions of Athenaeus and Matro of Pitane. The exaggerating hyperbole “undying old age”, which perhaps means “a very long old age”, seems to be an adaptation of the Homeric formula “undying and not old aged”, which fits the style of parody better than the ordinary compliment “undying voice”.

If we accept that fr. 7 is devoted to Matro’s fellow parodists, the text could be used as evidence for parody performances or competitions held at theatres in his time.²⁵ This in turn increases the value of the verses as testimony for relations among parodists attested by parody itself.

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F. Condello, “Note al Convivium Atticum di Matrone (fr. 1 O.–S. = SH 534)”, *Eikasmós* 13 (2002) 133–150.
E. D. Degani, *Poesia parodica greca* (Bologna ²1983).

²⁴ See the commentary by N. Hopkinson 1999, 257.

²⁵ A question arises as to what the audience of parody was. R. B. Cebrián, for instance, argues that parody was composed mostly by young authors and for a young audience (Cebrián 2008, 38–42). This seems to me a dubious approach and Matro’s fr. 7, for instance, interpreted this way, and provides arguments against it.

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- U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, “*Leserfrüchte* 171–180”, *Hermes* 58 (1923) 57–86 = id., *Leserfrüchte und Verwandtes. Kleine Schriften* IV, besorgt von K. Latte (Berlin 1962) 314–342.

The author defends the manuscript reading γῆρας *versus* the emendation γῆρυν accepted in recent editions of Athenaeus and Matro of Pitane. The exaggerating hyperbole “undying old age”, which likely means “a very long old age”, seems to be an adaptation of the Homeric formula “undying and not old aged” that fits parodic style better than the ordinary compliment “undying voice” would.

Автор статьи предлагает дополнительные аргументы в пользу рукописного чтения γῆρας, которому в последних изданиях Матрона из Питаны и Афиней (единственный источник, сохранивший стихи Матрона) предпочитают исправление γῆρυν. Парадоксальная гипербола “бессмертная старость”, по мнению автора, должна относиться к глубокому старику и подчеркивать необычную и нелепую для такого возраста говорливую активность персонажа, которого высмеивает Матрон. Complimentary же чтение “бессмертный голос” плохо согласуется с жанром пародии и подошло бы скорее энкомию.

PLATONE E GLI ELEATI (I)

Quale sia l'atteggiamento di Platone verso gli Eleati e quanto la sua filosofia sia indebitata con quella eleatica, può essere indagato in due modi, partendo cioè da ciò che Platone dice esplicitamente circa Parmenide e gli Eleati, oppure cercando analogie fra la filosofia di Platone e quello che noi sappiamo da altre fonti circa la filosofia eleatica.¹ Entrambi i modi sono legittimi ed è anzi doveroso condurre l'indagine da entrambi i punti di vista. Partiamo dunque da quello che Platone esplicitamente dice circa gli Eleati.

I dialoghi da analizzare sono essenzialmente due, il *Parm.* e il *Soph.*: nel primo sono presenti addirittura Parmenide e Zenone, nel secondo (così come nel *Pol.*, che però non si concentra su problematiche eleatiche) un anonimo ξένος Ἐλεάτης, che afferma di essere stato allievo, in gioventù, di Parmenide (*Soph.* 216 a; 237 a). Nel *Parm.* si narra che il filosofo di Elea, all'età di circa 65 anni, venne ad Atene assieme al più giovane seguace Zenone, ove ebbe una conversazione col giovanissimo Socrate: c'è un problema cronologico, poiché Diogene Laerzio (9, 23 = Apollodorus F 341 J.) pone l'ἄκμῃ di Parmenide al 504–501 a. C., per cui la nascita del filosofo andrebbe posta intorno al 540, ma in questo modo Parmenide all'età di 65 non avrebbe potuto incontrare il ventenne Socrate, nato attorno al 470.

Vediamo ora la struttura del dialogo. Il narratore è Cefalo di Clazomene, il quale narra di essersi recato una volta ad Atene per incontrare Antifonte (fratellastro di Platone); Cefalo sapeva, infatti, che Antifonte si era più volte incontrato con Pitodoro, un amico di Zenone, e voleva che Antifonte gli narrasse quanto aveva saputo da Pitodoro circa l'incontro che Parmenide e Zenone avevano avuto col giovane Socrate. Il racconto di Antifonte è appunto alla base del *Parm.*, la cui trama si può riassumere come segue:

¹ In questo articolo non distinguo fra pensiero socratico e pensiero platonico: Platone attribuisce *apertis verbis* a Socrate l'introduzione degli εἶδη, cosa che gli avrebbe consentito di superare le aporie eleatiche. È notissimo che l'attribuzione a Socrate della dottrina degli εἶδη è sommamente problematica. Poiché ai fini della nostra discussione non è essenziale determinare quanto Socrate abbia precorso Platone nell'introdurre gli εἶδη, nel seguito parlerò spesso di Socrate / Platone.

dopo che Zenone ha letto un suo scritto, Socrate gli chiede se il fine di tale scritto (il cui contenuto non viene riassunto nel dialogo) sia mostrare che, se supponiamo che le cose siano molteplici, ne segua che esse sono simili e dissimili, il che è evidentemente impossibile (127 e):

εἰ πολλά ἐστὶ τὰ ὄντα, ὥς ἄρα δεῖ αὐτὰ ὅμοιά τε εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοια,²
τοῦτο δὲ δὴ ἀδύνατον· οὔτε γὰρ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὅμοια οὔτε τὰ ὅμοια
ἀνόμοια οἶόν τε εἶναι.

Come Zenone dimostrasse che, se le cose sono molteplici, da questo segua che esse sono simili e dissimili, Platone non lo dice, ma si limita a riferirci che Zenone rispose affermativamente alla domanda di Socrate. Quest'ultimo si rivolge ora a Parmenide e gli dice che il poema di Parmenide e lo scritto di Zenone, a suo parere, vogliono mostrare la stessa cosa: Parmenide aveva affermato che tutto è uno (ἐν φῆς εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, 128 a), che a Socrate sembra l'altra faccia della medaglia della tesi di Zenone. Zenone conferma l'ipotesi di Socrate, ma precisa di aver scritto la sua opera molti anni prima, per rispondere a coloro che mettevano in ridicolo le tesi di Parmenide. Socrate accetta la precisazione, ma afferma di non capire quanto sostiene Zenone: che, infatti, argomenta Socrate, le cose visibili (ὁρώμενα) siano al contempo simili e dissimili, uno e molteplici, in quiete e in movimento ecc. non deve stupire: che un uomo partecipi (μεταλαμβάνειν, μετέχειν) del molteplice in quanto composto di mani, braccia ecc., e dell'uno in quanto singolo uomo diverso dagli altri uomini, non è cosa di cui meravigliarsi; sarebbe invece cosa degna di meraviglia, se si potesse mostrare che gli εἶδη stessi (τὰ λογισμῶ λαμβανόμενα: cioè e. g. la somiglianza e la dissomiglianza, l'unità e la molteplicità, la quiete e il movimento) partecipano gli uni degli altri e si mescolano (πλέκεσθαι). Parmenide chiede a Socrate, se egli creda che esistano tali εἶδη anche del καλόν, dell'ἀγαθόν e altre cose del genere, e anche dell'uomo, del fuoco, dell'acqua. Riguardo al primo gruppo Socrate risponde affermativamente, riguardo al secondo dice di dubitare, mentre esclude esistano εἶδη di cose come il capello, il fango, lo sporco, anche se confessa di aver dubitato anche a questo riguardo: in certi momenti ha pensato che esistano εἶδη di tutte le realtà (130 d):

² La frase significa evidentemente “si multa sunt quae sunt, oportet ea similia et dissimilia esse” (Ficino, così anche e. g. Taylor 1934, 46), non “se gli enti sono molti, allora le stesse cose devono essere simili e dissimili” (Ferrari 2004, 199, così anche e. g. Zekl 1972, 7). L'edizione di riferimento del *Parmenides* è quella di Moreschini (1966): ho iniziato una nuova *recensio* della tradizione manoscritta che mira a una nuova edizione.

ἔπειτα ὅταν ταύτη στῶ, φεύγων οἴχομαι, δείσας μή ποτε εἷς τινα
 βυθὸν φλυαρίας ἐμπεσὼν διαφθαρῶ· ἐκέισε δ' οὖν ἀφικόμενος, εἰς ἃ
 νυνδὴ ἔλεγον εἶδη ἔχειν, περὶ ἐκεῖνα πραγματευόμενος διατρίβω.

Parmenide dice che Socrate disprezza le entità suddette perché è ancora giovane e ancora legato alle opinioni degli uomini. L'Eleate chiede poi a Socrate come le cose sensibili partecipino degli εἶδη: l'εἶδος è presente nella sua interezza nelle singole realtà sensibili o si separa e si frantuma? Socrate risponde che non si separa e porta l'esempio della luce del sole, al quale Parmenide oppone quello del velo che copre molte persone, il quale copre ciascuno come parte, non come intero. In questo modo, argomenta Parmenide, l'εἶδος non è presente integralmente nelle singole realtà sensibili, ma ciascuna realtà ne ha una parte. Ciò implica alcune assurdità: se le cose grandi sono grandi in quanto hanno in se stesse una parte della grandezza, questa parte è più piccola della grandezza in se stessa e lo stesso può dirsi anche riguardo all'uguale e al piccolo. Di fronte a questa aporia Socrate confessa di non sapere cosa rispondere. Inoltre, continua Parmenide, se noi poniamo la grandezza in se stessa quale causa della grandezza delle singole cose grandi, nel momento in cui consideriamo tutte queste entità insieme, apparirà una seconda grandezza in se stessa, che sarà causa della grandezza delle entità precedentemente considerate e così all'infinito. Socrate risponde che forse ciascuno di questi εἶδη è un νόημα che esiste solo nella ψυχή, ma, di fronte alle obiezioni di Parmenide, Socrate afferma di credere più probabile che gli εἶδη siano dei παραδείγματα, di cui le cose sensibili sono ὁμοιώματα, in quanto ne partecipano (μετέχειν) per assimilazione (εἰκασθῆναι). Parmenide obietta che, se le cose sensibili sono simili all'εἶδος, deve esserci un altro εἶδος, in base al quale tale somiglianza esiste, e così all'infinito. Davanti a questa obiezione Socrate non sa cosa dire e Parmenide afferma che bisogna cercare un altro modo, rispetto alla ομοιότης, per cui le cose sensibili partecipano (μεταλαμβάνειν) degli εἶδη. Vi è poi una difficoltà ancora più grande che si oppone alla teoria di Socrate: se gli εἶδη sono separati dalla realtà sensibili, sarà difficile rispondere a chi obietti che essi non sono conoscibili e che sono completamente separati dalla realtà sensibile; tra la realtà sensibile e gli εἶδη ci sarà una separazione totale, sicché addirittura la divinità, che opererà nel mondo degli εἶδη, non avrà né conoscenza né influenza sul mondo sensibile. Socrate non sa cosa rispondere alle obiezioni del vecchio eleate, ma Parmenide afferma a questo punto che, sebbene la teoria socratica sia piena di ἀπορίαι, essa è l'unica che può portare sulla strada giusta: solo persone molto dotate (εὐφροεῖς) saranno in grado di procedere su questa strada di ricerca, ma porre degli εἶδη di ciascuna cosa è l'unico modo per poter continuare la ricerca filosofica (135 b–c):

εἷ γέ τις δῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὖ μὴ ἑάσει εἶδη τῶν ὄντων εἶναι, εἰς πάντα τὰ νυνδὴ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἀποβλέψας, μηδὲ τι ὀριεῖται εἶδος ἑνὸς ἐκάστου, οὐδὲ ὅποι τρέψει τὴν διάνοιαν ἕξει, μὴ ἑὼν ἰδέαν τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου τὴν αὐτὴν ἀεὶ εἶναι, καὶ οὕτως τὴν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν παντάπασιν διεφθερεῖ. τοῦ τοιούτου μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖς καὶ μᾶλλον ἡσθήσθαι.

Parmenide chiede quindi a Socrate cosa intenda fare della filosofia (τί οὖν ποιήσεις φιλοσοφίας πέρι; πῇ τρέψη ἀγνοουμένων τούτων;). Socrate non sa cosa rispondere e Parmenide afferma che Socrate ha cominciato troppo presto a dividere gli εἶδη, prima di essersi esercitato in quell'attività che a molti sembra inutile (135 c–d):

πρῶ γάρ, πρὶν γυμνασθῆναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀρίζεσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖς καλὸν τέ τι καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν εἰδῶν. [...] ἔλκυσον δὲ σαυτὸν καὶ γύμνασαι μᾶλλον διὰ τῆς δοκούσης ἀχρήστου εἶναι καὶ καλουμένης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀδολεσχίας, ἕως ἔτι νέος εἶ· εἰ δὲ μή, διαφεύζεται ἡ ἀλήθεια.

A Socrate, che gli chiede di quale γυμνασία stia parlando, Parmenide risponde che si tratta di quella che Socrate ha poco prima sentito esercitare da Zenone: Socrate ha fatto bene, continua Parmenide, a esortare Zenone a non limitare l'indagine agli ὁρώμενα e a estenderla ai λόγῳ λαμβανόμενα e ha ragione a credere che l'ipotesi dell'esistenza degli εἶδη risolva le aporie zenoniane, ma bisogna che Socrate si eserciti anche ad esaminare le conseguenze che derivano da ciascuna ipotesi (135 e –136 a):

χρὴ δὲ καὶ τόδε ἔτι πρὸς τούτῳ ποιεῖν, μὴ μόνον εἰ ἔστιν ἕκαστον ὑποτιθέμενον σκοπεῖν τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὑποτίθεσθαι, εἰ βούλει μᾶλλον γυμνασθῆναι.

A Socrate, che chiede spiegazioni, Parmenide propone un esempio: Zenone ha posto l'ὑπόθεσις che i molti siano; orbene, la γυμνασία di Parmenide impone che, partendo da questa ὑπόθεσις, se ne traggano tutte le conseguenze sia per i molti sia per l'uno, sia in relazione a se stessi sia in relazione reciproca. Poi bisognerà fare lo stesso tipo di deduzioni partendo dall'ὑπόθεσις che i molti non siano. Oltre che per l'uno e i molti, tali ὑποθέσεις e deduzioni andranno fatte anche per il simile e il dissimile, per il movimento e la quiete, la generazione e la corruzione, per l'essere e il non essere. Una volta esercitatosi così, Socrate potrà vedere il vero. Socrate prega Parmenide di dargli lui stesso una dimostrazione di questo metodo e Parmenide, dopo un po' di resistenza, accetta, ponendo come ipotesi proprio la sua, l'uno (ἀπ' ἐμᾶυτοῦ ἄρξωμαι καὶ τῆς ἐμᾶυτοῦ ὑποθέσεως, 137 b). Poiché ha bisogno di qualcuno che risponda alle sue

domande, egli sceglie il più giovane dei presenti, Aristotele.³ Le ipotesi (H) che pone Parmenide sono, conformemente a quanto detto, due, la prima che l'uno è (H 1), la seconda che l'uno non è (H 2); per ognuna di queste ipotesi vengono tratte quattro deduzioni (D).⁴ Vediamo il contenuto (coi numeri arabi fra parentesi indico alcuni punti fallaci del ragionamento di Parmenide su cui tornerò *infra*):

H 1 D 1 (137 c – 142 a): se l'uno è, esso non ha parti né è un intero (ὅλον) ed è privo di figura. Essendo privo di parti e di figura, esso non può né includere né essere incluso, quindi non è in nessun luogo e non si muove; ma poiché non è mai in nessun luogo, l'uno non è mai nello stesso luogo e quindi si muove (1).

L'uno non è identico a un'altra cosa, poiché non sarebbe più uno, e non è nemmeno identico a se stesso, poiché altrimenti sarebbe identico, non più uno; tuttavia, l'uno non è neppure diverso da se stesso, perché così non sarebbe più uno, né da un'altra cosa, poiché così sarebbe diverso e non più uno (2).

L'uno non è uguale né a se stesso né a un'altra cosa, poiché così sarebbe uguale e non uno, ma non è nemmeno disuguale né a se stesso né a un'altra cosa, poiché per essere disuguale dovrebbe essere costituito o da più unità di misura (ma in tal caso non sarebbe più uno) o da una sola unità di misura (ma in tal caso tale misura sarebbe uguale all'uno, che così parteciperebbe dell'uguaglianza, cosa impossibile) (3).

L'uno non ha né la medesima età né un'età diversa né di se stesso né degli altri, poiché in questo modo l'uno parteciperebbe dell'uguaglianza e della disuguaglianza (4).

L'uno non partecipa del tempo, poiché in tal caso avrebbe la stessa età di se stesso e diverrebbe più giovane e più vecchio di se stesso, ma l'uno non può partecipare né di uguaglianza né di diversità. L'uno non partecipa dell'essere, poiché per partecipare dell'essere dovrebbero potersi applicare a lui le voci del verbo essere (“era”, “è”, “sarà”), ma questo implicherebbe che l'uno è nel tempo, cosa che è risultata falsa. L'uno non è quindi in assoluto, poiché non partecipa dell'essere.

³ Si tratta, ovviamente, non dello Stagirita ma dell'uomo politico, che fece parte dei trenta tiranni (Kirchner 1895); qualsiasi tentativo di vedere nella scelta del nome un'allusione al più celebre filosofo non ha fondamento, cfr. Brisson 2002, 3.

⁴ Non c'è accordo fra gli studiosi a proposito del numero delle ipotesi e delle deduzioni; per un recentissimo panorama delle varie opinioni, cfr. Polansky–Cimakasky 2013; Austin 2014, 68–69. A mio giudizio, l'unica reale difficoltà riguarda 155 e – 157 b, il punto cioè di passaggio fra la seconda e la terza deduzione della prima ipotesi, sul quale cfr. le giuste osservazioni di Ferrari 2004, 318 n. 166. Io lo ho siglato H 1 D 1 + H 1 D 2, poiché in esso Parmenide si riferisce a tutto quanto ha detto fino a quel punto.

H 1 D 2: se l'uno è, esso deve partecipare dell'essere, dunque deve costituire un ὅλον di due parti, uno ed essere. L'uno e l'essere differiscono tra loro in quanto entrambi partecipano del diverso, sono quindi una coppia: se ad essi aggiungiamo il diverso, sono tre entità. Se esistono il due e il tre, devono esistere anche il due volte, il tre volte e quindi una pluralità illimitata, di cui ciascuna parte partecipa dell'essere. Ciascuna di queste parti possiede individualità, è quindi uno, sicché l'uno e l'essere sono distribuiti in una molteplicità di enti. Poiché le parti sono parti di un ὅλον, l'uno in quanto intero sarà limitato, in quanto parti (che sono all'interno dell'intero) illimitato (5).

Se l'uno ha parti, costituirà anche una figura. L'uno in quanto parti è compreso in se stesso, in quanto ὅλον è in altro, in quanto è compreso in se stesso è immobile, in quanto in altro (ἐν ἑτέρῳ) è in movimento (6).

L'uno è identico a se stesso, in quanto esso non è diverso da se stesso né in un rapporto parte / intero, ma è diverso da se stesso, in quanto si trova sia in se stesso che in altro contemporaneamente (come detto all'inizio di H 1 D 2, 7).

L'uno è diverso dagli altri, in quanto gli altri non sono uno, ma non è diverso dagli altri, poiché il diverso (τὸ ἕτερον) non può essere nell'identico (ἐν ταὐτῳ), e quindi gli enti non partecipano del diverso (8).

L'uno e gli altri non sono quindi in rapporto di diversità, ma non possono essere nemmeno in rapporto parte / intero, poiché gli altri non possono partecipare dell'uno, altrimenti sarebbero essi stessi uno. Se l'uno e gli altri non sono né in rapporto di diversità né in rapporto parte / intero, di conseguenza essi devono essere in rapporto di identità. Poiché d'altra parte, come già si è detto, l'uno è diverso dagli altri in quanto non è gli altri e diversità si oppone a identità, l'uno e gli altri sono sia identici sia non identici (9).

L'uno e gli altri partecipano del diverso reciprocamente nella stessa misura, e per questa loro partecipazione sono simili. Poiché l'uno e gli altri sono risultati anche identici e l'identico e il diverso sono opposti, se l'uno e gli altri sono simili in quanto partecipano del diverso, essi sono dissimili in quanto partecipano dell'identico (lo stesso vale anche per l'uno rispetto a se stesso). L'uno in quanto uno è in contatto con se stesso, ma in quanto ὅλον è in contatto con gli altri; tuttavia esso non è in contatto con se stesso, poiché contatto implica contiguità spaziale, quindi dualità, e l'uno non è nemmeno in contatto con gli altri, poiché in tale caso l'uno sarebbe in contatto con gli altri un numero di volte, ma gli altri, non partecipando dell'uno, non hanno numero. L'uno è uguale agli altri, poiché altrimenti dovrebbe partecipare di grandezza o piccolezza, ma nessun ente può partecipare di grandezza o piccolezza, ma l'uno è anche maggiore degli altri (poiché in quanto ὅλον li include) e minore (poiché in quanto parte degli altri ne è incluso) (10).

Lo stesso rapporto di grandezza al contempo uguale, maggiore e minore l'uno lo ha anche con se stesso. L'uno è e diventa più giovane e più vecchio di se stesso con il passare del tempo, ma non è e non diventa più giovane e più vecchio di se stesso col passare del tempo, poiché ha sempre la stessa età di se stesso. L'uno è più vecchio degli altri, poiché fra i numeri prima si generano quelli più piccoli, ma è più giovane in quanto ὅλον, poiché esso diviene tale solo come somma di tutti gli altri; l'uno ha anche la medesima età di tutti gli altri, poiché ogni parte che compone l'ὅλον è un'unità ed esse si generano in successione (11).

L'uno non diventa più giovane o più vecchio degli altri, poiché, se a partire dallo stesso tempo iniziale si aggiungono porzioni di tempo identiche a due entità, la differenza di età fra le due entità non cambia, ma, da un altro punto di vista, l'uno che è nato prima, diviene più giovane, poiché aggiungendo quantità uguali a grandezze diverse il rapporto che ne risulta tende a diminuire. Poiché l'uno partecipa del tempo, partecipa anche dell'essere e quindi è.

H 1 D 1 + H 1 D 2: da quanto detto, l'uno partecipa dell'essere e non partecipa dell'essere, è uno e molti, dissimile e simile, maggiore, minore e uguale, in movimento e in quiete. Poiché queste caratteristiche opposte non possono coesistere contemporaneamente, bisogna che intervengano cambi di stato; tali cambi di stato avvengono al di fuori del tempo, e fanno sì che l'uno si trovi a essere in una condizione ancora diversa rispetto agli opposti sopra elencati.

H 1 D 3: se l'uno è, gli altri dall'uno non sono uno, ma ne partecipano in quanto costituiscono un'unità. Gli altri in quanto partecipano dell'uno hanno un limite, ma in quanto, per propria natura di non-uno, non partecipano dell'uno non hanno limite. Gli altri dall'uno partecipano della somiglianza rispetto a se stessi e agli altri in quanto sono tutti limitati o illimitati, ma partecipano della dissomiglianza rispetto a se stessi e agli altri in quanto sono sia limitati sia illimitati. In base allo stesso principio, gli altri dall'uno partecipano anche dell'identico e del diverso, del movimento e della quiete.

H 1 D 4: se l'uno è, gli altri dall'uno devono essere separati dall'uno, poiché non esiste altro oltre all'uno e agli altri, quindi non esiste un luogo che contenga sia l'uno sia gli altri. Dunque gli altri sono separati dall'uno e quindi non ne partecipano in alcun modo e, non partecipando in alcun modo dell'uno, non sono né molti né uno né totalità né parti. Gli altri dall'uno non partecipano né della somiglianza né della dissomiglianza, poiché per parteciparne dovrebbero partecipare di due εἶδη, ma non è possibile, poiché essi non partecipano nemmeno di un εἶδος, in quanto non partecipano dell'uno. Gli altri dall'uno non

partecipano nemmeno dell'identità e della diversità, della quiete e del movimento, di una grandezza maggiore, minore o uguale, dell'essere e del non-essere, poiché non partecipano dell'uno né di nessun numero (12).

H 2 D 1: se l'uno non è, esso è comunque identificabile come qualcosa ed è quindi dissimile rispetto agli altri, ma simile rispetto a se stesso. L'uno che non è non è uguale agli altri, poiché altrimenti già sarebbe, ma se non è uguale è disuguale e quindi partecipa di grandezza e di piccolezza e quindi anche di uguaglianza (13).

L'uno che non è partecipa del non-essere in quanto non è, ma anche dell'essere, poiché quando diciamo che l'uno non è diciamo la verità (ἀληθῆ), quindi diciamo τὰ ὄντα (14).

L'uno che non è, in quanto non è, non può muoversi, ma, poiché è risultato sia essere sia non essere, esso deve muoversi, altrimenti non potrebbe cambiare di stato (15).

L'uno che non è, in quanto si muove e cambia di stato, diviene e perisce, in quanto non si muove e non cambia di stato non diviene e non perisce (16).

H 2 D 2: l'uno che non è non può avere alcun rapporto con l'essere, non si altera, non è né in quiete (poiché non è in nessun luogo) né in movimento (poiché non si altera). Poiché non è, all'uno non appartengono né grandezza né piccolezza né uguaglianza né somiglianza né diversità, né rispetto a se stesso né rispetto agli altri. Se non è in nessuno di questi rapporti, l'uno che non è non ha determinazioni.

H 2 D 3: se l'uno non è, gli altri sono una pluralità che non è possibile ridurre a unità. A chi la guardi da lontano, tale pluralità appare limitata e partecipante di somiglianza e di identità sia rispetto a se stessa sia rispetto agli altri, mentre a chi la guardi da vicino essa appare illimitata e partecipante di dissomiglianza e diversità. Anche la partecipazione degli altri dall'uno all'identità / diversità, contatto / separazione, movimento / quiete, divenire / non divenire, essere / non-essere, risulta opposta per chi guardi tali entità da lontano o da vicino.

H 2 D 4: se l'uno non è, gli altri dall'uno non sono né uno né molti, poiché nei molti è presente l'uno, non sono né simili né dissimili, né identici né diversi, né in contatto né separati, οὐδὲ ἄλλα ὅσα ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν διήλθομεν ὡς φαινόμενα αὐτά.

La conclusione generale è (166 c):

ἐν εἴτ' ἔστιν εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν, αὐτό τε καὶ τὰλλα καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλα πάντα πάντως ἐστὶ τε καὶ οὐκ ἔστι καὶ φαίνεται τε καὶ οὐ φαίνεται.

Aristotele acconsente e il dialogo si conclude.

Cosa vuol dire tutto questo? Che relazione c'è fra la discussione sugli εἶδη della prima parte e le ipotesi sull'uno? Il significato della prima parte è più perspicuo: a un giovane Socrate che propone dubitativamente la teoria che, secondo Platone, caratterizzerà tutto il suo pensiero, un vecchio ed esperto Parmenide oppone alcune, a prima vista ragionevoli, obiezioni, senza tuttavia negare il grande valore della teoria proposta dal giovane ateniese. Ben più arduo capire il significato della seconda parte: dalla sua notissima teoria circa l'uno, l'Eleate trae una serie di deduzioni, senza che si riesca a individuarvi un filo conduttore; l'unico filo conduttore sembra la continua smentita di ciò che è stato detto precedentemente.⁵ Questo vale non solo all'interno delle singole deduzioni (per osservare questo è sufficiente leggere il mio riassunto⁶), ma anche fra le deduzioni stesse: H 1 D 1 propone una visione dell'uno che è come privo di parte e di figura e si dice che esso non partecipa né del tempo né dell'essere, quindi non può essere definito in alcun modo; H 1 D 2 propone, invece, una visione dell'uno che è come avente parti e figura e si dice che esso partecipa sia del tempo che dell'essere, quindi può essere definito. H 1 D 3 propone una visione degli altri dall'uno che è come partecipanti dell'uno e dell'essere e quindi definibili, mentre H 1 D 4 propone una visione degli altri dall'uno che è come separati dall'uno e dall'essere e quindi non definibili. H 2 D 1 propone una visione dell'uno che non è come in qualche modo partecipante dell'essere e quindi in qualche modo definibile, mentre H 2 D 2 propone una visione dell'uno che non è come totalmente privo di essere e di determinazioni. H 2 D 3 propone una visione degli altri dall'uno che non è come apparenti e quindi in qualche modo definibili,

⁵ Che la γυμνασία miri a mostrare continuamente antinomie afferma anche Szabó 1992, 41–42.

⁶ Ecco alcune delle contraddizioni che saltano subito agli occhi del lettore: 139 b (οὔτε ἔστηκεν οὔτε κινεῖται); 139 e (ἕτερόν γε ἢ ταῦτόν τὸ ἐν οὐτ' ἂν αὐτῷ οὐτ' ἂν ἐτέρῳ εἴη); 140 b (οὔτε ἄρα ὅμοιον οὔτε ἀνόμοιον οὔθ' ἐτέρῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐν); *ibid.* (οὔτε ἴσον οὔτε ἄνισον ἔσται οὔτε ἑαυτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ); 141 a (οὐκ ἄρα ἂν εἴη νεώτερόν γε οὐδὲ πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχων τὸ ἐν οὔτε αὐτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ); 145 a (τὸ ἐν ἄρα ὃν ἐν τέ ἐστί που καὶ πολλὰ, καὶ ὅλον καὶ μέρη, καὶ πεπερασμένον καὶ ἄπειρον πλήθει); 146 a (ἀεὶ κινεῖσθαι τε καὶ ἐστάναι); 147 b (ἕτερόν τε τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ταῦτόν ἐκεῖνοις τε καὶ ἑαυτῷ); 148 c (ὅμοιον τε ἂν εἴη καὶ ἀνόμοιον τοῖς ἄλλοις); 149 d (τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἅπτεται τε καὶ οὐχ ἅπτεται); 151 e (τὸ ἐν καὶ ἴσον καὶ πλεον καὶ ἔλαττον τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ ἔσται καὶ τῶν ἄλλων); 155 c (αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον ἐστὶ τε καὶ γίγνεται, καὶ οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον οὐτ' ἔστιν οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε αὐτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων); 156 e – 157 b (οὐδὲ κινεῖται ἂν τότε, οὐδ' ἂν σταίη; οὔτε ἔστι τότε οὔτε οὐκ ἔστι, οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἀπόλλυται; οὔτε σμικρὸν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε ἴσον, οὔτε αὐξανόμενον οὔτε φθίνον οὔτε ἰσούμενον εἴη ἂν).

mentre H 2 D 4 propone una visione degli altri dall'uno che non è come totalmente privi di essere e definizioni. Come si vede, ogni deduzione si propone di contraddire quella immediatamente precedente e non viene proposta, almeno apparentemente, alcuna tesi positiva. Tuttavia, a partire dai Neoplatonici, si è cercato di trovare una dottrina positiva in questa seconda parte del *Parm.*:⁷ Plotino riferì H 1 D 1 all'uno assoluto, che è al di là dell'essere e del pensiero (di qui la teologia negativa e apofatica), H 1 D 2 al *voûς*, H 1 D 3 all'anima del mondo, Neoplatonici più recenti cercarono di attribuire significati fra loro non contraddittori anche alle altre ipotesi. Grazie a queste interpretazioni, il *Parm.* divenne il punto di riferimento della teologia negativa; questo ha fatto sì che molti, nel corso dei secoli, vi abbiano cercato significati nascosti e abbiano creduto che esso contenga la parte più profonda ed esoterica delle dottrine platoniche.⁸ Più recentemente, l'interpretazione neoplatonica è stata difesa e precisata da Wundt (1935) e altri studiosi hanno cercato di trovare significati positivi nella *γυμνασία*.⁹

Questa linea interpretativa riconosce dunque un valore positivo alla seconda parte del *Parm.* Altri studiosi negano che Platone consegnasse qualsiasi insegnamento positivo a questa parte:¹⁰ si tratterebbe o di un *jeu d'esprit* o di una *γυμνασία* propedeutica al discorso filosofico vero e proprio. Gli studiosi che aderiscono alla prima linea interpretativa si basano su un'analisi del solo *Parm.*, collegandone singoli aspetti con altri punti del pensiero platonico. Io credo che un tale modo di procedere sia profondamente sbagliato, poiché non tiene conto di un'indicazione fondamentale che ci dà lo stesso Platone. Il *Parm.* non è l'unico dialogo platonico in cui siano presenti pensatori eleati, anche nel *Soph.* e nel *Pol.* è presente un rappresentante di questa scuola. Già questo dovrebbe

⁷ Il *Parm.* è il dialogo platonico che sta alla base del Neoplatonismo: sebbene non si sappia con esattezza quando si sia cominciato a cercare nelle ipotesi e deduzioni della seconda parte del dialogo la più profonda e recondita metafisica di Platone (certo un platonico ortodosso come Alcino nel II sec. d. C. dava ancora un'interpretazione logica, non metafisica, del dialogo), per Plotino l'interpretazione metafisica era ovvia (forse già il neopitagorico Moderato di Gades interpretava il dialogo in questo senso, ma la cosa è dubbia). Su tutto questo cfr. Steel 2002.

⁸ Hanno aderito a tesi del genere Ficino, Leibniz, Hegel e altri insigni filosofi (cfr. anche Klibansky 1943).

⁹ Cfr. e. g. Hardie 1936; Cornford 1939; Rist 1970; Allen 1983; Migliori 1990; Meinwald 1991; Berti 1992; von Kutschera 1995; Sayre 1996; Hunt 1997, 19–20; Scolnicov 2003; Austin 2014. Per coloro che hanno sostenuto un punto di vista del genere nell'800 cfr. Horn 1904, 161–163 (che ne offre anche una lucida confutazione).

¹⁰ Cfr. e. g. Apelt 1891; Shorey 1903, 57; Wilamowitz 1919, II, 221–229; Taylor 1926, 349–370; Cherniss 1932; Taylor 1934; Ferrari 2004; Tabak 2015.

ammonirci che questi dialoghi vanno analizzati l'uno alla luce dell'altro. A questo si aggiunge il fatto che il *Soph.* tratta in gran parte gli stessi temi del *Parm.* e che Platone, all'inizio del *Soph.* (217 c; cfr. anche *Theaet.* 183 e), allude al *Parm.*¹¹ Platone non avrebbe potuto essere più esplicito nell'indicarci che il *Parm.* e il *Soph.* vanno letti l'uno alla luce dell'altro: qualsiasi interpretazione che non tenga conto di questo fatto è destinata fin da principio a fallire.

Vediamo dunque da vicino la trama del *Soph.* All'inizio del dialogo Teodoro di Cirene, che ha partecipato anche alla conversazione del *Theaet.*, che drammaticamente precede il *Soph.*, introduce a Socrate un anonimo ξένος Ἐλεάτης, ἐταῖρος τῶν ἀμφὶ Παρμενίδην καὶ Ζήνωνα. Socrate gli chiede come definiscano a Elea il sofista, il politico, il filosofo. Dopo avere ricordato il dialogo che ebbe da giovane con Parmenide (evidente allusione al *Parm.*), Socrate esorta lo ξένος a cercare, assieme a Teeteto, di definire il sofista.¹² Lo ξένος, consapevole delle difficoltà che comporterà la definizione, propone di partire dalla definizione dell'ἄσπαλιευτής: viene quindi proposta una divisione generale delle τέχναι, che consente facilmente di classificare l'ἄσπαλιευτής. Ben più difficile si rivela classificare il sofista: dopo una serie di suddivisioni, si arriva a dire che quella del sofista è una εἰδωλοποιτικὴ τέχνη (235 b) e che tale arte produce immagini, che sembrano, ma non sono, e che dice cose non vere (236 b–e). A questo punto lo ξένος comprende di essere in una gravissima difficoltà: come conciliare il fatto che il sofista dica cose false con l'insegnamento del maestro Parmenide? Parmenide, ricorda lo ξένος, gli aveva inculcato fin da ragazzo: οὐ γὰρ μή ποτε τοῦτο δαμῆ εἶναι μὴ ἔόντα / ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ' ἀφ' ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα (*Parm.* B 7, 1–2 D.–K.). Ma, osserva lo ξένος, quanto egli sta dicendo τετόλμηκεν ὑποθέσθαι τὸ μὴ ὄν εἶναι: ψεῦδος γὰρ οὐκ ὄν ἄλλως ἐγίγνετο ὄν. Occorre dunque precisare i significati del non essere: bisognerà cioè distinguere fra non dire nulla in assoluto (οὐ λέγειν) e dire cose false (μηδὲν λέγειν),¹³ e bisognerà riconoscere che esiste un non essere in senso assoluto, che non può essere detto né pensato, e un non essere come falso, che in qualche modo partecipa dell'essere. Per arrivare

¹¹ Sull'allusione al *Parm.* in *Theaet.* e *Soph.*, cfr. Horn 1904, 156–158.

¹² Del tutto fuorvianti le considerazioni di Gonzalez 2000, 163–164 sull'inizio del *Soph.* Sfugge a questo studioso (e non solo a lui) la cosa più evidente di tutte, che cioè lo ξένος è disposto fin dall'inizio a condurre con Teeteto un dialogo “socratico”, fatto cioè di domande e di risposte brevi e precise. Assennate osservazioni in Hochholzer 2016, 14.

¹³ In greco μηδὲν λέγειν può significare sia “non dire nulla” sia “non dire nulla di giusto, dire cose false”.

a definire il sofista è dunque necessario ammettere che il non essere in qualche modo sia, ma lo ξένος, per fare tale ammissione, deve diventare πατραλοίας (241 a–d) e contraddire l’affermazione di Parmenide che nega assolutamente che il non essere sia.¹⁴ Parmenide, osserva lo ξένος, si è espresso con faciloneria (εὐκόλως) sulla questione dell’essere, ma anche gli altri pensatori che hanno posto un numero maggiori di principi (si allude evidentemente ad altri presocratici, di sicuro anche a Eraclito ed Empedocle) si sono espressi in modo incomprensibile, senza dire nulla di chiaro circa l’essere e il divenire. Lo ξένος confessa che quando era νεώτερος credeva di capire le affermazioni di Parmenide sul non essere, ma ora si rende conto di non capirle. Parmenide attribuisce all’ἔν l’essere, ma già questo fa pensare a due cose, non a una sola (cioè l’una all’unità, l’altra all’essere); inoltre, la descrizione che egli ne fa (vengono qui citati i vv. 43–45 del fr. B 8 D.–K.) fanno pensare a un ὅλον composto di più parti. Certo, nulla impedisce, riconosce lo ξένος, che ciò che è un ὅλον sia, in un certo senso, uno, ma è anche pluralità in quanto contiene più parti (244 e – 245 d). Lo ξένος dice di aver fin qui passato in rassegna τοὺς διακριβολογουμένους ὄντος τε περί καὶ μή (245 e); ora passa a parlare di altri due gruppi di pensatori, gli uni materialisti, gli altri εἰδῶν φίλοι: fra i due gruppi c’è una γιγαντομαχία τις διὰ τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν περὶ τῆς οὐσίας. Gli εἰδῶν φίλοι distinguono fra il mondo materiale del divenire e il mondo intellettuale dell’essere, ma le caratteristiche che attribuiscono a quest’ultimo non convincono lo ξένος (sul problema cfr. *infra*). Si pone a questo punto il problema di definire i rapporti fra quiete, movimento ed essere: mentre la quiete e il movimento si escludono a vicenda (quando c’è l’uno, non può esserci l’altro), l’essere si mescola con entrambi; del tutto ridicoli sono coloro che ammettono solo l’autopredicazione ed escludono i giudizi sintetici (nel senso che ἄνθρωπος, per es., può predicarsi solo di ἄνθρωπος, ἀγαθός solo di ἀγαθός e non ammettono si possa dire ἄνθρωπος ἀγαθός). Dunque, alcuni enti si mescolano con altri: stabilire quali γένη si mescolino con altri, stabilire identità e diversità

¹⁴ È divenuta una moda negli ultimi tempi mettere in dubbio che lo ξένος commetta un vero “parricidio” (O’Brien 2013, 117–155; Bossi 2013, 157–173; Hochholzer 2016, 345 sgg.), ma non mi pare che gli argomenti addotti da questi studiosi siano forti. È vero, come nota O’Brien, che anche Platone (come Parmenide) ammette che non si può né pensare né dire ciò che non è assolutamente, ma Parmenide non aveva fatto le varie distinzioni del non-essere; dunque, una corretta dialettica doveva liberarsi delle sue affermazioni circa il non essere. Tutti i tentativi di limitare il “parricidio” sono, per usare le parole di O’Brien 2013, 117, “not only false, but foolish”. A precedenti formulazioni della tesi di O’Brien hanno opposte giuste obiezioni Notomi 2007, 167–187 e Dixsaut 2000, 269 n. 2.

degli εἶδη, questo sarà il compito della dialettica e della vera filosofia, afferma lo ξένος (253 b – 254 b). Bisognerà allora, prosegue lo ξένος, scegliere alcuni γένη e vedere se e come essi si mescolino fra loro; tali γένη saranno l'essere, il non essere, la quiete, il movimento, l'identico e il diverso (tale indagine è possibile, precisa lo ξένος a 254 c–d, solo ammettendo che il non essere in qualche modo sia, vale a dire, solo liberandosi dell'insegnamento fondamentale di Parmenide!). Il diverso fa sì che gli enti che non sono l'essere al contempo non siano l'essere, ma ne partecipino (256 d–e):

κατὰ πάντα γὰρ ἢ θατέρου φύσις ἕτερον ἀπεργαζομένη τοῦ ὄντος ἕκαστον οὐκ ὄν ποιεῖ, καὶ σύμπαντα δὴ κατὰ ταῦτα οὕτως οὐκ ὄντα ὁρθῶς ἐροῦμεν, καὶ πάλιν, ὅτι μετέχει τοῦ ὄντος, εἶναι τε καὶ ὄντα.

Lo ξένος riesce quindi a stabilire l'esistenza del non essere come diverso e dell'essere come partecipazione¹⁵ e ammonisce (259 b–d):

καὶ ταύταις ταῖς ἐναντιώσεσιν εἴτε ἀπιστεῖ τις, σκεπτέον αὐτῷ καὶ λεκτέον βέλτιόν τι τῶν νῦν εἰρημένων· εἴτε ὥς χαλεπὸν τι κατανενοηκῶς χαίρει τοτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα τοτὲ δ' ἐπὶ θάτερα τοὺς λόγους ἔλκων, οὐκ ἄξια πολλῆς σπουδῆς ἐσπούδακεν, ὥς οἱ νῦν λόγοι φασί. Τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ οὔτε τι κομψὸν οὔτε χαλεπὸν εὐρεῖν, ἐκεῖνο δ' ἤδη καὶ χαλεπὸν ἅμα καὶ καλόν. [...] Ὅ καὶ πρόσθεν εἴρηται, τὸ ταῦτα ἐάσαντα ὥς <παντί> [add. Diès] δυνατὰ τοῖς λεγομένοις οἷόν τ' εἶναι καθ' ἕκαστον ἐλέγχοντα ἐπακολουθεῖν, ὅταν τέ τις ἕτερον ὄν πη ταῦτόν εἶναι φῇ καὶ ὅταν ταῦτόν ὄν ἕτερον, ἐκείνη καὶ κατ' ἐκεῖνο ὃ φησι τούτων πεπονθέναι πότερον. Τὸ δὲ ταῦτόν ἕτερον ἀποφαίνειν ἀμῇ γέ πη καὶ τὸ θάτερον ταῦτόν καὶ τὸ μέγα σμικρὸν καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον ἀνόμοιον, καὶ χαίρειν οὕτω τὰναντία ἀεὶ προφέροντα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, οὔτε τις ἔλεγχος οὗτος ἀληθινὸς ἄρτι τε τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἐφαπτομένου δῆλος νεογενῆς ὢν.

È dunque stolido affermare che l'identico è diverso, il simile è dissimile ecc. senza determinare in che senso questo avvenga; se non si procede in modo corretto nell'analisi della συμπλοκὴ τῶν εἰδῶν, si avrà la τελεωτάτη ἀφάνισις τῶν λόγων (259 e). Ora che tutto questo è stato accertato e che lo ψεῦδος e il non-essere (di cui il sofista negava l'esistenza 260 c–d) sono stati definiti, si può procedere alla definizione del sofista e il dialogo si avvia alla conclusione.

¹⁵ Noi moderni distinguiamo tre fondamentali significati di εἶναι: come esistenza, come identità, come partecipazione; che questa distinzione fosse fondamentale è chiara anche a Platone non mi pare lecito dubitare, ma egli la formulava da un altro punto di vista, ontologico più che logico, cfr. Centrone 2008, LXVII.

La comunanza di argomenti fra *Parm.* e *Soph.* è ampia: in entrambi il tema centrale sono i rapporti fra gli εἶδη e quindi anche fra essere e non-essere. Nel *Parm.* non si giunge a nessuna risultato: ogni cosa affermata viene subito contraddetta. Platone ha voluto mostrare nella maniera più chiara possibile le continue antinomie: come già abbiamo osservato, non solo ogni deduzione contraddice nella maniera più evidente quella immediatamente precedente, ma anche all'interno delle singole deduzioni si evidenziano continuamente le conclusioni contraddittorie cui si giunge. Non c'è il minimo dubbio che lo scopo di Platone sia evidenziare le antinomie. Se osserviamo da vicino il modo in cui si giunge a tali antinomie, notiamo che il modo in cui argomenta Parmenide è spesso capzioso. Si confronti il riassunto del *Parm.* che ho fornito *supra* con questa tabella (i numeri iniziali corrispondono a quelli fra parentesi inseriti nel riassunto):

(1) L'argomento per cui l'uno si muove è capzioso: dopo aver mostrato che l'uno non è mai ἔν τινι, si deduce che esso non sia mai nello stesso luogo (ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ),¹⁶ e, poiché ciò che non è mai nello stesso luogo si muove, se ne deduce che l'uno si muove. È evidente che l'affermazione secondo cui ciò che non è mai nello stesso luogo si muove non vale a proposito di ciò che non è in nessun luogo.¹⁷

(2) L'argomento per cui l'uno non è identico a se stesso e non è diverso da un'altra cosa si basa sulla non distinzione fra essere partecipativo e essere identitario: Parmenide afferma (139 c) che οὐχ ἐνὶ προσήκει ἑτέρῳ τινὸς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἑτέρῳ ἑτέρου, ἀλλὰ δὲ οὐδενί. È evidente che in questo modo nessun ente parteciperebbe del diverso se non il diverso in sé! Lo stesso dicasi anche per l'identico, di cui Parmenide nega l'uno possa partecipare (139 d: εἰ τὸ ἔν καὶ ταὐτὸν μηδαμῇ διαφέρει, ὁπότε τι ταὐτὸν ἐγίγνετο, αἰεὶ ἂν ἔν ἐγίγνετο, καὶ ὁπότε ἔν, ταὐτόν).

(3) Anche in questo caso l'impossibilità dell'uguaglianza a se stesso e della disuguaglianza rispetto a un'altra cosa è dimostrata grazie alla non distinzione fra essere partecipativo ed essere identitario (come al punto 2).

(4) Anche qui l'argomento si basa sull'impossibilità per l'uno di partecipare all'uguaglianza e alla diversità, dunque sulla non distinzione fra essere partecipativo ed essere identitario (come ai punti 2 e 3).

(6) L'argomento per cui l'uno è in movimento è capzioso: è stato detto che ciò che è sempre nello stesso luogo (146 a: τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ αἰεὶ ὄν) è immobile e da questo si deduce che τὸ ἐν ἑτέρῳ αἰεὶ ὄν ἀνάγκη

¹⁶ Ad 139 a 6 io leggerei εἴη ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶν col manoscritto D, omettendo τῷ αὐτῷ di BT. Nulla cambia ai fini dell'argomentazione.

¹⁷ Cfr. Zekl 1972, 142 n. 80 e *infra* il punto 6.

μηδέποτε ἐν ταύτῳ εἶναι, ma questa deduzione è dovuta al cambiamento di significato di ἕτερον, nel primo caso “altro rispetto a un’altra cosa”, nel secondo “altro rispetto a se stesso”. La capziosità può presentare somiglianze con quella del punto 1.¹⁸

(8) L’argomento per cui nessun ente può partecipare del diverso è evidentemente basato sulla non distinzione fra essere partecipativo ed essere identitario (cfr. i punti 2, 3, 4): una logica corretta stabilisce che il diverso non può essere nell’identico rispetto all’identico stesso (*a* in quanto identico ad *a* non partecipa del diverso), ma può benissimo essere nell’identico rispetto a un’altra cosa (*a* identico ad *a* è diverso da *b* in quanto partecipa del diverso, cfr. 146 d–e).

(9) Che l’uno e gli altri non siano in rapporto di diversità lo si è potuto mostrare solo grazie alla non distinzione fra essere partecipativo ed essere identitario (cfr. il punto 8).

(10) È evidente che l’argomento per cui l’uno è uguale agli altri, poiché non può partecipare di grandezza e piccolezza, è basato sulla non distinzione fra essere partecipativo ed essere identitario (cfr. i punti 2, 3, 4, 8, 9).

(11) L’argomento è palesemente capzioso, poiché gli altri dall’uno vengono intesi prima come un insieme diverso dall’uno (che quindi si genera dopo l’uno), poi come le parti che costituiscono l’uno (e di cui quindi l’uno è più giovane).

(12) Tutta questa deduzione (H 1 D 4) si basa sulla separazione assoluta fra uno e altri dall’uno. Questa separazione viene prima dimostrata su base spaziale (χωρίς), da cui si ricava l’impossibilità della partecipazione: è evidente che questa deduzione presta il fianco a obiezioni.

(13) L’argomento è palesemente capzioso, poiché si nega che l’uno possa essere uguale, poiché altrimenti sarebbe (si ricordi che l’ipotesi H 2 è che l’uno non sia), ma in questo modo si confonde essere partecipativo ed essere esistenziale. Inoltre, non si capisce perché la non esistenza non impedisca all’uno anche di essere disuguale.¹⁹

(14) L’essere dell’uno che non è viene dedotto dal fatto che noi diciamo la verità (ἀληθῆ, quindi τὰ ὄντα), allorché diciamo che l’uno non è. L’argomento è capzioso, poiché si basa sull’identità di significato fra ἀληθῆ e τὰ ὄντα (gli eristi hanno spesso giocato su questa identità di significato).

(15) 162 b–e: l’argomento è capzioso, poiché esso si basa sul cambiamento di stato, ma in precedenza si era mostrato che l’essere e il non essere coesistono nell’uno che non è, non che si succedono.²⁰

¹⁸ Cfr. Zekl 1972, 151 n. 134.

¹⁹ Cfr. Ferrari 2004, 344 n. 192.

²⁰ Cfr. Ferrari 2004, 348 n. 198.

(16) Dal cambiamento di stato (γίγνεσθαι μὲν ἕτερον ἢ πρότερον, ἀπόλλυσθαι δὲ ἐκ τῆς προτέρας ἕξεως) viene dedotto il nascere e il perire (γίγνεσθαι e ἀπόλλυσθαι usati assolutamente), dunque si confonde anche qui essere partecipativo ed essere esistenziale (cfr. il punto 13).

Era consapevole Platone che gli argomenti dell'Eleate erano inficiati da tali capziosità?²¹ Indubitatilmente sì, come mostrano il *Soph.* e la prima parte dello stesso *Parm.* I punti 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10 sono tutti basati sulla non distinzione fra essere partecipativo ed essere identitario: si osservi che si tratta di ben sei punti e tutti di fondamentale importanza nell'argomentazione di Parmenide: se l'Eleate avesse distinto essere partecipativo da essere identitario, non sarebbe giunto alle antinomie cui giunge. Lo stesso può dirsi circa i punti 13, 16, ove è la non distinzione fra essere partecipativo ed essere esistenziale, la quale permettere di giungere all'antinomia. Orbene, nel *Soph.* lo ξένος arriva a formulare le distinzioni fra essere esistenziale, partecipativo e identitario: se il Parmenide del *Parm.* avesse tenuto presenti tali distinzioni, non sarebbe giunto alle antinomie cui giunge. Lo stesso dicasi circa il punto 11, che è basato sulla non distinzione fra uno nel senso di ὅλον e uno assoluto, chiarita nel *Soph.* (244 e – 245 d). È vero che la distinzione fra i tre tipi di essere non è formulata da Platone con la chiarezza e la consapevolezza che abbiamo noi, ma non c'è dubbio che egli ha avvertito la differenza essere esistenza / essere partecipazione e fra una partecipazione totale (= identità) e parziale; se non avesse avvertito tale differenza, non avrebbe scritto il *Soph.* Lo ξένος per arrivare a formulare queste distinzioni deve divenire πατραλοίας, liberarsi del maestro Parmenide; questo è detto in modo chiarissimo in ben due punti (241 a–d; 254 c–d): se non si ammette l'esistenza del non-essere come diverso, qualsiasi dialettica è impedita

²¹ La caratterizzazione forse migliore della γυμνασία del *Parm.* si deve a Apelt 1891, 32: "Es ist ein wahres Arsenal von Erschleichungen und Sophismen, teils versteckter, teils mehr handgreiflicher, wenn auch nirgends so grober Art, wie etwa die im Euthydem mit so unvergleichlichem Humor behandelten. Die Täuschungen konnten hier besonders zahlreich und blendend sein, weil es sich um einen Begriff handelt, der eine Reihe sehr verschiedener Bedeutungen anzunehmen fähig ist, ohne daß dabei der griechischen Sprache irgendwie Gewalt geschähe". Wilamowitz 1919, II, 220–221 osserva argutamente: "Wer sich in dieses logische Gestrüpp wagt und auf geniessbare Früchte hofft, wird schwer enttäuscht; da wachsen keine Pflaumen, sondern Schlehen". Secondo Cherniss 1932, 138, la seconda parte del *Parm.* "is a horrible exemple set up to warn all those who are tempted to indulge in the legerdemain of *Being* and *non-Being*. The *Sophist* gives a succinct and serious analysis of this sleight-of-hand and the answer to its mystical magic; the *Parmenides* is content to set the intelligent thinking that it is not safe to use the two-edged sword of paradox in the search of truth". Ottime osservazioni anche in Shorey 1903, 58–60.

e tutte le distinzioni proposte nel *Soph.* sono impossibili. Lo ξένος è ben consapevole della gravità delle conseguenze che tutto questo ha: egli confessa esplicitamente di dover abbandonare tutto ciò che ha sostenuto fino a quel momento: la breve conversazione con il giovane e inesperto Teeteto, che noi leggiamo nel *Soph.*, è stata per lui più istruttiva che tutta la vita precedente, in cui egli ha ragionato secondo i criteri eleatici. Addirittura, egli arriva a dire che, mentre cercava un'altra cosa (il sofista), quasi per caso, è arrivato a scoprire il filosofo e subito definisce i compiti dal filosofo, esercitare cioè bene la dialettica (253 c–d: τὸ κατὰ γένη διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ μῆτε ταὐτὸν εἶδος ἕτερον ἡγήσασθαι μῆτε ἕτερον αὐτὰ ταῦτον). È evidente che lo ξένος vuol dire che Parmenide non ha compreso nulla di tutto questo: Parmenide, a giudizio del suo discepolo, è rimasto implicato, come tutti i filosofi che noi definiamo “presocratici”, in una sterile discussione sull'εἶναι, senza aver prima definito i significati dell'εἶναι. Come Eraclito, Empedocle e altri, le affermazioni di Parmenide sono, agli occhi del suo discepolo, contraddittorie e incomprensibili. Dunque lo ξένος per arrivare a chiarire il problema dell'essere è costretto a “uccidere” il maestro Parmenide. È alla luce di tutto questo che deve essere letto il *Parm.* e Platone ce lo ha fatto intendere nella maniera più chiara possibile.²²

Le continue antinomie che occorrono nella seconda parte del *Parm.* sono basate su ragionamenti capziosi e scorretti, che la più corretta logica prospettata nel *Soph.* è in grado di smascherare: non è certo un caso che tali antinomie Parmenide le formuli proprio circa l'ἔν, uno dei punti centrali della sua dottrina; il messaggio di Platone è chiaro e quanto mai sarcastico verso l'Eleatismo: applicando la logica parmenidea, che nega

²² Come ho detto all'inizio di questo lavoro, credo che il significato del *Parm.* divenga comprensibile solo leggendo il *Soph.* A. Verlinsky si chiede se sia legittimo ipotizzare che un dialogo (il *Parm.*) divenga comprensibile solo in base a un altro (il *Soph.*) e se non sia piuttosto da immaginare che quando Platone scrisse il *Parm.* non avesse ancora le idee chiare sulle aporie sollevate nel dialogo (come pensa anche Robinson 1952). In questo modo si dovrebbe supporre che il *Parm.* non è un *jeu d'esprit*, ma fu scritto da Platone quando ancora non aveva chiare le dottrine che avrebbe poi proposto nel *Soph.* Per rispondere con certezza a questa domanda dovremmo essere meglio informati su come il pensiero degli Eleati era discusso all'interno dell'Accademia. Nella seconda parte di questo contributo cercherò di mostrare che Platone nella polemica antieleatica aveva di mira non tanto gli Eleati veri e propri, quanto filosofi a lui vicini che si richiamavano all'Eleatismo. Questo rende, secondo me, probabile che tutta la polemica antieleatica sia frutto dello stesso contesto e nasca dalle stesse discussioni, e che dunque *Parm.* e *Soph.* siano stati scritti per essere letti l'uno alla luce dell'altro. Nulla fa pensare che il *Parm.* rispecchi la riflessione di Platone in uno stadio successivo al *Soph.*

completamente il non-essere e non conosce gli εἶδη, all'έν dello stesso Parmenide, lo stesso έν diviene oggetto di tutte le contraddizioni che Parmenide enuncia.

Nella prima parte del *Parm.* Socrate, giovanissimo e timido, propone a Parmenide e Zenone la teoria degli εἶδη. Zenone ha appena sostenuto che εἰ πολλά ἐστὶ τὰ ὄντα, ὡς ἄρα δεῖ αὐτὰ ὅμοια τε εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοια, cosa secondo Zenone impossibile, poiché οὔτε τὰ ἀνόμοια ὅμοια οὔτε τὰ ὅμοια ἀνόμοια. Socrate osserva però che, se noi supponiamo che esistano gli εἶδη dell' ὁμοιον e dell' ἀνόμοιον, nulla impedisce che alcuni enti partecipino di uno di questi due εἶδη, altri addirittura di entrambi; non c'è quindi nulla di strano se gli enti sono simili e dissimili: le difficoltà nascerebbero se si mostrasse che gli εἶδη in se stessi assumono qualità fra loro opposte. Zenone ha quindi cercato di dimostrare (senza che Platone ci dica come) che le cose sono ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια. Un passo del *Phaedr.* (su cui torneremo *infra*) attribuisce a Zenone la stessa dimostrazione: (261 d): τὸν οὖν Ἑλεατικὸν Παλαμήδην λέγοντα οὐκ ἴσμεν τέχνη, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι τὰ αὐτὰ ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια, καὶ έν καὶ πολλά, μένοντά τε αὖ καὶ φερόμενα; In un passo del *Soph.* che abbiamo trascritto *supra* (259 d), lo ξένος, ormai libero dalle catene dell'Eleatismo, dice che stolido mostrare ταὐτὸν ἕτερον, τὸ θάτερον ταὐτόν, τὸ μέγα σμικρόν, τὸ ὁμοιον ἀνόμοιον, senza determinare cosa tali opposti abbiano effettivamente in comune. Il messaggio di Platone è evidente: Zenone ha mostrato che τὰ ὅμοια sono ἀνόμοια ecc. senza precisare cosa tali opposti abbiano effettivamente in comune. Quello che il giovanissimo Socrate obietta al più maturo Zenone è la stessa cosa che l'anziano ξένος condanna. Dunque, ci fa capire Platone, ciò che a Socrate era chiaro fin dalla prima giovinezza, lo ξένος lo capisce solo nel colloquio con Teeteto, perché solo con la teoria degli εἶδη si riesce a chiarire il senso dell'identità e della diversità e, più in generale, dei rapporti fra gli enti. Zenone, secondo quanto ci informa *Parm.* 127 e – 128 e, non voleva propriamente dimostrare che gli enti sono simili e dissimili, ma che questo è impossibile, mentre *Phaedr.* 261 d gli attribuisce *tout court* la dimostrazione che le stesse cose sono ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια. Tutto lascia pensare che sia più esatto quanto leggiamo nel *Parm.* (cfr. *infra*), ma per Platone il problema non era la finalità con cui dimostrazioni del genere venivano fatte, bensì il metodo, che non rispettava le regole di una dialettica corretta (e noi tutti siamo d'accordo su questo punto con Platone).

A questo punto, possiamo analizzare brevemente un'altra parte del *Parm.*, le obiezioni cioè che l'Eleate muove alla teoria degli εἶδη.²³

²³ Una discussione complessiva si trova in Fronterotta 2001, 235–287.

Il filosofo di Elea si dice convinto che l'introduzione degli εἶδη proposta da Socrate darà risultati eccellenti e che solo essa consentirà alla filosofia di progredire (135 b–c); tuttavia, prima di riconoscere tale eccellenza alla proposta di Socrate, egli le muove alcune obiezioni. Innanzitutto Parmenide chiede a Socrate se oltre agli εἶδη di δίκαιον, καλόν, ἀγαθόν ecc. ne esistano anche di ἄνθρωπος, πῦρ, ὕδωρ e addirittura di θρίξ, πηλός, ῥύπος. Socrate dice di essere in dubbio circa ἄνθρωπος ecc., mentre di escludere con certezza che esistano εἶδη di θρίξ ecc. Parmenide risponde che Socrate è ancora troppo giovane ed è per questo che disprezza (ἀτιμάζειν) le cose delle quali non crede esista un εἶδος (130 b–e). Parmenide chiede poi a Socrate come egli spieghi la partecipazione (μεταλαμβάνειν) degli enti agli εἶδη: come può avvenire tale partecipazione, senza che l'εἶδος si separi da se stesso e si divida in parti?²⁴ A questa obiezione Socrate non sa rispondere (130 e – 131 e). Inoltre, chiede Parmenide, se Socrate suppone che gli εἶδη esistano per spiegare le caratteristiche comuni degli enti sensibili, per ogni εἶδος che spiega le caratteristiche comuni degli enti sensibili che ne partecipano si genererà un ulteriore εἶδος che spiega le caratteristiche comuni agli enti sensibili e all'εἶδος precedente e così *ad infinitum*. Socrate cerca di rispondere all'obiezione supponendo che gli εἶδη siano solo pensieri, ma, davanti alle obiezioni di Parmenide, dice di preferire l'ipotesi che gli εἶδη siano dei παραδείγματα, di cui gli enti sensibili partecipano (μέθεξις) assomigliando loro. Parmenide fa presente che resta dunque il problema della generazione *ad infinitum* degli εἶδη (131 e – 133 b). Inoltre, afferma Parmenide, qualcuno potrebbe obiettare che gli εἶδη, poiché sono separati dal mondo sensibile, non sono per noi in alcun modo conoscibili: solo un interlocutore molto abile ed esperto (μὴ ἀφύης, πολλῶν ἔμπειρος) si lascerebbe persuadere che un'obiezione del genere è superabile (133 b – 134 e).²⁵

Si è molto discusso sul valore che Platone attribuiva a queste obiezioni di Parmenide alla teoria degli εἶδη e sul rapporto fra questa parte del

²⁴ Sembra che l'obiezione di Parmenide vada messa in relazione con l'interpretazione fisicista che del rapporto fra εἶδη e mondo sensibile dava Eudosso di Cnido (cfr. Arist. *Met.* 991 a 15–19 e 1079 b 18 sgg.) e che un'allusione a Eudosso fosse presente anche nel *Περὶ ἰδεῶν* di Aristotele, cfr. Cardullo 2002, 170–171. Per le analogie fra le obiezioni di Parmenide alla teoria degli εἶδη e le obiezioni di Aristotele, cfr. la stessa Cardullo. Nonostante il *Parm.* tratti la teoria degli εἶδη, che anche Aristotele spesso discute, lo Stagirita non cita mai il *Parm.* né mai vi allude, al contrario di quanto avviene con dialoghi analoghi (*Soph.*, *Theaet.*, *Phil.*). Taylor 1934, 10 e Tabak 2015, 56–57 sono certi che “the objections brought by Parmenides against the doctrine expounded by Socrates did not originate with Plato himself” (Taylor).

²⁵ Su quest'ultima obiezione cfr. ora Duncombe 2013.

dialogo e la γυμνασία della parte successiva. Per quanto riguarda il primo problema, a me pare abbastanza probabile che Platone non considerasse le obiezioni di Parmenide insuperabili; questo è dimostrato non solo dal fatto che lo stesso Parmenide riconosce la necessità di mantenere l'ipotesi degli εἶδη, ma anche dal fatto che, nel resto dei dialoghi platonici, si possono trovare risposte abbastanza chiare alle obiezioni di Parmenide (a parte il problema di quali enti esistano gli εἶδη).²⁶ Particolarmente istruttiva è l'obiezione circa la generazione *ad infinitum* delle idee; essa è ben nota e corrisponde nelle linee fondamentali al celeberrimo argomento del τρίτος ἄνθρωπος. Parmenide chiede a Socrate (132 a): οἰμαί σε ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦδε ἐν ἑκάστον εἶδος οἷσθαι εἶναι· ὅταν πολλὰ ἄττα μεγάλα σοι δόξη εἶναι, μία τις ἴσως δοκεῖ ἰδέα ἢ αὐτὴ εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδόντι, ὅθεν ἐν τῷ μέγα ἡγή εἶναι. Socrate acconsente; Parmenide prosegue: τί δ' αὐτὸ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὰλλα τὰ μεγάλα, ἐὰν ὡσαύτως τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπὶ πάντα ἴδης, οὐχὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μέγα φανεῖται, ᾧ ταῦτα πάντα μεγάλα φαίνεσθαι; È stato giustamente osservato che qui Parmenide confonde essere-identità ed essere-partecipazione, poiché egli tratta l'εἶδος partecipazione, anziché identità, nei riguardi dell'εἶδος stesso.²⁷ Questo punto è di capitale importanza: esso mostra da un lato l' "unità" di questa parte del dialogo con la γυμνασία, poiché in entrambe la discussione è condotta da un interlocutore (Parmenide) che confonde continuamente i significati di εἶναι impedendo alla discussione di procedere in maniera fruttuosa; da un altro lato, dal momento che l'introduzione degli εἶδη e di una dialettica corretta consentono di superare queste difficoltà, si può ragionevolmente supporre che anche nel caso del τρίτος ἄνθρωπος Platone credesse che una dialettica più corretta di quella di Parmenide

²⁶ Cfr. Ferrari 2004, 52–100 e da ultimo Tabak 2015, 5–57. Già Stallbaum 1839, 52–53 osserva: “Quod igitur Socrates in hoc sermone iuvenis inducitur, qui propter artis dialecticae inscitiam subtilissimi disputatoris dubitationes non potest refutare atque idearum doctrinae causam rite sustentare, ea re, nisi magnopere fallor, Plato significare voluit, istiusmodi dubitationes utique cadere in incohatam tantum rudemque doctrinam idearum, qualem fortasse ipse olim adolescens condidisset, neutiquam autem convenire in perfectam suisque rationibus ope artis dialecticae stabilitam et confirmatam doctrinae rationem”. Per Hunt 1997, 17 sgg. la giovinezza di Socrate non spiega che egli non sia in grado di rispondere all'argomento del τρίτος ἄνθρωπος.

²⁷ Hunt 1997, 19; Ferrari 2004, 77. Anche quanto Parmenide obietta circa la μέθεξις dei particolari sensibili agli εἶδη e l'impossibilità per questi ultimi di dividersi fra i diversi partecipanti trova probabilmente corrispondenza in H 1 D 2, allorché Parmenide dice che l'ἐν si divide in ogni parte dell'essere (144 c), cfr. Apelt 1891, 48–49, con altre importanti osservazioni su come la γυμνασία mostri che le obiezioni che Parmenide muove alla teoria degli εἶδη si applicano in maniera ancora più grave all'ἐν parmenideo.

potesse facilmente risolvere l'aporia.²⁸ Non mi soffermo qui sulle altre obiezioni di Parmenide, poiché ciò non sarebbe essenziale per il nostro discorso. Quello che mi pare chiaro è che Platone considera le obiezioni di Parmenide di per sé superabili, ma Socrate non in grado di superarle (il giovane ateniese non è, infatti, in grado di rispondere all'Eleate).²⁹ Ancor più importante è per noi osservare che Parmenide nella prima parte del dialogo commette gli stessi errori dialettici che commetterà nella seconda.³⁰

Se quanto abbiamo fin qui detto è corretto, Platone credeva che agli Eleati mancasse un metodo dialettico corretto e che tale metodo divenisse possibile solo con la teoria degli εἶδη. C'è qualcosa degli Eleati che Platone valuta positivamente? Come dicevo all'inizio di questo lavoro, per rispondere a questa domanda molti studiosi si sono basati sul confronto fra alcuni aspetti del pensiero platonico ed eleatico, prescindendo da quello che Platone dice esplicitamente circa Parmenide e la sua scuola. Questo modo di procedere è legittimo e anch'io tornerò *infra* su questo argomento, ma prima c'è un altro punto, sul quale Platone si è espresso in modo abbastanza chiaro, che dobbiamo discutere. Alla fine della prima parte del *Parm.*, prima di iniziare la lunga γυμνασία, l'anziano Eleate dice a Socrate che la teoria degli εἶδη formulata dal giovane ateniese è corretta, ma che Socrate ancora non ha la maturità per svilupparla, perché non ha ancora praticato la γυμνασία (135 c–d): di quale γυμνασία si tratta, chiede Socrate? Parmenide risponde che si tratta di quella che Socrate ha sentito utilizzare da Zenone, che consiste cioè nel porre un'ipotesi (ὑπόθεσις) e vedere quali conseguenze ne risultino. Orbene, questo modo di procedere è esattamente quello che Platone attribuisce a Socrate, sia in *Phaedo* (100 a–c) sia in *Prot.* (351 e) e che caratterizza il metodo

²⁸ Platone allude alla questione anche in *Resp.* 597 c e *Tim.* 30 d – 31 b, anche se il modo come in questi passi supera l'obiezione del τρίτος ἄνθρωπος è “una sorta di *petitio principii*” (Ferrari 2004, 79 n. 145).

²⁹ Verlinsky mi fa osservare che il lettore del *Parm.* non trova nulla (all'interno dello stesso *Parm.*) che faccia pensare che Platone, quando scriveva il *Parm.*, aveva in mente soluzioni alle aporie sollevati dai due Eleati nella prima parte del dialogo: il problema è sostanzialmente lo stesso discusso nella nota 22, quanto cioè ogni dialogo debba essere letto come unità a sé stante. Io credo che bisogna tenere sempre presente che i dialoghi traggono origine da discussioni che Platone aveva coi suoi contemporanei e che quindi quanto ciascuno di essi esplicitamente dice vada integrato il più possibile con deduzioni da altre testimonianze. Nel caso del *Parm.*, dato che la data drammatica è posta all'inizio dell'attività filosofica di Socrate, mi pare lecito supporre che il lettore sia stimolato a pensare che i problemi ivi trattati sono vecchi e ormai risolti, dal momento che Socrate ha passato la vita cercando di risolverli.

³⁰ Cfr. a questo proposito anche le osservazioni di Apelt citate nella nota 27.

socratico-platonico della discussione dialettica.³¹ In altre parole, nel *Parm.* si attribuisce agli Eleati il metodo ipotetico deduttivo, che Socrate nel *Phaedo* dice caratteristico del proprio metodo e che nel *Prot.* lo stesso Protagora gli attribuisce. Gli Eleati non conoscono la teoria degli εἶδη (nel *Parm.* è chiarissimo che Parmenide e Zenone ne sentono parlare per la prima volta nel momento in cui Socrate la espone in loro presenza³²) e questo impedisce loro (come è detto chiarissimamente nel *Soph.*) di sviluppare una dialettica corretta e profonda; tuttavia, Platone attribuisce loro il metodo ipotetico-deduttivo: così come i due Eleati sono totalmente ignari degli εἶδη, altrettanto ignaro sembra Socrate del metodo ipotetico-deduttivo (altrimenti non si spiegherebbe perché Parmenide glielo debba insegnare). Eppure, lo stesso Platone afferma più volte che anche il metodo ipotetico-deduttivo è tipico del modo di procedere socratico, non meno della teoria degli εἶδη. L'impressione che ho, è che nel *Parm.* Platone voglia attribuire a ciascuno i suoi meriti: a Socrate va la paternità della teoria degli εἶδη, agli Eleatici quella del metodo ipotetico-deduttivo.³³

Questa interpretazione si concilia benissimo anche con il *Soph.*: lo ξέvoς si mostra abile nell'argomentare e, appena integra le competenze che già la scuola eleatica gli ha dato con la teoria degli εἶδη, è perfettamente in grado di arrivare ai massimi risultati cui un dialettico possa aspirare. Diogene Laerzio (3, 52) dice che lo ξέvoς Ἑλεάτης esprime le opinioni di Platone.³⁴ Questa affermazione è giusta, nel senso che, durante la conversazione con Teeteto, lo ξέvoς passa da una posizione eleatica a una posizione platonico-socratica. Come si apprende dall'inizio del *Soph.*, lo ξέvoς non ha mai prima incontrato Socrate e nel seguito del dialogo egli arriva su posizioni socratico-platoniche da solo, senza ricevere il minimo aiuto da parte di Socrate, che resta muto. Anche l'aiuto che egli riceve da Teeteto è modestissimo, poiché il giovane Teeteto è ancora immaturo, come il giorno prima lo stesso Socrate ha sperimentato (nel *Theaet.*). Confrontando *Parm.* e *Soph.* ho l'impressione che Platone voglia dirci

³¹ Cfr. anche *Resp.* 510 b – 511 e; 533 c–e; Taylor 1952, 118 sgg.; Robinson 1952, 93 sgg.

³² Cfr. Taylor 1915–1916, 243–244.

³³ Burnet 1924, 163–164 è certo che Socrate abbia appreso il metodo ipotetico-deduttivo da Zenone; cfr. anche Taylor 1926, 203.

³⁴ A proposito dello ξέvoς del *Soph.*, il lavoro di Gonzalez 2000 non porta alcun contributo serio: scrivere che lo ξέvoς “appears utterly unsympathetic to philosophy as Socrates practices it” (163), che “the Stranger has failed his task” (168), significa aver frainteso completamente il *Soph.* Gonzalez commette l'errore fatale (purtroppo abbastanza diffuso) di cercare di interpretare il *Soph.* senza tenere in considerazione il *Parm.* Cfr. ora le giuste (per quel che riguarda lo ξέvoς come portavoce di Platone) osservazioni di Cordero 2013, 189.

che un eleatico, una volta che abbandoni la rigida negazione del non-essere propria di Parmenide e accolga la teoria degli εἶδη, può divenire un vero filosofo. Non mi spiego altrimenti perché Platone abbia introdotto lo ξένος Ἐλεάτης al posto di Socrate e lo abbia fatto dialogare, anziché con Socrate, con l'inesperto Teeteto. Se a Platone stava a cuore continuare la discussione del *Theaet.* e voleva svilupparla come effettivamente la ha sviluppata nel *Soph.*, non c'era nulla che lo costringesse a introdurre un rappresentante della scuola di Elea: le cose che dice lo ξένος avrebbe potuto dirle altrettanto bene Socrate (anzi, Socrate sarebbe arrivato prima alle conclusioni, in quanto non avrebbe dovuto sbarazzarsi degli errori della dialettica eleatica). Perché allora introdurre lo ξένος? Evidentemente, per confermare e approfondire il messaggio del *Parm.*, che cioè gli Eleati hanno dato un serio contributo alla filosofia e, in particolare, all'arte argomentativa, ma che senza la dialettica socratico-platonica non si poteva procedere oltre. La dialettica socratica sembra intesa da Platone come una continuazione di quanto gli Eleati avevano iniziato.³⁵

Se quanto ho detto fin qui è corretto, l'interpretazione del *Parm.* nel suo complesso non presenta più gravi difficoltà: per quanto concerne la dialettica, Platone riconosce alcuni meriti agli Eleati, ma crede che tutto ciò che questi filosofi potevano offrire di buono sia stato assunto da Socrate nel suo metodo, sicché la posizione eleatica è ormai totalmente superata (questo era funzionale al discorso di Platone in quanto, come vedremo, filosofi a lui contemporanei avevano ripreso l'Eleatismo: a costoro Platone voleva indicare che tale filosofia era superata e obsoleta, sebbene non priva di meriti storici). In questo quadro si spiega benissimo l'atteggiamento di Parmenide nei confronti del giovane Socrate: è evidente che l'anziano Eleate non ha mai sentito parlare della teoria degli εἶδη ed è anche evidente che, dato che Socrate propone tale teoria per confutare quanto detto da Zenone, le cui argomentazioni erano invece a favore della tesi di Parmenide, l'anziano Eleate avrebbe potuto mostrarsi contrario alla teoria degli εἶδη (come, infatti, Pitodoro sospetta, 130 a). Parmenide

³⁵ Capra – Martinelli Tempesta 2011, 140 affermano che Socrate avrebbe disatteso per tutta la vita le raccomandazioni di Parmenide. Ma come spiegano i due studiosi che Platone *apertis verbis* faccia di Parmenide e Zenone i maestri di Socrate riguardo a quel metodo ipotetico-deduttivo, che egli considerava come uno dei principali caratteri positivi del socratismo? Anche il suggerimento di Parmenide a Socrate, di non curarsi delle ἀνθρώπων δόξαι (130 e) va letto, secondo me, alla luce di quanto Parmenide dice circa l'ἀδόλεσχία (135 d): in entrambi i passi Parmenide esprime posizioni corrette in quanto tipiche dei filosofi opposte e a quelle della gente comune. Non si dovrebbe inoltre mai dimenticare, quando si parla di Parmenide e il pensiero socratico-platonico, che la divisione fra mondo sensibile / mondo intelligibile (accettata da Platone) ha origine eleatica.

muove in effetti alcune obiezioni alla teoria degli εἶδη, ma, nonostante che Socrate non sia in grado di rispondere adeguatamente a tali obiezioni, riconosce che la teoria degli εἶδη è l'unica soluzione per salvare la filosofia; addirittura, quanto egli dice presenta una stretta somiglianza con quanto dice lo ξένος nel *Soph.* dopo che ha rinunciato agli insegnamenti parmenidei per abbracciare la teoria socratica (cfr. *Parm.* 135 b–c con *Soph.* 259 e). Non c'è dubbio che Platone, scrivendo i due passi, ha voluto che i lettori osservassero la coincidenza di pensiero; il messaggio platonico mi pare abbastanza chiaro: gli Eleati hanno dato un importante contributo alla filosofia (come mostra il fatto che Socrate apprenda da loro il metodo ipotetico-deduttivo e la prontezza con cui Parmenide e lo ξένος comprendono l'importanza degli εἶδη³⁶), ma, poiché non sono arrivati agli εἶδη e sono invece rimasti legati a una dialettica primitiva, che non ha chiarito il rapporto essere / non-essere, non sono divenuti veri dialettici e filosofi. Del resto, Parmenide intuisce con notevole prontezza la bontà della teoria proposta dal giovane Socrate,³⁷ ma, non solo ne è completamente ignaro, ma per tutta la seconda parte del dialogo mostra, suo malgrado, quali conseguenze funeste ha non applicare la dialettica degli εἶδη. Parmenide è anche sufficientemente perspicace da apprezzare che Socrate abbia detto a Zenone che l'indagine deve riguardare la realtà intelligibile e non quella sensibile (135 d–e),³⁸ ma, quando mostra la propria dialettica (cioè in tutta la seconda parte del dialogo), Platone ne evidenzia impietosamente i gravissimi limiti. Particolarmente significativo

³⁶ È fondamentale dare il peso adeguato al fatto che Parmenide riconosce l'importanza della teoria degli εἶδη: cfr. Rist 1970, 228 che mette in relazione questo con il fatto che Platone attribuiva a Parmenide la scoperta della differenza mondo sensibile / mondo intelligibile.

³⁷ Si osservi anche che Parmenide, quando muove le sue obiezioni alla teoria degli εἶδη, riconosce che un interlocutore μὴ ἀφύης καὶ πολλῶν ἔμπειρος, se ben guidato nella conversazione, sarà in grado di superarla (133 b–c). Anche in questo caso Parmenide mostra dunque di intuire la via giusta della filosofia, senza poterla percorrere per mancanza di strumenti dialettici adeguati. Inoltre, Parmenide muove a Socrate obiezioni alle quali il giovane Ateniese non è in grado di rispondere; supponiamo, come pare legittimo e doveroso, che Platone credesse che, al tempo in cui si svolse il dialogo fra Parmenide e Socrate, Socrate fosse l'unica persona a conoscere la teoria degli εἶδη: se dunque Socrate non è in grado di rispondere alle obiezioni di Parmenide, ne segue che nessuno a quel tempo era in grado di farlo e dunque esse rappresentavano un reale contributo alla filosofia. Solo lo sviluppo successivo del metodo dialettico consentirà di risolvere i problemi posti da Parmenide, che dunque, nel momento in cui l'Eleate li sollevò, avevano piena legittimità.

³⁸ Il Parmenide storico e lo Zenone storico sono sempre partiti da indagini sul mondo sensibile e di questo Platone era probabilmente ben consapevole, cfr. Brisson 2002, 5 sgg.

è che Parmenide arrivi a conclusioni che si contraddicono proprio a proposito dell'uno e dell'essere, cioè di quello che, secondo Platone, costituiva il centro della filosofia dell'Eleate. Parmenide afferma tutto e il suo esatto contrario proprio circa i punti fondamentali della sua filosofia: è evidente che ciò che Platone vuole mettere davanti ai lettori non è una dottrina particolare, sibbene le continue antinomie e il metodo carente e rozzo, che a tali antinomie porta.

Il metodo argomentativo usato da Parmenide nella seconda parte del dialogo è lo stesso (e porta agli stessi risultati) di quello che Platone attribuisce più volte agli odiati ἀντιλογικοί. Questo punto è di fondamentale importanza, poiché Platone ha polemizzato per tutta la vita contro l'eristica degli ἀντιλογικοί e il *Parm.* assieme al *Soph.* suggerisce che Platone ritenesse gli Eleati all'origine dell'eristica più perversa.³⁹ Una delle prime cose che Socrate dice per confutare gli argomenti di Zenone e introdurre la teoria degli εἶδη (129 c), è che ὁ ἄνθρωπος è contemporaneamente ἓν καὶ πολλά (ovviamente “uno” in quanto essere umano e molti in quanto ciascun essere umano è composto di più parti, ha certe caratteristiche ecc.). Nel *Soph.* lo ξένος, da poco πατραλοίας, quando sta arrivando a comprendere la natura dell'essere partecipazione, dice che ὁ ἄνθρωπος può avere molte qualità (χρώματα, σχήματα, μεγέθη, κακίας, ἀρετάς), e che questo non verrà accettato da quei giovani e vecchi ottusi (νέοι καὶ οἱ ὀψιμαθεῖς τῶν γερόντων) che negano di un ente si possa predicare qualsiasi cosa oltre se stesso (251 a–c). Si tratta evidentemente di quegli eristi che dicevano che ἄνθρωπος è solo ἄνθρωπος, ἵππος solo ἵππος ecc., che negavano cioè la possibilità dei giudizi sintetici. Contro tali eristi Platone ha polemizzato sovente (cfr. *Phil.* 14–15, che ricorda molto da vicino il passo del *Soph.*). A Zenone viene attribuito sia il negare che di un ente si possano predicare più cose (*Parm.* 129 c) sia il mostrare che τὰ αὐτὰ ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια, καὶ ἓν καὶ πολλά (*Phaedr.* 261 d). Dunque, da un lato, secondo Platone, Zenone mostra che ἓν καὶ πολλά sono la stessa cosa, dall'altro nega che dell'ἓν si possano predicare più cose. A prima vista questo può apparire contraddittorio, ma in realtà entrambi i procedimenti erano tipici degli odiati ἀντιλογικοί. Mai forse come nell'*Euthyd.* Platone ci ha mostrato il procedimento di questi sofisti:⁴⁰ all'inizio del dialogo Dionisodoro ed

³⁹ Cherniss 1932, 125 scrive giustamente: “this amounts to calling Parmenides the fountain-head of all Sophistry, for as the sophist is ἀντιλογικός, Parmenides, who by his dictum of *Non-Being* gave rise to all these senseless antinomies, is the most ἀντιλογικός of all”.

⁴⁰ L'importanza di *Euth.* 283 e – 286 b per comprendere il *Soph.* è riconosciuta anche da Palmer 1999, 124 sgg. Per un elenco dei passi in cui Platone tratta degli eristi, cfr. Keulen 1971, 62–63.

Eutidemo portano Clinia a dire che οἱ μανθάνοντες sono sia i σοφοί che gli ἀμαθεῖς e che οἱ μανθάνοντες sono sia coloro che sanno sia coloro che non sanno (Dionisodoro confessa addirittura in segreto a Socrate che lo scopo della conversazione è confutare Clinia, qualsiasi cosa egli risponda). La dimostrazione di una cosa e del suo esatto contrario è tipica, secondo Platone, di Zenone, ma nella seconda parte del *Parm.* lo stesso Parmenide procede in questo modo, proponendo cioè continue contraddizioni basate su procedimenti dialettici capziosi. Anche altre capziosità, che il *Parm.* e il *Soph.* mostrano insite nel modo di argomentare degli Eleati, si incontrano nell'*Euthyd.*: a 283 c–d un sofisma di Dionisodoro si basa sulla non distinzione fra essere partecipativo ed essere esenziale, a 283 e – 284 a i due eristi giocano sul significato di τὰ ὄντα = τὰ ἀληθῆ, a 286 a sgg. Dionisodoro afferma l'impossibilità di dire o pensare cose false, a 297 d – 298 e il gioco eristico riguarda il significato partecipativo o assoluto di πατήρ. È evidente che per Platone l'eristica di Dionisodoro ed Eutidemo è dello stesso tipo di quella contro cui sono diretti il *Parm.* e il *Soph.* e che Platone crede che tale eristica possa essere vinta con la dialettica degli εἶδη. A proposito della negazione della possibilità di dire cose false, Socrate, nell'*Euthyd.* (286 b sgg.), dice a Dionisodoro di aver già sentito spesso tale argomento e che οἱ ἅμφὶ Πρωταγόραν σφόδρα ἐχρῶντο αὐτῷ καὶ οἱ ἔτι παλαιότεροι. Non c'è dubbio che οἱ ἔτι παλαιότεροι siano gli Eleati, come è sufficiente a mostrare *Soph.* 260 c–d, ove la negazione del non essere viene attribuita al sofista, che cerca di sfuggire a chi tenta di definirlo, mentre poco prima essa era stata attribuita a Parmenide.⁴¹

Continua.

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⁴¹ Che gli Eleati fossero all'origine dell'eristica affermano esplicitamente alcune fonti antiche, cfr. Keulen 1971, 77 n. 68. Anche Palmer 1999, 128 crede che οἱ παλαιότεροι dell'*Euthyd.* siano gli Eleati.

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The second part of Plato's *Parmenides* (Parmenides' reasoning, which starts from two opposite hypotheses – that One exists and that One does not exist) contains a number of fallacious arguments which are a signal to the reader that Parmenidean logic inevitably involves contradictions and absurdities. Plato does not explicitly point out in the *Parmenides* how these difficulties are to be resolved, but in his later *Sophist* demonstrates that only the assumption of the existence of Platonic εἶδη can save the logic of the relationship between One and Many from such absurdities. The reason why he treats Parmenides' teaching so disrespectfully in the *Parmenides* is his hostility to the eristic kind of argumentation which, in his view, descends from Parmenides, a primitive dialectician (Dionysodorus' captious arguments in the *Euthydemus* often entail the same logical errors as Parmenides' reasoning in the homonymous dialogue). In spite of this interpretation of Parmenides' philosophy as having such an infamous association, Plato acknowledges Socrates' and his own debt to the Eleatic school: both the assumption of an intelligible world and the hypothetico-deductive method of reasoning originate in Eleaticism, and Plato shows his awareness of this.

Во второй части “Парменида” Платона в рассуждении Парменида, исходящем из двух взаимоисключающих гипотез – что Единое существует и что не существует, – содержится ряд ошибочных аргументов, которые должны показать читателю, что логика Парменида противоречива и абсурдна. В этом диалоге Платон не говорит прямо, как разрешить эти противоречия, однако позже, в “Софисте”, показывает, что только гипотеза о существовании идей (εἶδη) помогает избавить рассуждение об отношениях Единого и Многого от нелепостей. Причина столь пренебрежительного отношения к учению Парменида в “Пармениде” – неприязнь Платона к эристической аргументации, которая, по его мнению, восходит к элейскому философу – примитивному диалектику (в каверзных аргументах Дионисодора в “Евтидеме” часто встречаются те же логические ошибки, что у Парменида в одноименном диалоге). Хотя Платон и ассоциирует философию Парменида со столь её компрометирующими эпигонами, он признает, что и Сократ, и он сам многим обязаны элейской школе, к которой восходит как предположение о наличии умопостигаемого мира, так и гипотетико-дедуктивный метод аргументации.

POETA CLASSICUS: WAS HORACE IN THE FLEET DURING THE BATTLE OF ACTIUM?

Introduction

Let me begin by addressing the question raised in the title of the article – was Horace in the fleet of Octavian during the Battle of Actium, depicted in the 9th Epode? It is my deepest conviction that he was not there. That Maecenas was present goes largely undisputed,¹ but it seems highly improbable that Horace would not have made *explicit* reference to this unusual experience, had he truly been amongst the fleet.

Whilst there is some evidence of Horace's military experience, it is not possible to claim that he participated in this particular campaign. However, it is the ambiguity of various hypotheses that lead critics to not exclude his presence at the Battle of Actium.

This tendency is particularly evident at the end of the last century – D. Mankin summarizes a common consensus thus: “it appears likely that the setting is Actium, possibly on board a ship in the Caesarian fleet”.² Another supporter of this hypothesis, R. Nisbet, refers to the works of Wistrand and Kraggerud,³ as well as his own, from 1984 to 2007.⁴

¹ Here we have a contradiction between *Elegiae ad Maecenatem* 1. 45 sq. (1st cent. AD) and the evidence of Appianus (*Civ.* 4. 50), who according to Wistrand's opinion, may have confused the Actium with the Alexandrian war (Wistrand 1958, 14–19).

² Mankin 1995, 159; see also 180 (on v. 35, following): “it <nausea> seems to be a possibly decisive indication that the poem is set on a ship in the Caesarian fleet <...>. Octavian himself spent the night following the battle on his ship, and it would not be surprising if his friends did the same”.

Nisbet 2007, 11: “It is disputed whether Horace was present at the Battle of Actium”. Mayer 1994, 273: “Horace may have been ...” (he also compares Horace's mention of a war experience with Aeschylus' epitaph); Watson 2003, 57: “it therefore seems likeliest that he was at Actium”. See also idem, 311; Wistrand 1958; Citroni 2000, 53.

³ Wistrand 1958, 2–65; Kraggerud 1984, 66–128.

⁴ Nisbet 1984, 9–17, Nisbet 2007, 11–12. For full bibliography see Setaioli 1981, 1716–1728.

In contrast, Ed. Fraenkel⁵ was clearly against the assumption, but unfortunately this was because he believed that Maecenas was present in Rome as Octavian's vice-regent.⁶

Thus, without any prominent opponent, Watson⁷ presents his case for Horaces' presence thus:

- In *Epode* 1 Horace declares his intention to follow Maecenas, even to war;
- There is some suggestion of autopsy in the 9th *Epode* (*at huc, sinistrorsum*);
- There are also references to military campaign(s) after Philippi (*Carm.* 2. 6; *Epist.* 1. 20).⁸

We will consider all three arguments, albeit in a different order and with some new considerations. The article will begin with a comparison of the 9th *Epode* with several other passages by Horace: this has not been done before, and the author believes that by doing so the reader may see a reflection of two events, of which Horace undoubtedly participated in one (the Battle of Philippi) and might have experienced the other (the shipwreck at the Cape of Palinuro).

I. References to the Battle of Philippi and the Campaign Against Sextus Pompeius

Horace makes two references to the Battle of Philippi in the *Odes* (*Carm.* 2. 7; 3. 4. 26) and one in the *Epistles* (*Epist.* 2. 2. 49).⁹ There are a number of reasons for this: the return of an amnestied friend;¹⁰ custody of the Muses, who saved Horace from death several times; lengthy remembrance of youth (*Epist.* 2. 2. 41–54). It is worth noting that the earliest of these

⁵ Fraenkel 1968, 7.

⁶ Based on the evidence of Appianus, see above n. 1. The same mistake drew Richard Bentley away from the discussion (Bentley 1711, 192): "... si carmen hoc in castris Caesarianis praesens scripsisset Noster: is vero tum Romae erat cum Maecenate urbi praefecto".

⁷ Watson 2003, 3 n. 28.

⁸ Here I omit Watson's argument: "the long established practice of taking a poet on campaign to hymn the expected military successes".

⁹ The passage (*Serm.* 1. 6. 48 *quod mihi pareret legio Romana tribuno*) refers to the same period, but gives no information on the battle itself.

¹⁰ Pompeius Varus was not the only friend of Horace who took part in the battle: others were Messala Corvinus, Lucius Sestius, Quintus Dellius a.o. (for a full list, and on the significance of the battle in Horace's life see Citroni 2000, 28).

poems dates back to 30 BC, so the events of October 23, 42 BC (the second battle at the town of Philippi) occurred quite some time before the poems were composed.

The most detailed description of the battle at Philippi is found in the famous *Carmen* 2. 7. Set in the context of a welcome feast being prepared for Pompeius Varus the account of this historical event contains:

1) personal impressions of Horace: *Philippos et celerem fugam sensi* (2. 7. 9–10), *me Mercurius paventem aere sustulit* (2. 7. 13–14);

2) an indication of the historical significance of the battle – the death of the leaders and the failure of the republicans (2. 7. 11–12).¹¹

Two other passages only mention the battle in passing, as an event that might have led the young poet to his doom: in the *Epistle* 2. 2. 49–51 the social impact is stressed (although ironically, the battle itself is referred to as a demobilization):

unde simul primum me dimisere Philippi
decisis humilem pinnis inopemque paterni
et laris et fundi ...

while in the *Carm.* 3. 4 the occasions on which Horace came close to death are recounted:

vestris amicum fontibus et choris 25
non me Philippis versa acies retro,¹²
devota non extinxit arbor,
nec Sicula Palinurus unda.

This latter mention of a dangerous encounter – supposedly the shipwreck at Capo Palinuro – is reminiscent of another event when during the campaign against Sextus Pompeius (36 BC) the Octavian's fleet was almost destroyed by a storm. The ablativus instrumenti *unda Sicula* may imply it, as it denotes *bellum Siculum*,¹³ whereas the Cape of Palinuro is in fact located quite far from Sicily.

¹¹ On the phrase *minaces turpe solum tetigere mente* see Nisbet–Hubbard 1978, 114–115.

¹² It is possible to consider these words a reference to the point when Brutus's legions were driven back while their ranks crumbled under pressure and the second and third reserve lines failed to keep pace with the retreat so that all three lines became entangled.

¹³ Nisbet–Rudd 2004, 66. The same incidence is mentioned in *Carm.* 2. 17. 20 (for commentary see Nisbet–Hubbard 1978, 281).

Appianus delivers the news of the naval disaster at Capo Palinuro (*Civ.* 5. 98), along with the information that right after this Maecenas was sent back to Rome (*Civ.* 5. 99). Consequently it is quite possible to assume that Horace was present as a member of Maecenas' retinue, as he escorted him on route to Brundisium (*Serm.* 1. 5).¹⁴

Admittedly, it seems more appealing to consider the 1st *Epode* as a reference to Sextus Pompeius than to the war with Antony, especially considering that Horace states in this poem that he is ready to accompany his high-ranking friend to naval war, while the campaign of 31–30 BC took place both on land and at sea.¹⁵

The reference of the 1st *Epode* to the events of 36 BC is by no means a new idea – among its proponents are T. Dyer (with his article in *Classical Museum*, 1845) and M. W. Thompson.¹⁶ Arguments against this relatively early date were put forward by Watson¹⁷ and Williams:¹⁸ they doubt that the opening piece of the book could date from so early on. Meanwhile the 1st *Epode* does not follow the traditional format of an opening poem and might have been placed first because it is the most serious of the four poems to Maecenas.¹⁹

After noting that the argument concerning the 1st *Epode* can be dismissed, let us observe some features in the passages above. Typically, when Horace describes the events that he witnessed

- 1) a place-name (e. g. of the battle) is directly stated;
- 2) 1st person pronouns and verbs are used (*sensi, me paventem, non me extinxit, dura emovere loco me tempora, me dimisere*);
- 3) Horace does not conceal the fact that he felt fear at being in the middle of fateful events.

This last point reveals a contradiction: even if there were not heavy casualties in *Bellum Actiacum*, a poet who described himself as *inbellis ac firmus parum* (*Epod.* 1. 16) could not but help indicating his presence in the fleet at Actium, as one of several dangerous situations experienced.

¹⁴ Another indirect argument can be discerned in the absence of information about any long-distant journeys made by Horace, apart from his visit to Greece in the 40s BC, whereas a usual route to Greece and back did not pass through the Tyrrhenian Sea.

¹⁵ Unfortunately, the reference to Liburnian galleys (*Epod.* 1. 1), an anchor for many scholars' hopes, provides no clear victory one way or another, as this kind of vessels was used both in 36 and 31 BC (Watson 2003, 59 with further literature).

¹⁶ Thompson 1970, 328.

¹⁷ Watson 2003, 57.

¹⁸ Williams 1972, 11.

¹⁹ *Epodes* 1, 3, 9 and 14. For some analyses on the composition of the *Epodes* as a book see Egorova 2014 [С. К. Егорова, "Эподы Горация и традиция составления стихотворного сборника"], 208–227.

II. 9th *Epode*

Let us analyse now the text of the 9th *Epode*.

First of all, the 9th *Epode* is an example of symposiac poetry rather than a description of the entire battle.²⁰ It has a ring-composition: lines 1–6 contain plans for the future feast, while lines 21–38 describe the official triumph²¹ marking the end of the war, with suggestions of a celebration. (This last section contains also some vague information on Antony's next movements.)

The first part of the poem begins with a rhetoric question: *quando... tecum sub alta ... domo ... bibam?* (ll. 1–4). These very words were for a long time interpreted as an indication of a scene far from Rome.²² However other details suggest that the focus is not on the scene (at Maecenas' house), but rather the whole event – both the solemn feast with Caecuban wine (l. 1: *repostum Caecubum ad festas dapes*) and the concert (ll. 5–6: *sonante mixtum tibiis carmen lyra, / hac Dorium, illis barbarum*). Therefore, regardless of Horace's whereabouts, it can be deduced that the scene describes a specific celebration, at the end of the campaign, when Octavian's victory is undisputed. The present state is depicted with some indistinctness, which arises suspicion that the poem was composed after news of the naval victory had reached Rome.²³

Following a 4-line junction (*ut nuper...*, ll. 7–10, of the Naulochus battle) the description of the battle itself begins with a series of general statements (a woman-leader, a mosquito-net amidst standards) and even a topos (an eastern court of Egypt is represented by palace-eunuchs),²⁴ – any of the details could have been guessed by anyone in Rome; while the action itself is reduced to a pair of episodes: desertion of Galatians (ll. 17–18) and the awkward movement (or forced immobility) of Antony's fleet (ll. 19–20).²⁵

In this case, the only indication as to the presence of the poet *in situ* are two spatial references: *at huc* – 'but here' (hither, this way) in line 17 and *sinistrorsum* – 'to the left' in line 20.²⁶

²⁰ For an interpretation of the 9th *Epode* as a symposiac poem see Giusti 2016, 131 fol.

²¹ It occurred 13–15 August 29 BC, see also *Carm.* 1. 37.

²² E. g. Nisbet–Hubbard 1978, 100.

²³ This indistinctness was noticed even by Watson 2003, 3.

²⁴ Tac. *Ann.* 6. 31; Ter. *Eun.* 167–168; Hor. *Carm.* 1. 37. 9–10.

²⁵ Wistrand 1958, 2–65.

²⁶ I see no problem in sickness (nausea, l. 35): even if Suet. *Aug.* 17 states that Octavianus *in nave victor pernoctaverit*, there is no reason to assume that Horace writes the poem aboard, desperately seasick, and all the more so using Caecuban wine as a cure. The mention of a nervous qualm adds color to the naval context of the poem.

The first expression, “a crucial (in both senses) piece of evidence”,²⁷ is a reference to the desertion of Antony by 2,000 Galatians:²⁸

at huc frementis verterunt bis mille equos
Galli canentes Caesarem.

at huc a² *unus* Bland. ad hunc V A a¹ Ccorr. R F δ¹ p u Ott. Ox. P Æ
adhuc C¹ λ l δ²

Although Nisbet believes *at huc* to be “the only plausible reading”, it should be noted that this is only a recent correction of the text in the mss. The well-preserved reading is *ad hunc* (hunc = Romanum, l. 11, i. e. Marcum Antonium), which is also possible, though not too elegant.²⁹

The passage is also problematic because the magnificent scene with snorting horses and singing horse-men galloping towards the enemy’s camp at the shore of the Actium peninsula differs greatly from other sources reporting on the desertion of Galatians:³⁰

Velleius Paterculus mentions the desertion of the Galatian king Amyntas very briefly: *rex Amyntas meliora et utiliora secutus...* (84. 2).

According to Plutarch, Galatian left Antony’s camp a week, or at least a few days, before the battle (*Ant.* 63. 3).

Dio Cassius (50. 13. 8) adds an interesting detail: his focus is not on the desertion itself, but on Antony’s fear of being abandoned by his allies. In the chapter preceding that which describes the naval battle, Antony is said to call back some Galatians, who had been sent to Thrace to collect taxes. The historian does not tell whether they did in fact return, and one can assume that they did not.

This detail may also lead to the conclusion that the poem was written far from where the battle took place, by which time the events of several days had become known across Rome and Italy.

This intermediate derivation is also significant because the second passage, where the “signs of autopsy” are found, is very obscure:

hostiliumque navium portu latent
puppes sinistrorsum citae.

²⁷ Nisbet 2007, 12.

²⁸ The text and the *apparatus criticus* are taken from Borzsák 1984, ad loc.

²⁹ With the preposition *ad* meaning ‘against’.

³⁰ This was noticed often, see e.g. Watson 2003, 315.

These words were thoroughly examined by Wistrand³¹ and Kraggerud,³² who found phases of the naval action that support this contradictory description.³³ The word *sinistrorsum* (*sinistrorsus*) – ‘to the left’ – is particularly unclear in this context and seems to show some “starting point” from which the spatial direction are marked (i.e. to the right/left from the speaker). Nevertheless all the passages cited in connection to this word in the *OLD* suggest that usually this adverb implies the reference to the moving direction regardless of the location of the narrator:³⁴

Ille sinistrorsum, hic dextrorsum abit (Hor. *Serm.* 2. 3. 50);

<Hercynia silva> oritur ab Helvetiorum ... finibus rectaque fluminis Danubi regione pertinet ad fines Dacorum et Anartium; hinc se flectit sinistrorsum diversis ab flumine regionibus... (Caes. *BG* 6. 25. 2–3);

Concipitur Appia in agro Lucullano Via Praenestina inter miliarium septimum et octavum deverticulo sinistrorsus passuum septingentorum octoginta (Fron. *Aq.* 1. 5);

... natus est VIII. Kal. Ian. in villa colli superposita prope Tarracinam, sinistrorsus Fundos petentibus (Suet. *Gal.* 4. 1).

This last observation does not solve the riddle of the verses 19–20,³⁵ but makes the presence of the poet unnecessary.

Therefore it is to be stated that

- 1) the text of the 9th Epode contains no clear signs of autopsy;
- 2) Horace was writing about events which had taken place several days, or even a week before the battle;
- 3) the passage lacks typical hallmarks, such as descriptions of his own impressions, first person narration, and so on.

III. Minor references to military service after Philippi

The first of two poems in question is *Carm.* 2. 6, a declaration of love to Tibur (Tivoli) and Tarentum (Taranto),³⁶ addressed to a friend called

³¹ Wistrand 1958, 26.

³² Kraggerud 1984, 94.

³³ On the sequence of events see Pelling 2001, 54–59 esp. Figure 1, p. 60.

³⁴ The gloss Paul. Fest. P. 117M has no context: *Laetrorsum sinistrorsum*.

³⁵ The verb *lateo* does not imply movement, but rather a state or result, e. g. *in silvis abditī latebant* (Caes. *BG* 2. 19. 1).

³⁶ On Tarentum see also *Epist.* 1. 6. 44–45; 1. 16. 11.

the Elder mentions that baths were prescribed against wounds (*aquae volneribus medentur*, 31. 10), so it can be assumed that the scope of ailments the baths cured might extend to arthritis and old wounds, which must be valuable for soldiers who participated in the campaigns of 60–40 BC.⁴¹

The second passage is distinctly different, forming part of an autobiography in the last poem of the first book of the *Epistles*.

The “person” to whom the poem is addressed is particularly interesting – it is the book of *Epistles*, prepared for publication, and also a young man, recently freed, who wishes to leave the house and explore the world. Horace gives it/him the following commission (*Epist.* 1. 20. 19–25):

Cum tibi sol tepidus pluris admouerit auris,	
me libertino natum patre et in tenui re	20
maiores pinnas nido extendisse loqueris,	
ut quantum generi demas, virtutibus addas;	
me primis urbis belli placuisse domique,	
corporis exigui, praecanum, solibus aptum,	
irasci celerem, tamen ut placabilis essem.	

Line 23 contains the phrase *belli domique*, which has attracted the interest of those who believe that Horace might have been at other campaigns after Philippi. The phrase *belli domique* is a formal one⁴² and usually goes with praise for a distinguished person who proved himself both in the war and civil life. Here the book/freedman should declare that Horace could please the finest people of Rome with the words *belli domique* relating either to *primis* or to *placuisse*.

Can it be a passing mention of partaking in Brutus’ campaign? Fraenkel interprets this passage so and even makes a moral inference: “... nothing obliged Horace to mention *belli* ... he has remained faithful to the memory of Brutus”.⁴³ Some friends of Horace, Messala and Sestius, were reported to have revered the last republican leader, even in presence of Octavian (Tac. *Ann.* 4. 34; Plut. *Brut.* 53; App. *Civ.* 4. 51. 223). Meanwhile Citroni,

⁴¹ This assumption would explain the tenses in *Carm.* 1. 7: *castra tenent* (l. 20), *tenebit Tiburis umbra* (ll. 20–21). There were some attempts to correct the text and to get rid of the Futurum, e.g. *latebris* [L. Müller], *recepit* [P. Maas], see Nisbet–Hubbard 1970, 103.

⁴² With variants *duelli domique*, *bellique domique*; see OLD s. v. *bellum* 1b and TLL s. v. *bellum* (adverbialia temporis).

⁴³ Fraenkel 1968, 360.

on whose opinion one must rely in this particular question, feels that here "... reference to Philippi is highly improbable".⁴⁴

One possible solution proposed by Citroni is simple and has been heard before: to refer the words *belli domique* to *primis* – "I pleased those who were the first people of Rome in the war and at home", meaning first Maecenas, and then Octavian. This opinion, though not popular with recent commentators (accepted by La Penna and Fedeli), was once quite common: Dacier (1691), Ritter (1857), Kiessling (1889),⁴⁵ L. Müller (1893). Those who prefer to read "I pleased in the war and at home the first people of Rome" (Ps.-Acro, Orelli, Wickham, Kiessling–Heinze, Fraenkel, Nisbet–Hubbard [on *Carm.* 2. 6], R. Mayer, Wistrand) have no strong arguments, except Orelli's "sic propria poetae laus augetur".⁴⁶

Meanwhile compatibility of this formal phrase with the verb *placuisse* seems doubtful: according to the *OLD*, it means 'to be pleasing', 'to be liked or approved', 'to come into favour', so in the 20th *Epistle* it would more likely mean "he was chosen as a companion", or "he was dear to the leaders of the city". Two similar usages can be found in Horace's works: *quod placui tibi, qui turpi secernis honestum / non patre praeclaro...* (of Maecenas, *Serm.* 1. 6. 63–64) and *principibus placuisse viris non ultima laus* (*Epist.* 1. 17. 35).⁴⁷

The usage of the phrase *belli domique* has quite a different effect, the verb (or expression) typically being used under different circumstances: once by Horace: *belli spectata domique / virtus* (*Epist.* 2. 1. 230–231; of Octavian); and also by other authors: *apud homines summa cum gloria belli domique versatos* (Cic., *De rep.* 1. 38. 3); *pectore res nostro est inter bellique domique / acta tot* (Ovid. *Met.* 12. 185–186); *omnia iuventutis decora belli domique* (Liv. 3. 19. 5), *praeefulgebat avus titulis bellique domique* (Sil. 4. 497) etc.

Thus we would agree with Citroni et al. in taking *belli domique* to refer to *primis*, noting also that the context of this *Epistle* as a whole and particularly the second half is ironic: the tale about a stubborn ass (ll. 15–16) and the words *ut quantum generi demas, virtutibus addas* (l. 22) rule out any serious interpretation. The speech belongs not to Horace, but to

⁴⁴ Citroni 2000, 44.

⁴⁵ The version by Heinze (Kiessling–Heinze 1957) distinguishes *primis belli* and *primis domi*, which conflicts with the usage of the phrase (the only case with differentiation is Sall. *Iug.* 63. 2: *animus belli ingens domi modicus*, but here also one person is described).

⁴⁶ Orelli 1852, 588.

⁴⁷ This later passage shows that there is no need to specify where (or under what circumstances) one pleased the leaders.

the elderly addressee, who among other things names character traits considered important for a master: *irasci celerem, tamen ut placabilis essem* (l. 25). In this context it is not possible to discern any true great event drawn from the life of Horace.⁴⁸

Conclusion

To conclude, let us revise the considered passages. We know that Horace took part in the Civil war and fought at Philippi in 42 BC. Here we see explicit affirmation of this fact, adorned with allusion to Archilochus (*Carm.* 2. 7. 10 *relicta non bene parmula*) and gratitude to the gods for rescue (*Carm.* 2. 7. 13–14; 3. 4. 25–26). However for obvious reasons Horace does not make reference to this episode of his life too often, and therefore one should not look for references to the Battle of Philippi in the final *Epistle* of the 1st book.

In the 30s BC, Horace was a member of Maecenas' retinue. He accompanied him to Brundisium in 37 BC and very likely took part in the naval expedition against Sextus Pompeius in 36 BC (*Carm.* 2. 17. 20; 3, 4, 28; *Epod.* 1 [?]). This second episode of his military experience allows him to consider war part of his youth (*Carm.* 2. 6. 8), after which he retired to Rome and the surrounding area in peace and quiet.

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 S. Egorova, “Epody Goratsyja i traditsiya sostavleniya stihotvornogo sbornika” [“The Epodes of Horace and a Roman Poetry Book”], *Philologia Classica* 9 (2014) 208–227.

⁴⁸ This irony is expressed very well in Fraenkel's nice paraphrase: “... in front of an old man's hovel: ‘My master, you know, many years ago, he was a fine man and also a great poet. He came from a very humble family, and yet – would you believe it? – the best people of Rome used to invite him to dinner, Maecenas quite often, and sometimes even the Emperor Caesar Augustus’ and so forth” (Fraenkel 1968, 360).

- E. Fraenkel, *Horace* (Oxford 1968).
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The author strives to disprove the common assumption that Horace was present in the fleet during the Battle of Actium, and that he wrote the 9th *Epode* aboard. In fact, the poet never explicitly states this. Therefore the first section of the article compares the 9th *Epode* with descriptions of two events that Horace claims to have experienced himself: the battle of Philippi and the shipwreck by Capo Palinuro. Also the use of spatial reference points is considered, which would suggest that the narrator was present at the battle. Meanwhile the *at huc* (l. 17) is a medieval correction of a clumsy *ad hunc*, and the adverb *sinistrorsum* (l. 20) means usually ‘to the left in the course of travel’ and does not necessarily imply the narrator’s point of reference. Finally, the author compares the passage under scrutiny with another of the poet’s works: *Carm.* 2. 6. and *Epist.* 1. 20. In the former Horace describes his lengthy experience of military service, exaggerating visibly, while his tone in *Epist.* 1. 20. 23 is rather ironic and does not imply any autobiographical details. Furthermore, this author believes that the phrase *belli domique* refers to the adjective *primis*, rather than *placuisse*.

Автор статьи стремится опровергнуть распространенное допущение, согласно которому Гораций мог присутствовать в битве при Акции и даже написать 9-й *Эпод* на борту корабля, притом что поэт нигде не рассказывает об этом прямо. Текст эпода сравнивается с упоминаниями двух событий, которые Гораций называет как пережитые им: это битва при Филиппах и кораблекрушение у мыса Палинур. Далее рассматриваются те пассажи из 9-го *Эпода*, которые интерпретируются учеными как указания на присутствие рассказчика *in situ*. Однако в первом случае (*at huc*, ст. 17) речь идет о позднем исправлении рукописного *ad hunc*, тогда как второе наречие *sinistrorsum* (ст. 20) обычно означает 'налево по ходу движения' и не обязательно предполагает расположение рассказчика в центре координат. В заключение разбираются два места, в которых Гораций говорит о своем опыте военной службы: в *Оде* 2, 6 он явно преувеличивает его, а в *Послании* 1, 20, 23 речь, возможно, идет не о самом поэте (словосочетание *belli domique* следует скорее отнести к прилагательному *primis*).

A FOX AND A WEASEL (HOR. *EPIST.* 1. 7. 29–36)

Forte per angustam tenuis volpecula rimam
repererat in cumeram frumenti, pastaque rursus
ire foras pleno tendebat corpore frustra;
cui mustela procul: “Si vis” ait “effugere istinc,
macra cavum repetes artum, quem macra subisti”.

Once upon a time a lean little fox crept into a basket of corn through a narrow chink, but after she stuffed herself she could not get out with her belly swollen full. A weasel, which was nearby, said to the fox: “If you want to escape, you must crawl out through the small chink being as lean as when you came here”.

The addressee of this epistle is Maecenas. According to it, Horace did not keep his promise and failed to come to Rome, when his patron asked him to, and so he is sending his apologies, making various excuses for his absence, giving reasons and examples. The tone of the epistle is very friendly and ironic, so a little fable fits in very naturally. The Aesopian text that Horace uses here is most probably Ἀλώπηξ ἐξογκωθείσα τὴν γαστέρα (“The Fox with the Swollen Belly”, 24 Perry). We have the following version of the fable:

ἀλώπηξ λιμώττουσα ὥς ἐθεάσατο ἓν τινι δρυὸς κοιλώματι ἄρτους καὶ κρέα ὑπὸ τινων ποιμένων καταλελειμμένα, ταῦτα εἰσελθοῦσα κατέφαγεν. ἐξογκωθείσα δὲ τὴν γαστέρα ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἠδύνατο ἐξελθεῖν, ἐστέναζε καὶ ὠδύρετο. ἑτέρα δὲ ἀλώπηξ τῇδε παριοῦσα ὥς ἤκουσεν αὐτῆς τὸν στεναγμόν, προσελθοῦσα ἐπυνθάνετο τὴν αἰτίαν. μαθοῦσα δὲ τὰ γεγεννημένα ἔφη πρὸς αὐτήν· “ἀλλὰ μενετέον σοὶ ἐνταῦθα, ἕως ἂν τοιαύτη γένη, ὅποια οὖσα εἰσῆλθες, καὶ οὕτω ραδίως ἐξελεύσῃ”.

ὁ λόγος δηλοῖ, ὅτι τὰ χαλεπὰ τῶν πραγμάτων ὁ χρόνος διαλύει.

A hungry fox had noticed bread and meat left by some shepherds in a hollow in a tree, crawled in there and ate its fill. The fox was unable to escape with its belly swollen and started weeping and wailing.

Another fox passing by heard the cries, approached, and asked what had happened. When she understood the whole situation, she advised: “You must stay there until you become as thin as you were when you entered; this way you will escape easily”. The fable shows that time can resolve difficult problems.

The final moral obviously cannot be authentic and must have been added to the fable by mistake, since it has nothing to do with the meaning of the story (the fox with a swollen belly does not have time to become thin again – the shepherds will certainly come to have lunch earlier and will kill the fox; the second fox gives useless and sardonically funny advice). Horace, on the other hand, conveys the true idea of the Aesopian fable. It is impossible not to notice that he changed the well-known story a little. In the “Epistles” the main characters are a fox and a weasel instead of two foxes. Why did he choose a weasel? It seems that weasels, much more familiar to Romans than to us, were used to ward off mice. Weasels were kept in granaries and mills and hunted rodents, just like cats later.¹ If this is true, this Horatian change is directly connected with the change of location: instead of a hollow of a tree we see a *cumera*.

These lines became famous for the many controversies that arose around them due to this very fact. Foxes do not eat nor steal corn; commentators have reacted differently to this striking contradiction for three centuries, trying to justify it or to change the text.

The discussion was started by Richard Bentley, who flatly refused to accept *volpecula* (29) found not only in all the manuscripts and scholia (Porph. *ad Epist.* 1. 7. 1), but also implicitly in some classical and late ancient paraphrases of the passage.² Calling hunters, farmers and physicists (*physicos*) to witness, Bentley notes that, first, foxes do not eat corn, and second, a fox cannot get into such a stupid situation, because it is a personification of intellect and wit.³ Moreover, it seems impossible to him that this wild creature was able to creep not only into a man’s house, but also into a basket through the tiniest chink, through which not even grains spill. His conjecture *nitedula* (a field mouse) was accepted, for instance, by C. Lachmann, M. Haupt, T. Martin, G. B. Wheeler⁴ and many others.

¹ Keller 1912, 164–165.

² Augustin. *Contra mendac.* 28 (*ad mores spectat fabula: ut apud Horatium mus loquitur muri, mustela vulpeculae*) = *Isid. Orig.* 1. 40. 6.

³ It is worth noting that in the original Aesopian fable we can already see stupidity of a fox (F. R. Adrados speaks of an “atypical role” of the fox in this particular case: Adrados 1999, 32).

⁴ Lachmann 1882, 204; Haupt 1871, *ad loc.*; Martin 1881, 290; Wheeler 1856, 283.

At the same time many solid counterarguments were made against this famous improvement. O. Keller argues that a weasel would certainly eat a mouse instantly instead of giving it advice;⁵ Th. Keightley added that a field mouse was very unlikely to come to a man's house, as those animals are wild and feed mostly on grass.⁶ A. Kiessling: a mouse would not be troubled trying to escape a *cumera*, but would enjoy staying there.⁷ R. Mayer: a field mouse is not found among fable characters.⁸

In 1968 a conjecture offered by G. Giangrande competed with Bentley's. Admitting that a fox eating corn is nonsense, Giangrande suggests changing *volpecula* to *cornicula* ("a small crow").⁹ He notices that Servius (*ad Aen.* 11. 522) citing Hor. *Epist.* 1. 3. 19 from memory replaced *cornicula* with *vulpecula* (according to Giangrande this should mean that these two words were easily confused); what is more, this corruption would be easier to explain paleographically for Roman cursive writing; finally, the ancients mentioned confrontations between weasels and crows. But although this weird improvement was accepted in D. R. Shackleton Bailey's edition,¹⁰ it is impossible to put up with a crow creeping through a narrow chink or having a swollen belly.

On the other hand, most of the numerous defenders of the manuscript reading suggested forgiving Horace for his zoological mistake. Orelli had already proposed this popular theory: the poet needs this brief story not for its plot, but to display a smart and witty idea (*doctrina*), and that is why he might have been inattentive to realistic details (*physica*).¹¹ In a well-known book by L. D. Reynolds and N. G. Wilson Bentley's suggestion is criticized as a typical example of an over-logical conjecture, when a too exceptionist reader corrects an inspired poet, without understanding his concept.¹²

In our opinion, we do not serve Horace well if we assume that he could be so inattentive to such an obvious detail. One of the important skills of a storyteller is to make a story credible. Ancient rhetoric theorists from Theon to Aphthonius paid great attention to the credibility

⁵ Keller–Holder 1925, 194.

⁶ Keightley 1848, 213

⁷ Kiessling–Heinze 1957, 75.

⁸ Mayer 1994, 163.

⁹ Giangrande 1968, 55–58.

¹⁰ Shackleton Bailey 1985, ad loc.

¹¹ Orellius 1852, 455. R. Mayer argued in the same way almost 150 years later: "it is the vixen's cunning, not its diet, that matters to the fabulist" (Mayer 1994, 163).

¹² Reynolds–Wilson 1991, 186.

of narrative and the necessity to maintain real features and characteristics of animals in fables.¹³

Munro's arguments ("whose foxes were not as our foxes" – as if the foxes in the fable were so different from those familiar to us that their diet was irrelevant)¹⁴ seem rather unfortunate as are C. Stocchi's (a fox in fables is not necessarily clever – it might be naïve as well; in our fable the fox stupidly ate the wrong type of food).¹⁵ We believe that we should defend *volpecula* differently.

It has been proposed several times, that Horace's fox feeds not on corn, but on *something* else. At first this idea was under a shadow of reading *camera* instead of *cumera*; *camera* appears in two 9th-century manuscripts (R² p¹) and was accepted by early editors starting with J. Locher.¹⁶

Forte per angustam tenuis volpecula rimam
repserat in *cameram* frumenti.

Camera frumenti was understood to mean a granary or a barn, something of a synonym for *horreum*, *granarium*. This reading seemed plausible to André Dacier (it is his comment that Bentley vehemently refutes),¹⁷ because it cancels the problem of incredibility: if a fox crawls into a barn, it might feed on chicks or doves living there. As a result Bentley (who by the way thought that this was Locher's conjecture), saw this proposal as being inseparably tied to the reading *camera*, and he spent most of his comment on rejecting it – noticing that the juncture *camera frumenti* is to be found nowhere in Latin texts and that *camera* itself means "cover", "dome". In fact, no matter what the fortune of this word was in later Romance languages, in classical Latin it does not mean "room". The closest meaning would be "a small covered ship".¹⁸

¹³ For a representative list of quotations on this: Gasparov 1968 [М. И. Гаспаров, *Басни Эзопа*], 254–255. Gasparov himself cites examples of how the "principle of credibility" are sometimes defied in Aesop's fables. However all of them, unlike our example, are strictly motivated by the logic of the plot (e.g. a lion and a donkey hunt together in a fable about the lion's share).

¹⁴ Munro 1869, 26: "Bentley's famous *nitedula* for *vulpecula* deserves all praise: it is brilliant; it is what Horace ought to have written: – but I sadly fear did not write, not from ignorance probably, but because he had in his thoughts some old-world fable, whose foxes were not as our foxes".

¹⁵ Stocchi 2014, 134–137.

¹⁶ Locher 1498, 430. On this edition of Horace (the very first in Germany) and the sources of Locher's commentaries see Pieper 2014, 61–90.

¹⁷ We used the re-edited version with supplements by Sanadon.

¹⁸ ThLL, s. v. *camera*.

Bentley's lexical arguments seem indisputable, but his "poetical" reasoning is much weaker. He asks: "Why was it necessary to mention *frumentum*, if the fox fed on something else? Why did Horace mix new details into an Aesopian fable, if the story is well-known?"¹⁹ He does not ask, however, why it was necessary to change the Aesopian fox to a field mouse. But to be honest, Dacier with his chicks and doves which are absolutely out of place in a barn, gave him solid cause for scathing criticism ("Vah commentum facetum et callidum! Frugi sane rusticus, qui in horreum pullos admiserit!" etc.).

However, reading *cumera* does not oblige us to think that the fox fed on corn. The word *cumera* (*cumerum*), which we translated above as "a basket", is not very frequently used and seems quite specific.²⁰ Ancient lexicographic sources and modern dictionaries based on them give the following explanations:

- Vas est ingens vimineum vel fictile simile doliis, ubi frumentum suum reponabant agricolae: vel vas minus, capiens quinque sive sex modios. It is a very big wicker or ceramic container, similar to a barrel, in which farmers used to keep corn: or a smaller container, holding five or six modii (Ps.-Acro *ad Hor. Serm.* 1. 1. 53).²¹
- Cumera vasi frumenratii genus factum est vimine admodum obductum. A type of a corn container made of rods tightly entwined (Porph. *ad Hor. Ep.* 1, 7, 30).
- Cumerum: vas nuptiale a similitudine cumerarum, quae fiunt palmeae vel sparteae ad usum popularem, sic appellatum. *Cumerum* – a basket for dowry used in wedding ceremonies, which got its name for looking similar to common baskets made of palm leaves or needle grass (Fest. 50 M, 43 L.).²²
- Cumeram vocabant antiqui vas quoddam, quod opertum in nuptiis ferebant, in quo erant nubentis utensilia, quod et camillum dicebant. The ancient used the word *cumera* for some type of a container, that was carried sealed in bridal processions and which contained the dowry; the same thing was called *camillus* (Fest. 63 M, 55 L.).

¹⁹ Bentley 1869, 32.

²⁰ See Siebert 1999. 217–218. On the etymology of "cumera" see Breyer 1993, 254–255.

²¹ 1 modius in Roman measuring system $\approx$ 8,7 kg.

²² For more detailed information on baskets in bridal processions: Hersch 2010, 162.

- Vas vimineum, vel sparteum, vel palmeum, vel etiam fictile, acuminato coperculo cameratum, unde et nomen suum accepisse videtur, quo rustici utuntur ad condenda frumenta.
A container made of entwined rods, needle grass, palm leaves or even ceramic with a cone-shaped lid, for which it got its name [an attempt to derive the etymology from the word ‘camera’] used by countrymen for corn storage (Forcellini 1771, I, 911).
- A great earthen or wicker vessel, in which poor people kept their small provision of corn (Gardin Dumesnil 1819, 290).
- A box or basket used to hold corn, etc., also ritual objects in a bridal procession (OLD, s. v. *cumera*).
- Noms donnés à des vases et à des corbeilles servant principalement dans l’usage commun à garder le grain, [...] grandes corbeilles d’osier...
Names given to containers and baskets used mostly for everyday corn storage, [...] big baskets made of rods... (Saglio 1877, 1588).

According to these explanations, *cumera* was not a small basket (Dacier should not have called it “petit vaisseau”), but a voluminous woven or ceramic vessel with a lid: even the smallest of them, based on Pseudo-Acron’s testimony, could hold up to 50 kg of corn (which means that their capacity could be about 60 liters). We believe it is fair to assume that something like a *cumera* is depicted on the tomb of Marcus Vergilius Eurysaces the baker near Porta Maggiore in Rome (around 50–20 BC). On one of the friezes we see all the stages of bread-making: the apportioning of corn, milling, flour bolting, the baking of the final product and the weighing of loaves.²³ In the top left corner workers are carrying big baskets on their shoulders – not of corn, but of freshly baked bread – big enough to be about 50–60 liters in volume.

A fox of average body length (about 70–77 cm without tail) and weight (about 6–7 kg) could easily crawl into such a vessel through a crack, which could appear if a lid was left ajar (and through which no corn could spill). In the Aesopian fable used by Horace the fox climbs into a hollow in a tree that was surely not bigger than a *cumera*. Just as the second fox was speaking from elsewhere in Aesop’s version, Horace’s weasel most probably was not inside the basket: it is said that it was standing nearby (*procul* means “away”, “over some distance”). Certainly, as in

²³ For more details on Eurysaces’ mausoleum and the economic history of Rome in the Augustan age see e.g.: Rostovtzeff 1957, 32.

any fable, we must not take all the details literally, but leave some scope for poetic or moralistic exaggeration. Maybe Horace's fox climbs into a basket and not into a barn, which would fit excellently here, precisely because Aesop's fox was stuck in a small space and because *cumera* was the biggest vessel commonly used for storage. The poet needs an enclosed space for the story: the main character has to be stuck. But at the same time he can't pick a tiny basket, so that the story is believable. He uses the same word in his "Satires", where he depicts a miser who amasses riches and does not spend them (*Serm.* 1. 1. 53): *cur tua plus laudes cumeris granaria nostris?* ("why do you praise your barns more than our baskets?"). Apparently, the *granaria* of a rich man are opposed to the *cumerae* of ordinary people: those who did not possess enough corn to fill a barn stored it in big baskets.

The word *cumera* is obviously non-poetic. In all the surviving Latin literature, except for scholiasts and lexicographers, it appears only twice – in Horace's poetry. An electronic thesaurus also shows lines from Ovid's "Women's Facial Cosmetics" (61–62), but *cumeris* there was suggested by R. Merkel as a conjecture for *innumeris*:

Iamque ubi pulvereae fuerint confusa farinae,
Protinus in *cumeris* omnia cerne cavis.²⁴

And so, when it is mixed with fine flour, sift it into hollowed baskets immediately.

F. W. Lenz questions this conjecture, as line 89 of the same poem (*per densa foramina cerne*) indicates a sieve finer than woven basket;²⁵ as it seems, our research provides one more argument against this improvement: a *cumera* is too big to be used as a sieve.

Going back to the question what exactly the fox ate it would be useful to mention that these animals (and also weasels) do not in fact feed on corn. An amusing attempt by E. S. Robertson to testify through personal experience that at least in India foxes come to feed in corn fields was disproved by zoologists, who explained that what attracts foxes into the fields is not corn, but rodents.²⁶ However, not calling an object by its name is a usual device for Horace. Stefan Borzsák comes to the same conclusion, suggesting that fables often lack details, so that

²⁴ Merkel 1862, *ad loc.*

²⁵ Lenz 1960, 120. *Innumeris* was also saved in the text by E. J. Kenney 1961, *ad loc.*

²⁶ Robertson 1906, 216; G. Giangrande consulted with London's Zoo staff on the question (Giangrande 1968, 58).

the readers have to figure a lot of things out themselves.²⁷ We agree with Borzsák that the very presence of a weasel hints at the fact that there are mice, which feed on corn. And the weasel makes a spiteful remark about the trapped fox: the latter has stolen its lunch. So we believe the plot to be the following: a hungry lean fox crawls into a barn and climbs into one of the baskets through a lid left slightly ajar, where it eats several mice; after that the fox cannot get out because of its swollen belly. A weasel, who thinks that the barn is its own hunting ground, laughs at the unlucky rival: the fox got into a trap very well-known to and, what is more, not even dangerous for the weasel, due to the weasel's miniature size.

An equally important question that has to be discussed to understand the story better is the role of the fable in the context of the *Epistle* 1. 7. The key is in the lines right below it (34–36):

Hac ego si compellor imagine, cuncta resigno:
nec somnum plebis laudo satur altitium nec
otia divitiis Arabum liberrima muto.

What causes trouble is line 34, especially the verbs *compellor* and *resigno*. Porphyry and Pseudo-Acron understand *compellor* as a form of *compellere* (“to provoke, to incite”): *si cogatur* (Porph.), *si [...] non concedatur* (Ps.-Acro). This explanation seems fallible, since our fable does not provoke anything; on the contrary, it warns. The latest commentators, e.g. Orelli, associate *compellor* with the verb *compellare* (“to vituperate, to address with a speech”), which is often used in the ablative case (for example, *edicto*: Cic. *Phil.* 3. 7. 17). This is how Orelli interprets the first half of line 34: *si ad me applicari potest haec imago, id est, fabella...*²⁸ G. Krüger compares the line *Epist.* 1. 7. 34 with *Serm.* 2. 3. 297 (*posthac ne compellarer inultus* – “so that I am not insulted with impunity later”), mentioning that in our case the verb does not carry any negative connotations of reproof and that we should translate *si compellor hac imagine* as “if this fable applies to me”.²⁹

Cuncta resigno is another stumbling block for translators and interpreters. The verb *resignare* has a direct meaning – “to unseal” (for example, a letter): Horace uses it in this very meaning in the same epistle (line 9). The second, figurative meaning for *resignare* is “to pay, to

²⁷ Borzsák 1969, 225–234.

²⁸ Orellius 1852, 455.

²⁹ Krüger 1872, 226.

repay”. Finally, there is the meaning that is usually suggested when the lines in question are discussed – “to cancel, to annul, to return”.³⁰ Krüger speaks about the semantic development of *resignare* and its affinity with *rescribere* and *reddere* in his commentary.³¹ But what does the poet refuse and what (and to whom) does he return?

R. Kilpatrick proposed to understand line 34 this way: “If I am the man impugned by this fable, I refute it all!”³² Horace has no reason to compare himself to the fox in the fable, because he has used Maecenas’ gifts only modestly; he denies (*resigno*) all accusations of that nature. Kilpatrick does realize though that his explanation lacks parallel examples that could prove this meaning of *resignare*. However, despite the vast lexicological review (somewhat exaggerating the obscurity of the word: “it’s a very uncommon Latin word”, “the word’s meaning was not always clear” etc.), he fails to find such examples. We must be very careful with the meaning “to annul, to refute, to invalidate”, which Kilpatrick finds in the Lewis–Short dictionary: relying on the inner form of *resignare* (literally “to break a seal”), this verb can mean “to refute” only in the sense of “to destroy, to cancel” (this is why it technically can mean “to give back what was borrowed”), but not “to deny, not to accept”; this is what it means in the quote from Cicero, cited by Kilpatrick (*Pro Arch.* 9: *omnem tabularum fidem resignasset*). It seems that Kilpatrick was confused by the English verb *to resign*; what he wants it to mean would probably apply to something like the Latin verb *refutare*.

The *opinio communis*, against which Kilpatrick argues, is represented rather well in Kiessling–Heinze’s commentary, where they retell every epistle in brief. Line 34 is paraphrased like this: “If someone wants to apply to me the fable about a fox who could not escape with its belly swollen and persuades me to refrain from everything, I am ready to return everything that I owe you, to you – this is how much I love and respect you”. Kiessling and Heinze interpret *cuncta resigno* as “I give you back everything that I owe you”.³³ Compare this with a similar paraphrase in Villeneuve’s edition: “Horace has never forgotten that everything he has he owes to Maecenas; but if it is necessary, he is ready and willing to give him everything back with no regrets”.³⁴ In our opinion, this understanding demands the potential mode of *resigno*, not *praesens indicativi*, as we find in Horace’s text.

³⁰ OLD, s. v.

³¹ Krüger 1872, 226.

³² Kilpatrick 1986, 19–20.

³³ Kiessling–Heinze 1957, 69, 75.

³⁴ Villeneuve 1934, 67.

E. Fraenkel notices that this seemingly playful story, which at first sight can be easily excluded from the epistle, takes on a very serious meaning when it comes to the poet's relationship with Maecenas.³⁵ The fox's unlucky fate is something that Horace should always keep in mind. According to Fraenkel, Horace associates himself with the fox and displays his readiness to give up "his most cherished possessions". Fraenkel calls the divisive line 34 "unambiguous". However, Fraenkel is convinced that Horace's determination is illusory and that Horace realizes that he cannot give up everything, hence *nec somnum plebis laudo satur atilium* in line 35.

R. Mayer also thinks that Horace here means to return all his property, including his Sabine farm. He draws a parallel with *Carm.* 3. 29. 54: *resigno quae dedit* [Fortuna] ("I reject everything that Fortune gave me").³⁶

We tend to disagree with the generally held opinion. The whole preceding part of the Epistle 1. 7 convinces Maecenas to forgive the poet for his long absence and appeals to the reason of his patron, who sees the difference between beans and coins (line 23) and does not weigh down his client with unwanted gifts (about a Calabrian guest – lines 14 sqq.). Is it possible that Horace says "I'll return everything" if he himself claims that he did not get anything extra? Horace always describes his (friendly and financial) relationship with his patron as rational, moderate, and mutually beneficial,³⁷ he calls himself *parvus* in line 44. The Aesopian fable is being used for the sake of contrast "me vs. the fox". We believe that *compellor* is a reflexive form, not a passive one. The iterative *praesens indicativi* points to the thoughts that come to the poet, who is of two minds about coming to Rome. He says, "You, Maecenas, want me to come and I realize that I have to. But as soon as I recall this fable and apply it to myself (*compellor*), I drop (*resigno*) this idea". *Cuncta* is not something that he possesses, but all the goods promised by life in Rome under the wing of his rich friend. The poet understands that if he succumbs once to the capital's temptations, he will never be able to go back to his simple life in the country.

The fable about a fox and a weasel is followed by two other detailed stories, centered on the idea that it is unwise to take more than you need. In the first one, which is practically a sketchy translation of the *Odyssey* (4. 601–608), Telemachus refuses to accept the horses given to him, because it is impossible to manage them on Ithaca (40–43):

³⁵ Fraenkel 1957, 334.

³⁶ Mayer 1994, 163. For a very representative list of other scholars adhering to the same explanation of *cuncta resigno* see: Hayward 1986, 19.

³⁷ Kilpatrick 1973, 47–53.

Haud male Telemachus, proles patientis Ulixei:
 “Non est aptus equis Ithace locus, ut neque planis
 porrectus spatiis nec multae prodigus herbae;
 Atride, magis apta tibi tua dona relinquam”.

Telemachus, sufferer Ulysses’ son, once said well: “The land of Ithaca is not suitable for horses, since there are no fields and no lawns rich with grass; I will leave your gift to you, Atreides, because it is more useful for you”.

Horace addresses the moralistic conclusion (ἐπιμύθιον) to himself (44–45):

Parvum parva decent; mihi iam non regia Roma,
 sed vacuum Tibur placet aut inbelle Tarentum.

Little befits little: and so not regal Rome is dear to me, but quiet Tibur or peaceful Tarentum.

In this case it seems obvious that Horace approves of Telemachus’ response: like Ulysses’ son, who wisely does not take horses with him to a rocky island, Horace wisely does not come to the capital against his own will. Telemachus’ situation is the reverse of the fable about a fox – unlike him the fox took what it did not need and got into trouble.

Another example that Horace uses to enforce the idea “every man to his trade” is a lengthy story about Volteius Mena. Mena falls for the graces of his patron (in fact, solicitor) Philippus, leaves the city he loves and starts living in a country. He fails to organize a profitable business, because he is not used to farming and was never meant for it. In the end he pleads with his patron to change things back. This story occupies lines 46–95. It shows in detail what can happen if someone is forced to give up his true inherent aims and wishes. Certainly, Horace sees and wants to keep his relationship with Maecenas entirely different. To draw a conclusion for this real life example he uses a fable-like moral (line 98): *Metiri se quemque suo modulo ad pede verum est* (“Each should measure himself by his own rule and standard”).

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The article discusses Hor. *Epist.* 1. 7. 29–33, with a version of an Aesopian fable. These verses are notoriously difficult. They describe a fox that crawls into a basket of corn (*cumera frumenti*), cannot climb out because it has eaten too much food, and is laughed at by a weasel; this surprisingly appears to mean that the fox feeds on corn. The author argues that, contrary to the prevailing opinion, Horace should not be charged with zoological ignorance or with poetic disregard of zoological facts; nor are Bentley's famous emendation to *nitedula* instead of *vulpecula* or some manuscripts' reading *camera* instead of *cumera* acceptable. The data of the lexica shows that *cumera* designates not a small basket, but a voluminous twiggen or ceramic vessel with a lid for grain; the fox climbs into it and eats several mice, not corn.

The meaning of the fable in the context of Horace's *Letter to Maecenas* is further revisited: the v. 34 *Hac ego si compellor imagine, cuncta resigno* is often taken to mean that the poet is ready to give Maecenas back everything that he got from him, fearing the fortune of the fox; however, this does not fit the poet's conduct; moreover, in this understanding, *resigno* is in the conjunctive, not the indicative case. Rather, the verse means that the poet, although desiring to please Maecenas and to come to Rome, remains in the countryside and thus abandons all eventual goods of life under Maecenas' tutelage, because he duly applies to himself (*compellare* in the reflexive meaning) the example of the stuffed fox.

В статье рассматриваются стихи Гор. *Epist.* 1. 7. 29–36, содержащие в себе вариацию эзоповской басни. В интерпретации Горация лиса забирается в корзину с зерном (*cumera frumenti*) и не может выбраться обратно из-за разбухшего от еды живота, вследствие чего над лисой насмехается ласка. Исходя из этих строк можно подумать, что лисы, по мнению поэта, питаются зерном. Автор статьи спорит с распространенным мнением о том, что Гораций допустил зоологическую ошибку по незнанию или в поэтических целях, и не принимает чтение *nitedula* вместо *vulpecula*, предложенное Бентли, а также чтение *camera* вместо *cumera*, присутствующее в некоторых

рукописях. Согласно мнению автора, лиса забирается в корзину, чтобы полакомиться мышами, а не зерном. Слово *синега* означает большой плетеный или глиняный сосуд с крышкой, применявшийся для хранения больших объемов продовольствия.

В статье также обсуждается значение басни в контексте послания к Мecenату: стих 34 *Hac ego si compellor imagine, cuncta resigno* нередко понимают так, будто поэт выражает готовность вернуть Мecenату все, что он когда-либо от него получал, поскольку близок к положению лисы из басни. Однако такое прочтение не вполне вписывается в общую линию повествования. Скорее всего, поэт говорит, что оставаясь в деревне, несмотря на настойчивые приглашения друга приехать в Рим, он отказывается от всех благ и роскоши, которые ждут его там под покровительством Мecenата, поскольку сам не желает оказаться на месте лисы (*compellare* в возвратном значении).

LES ATTITUDES DIVERSES DES NÉOPLATONICIENS AU SUJET DE LA THÉURGIE

*En hommage amical et collégial
à Monsieur Alexander Gavrilo
à l'occasion de son soixante-quinzième
anniversaire en 2016.*

Dans mon livre récent « Athenian and Alexandrian Neoplatonism and the Harmonization of Aristotle and Plato », ¹ j'avais commencé ma conclusion de la manière suivante :

I hope to have demonstrated that the tendency to harmonize the philosophies of Aristotle and Plato lasted from Porphyry throughout the entire period of Neoplatonism, including Themistius. In other words, throughout this entire period there is not, as far as I know, any exception to this rule in all of Neoplatonic literature, insofar as it has come down to us. From Porphyry to Simplicius, the Aristotelian cursus was always conceived as a necessary preparation for the Platonic cursus, a fact which implies a belief in the superiority (but not the infallibility) of Plato as compared to Aristotle, along with the belief in a more or less broad agreement between the two philosophers. Indeed, it is only the extent of this agreement that is subject to variations. But I also believe I have shown that it is not the schools themselves, for instance those of Athens and Alexandria, that differ from one another by the intensity of this will to harmonization, but groups of philosophers within these schools. For instance, the beginning of the school of Athens under Plutarch – judging not only by the testimony of his disciple Hierocles, but also by the fragments of Plutarch's work – is marked by a strong adherence to this tendency, under the influence of Iamblichus. This adherence reaches its weakest point under Syrianus–Proclus, to regain all its strength at the end of Neoplatonism with Damascius–Simplicius–Priscianus, thanks to a resolute return to the philosophy of Iamblichus, among others on this point. This is why, if we take into account the entire duration of each of the schools, it is impossible to find a global opposition concerning the

¹ I. Hadot 2015, 173. Dans les citations contenues dans le présent article, les passages entre crochets droits [...] indiquent mes ajouts propres.

vigor of this tendency between the schools of Athens and Alexandria. The intensity of the tendency toward harmonization of the Athenian Plutarch is identical to that of his disciple Hierocles, who taught at Alexandria, and that of Ammonius and his school at Alexandria seems to be situated halfway between that of Syrianus-Proclus and that of Damascius and his school at Athens... Likewise, P. Golitsis' belief that the school of Athens was more focussed on Plato and pagan religiosity, whereas the school of Alexandria was more interested in Aristotle and omitted the *Chaldaean Oracles* and Orphisme, is contradicted by the facts that I set forth in the Introduction, to which one must add Olympiodoros' links with Hermeticism and alchemy, which the research of C. Viano has revealed, and which I briefly discussed : the difference between the two schools is merely institutional. In the chapter on Themistius, by contrast, I have collected a few indications suggesting that alongside what is called 'school of Athens' and 'school of Alexandria', other Neoplatonic schools existed which were not interested in theurgy, and had little interest in the *Chaldaean Oracles*, for instance at Constantinople (Themistius²), Sicyon (the philosopher from Sicyon) and even at Athens still at the time of Plutarch of Athens or shortly before (partisans of Theodore of Asine).

C'est sur ce dernier point : les positions différenciées des différents néoplatoniciens du troisième au sixième siècle vis-à-vis de la théurgie, qui vont de l'enthousiasme jusqu'au rejet, que je voudrais insister maintenant.

Le terme 'théurgie' apparaît pour la première fois dans les fragments des *Oracles Chaldaïques*,³ mais quand je parle de 'théurgie', je comprends par ce terme la théurgie jambliquéenne comme elle est décrite dans le *De mysteriis* et mise en œuvre à partir de Jamblique par de nombreux néoplatoniciens, mais non pas par la totalité, comme nous allons le

² Dans mon livre (I. Hadot 2015), un long chapitre (74–97, cf. aussi 57–60) est voué à la confirmation de la thèse, déjà défendue entre autres par O. Ballériaux et E. P. Mahoney, selon laquelle Thémistius n'est pas un péripatéticien, mais un néoplatonicien. Je me borne ici à mentionner trois arguments : Thémistius était un partisan convaincu de la tendance néoplatonicienne à harmoniser les philosophies de Platon et d'Aristote, et, comme tous les néoplatoniciens après Jamblique dont nous connaissons au moins une partie de leur œuvre, il considérait le cycle aristotélicien de l'enseignement philosophique néoplatonicien comme une introduction au cycle platonicien. De même, sa paraphrase sur le *De anima*, qui est en réalité un commentaire, est une explication tout à fait néoplatonicienne du texte d'Aristote. Pour un argument supplémentaire, cf. plus loin, n. 38 et n. 24.

³ L'on lit quelquefois que ce terme se trouve déjà dans un écrit de théorie musicale de Nicomaque de Gêrasi (Nicom. Exc. 6, p. 277, 7 Jan), mais, comme déjà I. Tanaseanu-Döbler l'a remarqué (2010, 41 n. 124), il ne s'agit que d'une conjecture de Th. Gale (les manuscrits ont *θερμνοί*).

voir. Selon Jamblique, la théurgie, qui unit les théurges aux dieux, n'est pas un acte de la pensée comme la philosophie, « car...qu'est-ce qui empêcherait ceux qui philosophent théoriquement d'arriver à l'union théurgique avec les dieux ? », mais elle ne peut pas non plus aboutir *sans* la pensée philosophique et la possession des vertus : « Nos pensées ne provoquent donc pas, en les prévenant, les causes divines à s'exercer ; mais elles doivent, avec toutes les dispositions excellentes de l'âme et avec notre pureté, préexister comme causes auxiliaires ».⁴ Et un peu plus loin, Jamblique dit (*De myst.* II, 11 [98, 1–13], p. 96 sq. Des Places, traduction légèrement transformée) :

Je me suis étendu là-dessus ... pour que tu [*scil.* Porphyre] n'aïlles pas supposer que c'est dans nos conceptions [ἐννοίας], si elles correspondent à la vérité, que se manifeste d'une manière correcte la vraie œuvre de la théurgie. ... Ce n'est pas, en effet, si nous connaissons les particularités qui accompagnent chaque genre, que dès lors nous avons atteint la vérité de leurs œuvres [*scil.* des œuvres de la théurgie]. Même si l'union active [ἡ δραστική ἔνωσις] ne se produit jamais sans la connaissance [οὐκ ἄνευ τοῦ γινῶναι], elle ne lui est cependant pas identique, en sorte que la pureté divine [ἡ καθαρότης ἡ θεία] ne dépend pas de la connaissance exacte, comme celle du corps de la chasteté, mais l'union transcendante et la purification y dépassent plutôt la connaissance.

Les actes de la théurgie ou de la hiératique (terme que les néoplatoniciens utilisent de préférence⁵), qui comprennent, selon le *De mysteriis*, outre les techniques spécifiquement chaldaïques de communication directe avec les dieux, tous les anciens rites religieux païens ainsi que les cultes des mystères,⁶ donc aussi les multiples techniques de la divination, sont

⁴ Iambl. *De myst.* II, 11 (96, 14 – 97, 15), p. 96 Des Places. Pour une étude d'ensemble, cf. Nasemann 1991 et van Liefferinge 1999, et toujours Cremer 1969. Avant l'achèvement de cet article, j'ai pu encore prendre connaissance du très important livre d'I. Tanaseanu-Döbler 2013.

⁵ Cf. le chapitre « Theurgie und Hieratik » dans le livre toujours fondamental de Cremer 1969.

⁶ Les *Oracles Chaldaïques* par contre, largement utilisés par Jamblique, n'admettaient ni la divination des astrologues ni celles des augures et des haruspices : cf. Lewy 2011, 255 avec note 99 : « Submit not to thy mind earth's vast measures, for that the plant of truth grows not on earth, and measure not the course of the sun by joining rods, for that he moves in accordance with the will eternal of the Father, not for the sake of thee. Let go the moon's sound ; she ever runs by operation of necessity. The stars' procession was not brought forth for sake of thee. The wide-winged aerial flight of birds is never true, nor yet the slicings of the victims and of other entrails. These are all toys, lending support to mercenary fraud. Flee thou these things, if thou wouldst tender true worship's paradise, where Virtue, Wisdom and Good-Rule are met together ».

censés permettre entre autres la guérison de l'âme et du corps⁷ et, dans leurs formes les plus accomplies, l'union de l'âme du théurge avec le demiurge et même avec l'Un. C'est pour cette raison que Jamblique ajoute aux quatre vertus néoplatoniciennes de Porphyre, c'est-à-dire aux vertus civiles, cathartiques, théorétiques et paradigmatiques, encore un cinquième et ultime degré : les vertus théurgiques,⁸ et que pour lui le théurge accompli est supérieur au philosophe.

Je suis donc de l'avis entre autres de C. Van Liefferinge, qui constate que « même s'il accorde la primauté à la théurgie, Jamblique est loin de dévaloriser la philosophie. Il la prend en compte dans le *De mysteriis* pour répondre à certaines questions de Porphyre <I, 2 (5, 12 et 7, 4–5) Des Places>. Il dit se soucier 'd'enquêter philosophiquement' et de rejeter les sujets qui 'divaguent d'une manière éristique' <III, 25 (161, 9–10) *ibid.*> »⁹ mais il faut surtout tenir compte non seulement de son *Protreptique* à la philosophie, qui fait partie des dix livres qui composent le cycle *Sur le Pythagorisme*¹⁰ – cycle dans lequel Jamblique développe son

⁷ Concernant le fait qu'une partie des actes rituels de la théurgie était partagée avec les magiciens, cf. Tanaseanu-Döbler 2013, 21–22. J. Dillon 2007, 32 dit avec raison : « ... Iamblichus seems to me, in the *De Mysteriis*, to stand forth as the first theorist of the distinction between religion and Magic – though, as I shall argue, he is really taking a stand in defence of the higher magic ».

⁸ Cf. Marinus, *Proclus ou sur le bonheur* § 26, p. 30 Saffrey–Segonds : « Mais, après la mort de Syrianus, il [*scil.* Proclus] lut soigneusement les commentaires de ce philosophe sur Orphée, les immenses commentaires de Porphyre et de Jamblique sur les *Oracles* et les écrits des Chaldéens qui s'y rattachent ; il se nourrit enfin des divins *Oracles* eux-mêmes, et ainsi s'éleva jusqu'aux plus hautes des vertus accessibles à l'âme humaine, celle que Jamblique, l'inspiré des dieux, a excellemment nommées théurgiques ». – Il se pourrait aussi que Jamblique ait seulement remplacé les vertus paradigmatiques de Porphyre par les vertus théurgiques : cf. Helmig–Vargas 2014, 264 sq : « Oddly enough, Damascius reports that it was Iamblichus who first added the level of paradigmatic virtues (*Commentary of the Phaedo* I 143). Given Iamblichus' defense of the centrality of theurgy for the soul's ascent against the skeptical inquiries of Porphyry's *Letter to Anebo* in his *De Mysteriis*, it would seem that Iamblichus would have connected this highest level of the virtues with theurgy. He would thus turn Porphyry's own hierarchy of virtues to a further argument for the primacy of theurgy over contemplation, for even Porphyry himself would have recognized a life higher than the contemplative life ». Et, après avoir cité l'identification de la vertu paradigmatique avec la théurgie de la part d'Olympiodore (*In Phaed.* 8, 2. 13–20 Westerink), les deux auteurs concluent : « This appropriation of paradigmatic virtue shows clearly that the primacy of theurgy is not meant to displace philosophy, but rather to go beyond it ».

⁹ Van Liefferinge 1999, 35. Cf. aussi Nasemann 1991, 200 sq.

¹⁰ Sur cette œuvre majeure cf. O'Meara 1989.

programme de la *paideia* philosophique¹¹ –, mais aussi de ses commentaires sur Platon et Aristote, comme son commentaire très volumineux sur les *Catégories* d'Aristote (que le néoplatonicien Simplicius suivait encore pas à pas dans son propre commentaire sur le même sujet, tout en diminuant sa longueur et en le rendant plus compréhensible¹²), ainsi que ses écrits sur l'âme que le même Simplicius dit prendre comme modèle dans son commentaire sur le *De anima* d'Aristote.¹³ Jamblique n'aurait pas composé ses commentaires sur l'*Alcibiade I*, le *Phèdre*, le *Sophiste*, le *Philèbe*, le *Timée* et le *Parménide* de Platon et les commentaires sur les *Catégories*, les *Premiers Analytiques*, le livre *Lambda* de la *Métaphysique* et probablement aussi sur le *De interpretatione* d'Aristote (commentaires tous perdus), s'il avait été persuadé que le raisonnement philosophique ne servait à rien : pour lui, le raisonnement philosophique est indispensable au moins pour le théurge accompli, mais, contrairement à ce que pensaient les néoplatoniciens Plotin, Porphyre, Théodore d'Asiné et d'autres, il ne suffit pas pour garantir l'union de l'âme raisonnable humaine avec le démiurge ou l'Un : ce qui est décisif aux yeux de Jamblique, c'est la bienveillance des dieux, qui ne peut être obtenue que par les rites traditionnels, les symboles (σύμβολα ou συνθήματα)¹⁴ et les actes proprement théurgiques :

...ce n'est pas ... l'acte de penser qui unit aux dieux les théurges ; car alors qu'est-ce qui empêcherait ceux qui philosophent théoriquement d'arriver à l'union théurgique avec les dieux ? Mais la vérité est tout autre : c'est l'accomplissement religieux des actions ineffables dont les effets dépassent toute intellection, ainsi que le pouvoir des symboles indicibles, entendus des dieux seuls, qui opèrent l'union théurgique...¹⁵

¹¹ Sur ce sujet, cf. l'article fondamental de Lurie, 2013, et Tanaseanu-Döbler 2013, 111–130.

¹² Cf. Simplicius, *In Cat.* p. 3, 5 ss. Kalbfleisch.

¹³ Simplicius, *In Cat.* p. 2, 5–25 Kalbfleisch et *In De an.*, p. 1, 10–20 Hayduck. Cf. I. Hadot 2014, 231 sq. et 184 sq. ; cf. *ibid.* 187–218, où j'ai réaffirmé contre C. Steel l'authenticité du commentaire *In De anima* de Simplicius, attribué par Steel à Priscien de Lyde ; à propos de Jamblique comme propagateur, après des débuts dans le moyen-platonisme et après Porphyre, de l'harmonisation des philosophies de Platon et d'Aristote, cf. I. Hadot 2015, 65–73.

¹⁴ Ce sont certains animaux, plantes ou pierres, connus par les théurges « qui sont gouvernés par les êtres supérieurs » (Iambl. *De myst.* V, 24 [235, 5 sq.], p. 179 Des Places) et qui ont « conservé intacte et pure l'intention de leur auteur » et par l'intermédiaire desquelles les théurges mettent en mouvement, « d'une manière appropriée, la cause démiurgique qui, sans rien perdre de sa pureté, domine cette créature » (Iambl. *De myst.* V, 9 [209, 14–19], p. 164 Des Places). La magie traditionnelle procédait pareillement.

¹⁵ Iambl. *De myst.* II, 11 (96, 13 – 97, 2), p. 96 Des Places (traduction légèrement modifiée). Cf. *ibid.* V, 19 (226, 9–14), p. 174 Des Places : « Mais quand nous

En fait, comme le proclame Jamblique, l'union théurgique immatérielle avec les dieux, qui est la forme de théurgie la plus accomplie, présuppose l'acquisition préalable des vertus et des connaissances philosophiques poussées, et c'est précisément pour cette raison qu'elle n'est accessible qu'à un très petit nombre d'hommes. L'humanité dans sa majorité reste selon lui liée au corps et n'est pas capable d'une élévation purement spirituelle et encore moins d'une théurgie immatérielle, et c'est pour cela qu'elle ne peut accomplir que les rites matériels :

La masse du troupeau humain est assujettie à la nature, administrée par des puissances naturelles, et regarde en bas vers les œuvres de la nature ; elle exécute les dispositions de la fatalité, reçoit l'ordre de ce qui s'accomplit selon la fatalité, et ne cesse d'appliquer sa réflexion pratique aux seuls phénomènes naturels. Un petit nombre seulement, tirant partie d'une force d'intellect surnaturelle, se dégagent de la nature, se tournent vers l'intellect séparé et sans mélange, eux qui en même temps deviennent supérieurs aux puissances naturelles. Quelques-uns, entre les deux, se portent vers ce qui se tient à égale distance de la nature et de l'intellect pur, les uns suivant l'un et l'autre, d'autres menant une vie mixte, mêlée des deux éléments, les autres enfin s'affranchissant de l'inférieur et passant à ce qui est meilleur.¹⁶

Pas plus donc que les philosophies de Plotin et de Porphyre, la combinaison proposée par Jamblique de la philosophie avec la théurgie ne promet

entreprenons d'honorer ceux qui ont par eux-mêmes une forme unique, il convient de leur présenter des honneurs affranchis (de la matière) ; ce qui leur convient, ce sont les dons intellectuels et ceux de la vie incorporelle, tout ce que donnent la vertu, la sagesse et les autres biens parfaits et complets de l'âme ».

¹⁶ Iambl. *De myst.* V, 18 (223, 10 – 224, 6), p. 172 sq. Des Places, traduction légèrement modifiée. Cf. *ibid.* V, 22 (230, 15 – 231, 5), p. 177 Des Places : « Eh quoi ! le comble de l'art hiératique ne se porte-t-il pas vers l'Un qui est au sommet de toute la foule (des divinités), ne célèbre-t-il pas à la fois, en lui et avec lui, la multitude des essences et des principes ? Tout à fait, répondrais-je ; mais cela n'arrive que très tard et à une petite élite ». Cf. V, 20 (227, 17 – 228, 12), p. 175 Des Places : « Or la loi du culte attribue les semblables aux semblables, et s'étend ainsi à travers l'ensemble depuis le haut jusqu'aux extrémités, rendant les incorporels aux incorporels, les corps aux corps, à chacune des deux classes ce qui est proportionné à sa nature. Mais si quelqu'un participe aux dieux de la théurgie d'une manière hypercosmique (chose rare entre toutes), c'est évidemment celui qui dépasse les corps et la matière pour le service des dieux et qu'une force hypercosmique unit aux dieux. Ainsi donc, ce qui se produit en un seul homme à grand peine et tardivement, au sommet de l'art hiératique, il ne faut pas le déclarer commun à tous ni l'attribuer immédiatement à ceux qui abordent la théurgie ou qui sont au milieu de la course ; car ceux-là, d'une manière quelconque, donnent un caractère corporel à leur pratique de la piété ».

le salut de l'âme à la majorité des hommes, « la masse du troupeau humain », comme Jamblique s'exprime avec un certain dédain, mais seulement « à un petit nombre » qui n'inclut même pas tous les théurges qui dans leur ensemble sont déjà une élite. Contrairement à ce que l'on lit souvent à présent, la théurgie de Jamblique n'est pas moins élitiste que les philosophies néoplatoniciennes antérieures, qui donnent les premiers rôles au raisonnement philosophique et dont le système des vertus prévoyait quatre grades dont seul le premier était accessible à la plupart des philosophes.¹⁷

Pour ces deux classes d'hommes (si l'on regarde la catégorie intermédiaire comme faisant partie « de la masse du troupeau humain »), des formes différentes de la théurgie s'imposent, allant des sacrifices sanglants de quelques cultes païens jusqu' à certains procédés immatériels ou hypercosmiques. Alors qu'il n'est pas question dans le *De mysteriis* de ces derniers, pour lesquels la philosophie joue un rôle certain, l'utilité des premiers y est expliquée longuement : ils servent aussi bien à récupérer la santé du corps et à se procurer du succès dans la vie qu'à provoquer des épiphanies des dieux ;¹⁸ ils ne se distinguent donc pas par leur but de ceux des prêtres des anciens cultes et mystères anciens, ni des magiciens contemporains ; de ces derniers il se distinguent seulement par l'attitude : les magiciens prétendent pouvoir contraindre les dieux, tandis que, selon Jamblique, les théurges obtiennent tout par l'amitié des dieux (*De myst.* III, 31 [176, 3 sqq.], p. 144 Des Places, traduction modifiée) :

Les vrais dieux sont dispensateurs uniquement des biens, ils entrent en relation seulement avec les hommes de bien et fréquentent ceux qu'a purifiés la science hiératique ; ils émondent en eux toute malice et toute passion. Quand ils se mettent à briller, le mal et le démoniaque deviennent invisibles devant les êtres supérieurs, comme les ténèbres devant la lumière, et ne peuvent plus importuner les théurges ; de là ceux-ci reçoivent toute vertu, leurs mœurs deviennent excellentes et rangées, ils sont libérés des passions et de tout mouvement désordonné, purifiés de manières athées et impies.

Comme la première phrase de cette citation et les textes des notes 15 et 16 le prouvent, l'amitié des dieux ne s'étend pas à tous les hommes, mais seulement aux hommes de bien, c'est-à-dire à ceux qui sont purifiés par la

¹⁷ Cf. aussi plus loin (n. 41) le classement des philosophes néoplatoniciens par rapport aux différents vertus fourni par Damascius.

¹⁸ Iambl. *De myst.* V, 16 (221, 1 – 222, 3), p. 171 Des Places ; cf. entre autres *ibid.* II, 6 (81, 13 sqq.), p. 86 sq. Des Places, et II, 9 (87, 14 – 88, 16), p. 90 sq. Des Places.

science hiératique,¹⁹ donc aux théurges, qui forment déjà une élite, mais qui au début et au milieu de leur carrière n'exercent pas encore la théurgie d'une 'manière hypercosmique », but auquel ils n'arrivent que rarement (cf. n. 16). Rien ne me semble être plus trompeur que l'affirmation selon laquelle Jamblique réduit à néant l'élitisme philosophique plotino-porphyréen. Avant Jamblique comme après lui, il ne reste à la grande masse des païens que les bénéfices que promettent les cultes traditionnels, mais dont l'accessibilité diminue proportionnellement à l'avancée du christianisme.

Si l'on lit le *De mysteriis* d'une manière superficielle, c'est-à-dire sans tenir compte des textes du *De mysteriis* que j'ai cité plus haut, et si l'on laisse de côté, comme déjà l'empereur Julien, les autres œuvres de Jamblique comme les commentaires et ce qui nous reste des 10 livres *Sur le Pythagorisme*, l'on pourrait facilement avoir l'impression que l'étude de la philosophie n'a plus aucune utilité pour Jamblique. Mais je suis d'accord avec B. Nasemann qui, en tenant compte du but du *De mysteriis*, qui vise à convaincre Porphyre et ses adhérents de l'importance de la théurgie – et en face de ce publique-là il n'était nullement nécessaire de défendre l'importance de la philosophie –, est d'avis que Jamblique lui-même a d'une certaine manière voulu combiner les deux :²⁰ la connaissance de la philosophie est indispensable, mais elle n'est pas suffisante – contrairement à ce que pensait Porphyre –, et la théurgie se situe à un niveau supérieur à la philosophie. D'ailleurs, pour Porphyre aussi la théurgie n'était pas tout

¹⁹ Nous ne connaissons pas les détails de l'initiation à la science hiératique, mais nous en apprenons quelques éléments par la description que Marinus fait des activités théurgiques de Proclus et de son apprentissage : « Il [Proclus] faisait usage, en effet, des conjurations [συστάσεις = contacts immédiats avec une divinité] propres aux Chaldéens, de leur prières d'intercession et de leurs divines et indicibles roues magiques. De fait, il avait reçu tout cela d'Asclépigéneia, la fille de Plutarque [d'Athènes], qui lui avait appris aussi les émissions des voix ainsi que toutes les autres pratiques des Chaldéens. C'est en effet chez elle et elle seule que s'étaient conservés les rites secrets et toute la pratique théurgique, qui venaient du grand Nestorius et qui lui avaient été enseignés par son père. Auparavant, comme il convient, le philosophe [Proclus] s'était purifié au moyen des rites purificateurs Chaldaïques [purifications par l'eau de mer et par le feu] et il bénéficia d'apparitions lumineuses d'Hécate, face à face, comme il le relate lui-même quelque part dans un écrit particulier. Il provoqua aussi des chutes de pluie en mettant en mouvement comme il faut une certaine iynx [roue magique], et délivra ainsi l'Attique de funeste sécheresses » (Marinus, *Proclus ou sur le bonheur*, § 28, p. 33 Saffrey–Segonds). Mais cf. Tanaseanu-Döbler 2013, 40 n. 120, qui plaide d'une manière convaincante pour une datation plus tardive du terme σύστασις.

²⁰ Nasemann 1991, 199–201. Cf. surtout Lurie, 2013 sur le plan jambliquéen des études philosophiques et le rôle des vertus dans les dix livres de *La vie de Pythagore*, et Tanaseanu-Döbler 2013, 95–130.

à fait inutile : elle pouvait contribuer accessoirement à purifier le corps pneumatique de l'âme des gens incultes – purification dont, selon lui, les philosophes n'avaient pas besoin –, mais non pas l'âme raisonnable elle-même.²¹ Elle avait donc pour lui une valeur très inférieure à la philosophie. Le jambliquéen Eunape de Sardes, dans son chapitre néanmoins très élogieux sur Porphyre, lui attribue même un exorcisme (t. II, IV, 12, p. 9 Goulet).²²

²¹ Cf. Porph. *De regressu animae*, frgm. 287 F, 290 F, 291 F etc. Smith. Cf. aussi Wintjes 2010, 43–61.

Dans son livre très important de 1999, D. P. Taormina a très bien analysé le cheminement de l'argumentation jambliquéenne. Pour notre sujet, le chapitre IV « Philosophie, Théologie, Théurgie. Le débat sur le rôle et les limites de la raison » est particulièrement important. Dans le cadre de l'article présent, je n'en peux malheureusement citer que des bribes insuffisantes : Selon Jamblique, ce n'est pas la raison qui nous procure une connaissance des dieux, mais le fait que « nous avons des dieux une connaissance innée, supérieure à tout jugement et à toute option, antérieure au raisonnement et à la démonstration et qui explique notre désir naturel du Bien » (p. 141). « A la différence de la pensée discursive, l'intellect possède les idées 'comme' par contact ... ; il les voit 'comme' par intuition » (p. 145). « ... l'activité du νοῦς (intellect) en puissance (ou ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦς) se définit comme le résultat d'un processus double et complémentaire. D'abord l'intellect possède une forme de connaissance qui dérive totalement de lui, il a une stabilité grâce à une activité unique, simple et sans opposition, et se tourne vers l'intelligible. D'autre part ... il est nécessaire que la forme noétique et l'intellection en acte soient stimulées par l'intellect imparticipable (p. 152) », autrement dit, par 'l'illumination'.

Dans son Épilogue, D. P. Taormina (p. 159) pose la question suivante : « Dans sa controverse contre Plotin et Porphyre, Jamblique a-t-il gagné ? », et elle répond par l'affirmative. Elle peut avoir raison en ce qui concerne Plotin et Porphyre, qui ne doutaient pas de l'existence des dieux. Cependant, objectivement Jamblique n'a pas gagné, car toute son argumentation en faveur de la théurgie part de l'hypothèse selon laquelle tous les hommes ont une connaissance innée des dieux. Or, comme un récent colloque du C.N.R.S. (à Paris) sur l'agnosticisme dans l'Antiquité l'a encore une fois mis en lumière, cette hypothèse est fausse. Il y a toujours eu des hommes, et il en aura toujours, qui doutent fort de l'existence des dieux ou de Dieu, ou du moins de leur sollicitude envers les hommes, et ils sont à nos jours nombreux à faire cet aveu dans les pays où ils ne courent plus le danger d'être tués ou persécutés pour cette opinion.

²² Muscolino 2015, 146–158 commente cette indication d'Eunape de la manière suivante (p. 156 sq.) : « It is clear from the reference to black magic [*scil.* la magie qui s'exerce en contact avec les mauvais démons] in works such as *De abstinentia*, the *Philosophia ex oraculis* and the *Letter to Anebo*, that the philosopher of Tyre knows the rituals, the effects, the rules of the magical ceremonial, so much that we can suppose he sometimes has practiced black magic. ... Porphyry himself knows several exorcisms practiced by his people, precisely the Phoenicians and the Egyptians ... ». Et il arrive à la conclusion suivante (p. 157) : « From what has been observed it is clear that Porphyry has a specialized knowledge of black magic, an art that in certain occasions ... he might have practiced, in addition to the art of Magi (magic) and the theurgy. However, it is apparent that its exercise does not have as a goal to use the evil demons

Quant aux *Oracles Chaldaïques*, Porphyre semble avoir été le premier à les commenter.²³ De toute manière, comme l'a expliqué P. Hadot,²⁴ ils ont laissé des traces dans le système métaphysique de Porphyre, surtout dans l'interprétation de la première triade des *Oracles*, qui était située au sommet de tout et qui était « formée par le Père, c'est-à-dire le Dieu suprême, et par sa Puissance et son Intellect, triade qui d'ailleurs était une monade, puisque ces puissances étaient identiques au Père lui-même ».

Il ne faudrait pas non plus penser que l'attitude de Jamblique lui-même vis à vis de Porphyre était d'une hostilité insurmontable et que la philosophie de ce dernier était chez les néoplatoniciens grecs postérieurs l'objet d'un rejet total ; il ne faudrait pas vouloir généraliser l'attitude personnelle de l'empereur Julien, pour lequel ne comptait que l'aspect religieux de la pensée jambliquéenne. Après Eunape de Sardes, je cite comme preuve du contraire un texte de Simplicius, qui était actif dans le deuxième tiers du VI^{ème} siècle et le dernier néoplatonicien grec donc l'œuvre nous est partiellement connue :

Après ceux-là Porphyre, *cause pour nous de tout bien*, a composé, sans ménager sa peine, un commentaire complet du livre [*scil.* des *Catégories* d'Aristote], avec des solutions à toutes les objections, en sept livres dédiés à Gédalios, dans lequel il traite souvent aussi de théories stoïciennes quand il y a une parenté de notions. *Après lui le divin*

in order to obtain services and favours, the so-called adoricism – performed only by the sorcerer –, but only to drive them away from the possessed person or a place haunted by them. Because of this thorough knowledge of the ritual, of the hierarchy of evil demons, of the extreme danger of their presence for a victim or even a population, it is likely that he has practiced some exorcism even though this practice supposes the philosopher's research, the knowledge, the escape from alone to Alone, the assimilation to God [cf. Porph. *De abstinencia* II, 49, 1, t. II, p. 114 Bouffartigue–Patillon] ; all theories that Porphyry supports until the last of his works, the *Letter to Marcella*, and that constitute the ultimate reminder of the philosopher, the ultimate moral testament to his wife and to all humanity ».

²³ Cf. plus haut, n. 8.

²⁴ P. Hadot 1968, 96–100. A la p. 97 P. Hadot écrit : « L'exégèse de Porphyre concernant la triade suprême des *Oracles chaldaïques* est beaucoup plus simple [que celle de Jamblique]. Non seulement Porphyre ne connaît pas de principe transcendant, antérieur à l'Un, mais il ne place même pas l'Un avant la triade. L'Un devient le premier terme de cette triade. C'est bien ainsi qu'il faut entendre la formule de Damascius [visant Porphyre] : 'Le Père de la triade intelligible est le Principe unique de toutes choses.' En effet le 'Père' est effectivement le premier terme de cette triade, et le 'Principe unique' n'est autre que l'Un. C'est bien ainsi que les néoplatoniciens postérieurs comprendrons la doctrine de Porphyre et c'est pourquoi ils la critiqueront âprement : ils lui reprocheront de 'compter ensemble' l'Un et ce qui vient après lui. » Cf. P. Hadot 1966, 127–157, et la traduction allemande de cet article: 1977, 208–237.

Jamblique a écrit lui aussi une volumineuse étude sur ce livre ; sur la plupart des questions il suit Porphyre à la lettre, tandis qu'il choisit d'examiner certains points, sur lesquels il donne des explications plus précises tout en ramassant les réponses que Porphyre déployait avec verbosité en répondant aux objections, comme s'il avait développé des leçons magistrales ; partout d'autre part, presque à chaque chapitre, il ajoute une exégèse qui s'élève au point de vue de l'intellect. ... j'ai pris modèle sur le commentaire de Jamblique, avec tout le soin dont j'étais capable, en le suivant pas à pas et en utilisant fréquemment le texte même de ce philosophe (Simpl. In Cat. p. 2, 5 – 3, 4 Kalbfleisch).²⁵

... Je conseille cependant aux lecteurs de ne jamais négliger non plus, en particulier, les commentaires de Porphyre et de Jamblique (Simpl. In Cat., p. 3, 13 sq. Kalbfleisch).

Nous voyons donc la grande estime que Porphyre rencontrait encore à la fin du néoplatonisme, même si pour Simplicius les plus hautes autorités étaient son maître Damascius et Jamblique. Ce dernier, on l'a vu, ne dédaignait pas de « suivre Porphyre à la lettre » quand il le jugeait opportun. En même temps ces quelques lignes citées témoignent de l'intérêt vif de Jamblique pour des questions purement philosophiques.

Après cette parenthèse sur Porphyre, passons maintenant à l'attitude envers la théurgie de la première et de la deuxième génération des néoplatoniciens après Jamblique. Retenons pour le moment que pour Jamblique la philosophie est nécessaire, mais qu'elle prend la deuxième place après la théurgie.

Grâce aux *Vies de philosophes et de sophistes* d'Eunape de Sardes (né en 349, mort après 416 selon R. Goulet²⁶) il nous est possible d'avoir une petite idée sur les positions de quelques néoplatoniciens, élèves directs ou indirects de Jamblique, qu'Eunape connaissait personnellement ou à travers son propre professeur de philosophie : Chrysante de Sardes.

Selon Eunape, c'est Aidésius de Cappadoce, élève de Jamblique en Syrie, qui, après la mort de Jamblique, reçoit à titre de successeur l'école de Jamblique. Mais nous n'entendons parler que de son enseignement à Pergame, où il avait comme élèves Maxime d'Éphèse, Priscus de Thesprotie – les deux philosophes qui devaient devenir des proches conseillers du futur empereur Julien –, Chrysante de Sardes, le maître d'Eunape, et Eusèbe de Myndes.

²⁵ Cité dans la traduction de Ph. Hoffmann, dans I. Hadot *et alii* 1990, 8 sq. En ce qui concerne la vie de Simplicius, cf. I. Hadot 2014, 13–134.

²⁶ Goulet 2014, t. I, 5–34. De cette œuvre en deux tomes, le tome I entier contient une très précieuse et exhaustive introduction au texte d'Eunape, qui est édité, traduit et annoté dans le t. II, paru à la même date.

D'Aidésius, Eunape dresse le portrait suivant (VI, 4–5 [17–18 G], t. II, p. 19, 5–16 Goulet) :

Lorsqu'il vit l'homme [*scil.* Jamblique] et l'entendit parler, il fut suspendu à ses propos et ne se rassasia pas de son enseignement. En parvenant à cette fin, Aidésius devint (un expert) qui restait de peu en deçà de Jamblique, sauf en ce qui concerne le pouvoir divin [θεῖα σμῆξ]²⁷ de Jamblique. Car sur ce point nous n'avions rien à écrire, d'une part du fait que peut-être Aidésius lui-même gardait (de tels détails) secrets à cause de l'époque – car Constantin était empereur, démolissant les sanctuaires les plus magnifiques et érigeant les édifices des chrétiens –, d'autre part du fait que la crème des disciples avait peut-être tendance et était encline à garder un silence mystérieux et une discrétion hiérophantique.

La seule activité religieuse d'Aidésius qu'Eunape signale un peu plus loin (VI, 32–35 [23–24 G], t. II, p. 24, 24 – 25, 18 Goulet), c'est la prière, forme de piété beaucoup plus ancienne que la théurgie de Jamblique: c'est par la prière qu'Aidésius avait obtenu en rêve un oracle qui, après ses études auprès de Jamblique, le poussa tout d'abord à mener une vie de paysan-philosophe en Cappadoce, avant de se décider à ouvrir une école de philosophie à Pergame dans la province d'Asie. Il se pourrait qu'Aidésius ait lui-même eu peu de penchant pour le côté thaumaturgique de la philosophie de Jamblique, mais il est sûr qu'il était doté d'une grande tolérance. C'est en tout cas la conclusion que l'on doit tirer du témoignage d'Eunape que je viens de citer, comme aussi de la façon dont le même Eunape décrit la diversité des enseignements dispensés à l'école d'Aidésius à Pergame. Eunape raconte que, quand le futur empereur Julien vint à Pergame et souhaita devenir son disciple, Aidésius ne l'accepta pas, se déclarant trop vieux, et, en l'absence de ses élèves Maxime et Priscus, qui enseignaient déjà ailleurs, lui recommanda de suivre l'enseignement de Chrysanthé et d'Eusèbe en les désignant avec les premiers 'comme ses enfants authentiques' :²⁸

Lorsque Julien eut entendu ces paroles, il ne s'éloigna pas pour autant du philosophe, mais il s'attachait la plupart du temps à Eusèbe et Chrysanthé. Or Chrysanthé avait le même esprit que Maxime, s'enthousiasmant comme lui pour les rites qui assurent un pouvoir divin, et il s'adonnait

²⁷ Sur ce terme, cf. Goulet 2014, t. I, 367–376.

²⁸ Eunape, *Vies de philosophes*, VII, 15–26 (43–45 G), t. II, p. 44, 9 – 46, 22 Goulet. Cf. Goulet, t. I, p. 174–179, le chapitre très instructif « Tensions dans l'école de Jamblique ».

aux disciplines,²⁹ étant quant au reste également d'un caractère semblable. Mais Eusèbe, en présence de Maxime, fuyait quelque peu la minutie dans les parties du discours, ainsi que les artifices et les ruses dialectiques, mais, en son absence, il brillait comme un astre sans la lumière du soleil, tant une certaine facilité et une certaine grâce fleurissaient sur ses discours. Et Chrysanthé, quand il était présent, (le) louait et (lui) donnait son assentiment. Quant à Julien, il vénérât cet homme. Mais Eusèbe, après son exposé, ajoutait que ces objets (de son discours) étaient les réalités véritables [τὰ ὄντως ὄντα], tandis que les tours de sorcellerie qui trompent et mystifient la sensation sont des pratiques de charlatans et de gens qui dans leur délire et leur déraison (se tournent) vers de certaines puissances matérielles. Comme il entendait souvent cette conclusion, le très divin Julien prit à part Chrysanthé et lui dit: « Si tu as part à la vérité en quelque point, cher Chrysanthé, explique-moi clairement (ce que veut dire) cette conclusion de l'exposé ». Celui-ci, dans une réponse fort profonde et prudente, dit: « En vérité, tu feras une chose sage si, au lieu de me poser la question à moi, tu la lui poses à lui-même ». Et ayant compris, (Julien) écouta le conseil et le mit en pratique, considérant, à cause de cette parole, que Chrysanthé était un dieu. Lorsqu'eut lieu le cours, (Eusèbe) conclut sur les mêmes mots. Mais Julien lui demanda avec résolution ce qu'il voulait dire par cette conclusion invariable. Alors Eusèbe, en donnant libre cours à son éloquence et en laissant son aisance de parole se porter vers une expression sans contrainte, dit: « Maxime est un des plus anciens auditeurs et l'un des plus cultivés. Celui-ci, parce qu'il méprisait, à cause de la noblesse de son caractère et de (sa) supériorité dans les discours, les démonstrations qu'ils comportent, s'est élancé et a couru vers de certaines folies; il nous convoqua récemment, nous les (compagnons) présents, au sanctuaire d'Hécate et il rendit nombreux les témoins contre lui. Lorsque nous fûmes réunis et que nous fûmes prosternés devant la déesse, il nous dit: « Asseyez-vous, très chers compagnons, regardez ce qui va arriver et (voyez) si en quelque point je diffère de la multitude [des philosophes] ». Ayant dit cela, et alors que nous étions assis, il fit brûler un grain d'encens, et tout en récitant jusqu'à la fin pour lui-même je ne sais quel hymne, il se lança dans une telle exhibition qu'au début la déesse souriait et qu'ensuite ce qui apparaissait était un rire. Comme nous étions troublés par ce spectacle, (il dit): « Que nul d'entre vous ne soit perturbé par de telles manifestations, car tout de suite vont également s'allumer les flambeaux que la déesse tient dans ses deux mains ». Et il n'avait pas fini de parler qu'(on vit) la lumière d'une

²⁹ R. Goulet (voir aussi la note 13, t. II, p. 210 sq.) suppose qu'il s'agit ici des disciplines divinatoires, mais je penche plutôt à penser qu'il y est question des différentes disciplines de la philosophie. Cf. le chapitre sur Chrysanthé, t. II, XXIII, p. 96–102, et spécialement XXII, 30, p. 101 Goulet.

flamme sur les flambeaux.³⁰ Quant à nous donc, stupéfaits sur le moment devant ce prestidigitateur digne du théâtre, nous nous retirâmes. Mais toi, n'admire aucun de ces prodiges, pas plus que je ne le fais moi-même, considérant comme une grande chose la purification assurée par la raison ». Mais le très divin Julien, ayant entendu ces paroles, dit: « Dans ce cas, au revoir! Reste attaché à tes livres. En ce qui me concerne, tu m'as fait connaître l'homme que je cherchais ». Et sur ces mots, il embrassa Chrysante sur la tête et partit en hâte vers Éphèse. Ayant rencontré Maxime à cet endroit, il était suspendu à cet homme et s'attachait fermement à (sa) sagesse tout entière.

Bien que ce texte propose un tableau qui n'est peut-être ni complet ni tout à fait objectif des activités des différents personnages,³¹ il me semble néanmoins que cette description vivante de la diversité des opinions concernant la théurgie dans l'école d'Aidésius peut être considérée comme représentative des attitudes diverses chez l'ensemble des néoplatoniciens après Jamblique. Prenons d'abord Aidésius: Eunape n'a pu discerner chez ce chef de l'école néoplatonicienne de Pergame aucune activité théurgique, ce qu'il attribue à la prudence. De toute manière, l'attitude d'Aidésius envers ses quatre élèves et co-enseignants Maxime, Priscus, Chrysante et Eusèbe était apparemment d'une égale bienveillance: malgré leurs dispositions d'esprit très divergentes, il les appelle tous « ses enfants authentiques », sans faire de différence; pourtant, fondateur et chef de l'école privée de Pergame, il aurait été libre d'exclure comme enseignant

³⁰ Cf. plus haut, n. 19, Proclus et ses apparitions lumineuses d'Hécate.

³¹ Pour compléter le tableau il faudrait lire les chapitres qu'Eunape écrit sur Chrysante, sur Chrysante en comparaison avec Maxime, et sur Priscus. Pour avoir un aperçu encore plus complet des différentes personnalités nommées dans ce texte, je renvoie aux articles les concernant dans le *DPhA* de R. Goulet. Je n'ajoute que deux détails: Simplicius, donnant un survol historique sur les commentateurs péripatéticiens et néoplatoniciens des *Catégories* d'Aristote dans l'introduction de son propre commentaire sur ces *Catégories*, y mentionne aussi un commentaire de Maxime d'Éphèse en disant qu'« il s'accorde presque en tout avec Alexandre » d'Aphrodise le péripatéticien; cela veut dire qu'y était très peu apparente la tendance à harmoniser les philosophies de Platon et d'Aristote, tendance qui est propre à quelques moyen-platoniciens et à tous les néoplatoniciens à partir de Porphyre et Jamblique. De Maxime sont encore connus, mais non pas conservés, d'autres écrits sur la logique. Priscus également avait écrit, selon Julien (*Lettre* 12 à Priscus, cité partiellement p. 106–107), des résumés de la philosophie d'Aristote (Ἀριστοτέλους συναγωγή) en un seul livre, ouvrage que Julien préférait aux œuvres 'du Tyrien', c'est-à-dire de Porphyre. (C'est la seule conclusion sûre que l'on puisse tirer des deux phrases, partiellement corrompues, des lignes 15 à 19 de l'édition Bidez de la lettre 12, et je ne vois pas quelles raisons ont pu amener I. Tanaseanu-Döbler [2010, 137] à croire que c'est seulement l'*Isagoge* de Porphyre qui est visée.)

celui qu'il ne croyait pas digne d'en faire partie. Aidésius semble donc avoir eu l'esprit très large, tolérant dans son école des attitudes diamétralement opposées envers la théurgie, allant de l'enthousiasme sans limites de Maxime au rejet chez Eusèbe, qui prône la purification par la raison, en passant par une attitude plus modérée (comme Eunape le montre plus loin, XXIII, 11–17 [92–93 G], t. II, p. 98 sq. Goulet) de la part de Chrysanthé. Eusèbe ne voit en Maxime qu'un charlatan; sur la théurgie et la philosophie, il prend peut-être la même position que Porphyre concernant la théurgie et la philosophie: il se peut que, comme Porphyre dans le *De regressu*, il ait attribué à la théurgie – une théurgie exempte des tours de magicien à la Maxime – un rôle très secondaire par rapport à la philosophie, mais il est aussi possible qu'il l'ait rejetée complètement. Quant à Chrysanthé, bien qu'il éprouvât selon Eunape un aussi grand enthousiasme que Maxime pour la théurgie, il loue et approuve quand même l'enseignement proprement philosophique d'Eusèbe, lequel à son tour ne critique pas Maxime à moins d'y être convié. L'on apprendra d'ailleurs plus loin par Eunape (VII, 37–43 [47 G], t. II, p. 49 sq. Goulet) que Maxime pratiquait une théurgie qui prétendait contraindre les dieux – attitude attribuée aux magiciens et réprouvée par Jamblique comme par Chrysanthé – et qu'il avait en dehors de cela un comportement humain peu philosophique. En revanche Chrysanthé est décrit par Eunape comme un personnage très équilibré. Malgré cela, attiré vers les pseudo-miracles de Maxime comme un papillon de nuit par la flamme d'un cierge dans laquelle il va se brûler, le jeune Julien ne cesse non seulement de suivre les leçons d'Eusèbe, mais même celles de Chrysanthé: il se livre corps et âme à Maxime, dont il allait suivre l'enseignement et les conseils jusqu'à sa mort.

La même tolérance mutuelle entre ces deux tendances néoplatoniciennes différentes, personnifiées chez Eunape par Eusèbe et Maxime, semble avoir régné à peu près à la même date à Athènes où enseignait Priscus (brièvement nommé dans le texte d'Eunape que je viens de citer), comme Maxime élève d'Aidésius et, comme lui, futur conseiller de Julien. Une lettre de Julien, envoyée de Gaule vers 359 à Priscus enseignant à Athènes,³² témoigne de cette tolérance. Le futur empereur le prie en effet de ne pas se laisser rebattre les oreilles par les partisans de Théodore, qui répètent

que Jamblique fut un ambitieux, lui, le maître vraiment divin, le premier après Pythagore et Platon. Et s'il y a de l'outrecuidance à manifester son opinion devant toi avec les transports d'un enthousiaste, tu trouveras

³² *Epist.* 12, p. 19 Bidez = *Testimonium* 4 Deuse. Comme Julien se trouvait en Gaule, c'est Priscus lui-même qui a dû l'informer de ce qui se passait à Athènes.

dans cette exaltation même une raison de m'excuser. Pour ma part, je raffole de Jamblique en philosophie et de mon homonyme [= Julien le théurge] en théosophie et ... auprès de ceux-là, à mes yeux, les autres ne comptent pas.

Il s'agit des partisans de Théodore d'Asiné, le disciple de Porphyre et de Jamblique et influencé aussi par Amélius,³³ dont la pensée avait eu un grand retentissement au moins jusqu'au début du V^e siècle. Comme le remarque très bien J. Bouffartigue,³⁴ Porphyre et Théodore d'Asiné s'opposaient tous les deux à Jamblique en général, en refusant ses convictions théurgiques, mais en particulier en ne croyant pas au pouvoir des noms divins, élément capital de la théurgie de Jamblique. Ce dernier était d'avis que les noms des dieux avaient été révélés par les dieux eux-mêmes, tandis que pour Porphyre et Théodore ils étaient établis par convention entre les hommes.³⁵

Le fait que Julien se sente obligé de prévenir Priscus contre les disciples de Théodore semble indiquer qu'à Athènes ces différences doctrinales n'avaient pas abouti à des hostilités ouvertes. Comme l'écrit J. Bouffartigue :³⁶ « Il semble que certains des maîtres de Julien aient été peu soucieux d'attiser la querelle entre le parti de Jamblique et le parti de Théodore d'Asiné, et qu'ils aient au contraire cherché les voies d'une conciliation. En tout cas, ils ne vouaient pas la doctrine théodorienne au silence et à l'oubli, ni ne la condamnaient systématiquement ». ³⁷ La seule

³³ Cf. Deuse 1973, 1–2 et 20 ; cf. aussi Brisson 1987, 818 sq.

³⁴ Bouffartigue 1992, 129. Cf. aussi W. Deuse 1973, 10 : « Théodore souligne fortement ... l'aptitude de l'âme humaine à se débarrasser de ce qui est corporel et de s'assimiler au règne des hypostases supérieures. Elle trouve la force pour une telle ascension à la transcendance dans l'intellect qui est en elle. Dans *Test.* 36 nous lisons que, selon Théodore, l'âme possède quelque chose en elle qui est tout à fait exempt de passions et ne cesse jamais de penser. C'est cette qualité de l'âme qui conditionne aussi bien l'aspiration de l'homme vers le Bien par la seule force de sa volonté que la libération de l'homme des chaînes corporelles. Cette intellectualité marquée que Théodore enseigne l'a amené à refuser la théurgie, ou pour le moins à la regarder comme inutile, contrairement à l'opinion de Jamblique » (ma traduction).

³⁵ Pour Porphyre, cf. Iambl. *De myst.* VII, 5 (257, 1–260, 2), p. 193–195 Des Places.

³⁶ Bouffartigue 1992, 358 sq.

³⁷ J'aurais tendance à rapprocher de ce passage de la lettre de Julien la remarque suivante d'Eunape à propos de Priscus (VIII, 10 [58 G], p. 60 Goulet) : « ...supportant de nombreuses innovations de la part de jeunes gens qui s'enthousiasmaient pour la sagesse, conservant en toutes circonstances la profondeur de son caractère et riant de la faiblesse humaine, c'est après avoir atteint une grande vieillesse, qu'il disparut à quatre-vingt-dix ans passés... ». En ce qui concerne les innovations des 'jeunes gens qui s'enthousiasmaient pour la sagesse (ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ)', je les identifierais

attitude vraiment tranchée est celle de Julien : pour lui ne comptent que la théurgie de Jamblique et les *Oracles Chaldaïques*.

Outre Porphyre, Eusèbe à Pergame, Théodore d'Asiné et ses disciples à Athènes nous connaissons encore deux autres philosophes néoplatoniciens contemporains réfractères à la théurgie jambliquéenne. Le premier, dont le nom n'est pas transmis, enseignait la philosophie à Sicyone; le second, Thémistius, était à la fois un responsable politique et un professeur de philosophie à Constantinople. Thémistius³⁸ parle dans son *Discours XXIII (Sophistes, 295 b – 296 a Dindorf)* d'un philosophe de Sicyone qui, à son avis, était, parmi les Hellènes [= les Grecs restés païens] de son temps, celui qui s'était approprié la philosophie de la manière droite et la plus pure; selon Thémistius, ce philosophe avait été le disciple de l'homme de Chalcis [= Jamblique], quand celui-ci était déjà âgé, mais il ne pratiquait cependant pas le nouveau chant (τὴν νέαν ᾠδὴν), mais bien le chant ancestral et antique de l'Académie et du Lycée. A en juger par l'éloge de l'empereur Julien au sujet de l'impératrice Eusébie (*Discours II [III], § 12, 119 b–d Bidez*), Sicyone, près de Corinthe, était de son temps en Grèce l'un des trois centres de philosophie néoplatonicienne à côté d'Athènes et de Masè en Argolide. Autant que je sache, on est unanime à comprendre que, selon Thémistius, le philosophe de Sicyone, bien qu'il ait été disciple de Jamblique et néoplatonicien, s'était refusé à suivre l'enthousiasme de son maître pour la théurgie. Cela ne signifie pas que ce philosophe n'était pas resté fidèle aux anciens cultes : selon Thémistius, il avait envoyé des élèves consulter l'oracle d'Apollon, ce qui prouve le contraire. D'une manière générale, le refus de la théurgie de Jamblique n'inclut pas l'infidélité aux anciens cultes. Le ton louangeur que Thémistius emploie lorsqu'il parle de ce philosophe de Sicyone semble bien témoigner d'une sympathie profonde, fondée sur leur réserve

plutôt à celles des adhérents de Théodore d'Asiné à Athènes qu'à un 'développement à Athènes des tendances théurgiques caractéristiques d'une partie de la tradition de Jamblique', comme le propose d'une manière dubitative R. Goulet (t. I, p. 171 ; cf. aussi t. II, p. 237 n. 8). Comme Priscus était, comme Maxime, très proche de l'empereur Julien, il aurait dû être au contraire très content d'une propagande pour la théurgie de Jamblique.

³⁸ Cf. plus haut, n. 2. Sur Thémistius comme néoplatonicien, cf. surtout mes plus amples démonstrations dans I. Hadot 2015, 74–97. J'ajoute seulement l'argument suivant : une des raisons pour lesquelles, dans sa paraphrase sur le livre A de la *Métaphysique* d'Aristote, Thémistius ne distingue pas clairement l'Un de l'Intellect, est accessoirement à chercher dans la possibilité qu'il se rapprochait sur ce point de Porphyre (cf. plus haut, n. 24), dont l'œuvre lui était bien connue : les néoplatoniciens postérieurs reprochaient à Porphyre de 'compter ensemble' l'Un et ce qui vient après. Cf. I. Hadot 2015, 56–60.

commune vis-à-vis du côté miraculeux de la théurgie de Jamblique et d'une partie de ses adhérents.

Il est vrai que la position éminente dont Thémistius, bien que philosophe païen, jouissait à la cour chrétienne de Constantinople ne lui aurait pas permis d'y pratiquer la théurgie ou de manifester sa sympathie pour elle, même s'il avait cru en son utilité. Mais quand on lit ses *Discours*, surtout les *Discours privés*, l'on n'a pas l'impression que Thémistius s'efforce de cacher ses opinions, et l'on est plutôt frappé par son réalisme, qu'il s'agisse de la situation politique ou des capacités de la majorité des hommes – la métriopathie prônée par Aristote lui semble plus accessible à l'homme du commun que l'exigence platonicienne de chercher à devenir semblable à Dieu :

J'admire beaucoup de choses chez Aristote, dit Thémistius, mais j'admire et cherche à imiter surtout la sagesse de cet homme qui se manifeste dans le fait que ses discours ne surpassent pas la nature [de l'homme] pour laquelle ils ont été énoncés, mais viennent en aide à sa faiblesse, remettent en ordre ce qui en elle est défectueux et mettent tout en œuvre pour qu'ils arrivent au meilleur résultat. Ils ne transgressent en effet jamais la limite de la nature [de l'homme], qui est le centre de leur préoccupation, ni ne poussent la sagesse à un tel degré qu'ils oublient, à cause de cette sagesse, que l'être vivant, qui est leur objet, a en lui beaucoup d'infernal et de terrestre, mais peu de divin et de céleste. Ses discours sont satisfaits s'ils arrivent à écarter et à purifier entièrement les nombreuses choses inutiles par lesquelles la partie immortelle d'un être mortel est encombrée, et si, en ce qui concerne ce qui ne peut pas être enlevé par un lavage ou être affaibli, parce qu'il est profondément entaillé ou enfoncé, ils arrivent au moins à l'améliorer et à l'embellir et à en enlever ce qui se manifeste d'une manière excessive (Themist. Or. XXXII, 358 d – 359 b, p. 433 sq. Dindorf).

Thémistius ne critique pas Platon, dont la supériorité en matière de théologie va sans dire ; au contraire, il se joint au chœur de tous les moyens- et néoplatoniciens qui chantent la supériorité de Platon sur Aristote même en ce qui concerne la logique.³⁹ Cependant, en raison aussi

³⁹ Cf. Philopon, *In Anal. Pr.*, p. 6, 14–18 Willies : « Étant arrivé jusqu'ici, Thémistius pose la question : 'Est-ce que les *Analytiques* sont une création d'Aristote ou non ?', et il dit qu'ils ne sont pas une création de lui : le divin Platon en effet brille comme étant capable de raisonner et de faire des démonstrations dans le *Phédon* et dans presque tous ses dialogues. Composer l'ouvrage et faire du traité en question un art au moyen de quelques règles n'est rien d'extraordinaire ». Pour d'autres exemples de ce genre, cf. I. Hadot 2015, 143–146.

bien de sa position politique vouée à l'action⁴⁰ que d'une perception réaliste de ses propres moyens humains et de ceux du vaste public à qui son discours s'adresse, il limite ses efforts à l'obtention du premier degré des vertus néoplatoniciennes, lequel se fonde sur la métriopathie d'origine aristotélicienne. Mais d'autres néoplatoniciens tenaient également en haute estime les vertus politiques.⁴¹ Je ne cite qu'un seul exemple : le néoplatonicien Damascius, le dernier diadoque de l'école néoplatonicienne privée d'Athènes, avait par son administration efficace amené celle-ci à un dernier point culminant de prospérité et avait pris l'initiative courageuse de la transférer en Perse⁴² quand son existence ne fut plus assurée à Athènes. Voici son opinion (*Vita Isidori*, Phot. *Bibl.* cod. 242, § 296, t. VI, p. 53–54 Henry, cf. *Suid.* t. I, 3, p. 587 sq. Adler) :

Les hommes donnent naturellement volontiers un renom de vertu à la vie qui fuit l'action alors que, selon moi du moins, elle ne le mérite pas. Car la vertu qui se débat en pleine vie publique dans l'action et les discours politiques exerce l'âme à acquérir plus de force et affermit par l'expérience ce qu'elle a de sain et d'accompli ; et tout ce qui se cache de faux et d'artificiel dans les existences humaines est tout entier révélé et mis sur la voie du redressement. Et combien n'y a-t-il pas d'occasions, dans les affaires publiques, d'agir dans le sens du bon et de l'utile ? Et combien n'y faut-il pas d'assurance et de fermeté ? C'est pourquoi les doctes qui restent assis dans leur coin à philosopher gravement et longuement sur la justice et la sagesse, quand ils sont forcés d'en venir à l'action, font piètre figure. En sorte que, si les actions sont absentes, tout discours semble être vain et vide.

⁴⁰ Tout au contraire de Julien l'empereur, Thémistius était réaliste et très tolérant. A la cour de Constantinople il se faisait toujours l'avocat de la liberté religieuse en général, c'est-à-dire en ce qui concerne les différentes factions des chrétiens eux-mêmes (il plaidait p. ex. sous Valens l'arien la tolérance vis-à-vis des nicéens), et en particulier il prenait la défense des temples et des rites païens. Et c'est sous son influence que les empereurs Constance et Théodose prennent des mesures pour assurer la conservation des textes de la tradition classique et que voit le jour la première bibliothèque impériale à Constantinople. Cf. Dagron 1968, spécialement les pp. 186–198.

⁴¹ Comme je l'ai déjà dit (I. Hadot 2015, 84), Thémistius n'est pas le seul parmi les néoplatoniciens à n'avoir jamais dépassé le niveau inférieur de leur système de vertus. Le tableau que D. J. O'Meara a mis à la fin de son article (O'Meara 2006, 90) montre que, parmi les 27 philosophes représentés par ce tableau (non exhaustif), il ne se trouve que cinq dont on puisse croire, à en juger par les commentaires de Damascius, qu'ils ont surpassé le degré des vertus politiques ou civiles et progressé plus ou moins loin dans leur transformation pour devenir semblable à Dieu : ce sont Syrianus, Hermias, Sarapion, Heraïscus et Isidore.

⁴² Sur le sort d'une partie au moins de l'École d'Athènes après le séjour en Perse, cf. I. Hadot 2014, 19–133.

Outre son refus de la théurgie jambliquéenne et son activité politique, qui lui a été reprochée par des collègues philosophes,⁴³ il y a encore un autre trait qui distingue Thémistius d'un certain nombre de néoplatoniciens post-jambliquéens connus de nous : c'est le fait qu'il était assez clairvoyant pour contester l'authenticité du fameux traité *Sur le Tout* que l'on rapportait au pythagoricien Archytas⁴⁴ et qu'on considérait comme antérieur aux *Catégories* d'Aristote. Jamblique fut le premier à l'utiliser dans son commentaire des *Catégories* d'Aristote, tandis que Porphyre ne le mentionnait pas. Selon Boèce (*In Cat.* I, col. 162 A [*Patrologia Latina*, t. 64, Migne]), qui s'est servi de plusieurs œuvres de Thémistius dans ses propres travaux, ce dernier pensait que l'auteur du *Sur le Tout* n'était pas un pythagoricien, mais un péripatéticien qui voulait donner à sa nouvelle production l'autorité d'un nom ancien.

La renommée de Thémistius comme professeur de philosophie s'étendait très loin en dehors de Constantinople. Plusieurs villes orientales, dont Ancyre et Antioche, avaient tenté, mais en vain, de s'attacher ce fameux professeur de philosophie. Quand Thémistius avait été envoyé en ambassade à Rome (en 357) – il s'agissait d'un assez long séjour qui lui donnait aussi l'occasion d'enseigner –, les Romains avaient été si enthousiastes de son enseignement qu'ils avaient essayé par tous les moyens de le retenir à Rome.⁴⁵ Il est un fait que ses œuvres étaient bien connues à Rome, et l'on peut supposer qu'il y a peut-être rencontré entre autres Agorius Vettius Praetextatus.⁴⁶ Boèce, qui connaissait également les œuvres de Thémistius, n'était pas encore né à cette

⁴³ Contre ce reproche, Thémistius se défend dans l'*Oratio* XXXIV, 30 en se référant à l'allégorie de la caverne dans le livre VII de la *République* de Platon : cf. I. Hadot 2015, 86 sq. C'est le livre de D. J. O'Meara 2003, qui a mis fin à l'opinion longtemps défendue, selon laquelle tous les néoplatoniciens se désintéressaient de la politique et avaient comme seul but de rendre l'homme le plus possible semblable à Dieu. Aux pages 16 à 26, O'Meara examine tous les néoplatoniciens post-jambliquéens qui ont fait de la politique, par exemple Sopator à la cour de Constantin I à Constantinople, Eustathius, ambassadeur de Constance II à la cour du roi Perse Sapor, etc. Dans son Appendix 1, O'Meara discute « Themistius and Neoplatonic Philosophy ».

⁴⁴ L'inauthenticité a été confirmée depuis par la recherche moderne : cf. Szlezak 1972.

⁴⁵ Sur la carrière de Thémistius, cf. Dagron 1968, 5–13, le chap. « La vie de Thémistius ».

⁴⁶ Agorius Vettius Praetextatus est généralement considéré comme un néoplatonicien. Il connaissait bien les œuvres de Thémistius : il avait traduit ses paraphrases sur les *Analytica priora* et *posteriora* d'Aristote, comme le remarque Boèce (*De interpret. comm. sec.* 1, p. 3–4 Meister).

date, mais sa famille entretenait des contacts suivis avec Constantinople. La grande réputation de Thémistius comme professeur attirait à Constantinople un très grand nombre d'élèves. Sa carrière politique ainsi que son succès comme professeur lui faisaient, comme c'est naturel, beaucoup d'envieux, notamment chez ses collègues philosophes (cf. Themist. *Or.* XXIII [*Sophistes*]).

Pour toutes ces raisons : sa carrière politique sous des empereurs chrétiens, sa grande renommée comme philosophe et son rejet de la théurgie, Thémistius ne semble pas avoir fait bonne figure chez quelques disciples fidèles de Jamblique. Il est d'ailleurs tout à fait significatif qu'Eunape ne parle jamais de lui. Quand en 361, après la mort de Constance, l'empereur Julien arrive à Constantinople, Thémistius a droit à quelques égards de sa part, mais non pas à sa sympathie. Mais laissons parler Thémistius lui-même (*Or.* XXXI, 354 d, p. 428 sq. Dindorf) :

Il me suffit que Constance ait souvent répété que ma philosophie était la parure de sa royauté ; il me suffit que Julien ait *bien été forcé* [βίασθείς] de me déclarer digne de l'ambassade du monde et non seulement de la Belle Cité (Constantinople), et que, par écrit il ait reconnu que j'emportais le premier prix de philosophie...

Un dernier exemple éclairant les relations entre Julien et Thémistius nous vient du commentaire d'Ammonius sur les *Premiers Analytiques* d'Aristote, qui nous garde le souvenir d'un débat entre Thémistius et Maxime d'Éphèse arbitré par l'empereur Julien (Ammon. *In Analyt. prior.* p. 31, 10–33 Wallies).⁴⁷ Contre Thémistius, qui défend l'avis d'Aristote, à savoir que les syllogismes des deuxième et troisième figures sont imparfaits, Julien donne raison à Maxime, qui avait épousé les vues du péripatéticien Boéthos et des néoplatoniciens Porphyre et Jamblique, lesquels soutenaient que ces syllogismes étaient parfaits eux aussi, opinion admise plus tard également par Syrianus, Hermias, Proclus et Ammonius lui-même.

Ces deux témoignages, l'un de Thémistius et l'autre d'Ammonius, montrent qu'à Constantinople au temps de l'empereur Julien le *modus vivendi* entre défenseurs et adversaires de la théurgie est resté à peu près le même qu'à l'intérieur de l'école d'Aidésius à Pergame et qu'entre les deux écoles adverses de Priscus et de Théodore d'Asiné à Athènes : la diversité des opinions n'empêchait pas un comportement poli et même à un certain degré respectueux des uns vis-à-vis des autres.

⁴⁷ Cf. le commentaire de ce passage par Bouffartigue 1992, 357 sq.

Passons maintenant au néoplatonicien Hiéroclès,⁴⁸ élève de Plutarque d'Athènes (mort 431/432) et enseignant à Alexandrie (mort avant 490). Aux chapitres XXV, XXVI et XXVII de son commentaire sur le *Carmen aureum*, qui est destiné surtout aux débutants, Hiéroclès, dont le système philosophique est à placer entre Jamblique et Syrianus-Proclus, décrit le rapport entre philosophie et théurgie, sans jamais employer le terme « théurgie », visiblement parce que celui-ci ne se trouve pas dans le poème.⁴⁹ Selon Hiéroclès, le retour de l'âme raisonnable humaine dans sa patrie n'est possible que sous certaines conditions : d'un côté, l'acquisition des vertus, l'apprentissage des sciences mathématiques et de la philosophie, qui purifient l'âme raisonnable humaine, et d'un autre côté, la pratique de la téléstique, qui purifie le véhicule éthéré ou pneumatique,⁵⁰ lequel a été joint à l'âme raisonnable par le démiurge. La théurgie consiste selon lui en deux parties : la téléstique et l'élévation hiératique (ιερατική ἀναγωγή). La téléstique comprend selon lui la totalité des rites païens locaux (*In Carm. aur.* XXVI, p. 118, 10 sq. Köhler). L'élévation hiératique n'est mentionnée qu'allusivement, et son contenu ne sera pas décrit, car elle est de toute manière inaccessible aux débutants auxquels il s'adresse. Elle est, comme on peut le déduire du contexte, identique à la partie la plus élevée de la théurgie. Le texte d'Hiéroclès que je citerai se rapporte aux vers 67 à 69 du *Carmen aureum* (XXVI, 21–22, p. 116, 20 –

⁴⁸ Dans son chapitre sur Hiéroclès, I. Tanaseanu-Döbler (2013) affirme que le démiurge est pour ce dernier l'entité la plus haut placée, ce qui voudrait en effet dire qu'Hiéroclès n'est pas un néoplatonicien. C'est un des rares points dans son livre sur lequel je ne suis pas d'accord, livre qui est en général très intéressant et très bien documenté. En ce qui concerne Hiéroclès, elle reprend pour l'essentiel les travaux de N. Aujoulat (1986), et de Th. Kobusch (1976), travaux qu'aussi bien H. S. Schibli (2002) que moi-même avons réfuté (I. Hadot 1990 et *eadem* 1993, ainsi que 2004). Dans ces trois dernières publications, restées inconnues de I. Tanaseanu-Döbler, il est entre autres question d'un assez long texte d'Hiéroclès (*In Carm. aur.* p. 87, 16 – 89, 18 Köhler) sur la mystique pythagoricienne des nombres, texte qui selon moi (et aussi selon Schibli 2002, IX–X) prouve précisément que le démiurge d'Hiéroclès, désigné comme tétrade (= le nombre 4 [et non pas un ensemble de quatre], comme dans tous les textes de tradition pythagoricienne de la mystique des nombres), n'arrive qu'à la quatrième place à partir de la monade. (En ce qui concerne Th. Kobusch, il a eu la gentillesse de me dire, après la parution de mes deux articles, qu'il ne défend plus sa position antérieure en ce qui concerne Hiéroclès).

⁴⁹ Je reprends dans ce qui suit mon interprétation de ce passage dans I. et P. Hadot 2004, 189–192 (Livre de Poche, Références). Cf. aussi le chapitre « Theurgy » dans I. Hadot 2004.

⁵⁰ Hiéroclès, comme Jamblique et les néoplatoniciens avant eux, ne connaît encore qu'un seul véhicule de l'âme, indistinctement nommé pneumatique, éthéré ou lumineux.

117, 10 Köhler), dans lesquels il est question des purifications de l'âme raisonnable humaine et de sa délivrance (λύσις) :

Les purifications requises pour l'âme raisonnable sont les sciences mathématiques, et la délivrance, qui la fait remonter (l'ἀνάγωγος λύσις), c'est la vision dialectique des étants.⁵¹ C'est pourquoi on parle [dans le *Carmen aureum*] de la délivrance au singulier : « dans la délivrance de l'âme », car elle s'achève en une seule science, tandis que la mathématique contient une pluralité des sciences. Il faut donc aussi ordonner pour le corps lumineux des prescriptions analogues à celles qui sont transmises d'une manière convenable pour les purifications et la délivrance de l'âme. Il faut donc que les purifications téléstiques correspondent à celles des mathématiques et que l'élévation hiératique accompagne la délivrance dialectique (διαλεκτική λύσις) De même qu'il convient d'orner l'âme de science et de vertu, pour qu'elle puisse s'unir à ceux qui sont en permanence en possession de cela, de même il faut rendre le véhicule lumineux pur et immatériel, afin qu'il puisse supporter le commerce avec les corps éthérés.

La correspondance entre les purifications et délivrances de l'âme raisonnable et de son véhicule est illustrée par le schéma suivant :

purifications et délivrances	
de l'âme raisonnable	du véhicule pneumatique ou lumineux
<i>purification</i> : sciences mathématiques	art téléstique (rites sacrés des cités)
<i>délivrance</i> : vision dialectique des étants	élévation hiératique

Les « corps éthérés » de la dernière phrase du texte cité sont les astres, auxquels l'âme raisonnable humaine est censée retourner avec son véhicule, appelé encore indifféremment par Jamblique et Hiéroclès « pneumatique » ou « lumineux » ou « éthéré. Et, après avoir dit qu'il ne faut négliger ni la purification de l'âme raisonnable ni celle du véhicule lumineux, Hiéroclès continue un peu plus loin de la manière suivante (*In Carm. aur.* XXVI, 24–27, p. 117, 20 – 118, 12 Köhler) :

C'est pour cela que la philosophie est réunie avec l'art des choses sacrées (τῇ τῶν ἱερῶν τέχνῃ), car ce dernier s'occupe de la purification du véhicule lumineux, et si tu sé pares de cet art l'intellect philosophique, tu

⁵¹ C'est-à-dire la philosophie au sens de Platon.

te rendras compte qu'il n'a plus la même puissance (δύναμις).⁵² Et en effet, des facteurs qui concourent à parachever notre perfection, l'un a été procuré par l'activité téléstique en suivant l'intellect philosophique. J'appelle 'activité téléstique' la puissance qui purifie le véhicule lumineux, en sorte que, de la totalité de la philosophie, la partie théorique précède en tant qu'intellect, et la pratique suit en tant que puissance. Mais il y a pour nous deux espèces de pratiques, l'une est la morale civique, l'autre la téléstique, l'une nous purifie de l'irrationalité à l'aide des vertus, l'autre nous enlève les imaginations matérielles par les méthodes sacrées. Une manifestation non négligeable de la philosophie politique sont les lois qui régissent une collectivité, et, de la philosophie téléstique, les rites sacrés pratiqués dans les cités (τὰ τῶν πόλεων ἱερά).

Mais le sommet de toute la philosophie est l'intellect théorique, au milieu se tient l'intellect politique, et la troisième place revient à l'intellect téléstique.

Finalement, la philosophie éthique ou politique est donc comprise avec « l'art des choses sacrées » dans une philosophie qui englobe tout. A la purification de l'âme raisonnable par les mathématiques se joint encore la purification par la 'morale civique', c'est-à-dire par l'acquisition des vertus civiques ou politiques qui forment le premier degré du système des vertus néoplatoniciennes. Aux mathématiques et aux vertus civiques ou politiques correspond, au niveau du véhicule pneumatique ou lumineux, « l'activité téléstique », qui s'exerce dans les rites sacrés pratiqués dans les cités. Philosophie pratique et activité téléstique doivent aller de pair, car la philosophie sans la téléstique achève seulement la purification de l'âme raisonnable humaine, qui est immortelle, mais non pas la purification du véhicule, immortel lui aussi, et elle ne pourrait donc pas à elle seule garantir le retour de l'âme, qui est liée à son véhicule, dans sa patrie. Cela veut dire que l'homme, pour se purifier, doit pratiquer à la fois les exercices philosophiques et les rites religieux. Hiéroclès n'explique pas le contenu de l'élévation hiératique, qui est la 'délivrance' du véhicule pneumatique ou lumineux, et qui, de toute manière, n'est pas encore accessible au public auquel son commentaire sur le *Carmen aureum* était destiné ; mais de toute manière, même si son contenu était apparenté

⁵² Cf. *In Carm. aur.* XXVI, 7, p. 113, 6–15 Köhler : il faut purifier le corps pneumatique « en suivant les lois sacrées et les techniques des rites sacrés. Cette purification est en quelque sorte plus corporelle. C'est pour cela qu'elle a recours à des matières diverses [...] mais toute cette pratique, si elle se fait de manière qui convient aux dieux et non pas de la façon d'un charlatan, se trouve conforme aux canons de la vérité et de la vertu ».

au plus haut degré de la théurgie de Jamblique, elle ne représente pour Hiéroclès que la ‘délivrance’ du véhicule de l’âme, tandis que la ‘délivrance’ de l’âme raisonnable elle-même est la ‘vision dialectique des étants’, donc la philosophie à son plus haut niveau. Il s’agit là clairement d’un rapprochement vers la position de Porphyre et de la négation de la suprématie de la théurgie par rapport à la philosophie.⁵³

Cette division des néoplatoniciens entre adhérents et adversaires de la théurgie jambliquéenne a perduré jusqu’à la fin du néoplatonisme : un texte de Damascius, dernier diadoque de l’école d’Athènes, en témoigne (*In Phaed.* I § 172, 1–5, p. 104–105 Westerink) :

Certains placent avant toute autre chose la philosophie, tels sont Porphyre, Plotin et beaucoup d’autres philosophes ; d’autres mettent en premier l’art ‘hiératique’, tels Jamblique, Syrianus, Proclus et tous les ‘hiératiques’. Platon, de son côté, ayant discerné les nombreux arguments en faveur de chacune des deux opinions, les a réunies en une seule vérité, ce qu’il exprime en appelant le philosophe un Bacchant.

Le premier renseignement que l’on peut tirer de ce texte est le suivant : les deux branches du néoplatonisme, l’une défendant et l’autre critiquant, certes à divers degrés, la théurgie, ont perduré jusqu’à la fin du néoplatonisme et semblent – et ceci est remarquable –, avoir été de la même importance. Ensuite nous apprenons, comme Ph. Hoffmann l’a très bien vu⁵⁴, que Damascius a voulu

réaliser la *synthèse des deux courants fondamentaux de la philosophie et de la théurgie* : il suivait en cela son maître Isidore [d’Alexandrie], lequel, par-delà une telle distinction, ‘divinisait’ conjointement Pythagore, Platon, Porphyre, Jamblique, Syrianus et Proclus, selon le § 36 Photius (t. VI, p. 15 Henry) qui constitue un document fondamental pour comprendre quelle représentation Isidore et Damascius se faisaient de l’histoire de la philosophie : ‘Parmi les philosophes anciens, il [Isidore] divinise (θειάζει) Pythagore et Platon qui sont de ces grandes âmes ailées qui atteignent au lieu supracéleste, à la plaine de la vérité, à la prairie des formes divines et y trouvent leur pâture (cf. Platon, *Phèdre*, 247 c, 246 c et 248 b). Parmi les penseurs d’époque récente, ce sont Porphyre, Jamblique, Syrianus et Proclus. D’autres encore ont, dans l’intervalle, accumulé, dit-il, un riche trésor de science divine. Toutefois, ceux qui ne s’appliquent (φιλοπονούμενοι) qu’aux choses périssables et humaines ou qui veulent comprendre trop vite ou acquérir

⁵³ Cf. la dernière phrase de la deuxième citation de Hiéroclès, p. 115.

⁵⁴ Hoffmann, 1994, 573 sq.

simplement des connaissances (φιλομαθεῖς) n'atteignent guère à la grande et divine sagesse. Car, parmi les Anciens, Aristote et Chrysippe, qui furent les mieux doués mais aussi les plus avides de science (φιλομαθέστατοι) et qui furent aussi des laborieux (φιλόπονοι), n'ont pas néanmoins accompli toute l'ascension (οὐκ ἀναβῆναι ὅμως τὴν ὅλην ἀνάβασιν).

Selon Damascius donc, ceux qui, comme Aristote, ne pratiquent pas assez la partie théologique de la philosophie, c'est-à-dire ceux qui, dans la perspective néoplatonicienne, n'étudient que la première partie de leur cursus philosophique, les 'petits mystères', qui portent sur les œuvres d'Aristote (sauf sur celles appartenant à la science naturelle⁵⁵), n'arrivent pas à « la grande et divine sagesse » que l'on ne peut atteindre qu'en étudiant aussi d'une manière zélée « les grands mystères », le cursus platonicien complété par la théurgie.

Dans mon article de 2002,⁵⁶ j'ai interprété tous les textes de Damascius dans lesquels il est question du rapport entre philosophie et théurgie. Ici je n'en citerai que deux. Dans son commentaire sur le Phédon, Damascius remarque (*In Phaed.* I, 168, 13–16, p. 101 sq. Westerink) :

En analogie avec cela [*scil.* les différentes étapes de l'initiation théurgique mentionnées auparavant] il faut considérer les chemins de la philosophie qui mènent en haut, même s'ils ne produisent l'union [avec le divin] ni parfaitement ni à la manière de l'union indicible. S'il est vrai que l'homme qui s'adonne à la philosophie d'une manière négligente ne profitera pas de ses résultats, il n'est pas moins vrai aussi que celui qui s'adonne à la téléstique sans instruction (philosophique) [ἰδιωτικῶς] ne cueillera pas ses fruits.

Comme ce premier texte cité, le suivant mettra aussi l'accent sur l'importance de la philosophie. Cette fois-ci Damascius met en scène son maître Isidore qui admoneste l'Athénien Hégias, un élève de Proclus. Celui-ci avait bénéficié auprès de Proclus d'une instruction complète aussi bien en philosophie qu'en théurgie, mais il s'était adonné par la suite presque exclusivement à la théurgie. La scène où Isidore lui fait des remontrances avait probablement lieu à Athènes au temps où Isidore était, après Proclus et Marinus, le diadoque de l'école d'Athènes. Je cite Damascius (*Vita Isidori*, in Phot. *Bibl.* cod. 242, § 227, t. VI, p. 46 Henry = *Damascius, The Philosophical History*, frgm. 150 Athanassiadi) :

⁵⁵ Cf. I. Hadot *et alii* 1990, ch. III « La division néoplatonicienne des écrits d'Aristote », 63–93, surtout p. 85–90.

⁵⁶ I. Hadot, 2002, 323–353.

Et si c'est, comme tu l'affirmes, Hégias, disait Isidore, une chose divine que la pratique de la théurgie, je le dis, moi aussi ; mais il faut que ceux qui seront les dieux [scil. les théurges] soient d'abord des hommes. C'est pourquoi Platon disait, lui aussi, que, chez les hommes, il n'était pas advenu de bien plus grand que la philosophie.

Cette fois-ci, il ne s'agit pas chez Hégias d'un rejet de la théurgie, comme dans les exemples précédents (Eusèbe, Théodore d'Asiné et ses disciples, le professeur de philosophie enseignant à Sicyone, Thémistius), mais d'un rejet de la philosophie en faveur de la théurgie. « Aussi loin que remontent nos souvenirs, nous n'avons jamais vu mépriser la philosophie à Athènes comme nous l'avons vu déshonorer sous Hégias » dit Damascius (*Vita Isidori*, in Phot. *Bibl. cod.* 242, § 221, t. VI, p. 45 s. Henry = frgm. 145 Athanassidi). Ce sera Damascius lui-même qui rétablira l'ancien niveau de cette école.

Quant à Simplicius, l'élève d'Ammonius d'Alexandrie et de Damascius, dans son commentaire du chapitre du *Manuel* d'Épictète dans lequel il est question entre autres des sujets sur lesquels on peut avoir recours à la divination (comme partie de la théurgie), il s'exprime comme suit (XXXIX, 58–74 I. Hadot [Brill]) :

Mais il vaut la peine d'examiner si, au sujet des choses qui dépendent de nous, il faut absolument ne pas recourir à la divination, <par exemple> : comment faut-il penser au sujet de l'âme ? Est-elle mortelle ou immortelle ? Et s'il faut étudier avec ce professeur-là ? Car on voit que, parmi les anciens, beaucoup ont posé des questions au sujet de la nature des choses, et pourtant nous disons que le fait de penser de telle ou telle façon est notre affaire et appartient aux choses qui dépendent de nous. Cela étant, peut-être que c'est par la démonstration qu'il faut apprendre ce qui est saisissable par la démonstration logique. C'est de cette manière en effet que se réalisera une connaissance scientifique, si la démonstration se fait à partir de la cause. Mais le fait d'entendre de Dieu que l'âme est immortelle fait naître certes la foi, et même une foi solide, comme cela est naturel, mais tout de même pas la science de la chose. Si quelqu'un est jugé digne par le dieu d'apprendre précisément les causes et de devenir savant, cela est un autre genre de la bonté [du dieu], mais non pas le genre divinatoire : ce dernier en effet semble faire savoir d'avance, dans les choses pratiques, les issues qui sont impénétrables pour la pensée de l'homme. C'est pourquoi, même si quelques-uns ont posé des questions sur la nature des étants, du moins ceux-ci étaient rares et ils ne tenaient pas le premier rang en philosophie, mais étaient de ceux qui avaient pris l'habitude d'avoir une foi confiante et non pas scientifique, tandis que Dieu veut, comme il paraît, que l'âme, puisqu'elle se meut elle-même, voie la vérité par elle-même.

Comme Damascius, Simplicius a tendance, lui aussi, à équilibrer la philosophie et la théurgie, comme je l'ai démontré plus amplement dans mon article de 2002.

Dans mon livre de 2015 j'ai pu mettre en évidence que l'intensité de la tendance à harmoniser les philosophies de Platon et d'Aristote, quoique commune à tous les néoplatoniciens à partir de Porphyre, n'était cependant pas égale à toutes les époques ni dans une même école. Par le présent article, j'espère avoir démontré cette fois-ci que les attitudes des néoplatoniciens vis-à-vis du rôle à accorder à la théurgie de Jamblique pouvaient être très diverses elles aussi. Il ne s'agissait sans doute que rarement d'un refus total, mais plutôt du rejet de ce que Jamblique avait ajouté aux rites des anciens cultes, c'est-à-dire principalement les actes théurgiques qui reproduisaient ceux des magiciens : il y a toujours eu et il y aura toujours des individus, comme Eusèbe de Myndes, qui par nature ne sont pas capables de croire à des miracles et qui dénoncent la tromperie des charlatans. Le rôle accordé à la philosophie par les contemporains ou les générations postérieures à Jamblique est inversement proportionnel à leur capacité de croire sans preuves : pour les uns, le raisonnement philosophique est le plus important, pour les autres, probablement plus nombreux, c'est la théurgie, mais avec des contenus différents, et au milieu se situent ceux qui donnent la même importance aux deux. Mais dans la grande majorité des cas, Jamblique inclus, la philosophie reste indispensable, et le salut de l'âme reste toujours réservé à une minorité.

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This paper discusses the attitudes of the Neoplatonist philosophers of the 3rd to 6th centuries AD toward theurgy, i.e., the conglomerate of different magical techniques and ritual rites used to communicate with gods. All this time there were persons who rejected theurgy as it was propagated by Iamblichus in his *De mysteriis* or assigned to it only a subordinate role in the salvation of the human soul in comparison with philosophy. Only a few Neoplatonists, however, rejected theurgy entirely; much more often they rejected only those theurgic techniques that Iamblichus had added to the traditional cultic rites, viz. those that could not be practically distinguished from magic rites. Persons like Eusebius of Myndes, who were not able to believe in wonders, tried to expose the frauds of charlatans. Depending on their attitudes toward theurgy, the Neoplatonists estimated the role

of philosophy differently: some, following Iamblichus, assigned to theurgy a higher status than philosophy; others treated them as having equal value; and a third group preferred rational philosophical enquiry to theurgy. But the overwhelming majority of the Neoplatonists, including Iamblichus himself, considered the study of philosophy indispensable; according to the Neoplatonists (and also to Iamblichus), the salvation of the soul was available only to a minority.

В статье рассматривается отношение неоплатоников III–VI вв. н. э. к теургии (совокупность разнообразных магических и религиозных обрядов, использовавшихся для общения с богами). В течение всего этого времени обнаруживаются неоплатоники, которые либо отвергали теургию в той форме, в которой ее принес в школу Ямвлих в своем трактате “О таинствах”, либо отводили ей в спасении души лишь подчиненную роль по отношению к философии. Однако лишь в единичных случаях речь идет при этом о полном отрицании теургии; много чаще отвергаются те теургические практики, которые Ямвлих добавил к традиционным религиозным обрядам, т. е. которые ничем практически не отличались от магии. Люди, подобные Евсевию из Минды, не способные верить в чудеса, пытались разоблачать проделки теургов-шарлатанов. В зависимости от отношения к теургии неоплатоники по-разному оценивали и роль философии: одни, следуя за Ямвлихом, отводили теургии более высокий статус, чем философии; другие признавали их равноценными; третьи, наконец, предпочитали философские занятия теургии. Тем не менее, подавляющее большинство неоплатоников, включая и самого Ямвлиха, признавали необходимой философскую подготовку; спасение души оставалось для неоплатонической школы, в том числе и Ямвлиха, достижимым только для меньшинства.

AP IX, 484 (PALLADAS):
*AIOLOS SERVIERT WIND**

Palladas' Epigramm *AP IX, 484* steht in einer Reihe seiner spöttischen Gedichte, die den Leser auf bei den Grammatikern populäre homerische Zitate verweisen:¹

Ἄσκον τῶν ἀνέμων ἔλαβέν ποτε δῶρον Ὀδυσσεὺς
πόντον ἐπιπλείων· χρῆμα γὰρ ἦν τι μέγα.
Ἄλλ' ἐμὸς Αἰόλος οὗτος ἔχων ἀνεμώλιον ἦτορ,
ὄρνεον ἐκπέμπει τῶν ἀνέμων γεμίσας.
Πνεύματά μοι πτερόεντα, φίλος, † καὶ † πνεύματα πέμπεις;²
οὐ δύναμαι δὲ φαγεῖν θλιβομένους ἀνέμους.

Einmal empfing Odysseus einen Schlauch voller Winde als Geschenk, als er über das Meer segelte; das war wirklich etwas Großes. Doch dieser Aiolos, den ich hab, mit einem windigen Herzen, schickt mir einen Vogel zu, den er mit Winden gefüllt hat. Du schickst mir geflügelte Hauche, mein Freund, ... Hauche – doch kann ich eingeengte Winde nicht essen.

Das Gedicht kann zu den Epigrammen, in denen schlechtes Essen (bei einem Gastgeber serviertes oder als Geschenk empfangenes) verspottet wird, gezählt werden.³ Hier sind ein – wohl ausgedachter – Fall aus Palladas' Leben und eine allgemein bekannte Episode aus dem 10. Gesang der "Odyssee" verbunden. Es finden sich zweierlei Wortspiele: einerseits

* Wir möchten uns an dieser Stelle bei Herrn J. Kohler für sorgfältige Lektüre dieses Aufsatzes und zum Nachdenken anregende Fragen ganz herzlich bedanken.

¹ Vgl. z.B. *AP VI, 61*; *X, 41*; *IX, 395*; *X, 50*.

² Es ist klar, dass es im 5. Vers eine Beschädigung zu sehen ist: das in den Handschriften stehende καὶ ist sinnlos, das von Scaliger vorgeschlagene καὶ verbessert den Vers auch nicht. Fr. Jacobs lässt im Text καὶ stehen (Jacobs 1814, 173), aber schlägt vorsichtig vor, καὶ durch κεῖν zu ersetzen (Jacobs 1817, 576); obwohl diese Korrektur den meisten am sinnvollsten scheint, steht das Problem offen. Für unsere Diskussion ist es allerdings nicht relevant. Einen vollständigen kritischen Apparat kann man bei H. Stadtmüller finden: Stadtmüller 1906, 479–481.

³ Vgl. einen Überblick der Epigramme über schlechtes Essen bzw. schlechten Wein: Brecht 1930, 74–75.

die gewöhnliche Erwähnung eines homerischen Sujets neben homerischen Zitaten: πόντον ἐπιπλείων (cf. Hom. *Od.* V, 284), πτερόεντα in einer erstaunlichen Verbindung mit πνεύματα;⁴ andererseits das oft wiederholte ἄνεμος und das von ihm abgeleitete homerische ἀνεμώλιος, die eine ironische Metapher bilden.

Die erste Frage, die wir behandeln, ist, um was für einen “mit Winden gefüllten Vogel” es geht, und warum genau ein solches Geschenk den Empfänger enttäuscht. Die traditionelle Interpretation versteht es so, dass der Vogel keinerlei Füllung enthielt. So W. Zerwes: “mit Winden gefüllten (d.h. leeren) Vogel”;⁵ auf ähnliche Weise übersetzen diese Stelle H. Beckby und W. Paton.⁶ Auch sagt Fr. Jacobs in seiner Beschreibung der Erwartungen des Empfängers: “in avem, vento pro farto inflatam”.⁷ P. Waltz versucht, das σιτεύσιμον im Lemma zu diesem Epigramm in der Anthologie (εἷς τινα αὐτῷ πέψαντα σιτεύσιμον) als “einen gefüllten Vogel” zu interpretieren, was jedoch aus dem von ihm angeführten Fragment des parodischen Epos Matrons nicht zu folgen scheint.⁸ Zerwes, treu seiner Neigung, jedes Epigramm von Palladas als eine Erzählung über einen tatsächlichen Fall zu betrachten, gibt eine lebhafte Schilderung der Enttäuschung des Dichters, der den Vogel aufgeschnitten habe, “in der berechtigten Erwartung, in seinem Inneren allerlei gute Sachen zu finden”.⁹

Aber trotz der Beliebtheit gefüllter Vögel bei den Köchen der römischen Zeit, ist u.E. diese Interpretation auszuschließen; wie anziehend dieses Bild auch sein mag, die Annahme, dass Palladas statt eines gefüllten Vogels einen nicht gefüllten bekommen habe, passt nicht zu der Assoziationsentwicklung, die er von seinen Lesern erwartet haben könnte: der Vogel *ist* gefüllt, aber mit Winden, und genau das macht ihn dem Schlauch von Aiolos ähnlich. Ein Vogel ohne Füllung wäre für diesen Vergleich nicht geeignet.

⁴ Hier ist auf eine Alliteration hinzuweisen: unter sieben Wörtern beginnen vier mit π-, dazu kommt auch φίλος.

⁵ Zerwes 1956, 246.

⁶ Beckby 1966, 299; Paton 1918, 271.

⁷ Jacobs 1801, 209.

⁸ Waltz, Soury 1974, 220, wo es auch darauf hingewiesen ist, dass σιτεύσιμον nur zweimal belegt ist, das zweite Mal ebenso in einem Lemma. Das entsprechende Matron-Fragment (fr. 5, 2 Olson–Sens = Athen. 656 e) zählt drei Verse und beschreibt die aufgetragenen ὀρνιθες σιτευταί. Der Kommentar von Olson und Sens versteht aber diese Wortverbindung als “gemästete Vögel” und belegt das durch viele Parallelstellen: Olson–Sens 1999, 148. Der Wortbildung der Adjektive auf -σιμος entsprechend müsste σιτεύσιμον einfach “eine Speise” bedeuten. Weitere Beispiele für dieses Modell: Buck–Petersen 1948, 185.

⁹ Zerwes 1956, 246.

Stattdessen schlagen wir folgende Interpretation vor: der geschenkte Vogel ist wirklich aufgeblasen, wie Aiolos' Schlauch. Dabei sei auf Palladas' Epigramm IX, 486 verwiesen, das von jeher mit dem uns interessierenden verglichen wird:

Τὴν λαπάραν, τὴν αὐτὸς ἀποσφίγξας ἀποπέμπεις,
εἶδεν ὁ παῖς λύσας φύσαν ὑπηνέμιον.

Die Wurst,¹⁰ die du selbst zugebunden hast und mir schickst, / erkannte der Bursche, als er sie öffnete, als eine Blase voller Wind.

Die Kommentatoren merken treffend, dass eine solche "Wurst" kein Fleisch enthalten soll – man musste sie doch aufblasen, damit sie wie eine echte Wurst aussieht; aber wenn eine Wurst ohne Füllung auch keine Wurst ist, bleibt ein Vogel ohne Füllung doch ein Vogel, und die Füllung ist dann nicht so wichtig; wahrscheinlich wurde der Vogel einfach aufgeblasen, so dass er größer scheint. Diese Erklärung wurde bisher nicht in Betracht gezogen; sie lässt sich jedoch durch eine weitere Stelle bestätigen, wo dieser Trick griechischer Verkäufer belegt ist.

In den *Vögeln* von Aristophanes gibt der Vogelchor seine Pläne bekannt, u.A., eine Fahndung nach Leuten durchzuführen, die an Vögeln schwere Delikte begangen haben, 1076–1083:

Βουλόμεσθ' οἶν νῦν ἀνειπεῖν ταῦτα χήμεις ἐνθάδε·
“Ἦν ἀποκτεῖνῃ τις ὑμῶν Φιλοκράτη τὸν Στρούθιον,
λήψεται τάλαντον, ἦν δὲ ζῶντα γ' ἀγάγη, τέτταρα,
ὅτι συνείρων τοὺς σπίνους πωλεῖ καθ' ἐπτὰ τοῦβολοῦ,
εἶτα φυσῶν τὰς κίχλας δείκνυσι καὶ λυμαίνεται,
τοῖς τε κοψίχοισι εἰς τὰς ῥίνας ἐγχεῖ τὰ πτερά,
τὰς περιστεράς θ' ὁμοίως ξυλλαβὼν εἶρξας ἔχει,
κάπαναγκάζει παλεύειν δεδεμένους ἐν δικτύῳ”.

So wollen auch wir jetzt Folgendes bekannt machen: / wer von euch Philokrates den Sperling tötet, / wird ein Talent bekommen; und wer ihn gar lebendig liefert, vier; / weil er Finken fängt und sie zu siebt für einen Obolos verkauft; / *auch bläst er Drosseln auf, stellt sie aus und fügt ihnen Schmach zu*;¹¹ / und den Amseln steckt er Federn in die Nasen, / und die Tauben hält er alle zusammengepackt gefangen / und zwingt sie, im Fangnetz gebunden, die anderen zu locken.

¹⁰ Die Bedeutung folgt aus dem Kontext. Siehe auch Guichard 2017, 163–164.

¹¹ Van Leeuwen merkt treffend: “Efficiunt autem haec ἐν διὰ δυοῖν quod dicitur” (Van Leeuwen 1902, 169).

Diese Liste der von Philokrates begangenen Misshandlungen der Vögel und Schändungen ihrer Leichen ist eine unterhaltsame Skizze der Tätigkeit der griechischen Vogelfänger. Man könnte zwar das Aufblasen der Vögel für reine Phantasie halten; so denken unter anderen F. Olck (“Unreelle Händler bliesen sie auf, um sie fetter erscheinen zu lassen”) und O. Keller.¹² Es ist aber wichtig, im Auge zu behalten, dass an dieser Stelle gewöhnliche menschliche Tätigkeiten von den Vögeln als ein Frevel wahrgenommen werden. Daraus folgt, wie auch Palladas bezeugt, dass Vögel wirklich aufgeblasen wurden. Die Kommentatoren einigen sich darauf, dass ein solcher Vogel fetter aussehen müsste, geben aber keine Parallelstellen dazu an. Das Aufblasen der Vögel ist also keine Erfindung von Aristophanes oder Palladas, sondern ein reelles Verfahren der antiken Verkäufer.¹³ Wir lassen die Leser selbst über die Details des Prozesses nachdenken, denn die Quellen sind dazu viel zu knapp.¹⁴

Warum spricht Palladas von einem ἀνεμόλιον ἦτορ?¹⁵ Aus der wörtlichen Übersetzung (‘windig’, ‘full of wind’, ‘ventosus’ etc.) geht es nicht hervor. Manche Kommentatoren haben versucht, davon ausgehend die Motive des Senders zu verstehen. So nennt W. Zerwes ihn “hochmütig” und

¹² Olck 1905, 1724. Keller 1963, 78.

¹³ Wir haben A. Tschernowskaja noch eine interessante Parallele zu verdanken: vor der Aufblasung magerer Vögel auf dem Markt wird in einem russischen Kochbuch Ende des 19. Jh. gewarnt; dabei werden unangenehme technische Kleinigkeiten angeführt (Avdeeva–Maslov 1915 [E. Авдеева, Н. Маслов, “Поваренная книга русской опытной хозяйки. Руководство к уменьшению расходов в домашнем хозяйстве”], 22).

¹⁴ Darüber s. Dunbar 2004, 585. Man mag sich auch fragen, wozu es diene. U.E. sollte der Käufer glauben, der Vogel habe ausreichend zartes Fleisch: bei Palladas könnte es zudem um einen gemästeten, “fetten” Vogel gehen (seit 1. Jh. v. Chr. ist das Mästen von Drosseln zumindest für Italien gut belegt: Plut. *Luc.* 40; Varro *RR* 3, 4, 1–3; 3, 5, 1–17; s. Arnott 2007, 94–95; Keller 1963, 78), aber Aristophanes meint höchstwahrscheinlich frischgefangene magere Drosseln; darum kann von ihrer Masse kaum die Rede sein (dabei gibt es keine Belege, ob die Kunden ihre Waren vor dem Kauf wiegen konnten; cf. *Av.* 530: die Vögel werden betastet). Es wäre komplizierter, den Betrug zu bemerken, wenn Drosseln, wie auch andere kleine Vögel, in “Kränzen” verkauft wurden. Arnott 2007, 95 belegt das mit Mart. 3, 47, 10: *coronam pinguibus gravem turdis*; 13, 51 (*Turdorum decuria*): *de turdis facta corona*; vgl. auch *Ar. Av.* 529; Keller 1963, 79 über Abbildungen von Drosseln, darunter ein Mosaik mit einer solchen *corona* von ungerupften Drosseln (Fig. 24); dagegen spricht aber die Bemerkung des Scholiasten zu *Ar. Av.* 14 (ὁ πινακοπώλης Φιλοκράτης): ὁ ὀρνεοπώλης: ὅτι τὰ λιπαρὰ τῶν ὀρνέων ἐπὶ πίνακον τιθέντες ἐπώλουν (zitiert nach White 1914, 14).

¹⁵ Die Konstruktion ἔχων + Adj. + ἦτορ wird überwiegend attributiv gebraucht und beschreibt meistens eine stabile Charaktereigenschaft. Sie kommt in noch einem Epigramm von Palladas (VII, 683) vor und ist Teil der negativen Beschreibung von Gessios (die Person ist nur aus Palladas’ Epigrammen bekannt: s. Bowra 1960, 91–95).

rekonstruiert so ein Verhältnis zwischen Palladas und dem Absender, dass “jener glaubte, der Dichter werde schon für den bloßen Vogel ohne Füllsel dankbar sein”.¹⁶ So sieht den Absender auch Jacobs: “*stolida significatur superbia*”.¹⁷ Gugo Grotius versteht es so, dass er einfach ein gieriger Mensch ist, und fügt ironisch in seine Übersetzung *largus* ein.¹⁸ Hier sollte man erstens anmerken, dass Palladas keinen einzigen Hinweis auf das Verhältnis zwischen den beiden gibt, und zweitens, dass die Bedeutung von ἀνεμώλιος keiner dieser Interpretationen entspricht;¹⁹ folglich wäre die primäre Übersetzung davon zu gebrauchen, nämlich ‘wirkungslos’, ‘nutzlos’.²⁰ So gab schon 1862 F. D. Dehèque diesen Vers wieder: “... mon Éole, dont le coeur n’est que du vent...”; diese Übersetzung unseres Epigramms wurde von den späteren Herausgebern leider vernachlässigt.²¹

Eine interessante Analogie kann man im Epigramm des Macedonius Consul (AP XI, 61; 6 (?). Jh. n.Chr.) finden. Der Kranke beschwert sich über einen Arzt, der ihm den Alkoholkonsum untersagt hat: “[der Arzt], ἀνεμώλιος, hat nicht gelernt, dass Homer den Wein die Kraft der Sterblichen genannt hatte”. Daraus wird deutlich, dass der Arzt kein Betrüger ist, sondern ein Unbelehrter (οὐδ’ ἐδιδάχθη), von dem man keine echte Hilfe bekommen kann, also auch ‘nutzlos’. Lukian (*Astr.* 2, 9) sagt, dass die

¹⁶ Zerwes 1956, 246.

¹⁷ Jacobs 1817, 576.

¹⁸ *Dulichius quondam ventorum accepit utrem, / Quo mare transiret : nec leve munus erat. / Aeolus at meus hic, vento cui, credo, tumet cor, / Ventorum tumidam dat mihi largus avem. / Quid mihi das, quaeso, volucres, nihil amplius, aras? / Crede, meus non sunt flamma pressa cibus* (zitiert nach Dübner 1888, 100).

¹⁹ Passow s.v.: “nichtig, unnütz, vergeblich”, Montanari s.v.: “light as the wind, vain, useless”. So Apollonius (*Lex. Hom.* 35.18): ἀνεμώλια: μάταια, ἀνεμώδη, ἀπὸ τοῦ μετὰ τῶν ἀνέμων μολίσκειν, οἷον ἀνεμοφόρητα: “ἀνεμώλια γάρ μοι ὀπήδει”.

²⁰ Hier ist *Il.* 20, 123 zu erwähnen, eine wichtige Stelle für die Interpretation von ἀνεμώλιος bei Homer; problematisch für uns ist, dass für diesen Vers manche anderen Bedeutungen des Wortes vorgeschlagen wurden. Hera nennt ἀνεμώλιοι die troerfreundlichen Götter – die einzige homerische Stelle, wo ἀνεμώλιος, wie in unserem Epigramm, im Bezug auf Lebewesen vorkommt. Im LSJ wird dazu die Bedeutung ‘empty boasters’ angegeben, die wir sowohl für Palladas, als auch für Homer für unnötig halten: Im Gegensatz zu den ἀνεμώλιοι nennt Hera die Götter, die Achilles beiseite stehen, ἄριστοι ἄθανάτων; ἀνεμώλιος ist nichts mehr als eine Beschimpfung. Gegen die Übersetzung ‘nutzlos’ der homerischen Stelle kann nur ein Einwand erhoben werden – dass die troerfreundlichen Götter für die Trojaner nutzlos seien, nicht für Achilles, den Hera ermutigen will. Darum wird in dem entsprechenden Artikel bei *LfgE* (Albertz–Motzkus 1967, 816) das Adjektiv als ‘ohnmächtig, schwach’ übersetzt. Wir lassen die Frage außer Betracht, ob die angeführte homerische Stelle verlangt, eine weitere semantische Entwicklung für ἀνεμώλιος anzunehmen: wenn sie auch zu bejahen ist, passt die neuere Bedeutung “ohnmächtig” sicher nicht im Kontext unseres Epigramms.

²¹ [Dehèque] 1863, 325.

Gegner der Astrologie οὐδέ μιν οὔτε ὑγίεια οὔτε ἀληθέα νομίζουσι, ἀλλὰ λόγον ψευδέα καὶ ἀνεμώλιον. Da wird dasselbe Adjektiv wieder als ‘leer’, ‘unnütz’ verwendet. Es ist auch bemerkenswert, dass durch diese zwei Paare von Antonymen die Bedeutung ‘falsch / betrügerisch’, die man aus dem Kontext des Epigramms von Palladas erschließen könnte, – die Aufblasung ist eigentlich ein Betrug – für ἀνεμώλιος ausgeschlossen werden muss.²²

Schließlich haben wir auch in Palladas’ Epigrammen noch ein Gebrauchsbeispiel für ἀνεμώλιος, nämlich in VII, 688. Das Epitheton wird für die ganze Menschheit benutzt: ὦ γένος ἀνθρώπων ἀνεμώλιον, αὐτοχόλωτον, / ἄχρι τέλους βίотου μηδὲν ἐπιστάμενον (vv. 3–4). Die Bedeutung ‘nutzlos’ passt auch hier gut sowohl zu Palladas’ pessimistischer Lebenseinstellung als auch zu der ganzen Reihe von negativen Charakteristiken, die er dem Menschenschlag zuschreibt.

Obwohl viele Gründe für die Tat des “Aiolos” denkbar sind, ist dazu im Text nichts zu finden. Der Absender ist, dem Ausdruck von Palladas nach, weder ein Großsprecher noch ein Schwindler. Er ist einfach nutzlos, genau wie sein Geschenk, im Gegensatz zur wahren Hilfe von Aiolos und seinem Schlauch der Winde, der für Odysseus ein χρῆμά τι μέγα war. Ob der Sender böse Absichten hatte, einen Scherz machte oder versuchte, das zu bescheidene Geschenk etwas schöner zu machen, sagt das Epigramm nicht.

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²² Die Bedeutung des homerischen Ausdrucks ἀνεμώλια βάζειν, die auch zu diesem Gedanken führen könnte, muss man separat behandeln. Eustathios erläutert den Vers *Il.* IV, 355 (... σὺ δὲ ταῦτ’ ἀνεμώλια βάσεις; Odysseus antwortet auf die Vorwürfe Agamemnons) als ψευδῇ λέγεις. Aber aus dem Gesagten wird klar, dass das echte Synonym für ἀνεμώλιος gar nicht ψευδής ist. Ἀνεμώλια βάζειν heißt ‘etwas sagen, ohne es selbst sicher zu wissen’, ‘etwas leichtfertig behaupten’. Bei Homer kommt der Ausdruck außer dem obengenannten noch zweimal vor (*Od.* IV, 837; XI, 464); in beiden Fällen will der Sprecher unsichere Informationen nicht geben. Die Benutzung von ἀνεμώλιος oder dem synonymischen μεταμώνιος bezeichnet eine Aussage als keine akkurate Informationen enthaltend, der Realität nicht entsprechend und deswegen nicht zuverlässig (Levet 1976, 226–228). Die Übersetzung wäre also nicht “Lügen erzählen”, sondern eher “Unsinn reden”.

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The paper aims to analyse Palladas' epigram *AP* 9. 484 and the function of allusions to Homer in it. The speaker gets "a bird full of winds" as a present, which he compares to the bag of winds given to Odysseus by Aeolus. Most commentators think that this bird was simply not stuffed, hence the disappointment; however, the comparison with Aeolus' bag of winds does not justify this interpretation. A parallel from Aristophanes (*Av.* 1076–1083), unnoticed by other commentators, shows that ancient merchants used to blow up birds to make them look more appealing to the potential customer, and supports literal understanding, i.e., that the bird in Palladas' epigram is actually inflated. The sender does it himself (γεμίσας), but the reason behind sending this kind of present stays unclear. Although attempts have been made to reconstruct the possible relationship between the sender and the recipient, they prove to be unfounded. An analysis of the expression ἀνεμώλιον ἦτορ concludes the paper. It is argued that the primary meaning of the adjective ἀνεμώλιος, i. e. 'useless', fits the context of the epigram in question and it is not needed to look any further. Palladas' "Aeolus" is useless, as well as his wind-stuffed bird, which sets him in contrast to the real Aeolus from the *Odyssey* and rounds up the joke.

В статье анализируется использование отсылок к гомеровским поэмам в эпиграмме Паллада *AP* IX, 484. Герой этой эпиграммы получает в подарок "полную ветров" птицу и сравнивает ее с мехом ветров Эола, полученным в дар Одиссеем. Нам кажется ошибочным распространенное объяснение, что полученная в подарок птица просто не была нафарширована, – такая птица не годилась бы для сравнения с мехом, в котором были заключены в плен ветры; кроме того, не замеченная комментаторами параллель (*Ar.* *Av.* 1076–1083) позволяет заключить, что обычно птицы надувались античными торговцами для того, чтобы покупателю они казались более откормленными. В эпиграмме Паллада речь идет о том, что птицу надул сам даритель (γεμίσας); однако ни текст эпиграммы, ни доступный читателю контекст не позволяют сделать вывода, какую цель преследовал такой подарок; между тем, многие комментаторы пытались делать необоснованные предположения об отношениях дарителя и получателя подарка. Далее анализируется употребленное Палладом ἀνεμώλιον ἦτορ: для гомеровского ἀνεμώλιος, кроме основного значения, 'бесполезный', порой предлагались другие, на наш взгляд, не подходящие к разбираемой эпиграмме. Таким образом, Палладов "Эол" настолько же бесполезен, насколько и его птица, что отражает противопоставление этого подарка действительно ценным ветрам гомеровского Эола.

SYMBOLAE
CHRISTIANO HABICHT NONAGENARIO
OBLATAE,
QUAE *HYPERBOREI* VOLUMINIS XXII FASCICULO II
IN EIUS HONOREM EDITO
ADICIUNTUR

ZANES SPEAK: OLYMPIC FINES IN HELLENIC INTELLECTUAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

I

Just before the vaulted passage of the entrance to the stadion of Olympia, at the foot of the Hill of the Treasure-Houses, the bases of a separate series of now lost statues are still to see. Pausanias has seen these statues standing there during his visit of the site and begins with them his report on the images of Zeus dedicated in the supreme god's Olympic sanctuary (5. 21. 2 ff.). In the local dialect, those specific monuments were called Ζᾶνες (the plural of Ζᾶν = Ζεύς).¹ They had been made of bronze, and they seem to have represented the god in one of his usual postures, e.g. standing on his right foot while the left one takes a resting position, as we may conclude from the holes preserved in some of the surviving bases. The statues also bore epigrams, read and summarized by Pausanias, and they built groups of dedications resulting from violations of Olympic agonistic rules. Especially cases of bribing co-athletes to achieve a victory incurred fines, which were then not perfunctorily added to the treasury of the sanctuary but were invested in erecting these monuments. Their dedicative texts in combination with local memory as expressed by Olympic 'guides / interpreters' (ἐξηγηταί) preserved and perpetuated the data of infringements on the proper agonistic spirit which had met in these cases the due reaction from the Hellanodikai. As one of the relevant epigrams mentioned, Pausanias says, "Olympic victories were not to buy with money, a lesson to all Greeks (διδασκαλίαν πᾶσιν Ἑλλήσιν)". One can only highlight this demonstrative austerity which certainly deserves further thoughts.

First, as already noted, the economic use of the fines in question is instructive.² They were not regarded and utilized as a mere addition to

¹ Still basic on the Zanes, especially in archaeological respect: Herrmann 1974. Cf. also Golden 1998, 15–16; Kyle 2007, 131–132; Weiler 2014, 5–11.

² Cf. Golden 1998, 16: "It is striking... that the fines were used for dedications to the god" (without further comments).

the sanctuary's income to face various expenses or to increase the sacred capital through lending, but to create works of art. It is crucial to observe in this respect that these athletic frauds were classified by the organizers and the participants in the contests as a sort of ὕβρις, an insolent violation of sacred law, on which the constitution of the whole games was believed to be founded. Pausanias himself expresses this spirit in his relevant passages when he remarks (more than once) that those punished had committed this crime against the Olympic rules (5. 21. 2: ὑβρίσασιν ἐς τὸν ἀγῶνα; cf. *ib.* 13). Thus these crimes were similar in moral essence with those committed i.a. by the barbarians who had once come to enslave Greece, and whose booty had been also used to produce famous works of art like the Delphian tripod, the dedicative monument of Plataia. The punishment had to be monumentalized to work as an everlasting admonition for the future. This is an idea we encounter also here in respect to athletic regulations and discipline under divine observance.

Another aspect of these monuments was the refined self-portrayal of the Eleian organizers as guarantors of this athletic order and impartiality. Pausanias mentions that this motif appeared also repeatedly in the epigrams completing the impression of the Zanes on all visitors: the Eleians deserved to be the Ἑλλανοδίκαι of the games as they were able to judge correctly among all Greeks. We also know of cases where the Eleian Hellanodikai had not behaved so, and the Olympic Council (apparently a variant of the Eleian one)³ had to punish in a sense its own functionaries.⁴ However, these cases are not reported to have caused the erection of any statues in the Zanes' row. Characteristically, a case of bribery by an Eleian father unduly caring for his son's victory seems to have been commemorated by a statue at the gymnasium of Elis, "entre nous", while the bribed father's similar monument was posted in front of the Stoa of Echo at Olympia, at a conspicuous place and not far from the Zanes (Paus. 5. 21. 16–17). Thus the latter exhibited Eleian austerity in its edition towards the other Greeks. The Eleians' image as trustees of interpoliad justice and impartiality in the service of the Panhellenic athletic ideal should suffer no self-imposed corrections at the same place.

³ Cf. esp. the analysis of the relevant evidence and the conclusions by Baitinger–Eder 2003.

⁴ Paus. 6. 3. 7: Leon of Ambrakia appeals at the Olympic Council against two of the three Hellanodikai who gave the victory to his antagonist, the Eleian Eupolemos; the victory remains officially with the latter, as the epigram on his honorific statue mentioned, but the two partial Hellanodikai are fined. Thus the once proclaimed result could not change but the partiality of the athletic judges could be also fined.

II

On another important aspect of the games the evidence of the Zanes has not been properly scrutinized so far. Who paid the fines? The natural answer is: the delinquents, that is, the deceitful sportsmen (or their parents, if the athletes were boys: Paus. *ib.*). Indeed, the first case of Zanes reported by Pausanias (5. 21. 3–4), presenting his material in chronological order – as the statues actually stood – corresponded to such a case of payment by the athletic transgressors themselves: the Thessalian boxer Eupolos had managed in 388 BC to bribe his antagonists recorded by name and origin (from Arkadia, Kyzikos and Halikarnassos) and so attain a paid victory. Both he and the bribed were fined for that and the affair and its moral precept was the reason for setting there six Zanes with concomitant epigrams (on four of them). It is interesting that one of the latter may have generalized the capacities necessary for an Olympic victory beyond the specific conditions of the game in question: “quick feet and strength of body” were the proper qualities to be appreciated at Olympia, not money. The virus might infect further sports, therefore the expression of the crime in more general terms was even more reasonable. However, it is clear that in this case the persons who broke the rules also had to face the bill for their acts, and were further inflicted with eternal bad name.

The next case of Zanes perpetuated the memory of an incident with a much more complicated sequel. In 332 BC the Athenian pentathlete Kallippos was discovered to have been proclaimed victor after extinguishing his antagonists’ fervour with corresponding sums of money. All involved were fined again but not all obeyed the decision of the Hellanodikai. We do not know the origin of the bribed nor how they reacted. Probably, they paid their fines and were later allowed to fall into relative oblivion. However, Kallippos not only did not pay himself but surprisingly his city appears to have intervened on his behalf to annul his punishment. No less an orator (and important statesman of the period) than Hypereides undertook a sort of judicial embassy to the Eleians, appeared before the Eleian Council and strove to annul the judgment.⁵ His effort seems to have been unsuccessful, at least finally. Thus reports Pausanias, on the basis of the corresponding (again six) Zanes and their epigrams. On the other hand, Hypereides’ *Vita* in Pseudo-Plutarch mentions that the great speaker won his case, possibly initially, when he appeared before the Eleian Council. We shall return to this point. Anyway, the judgment of the Hellanodikai in the end remained valid but Kallippos and Athens

⁵ Cf. Weiler 1991.

were obstinate. Whether the fined Athenian champion was able to pay or not, we cannot know. However, Pausanias further reports that Athens did not recognize and refused to pay the fine, apparently on the sportsman's behalf, and even preferred to abstain for some (unspecified) time from the Olympic Games because of this difference with the Eleians and Olympia. Furthermore, the situation would have not changed if Delphi and its oracle had not intervened and warned the Athenians not to ask for any oracle from Apollo as long as they had not solved their debt towards Olympia. Faced with this strict sacred solidarity and embargo, the Athenians gave in, paid, and the new group of Zanes were produced from that money. Eloquent epigrams alluding to the basic phases of the affair decorated the bases again.

One could first think that this final responsibility of Athens to pay the fine of a transgressive Athenian athlete was as exceptional as this whole affair looks like. However, Pausanias (5. 21. 8–9) reports a second example of such a connection between city and athlete in regard to a fine: it was demonstrated by the first of a further group of two statues concerning Rhodian wrestlers in the same “gallery of the Zanes”. For there was also a wrestler of that origin whose bribed victory had been fined again but the fine was paid by his city, as the epigram accompanying the first of these Zanes expressly mentioned. In regard to the second statue of this group, the epigram mentioned that its creation was owed to the fines imposed on the athletes involved without further specification. The local guides of Pausanias were ready here to supply the briber's name, Philostratos the Rhodian, and that of his opponent, Eudelos, and the year of the relevant Olympiad (the 178th, that is in 68 BC). Pausanias checked this against the official list of the Olympic winners kept at the seat of the games and found there the name of someone else as winner. However, it might be, as has been already correctly observed, that the fact of the bribery had been found out and punished in time by the Hellanodikai so that another wrestler was finally proclaimed as victor.⁶ In any case and for our present point, it is enough to retain that at least the first of these fines and the corresponding Zan had been paid, for whatever reason, not by the Rhodian athlete(s) responsible but by his / their polis community.⁷

The necessary conclusion on the basis of these remarks seems then to be that the connection between city and athlete was both of an ideological and of a specific material nature also in this respect. In other words, the polis acted as a sort of guarantor for its athletes if they incurred fines. The spirit

⁶ Cf. Herrmann 1974, 980 (with further lit.).

⁷ Maddoli–Saladino 1995, 315 have noted this without further comments.

of identification between athletes of wider Hellenic standing / aspirations and their cities, and the specific financial support of the first by the latter, for which we do have detailed evidence since the early Hellenistic age (e.g. in respect to training and traveling subsidies as testified by an Ephesian inscription of ca. 300 BC),⁸ gains in background. We should further realize even better that the athletes, although they participated as private individuals in the big contests, did not cease in fact to constitute a sort of highly specialized, competent *θεωρία* of their cities to those places. They did not represent simply themselves but also their cities, and this obviously had its important, and recognized, practical consequences.⁹

III

The political-ideological aspect of this representation, however, could also acquire important weight as we may now see trying to set the already examined “Kallippos affair” into its full contemporary context. For it was apparently not a simple thing for Athens of 332 BC to be stigmatized as having been represented at Olympia by an athlete expending money to pretend physical superiority.¹⁰ The psychological wound of Chaironeia must have still been very fresh and deep, and Athens was certainly interested in presenting to the Greek world the image of a city which, despite the indubitably prevailing power of Alexander’s Macedonia, had not lost its vigour and ability to fight on any field. The selection of Hypereides, one of the two most important representatives of the traditional anti-Macedonian camp in Athens, to plead against a fine symbolically denigrating Athenian strength cannot have been fortuitous.¹¹

Moreover, the address to which Hypereides had been sent must have been equally involved in related political concerns. For we know that the Eleians had repeatedly expressed signs of political recalcitrance from Macedonia in the years preceding that incident. From Diodoros (17. 3. 4–5) we have the information that the hosts of Olympia were among those

⁸ *I. Ephesos* 2005. Cf. Mann 2013.

⁹ This sort of underlying connection between city and athlete can then even better explain the irritated reactions of Greek cities towards citizen athletes who changed their allegiance and chose to represent other cities at the Panhellenic games: Kyle 2007, 131 collects and discusses examples.

¹⁰ Herrmann 1974, 979 remarks that “Athen... den Fall offenbar als ‘nationale’ Angelegenheit auffasste” without further analysis. Weiler 1991, 90 similarly tends to recognize the reasons for Hypereides’ choice simply in his rhetorical talent and patriotism.

¹¹ Cf. Weiler 1991, 90–92; Engels 1993, 195–196.

Greeks who became restive after Philip's death and during Alexander's royal beginnings, wishing to regain their autonomy. The same source mentions a little further (17. 8. 5) that the revolted Thebans dispatched an embassy also to the Eleians asking for help to face Alexander. We do not know whether the Eleians sent any help in the end, but the fact of the Thebans' plea to them is already significant. Arrian (*An.* 1. 10. 1) adds then that after the capture and destruction of Thebes by Alexander in 335 BC the Eleians had to recall their pro-Macedonian exiles, obviously and inevitably revising their recently declared anti-Macedonian policy. Very probably, this phase of Eleian *στάσις* is further testified by an inscription from Olympia dated approximately to the same period.¹² Here it is expressly foreseen that those banished from the city after a specific local year may return home, while their properties are not to be confiscated or otherwise liquidized and exported. There seem to be here limits to the enforced reconciliation between Eleian parties, while at least some of the exiles seem not decided to return yet. One gains an impression of how delicate the situation in Elis must have been after these new political conditions had been imposed from outside. Therefore, it is clear that Hypereides' embassy in Athenian and outwardly financial interest to Elis could reckon from the beginning on the very friendly feelings of a strong party there. It is equally understandable then that the talented orator would be perfectly able to point or allude in his speech in front of the Eleian Council on the "Kallippos affair" to the seductive "naked beauty" of Greek liberty (we recall how dexterous a defendant of Phryne he has also been!) versus Macedonian domination to win local feelings. One should then not underrate or simply reject the tradition in Ps.-Plutarch crediting his effort with success. He may have gained great applause in Elis with his words, even initially the impression of an actual change of the Eleian position on the matter. Nevertheless, the Eleians seem to have retained sobriety in the end and not attempted a revision that might have exposed them as partial *and* too close friends of the Athenians in a decidedly Macedonian age. After all, the Philippeion of Olympia, erected there under Philip and Alexander to highlight the Macedonian royal house's connection with the Panhellenic sanctuary and ideals, was clearly to see from the gallery of the Zanes. Zeus had acquired discreet royal supervisors in the aftermath of Chaeroneia. The verdict of the Hellanodikai, always valid, rested now indirectly also on the authority of the Hellenic League and its masters.

¹² Schwyzler, *DGE* no. 424, now re-edited (with German translation) by Siewert-Taeuber 2013, 37–38, no. 8. Still useful remarks on the content of this inscription: Seibert 1979, 149–151.

We should also reflect that the decisive intervention of Delphi which effected the final Athenian capitulation in this case does not need to have been simply an expression of firm collegiality between the two biggest Panhellenic sanctuaries, or of Apollo's filial respect to his father¹³ and the latter's central sanctuary in Greece. Equal weight, at least, should be ascribed to the current state of Amphictionic policies, under similar but discreet control of Macedonia since Philip's Sacred War.

Some further remarks may strengthen this impression of a Macedonian background to the "Kallippos affair". In the next Olympiad (328 BC) we find a Macedonian stadion race winner at Olympia, Kleiton. However, it is more intriguing that we find for the same year in the lists of Olympia victors the mention of a Demades, son of Demeas, which may be combined with an entry in *Suda*¹⁴ attributing to the homonymous Athenian orator a horse race victory at Olympia. Moretti has expressed doubts on this combination (not on the identity of this Demades),¹⁵ but the evidence at least exists. One may remark that it would have been a superbly clever move for the Eleians to have won as a participant and assured as a winner in the next Olympiad after the "Kallippos affair", while Athens officially abstained from the games,¹⁶ a man who was not only an Athenian but also the well-known head of the pro-Macedonian faction there, the politician who had attained to patch up the relations of the city of Pallas with Philip after Chaironeia. Whereas Hypereides had been finally unsuccessful, Demades may have been both welcome and successful in signalling the Eleians' own compromise with Macedonian power. After Alexander's death the Eleians presented again their old anti-Macedonian leanings.¹⁷ However, as long as Alexander lived, they must have understood that it was better for them to respect the rules of both the games and current policy.

It would be also useful to remember in this context another story exemplifying how laden with political meaning any athletic activity or rivalry between Athens and Macedonia in the same period could be. We know that Alexander had among his entourage in Asia the Athenian

¹³ Cf. Golden 1998, 16: "...Apollo at Delphi, a dutiful son of Zeus, declared that he would not deliver any oracle..."

¹⁴ *Suda* 415 s.v. Δημάδης.

¹⁵ Moretti 1957, 127. Kyle 1987, 166–167 accepts both the date and the identity of the victor (Demades the orator, 328 BC).

¹⁶ Weiler 1991, 91 remarks that the catalogue of the Olympia victors does not mention (otherwise) any Athenian for ca. twenty years after the "Kallippos affair".

¹⁷ Diod. 18. 11. 2: Elis in the coalition of the Lamian War against Antipatros.

pankratiast Dioxippos, an ex-Olympia winner.¹⁸ During the Indian phase of the expedition in 325 BC a match was organized to entertain the army where Dioxippos, dressed like Herakles, equipped with only a club, accepted to face the Macedonian Koragos, fully armed as a Macedonian edition of Ares.¹⁹ Poor Dioxippos was victorious but unlucky: his deserved victory did not fail to provoke the deep embitterment not only of the other Macedonians but also of Alexander himself. The pankratiast's feat was perceived as a dangerous disclosure of Athenian physical superiority over Macedonians as mirrored even in this specific athletic meeting. The Athenian champion was then treacherously accused of theft, and he was forced to commit suicide. One may then better understand that also in the "Kallippos affair" not mainly money but crucial fame was at stake. The athletic ground assumed symbolically under the circumstances of that age the importance of an ideological battlefield.

IV

Let me conclude with some final remarks. The reconstructed testimony of the Olympic Zanes proves finally very eloquent. It shows, once again, how 'mere', apparently not further significant data of economic administration like fines may be deeply connected with and contribute to the understanding of the moral values, the self-image and the political life of a society. Money and fame, and their typical stadium of exercise, that is politics, have never been separated, no more or less in ancient Greece than in our present world. The specific trait of the Greek world was, however, that once again art had an important part in that interplay, creating monuments and donating eternity even to human weaknesses and passions.

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¹⁸ Sources on the "Dioxippos affair": Diod. 17. 100–101 (cf. esp. 101. 2: Dioxippos was κοινὴν πᾶσι τοῖς Ἑλλήσι παρεσχημένος εὐδοξίαν); Ael. *VH* 10. 22; Curt. 9. 7. 16–26 (cf. esp. 23: Alexander *celebratam Macedonum fortitudinem ad ludibrium recidisse querebatur*). Cf. Kyle 2007, 176; 240.

¹⁹ The connection of Ares with Macedonia versus Athens is brought out very clearly in the famous epigram for Demosthenes (Plut. *Dem.* 30): if the orator's strength of mind had equaled his physical one, "Ἀρης Μακεδόν would have never ruled over Greece. Dioxippos was going to ridicule a Macedonian image apparently conceded by the Athenians themselves.

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Olympic Zanes, statues erected with the fines of athletic transgressions, apparently not further significant data of economic administration, are shown to be more deeply connected with and able to contribute to the understanding of the moral values, the self-image and the political life of ancient Greek society, in the first period of Macedonian control over the Greek cities.

В статье рассматриваются олимпийские Ζᾶνες (“Зевсы”), бронзовые статуи, обязанность посвящения которых в Олимпийское святилище налагалась на провинившихся атлетов в качестве штрафа. Автор демонстрирует, что, не имея серьезного экономического значения, статуи служат интересным свидетельством для изучения моральных ценностей и политической жизни раннеэллинистической эпохи.

DRACO'S CONSTITUTION IN THE *ATHENAION POLITEIA* 4: IS IT AN INTERPOLATION OR AN AUTHOR'S LATER ADDITION?*

The debate on two main questions regarding Draco's constitution (DC in what follows) started almost immediately after publication of the London papyrus in 1891: (1) is it historically reliable or a politically biased forgery; and (2) is it the integral part of the text or was it added to the text by the author at some later date or by an interpolator?¹ At that time the overwhelming majority of scholars treated the *AP* as Aristotle's work, although there were exceptions.² Most of the scholars who denied the historicity of DC supposed at the same time that it was a forgery: they pointed out the similarity between DC and the moderate oligarchic constitution of 411 BC in *AP* 30 and inferred that DC was forged by some oligarchic writer to give a pseudo-historical justification to this plan. They

* This paper is dedicated to Christian Habicht, a great scholar of Athens, with gratitude to him and to Freia Habicht for their cordial care and hospitality in the IAS Princeton in 2008, as well as for his help and support on many other occasions. I am grateful to Kevin McAleer (Berlin) for prompt and effective linguistic assistance.

¹ The debate was surveyed by Busolt 1895, 36–41, and later Busolt–Swoboda I, 1920, 52–58 (Busolt's work was completed before 1914; for some addenda see 630 c–d, and Swoboda's further addenda, Busolt–Swoboda II, 1926, 1577); for later updates see Fuks 1953, 98 nn. 1–2 (both Busolt and Fuks classify the literature according to the view of DC's historicity; Fuks incorrectly assigns von Fritz – Kapp 1950 to the proponents of historicity); Rhodes 1981/1993, 84–88; Chambers 1990, 154. The literature on the subject is immense, especially during the hot discussion in the 1890s. The outstanding survey of the earlier literature on the *AP* by Valerian von Schoeffer 1894 and 1896, a Moscow classicist [1864–1900], is still of value, also for DC.

² For instance Cauer 1891, who pointed to the Isocratean features of style, lack of hiatuses and the 'round' style of the *AP* which are in contrast to Aristotle's manner in his previously known works (pp. 3 f.) as well as to the differences in judgement as compared to Aristotle's *Politics* (p. 4, see further) and the treatment of material unworthy of Aristotle. Although it was soon shown that the unusual features are in large part explained by the 'exoteric' character of the *AP*, the published work, in contrast with the 'school' treatises which were known before (see most notably, Kaibel 1893), these and similar considerations still play a role in the widespread treatment of the *AP* as 'pseudo-Aristotelian'; but see contra Chambers 1990, 75–82.

also argued that ch. 4 of DC was interpolated in the text of the *AP*.³ The proponents of the historicity of DC, for their part, denied that it was an interpolation.⁴ Soon, however, two intermediate positions emerged, one of the partisans of the 'forgery' party, which supposed that Aristotle himself had added ch. 4 to his narrative, which followed a historical work, an Atthis, having been deceived by some oligarchic treatise;⁵ and on the other hand, certain proponents of historicity conceded to their scholarly adversaries that DC was later added by the author of the treatise himself, most notable among them Wilamowitz with his theory that DC stemmed from the real document which was found by oligarchs and used in their treatise to justify reform of constitution in 411 BC; Aristotle found this treatise after the bulk of his work had been completed, and he added DC from it into the text.⁶

The debate was apparently felt to have been concluded by Busolt in his survey from about 1914:⁷ non-historicity of DC, because of its anachronistic provisions, is indisputable; it follows that it is "eine politische Erfindung" (p. 57); the similarity of DC to the constitution of 411 BC (p. 55) together with its non-historicity further points to its origin as being from the circle of Theramenes in 411 or 404 BC (pp. 59–60);⁸ it is also

³ The proposal that combined all these statements was made simultaneously, very soon after publication of the *AP* by Weil 1891, 208 f.; Headlam 1891, 168, and also by Cauer 1891, 70 f. (but Cauer, since he denied that Aristotle was the author of the *AP*, did not treat DC as an interpolation). Reinach 1891 and Macan 1891 supposed that DC reflects the ideas of Theramenes and the moderates in 404/3 BC; this view won support of many scholars, especially after the appearance of Wilcken's paper (Wilken 1903).

⁴ Busolt 1891 (he changed his view in favour of non-historicity in Busolt 1895, 39–41); P. Meyer 1891, 31–44; Kenyon 1892, 11 f.; Fränkel 1892, 477; Keil 1892, 96 f., 115 f.; 202; Thalheim 1894.

⁵ Ed. Meyer 1892, 236–239 (the pages on DC were appended to Meyer's earlier published work on Lycourgos); Meyer argued that DC was a forgery which like Lycourgos' law stems from some 'apocryphal' treatise; see also Mathieu 1915, 103–113 (not historical, but rather an integral part of the *AP*).

⁶ Wilamowitz 1893, I, 57–59; 76 f. For a similar position see Schoeffer 1894, 41 f. (historical, Aristotle's own later addition); 1895, 220 f. (against Buzesku's treatment of chs. 4 and 25 as interpolations); 228–232 (against Oppenraaij, in favour of historicity); Seeck 1904 (pp. 271–279: historical, but an interpolation as proved by Wilcken; goes back to marginal notes of Aristotle which were incorporated in the text by his student who edited *AP* after Aristotle's death).

⁷ Busolt–Swoboda I, 1920, 52–58 (see n. 1).

⁸ The similarity between DC and the constitution of 411 BC appeared indisputable even to those who believed in historicity of DC: they argued that the project of 411 imitated the real constitution which was in force before Solon: Busolt 1891, 395 f.; Wilamowitz 1893, I, 82 and II, 124 (he notes both the similarities and differences of

certainly a later addition to the main text: Busolt refers to Wilcken 1903, who proved this definitely and notes that even the defenders of DC's historicity admit this, like Seeck 1904 (p. 58); it is only unclear whether it was added by Aristotle himself or 'soon after the publication of the *AP* by some other' – but not later than during the reign of Demetrius of Phalerum (p. 58 with n. 3).⁹

Further discussions of DC were for a very long time marked by the conviction, as formulated by Busolt, that DC is non-historical, comes from an oligarchic pamphlet and is an interpolation or at least later addition to the text. The sole debate concerned when and in what circles this forgery was perpetrated.¹⁰ The main effect of this phase of scholarship was a succinct and impressive analysis by A. Fuks.¹¹ Like his predecessors he considered it as proven that DC was either interpolated or added later to the text by Aristotle himself (Fuks referred mainly to Wilcken's argument, pp. 96 f.) and shared the view that DC was a forgery by moderate oligarchs. At the same time he dated it not to the epoch of two oligarchic revolutions of the late fifth century, as was the unanimous opinion before, but to a date later in the fourth century because the moderate oligarchs of 412/11 and 404/3 BC claimed that they were trying to return the state to the constitutions of Solon and Clisthenes and not to that of Draco (p. 92) and because the anachronistic provisions of DC are similar to institutions

two constitutions, and he argues that if DC were a forgery of the oligarchs of 411 then they would have made it an exact copy of their project; see contra Ledl 1914, 47–48; also Seeck 1904, 304–318 (Seeck noted on p. 303 that the constitution under the name of Draco could only be frightening; see contra Busolt–Swoboda I, 1920, 58 n. 1, on Draco's authority as legislator).

⁹ The mention of Demetrius is explained by Busolt's (1920, 58 n. 3) reference to Wilcken 1903, 97: according to Wilcken, Cic. *Rep.* 2. 1. 2 (the mention of Draco's constitution, along with that of Demetrius; Cicero's alleged source is thus Demetrius!) shows that ch. 4 was inserted before the end of Demetrius' reign.

¹⁰ After more diffuse comparisons of DC with the projects of 411/10 came the more detailed analysis: Ledl compared DC with the oligarchic constitutional project 'for the future' (*AP* 30) and argued that DC could not be forged as its pseudo-historical antecedent because DC is more moderate than that project; he supposed that it was forged at a later date than this draft, after overthrow of the 400 and during rule of the 5000, as described in the *AP* 33 (Ledl 1914, 52–66); Mathieu 1915, 99–113, argued in favour of 409–408 BC in connection with the republication of Draco's laws on homicide; Cloché 1940, 64–73, contrary to Ledl, found that the differences between the constitution of the *AP* 30 and DC are not considerable enough to deny their common provenance: both emerged from the moderate circle of Theramenes (p. 73, on the moderate oligarchic project of Phormisius after the restoration of democracy in 403 BC; Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 32).

¹¹ Fuks 1953, 84–101.

which are attested only from the fourth century (pp. 92–95).¹² He also noted that although DC is certainly an ‘invention’, it originated in fourth-century attempts to reinterpret the earlier constitutional history in favour of moderate oligarchy, like Isocrates’ picture of Areopagus’ influence in the Areopagiticus, rather than being simply the project of implementing a desirable constitution, which was ascribed to the past legislator in order to strengthen its appeal (pp. 95 f.).

Fuks’ results were widely accepted but did not have much impact on treatment of DC as part of the *AP*. As earlier, it continued to be viewed as an insertion (either made by the author himself or by some interpolator) but now issuing from an oligarchic treatise of the 4th century. Some scholars, such as an historian of the Athenian constitution, have ascribed the forgery to Demetrius of Phalerum.¹³ Quite recently, H. van Wees argued that DC was interpolated into the text of the *AP* during the rule of Demetrius in order to justify his constitution as an ‘ancestral’ one.¹⁴

In fact Fuks’ analysis shows that the case to be made for an ‘oligarchic forgery’ is not certain. Fuks effectively dismantled the earlier consensus that DC emerged as a fictive justification for the constitution of 412/11 BC. But his own view that it appeared for a similar purpose later in the fourth century remains unsupported in the same respect as the earlier orthodoxy: although Draco is mentioned by Athenian orators of the time as a good legislator, along with Solon, and although there is some later evidence for the belief that he was author of a constitution (this evidence can be independent from the *AP*, in my view) nothing suggests that his constitution was used as a standard for moderate oligarchs of the fourth century in view of the fact that it is not attested for the later fifth. In the *AP* it is certainly not presented as a standard one; no matter, it must have

¹² Fuks also rejected earlier attempts by Ledl and Cloché to show that DC is more moderate-oligarchic or even more radical than the constitution of the 5000 in the *AP*: his own view was that both are moderate in their own way. I hope to return to this question in the sequel to this paper. In my view DC has features which make it inappropriate as a model for any actual project of the fifth and fourth centuries BC.

¹³ Jacoby 1949, 94; 385 n. 51, while supporting the prevailing view that DC was a forgery of oligarchs at end of fifth century BC, which was either “interpolated or faithfully worked by Aristotle into his original manuscript”, and he presumed that it made its way into the *AP* from Demetrius’ treatise *On the Athenian Constitutions*; see further, Ruschenbusch 1958, 421 f., who endorses this proposal, but in following Fuks’ fourth-century date for DC he then ascribes it to Demetrius himself. Contrary to such suppositions, it is useful to keep in mind that the date of Demetrius’ treatise is unknown and that there are no attested traces of his impact on the *AP*.

¹⁴ Van Wees, 2011; his view was anticipated by Stecchini 1950 (*non vidi*); contra see von Fritz 1954, 92 f. n. 16.

either been part of the original text or was added later: it was a short-lived constitution which failed to settle any of the conflicts, political or economic, which tore Athenian society apart; for this reason it was entirely abandoned by Solon (7. 1), who constructed his constitution not by modifying that of Draco but the one before Draco. More generally, and contrary to Fuks' proposal, there is no evidence to suggest that oligarchs of the fourth century regarded Solon's constitution as so democratic as to fabricate Draco's as a correct alternative.

And the final point: Isocrates' depiction of the domination of the Areopagus in the past, which serves Fuks as a relevant analogy for DC, in fact differs considerably from DC in its form:¹⁵ *Areopagiticus* is scarce in constitutional details; it mentions only the mode of appointment of the archons (selection by lot from the pre-elected) which corresponds to the standard view and is correct but also lavish in depiction of the purely moral authority of the Areopagus and its salubrious effects. On the contrary, in depiction of DC one misses any features which might make this order appealing to the audience. Even if we admit that DC was presented in the original source in a more positive light, we can be certain that the person who rearranged it for the *AP* did not put it in the text for the purposes of propaganda (van Wees' proposal that it was concocted by Demetrius of Phalerum, who wanted to thereby justify his constitutional changes, is implausible *inter alia* for this very reason). More definitely, regarding the source or sources of DC, one can assert that its form of presentation was certainly inappropriate for a text of political propaganda. In contrast to Isocrates, it is very detailed and exact in its description of the set of offices, qualifications for them and the ways of appointment, even going into minutiae. If DC was not conceived as a real project for the present but simply dressed up for the purposes of mimicry in the clothes of the past (and this option is rightly rejected by Fuks), then the detailed provisions it reports become meaningless: moreover, since these provisions, as I will try to show in the sequel to this paper, could not be implemented in this precise form in the fifth or fourth century, their exactness would be counterproductive to propagandizing an oligarchic ideal.

This view that DC is non-historical, that it comes from a political pamphlet and that it was added by either Aristotle or somebody else now became indisputable. This consensus also demonstrates the import of the two most recent and significant commentaries on the *AP*, namely by

¹⁵ This difference was noticed by Fuks himself: 'such a pamphlet is to be regarded as an invention (going perhaps into more "historical" detail than the *Areopagitikos*) but hardly as the rather sinister "forgery" concocted for immediate political use which "'Drakon's constitution' is commonly supposed to be" (p. 96).

P. J. Rhodes¹⁶ and M. Chambers,¹⁷ albeit with considerable difference in argument and certainty. A few dissidents from this view (which we shall later discuss) apparently had no influence on the general view of matters.

The conviction on the part of many scholars that DC was an interpolation did stem from the belief that it was unhistorical and an oligarchic forgery. This is a psychologically understandable but logically invalid inference: DC might well be unhistorical, forged by some oligarch, but at the same time be an integral part of the text because the author of the *AP* did not himself think that it was unhistorical (this was in fact the view of certain scholars, for instance Ed. Meyer). On the contrary, it is important to consider on internal grounds, independent of assumptions of historicity and oligarchic forgery, whether DC is an interpolation by an alien hand,

¹⁶ Rhodes 1981/1993, 84–88, apparently does not think that non-historicity of DC suggests that it is an interpolation: he notes (p. 86) that chs. 3 (the “ancient constitution”) and 4 both “represent theoretical reconstruction rather than well-documented history” and that “a reconstruction which does not deceive us might have deceived A. or his pupil”. Nevertheless, he defends ch. 3 (pp. 86 f.) but is certain that DC is “in some sense an insertion in the text of *A.P.*” (pp. 85–86), because of “patch work” in 3.1 and 41. 2: he has in view the beginning of the ancient constitution (3. 1 Ἦν δ’ ἡ τάξις τῆς ἀρχαίας πολιτείας τῆς πρὸ Δράκοντος τοιαύδε) where the proponents of an interpolation deleted the words τῆς πρὸ Δράκοντος (cf. p. 85); the deletion is based however on *petitio principii* – and lack of number with Draco’s in the list of constitutional changes (41. 2), i.e. Wilcken’s argument which will be discussed in detail. Rhodes supposes that the insertion runs from 4. 1 to 4. 4 (incl.) and that it substituted the description of Draco’s laws in the earlier text (pp. 86 f.): the latter proposal seems to be unfounded, since Draco’s laws on homicide were beyond the subject of the treatise (and were regarded moreover by Aristotle as unremarkable apart from their cruelty in *Pol.* 2. 12. 1274 b 15–18). Rhodes is non-committal on the question as to whether the insertion was made by the author or by someone else (p. 87) which is more relevant for those who accept Aristotelian authorship of the *AP* (Rhodes believes that this is a work of a pupil). He supposes that DC was absent from the version of the text “which circulated most widely in antiquity” (p. 87, cf. 53–56), but at the same time he believes that the modifications made in other parts of the text imply that DC is not the interpolation of a private reader but rather a deliberate revision made in Aristotle’s school.

¹⁷ Chambers 1990, 154 treats DC as an oligarchic utopia and as an insertion which may be made by Aristotle himself but is certainly derived from the tradition which he or a member of his school found at a later stage of work on the text, inter alia because according to *Pol.* 2. 1274 b 15 f., Draco was the author of laws made for an already existing constitution; ch. 4 has no features of Aristotle’s thought, being purely schematic, contrary to ch. 3, but whoever made this insertion found it reliable because it corresponded to Aristotle’s statement that “die früheste politische Ordnung bei den Griechen nach der Königsherrschaft sich auf die Krieger stützte” (*Pol.* 4. 13. 1297 b 16–17). I will return to this latter note in the sequel to this paper. According to Chambers, ch. 3 (the “ancient constitution”) reflects a later change in Aristotle’s thought, but he disagrees with Jacoby and other scholars who proposed to athetize it together with ch. 4.

a later addition of the author himself, or an integral part of the text. The purpose of this paper is to give a definite answer to these questions as far as possible. This question would seem to be of a purely formal character, but apart from its relevance to the particular issue of the origin of DC, it is also of some importance for understanding the work method of the *AP* author.

The prevailing though hardly unanimous view is that the *AP* was written not by Aristotle but by some of his students within the framework of his project to describe the constitutions of the various Greek states. The author's identity is of secondary importance for this paper (though I personally find the arguments against it being Aristotle not convincing) and it is only of some interest that there is indeed sufficient evidence to maintain that the *AP* was published (once or twice) *before* Aristotle's death.

Most of the arguments pro and contra DC as an addition to the main text are naturally undifferentiated with respect to taking this addition as an interpolation by an alien hand or a later addition by the author himself. It is in fact difficult or even impossible to distinguish this on purely formal grounds with regard to the remaining incongruencies in the text. Nevertheless, with respect to the *AP*, we are in a happy position because it is possible to eliminate as plausible any substantial interpolations, like that of DC, dated much later than composition of the bulk of the treatise. The most important *terminus a. q.* for publication of the *AP* is provided by the lack of any mention regarding abandonment of the democratic constitution by Antipater in 321/0 BC: in the list of constitutional changes in ch. 41 the last one is the restoration of democracy in 403 BC; moreover, the democratic constitution is depicted in the second part of the *AP* as being in full force.¹⁸ There are further indications which point to publication taking place at an earlier date than 321/0 BC: 62. 2 (the Athenian officials are still sent to Samos, which Athens lost in 322, as a result of the Lamian War¹⁹). Further, at 46. 1 there are triremes and quadriremes mentioned as part of the Athenian navy, but not quinqueremes, which are attested for the first time in 325/4 BC. This implies a publication before 325/4.²⁰

¹⁸ Rhodes 1981/1993, 52.

¹⁹ This *terminus a. q.* remains valid in spite of Rhodes' having noted that Samos was returned to Athens by Polyperchon in 319 BC (Rhodes 1981/1993, 694 f.) because the publication (or re-publication) date after 321/0 is improbable on more serious grounds (see further).

²⁰ This indication is accepted as the *terminus a. q.* by Chambers 1990, 82–83. Keaney 1970, 326 finds this “based on inconclusive evidence”. Following Tovar 1948, 153–159 (non vidi) and Keaney, Rhodes 1981/1993, 546 f. supposes that mention of the quadriremes is the later addition (see further); even if it were the case, though, the absence of any mention of quinqueremes implies that the alleged revised version was published earlier than 325/4 BC.

The *terminus p. q.* for publication of the *AP* is a more complicated issue. Most scholars rightly admit that the *AP* was composed, whether by Aristotle or his pupil, after Aristotle's return to Athens because the treatise demonstrates a rich knowledge of Athenian literary and documentary sources. More definite indications for the *termini p. q.* of its publication are *AP* 42. 2–5, the description of ephebeia as an obligatory program of two years' service which was instituted in this form about 335/4 BC,²¹ and possibly 61. 1, the mention of two *strategoi* for Piraeus, one for Munichia and another for Acte: the earliest mention of two *strategoi* for Piraeus is 325/4 [the date uncertain]; in 333/2 there was still one *strategos* for Piraeus.²² These passages imply a publication date no earlier than 333/2 BC.

There are also indicators that point to a later *terminus p. q.*: mention of quadriremes at 46. 1, which are first attested in the Athenian navy list in 330/29; the addition of the Hephaistia to the penteteric festivals under the archon Ctesiphon, i.e. in 329/8 BC (54. 7). Rhodes, however, treats these latter passages as the later additions²³ and opts for the first edition of the work in the late 330s and for the second revised one after 325/4 and before 321/0 BC. The arguments that both these passages – on quadriremes²⁴

²¹ Rhodes 1981/1993, 52; 493–495, and a detailed discussion: Friend, 2009, 4–56.

²² Rhodes 1981/1993, 51 f. and 679.

²³ Rhodes 1981/1993, 52–53 and 55–56, and his commentary ad locc.

²⁴ Following the earlier proposal of Tovar and Keaney 1970, 327 f. (who was more cautious), Rhodes 1981/1993, 546 f. believes that quadriremes at 46. 1 are the later addition because in the beginning of the sentence the *boule* is said to take care of the triremes already built, while in the continuation it is about building not only triremes but quadriremes (Ἐπιμελεῖται δὲ καὶ τῶν πεποιημένων τριήρων καὶ τῶν σκευῶν καὶ τῶν νεωσοίκων, καὶ ποιεῖται καινὰς δὲ τριήρεις ἢ τετρήρεις, ὅποτέρας ἂν ὁ δῆμος χειροτονήσῃ, καὶ σκεύη τάς ταις καὶ νεωσοίκους). It has been supposed that the continuation was modified at the later date (the quadriremes are for the first time attested in 330/29 BC; the first edition is thus assigned to an earlier date than this). However, the inconsistency thus ascribed to the author of the revision within one sentence is unlikely; and it is for the same reason that Chambers' argument (1990, 359) against the later addition should be rejected ("die meisten athenischen Kriegsschiffe waren Trieren, und ich glaube, dass Aristoteles keine Notwendigkeit sah, bei jeder Erwähnung der Trieren die Tetreren hinzuzufügen"). Rather one may suppose that the author purposely avoided mention of the *boule*'s taking care of the quadriremes because they had been recently built and still had no need of extensive repairs; he wanted instead to emphasise the role of the *boule* in building the new quadriremes and in taking care of old triremes. In fact in 330/29 there were 392 triremes as opposed to just eighteen quadriremes; in 326/5 there were 360 triremes as compared to fifty quadriremes and two quinquiremes (see Rhodes 1981/1993, 546). This shows the rate of additional quadriremes as eight per year along with an equal diminution in the number of triremes. Thus the considerable number of triremes was old and in need

and on the Hephaistia²⁵ – were added in the second editions are in my view unconvincing.²⁶ Chambers, who supposes the single edition between 328/7 and 325/4, seems to be closer to the mark.²⁷ Even if it were a second revised edition of the *AP*, as Keaney and Rhodes believe, it certainly should be dated before Antipater's change of the Athenian constitution in 322/1, as we have seen. Moreover, we can move the *terminus a. q.* for publication to an even earlier date, before Aristotle's dramatic departure from Athens in 323/2: even if the *AP* was written not by Aristotle but only under his aegis, its publication under his name would be unthinkable after Aristotle's having fled Athens.

of repairs; many even had to be entirely scrapped, partially because they were being replaced by the quadriremes (the scrapping rates of these older ships were clearly more than eight per year because the new triremes continued to be built).

²⁵ The addition of the quadrennial festival (πεντετηρίς) of the *Hephaistia* in 329/8 BC under the archon Cephisophon (54. 7) was treated by Keaney 1970, 332 f., albeit cautiously, as a later addition and as evidence for two editions of the *AP* because of Pollux 8. 107, who cites four festivals mentioned in the *AP* but omits the *Hephaistia*. However, the introduction of the quadrennial celebration in honour of Hephaestus is neither attested nor probable at this date and may be a mistake in place of Ἀμφιάραια, i.e. the festival in honour of Amphiaraos at his sanctuary of Oropus (see the discussion in Rhodes 1981/1993, 610 and further, in favour of *Amphiaraia*, Knoepfler 1993, 279–302). If this be the case then omission of the festival either by Pollux, or rather by his source, may be explained by a recognition that *Hephaistia* is a mistake. Again, if the right *Amphiaraia* was in their text, it might have been omitted because they were aware of the short life of this provision. Oropus was granted to Athens, either by Philip II in 338 BC, or more likely by Alexander in 335, and the quadrennial celebration for Amphiaraus was established in 332/1 (*IG* II³ 348) and first celebrated in 329/8 (*IG* II³ 355); Athens lost Oropus after her defeat in the Lamian War in 322 BC (Habicht 1997, 40 f., but cf. Tracy 1995, 92 n. 19, who argues that Athens lost Oropus only in 312); then took it again from Demetrius Poliorcetes in 305/4 (Habicht, p. 77) and conclusively lost it in 287 (Habicht, p. 129), or even earlier in 295 (see Knoepfler 2014, 70). It is thus possible that the *Amphiaraia* were celebrated only in a short period between 329/8 and 322 BC.

²⁶ Both in his *t. p.* and *t. a. q.* Rhodes largely follows Keaney 1970; Keaney, who believed that Aristotle was the author of the *AP*, asserted that the additions were made by his pupil (p. 335: "On the basis of internal and external evidence, it has been argued that Aristotle finished the *AP* ca. 334/3, soon after his return to Athens, that this text was in circulation in or soon after that date, and that this edition was brought up to date in the 320s, when certain changes had taken place which contradicted [!] the earlier text"); according to Rhodes, the author was not Aristotle but his pupil; he is non-committal on the authorship of additions. Keaney's date of ca. 334/3 for the first edition is based on the argument that the indications of a later date than this are "additions" made in the second edition. See two previous notes against this.

²⁷ Chambers 1990, 82 f., cf. Day–Chambers 1962, 196 f.; see the proposals by Weil and Torr as early as 1891.

Antipater's drastic changes to the Athenian constitution which were not mentioned in the *AP* make any edition or re-edition by its main author(s) after that date highly implausible. Even more improbable is the recent proposal by H. Van Wees that DC was added in the re-edition of the *AP* under Demetrius of Phaleron as a pseudo-historical precedent for Demetrius' constitution.²⁸ This proposal would mean that the new edition omitted all changes of the constitution after Antipater, including that under Demetrius, for which it tried to invent this antecedent. A revised version of the *AP* before Antipater cannot be so safely excluded, but, as I argued the case for the second edition of the text, is far from being conclusive.

It is now necessary to reconsider the arguments from the text of the *AP* itself and which were used to prove that the chapter on DC somehow contradicts or is incongruent with the text of the *AP* and thus should be treated as an addition to the text by its main author (Aristotle or his pupil) or by some alien hand.

At the earlier stage of the debate on DC the suggestion that it was an interpolation was simply the sequence of its non-historicity; the additional arguments were that Aristotle in the *Politics* says explicitly that Draco did not create the constitutional order on his own but imposed his laws on the preexisting one, that DC goes unmentioned by other sources, and that Plutarch, who used either the *AP* or material similar to the *AP* in his *Life of Solon*, shows no awareness of DC. Most of these arguments were successfully refuted by defenders of DC's historicity.²⁹

In the *Politics* 2. 1274 b 12 f. Aristotle refers to Draco as a legislator who was not the creator of a new constitutional order but wrote his laws within the framework of a preexisting one. This difference between the *Politics* and the *AP* struck many scholars immediately after discovery of the *AP* and resulted in different reactions to it: (1) a few scholars deleted the relevant sentence in the *Politics*; (2) the other (then a minority) also relied on other differences between the *Politics* and the *AP* and denied Aristotle's authorship of the *AP*; (3) the third (again a minority) attempted to prove that Draco also fails to appear as author of a constitution in the *AP*;³⁰ (4) most scholars proposed deleting the chapter on DC as non-Aristotelian. Of all these strategies: (1) died as having been totally unfounded; (2) still finds some supporters today but is wrong, as I will argue; (3) became the present orthodoxy on many grounds, and it is usually combined with

²⁸ Van Wees 2011. I will discuss in the next paper the alleged similarity of Demetrius' constitution to DC as proposed by Van Wees.

²⁹ See Schoeffer 1896, 220 f.

³⁰ See P. Meyer 1891, 36–44; Blass, 1898, XXI–XXIV; Blass, 1903, 118–120 (see further).

(4) in that it is an addition to the text made either by the author of the *AP* (not Aristotle) or some later interpolator. The problem of authorship of the *AP* can here be put aside, but it is clear that the passage of the *Politics* does not prove that DC is an addition to the text in any possible sense: if DC had been written not by Aristotle but by his pupil, he could dissent through the *Politics* under impact of the sources he used; but Aristotle himself, if he had been the author of the *AP*, could also have changed his mind during work on the *AP* under the influence of evidence which had been unavailable to him at the time of his writing the corresponding passage of the *Politics*.³¹ Aristotle certainly worked on the relevant section of the *Politics* earlier than he wrote the *AP*,³² and one may suppose that he did not live long enough to work into the text of the *Politics* this and similar alterations because, contrary to the *AP* which was published close to Aristotle's death, the *Politics* at this time remained unfinished and was still awaiting revision. So far, the contradiction of DC with the *Politics* cannot prove that DC is a later addition. Moreover, the tacit assumption of this particular argument in favour of a later addition is that Aristotle's pupil should have been bound by his authority and that the genuine text of the *AP* should have conformed to the *Politics*. This assumption is unfounded – in Aristotle's school there was no *in verba magistri iurare*; moreover, as we have seen, the edition (or re-edition) of the *AP* with DC could not

³¹ Ste. Croix, 2004, 273; 275 (edited posthumously) supports the view that DC was later inserted into the text because Aristotle changed his mind under influence of the discovered forgery (Ste. Croix rejects the once standard view that the *Politeiai* were written earlier than the *Politics*, but he admits that the statement in the *AP* on Draco is later than in the *Politics*); this might indeed be the case, but it is unclear why he could not have already changed his mind when working on the main version of the *AP*. Rhodes 1981/1993, 62 also points to the possibility of him having changed his mind, although he disbelieves both Aristotle's authorship of the *AP* and rejects DC as an integral part of its text. For other incongruities between the *AP* and the *Politics*, see Rhodes 1981/1993, 60 f., who argues against Hignett 1952, that these incongruities do not show the inferior judgement of the *AP* in comparison with the *Politics* (this latter is also the view of Ste. Croix 2004, 273–277).

³² The last datable event mentioned in the *Politics* (5. 1311 b 1–3) is the murder of Philip II in 336 BC (Rhodes 1981/1993, 58); according to Schütrumpf, Gehrke 1996, 178, the books 4–6, which show a thematic similarity to the *Politeiai*, are part of the latest stratum of the *Politics*; the question of the use to which the *Politeiai* was put in these books is more complicated, but the general consensus is that the *AP* was not used in the relevant part of the *Politics* (Rhodes 1981/1993, 59). This might imply that the empirical interests of the later books of the *Politics* (written before or at start of his second stay in Athens) impelled Aristotle to begin collecting material for the *Politeiai* in his second Athenian period (see also the plan of such a collection in the *EN* 10. 10: this *Ethics* is in all probability belongs to the Athenian period) and that he did not work extensively on the *Politics* during this time (nor did he revise it thoroughly).

have occurred after Aristotle's death (i.e. later than Antipater enacting the change of constitution): it is thus clear that the person who edited the *AP* in its present form, with DC, was untroubled by any discrepancy with the *Politics*. The discrepancy thus in no way proves an addition by the writer of the *AP* or an interpolation made by an alien hand.

Far more impressive were the arguments in favour of addition or interpolation brought forward by Wilamowitz and Wilcken, which noticeably changed the balance of scholarly opinion in their own time and remain (especially those of Wilcken) the main basis for such a view in our present day. These arguments should be treated separately.

Wilamowitz, from whom stems the most elaborate argument based on the composition of ch. 4 and its neighboring chapters, was a partisan of DC's historicity.³³ He argued that ch. 4 was later added by Aristotle to his text, from that source which was still unknown to him while working on his main narrative. Wilamowitz's arguments (pp. 57–59) were as follows: (1) DC narrative has a documentary character, as opposed to the main narrative which followed a historical source, namely *Atthis* by Androtion;³⁴ (2) DC breaks the chronological narrative sequence: in ch. 2 the civil strife under Cylon's coup is depicted; ch. 3 with its account of the "ancient" constitution ensues felicitously because it provides causes for this strife, but instead of expected appearance of the saviour Solon, it then follows DC and only afterward does the narrative return to the condition of the poor segment of Athenians and the reforms of Solon are described; moreover, the account of DC in ch. 4 begins with an unclear chronological reference: it was "not long after that" that Draco enacted his

³³ Wilamowitz 1893, I, 76–88. Wilamowitz agreed with previous scholars that DC is similar to the constitution of 5000, but he did not believe that this disproved the historicity of DC. He supposed that the moderate oligarchs of 411 BC had a vested interest in the pre-Solonian state; they discovered and published the previously unknown document on DC and compiled their own project on its very model; Aristotle found both the description of DC and the constitution of the 5000 (*AP* ch. 30) in the same moderate oligarchic source (Theramenes). The details of this elaborate hypothesis of sources will not worry us here.

³⁴ On the use of *Atthis* for the whole earlier history, including now lost chapters, see Wilamowitz 1893, I, 57; according to Wilamowitz, Androtion's *Atthis* began his description of the Athenian constitution only starting with Solon; from this material (i.e. references to the earlier institutions in the story of Solon's reforms) Aristotle composed the 'ancient constitution' of ch. 3 which was missing in Androtion and in Aristotle's original text – this led to the appearance of doublets in chs. 3, 7 and 8 (pp. 49 f.). This supposition is unwarranted: some references in chs. 7 and 8 to the state of affairs before Solon are not "doublets" because the relative facts were not described earlier; ch. 3 contains the antiquarian notices which Aristotle uses for his suppositions about the development of archonship and which cannot be borrowed from the sources on Solon.

constitution.³⁵ Since “after that” cannot refer to the civil strife (it continued after DC) it can refer either to Cylon’s affair or to the later “purification” of Athens by Epimenides (1. 1) which happened at least a generation later than the murder of Cylon’s supporters; the author has certainly the former event in mind, but the statement can also be understood as a reference to the latter, and this signals an “addition”; (3) the state of affairs after enactment of DC (debt slavery and the concentration of land in the hands of a few, 4. 4) is described in the same words as in the earlier narrative on civil strife (2. 2) which was interrupted by the excursus on the “ancient” constitution and then by the story of DC; (4) DC goes unmentioned by Plutarch in his biography of Solon despite its many similarities with relevant parts of the *AP*; this means, according to Wilamowitz, that DC was not mentioned in the common source of the *AP* and Solon, namely Androtion’s *Atthis* (which Plutarch used indirectly, via Hermippus, according to that view which was popular at that time).

Wilamowitz’s arguments convinced certain DC historicity proponents, like Schoeffer,³⁶ and in general they played a noticeable role in laying siege to the view that DC is not an integral part of the text, even among the scholars who were not prepared to regard it as interpolation by an alien hand.³⁷ Moderate as Wilamowitz’s position in fact was in this respect, it provided a support for a far more decisive attempt of Wilcken to prove that DC was added by somebody other than the author of the main text (Aristotle) of the *AP*. In general, the considerations about “awkwardness” of the position of DC in the text still play a role in its treatment as a later addition.³⁸ It is thus to check how convincing is the proposal of a great scholar.

First of all, some assumptions of Wilamowitz’s reasoning are dubious: he was certain that Aristotle’s main source for the earlier period of Athenian history and even for the style of his narrative was Androtion and that the “documentary” character of DC does not fit the chronographic style of Androtion. In fact there is no conclusive evidence for it; instead we should reckon with a plurality of sources and with the possibility that Aristotle reworked and rearranged their material as well as giving it his

³⁵ Ἡ μὲν οὖν πρώτη πολιτεία αὐτὴν εἶχε τὴν ὑπογραφὴν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα χρόνου τινὸς οὐ πολλοῦ διελθόντος, ἐπ’ Ἀρισταίχμου ἄρχοντος, Δράκιδων τοὺς θεσμοὺς ἔθηκεν· ἡ δὲ τάξις αὐτοῦ τόνδε τὸν τρόπον εἶχε.

³⁶ Schoeffer 1896, 220.

³⁷ See Busolt 1895, 37 n. 1: the peculiarities in style of ch. 4 point to a source other than *Atthis* (cf. pp. 33 f. on *Atthis*, especially by Androtion, as the main source of the *AP*).

³⁸ See Rhodes 1981/1992, 86f., on various attempts to ‘correct’ the logic of narrative; he himself is rather cautious about them.

own stylistic colouring.³⁹ DC could have been compiled by Aristotle from various sources, and in ch. 3 his account of the development of archonship draws on several authors and is based on many probabilist inferences from antiquarian facts which at least partially belong to Aristotle himself.

Next is the alleged decline from a natural logical order: after depiction of grounds for the civil strife – economic in ch. 2 and political in ch. 3 (“ancient constitution” with its oligarchic order) – one gets DC instead of the expected appearance of Solon. Here Wilamowitz commits a *petitio principii*: he wants to prove that DC was an addition as based on the unproven premise that Aristotle was unfamiliar with it when he wrote about the causes of Solon’s reforms. If DC was known to him, however, then it occupies a natural place between the “ancient constitution” and Solon’s reform because chronologically it follows the former and precedes the latter. Moreover, DC nicely fits the logical aspect of the narrative because it complements the account of political causes of the conflict: although it is not explicitly enunciated, it is clear that DC with its enfranchisement of hoplites was apparently an attempt to broaden the state’s social base, and presumably it attained this purpose, at least in part, since Solon (who was elected the archon) afterwards belonged not to the wealthiest elite but to the middle stratum (5. 2) and since later, after Solon’s reform, we have not two parties, as earlier, but three – the proponents of oligarchy, of more radical democracy, and of the “middle constitution” (13. 4). Nevertheless, as it is stated, after the account of Dracon’s reform (4. 5; 5. 1), the main causes of conflict, debt slavery and concentration of land in the hands of many was not abandoned; the civil strife continued (5. 1) on up to the election of Solon as a reformer.

A minor difficulty, stressed by Wilamowitz, is lack of any definite reference at the beginning of ch. 4 for μετὰ ταῦτα. In fact this awkwardness proves the integrity of the text rather than that ch. 4 was added: for μετὰ ταῦτα clearly has the same reference, as the earlier μετὰ ταῦτα in the beginning of ch. 3, which can only refer to Cylon’s affair. If ch. 4 were added to the main narrative, by Aristotle or some other person, nothing would be easier than providing an explicit reference to Cylon who was mentioned two Teubner pages earlier. But for the author who remembered that the reform of Draco is the single dated event after Cylon and who wrote the whole of two chapters, namely 3 and 4, as an expanded excursus

³⁹ On the question of the use of Androton in the *AP* see Rhodes 1981/1993, 15–30, and for the tentative table of sources, pp. 28 f.: there is no certainty that a single source, Androton or other, was used for the earliest part of Athenian history, including Solon’s reforms; see also Harding 1994, 51 f.: one only safely attested instance of drawing on Androton directly is *AP* 22. 3–4 (origin of ostracism).

on the causes of civil strife, it would have been natural to refer in such a form to this initial event of the struggle because he had kept in mind his earlier reference to it.

Lastly there is Plutarch's silence on DC: to argue in favour of the later addition, Wilamowitz (also Ed. Meyer) pointed out that Plutarch never mentioned DC. This consideration is not decisive. It is indisputable that Plutarch in his *Life of Solon* uses in part the same material as the *AP*, but it is unclear what it actually means: the prevailing view was that Plutarch used not the *AP*, but Hermippus, and Hermippus drew from the same source as the *AP*; the most popular candidate was long Androtion. But now serious doubts have arisen regarding the view that Androtion was Plutarch's principal source for Solon's biography,⁴⁰ and this makes one wonder whether the common material does not derive from Hermippus himself who used the *AP* together with other sources. In any event, Plutarch's (and Hermippus') use of this common material was selective because he wrote a biography of Solon and not a history of the Athenian constitution, and his silence on DC means not more than his silence on the "ancient constitution" in ch. 3 which would immediately precede Solon's reform granted that DC was absent in the source Plutarch used. But more important is another consideration: even if it were correct that Plutarch's source was also source of the *AP* and that it did not have DC as part of it, then it would still not prove that DC was a later addition to the *AP* because Aristotle drew on several sources and their material might have been organized by him as a single whole in the initial redaction of his text.

It is superfluous to discuss the other numerous attempts to "extract" ch. 4 or both chs. 3 and 4 from the text and to re-arrange these chapters in order to restore the "logic" of narrative. As far as scholars presume that these parts are additions or interpolations, they suffer from the same *petitio principii* as Wilamowitz: that Aristotle did not know DC when he wrote on the causes of strife and of Solon's reform. If he had then our text needs no improvements.⁴¹ But as an autonomous argument in favour of an interpolation, the alleged inaccuracies are simply inadequate – as admitted

⁴⁰ See Rhodes 1981/1993, 118.

⁴¹ It was for formal reasons that some scholars (not Wilamowitz) attempted to extract ch. 3 together with ch. 4 because the text returns at 4. 5 to that debt-slavery which had already been mentioned in 2. 2 (for instance, Jacoby *FGrH* Teil 3 b Suppl. 1 [1954] 50). This ignores the causal link between the civil strife and the oligarchic character of the constitution and should be definitely rejected. It is irrelevant here that Wilamowitz regarded ch. 3 also as the later edition (see above n.34) because he did it for reasons different from those which made him regard ch. 4 as an addition, and he apparently did not believe that both chapters emanated from the same source and were added simultaneously.

even by Wilcken, one of the decisive proponents of an interpolation: he agreed that without the proof of it which he detected in ch. 41, his and others proposals about chs. 3 and 4 proved nothing.⁴²

Now let us turn to the most impressive argument to the effect that DC is an addition which was brought forward by Wilcken.⁴³ Contrary to Wilamowitz, he endorsed the view that DC was anachronistic, stemmed from an oligarchic pamphlet and was interpolated by an alien hand. He maintained, first of all, that the correct reading in 4. 1 is ἡ δὲ τάξις αὐτ' ° (i.e. superscript) = αὐτο(ῦ) [sc. Δράκοντος] τόνδε τὸν τρόπον εἶχε, not αὐτ' (i.e. compendium) = αὐτῆς, as according to Kenyon, viz. that Draco is designated explicitly as the founder of a new constitution.⁴⁴ He then pointed out that the reading μετάστασις in ch. 41 which he firmly maintained, instead of κατάστασις of the earlier editors,⁴⁵ for the first time gives a satisfactory understanding of this text and proves simultaneously that mention of DC in this list is an interpolation. The text is as follows:

ἦν δὲ τῶν μεταβολῶν ἑνδεκάτη τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὕτη (sc. ἐπὶ Πυθοδώρα). πρώτη μὲν γὰρ ἐγένετο <ἡ> μετάστασις τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς Ἰωνος καὶ τῶν μετ' αὐτοῦ συνοικησάντων· τότε γὰρ πρῶτον εἰς τὰς τέτταρας συνενεμήθησαν φυλάς, καὶ τοὺς φυλοβασιλέας κατέστησαν. δευτέρα δὲ καὶ πρώτη μετὰ ταύτην ἔχουσα πολιτείας τάξιν ἡ

⁴² Keaney 1969, 415–417, 415 n. 20, found an additional argument for treating DC as an interpolation in that it does not fit the “ring composition” he discovered in chs. 2–5 (cf. Keaney 1992, 155 n. 4), but the argument seems to be highly artificial. Rhodes 1981/1993, 46 and 87 rightly casts doubt on it.

⁴³ Wilcken 1903, 92.

⁴⁴ Wilcken thus dismantled the attempts of some scholars (G. Schulz and F. Blass) to remove the contradiction between the appearance of Draco's (in ch. 4) and Aristotle's claim in the *Politics* that Draco did not establish a new constitution but imposed his laws on the existing one: these scholars emended Kenyon's αὐτῆς (ch. 4. 1) into αὐτή and rendered it variously but with the general sense that the constitution described in ch. 4 was not new with Draco but had predated him (see on further revivals of these attempts). Even using this reading of it and accepting the supposed emendation, this is hardly plausible, as Wilcken rightly noted; in fact the *prima facie* meaning of the sentence with αὐτή would be that *this* constitutional order was established by Draco's θεσμοί; Blass later attempted to retain Kenyon's ἡ δὲ τάξις αὐτῆς (Blass 1898) in order to attain the same effect, but the reference here to the constitution of the previous chapter is strained; he further yielded to Wilcken that the correct reading is αὐτο(ῦ), but then proposed to athetize it (Blass 1903=1908, appendix 118–120, a desperate attempt to defend the earlier view). Kenyon continued insisting on αὐτῆς (Kenyon, 1913 ad loc.), but Chambers 1965, 33, re-affirmed that Wilcken was right and that the papyrus has αὐτ' °.

⁴⁵ The correct reading μετάστασις had already been maintained by Wilcken in his earlier paper from 1895 and later, in response to Blass, again by Kaibel–Wilamowitz in their third edition of the *AP* (1898); Blass accepted this reading in his third edition (1898) and the other editors followed him.

ἐπὶ Θησέως γενομένη, μικρὸν παρεγκλίνουσα τῆς βασιλικῆς. μετὰ δὲ ταύτην ἢ ἐπὶ Δράκοντος, ἐν ἧ καὶ νόμους ἀνέγραψαν πρῶτον. τρίτη δ' ἢ μετὰ τὴν στάσιν ἢ ἐπὶ Σόλωνος, ἀφ' ἧς ἀρχὴ δημοκρατίας ἐγένετο. τετάρτη δ' ἢ ἐπὶ Πεισιστράτου τυραννίς. πέμπτη δ' ἢ μετὰ <τὴν> τῶν τυράννων κατάλυσιν ἢ Κλεισθένους, δημοτικωτέρα τῆς Σόλωνος. ἕκτη δ' ἢ μετὰ τὰ Μηδικά, τῆς ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλῆς ἐπιστατούσης. ἑβδόμη δὲ ἢ μετὰ ταύτην, ἣν Ἀριστείδης μὲν ὑπέδειξεν, Ἐφιάλτης δ' ἐπετέλεσεν, καταλύσας τὴν Ἀρεοπαγίτιν βουλήν· ἐν ἧ πλεῖστα συνέβη τὴν πόλιν διὰ τοὺς δημαγωγοὺς ἀμαρτάνειν διὰ τὴν τῆς θαλάττης ἀρχήν. ὀγδόη δ' ἢ τῶν τετρακοσίων κατάστασις, καὶ μετὰ ταύτην, ἐνάτη δέ, ἡ δημοκρατία πάλιν. δεκάτη δ' ἢ τῶν τριάκοντα καὶ ἡ τῶν δέκα τυραννίς. ἑνδεκάτη δ' ἢ μετὰ τὴν ἀπὸ Φυλῆς καὶ ἐκ Πειραιεύς κάθοδον, ἀφ' ἧς διαγεγένηται μέχρι τῆς νῦν, αἰὶ προσεπιλαμβάνουσα τῷ πλήθει τὴν ἐξουσίαν.

According to the first sentence of the chapter, there were eleven changes to the Athenian constitution, the last being the restoration of democracy in 403 BC. On the earlier reading *κατάστασις* the order established in the time of Ion was the first constitutional order, not the first change; the order established under Theseus could thus be taken as the first change of constitution, and together with the following ten changes it made for a total number of eleven changes.⁴⁶ However, on the reading *πρώτη μετάστασις*, Ion now appears as the first changer of the initial constitution and the text becomes awkward since it now lists twelve changes, not eleven. The change under Draco, which was bad for this change, is cited without number and is thus the most natural candidate for deletion.⁴⁷ Wilcken further argued that the addition of DC in 41. 2 could not have been made by Aristotle himself at some later stage of his work because he would in that case have changed the numeration of other items and, accordingly, their total number. Consequently, ch. 4 was interpolated by an alien hand (Wilcken assumed that DC was non-historical and stemmed from an oligarchic pamphlet); he then proceeded to argue that the other explicit and implicit references to DC were added by the same interpolator.

⁴⁶ See Kenyon in his third edition (1893, 128).

⁴⁷ It was before Wilcken that De Sanctis 1898, 164 used lack of any number indicators with DC as an argument that its mention was inserted in ch. 41 by Aristotle himself when he added ch. 4; he supposed that Theseus' constitution was originally numbered as the second one (viz. the second order) and that *πρώτη μετὰ ταύτην ἔχουσα πολιτείας τάξιν* was added to it when DC appeared in the text so as to harmonise the interpolation with the total of eleven changes. However, he overlooked the fact that on the reading *κατάστασις* which was then accepted, the order of Ion is not a change but instead the initial constitution, and the number of eleven changes can only be gotten with DC.

Wilcken certainly made an impressive case and with his proposal won far greater approval than any of his earlier attempts to argue that DC was interpolated.⁴⁸ His argument impressed even those scholars who still believed that DC could have been written by the author of the *AP*: they now yielded to the notion that Wilcken had provided decisive proof for the view (in line with Wilamowitz) that it was awkwardly added at some later stage of the work.⁴⁹

Nevertheless, even after Wilcken, some scholars sought to prove that DC is an integral part of the text (not an interpolation or an author's later addition). They argued that the number with DC in the list of changes is missing because Aristotle did not regard the order enacted by Draco as a constitution in its own right.⁵⁰ Thus von Fritz and Kapp and later von Fritz alone⁵¹ argued that DC and the "ancient" constitution described in ch. 3 are in fact one and the same constitution but simply seen from different points of view – "one from a more static [ch. 4], another from a more evolutionary [ch. 3]".⁵² They were aware that both the mention

⁴⁸ The silencing of the defenders of DC as an integral part of the text after Wilcken is visible from the survey of Busolt–Swoboda [see above n. 1]. For the further date see the Teubner edition of the *AP* by Thalheim 1909, based on Blass, and its successor Oppermann 1928, who bracketed all mentions of DC as interpolations; the cogency of Wilcken's argument is assumed in further discussions of DC by Ledl, Cloché, Fuks and Rhodes.

⁴⁹ Seeck (see above n. 6); Day–Chambers 1962, 198; Chambers 1990, 154 (two latter works are noncommittal as to whether the addition is made by Aristotle or a later redactor).

⁵⁰ These scholars thus revived the earlier arguments to the same effect as adduced by Blass and other scholars who tried to harmonise the *AP* with the *Politics*: see above.

⁵¹ Von Fritz – Kapp 1950, 10 f.; von Fritz 1954. As von Fritz (pp. 73–75) explained in response to the criticism of their opponents, they did not intend to revise the question of DC's historicity, which according to them was definitely solved by Ed. Meyer in a negative way. Remarkably, in their book von Fritz and Kapp 1950, show no awareness of Wilcken's 1903 paper. They correctly render (p. 8) Wilcken's reading μετάστασις at 41. 2 (p. 37. 1 Chambers) presumably following Oppermann's edition, and they interpret the text of ch. 41 accordingly; but they still vacillate (p. 9; 152 n. 9) between reading αὐτοῦ or αὐτῇ at 4. 1 (p. 3. 1 Chambers), also after Oppermann, thus ignorant of the fact that the correct αὐτοῦ was maintained by Wilcken. Von Fritz in his later paper of 1954 attacked De Sanctis 1912, 162 f. (who now read μετάστασις after Wilcken) but again does not mention Wilcken himself.

⁵² More clearly, cf. von Fritz 1954, 73: "Aristotle in that chapter did not mean to say that Draco created a new constitution (in contradiction to a well-known passage of Aristotle's *Politics* where the statement is made in the clearest possible terms that Draco gave his laws for an already existing constitution) but that he instead intended to give a more detailed description of a political order that had been in the process of developing ever since the abolition of the monarchy and had culminated in the specific form it had reached at the time of Draco".

of Draco in the list of changes in ch. 41 and the initial sentences of both the third chapters (the “ancient constitution” is one that was in force before *the constitution of Draco*) and 4 (*his* [Draco’s] constitution was as follows) are at odds with this interpretation.⁵³ But they claimed that ch. 4 “contains absolutely nothing that represents a definite innovation in comparison with the latest stage of the development described in the preceding chapter”,⁵⁴ and on this they founded their view that Aristotle’s sources were unaware of a separate constitution enacted by Draco. Ch. 41. 2 mentions Draco not as creator of the constitution but only as “the most representative figure” of the oligarchic regime which developed from the abolition of monarchy up to the constitution of Solon (Aristotle in the *AP* thus did not abandon his earlier view in the *Politics* that Draco instituted the laws for the preexisting constitution).⁵⁵ They explained the appearance of the “ancient constitution” and DC as two different constitutions by citing the poor condition of the *AP*’s text: it had either not been published or even revised before publication. In favour of this unrevised state of the text, they pointed out that both chs. 3 and 4 disrupt the narrative, which would plainly proceed without them from those conditions which made Solon’s reforms necessary (ch. 2) to the description of reforms themselves (ch. 5) and thus reviving the argument of Wilamowitz and other scholars who believed that both chs. 3 and 4 were later added by Aristotle to the text (see contra above).

This attempt was sharply criticized and universally rejected.⁵⁶ There are pertinent remarks in both works against the plausibility of an interpolation,⁵⁷

⁵³ The criticism by Rizzo 1963, 273 f. is unjustified in this respect.

⁵⁴ Von Fritz – Kapp 1950, 10 f.; von Fritz 1954, 83 f.

⁵⁵ This is reflected in their translation of 41. 2 as “after this came *the constitution which prevailed under Draco* [my italics], in which, for the first time, they drew up a code of laws” (cf. already Blass, 1898, XXII f.). This is wrong because, as the previous sentence shows, the omitted word is not ‘constitution’ but ‘change’.

⁵⁶ Rhodes 1981/1993, 86.

⁵⁷ But not von Fritz’s argument (1954, 77) that if one removes any mention of Draco in ch. 41 then the constitution of Solon would immediately follow the introduction of “democratic monarchy” under Theseus; but “he [Aristotle] cannot have considered the oligarchic republic following upon the abolition of the democratic monarchy a continuation of the latter, and he can hardly have considered it as no political order at all”. The argument is fallacious because even if Draco was depicted as representative of “the oligarchic republic” in ch. 41, as von Fritz wishes, and not as the maker of a new constitutional order, as in fact he was, ch. 3 shows that the abolition of monarchy was mentioned only as one of the changes within the “first constitution” and not as the origin of the oligarchic republic (this was rightly noted by Jacoby *FGrH* Teil 3 b Suppl. 2 [1954] 50). The “first constitution” is thus the order which existed both under monarchy and after it, before DC was enacted (or before Solon, if one removes DC).

but its main defect is the inaccurate statement that two accounts in chs. 3 and 4 could have derived from a description of the same constitution: in fact, although the account in ch. 3 is very selective, there are clear indications that both constitutional orders are substantially different. With this falls the whole supposition that the author awkwardly depicted the same order from different angles because all *explicit* mentions of DC in the text refer to it as to the separate constitution (against their view that 41. 2 depicts Draco as only a “representative” of the preexisting order, see above n. 55).⁵⁸ The deletion of both ch. 4 and 41. 2 together with other mentions of DC from the text might seem a much more attractive panacea than taking refuge in so many gratuitous assumptions so as to prove that DC must remain in the text but not as a constitution in its own right.

Further attempts to defend DC as an integral part of the text were critical of von Fritz and Kapp: they rightly started from the premise that it was an order different from the “first constitution”, and they tried to explain why, in spite of this, DC is not enumerated in ch. 41 as one of the constitutional changes. Thus Rizzo, whose main target was to prove DC's historicity, argued against De Sanctis that it was depicted not as a radical change but rather as the result of gradual development and for this reason was not enumerated in the list.⁵⁹ His proposal, however, merits little discussion because he is surprisingly unaware of Wilcken's correct reading *μετάστασις* (although it is cited by both his opponents: De Sanctis in his second edition and von Fritz) and admits the earlier reading *κατάστασις* and thus returning to the same difficulty as before Wilcken: in this reading the reform under Ion can be taken not as the first change but as creation of the initial order; the further numbers in this list would also be related to orders and not to changes. It would give the total number of twelve orders and eleven changes (including DC in both cases) and the problem therewith goes unsolved because DC appears to have been counted in the total of eleven changes, so the missing number remains unexplained.

⁵⁸ In support of their proposal of two versions of the same constitution, von Fritz – Kapp 1950, 10 f., pointed out that ch. 41 has only one constitution between the “restricted” monarchy as established by Theseus and Solon, namely of Draco, while chs. 3 and 4 split this period between the order before and the one during Draco. This will not do because the description of the constitution in ch. 3, “the first constitution” (4. 1), includes the development of institutions which started earlier than Theseus, like the appearance of the archon polemarch under Ion. The “first constitution” of ch. 3 is thus the constitutional order which existed from the very beginning up until DC, the order that was substantially changed but not abandoned by Theseus (see further).

⁵⁹ Rizzo 1963, 275–277.

Two last attempts to disable Wilcken's argument are those of R. Develin and R. Wallace.⁶⁰ These scholars have different objectives – the first tries to prove that DC is historical, the second that it is not – but both endeavour to show through somewhat similar arguments that it is not enumerated in ch. 41 because the author of the *AP* did not regard it as a constitutional change in every sense. Develin's specific point is that Draco is mentioned in ch. 41 only as an author of the legal code but not of a constitution: the first *metabole* of the constitution is the introduction of four tribes under Ion; the second is under Theseus, which was the first *ἔχουσα πολιτείας τάξιν* and which means that he instituted the *πολιτεία*, i.e. a constitutional order which involves the self-rule of citizens; Solon then further developed the democratic institutions. The changes between Theseus and Solon do not amount to *metabolai*, and Draco is mentioned in this list only because his laws had some impact on the already existing constitutional order (Develin supposes that it was mentioned in the lost part of the *AP*). This proposal, apart from its contradiction to the real sense of ch. 4 (see what follows) apparently contradicts the statement on Draco in ch. 41. Here it is said that the *metastasis*, the change, under Draco followed that under Theseus (i.e. the change under Theseus) and that in Draco's change the laws were *also* for the first time published, i.e. along with the change of constitution. The text thus clearly ascribes to Draco a change which is similar to Theseus and, since the change under Theseus was a constitutional one, implies that Draco not only made a constitutional change but also edited the laws.

The second point common to Develin and Wallace is that ch. 4 does not show him as inventor of the associated constitutional elements but rather as one who left untouched the constitution which was in force before him (there thus being no contradiction between Aristotle's statement in the *Politics* 1274 b 15, that Draco did not create a new *politeia* but imposed his laws upon an existing one).⁶¹ Both scholars (Develin, p. 300; Wallace, pp. 277 f.) used the old argument for this: that the first provision of DC, mentioned in the text, the enfranchisement of those who possessed hoplite armour, is expressed in the pluperfect *ἀπεδέδοτο* 4. 1), in contrast to the imperfect of the further provisions: according to Develin and Wallace, this

⁶⁰ Develin 1984, 300–302; Wallace 1992, 274–279.

⁶¹ 4. 1: Ἡ μὲν οὖν πρώτη πολιτεία ταύτην εἶχε τὴν ὑπογραφὴν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα χρόνου τινὸς οὐ πολλοῦ διελθόντος, ἐπ' Ἀρισταίχμου ἄρχοντος, Δράκων τοὺς θεσμοὺς ἔθηκεν· ἡ δὲ τάξις αὐτοῦ τὸνδε τὸν τρόπον εἶχε. ἀπεδέδοτο μὲν ἡ πολιτεία τοῖς ὅπλα παρεχομένοις· ἥρουντο δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἐννέα ἄρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ταμίας οὐσίαν κεκτημένους οὐκ ἐλάττω δέκα μνῶν ἐλευθέρων, τὰς δ' ἄλλας ἀρχὰς <τὰς> ἐλάττους ἐκ τῶν ὅπλα παρεχομένων, κτλ.

should mean that this provision preceded Draco.⁶² Even if such a reading were correct, which is by no means certain (Chambers in his edition printed impf. ἀπεδίδοτο)⁶³ this understanding is untenable: the pluperfect, as was rightly noted long ago, cannot have the meaning that Develin and Wallace assign to it without some qualifying expressions like “as it was earlier”.⁶⁴ The pluperfect alone can merely denote a completed action in the past with the result of that action persisting in the past and, important here, when the pluperfect verb is used along with the imperfect verbs then the action of the first need not be all that much prior to the action of the latter.⁶⁵ Provided that this reading is sound, it means simply that enfranchisement of hoplites was the initial measure undertaken by Draco in enacting his constitution (it was of course also the most important one and upon which the other constitutional measures were predicated). The following use of imperfects means only a stylistic variation: instead of the tedious repetition of “it was enacted that...” in pqp.f., the author preferred more

⁶² For the similar proposal cf. P. Meyer 1891, 31–44 (see also Blass 1908, 120), who attempted in this way to harmonise the *AP* with the *Politics*, according to which Draco did not enact a new constitution; against this attempt, see Kenyon 1892, 11 f.

⁶³ The papyrus' reading is ἀπεδοτο with the first -o- corrected to -ε- or -ι- and with -δο- superscribed, all three letters having being written above the line. The restored verb is thus either pqp.f. ἀπεδέδοτο or the impf. ἀπεδίδοτο; see Herwerden – van Leeuwen 1891. Other editors (Kenyon, Blass, Kaibel–Wilamowitz) printed ἀπεδέδοτο. The reading of the imperfect by Herwerden – van Leeuwen was entirely forgotten until Chambers in his edition (1986; corr. 21994) printed ἀπεδίδοτο, presumably relying on autopsy, but surprisingly without noting the emended letter and the initially omitted and two letters which were later superscribed. (I am in no position to judge such matters, but the corrected letter on the photo looks like *iota* rather than *epsilon*; see http://www.bl.uk/manuscripts/FullDisplay.aspx?ref=Papyrus_131).

⁶⁴ Kenyon in his third edition (Kenyon 1892, 13) suspected that the pqp.f. may have meant that the enfranchisement of hoplites was enacted before Draco and for this reason emended the pluperfect into imperfect ἀπεδίδοτο, noting that if this were intended then the hoplite census would have been mentioned earlier in ch. 3 and also that the manner of expression suggests that this provision was part of the order constituted by Draco, both considerations certainly being correct; Kenyon's note was apparently incited by P. Meyer 1891, 34, who in his attempt to prove that DC was identical to the ‘ancient’ constitution of ch. 3, made note inter alia of the pluperfect form. But in fact, as immediately pointed out by Richards 1891, 467 b, Kenyon's emendation was superfluous: the pluperfect without additional words like “before D.”, “earlier than D.” etc. cannot have this meaning. Richards' explanation was apparently accepted by Kenyon, who in his 1903 edition printed ἀπεδέδοτο without emendation; he also made a more exact note on the text ‘ἀπεδοτο L, corr. L¹’. Sandys, who accepted Kenyon's emendation in his first edition, also printed ἀπεδέδοτο in the second, citing approvingly Richards (Sandys 1912, 15) as well as the following editors: Thalheim (1914); Mathieu – Hassoullier (1930); see also Rhodes 1981/1993, 112.

⁶⁵ See Kühner–Gerth I, 151 f., with the examples: see Hdt. 1. 84 (bis).

economic modes of expression – “they elected...” and “these offices were to be held...” etc. – viz. he depicted further elements of the same order as existing practice at the time.

Wallace attempted to explain the lack of number with DC in ch. 41 by means of a more sophisticated manoeuvre (p. 278): he proposed that ἡ δὲ τάξις αὐτοῦ enacted by Draco according to 4. 1 was not a new constitution, πολιτεία, but only a new sub-order within the old one. This proposal fails to convince because at 3. 1 the constitutional order which existed before Draco is called ἡ τάξις τῆς ἀρχαίας πολιτείας τῆς πρὸ Δράκοντος, “the order of that constitution which was in force before Draco”.⁶⁶ This shows unambiguously that in the *AP* author’s view Draco was creator of a new πολιτεία and that the expression ἡ δὲ τάξις αὐτοῦ (sc. of Draco) is only a concise form of the expression ἡ τάξις τῆς πολιτείας τοῦ Δράκοντος at 4. 1.⁶⁷

Thus, despite the acumen of their champions, these arguments designed to refute Wilcken’s position by showing that DC in ch. 4 is *not* presented as the separate constitution are quite unsatisfactory. Instead of such a strained treatment of ch. 4, it is more promising to consider whether the awkward counting of constitutions in ch. 41 and the omission of number with DC are in fact sufficient evidence that DC was interpolated. Here, first of all, we can challenge Wilcken’s important presupposition that if addition of DC was made by the author of the *AP* himself then he should have necessarily had to change the enumeration of changes: that it was *not* done thus proves that the addition was made by an interpolator. The real state of affairs seems to be precisely the opposite: the lack of number with DC is so striking that it elicits the question as to how the alleged interpolator who was cautious

⁶⁶ Wallace’s rendering of these words (p. 278) – an earlier τάξις in a πολιτεία that later developed under Draco – would demand the article in nominative, not in genitive, something like this: ἡ τάξις τῆς ἀρχαίας πολιτείας ἡ πρὸ Δράκοντος.

⁶⁷ By the same token, the *AP* 5. 1, τοιαύτης δὲ τῆς τάξεως οὔσης ἐν τῇ πολιτεία, does not mean of course that Draco’s order was not a πολιτεία but a sub-order of an ancient πολιτεία, as Wallace argues; it is only a stylistic variation, instead of τῆς τάξεως οὔσης τῆς πολιτείας (viz. ἡ τάξις τῆς πολιτείας). In fact I see no clear instance for τάξις in the meaning, which Wallace proposes, a sub-order in the constitution, which can be transformed into another sub-order of it; the normal relation of τάξις to πολιτεία is not of a species to a genus but that of essence to substance. Of course it is possible to say that ἡ τάξις τῆς πολιτείας has been changed in the sense of ‘constitutional’ change, but in that case πολιτεία means the constitutional order as such, not a particular constitution. Wallace claimed that τάξις alone is not used in the meaning of πολιτεία anywhere in the *AP*, but see 11. 2 (ὁ μὲν γὰρ δῆμος ᾤετο πάντ’ ἀνάδαστα ποιήσιν αὐτόν, οἱ δὲ γνώριμοι πάλιν εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν τάξιν ἀποδώσειν, ἢ μ[ικρ]ο[ὶ]ν παραλλάξειν) where it is used very similarly to 4. 1, as a concise expression instead of ἡ τάξις τῆς πολιτείας.

enough to skillfully supply references to DC in this chapter and other places then failed to change the enumeration of constitutional changes and their total number.⁶⁸ Much more plausible is that the author of the treatise was so incautious as to feel no need for mimicry. This might lend weight to the view that DC was inserted in the list by the author after he had added, at some later point in his work, DC in ch. 4 and made the corresponding additions in other places. However, the omission of number with DC may be explained as the result of a more simple-minded negligence entailing no addition to the text and even precluding the possibility of any such addition.

It is said in the beginning that there were on the whole eleven μεταβολαί in the history of Athens; this word normally means the change of a constitutional order, gradual or immediate, formal or informal. It is further asserted that the first was a μετάστασις, the change of earlier institutions, after the advent of Ion and his comrades; it was the establishment of four tribes and the assignment of the *phylobasileis* to them. Next comes the difficult and certainly corrupted sentence:

δευτέρα δὲ καὶ πρώτη μετὰ ταύτην ἔχουσα πολιτείας (Wyse; πολιτείαν pap.) τάξιν ἢ ἐπὶ Θησέως γενομένη, μικρὸν παρεγκλίνουσα τῆς βασιλικῆς. μετὰ δὲ ταύτην ἢ ἐπὶ Δράκοντος, ἐν ᾗ καὶ νόμους ἀνέγραψαν πρῶτον.

The ἔχουσα πολιτείαν τάξιν of papyrus is certainly corrupt and was variously emended;⁶⁹ ἔχουσα πολιτείας τάξιν is the minimal and most obvious emendation and seems to be along the right lines.⁷⁰ The literal

⁶⁸ This discrepancy between the alleged inaccuracy of an interpolator in 41. 2 and his accuracy in other passages was rightly noticed by von Fritz and other opponents of Wilcken; however, they drew the wrong inference that an omission of number was intended and due to Aristotle's treatment of DC as not being a constitutional change in the proper sense.

⁶⁹ There are further corruptions in this sentence emended by a corrector of the papyrus; see Chambers, app. ad loc.

⁷⁰ The emendation was proposed by Wyse (Varii 1891, 115) in the form παρέχουσα πολιτείας τάξιν (Kenyon in his first edition read [εξ]έχουσα πολιτείας τάξις; various attempts to emend the preposition followed, see Varii 1891, 115); but Kenyon in his third edition (1892, 128) stated that "the lacuna will not admit any of them" and printed ἔχουσα πολιτείας τάξιν; Kaibel–Wilamowitz 1891 did the same earlier, but with two dots before ἔχουσα (see also Kaibel 1893, 202). Wilamowitz later (1893, I, 186 n. 1) proposed ἔχουσα τι πολιτείας τάξις, i.e. "the second political order and the first one which has some properties of constitution" (also in Kaibel–Wilamowitz 1898); it was far more attractive when in the previous sentence it was read as κατάστασις (πρώτη μὲν γὰρ ἐγένετο κατάστασις τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς Ἰῶνος) and even more importantly it entails the idea that Theseus was a creator of the Athenian "ancient", i.e. pre-Dracon's constitution, which is not the case.

meaning of the emended sentence should be that this change was the first one “having the rank of constitution” (not “having some semblance of a constitution”, as Kenyon and others).⁷¹ There are two possible interpretations of this.⁷² It can mean that the change under Theseus was the first *constitutional* change (πρώτη ἔχουσα πολιτείας τάξιν is a brachylogical equivalent of πρώτη ἔχουσα τῆς μεταστάσεως τῆς πολιτείας τάξιν), i.e. the change under Ion was *not* the constitutional one – though the introduction of tribes was indeed an important institutional innovation. Alternatively, this can mean that Theseus was the first to introduce the constitutional order in an explicit form – in contrast to the previous state of affairs which was traditional and not ordered formally (the change of Ion would be the first institutional one in the way of establishing this explicit order – though not quite amounting to such in every sense). Both these interpretations are possible because μεταβολή is used in this chapter not only in the narrow sense of “constitutional change” but in the expanded sense as a reference both to the change itself and to the new constitutional order which was an effect of the change.⁷³

The first option seems to be correct: there was a constitution, namely πολιτεία, before Theseus, and the change under him was the first *constitutional* change in Athenian history. This is in accord with the literal meaning of 41. 2: Theseus slightly changed the *monarchical* constitution, μικρὸν παρεγκλίνουσα τῆς βασιλικῆς (sc. πολιτείας). Moreover, the account of the “ancient constitution” in ch. 3 which was in force before

⁷¹ For τάξις in the meaning ‘position’, ‘rank’, ‘status’, see *AP* 3. 6, and further LSJ, s.v. III. 1; Bonitz, *IA* 747 a 42–44, e.g. *Pol.* 1252 b 6 (Rhodes 1981/1993, 484 f., makes the error of rendering it here as “a form of constitution”, comparing it with 3. 1, 4. 1 and 5. 1, where the word does in fact have this meaning).

⁷² Wilcken 1903, 88, supposed mistakenly that Theseus enacted something similar to πολιτεία in Aristotle’s specific significance of a middle-class constitution; Develin 1984, 301 was equally wrong with his proposal that Theseus introduced the first πολιτεία in the sense that it was the first order which involved the citizenry in self-rule because there is no instance of this restrictive usage of *politeia* in Aristotle.

⁷³ This expanded meaning is evident beginning with the fourth change under Peisistratus: τετάρτη δ’ ἡ ἐπὶ Πεισιστράτου τυραννίς (lit. “the fourth change was the tyranny under P.”); see further ἔκτη δ’ ἡ μετὰ τὰ Μηδικά, τῆς ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλῆς ἐπιστατοῦσης. ... δεκάτη δ’ ἡ τῶν τριάκοντα καὶ ἡ τῶν δέκα τυραννίς (ὀγδόη δ’ ἡ τῶν τετρακοσίων κατάστασις is ambiguous because κατάστασις can mean both the implementing of an order and a political order itself). Under the “changes” are listed even the resulting constitutions as existing without interruption through time and undergoing a gradual inner development: ἐβδόμη δὲ ἡ μετὰ ταύτην, ἣν Ἀριστείδης μὲν ὑπέδειξεν, Ἐφιάλτης δ’ ἐπετέλεσεν, καταλύσας τὴν Ἀρεοπαγίτιν βουλήν· ἐν ᾗ πλεῖστα συνέβη τὴν πόλιν διὰ τοὺς δημαγωγοὺς ἀμαρτάνειν διὰ τὴν τῆς θαλάττης ἀρχήν... ἐνδεκάτη δ’ ἡ μετὰ τὴν ἀπὸ Φυλῆς καὶ ἐκ Πειραιέως κάθοδον, ἀφ’ ἧς διαγεγένηται μέχρι τῆς νῦν, αἰὲ προσεπιλαμβάνουσα τῷ πλήθει τὴν ἐξουσίαν.

Draco and which is labelled as the “first” (4. 1) gives no hint that Theseus was its creator, not even that this constitution acquired its true form under Theseus: it does not mention Theseus at all, while depicting some of those institutions which arose earlier than Theseus and some of those which arose much later.⁷⁴ In the list of changes, Theseus of course features as one who transformed monarchy, i.e. as the author of a *constitutional* change. But at the same time he is not represented as author of a new constitution: the declination from monarchy under him was “minor” (μικρὸν παρεγκλίνουσα τῆς βασιλικῆς), and brought with it no abolition of the monarchic order.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ The constitutional order depicted in the ch. 3 actually only consists of the archons and Areopagus; the changes in the order of holding the archon offices are followed – from governing for life to annual magistracies; these embrace the establishment of the office of the archon-polemarch for Ion, i.e. under Erechtheus, in the first half of the fourteenth century BC, according to traditional chronology, and earlier than Theseus' reign (the last decades of the thirteenth century BC) and the transition from the hereditary holding of the kingship to appointment of the eponymous archons who governed for life under Medon or Adrastus in the eleventh century BC, i.e. much later than Theseus, as well as the still more later establishment of the annual archonship (683 BC). The origin of Areopagus is not discussed.

⁷⁵ Unfortunately, since the beginning of the *AP* is lost, it is unclear how this change was presented in detail (41. 2 only summarises the earlier account). Heraclides' Epitome mentions Theseus' invitation that foreigners come and settle there on equal terms with the citizenry, and this suggests a more substantial treatment of political matters (cf. Jacoby, *FGrH* III, Suppl. 2. Notes [1954] 61). Plutarch (*Thes.* 25.3 = *AP* fr. 3 Chambers) cites Aristotle's statement that Theseus was the first who ἀπέκλινε πρὸς τὸν ὄχλον, which seems also to be a reference to the lost and more detailed treatment in the earlier part of the *AP* rather than simply the echo of *AP* 41. 2, where the exact character of Theseus' declination from the earlier monarchic order goes unstated. The preceding piece of Plutarch (25. 1) mentions Theseus' proclamation – the invitation (κήρυγμα) to foreigners that they come and settle on equal terms with the citizenry, and this is very close to the note in the Epitome (see Wade-Gery 1931, 4–6, who assigns this piece to the lost part of the *AP*; Jacoby 1947, 247 f. n.49, is unduly skeptical when assigning the invitation in the Epitome to the synoicism and not to the invitation of foreigners – against this ἐκήρυξε of the Epitome; Rhodes 1981/1993, 74, cf. 67, is also skeptical). It is tempting, following Wade-Gery, to ascribe to the lost part of the *AP* also the piece of Plutarch (25. 2) sandwiched between these two reminiscences of the *AP* – Theseus divided the citizens into three orders, εὐπατρίδες, γεώμοροι and δημιοργοί – especially since the *AP* (fr. 2) mentioned the earlier division into γεώργου and δημιοργοί, and all three orders were mentioned in 13. 2. Plutarch also reports that Theseus granted to the Eupatrids the exclusive right of being priests and officials but maintained an “equality” of two other groups, as being most useful and most numerous respectively. In this “expanded” version Theseus appears to be an important reformer of the Athenian constitution, but my interpretation does not depend on it: even on the minimal evidence of 41. 2, his change was a constitutional one – he transformed the previous monarchic order by granting some rights to the people and thus initiated the gradual abandonment of monarchy.

The optimal solution, in view of all this, seems to be that according to the *AP* the whole state order from the very beginning of the Athenian state till enactment of DC was the “first [or ancient] constitution” which underwent some important changes but only one which touched on constitutional principles – though it did not abandon the “first constitution” on the whole, i.e. that change implemented under Theseus. The change under Ion – introduction of the tribal order – was on the list of changes as an important institutional novelty, but it did not change the relative power of social classes in the state and the branches of power representing them, which is typical for other changes in the list. The development within the “ancient constitution” from hereditary monarchy to an annual archonship as well as other changes (the adding of further archons, redistribution of their prerogatives) surveyed in ch. 3 were not listed as the μεταβολαί in ch. 41, apparently because none of these reforms amounted to a real constitutional change.⁷⁶

Although my sympathies are with this option – that the change under Theseus was the first constitutional change in Athenian history and not that he was creator of the first constitution – in both interpretations the change under Ion, the introduction of four tribes with their “kings”, is *not* a constitutional change: this reform is too insubstantial to change the principles of the constitutional order, even less so does it amount to the creation of the first constitutional order. On the contrary, the change under Theseus with its minor declination from monarchy to democracy is a real constitutional change. The following nine changes enumerated after Draco do not necessarily amount to the introduction of a new constitution but are certainly changes to the character of πολιτεία, i.e. constitutional changes, formal ones (like the constitutions of Solon, Clisthenes and Ephialtes, all

⁷⁶ Rhodes 1981/1993, 108 f., objects to a literal understanding of the constitution before Draco as the “first” (4. 1) in a chronological sense: he points out that the constitution was changed under Ion and Theseus according to ch. 41 and finds it surprising that ‘the constitution in force after the abolition of the monarchy and the creation of nine archons’ could be called “the first”; he thus understands the “first *politeia*” as the first in order of description, i.e. the first point at which the outline of the *politeia* is given “in opposition to events which only impinged on the *politeia*”. However, the first two changes under Ion and Theseus, ample enough to be mentioned in the list of ch. 41, were not regarded as an abandonment of the initial order because the ages of both Ion and Theseus are assigned in ch. 3 to the epoch of the ‘first’ constitution. The institution of the life-long archonship instead of hereditary kingship certainly was not considered by the author of the *AP* to be a new constitutional order, not even as the considerable change of an existing constitution, because it went unmentioned in ch. 41, presumably since the de facto difference in position of the later hereditary kings and the earlier appointed life-long archons was insignificant in terms of the system of government.

progressing toward democracy, or the oligarchies of 411 and 404 BC, and the restorations of democracy which followed each of these oligarchies) or informal (the tyranny of Pisistratus and his sons and the “domination” of the Areopagus after the Persian Wars).⁷⁷ Hence the total number of eleven μεταβολαί can be explained without any surmise that DC was added later: the counting of constitutional changes starts with Theseus and not with Ion.⁷⁸ The other oddity – lack of number with the change under Draco – is the result of negligence, but an understandable one: the author had to enumerate it either in a manner similar to the preceding item – the third change absolutely but the second constitutional one – a tedious pedantry – or designate it simply as the second constitutional change and thus having one “second” follow the other.⁷⁹ Perhaps for this reason, in an effort to avoid repetitions, Draco's change was instead simply designated as the “next one after that [of Theseus]”, which can be understood as the next constitutional change after that under Theseus. Solon's change was next enumerated as the third, viz. the third in the constitutional sense, because the author was now counting from Theseus, not from Ion. The total of eleven changes thus means eleven in the constitutional sense: the change under Ion was too important not to be mentioned but was not a constitutional one and thus was not counted.⁸⁰

⁷⁷ Pace Wallace 1992, 274.

⁷⁸ The similar proposal – that the total number of eleven and not twelve should be explained by the double enumeration of the change under Theseus – had already been made by Kaibel 1893, 202, but seems to be entirely forgotten.

⁷⁹ Some scholars, beginning with De Sanctis 1912, 163, and including Chambers 1990, 324 f., argued that in the sentence δευτέρα δὲ καὶ πρώτη μετὰ ταύτην ἔχουσα πολιτείας τάξιν ἢ ἐπὶ Θησέως γενομένη, μικρὸν παρεγκλίνουσα τῆς βασιλικῆς the words μετὰ ταύτην are superfluous and were added by someone who interpolated the next sentence in DC so as to give the impression that the numbering starts with Theseus and not with Ion (he did this, as they believe, instead of adjusting all numbers in accordance with the added new item). μετὰ ταύτην is in fact difficult but precisely for this reason it can hardly be an interpolation: the numbering of *constitutional* changes would start from Theseus more clearly without these words. It is perhaps for this reason that Seeck 1904, 52 and Rhodes 1981/1993, 484 f., suppose even more radically that the words καὶ πρώτη μετὰ ταύτην and probably also ἔχουσα πολιτείας τάξιν were interpolated with the same purpose – but this begs the question as to why the alleged interpolator who skillfully gave a double enumeration to the change under Theseus did not do the same with the change under Draco. In fact μετὰ ταύτην, which modifies γενομένη, as Wilamowitz noted, is only a bold hyperbaton, which seems to be tolerable.

⁸⁰ At first sight it is contradicted by the fact that immediately after saying there were eleven μεταβολαί, Aristotle proceeds to assert that the first of them was the μετὰστασις under Ion, thus counting this change as one of eleven μεταβολαί (ἦν δὲ τῶν μεταβολῶν ἑνδεκάτῃ τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὕτη (sc. ἐπὶ Πυθοδώρου). πρώτη μὲν γὰρ ἐγένετο <ἡ> μετὰστασις τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς Ἰωνος καὶ τῶν μετ' αὐτοῦ συννοικησάντων).

To summarise, there are no sufficient grounds for treatment of DC as an interpolation in the text or as a later addition to it made by the author himself. The character of DC, its provenance and historicity, deserve further investigation.

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Even if it were the case, this would be only an unhappy mode of expression, and insufficient reason for treatment of DC as an insertion, because in the next sentence on Theseus we have Aristotle stating more clearly that the change under Ion was not the full-fledged μεταβολή. However, the Greek of the sentence on Ion is ambiguous and it is quite possible that Aristotle does not say that the change under Ion was the first of μεταβολαί. His words can have the meaning: “for the first in order was the μετάστασις under Ion” (i.e. he calls the change under Ion the first μετάστασις, not the first μεταβολή). Contrary to μεταβολή and μεταβάλλεσθαι which are the standard words for constitutional changes (apart from the *AP*, there are numerous examples in the *Politics*), μετάστασις and μεθίστασθαι have a more general meaning of change, and are rare in a political context (for a few examples see Rhodes 1981/1993, 483; there are three instances in the *Politics* where μεθίστασθαι is used as synonymous with μεταβάλλεσθαι, and no instance of μετάστασις at all). It is thus possible that μετάστασις is used in *AP* 41, 2 as a non-technical word in order to distinguish the change under Ion from the μεταβολαί in a full sense; γὰρ in this case is not explicative (it does not introduce the first of eleven μεταβολαί) but rather parenthetical and anticipatory (see Denniston, *GP*, 68 f.): the sentence gives a reason as to why the author begins with Ion – it was too important an institutional innovation not to be mentioned but not one to be counted as a real μεταβολή. The change under Theseus is next called the second, i.e. the second μετάστασις, but the first one of a constitutional character, viz. the first μεταβολή. All the following changes can be understood as μεταβολαί, i.e. the constitutional changes which in sum then issue in the number eleven.

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The paper reconsiders Draco's constitution (DC) in ch. 4 of Aristotle's *Athenaion Politeia*, which is widely held to be an interpolation in the text (or, minimally, an author's later addition). The present paper is an attempt to prove that neither argument – neither that from the structure of the text of the first chapters of the *AP* nor the argument from the omission of number with DC in the list of constitutional changes (ch. 41) and the discrepancy in the total number of changes (eleven instead of twelve) does *not* prove that DC was later inserted into the text in any way. At the same time the attempts to explain the awkwardness in ch. 41 through the supposition that DC is *not* depicted in ch. 4 as a constitution in its own right and thus proving it to be an integral part of the text are misleading. The confusion in ch. 41 is related to the double status of the change under Theseus which preceded the one under Draco: it is called the second change (i.e. second institutional change), but the first constitutional one. The first change absolutely, that which took place under Ion, was thus not constitutional, and this change, and *not* that which took place under Draco, was not counted.

В статье рассматривается один из вопросов, связанных с так наз. "конституцией Драконта" (ДК) в гл. 4 *Афинской политики* Аристотеля. Описание этого государственного устройства, согласно преобладающему в науке мнению, является позднейшей интерполяцией или, по крайней мере, позднейшей вставкой, сделанной самим автором сочинения. В статье доказывается, что аргументы, на которых основывается это мнение (формальные особенности композиции первых глав, пропуск номера при ДК в перечне изменений афинского государственного устройства в гл. 41, общее число 11 изменений в той же главе, вместо ожидаемого 12), не доказывают наличие позднейшей вставки в текст. Вместе с тем, ошибочны и попытки объяснить странности гл. 41 тем, что ДК в гл. 4 не изображается как самостоятельная конституция. Их более вероятное объяснение состоит в том, что изменение при Тесее обозначено двояким образом – как второе по порядку, но первое, имевшее конституционный характер. Первое по времени изменение, при Ионе, не имело, следовательно, конституционного характера: именно оно, а не изменение при Драконте, было не учтено в общей сумме изменений.

Key Words

BURASELIS

finis of athletic transgressions, Olympic sanctuary, Zanes

Заны, святилище в Олимпии, штрафы за нарушение правил атлетами

EGOROVA

Actium, *Epist.* 1. 20, Horace, Tibur (Tivoli), Philippi, sinistrorsum, 9th *Epode*

Акций, Гораций, *Послание* 1, 20, Тибур (Тиволи), Филиппы, sinistrorsum,

9-й *Эпод*

ERMOLAEVA

cento, Homeric formula, Matro, parody

гомеровская формула, Матрон, пародия, центон

HADOT

De mysteriis, Iamblichus, neoplatonism, theurgy

неоплатонизм, теургия, трактат “О таинствах”, Ямвлих

KONDAKOVA – KUZNETSOVA

Aristophanes, *Aves*, Greek epigram, Homer, Palladas

Аристофан, Гомер, греческая эпиграмма, Паллад, *Птицы*

KOSTYLEVA

Euripides, *Hercules*, G. Bond

Еврипид, *Геракл*, Г. Бонд

LUCARINI

Eleatic philosophy, Eristic, *Parmenides*, Plato, *Sophist*

Парменид, Платон, *Софист*, философия элеатов, эристика

NOVIKOVA

Aesop, *cumera*, *Epistle* 1. 7, fable, fox, Horatius, mouse, weasel

басня, Гораций, ласка, лиса, мышь, *Послания* 1. 7, Эзоп

POZDNEV

dedications, Dodona, Homer, inscriptions, *Patrocleia*, rhapsodes

Гомер, Додона, *Патроклия*, посвящения, рапсоды, эпитафические памятники

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Aristotle, *Athenaion Politeia*, Draco's constitution

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