

HYPERBOREUS

STUDIA CLASSICA

ναυσὶ δ' οὔτε πεζὸς ἰὼν κεν εὗροις
ἐς Ὑπερβορέων ἀγῶνα θαυμαστὰν ὁδόν

(Pind. *Pyth.* 10. 29–30)

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SU ALCUNE OCCORRENZE DI ΟΡΕΓΩ

Sotto la voce ὀρέγω, al punto 2. della diatesi attiva, LSJ allineano per i significati ‘reach out, hold out, hand give’ i seguenti passi (1247 a):

Od. XV, 312 κατὰ δὲ πτόλιν αὐτὸς ἀνάγκη / πλάγξομαι, αἶ κέν τις κοτύλην καὶ πύρνον ὀρέξῃ

Il. XXIV, 102 Ἥρη δὲ χρύσειον καλὸν δέπας ἐν χειρὶ θῆκε / καὶ ῥ’ εὐφρην’ ἐπέεσσι· Θέτις δ’ ὥρεξε πιοῦσα

Il. V, 33 ὀπποτέροισι πατήρ Ζεὺς κῦδος ὀρέξῃ (cf. *Il.* 17, 453 νῆας ἔπι γλαφυράς· ἔτι γάρ σφισι κῦδος ὀρέξω, *Hes. Th.* 433 οἷς κ’ ἐθέλῃσι / νίκην προφρονέως ὀπάσαι καὶ κῦδος ὀρέξαι)

Il. XII, 328 ἴομεν ἢ τῷ εὐχος ὀρέξομεν ἢ τις ἡμῖν (cf. *S. Ph.* 1203 ὦ ξένοι, ἔν γέ μοι εὐχος ὀρέξατε)

Pi. P. 3, 110 εἰ δέ μοι πλοῦτον θεὸς ἄβρὸν ὀρέξαι

Pi. N. 7, 58 τίνοι τοῦτο Μοῖρα τέλος ἔμπεδον / ὥρεξε

Pl. Phd. 117 b καὶ ἅμα ὥρεξε τὴν κύλικα τῷ Σωκράτει

POxy. 902, 11 (Kynopolis, 464 d. C.) πρὸ[ς] τῷ (l. τὸ) βοήθειαν ὀρέξαι τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις.

Di grana più fine è la schedatura in Führer 2000, che isola una sezione 2., con il significato di ‘reichen; zuteil werden lassen’. Un significato “indebolito” rispetto all’originario ‘stendere in linea retta’, e con focalizzazione sul complemento oggetto. Führer distingue tra oggetti concreti (2 a) e oggetti astratti (2 b) del verbo.¹ Dei passi elencati da LSJ e trascritti sopra, *Il.* XXIV, 102; *Od.* XV, 312 sono nella prima sottosezione (763, 35–46), insieme a *Od.* XVII, 407 εἰ οἱ τόσσον πάντες ὀρέξειαν μνηστῆρες, / καὶ κέν μιν τρεῖς μῆνας ἀπόπροθεν οἶκος ἐρύκοι e *H. Merc.* 496 ὥς εἰπὼν (scil. Hermes) ὥρεξ’ (scil. la lira), ὃ δ’ ἐδέξατο Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων; mentre nella seconda (763, 47 – 764, 10) troviamo *Il.* V, 33; XII, 328; XVII, 453; *Hes. Th.* 433, con gli altri passi dell’epica arcaica ove ὀρέγω ha un astratto come oggetto diretto.

L’uso del verbo con oggetto concreto non è frequente, ma sembra crescere in periodo ellenistico, come vedremo.

¹ Sull’evoluzione di ὀρέγω al senso di “dare” vd. De Boel 1988, 118. Sulla sintassi del verbo, vd. De Boel 1987, 37.

Le occorrenze che conosco, fino alla fine del periodo ellenistico, sono:

- Il. XXIV*, 102 Ἥρη δὲ χρύσειον καλὸν δέπας ἐν χειρὶ θήκε / καὶ ῥ' εὐφρην' ἐπέεσσι· Θέτις δ' ὥρεξε πιούσα
Od. XV, 312 κατὰ δὲ πτόλιν αὐτὸς ἀνάγκη / πλάγχομαι, αἶ κέν τις κοτύλην καὶ πύρνον ὀρέξῃ
XVII, 407 εἴ οἱ τόσσον πάντες ὀρέξειαν μνηστῆρες, / καὶ κέν μιν τρεῖς μῆνας ἀπόπροθεν οἶκος ἐρύκοι (Antinoo, in relazione al lancio dello sgabello contro Odisseo)
H. Merc. 496 ὥς εἰπὼν (scil. Hermes) ὥρεξ' (scil. la lira), ὁ δ' ἐδέξατο Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων
Critias, fr. 4, 6 G.-P. καὶ προπόσεις ὀρέγειν ἐπιδέξια
Ar. Pax 1105 ἔγχει δὴ κάμοι καὶ σπλάγχνων μοῖραν ὀρεξον
X. An. VII, 3, 29 ὁ δὲ Ἡρακλείδης ἐκέλευεν αὐτῷ τὸ κέρας ὀρέξαι τὸν οἰνοχόον
Pl. Phd. 117 b 2 καὶ ἅμα ὥρεξε τὴν κύλικα τῷ Σωκράτει
Arist. HA 497 b 27 πίνει γὰρ καὶ ἐσθίει ὀρέγων τούτῳ εἰς τὸ στόμα, καὶ τῷ ἐλεφαντιστῇ ἀνορέγει ἄνω
Eudem. fr. 127 W. ὥς δὲ οὐ συνίει, ὁ δὲ τῷ στόματι ἐλάβετο (scil. la scure) καὶ ὥρεξεν οἱ
Anyt. APl. XVI, 291, 4 (= 675 G.-P.) ὀρέξασαι (scil. Ninfe) χερσὶ μελιχρὸν ὕδωρ
Theoc. 5, 135 ἀλλ' ἐγὼ Εὐμήδους ἔραμαι μέγα· καὶ γὰρ ὅκ' αὐτῷ / τὰν σύριγγ' ὥρεξα, καλὸν τί με κάρτ' ἐφίλησεν
Crantor, fr. 5 b Mette (*Lustrum* 26 [1984] 20. 39 s.) καὶ οὕτω δὴ ὀρέξαι οἱ γραμματίδιον
Arch. AP IX, 64, 4 καὶ σοι (scil. Esiodo) καλλιπέτηλον ... / ὥρεξαν (scil. le Muse) δάφνας ἱερὸν ἀκρεμόνα²
Ar. Byz. Epit. II, 122 προσιέναι τε τοὺς τούτων πωλευτὰς καὶ ἐκ χειρὸς ὀρέγειν τροφήν
Nic. Alex. 88 ἔτι μυρτίνης σχεδίην δεπάεσσιν ὀρέξαις
 203 δῆποτε δ' ἱρινέου θυέος μετρηδὸν ὀρέξαις
 fr. 74, 5 ἄσσα (scil. violaciocche gialle) τ' Ἰωνιάδες Νύμφαι στέφος ἄγνων Ἰωνι / Πισαίοις ποθέσασαι ἐνὶ κλήροις ὀρεξαν
 fr. 81, 4 ἐς χέρας ἡιθέοισι πάλαι ποθέουσιν ὀρέξης (scil. corone di fiore di loto)
Nic. Dam. FGrHist 90 F 66(5) Jac. καὶ αὐτὸς βασιλεῖ ὥρεγε πιεῖν τὴν φιάλην (in contesto di simposio)
Epic. Alex. Adesp. fr. 4, 16 Pow. ἡ δ' αὐτὴ πολέεσσι π[οτ]οῦ καὶ σῖτον ὀρεξα.³

² Attribuito anche ad Asclepiade, ma non suo per Knauer 1935, 82; di Archia per Gow–Page 1965, 149; bibl. recente in Di Marco 2013, 161 n. 1.

³ Lyc. 1445 καὶ σκήπτρ' ὀρέξαι τῆς πάλαι μοναρχίας ha oggetto astratto: σκήπτρ(α) significa 'il dominio, il regno'.

Il significato è piuttosto generico, ‘porgere’, ma, se si osservano i contesti, vi sono un paio di *lignée* prevalenti. Questa osservazione può aiutare a vedere la pregnanza di almeno alcune delle occorrenze, e a interpretarne altre in maniera più completa di quanto sia avvenuto finora. Seleziono dall’elenco precedente i passi che mostrano in maniera più chiara i due contesti in questione:

A) porgere un boccale (in occasioni conviviali):

Critias, fr. 4, 6 G.–P. καὶ προπόσεις ὀρέγειν ἐπιδέξια

Ar. *Pax* 1105 ἔγχει δὴ καὶ μοὶ καὶ σπλάγχνων μοῖραν ὄρεξον⁴

X. *An.* VII, 3, 29 ὁ δὲ Ἡρακλείδης ἐκέλευεν αὐτῷ τὸ κέρασ ὀρέξαι τὸν οἰνοχόον

Nic. Dam. *FGrHist* 90 F 66(5) Jac. καὶ αὐτὸς βασιλεῖ ὄρεγε πιεῖν τὴν φιάλην

B) dar da mangiare e bere ai bisognosi:

Od. XV, 312 κατὰ δὲ πτόλιν αὐτὸς ἀνάγκη / πλάγξομαι, αἶ κέν τις κοτύλην καὶ πύρνον ὀρέξῃ

XVII, 407 εἰ οἱ τόσσον πάντες ὀρέξειαν μνηστῆρες, / καὶ κέν μιν τρεῖς μῆνας ἀπόπροθεν οἶκος ἐρύκοι

Epic. Alex. Adesp. fr. 4, 16 Pow. ἡ δ’ αὐτὴ πολέεσσι π[οτὸ]ν καὶ σῖτον ὄρεξα (probabilmente, vd. *infra*)

Una prima annotazione sui passi odissiaci. In XV, 312 κατὰ δὲ πτόλιν αὐτὸς ἀνάγκη / πλάγξομαι, αἶ κέν τις κοτύλην καὶ πύρνον ὀρέξῃ e XVII, 407 εἰ οἱ τόσσον πάντες ὀρέξειαν μνηστῆρες, / καὶ κέν μιν τρεῖς μῆνας ἀπόπροθεν οἶκος ἐρύκοι, si tratta di rifocillare chi ha bisogno. Nel secondo passo in termini ironici, poiché Antinoo in realtà intende quale offerta a Odisseo mendico lo sgabello lanciatogli. A questo proposito Stanford 1958, 293, commenta che “the verbs ὀρέγω and ἐρύκω are chosen for their ambiguity; both can also be used in a hospitable sense of bestowing gifts and keeping a guest”. Il generico senso di ‘bestowing gifts’ non aiuta una analisi precisa. Bisognerebbe più precisamente osservare, rifacendosi specificamente a *Od.* XV, 312, che ὀρέγω può essere usato per il fornire da mangiare e da bere a bisognosi. Il verbo, quindi, sottolinea il sarcasmo di Antinoo.⁵

Conviene considerare alcune delle occorrenze alla luce di queste due serie di esempi.

⁴ In questo caso ὄρεξον è indotto da ἔγχει “versami da bere (e porgimelo)”.

⁵ In Ameis–Hentze 1884, 146, si osserva che Antinoo “mit ὀρέγειν ein höhndendes Spiel treibt”.

Per B): *Epic. Alex. Adesp.* fr. 4, 16 Pow. ἡ δ' αὐτὴ πολέεσσι π[οτὸ]ν καὶ σῖτον ὄρεξα: nel frammento parla una donna ridotta in stato di indigenza, che ricorda un passato benessere, quando era in grado di offrire da mangiare e bere a molti. Il ricordo di questa sua trascorsa facoltà viene espressa con colorito omerico: *Od.* XV, 312, soprattutto, ma anche XVII, 407 sono le sole occorrenze ove ὄρέγω viene utilizzato in questo senso.

Se consideriamo *Od.* XV, 312, l'utilizzo di questo verbo per ricordare la trascorsa abbondanza della donna, enfatizza, *e contrario*, la sua attuale miserabile situazione.

Per A): di bere si tratta in altri dei luoghi ove ὀρέγειν significa 'porgere' qualcosa di concreto. Essi mostrano una specializzazione nel porgere da bere in occasioni conviviali e aiutano a mettere in risalto alcune sfumature di altre occorrenze di ὀρέγω = 'porgere (un oggetto concreto)':

1) Pl. *Phd.* 117 b 2 καὶ ἅμα ὄρεξε τὴν κύλικα τῷ Σωκράτει: il παῖς porge la coppa con la cicuta a Socrate. Io credo che non ci siano dubbi che Platone abbia voluto ricordare l'atto di porgere il boccale all'ospite o al compagno di banchetto in occasioni simposiali, creando così una frizione straniante. È una maniera di sottolineare la serenità e il sovrano controllo con cui Socrate vive il momento letale: del resto, subito dopo di lui si dice καὶ ὃς λαβὼν καὶ μάλα ἔλεως (117 b 3). Ma soprattutto il verbo è solidale con la scherzosa affermazione dello stesso (117 b 6 s.): τί λέγεις ... περὶ τοῦδε τοῦ πώματος πρὸς τὸ ἀποσπεῖσαί τι; ἔξεστιν ἢ οὐ; Infine, per altro verso, enfatizza, *e contrario*, il carattere luttuoso dell'avvenimento.

2) Anyt. *APL.* XVI, 291, 4 (= 675 G.–P.) ὀρέξασαι (scil. le Ninfe) χερσὶ μελιχρὸν ὕδωρ: Gow–Page 1965, 93, si avvicinano a comprendere la *ratio* di ὀρέξασαι quando annotano, “μελιχρὸν, of wine (*Alc.* fr. 338, *Anacr.* fr. 38, *Telecl.* fr. 24) ... is somewhat oddly applied to water however refreshing”. In effetti μελιχρὸν è una allusione al convivio, con cui l'altrettanto allusivo ὀρέξασαι è solidale. Le Ninfe hanno fornito a Teodoto acqua rinfrescante nella calura estiva: un'offerta umile di una cosa semplice, ma gradita, accolta e percepita con lo stesso valore dell'offerta da bere in contesto simposiale.⁶ È facile richiamare l'ideologia del λιτὸς βίος.

⁶ Nulla di tutto ciò è colto da Geoghean 1979, 54 s., “Anyte has reversed Homer. In Homer ὀρέγομαι is coupled with χερσὶ in the sense ‘grab’. In Anyte the active ὀρέξασαι is coupled with χερσὶ in the sense *tensis manibus dare*”.

3–4) Nic. *Alex.* 88 ἔτι μυρτίνης σχεδίην δεπάεσσιν ὀρέξαις, e 203 δῆποτε δ' ἱρινέου θυέος μετρηδὸν ὀρέξαις: nei due casi Nicandro usa il verbo per il porgere da bere, come nei contesti simposiali. Si tratta qui, però, di una pozione medicamentosa: contenuti ben diversi, ma rimane la sfumatura positiva del tratto confortante e amichevole che accompagna l'atto di ὀρέγειν qualcosa da bere nelle occorrenze simposiali. Probabilmente si tratta di una *abusio*, tra le molte che caratterizzano il lessico nicandro.

Forse si può individuare una terza trafila nei casi di ὀρέγω con complemento diretto un oggetto concreto:

C) La quarta e ultima occorrenza epica di ὀρέγω con oggetto concreto è *H.Merc.* 496 ὧς εἰπὼν (scil. Hermes) ὥρεξ' (scil. la lira), ὃ δ' ἐδέξατο Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων. Qui si tratta di un dono, da Hermes ad Apollo, che costituisce allo stesso tempo una sorta di curiosa investitura da parte del giovanissimo Hermes nei confronti di Apollo. La lira, infatti, costituisce uno degli attributi del dio.

1) Mi sembra di poter avanzare l'ipotesi che l'idea di Arch. *AP IX*, 64, 4 καὶ σοι (scil. Esiodo) καλλιπέτηλον ... / ὥρεξαν (scil. le Muse) δάφνας ἱερὸν ἀκρεμόνα di usare ὀρέγω per qualificare il dono delle Muse ad Esiodo, ossia per la sua investitura, venga dal luogo innico, o che comunque l'epigrammista abbia sfruttato la specifica *nuance* del verbo lì presente. Il caso non è esattamente sovrapponibile a quello in cui un dio dà κῦδος ο εὖχος vel. sim. a un mortale, uno degli usi epici di ὀρέγω (vd. *supra*),⁷ e che prevede un astratto come oggetto, ma possiamo considerare i due aspetti sulla medesima linea.

2) Il passo di Teocrito, 5, 135 ἀλλ' ἐγὼ Εὐμήδευς ἔραμαι μέγα· καὶ γὰρ ὄκ' ἀντῶ / τὰν σύριγγ' ὥρεξα, καλὸν τί με κάρτ' ἐφίλησεν presenta alcuni tratti in comune con questi passi. Si tratta di un dono, di cui è oggetto uno strumento musicale, l'ambiente è bucolico. Manca però una qualche forma di investitura, anche se di rango ridotto. Gow 1952, 115 s., non sa bene come orientarsi: "In Homer the word has this sense (scil. 'porgere, dare') only with abstracts – κῦδος, εὖχος, τάχος, and it is far more commonly used of the gifts of immortals than of mortals. On Lacon's lips it seems extremely pompous, but in view of T.' habitually high-coloured vocabulary this effect may be unintentional".⁸ Contrariamente

⁷ Sens 2011, 315 menziona, per il senso già epico di "porgere > dare" Hes. *Th.* 433 κῦδος ὀρέξαι.

⁸ Vd. anche Monteil 1968, 97.

a quanto afferma Gow, nell'epica arcaica si dà l'uso di ὀρέγειν 'porgere, dare' per oggetti concreti, sia pure in misura minoritaria, come abbiamo visto. Il problema non è questo, ma il contesto. La caratterizzazione di questa occorrenza come "non intenzionalmente pomposa" fa difficoltà, poiché presuppone che comunque sia pretenziosa. Più linearmente direi che in τὰν σύριγγ' ὄρεξα il verbo si qualifica, ancora una volta, per il tratto benevolo del gesto, nello specifico del 'donare', non accompagnato, però, da quelli, solenni, dell'investitura o, comunque, dell'emanazione divina.

In questo senso vanno i casi dai frammenti di Nicandro:

3) fr. 74, 5 Schn. ἄσσα (scil. le violaciocche gialle) τ' Ἰωνιάδες Νύμφαι στέφος ἄγνὸν Ἴωνι / Πισαίοις ποθέσασαι ἐνὶ κλήροισιν ὄρεξαν;

4) fr. 81, 4 Schn. ὄφρα θερείης / ἀνθέων (scil. fiori di loto) μὲν στεφάνους ἀνύσῃς ... / ... δαινυμένοισιν / ἐς χέρας ἡιθέοισι πάλαι ποθέουσιν ὀρέξης.

Il verbo qualifica un dono, in entrambi i casi di fiori, in forma di corona, nel fr. 74 da parte di ninfe (ovvero esseri sovrannaturali). Potrebbe ben trattarsi di una forma di *abusio*, almeno parziale, di Nicandro, non molto differente da quanto troviamo nelle due occorrenze dagli *Alexipharmaca* considerate *supra*.

5) Qualcosa del genere è in Lyc. 1445 καὶ σκῆπτρ' ὀρέξαι τῆς πάλαι μοναρχίας, ove i capi greci, tremanti, offrono la primazia sulla Grecia (ad Alessandro?, Antipatro?). Una investitura, se vogliamo, ma da parte di persone in stato di inferiorità e non con l'aura positiva che caratterizza gli esempi dell'*Inno a Mercurio* e di Archia.

Forse questo valore di ὀρέγω, nei casi sotto le lettere B e C, è il derivato del progressivo sbiadire dell'espressione di una funzione della regalità.⁹ Funzione che è ancora evidente nell'uso del verbo per la donazione di astratti (κῦδος ὀρέγειν), anche se il contesto non è quello originario.

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⁹ Vd. Gonda 1956, 157.

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Three of the contexts in which ὀρέγω ‘to hand out’ is used with a definite object are: (1) ‘to hand out a cup (on a convivial occasion)’; (2) ‘to give food and drink to those in need’; (3) ‘to offer a gift’. Starting from these uses, it is possible to see the meaningfulness of some occurrences of the verb and to interpret others in more detail than has previously been done.

Глагол ὀρέγω с прямым дополнением встречается в трех контекстах: (1) ‘протянуть чашу (на пиру)’; (2) ‘дать еды и питья тем, кто в них нуждается’; (3) ‘преподнести подарок’. Отталкиваясь от этих вариантов употребления, в некоторых случаях можно проследить особую значимость выбора этого глагола, а в других – прийти к более детальной интерпретации, чем прежде.

ANAXAGORAS ON THE LIGHT AND PHASES OF THE MOON*

Introduction

In the previous paper, “Anaxagoras on the Milky Way and Lunar Eclipses”,¹ I stated that two different theories about the shadow of the earth have been attributed to Anaxagoras. According to the first theory, the shadow of the earth was responsible for the phenomenon of the Milky Way, while according to the second, the shadow of the earth caused eclipses of the moon. I argued that these two theories are irreconcilable. I also argued that Anaxagoras’ explanation of the Milky Way, which was underpinned by the notion that lights shine brighter in the dark, is better attested than his alleged adoption of the correct explanation of lunar eclipses and harmonizes better with the rest of his astronomical ideas, especially that of a flat earth. My first conclusion was that Anaxagoras could not have discovered or held the theory that lunar eclipses were caused by the shadow of the earth. My second conclusion was that the idea of one or more invisible bodies between the moon and the earth, which according to the doxography was merely additional to the true explanation, in fact must have constituted Anaxagoras’ one and only explanation of lunar eclipses. I suggested that the source of the misunderstanding was probably a text in Aristotle that mentions some Pythagoreans and the notion of invisible bodies causing lunar eclipses. My interpretation did not, however, address one serious remaining problem, which does not concern eclipses but the light and phases of the moon. During the month, the moon exhibits phases, from new moon to waxing crescent, first quarter, waxing gibbous, full moon, and then back to waning gibbous, last quarter, waning crescent, and new moon. In the present paper, I will investigate how Anaxagoras could have explained these phenomena.

My method of investigation in this and the previous paper is to start with the most reliably documented aspects of Anaxagoras’ astronomy

* This paper is supported by the Czech Grant Agency Project, GACR 15-08890S.

¹ Couprie 2017, 181–207.

and to see whether it is possible, from that basis, to interpret the rest of the relevant doxography and to achieve a coherent overall understanding of his astronomical thoughts. As regards the subject of this paper, the most important certainty we have on Anaxagoras' astronomical thinking is that he believed the earth to be flat. Another of his best documented astronomical ideas is that the Milky Way was the band of stars not illuminated by the sun. Finally, it is well documented that he thought the heavens were inclined in relation to the flat earth's surface, that the heavenly bodies were relatively close and smaller than the earth,² and that the sun and the stars were of a fiery, stony nature.³ A main presupposition of this paper's method is the conviction that the ideas of Presocratic thinkers like Anaxagoras form a consistent whole; they are not a mere collection of notions that might be overtly contradictory. A further methodological tool is to remember that some ancient ideas that may look strange to our eyes may nonetheless have made sense within the contemporary context. In the case of Anaxagoras, this includes observing the heavenly phenomena with the conviction that the earth is flat. A final methodological tool, akin to the previous one, consists of avoiding to read into the ancient records notions to which we are accustomed, the so-called anachronistic trap. In this paper, we will meet a typical example in expressions like "the moon receives its light from the sun". A special kind of this mistake, which the Greek doxographers were fond of, is to accredit the ancient Greek philosophers with being the first to have offered a given theory. I think this attitude is still not absent in the interpretative work of some modern scholars. Take, for instance, the recent claims that Parmenides and Anaxagoras were the first advocates of "heliophotism" – the idea that the moon is illuminated by the sun – and that Anaxagoras was the discoverer of the true cause of lunar eclipses, namely that the moon is eclipsed when the earth blocks the sun's light. The danger of such interpretations is that they easily tend to disregard data that do not concur with them. I must confess that I made this kind of mistake in what I wrote some years ago about Anaxagoras, eclipses and the moon's light. This means that I must withdraw most of what I wrote on page 177 of my *Heaven and Earth in Ancient Greek Cosmology*.⁴ The present paper, along with "Anaxagoras on the Milky Way and Lunar Eclipses", offers

² The arguments are enumerated in my previous paper.

³ The moon is also stony, but whether or not (and to what degree) it has a fiery nature is one of the topics investigated in this paper. As stated in my previous paper, I think an exception must be made for the so-called invisible bodies below the moon; they are obviously not fiery, and it can be argued that they are not stony either.

⁴ Cf. Couprie 2011, 177.

my current ideas on these subjects. The studies that most provoked my thinking about Anaxagoras' astronomy were Dennis O'Brien's fifty-year-old paper "Derived Light and Eclipses in the Fifth Century"⁵ and Daniel Graham's recent and innovative book *Science Before Socrates*,⁶ even and especially when I disagree (from time to time fundamentally) with them.

Two preliminary reasons to doubt that Anaxagoras could have given the correct explanation of the moon's phases

The standard interpretation of Anaxagoras' explanation of the phases of the moon is that they display the shapes of the portion of the moon illuminated by the sun as seen by an observer on earth. The moon's phases are usually illustrated with the help of a diagram like this one:




Fig. 1. The standard explanation of the phases of the moon⁷

⁵ O'Brien 1968.

⁶ Graham 2013.

⁷ A similar diagram in Graham 2013, 98 Figure 3.1.

There are at least two reasons to doubt whether Anaxagoras could have understood the phases of the moon as we do. The first is that our understanding of the shapes of the moon's phases requires that the moon is spherical. Anaxagoras, in all probability, thought of the heavenly bodies as flat disks like the earth.⁸ Several texts referring to his ideas state that he thought the moon had hills, and ravines, just like the earth, which he conceived of as flat.⁹ Plato says that, according to Anaxagoras, the moon is earth (*Apol.* 26 D 1 = DK 59 A 35). Another report bluntly states the following:

A. *Schol. in Apoll. Rhod.* 1. 498 = DK 59 A 77

This same Anaxagoras says that the moon is a flat place (χώρα πλατεῖα) (...).¹⁰

If the phases were caused by the light of the sun, the moon as a flat disk would always show full, except at new moon, as Cleomedes (2. 5. 37–40) argued: “So if the moon’s shape were flat, it would be full as soon as it passed by the sun after conjunction, and would remain full until [the next] conjunction”.¹¹ This can be elucidated by means of a picture:




Fig. 2. The moon as a flat disk does not show phases (approximately to scale)

⁸ An indication could be that Empedocles still believed that the moon does not have the form of a sphere but that of a disk, as is reported by Plut. *Quaest. Rom.* 288 b = DK 31 A 60, and Diog. Laert. 8. 77 = DK 31 A 1 (77).

⁹ Cf. Diog. Laert. 2. 8 = DK 59 A 1 (8).

¹⁰ Graham 2013, 251 n. 21, calls this text a “testimony of uncertain pedigree and value”. It is, though, the only straightforward text we have on Anaxagoras and the shape of the moon.

¹¹ In: Bowen–Todd 2004, 146–147.

In much more recent times, Heath wrote, “Whether Anaxagoras reached the true explanation of the phases of the moon is doubtful. (...) it required that the moon should be spherical in shape; Anaxagoras, however, held that the earth, *and doubtless the other heavenly bodies also*, were flat. And accordingly, his explanation of the phases could hardly have been correct”.¹² In other words, conceiving of the moon as flat, Anaxagoras could not have explained the phases of the moon as caused by the light of the sun.

Graham, convinced that Anaxagoras had discovered that the moon was illuminated by the sun, argues the other way around and claims that Anaxagoras must have held that the moon was spherical because, otherwise, his understanding of the phases of the moon would have been impossible.¹³ Yet there exists no report that confirms that Anaxagoras conceived of the moon as spherical.¹⁴ As far as I know, Aristotle was the first to state that the moon’s spherical shape could be deduced from its phases (*Cael.* 291 b 18–23 and *An. post.* 78 b 4–12). In this paper, I take up the challenge contained in Graham’s words: “Couprie (...) holds that Anaxagoras’ moon is disk-shaped, which makes his understanding of the phases of the moon impossible”.¹⁵ Although I think Anaxagoras believed the moon to be a flat disk, like the earth, the two possible explanations given at the end of this paper for the moon’s phases in Anaxagoras’ astronomy are independent of the moon’s shape.

The second reason why Anaxagoras could not have explained the phases of the moon as we do is found in his explanation of the Milky Way. Aristotle and several other sources assert that according to Anaxagoras (and Democritus) the phenomenon of the Milky Way results from the shadow of the earth, cast upon the stars by the sun. The optical theory behind this is that lights glow brighter in the dark. This explanation of the Milky Way is strange and definitely wrong, but it is one of the best attested of Anaxagoras’ astronomical theories and I know of no author who questions its authenticity or has attempted to argue it away. The band

¹² Heath 1913, 80–81, my italics. See also Tannery 1887, 278.

¹³ See Graham 2013, 99: “the moon’s shape is a *function* of its angular distance to the sun. This is what heliophotism, taken as a hypothesis, predicts”.

¹⁴ Graham’s argument does not always seem consistent. He states that “if Parmenides fully understood heliophotism, he would see that the moon provides a model for all the heavenly bodies. (...) Heavenly bodies, including *the earth, must*, by parity of reasoning, *be spherical*” (Graham 2013, 114, my italics). Elsewhere, he declares that “it is important to notice that Anaxagoras seems to grasp *all the implications* of heliophotism” (*ibid.*, 124, my italics). However, Anaxagoras does not seem to have grasped *all* of the implications of heliophotism, since he believed that the earth is flat.

¹⁵ Graham 2013, 254 n. 28.

of the Milky Way is inclined by about 60 degrees in relation to the ecliptic. The moon's monthly path among the stars, in its turn, is inclined about five degrees in relation to the ecliptic. This means that the moon regularly passes through the Milky Way, where it is visible and shows phases. If Anaxagoras really believed that the moon's light is reflected light from the sun, it is hard to see how he could have explained the visibility of the moon and its phases when the moon is in the Milky Way, where it does not receive light from the sun (see Fig. 3).




Fig. 3. The full moon in the shadow of the earth
(approximately to scale)

On the one hand, O'Brien underestimates the problem when he writes that "the shadow of the earth must therefore be *a fairly narrow band*, which would *occasionally* obscure the light of the moon", but on the other hand he overestimates the problem when he writes that "the moon would be eclipsed *night after night*".¹⁶ The width of the Milky Way in the night sky is roughly 30 degrees, through which the moon passes twice per month for several nights. The suggestion that this problem may have escaped Anaxagoras' attention is hardly convincing, since it concerns a frequently recurring phenomenon that is simple to observe.

Except for one item regarding the moon's "monthly concealments" in Stobaeus' version of Aëtius, to be discussed below (text L), there exists

¹⁶ See O'Brien 1968, 125 and 124; my italics.

no straightforward evidence of Anaxagoras' explanation of the phases of the moon. Anaxagoras' views on the phases of the moon must, of course, have been closely linked to his ideas about the nature of the moon's light, of which we have several reports. Aëtius' statements on the subject of the moon's light are scattered over four chapters. We will discuss them in the next sections and return to the moon's phases at the end of this paper.

Aëtius 2. 25 and analogous texts

The first relevant chapter is the particularly well-attested¹⁷ chapter 2. 25, called "On the substance (περὶ οὐσίας) of the moon".¹⁸ The item on Anaxagoras says:

B. Aët. in Ps.-Plut. *Plac.* 2. 25. 9 = DK 59 A 77

Anaxagoras and Democritus [declare that it is] an inflamed solid mass (στερέωμα διάπυρον), which has in it plains and mountains and ravines.¹⁹

Anaxagoras' conception of the moon's substance was not exceptional. Almost all philosophers mentioned in Aëtius 2. 25 held that the moon was, in one way or another, fiery. Anaximander believed it to be "a wheel with a hollow rim and full of fire (πυρὸς πλήρη)"; Anaximenes, Parmenides, and Heraclitus that it was "fiery (πυρίνη)"; Xenophanes, "an inflamed condensed cloud (νέφος πεπυρωμένον)"; Posidonius and most of the Stoics, "combined out of fire and air (μικτὴ ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ ἀέρος)"; Cleanthes, "fire-like (πυροειδῆ)"; Empedocles, "compacted air, fixed by fire (πεπηγότα ὑπὸ πυρός)"; Plato, "formed for the most part from fiery material (τοῦ πυρώδους)"; Diogenes, "a sponge-like ignited mass (ἄναμμα)"; and Berosus, "half-inflamed (ἡμιπύρωτος)". The only exceptions are Thales ("earthy"), Aristotle ("formed from the fifth body"), Ion ("partly glass-like and transparent, partly opaque"), and Pythagoras ("mirror-like").²⁰ It should be noted that in the item on Anaxagoras no restriction or further qualification is added, unlike Posidonius, Cleanthes, Empedocles, Plato, and Berosus. That the moon, according to Anaxagoras, consisted of inflamed material is confirmed by Origen:

¹⁷ For this qualification, see Mansfeld–Runia 2009, 572.

¹⁸ See Diels 1879, 355–357; Mansfeld–Runia 2009, 572–587.

¹⁹ Trans. Mansfeld–Runia.

²⁰ Assuming that Pseudo-Plutarch's κατὰ τὸ πυροειδὲς σῶμα must be replaced by Stobaeus' κατοπτροειδὲς σῶμα. See Diels 1879, 357 n. 1 and Mansfeld–Runia 2009, 381 (c).

C. Origen. *c. Cels.* 5. 11, not in DK

(...) nor will we call the sun, moon, and stars inflamed clumps (μύδρον διάπυρον) as Anaxagoras did.²¹

Achilles Tatius' chapter "About the Moon" does not mention specific names, but one statement is equivalent to that of Pseudo-Plutarch on Anaxagoras and Democritus:

D. Ach. Tat. *Introd.* 21 = DK 59 A 77

Some (say the moon is) a solid ignited earth containing fire (ἕτεροι δὲ γῆν πεπυρομένην στερέμνιον ἔχουσιν πῦρ).

In the same sense, Hippolytus relates Anaxagoras' beliefs as follows:

E. Hippol. *Refut.* 1. 8. 6 = DK 59 A 42 (6)

The sun and moon and all the heavenly bodies are fiery stones (λίθους ἐμπύρους) carried around by the revolution of the aether.

It is notable that in Aëtius' chapter 2. 20 "On the substance of the sun" the same or similar words are used in reference to the sun. In the case of Anaxagoras, almost the same characterizations are used in relation to the moon ("an inflamed solid mass", στερέωμα διάπυρον) as to the sun ("an inflamed clump or rock", μύδρος ἢ πέτρος διάπυρος).²² Hippolytus calls both the sun and the moon "inflamed stones" (λίθοι ἔμπυροι) (text E). These texts leave no doubt that, according to Anaxagoras, the moon was an inflamed solid body like the sun and the stars. The most obvious interpretation is that these qualifications also describe the moon's light: the moon is fiery and shines with its own light. This seems to exclude the option that Anaxagoras considered the moon's light to be the reflection of the light of the sun. If we take seriously the proposition that, for Anaxagoras, the moon was a fiery, inflamed body – and I do not see any reason why we should not – this is another reason why Anaxagoras could not have understood the phases of the moon as we do. If these were the only texts about Anaxagoras and the light of the moon, I think nobody would ever have thought about ascribing to him "heliophotism" in the sense of light reflected from the sun. But let us see what the other texts have to say.

²¹ See Gershenson–Greenberg 1964, 150 (268).

²² Aët. in Ps.-Plut. *Plac.* 2. 20. 6.

Aëtius 2. 28 and analogous texts

Aëtius' second relevant chapter is 2. 28, "On the lights (φωτισμῶν) of the moon".²³ In Stobaeus' version, Anaxagoras is mentioned as one of the successors of Thales:

F. Aët. in Stob. *Anth.* 1. 26 = DK 59 A 77

Thales was the first to say that it is illuminated by the sun (ὕπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φωτίζεσθαι).

Pythagoras, Parmenides, Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Metrodorus (declare) likewise.

Instead of these lines Pseudo-Plutarch writes this:

G. Aët. in Ps.-Plut. *Plac.* 2. 28. 5

Thales and his successors (οἱ ἅπ' αὐτοῦ) (declare that) it is illuminated by the sun.²⁴

Mansfeld and Runia suppose that Pseudo-Plutarch shortened the original series of names that has been preserved by Stobaeus.²⁵ Assuming that they are right, the phrase "the moon is illuminated by the sun" seems to contradict what we found in Aëtius' chapter 2. 25: the moon is of a fiery substance. Another possibility is that Stobaeus felt obliged to offer his own exemplification of "Thales' followers". Be that as it may, Hippolytus also reports on Anaxagoras, a few lines after his remark that the sun and moon are fiery bodies:

H. Hippol. *Refut.* 1. 8. 8 = DK 59 A 42 (8)

The moon does not have its own (μὴ ἴδιον ἔχειν) light, but [gets it] from the sun.²⁶

²³ See Diels 1879, 358–359; Mansfeld–Runia 2009, 601–612. They translate: "On the illuminations of the moon".

²⁴ See Diels 1879, 358.

²⁵ Cf. Mansfeld–Runia 2009, 603.

²⁶ Trans. Graham. I put the words "gets it" between brackets, because there is no verb in this clause.

And Plutarch writes:

I. Plut. *De facie* 929b = DK 59 B 18

A favorable reception was given to our friend's exposition, which presented the Anaxagorean theory that the sun imparts (ἐντίθησι) to the moon its brightness (τὸ λαμπρόν).²⁷

The oldest and at the same time most enigmatic record of Anaxagoras' thought on the moon's light is in Plato's dialogue *Cratylus*, when he discusses a curious etymology of the word σελήνη:

J. Plat., *Crat.* 409a7–b10 = DK 59 A 76

Socr.: It seems to show that the view he has recently advocated – that the moon gets (ἔχει) its light from the sun – is quite ancient (παλαιότερον). (...)

Socr.: This light (φῶς) around (περί) the moon is always (ἀεί) new (νέον) and old (ἔνόν), if the followers of Anaxagoras are right. For as the sun is always traveling around the moon in a circle, presumably (πou) it always sheds (ἐπιβάλλει) new light (νέον) on it, while the old (ἔνόν) of the previous month persists (ὑπάρχει).²⁸

I suppose that the somewhat clumsy expression “light around the moon” in text J simply refers to the light we observe on the moon. In text L, the word περιλαμπομένην is used in the same sense. The words “the sun is always traveling around the moon in a circle” are a somewhat strange way of saying that the sun and moon are in opposition once per month and are in conjunction half a month later. The words “the old light of the previous month persists” seem to have to do with the moon's phases. But why is “the moon *always* new and old”? Even more interesting is the question of the precise meaning of “the moon gets its light from the sun”. Usually, this is assumed to mean that the moon reflects the light of the sun, which seems to contradict the contents of texts B – E. These problems will be discussed in later sections of this paper. Plato's text is referred to by Plutarch:

²⁷ My trans. Curd 2010, 27, translates “the sun places the light in the moon”.

²⁸ Trans. Graham, adapted.

K. Plut. *De E in Delph.* 15, not in DK

(...) he said that Anaxagoras was embarrassed by the name of the moon, since he tried to claim as his own some very ancient opinion in regard to its illumination (περὶ τῶν φωτισμῶν). Has not Plato said this in the *Cratylus*?²⁹

At first sight, these texts (F–K) seem to contradict what was said in the previous section (texts B–E). It is especially hard to understand how Hippolytus can state both that the moon is a fiery stone (text E) and that the moon does not have its own light (text H).

Aëtius 2. 29 and analogous texts

The third relevant chapter of Aëtius is 2. 29, “On the eclipse (περὶ ἐκλείψεως) of the moon”.³⁰ Four items in this chapter, rather surprisingly, also contain opinions (of Anaximander, some unnamed youngsters, Xenophanes, and Anaxagoras) on the phases of the moon. Anaxagoras is mentioned in Stobaeus’ version of an item, part of which I have already discussed in my previous paper “Anaxagoras, the Milky Way, and Lunar Eclipses”. The lines relevant to this paper read as follows:

L. Aët. in Stob. *Anth.* 1. 26. 3 = DK 59 A 77

Thales, Anaxagoras, Plato, and the Stoics agree with the astronomers that it (the moon) produces the monthly concealments (τὰς μηνιαίους ἀποκρύψεις) by following the sun’s path and being illuminated (περιλαμπομένην) by it (...).³¹

In Pseudo-Plutarch’s version, however, Anaxagoras is not mentioned:

M. Aët. in Ps.-Plut. *Plac.* 2. 29. 6

Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics agree with the astronomers that it produces the monthly concealments by following the sun’s path and being illuminated by it (...).³²

²⁹ Trans. Babbitt 1999.

³⁰ See Diels 1879, 359–360; Mansfeld–Runia 2009, 613–623.

³¹ My trans.

³² See Diels 1879, 360.

In their reconstructed text, Mansfeld and Runia insert Aristotle, who appears only in Pseudo-Plutarch's version of this passage.³³ In my previous paper, I argued that, from the viewpoint of astronomical conceptions, Pseudo-Plutarch's enumeration, "Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and the astronomers", all of whom were defenders of a spherical earth, makes more sense than Stobaeus' version. Strictly speaking, the words "monthly concealments" in this text allude only to the new moon, but one may suppose that by implication, the moon's phases are meant as well (reading something like "the moon's partial or total concealments during the month").

Hippolytus makes perfectly clear that by the term "illuminations", he means the correct interpretation of the moon's phases, when he straightforwardly states the following:

N. Hippol. *Refut.* 1. 8. 10 = DK 59 A 42 (10)

He first correctly explained (ἀφώρισε πρώτος) eclipses and illuminations (φωτισμούς).³⁴

As we have seen (text E), Hippolytus said that, according to Anaxagoras, the moon was a fiery stone and also (in text H) that the moon did not have its own light but got it from the sun. Gershenson and Greenberg rightly comment, "He nowhere explains how (...) these statements [in texts E, H, and N] are to be reconciled".³⁵ This statement can be generalized as the question of how to reconcile what is said in Aëtius' chapters 2. 28 and 2. 29 with what is said in chapter 2. 25.

Two other items in Aëtius' chapter 2. 29 deserve our attention. One of them is interesting in the context of our enquiry, although Anaxagoras is not mentioned. In Pseudo-Plutarch's version, it reads as follows:

O. Aët. in Ps.-Plut. *Plac.* 2. 29. 4

The youngers (οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι) [say that the phases of the moon appear] in accordance with the spreading of a flame (κατ' ἐπινέμησιν φλογός) that is kindled little by little in an orderly manner (κατὰ μικρὸν ἐξαπομένης τεταγμένως),³⁶ until it produces the complete full moon, and analogously diminishes (μειοιυμένης) again until the conjunction [of the sun and the moon], when it is completely quenched (σβέννυται).³⁷

³³ Mansfeld–Runia 2009, 622.

³⁴ Trans. Graham, slightly adapted; my italics.

³⁵ Gershenson–Greenberg 1964, 339.

³⁶ Mansfeld–Runia 2009, 622 translate "that slowly catches alight", which says pretty much the same.

³⁷ My trans. Cf. Diels 1879, 360 and DK 58 B 36.

Where Pseudo-Plutarch simply reads “the youngers”, Stobaeus’ version says, “there are some of the youngers in whose opinion...” (τῶν δὲ νεωτέρων εἰσὶ τινες οἷς ἔδοξε). After the words “the youngers”, Mansfeld and Runia, who follow Stobaeus’ version, put “members of the school” between brackets, and Huffman adds “Pythagoreans”, but Dumont notes, “il n’est pas sûr que ses modernes soient eux aussi des pythagoriens”.³⁸ Mansfeld and Runia read, “in whose opinion (an eclipse takes place)”, but remark a few pages earlier, “note again the confusion between eclipses and phases”.³⁹ Huffman reads, “who thought that [the phases of the moon?]” and Dumont adds, “La seconde explication (i.e. that in text O) rend compte des phases de la lune”. According to me, this text is clearly not about eclipses but about the phases of the moon, as indicated by the sequence “full moon – until the conjunction”. I added, between square brackets, “of the sun and the moon”. According to Graham, “the most important feature of this account is that it seems confused: what the sentence describes is not a lunar eclipse – which happens in hours, not in the course of a month – but rather the phases of the moon”.⁴⁰ In my view, the sentence is not confused but placed under the wrong heading.⁴¹ At the end of this paper, I will return to its interpretation. “The conjunction” means the conjunction of the new moon with the sun.

Aëtius 2. 30 and analogous texts

The fourth relevant chapter is 2. 30, “On its [sc. the moon’s] appearance (περὶ ἐμφάσεως) and why it appears to be earthy”.⁴² The item on Anaxagoras reads as follows:

P. Aët. in Stob. *Anth.* 1. 26 = DK 59 A 77

Anaxagoras (declares the appearance of the moon is caused by) the unevenness of its composition on account of cold being mixed together with the earthy, the moon having some parts that are high, others that are

³⁸ Mansfeld–Runia 2009, 622; Huffman 1993, 237; Dumont 1988, 581 and 1405 n. 5 at p. 581.

³⁹ Mansfeld–Runia 2009, 618.

⁴⁰ Graham 2013, 196–197.

⁴¹ For an analysis of Aët. 2. 29, see Bakker 2013, who argues that “two chapters have been conflated, the first dealing with the phases of the moon, while only those at the end deal with lunar eclipses” (Bakker 2013, 682).

⁴² See Diels 1879, 361–362; Mansfeld–Runia 2009, 624–634. Gershenson–Greenberg 1968, 119 (172) translate: “Concerning the reflection of light from the moon”, which is certainly not right.

low, and others that are hollow. Moreover, (he declares that) the dark (τὸ ζοφῶδες) has been mixed in with the fire-like (παραμεμῖχθαι τῷ πυροειδεῖ), the effect of which causes the shadowy (τὸ σκιερὸν) to appear; for this reason, the heavenly body is called “falsely appearing” (ψευδοφανῇ).⁴³

Pseudo-Plutarch’s version is much shorter:

Q. Aët. in Ps.-Plut. *Plac.* 2. 30. 2

Anaxagoras (declares the appearance of the moon is caused by) the unevenness of its composition on account of cold being mixed together with the earthy, because (γάρ) the dark has been mixed in with the fire-like. For this reason, the heavenly body is called “falsely appearing” (ψευδοφανῇ λέγεσθαι).⁴⁴

Mansfeld and Runia state that, in Pseudo-Plutarch’s version, “the information about the unevenness of its surface is deleted”.⁴⁵ I think it is also possible that Stobaeus inserted some clarifying text, freely borrowed from Aëtius’ chapter 2. 25 (cf. text B). Pseudo-Plutarch’s text makes clear, by means of the word γάρ, that the words “the cold is mixed with the earthy” are intended to mean the same as “the dark is mixed with the fire-like”. Apparently, the dark spots on the moon must be considered as places that are less hot; this is a kind of mitigation of the fiery moon in Aëtius’ chapter 2. 25. 9 (text B). As far as I can see, the issue of texts P and Q is the light and dark spots on the moon, or “the face on the moon”. The same is the case with the other texts in Aëtius’ chapter 2. 30, as its title, “On its appearance and why it appears to be earthy”, indicates.

The manuscripts of Plutarch have the variants ψευδοφαῖ and ψευδοφανῇ. I followed Mansfeld and Runia’s reading ψευδοφανῇ and their translation translation “falsely appearing”.⁴⁶ The dictionary has for both terms “shining with false, i.e. borrowed, light”,⁴⁷ but in texts P and Q, the issue is not whether the moon borrows its light from the sun but what the surface of the moon looks like.⁴⁸ Whatever this word may indicate,

⁴³ Trans. Mansfeld–Runia, slightly adapted.

⁴⁴ Trans. Mansfeld–Runia.

⁴⁵ Mansfeld–Runia 2009, 626.

⁴⁶ See Mansfeld–Runia 2009, 628, n. 514; LSJ s.v. ψευδοφαῖς.

⁴⁷ LSJ s.v. ψευδοφανῇ.

⁴⁸ The term ψευδοφαῖς is used by Diog. Laert. 2. 1 in his account on Anaximander (DK 12 A 1 (1)), but DK (81 note at lines 11 and 12) comment: “das Theophrastexcerpt wohl von Anaxagoras fälschlich übertragen”. With the exception of Dumont 1988, 22,

it does not have to do with the phases of the moon but with “the face on the moon”, according to the title of Aëtius chapter 2. 30. The last lines are a duplicate with the text on Parmenides, two items further down.⁴⁹ Although *ψευδοφανής* fits nicely into a hexameter,⁵⁰ from Parmenides’ poem (DK 28 B 14) we only know the word *νυκτιφάεζ* (shining by night). While Diels has argued that the word *ψευδοφανή* was falsely attributed to Parmenides, Mansfeld and Runia argue that it makes sense to reserve the last line of text Q for Parmenides. Nevertheless, they include it in their reconstructed text of Anaxagoras.⁵¹

Finally, a passage in Plutarch’s biography of *Nicias* deserves our attention:

R. Plut. *Nic.* 23. 2 = DK 59 A 18

Anaxagoras first put in writing in the clearest and boldest terms of all a theory concerning the radiant and shadowy (places) of the moon (*περὶ σελήνης καταυγασμῶν καὶ σκιᾶς*). This theory (*λόγος*), which was not ancient (*παλαιός*) or generally accepted, at this time still went about whispered in secret with caution rather than confidence among a few men.⁵²

The interpretation of this cryptic text meets several difficulties. In the first place, Plutarch speaks, rather vaguely, about “a theory”, and when he circumscribes it, he uses the word *καταυγασμός* that is not attested elsewhere, but is a verbal noun from *καταυγάζω* and translated in LSJ as “shining brightly”. Then, he stresses that this theory is new and not generally accepted, using the words *οὔτε παλαιός*, which seems to be meant as a polemic against Plato (text J), who calls “quite ancient” (*παλαιότερον*) the view that the moon gets its light from the sun. Sometimes, however, the second sentence of text R is taken to be referring not to a theory but to Anaxagoras: “Anaxagoras himself was not venerated (*παλαιός*), nor was his doctrine the best known”.⁵³ And finally, Plutarch calls this theory, whatever it was, both “written in the clearest and boldest terms” and “whispered in secret”, which looks contradictory.

compilations of texts of the Presocratics and handbooks usually omit this line or put it between brackets, following DK.

⁴⁹ Cf. Mansfeld–Runia 2009, 627–628.

⁵⁰ Cf. Mansfeld–Runia 2009, 628.

⁵¹ Cf. Diels 1897, 110–112; Mansfeld–Runia 2009, 628 and 632. This paper is not the place to further discuss this question.

⁵² Trans. Graham, adapted.

⁵³ Curd 2010, 85.

Plutarch's text can be interpreted in at least three different ways, two of which can be found in the translations and commentaries. Gershenson and Greenberg, like Panchenko, translate *περὶ σελήνης καταυγασμῶν καὶ σκιᾶς* as "of the phases of the moon" or "about the waxing and the waning of the moon."⁵⁴ Similarly, Gilardoni and Giugnoli translate: "una teoria sui periodi di illuminazione e di oscuramento della luna" and comment that the text is about "fasi lunari".⁵⁵ Curd translates this as "about the changing phases of the moon", but elsewhere, she explains that the text is about eclipses.⁵⁶ Graham writes that Plutarch's text is "concerning the illumination and shadow of the moon"⁵⁷ and adds: "Hippolytus agrees: He [Anaxagoras] first correctly explained eclipses and illuminations".⁵⁸ Laks and Most write, "concerning the illuminations and darkenings of the moon", and summarize elsewhere that this text is about the light of the moon.⁵⁹ According to Guthrie, the text is about lunar eclipses.⁶⁰ We may conclude that these recent commentators hesitate whether Plutarch is speaking about Anaxagoras' explanation of the phases of the moon or about his (alleged) theory of eclipses. In favor of the former interpretation may speak that the most natural translation of *περὶ σελήνης καταυγασμῶν καὶ σκιᾶς* seems to be that the theory was about the changing phases of the moon. In favor of the latter interpretation one can point at the context, in which Plutarch is speaking about eclipses. On the other hand, it sounds somewhat strange to introduce a theory of eclipses with the word "shining brightly" (*καταυγασμός*). Moreover, the text does not seem to speak about the shadow of the earth, as would be the case in an explanation of lunar eclipses, but about shadows (on the surface) of the moon. I would like to add a third possible interpretation, according to which the issue is the light and dark spots on the moon or "the face on the moon" (compare the word *σκιᾶς* in text R and *τὸ σκιερόν* in text P, which is clearly

⁵⁴ Gershenson–Greenberg 1964, 128 (197); Panchenko 2002, 326. This is also Perrin's translation in the Loeb edition.

⁵⁵ Gilardoni–Giugnoli 2002, 61 and 254.

⁵⁶ Curd 2010, 85 and 211.

⁵⁷ Graham 2013, 138. Graham quotes this text first in a discussion about the relative ages of Empedocles and Anaxagoras and a second time when he summarizes the thesis of his book – that Parmenides and Anaxagoras were the heroes of early Greek astronomy (Graham 2013, 138 and 247) – but not when he discusses Anaxagoras' alleged heliophotism and states that he "seems to grasp all the implications of heliophotism" (*ibid.*, 124).

⁵⁸ Graham 2013, 138.

⁵⁹ Laks–Most 2016, 81 (D 38) and 27 (P 25 b).

⁶⁰ Guthrie 1965, 306.

about the moon's appearance). This interpretation would explain why the theory had to be "whispered in secret with caution": it had to do with Anaxagoras' blasphemous conception of the heavenly bodies as (fiery) stones, for which he was condemned.⁶¹ To me, it is not clear, whether or not Laks and Most's interpretation that the text is about the light of the moon fits into one of these three interpretations or is meant as a separate one. In the end, I think we must conclude that Plutarch's text does not help us very much, because, whatever interpretation we prefer, it remains unclear what precisely the content of the "theory" in question is supposed to have been.

Problems and earlier suggestions to solve them

The texts collected in the previous sections show that the question of Anaxagoras' conception of the moon's light and phases is quite complicated. Sometimes evidence can be found in a chapter of Aëtius in which we would not expect it. It is not always immediately clear whether a text is about eclipses, about the waning and waxing of the moon, or about the light and dark spots on the moon.⁶² The Presocratics did not always distinguish clearly between phenomena like the waning and waxing of the moon, eclipses, and the risings and settings of the heavenly bodies, in all of which a heavenly body disappears partially or totally for some time, to appear again at a later time.⁶³ In Aëtius' rendition of Xenophanes' cosmology, for instance, the setting of the sun is treated under the heading "On the eclipse of the sun".⁶⁴ Xenophanes seems to have classified settings, eclipses, and moon phases together as "quenchings".⁶⁵ In Anaximander's cosmological conception, the opening in the wheel of the moon closes partially or totally both during lunar eclipses and during the monthly phases of the moon.⁶⁶ We may wonder how far Anaxagoras had advanced on the path of distinguishing between settings, eclipses, and the waning and waxing of the moon.

⁶¹ Cf. Diog. Laert. 2. 12 = DK 59 A 1 (12).

⁶² Cf. Mansfeld–Runia 2009, 661.

⁶³ Perhaps star occultations must be added to the list, but, as far as I know, there are no reports of star occultations in Greece from these early times. According to Stephenson 1997, 47, "tens of observations of this kind are described in Babylonian history, but East Asian history is replete with such reports".

⁶⁴ Cf. Aët. in Ps.-Plut. *Plac.* 2. 24. 4 = DK 21 A 41.

⁶⁵ Laks–Most 2016, 47, note at this testimony (D 34 in their numbering): "The important point for Xenophanes seems to have been disappearance in general".

⁶⁶ Cf. Hippol. *Refut.* 1. 6. 4 and 5 = DK 12 A 311 (4 and 5).

As regards the question of whether the moon has its own light or receives its light from the sun, there seems to be a crucial divergence between the accounts in Aëtius' chapter on the substance of the moon (*Placita* 2. 25) and those in his chapter on the illuminations of the moon (*Placita* 2. 28). In 2. 25 most Presocratics are said to hold that the moon is fiery in one way or another. Apart from the dubious testimonies on Thales (the moon is earthy) and Ion (the moon is partly glass-like and transparent, partly opaque) the only exception in this chapter is Pythagoras, who is said to have held that the moon is a mirror-like body (κατοπτροειδὲς σῶμα).⁶⁷ From this, we would expect that, in 2. 28, we would be told that almost all Presocratics held that the moon has its own light and that only Pythagoras held that the moon is illuminated by the sun, but this is not the case. Not only Pythagoras, but also Thales, Parmenides, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Metrodorus are mentioned as thinkers who said that the moon is illuminated by the sun (ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φωτίζεται) (text F) whereas only Anaximander, Xenophanes, and the sophist Antiphon are said to have held that the moon has its own light (ἴδιον φῶς, ἰδιοφεγγής). Apparently, there is no consistent correlation between the notions of the moon "being fiery" and "having its own light". And in Stobaeus' version of chapter 2. 29,⁶⁸ not Pythagoras but Thales and Anaxagoras are mentioned as saying that the moon's monthly concealments result from its being illuminated (περιλαμπομένην) by the sun (text L). As regards Anaxagoras, this means that we must investigate whether the apparent contradiction between texts B–E (the moon is an inflamed solid mass) and texts F and H–N (the moon is illuminated by the sun) can be resolved within the context of Anaxagoras' astronomy.

The simplest solution, which is widely held, seems to be that the moon not only has its own light, which is sometimes visible as "earthshine" or as a "blood moon", but is also, except during a new moon, illuminated by the sun, whose light normally overpowers the moon's much fainter light. This was the stand taken, with some slight variations, by O'Brien, Wöhrle, Panchenko, and Graham, and also by myself some years ago.⁶⁹ The text that is usually referred to as evidence is that of Olympiodorus, of which I showed in my previous paper how confused it is:

⁶⁷ Cf. Stob. *Anth.* 1. 26. 1; not in DK, but cf. Diels 1879, 357. For the reading κατοπτροειδὲς σῶμα also in Pseudo-Plutarch's corrupted text, see Mansfeld–Runia 2009, 581.

⁶⁸ See Diels 1879, 359–360; Mansfeld–Runia 2009, 613–623.

⁶⁹ Cf. Dreyer 1953, 32, n. 1; O'Brien 1968, 126–127; Wöhrle 1995, 245; Panchenko 2002, 329–331; Graham 2013, 131; Couprie 2011, 177.

S. Olympiodor. *In Arist. Meteor.* 67. 33, not in DK

A third view is that of Anaxagoras and Democritus. They say the Milky Way is the proper light of stars not illuminated by the sun. For the stars (τὰ ἄστρα), he [sc. Aristotle] says, have their own light as well a light acquired from the sun. And the case of the moon makes this clear. For this has one kind of light of its own and another from the sun. *Its own light is coal-like, which the moon's eclipse shows us.* However, they say, not all the stars receive additional light from the sun and those which do not, compose the band of the Milky Way.⁷⁰

O'Brien rightly comments that "the parallel with the moon seems to be Olympiodorus' own illustration (...). It would be wrong therefore to take Olympiodorus' words as positive evidence for Anaxagoras". Nevertheless, he suggests that "in this instance, Olympiodorus' idea seems to have a good chance of representing Anaxagoras' view".⁷¹ Panchenko sees in this text "direct evidence that Anaxagoras assigned a double nature to lunar light".⁷² He translates τὰ ἄστρα as "the luminaries",⁷³ which is definitely wrong here because the reference is to the explanation of the behavior of the stars within and outside of the Milky Way. Graham also reads this text as a confirmation that Anaxagoras believed in the double nature of the moon's light. He comments: "Anaxagoras (...) wanted to account for the light that is emanating from the moon even during its complete eclipse. The moon must have a natural source of light that is normally overpowered by its reflection of the sun's light".⁷⁴

What these authors (and Olympiodorus in the first place) overlook is that, if the moon has its own source of light, this must also be visible when the moon is in conjunction with the Milky Way. When this happens, the rays of the sun cannot overpower the moon's light because the Milky Way is the consequence, according to Anaxagoras, of the earth's shadow, which implies that the moon's own light would shine brightly in the dark, just like the stars of the Milky Way. But since the moon's phases were thought to be due to its illumination by the sun, the moon's own light in the Milky Way would always be seen as a full moon. As noted earlier, it is hardly believable that this problem has escaped Anaxagoras' attention. The supposition that Anaxagoras' moon had a mixed light, one reflected from the sun and another of its own, does not, therefore,

⁷⁰ Trans. Graham, Gershenson–Greenberg (last sentence), my italics.

⁷¹ O'Brien 1968, 126.

⁷² Panchenko 2002, 329.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ Graham 2013, 131.

solve the problem of the explanation of the moon's light and phases in Anaxagoras' astronomy.

Most authors also bring up Plato's words in the *Cratylus* (text J) as evidence for this interpretation of Anaxagoras' ideas about the light and phases of the moon. In Panchenko's words: "If we take the Platonic words seriously, it follows that the moon not only shines by reflection, but also in some way absorbs and stores the light received from the sun".⁷⁵ Again, this does not solve the problem of the moon's phases twice a month during several nights when it is in conjunction with the Milky Way. Moreover, Plato's text does not speak of "reflection" but says, successively, that the moon gets (ἔχει) its light from the sun, that the light is around (περί) the moon, and that the sun always sheds (ἐπιβάλλει) new light on the moon. Ferguson explicitly maintains, "This is a theory of borrowed light, but it is not a theory of reflection".⁷⁶ This brings us to the fundamental ambiguity to be discussed in the next section.

Ambiguities

The question is, then, whether there might not be another explanation for the light and phases of the moon that would be compatible with Anaxagoras' other astronomical ideas (the Milky Way as caused by the earth's shadow, and the earth and the heavenly bodies as flat disks) and that would reconcile the texts attributing to him the view that the moon is an inflamed solid body with the texts that report him as saying the moon gets its light from the sun.

In a commentary on Empedocles, Ferguson wrote, "'the moon has its light from the sun'. This apparently simple statement bristles with difficulties. (...) The actual words do not necessarily mean that the moon shines with *reflected* light; they are not incompatible with the idea that the moon is *kindled* by the sun".⁷⁷ O'Brien picked up this idea more specifically with regard to Anaxagoras: "The proper solution, I suggest, lies in breaking the (...) assumption: that derived light means reflected light. This is in fact a modern assumption, which was not shared in later antiquity".⁷⁸ We are easily tempted to interpret the words "the moon receives its light from the sun" in conformity with our modern conception of the moon reflecting the light of the sun, but we may question whether

⁷⁵ Panchenko 2002, 329. See O'Brien 1968, 127; Wöhrle 1995, 246; Couprie 2011, 177; Graham 2013, 132.

⁷⁶ Ferguson 1968, 100.

⁷⁷ Ferguson 1968, 99. Cf. DK 31 A 30 (Ps.-Plut. *Strom.* 10).

⁷⁸ O'Brien 1968, 122.

this was as evident to the ancient Greeks as it is to us. In other words, this could be a case of the anachronistic fallacy at work.

We may even wonder whether a similar bias already affected the accounts of Presocratic conceptions in the doxography. In other words, the authors of these texts could have understood expressions like “the moon receives its light from the sun” as meaning “the moon reflects the light of the sun” in conformity with their acquaintance with the right explanation of the moon’s phases. Additionally, it is important to note that the expression “the moon has its own light” is also ambiguous. It might imply that the light of the moon does not reflect the light of the sun, but it is not at odds with theories according to which the moon is ignited by the sun. Once the moon has received its light by being kindled by the sun, this light could be said to be the moon’s own light. In the same sense, we say that a candle is ignited by a match but, once kindled, has its own light.

In the context of Anaxagoras’ astronomical ideas, it is highly plausible that expressions like “the moon receives its light from the sun” should be read as meaning that the moon is, in one way or another, ignited or kindled by the sun. To quote O’Brien again, “It is not explicitly stated that Anaxagoras’ moon shines by reflection. Plutarch’s (...) sentence shows that the moon’s light is derived light, but not whether it is derived by kindling or by reflection”.⁷⁹ Elsewhere, O’Brien writes, “A fiery moon, even a partially fiery one, would seem to be inconsistent with the moon’s deriving her light from the sun, if derived light means reflected light”.⁸⁰ To quote O’Brien once more, “the simple theory of a moon whose light is kindled from the sun will at once resolve the difficulties in the evidence for the fifth century. For derivation by kindling, as distinct from reflection, is not inconsistent with, in fact it demands, a fiery moon”.⁸¹ Unfortunately, as we have seen, O’Brien, does not come to grips with the full impact of his own words because he does not take into account the implications of Anaxagoras’ explanation of the Milky Way. Graham neglects the ambiguity of the expression “The moon receives its light from the sun”.⁸² In his book, “derived light” equals “reflected light” as his definition of

⁷⁹ O’Brien 1968, 125, referring to Plut. *De facie* 929 b = DK 59 B 18 (see text I).

⁸⁰ O’Brien 1968, 121.

⁸¹ See O’Brien 1968, 123.

⁸² In an earlier paper, he discusses this ambiguity. See Graham 2002, 364, where he concludes: “L’ensemble de l’explication n’est pas nécessaire. Car, quoi que puisse être la physique de la lumière de la lune, il s’avère que l’éclairage de la surface de la lune par le soleil est toujours une condition nécessaire pour que la lune émette de la lumière”. It is this presupposed necessity that is questioned in this and the next section of this paper.

heliophotism shows: “Heliophotism makes a causal connection between the phases of the moon and the sun: the sun’s light is *reflected* from the surface of the moon”.⁸³ Significantly, Graham, who advocates that Anaxagoras defended heliophotism,⁸⁴ almost completely ignores the texts that say the moon is fiery just as he almost completely ignores the texts that say the Milky Way is caused by the earth’s shadow.⁸⁵

The moon’s light and phases according to Anaxagoras; a new interpretation

Parmenides said that the lighted side of the moon is always turned towards the sun.⁸⁶ It is hard to believe that he was the first to discover this. We can read it as a statement of a well-known fact since it is a primary observational datum. Thales had already studied and tried to predict eclipses of the sun. He could not have done this without being acquainted with the observational fact that a solar eclipse occurs during new moon and a lunar eclipse during full moon and that the phases of the moon occur between these two events. As the cases of Anaximander and Xenophanes show, this knowledge did not automatically lead to a correct explanation of the light and the phases of the moon. There is no reason to doubt that Anaxagoras was also acquainted with this observational fact. However, as we have seen, its correct explanation would have been incompatible with the rest of his astronomical ideas. As defended above and in my previous paper, Pseudo-Plutarch’s version of Aëtius’ text on the right explanation of the moon (text M) does not mention Anaxagoras and has to be preferred above the version of Stobaeus (text L).⁸⁷ This means that we do not

⁸³ Graham 2013, 109–110 (my italics).

⁸⁴ See Graham 2013, 87–88.

⁸⁵ Graham mentions text B once, in a footnote, but only in relation to the claim that the moon has plains, mountains, and ravines. And his only comment on text E is this: “the sun, moon, and stars are fiery stones, hence solid, massive bodies of presumably spherical shape”. See Graham 2013, 123 n. 14, and 124. He does not mention texts C and D.

⁸⁶ See Plut. *De facie* 929 b = DK 28 B 15. A lot has been written about Parmenides’ alleged discovery of heliophotism. Even after the recent thorough studies on this subject (e.g., Mourelatos 2013), I remain skeptical as to whether someone who called the moon νυκτιφάεξ (or νυκτι φάος) and who reportedly called it fiery (πυρίνη) could have developed the theory that the moon reflects the light of the sun. But a discussion of this issue would be far beyond the scope of this paper.

⁸⁷ Even Graham 2013 does not use Stobaeus’ version as an argument for his interpretation of Anaxagoras.

possess direct information on Anaxagoras' explanation of the moon's phases. Nevertheless, given our knowledge of his other astronomical ideas and taking into account the ambiguity of expressions like "the moon receives its light from the sun" and its equivalents (in texts F–J and even in L and M), we can make a reasonable guess. As far as I can see, two options deserve serious consideration.

O'Brien and Panchenko questioned whether a pure theory of derived light, kindled by the sun (not reflected), ever existed.⁸⁸ In this, they overlooked text O, according to which unnamed "youngers" defended a full-fledged theory of a fiery moon and its phases. If my analysis in this paper is correct, Anaxagoras may have been one of this theory's advocates. His conception of the earth as flat and his explanation of the Milky Way implied that the heavenly bodies must be relatively near and smaller than the earth. This means that, when the moon and the sun are in conjunction during new moon, the two luminaries must be very close to each other, as is shown in Fig. 4. At this point, the heat of the sun on the back of the moon – the side that is turned away from the earth – would necessarily be very intense, enabling it to ignite the moon.⁸⁹ However, during new moon, we do not see this light of the heated moon because the side that is kindled is the one that is turned away from us.




Fig. 4. During new moon, the sun is very close to the moon (approximately to scale)

⁸⁸ Cf. O'Brien 1968, 123; Panchenko 2002, 328.

⁸⁹ Cf. Panchenko 2002, 333: "At the time of conjunction (...), the side of the moon turned to the sun is turned *from* us, while the side which is not affected by heating is turned towards us".

Subsequently, this light, which is actually the glowing stony surface of the moon, expands. We see the first glimpse of fire creeping over the rim of the moon when we observe the small sickle a few days after new moon. As the moon goes through the phases of waxing crescent, first quarter, waxing gibbous, and finally full moon, the glow gradually spreads, covering an ever-growing part of the moon and finally its whole surface. We may compare this process with a fireplace that is lit on one side with a small fire that grows bigger and bigger until the whole fireplace is burning. However, because the moon is stony, it is not ignited with a raging fire but with the quiet glow we observe. After full moon, when the sun is farthest away from the moon, the glow shrinks again, gradually diminishing as the moon passes through the phases of waning gibbous, last quarter, and waning crescent, until it is finally extinguished at new moon and then is kindled again. With this explanation of the phases of the moon there is no question of reflected light. The light that we see on the moon is not the reflection of the sun's light but the glow of the moon's heated surface. In this explanation, expressions like "the moon receives its light from the sun" are understood literally: the moon is kindled by the sun. Although it must be kindled anew every month, once kindled, it can be said to have its own light, just like a lamp that is lighted has its own light.

This is the explanation of the moon's light and phases that is ascribed to unnamed "youngers" in text O. Although the text does not mention how the flame is kindled, the most natural reading is that the moon is kindled by the sun as described above. It might even be argued that this explanation of the moon's light and phases was offered as an improvement over those of Anaximander and Xenophanes, which did not explain why the opening of the vents in the celestial wheels or the kindling started during new moon and then followed the rhythm of the lunar month. Usually, text O is thought to be about "younger Pythagoreans", but it is hard to see who these younger Pythagoreans could have been,⁹⁰ who allegedly rebelled against the Pythagorean theory that the moon, functioning like a mirror (κατοπτροειδής), has its light by reflection (ἀνταυγεία).⁹¹ Moreover, text O is about the phases of the moon whereas the immediately preceding text is about the Pythagorean (Philolaic) theory of lunar eclipses. If we assume that, in text O, not Pythagoreans but others are meant, the most likely candidate would be Anaxagoras (and his followers), in whose system this explanation of the phases of the moon would fit very well.

⁹⁰ Cf. p. 23–24 with n. 38 above.

⁹¹ Cf. Aët. in Stob. *Anthol.* 1. 26, not in DK, but see Diels 1879, 357; Aët. in Ps.-Plut. *Plac.* 2. 29. 4 = DK 58 B 36.

This explanation also makes sense in relation to Plato's text in the *Cratylus* (text J). Socrates can call this explanation "ancient" because it presupposes a fiery moon as did almost all other Presocratic thinkers (cf. the remarks on Aëtius' chapter 2. 25 after text B). The light of the moon can be called "always new" because the moon's light is kindled anew every month. We can easily imagine that what we see during the month as the dark part of the moon has a faint afterglow, comparable with a peat-moor fire that spreads underground as the remnant of an earlier ignition. Usually, we do not see this faint afterglow because it is outshined by the light part (in this theory: the burning part) of the moon. Only when the light of the crescent moon is very small can we observe it as what we now call earthshine. Because it is the faint afterglow of the extinguished fire, this light can also be called "old". Socrates uses the words "the followers of Anaxagoras" (οἱ Ἀναξαγόρειοι), which can be compared with "the youngers" in text O.

An explanation similar to the one suggested above has been proposed by Sider in his interpretation of Anaxagoras' fragment B18 (text I). I quote: "The sun actually gives up some of its λαμπρόν (in the form of bright aither), which becomes part of the moon during and, to a lesser extent, after the time of direct illumination". And somewhat further: "Only if some light was physically absorbed could the moon glow from the light of the sun when the sun no longer shines directly on it". And again: "(...) the sun had physical substance which would penetrate into the moon's surface".⁹² In Sider's interpretation, too, the moon's light is not reflected light from the sun, but in a way kindled by the sun, although according to him in the form of bright aether, while in the interpretation suggested above it is the sun's fire that starts the moon's glow.

The other possibility that deserves to be mentioned is an extrapolation of the conception of invisible heavenly bodies, which I argued in my previous paper must have been Anaxagoras' one and only explanation for lunar eclipses. Earlier thinkers like Anaximander and Xenophanes made no distinction in the way they explained eclipses and phases of the moon. Anaximander said they were both due to the closing of the apertures of the moon wheel. Xenophanes considered them to be quenchantings. Anaxagoras may well have found it satisfying to propose a uniform explanation for eclipses, occultations, settings, and phases, explaining them with reference to a body that obstructs our vision of another celestial body: the moon (in solar eclipses and star occultations), the earth (in the settings of sun, moon, and stars), or an invisible body (in the case of lunar eclipses and

⁹² Sider 2005, 158–159 (= Sider 1981, 122–123).

phases). In this scenario, too, the moon must be a fiery stone ignited by the sun's heat. The phenomenon of "earthshine" during the crescent waxing or waning moon could be explained, in analogy with the explanation of the "blood moon" during lunar eclipses, by the temporary transparency of the air-like invisible heavenly body, perhaps because of its proximity to the sun. This second suggestion of an explanation of the moon's phases, however, would not explain why the cycle starts during new moon and follows the rhythm of the lunar month.

Conclusion

According to Graham, "Anaxagoras profoundly changed the understanding of the heavens irreversibly and forever".⁹³ In my opinion, on the contrary, Anaxagoras inventively defended ideas that were already outdated when he wrote them down – about the shapes of the earth and of the other heavenly bodies, the Milky Way, lunar eclipses, and the light of the moon – in opposition to what we would now consider more progressive ideas. Taken together, however, his ideas formed a coherent whole. Anaxagoras' main achievement in astronomy was his acknowledgement that the heavenly bodies are fiery stones, and for this idea he had to go into exile. But as regards his general understanding of the heavenly phenomena, perhaps, after all, he is best described as a tragic figure.

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⁹³ Graham 2013, 242.

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This paper is a sequel of “Anaxagoras on the Milky Way and Lunar Eclipses” (Couprie 2017). Doxographic reports state that, according to Anaxagoras, the moon receives its light from the sun. Most authors understand it as meaning “the moon reflects the light of the sun”. This conflicts, however, with several testimonies that say clearly that the moon is a fiery stone, using essentially the same words as they do for the sun. O’Brien (1968) has already pointed out that the expression “the moon receives its light from the sun” is ambiguous. I argue that, within the general context of Anaxagoras’ astronomy, it is more probable that “the moon receives its light from the sun” means that the moon’s light is ignited by the sun. Unfortunately, we do not possess information on Anaxagoras’ explanation of the moon’s phases.

I suggest two options. In one, the moon is ignited by the sun when, during new moon, the two luminaries are close together. After that, the fire spreads and extinguishes during the monthly cycle of phases. In the other, the moon's phases are due to an invisible body, just like during a lunar eclipse.

My conclusion from both papers is that Anaxagoras was not the great discoverer of the real cause of lunar eclipses and the moon light as he is depicted in recent publications. Anaxagoras inventively defended a coherent set of ideas that were already outdated: the flat earth, the Milky Way caused by the earth's shadow, the moon a fiery stone, and lunar eclipses caused by invisible heavenly bodies. As regards his general understanding of the heavenly phenomena, he is best described as a tragic figure.

Настоящая статья служит продолжением публикации “Анаксагор о Млечном пути и лунных затмениях” (Courpie 2017). Согласно доксографическим свидетельствам, Анаксагор утверждал, что луна получает свет от солнца. Большинство ученых понимают это в том смысле, что луна отражает солнечный свет. Между тем, это противоречит ряду других свидетельств, в которых отчетливо говорится, что луна – это огненный камень, причем используются почти такие же слова, как в описании солнца. На двусмысленность выражения “луна получает свой свет от солнца” указывал еще О’Брайен (O’Brien 1968). В рамках общего контекста астрономии Анаксагора представляется, что эти слова с большей вероятностью означают, что луна получает свет, воспламеняясь солнцем. К сожалению, у нас нет сведений о том, как Анаксагор объяснял смену лунных фаз. Автор предлагает два возможных объяснения. Согласно первому, луна воспламеняется солнцем, когда в период новолуния два светила оказываются близко друг к другу. После этого огонь распространяется и затухает в течение месяца, в соответствии с фазами луны. Согласно второму – фазы луны обусловлены невидимым небесным телом, как в случае лунных затмений.

Из обеих статей следует вывод о том, что, вопреки новейшим публикациям, Анаксагор не был автором великого открытия – объяснения причин лунных затмений и природы лунного света. Напротив, он с изобретательностью отстаивал систему согласующихся между собой, но устаревших представлений: плоскую форму Земли, тень от Земли как объяснение Млечного Пути, луну в качестве огненного камня и невидимые небесные тела как объяснение лунных затмений. Если говорить о понимании Анаксагором небесных явлений в целом, ему лучше всего подходит определение “трагическая фигура”.

THE LEAD LETTER OF PISTOS FROM PATRAEUS*

In the autumn of 2012, a resident of Garkushi village (Taman peninsula, Russia) found by chance a lead letter in the part of ancient Greek settlement Patraeus that was submerged by the waters of Taman Bay (St. Byz. s.v. Πάτρασος).¹ The text is written on one of the sides of an irregularly shaped plate (max. length 14.05 cm, max. width 4.10 cm; letter height 6–8 mm). The plate is broken off from a longer lead stripe, probably specially for the given letter. The first letters in the beginnings of the lines are barely visible. At the end of the first line, the crack that arose during the unfolding of the plate evidently destroyed the last letter in this line. A large round lacuna has eliminated two letters at the end of the fourth line. The rest of the lead letter is fairly well preserved (Fig. 1).

The palaeographic features of the Patraeus letter enable us to date it to the last quarter of the 5th century BC.² The punctuation in the form of two dots, incised in every line of the letter under consideration, occurs in the Bosphorus in graffiti and lead letters dated from the third quarter of the 6th to the late 5th centuries BC.³

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¹ Currently it is kept in the Archaeological Museum affiliated with the Institute of Archaeology and Cultural Heritage of the Saratov State University.

² Avram–Chiriac–Matei 2007, 391, 401; Saprykin–Maslennikov 2007 [С. Ю. Сапрыкин, А. А. Масленников, *Граффити и дипинти хоры античного Боспора*], 84–85, no. 369, 132–135, no. 694; Saprykin–Fedoseev 2010 [С. Ю. Сапрыкин, Н. Ф. Федосеев, “Фрагмент хозяйственного письма из Пантикапея”, *ВДИ*], 50–58.

³ Agaonov 2017 [А. А. Агафонов, *Общественный комплекс на западном плато. Последняя четверть VI – вторая четверть V вв. до н.э.*], 268, no. 132; Sokol’skiy 1973 [Н. И. Сокольский, “Кульτ Афродиты в Кепях в VI–V вв. до н.э.”, *ВДИ*], 88–89, fig. 1, 2; Vinogradov 2001 [Ю. Г. Виноградов, “Визит эвбейца




Fig. 1. The lead letter of Pistos (the photo and the drawing)

- 1 Ὁρ[ι]στώνυμε : ἐπιστέλλῃ τοι : Πίστο[ς]
 [τ]ῆς ἀποτέσασθαι : Σαπασιν : στατήρα χρυσῶ
 καὶ ἀνδράποδον : καὶ Σῆμον : ἡμιστάτηρον
 χρυσῶ κἀρακλείδην : τρεῖς τετάρτας ἀργυρῶ
 5 καὶ Δημόνακτα : τρίτην : ἀργυρῶ.

The pronoun *τοι* instead of *σοι*, such forms as *ἐπιστέλλῃ*, *ἀποτέσασθαι* and *τρέξ*, where *ει* is represented as *ῃ*, and the presence of *ῶ* (*χρυσῶ*, *ἀργυρῶ*) indicate the Ionian dialect.

Lines 1–2. In the middle of the first line, *ΕΠΙΣΤΕΛΛΕΤΟΙ* is distinctly read. The verb *ἐπιστέλλω* and its derivatives were often used in the beginning of the letters.⁴ Although the through hole in the plate has annihilated the left part of the first letter in this line, its right part is preserved fairly well, enabling us to reconstruct an *omega* here. Thus, the letter evidently began with a form of address to a certain Aristonymos –

в Фанагорию”, *ВДИ*], 103–104 (*SEG* LI, p. 288, no. 991); Tolstikov–Zhuravlev–Lomtadze 2004 [В. П. Толстиков, Д. В. Журавлев, Г. А. Ломтадзе, “Новые материалы к хронологии раннего Пантикапея”, *Древности Боспора*], 348 ff., 365, fig. 11. 1; Dana 2007, 87, no. 12; Pavlichenko–Kashaev 2012, 228, fig. 1, 2.

⁴ *Syll.*³ 1259; Jordan 2000, 95; Pavlichenko–Kashaev 2012, 230.

ῶρ[ι]στώνυμε, with a crasis of the interjection and initial [a].⁵ The personal name Ἀριστώνυμος has not been previously attested in the Bosphorus. In the Black Sea littoral, it has been encountered only once, in the epitaph to Mastor from Berezan (ca. 550 BC).⁶ Thus the addressee was called Aristonymos, while the name of the author of the letter was the subject of ἐπιστέλλει and, consequently, put in *nom. sing.*, must have been positioned after the verb. After τοι and the sign of punctuation in the form of two dots, we can restore the personal name Πίστος.⁷

Part of the first letter in the beginning of the second line is destroyed by the break in the tablet, but in the upper area of the line, the right edge of a horizontal hasta is distinctly discernible. Further, the letters ΑΣ are scratched on the tablet, followed by a punctuation mark and ἀποτέσασθαι. The reconstruction of *gamma* or *pi* does not yield satisfactory sense and therefore the second line probably began with a new word – a feminine article in *acc. plur.* [τ]άς.

Line 2. Thus, in the first line we read: ῶρ[ι]στώνυμε : ἐπιστέλλει τοι : Πίστο[ς]. After ἐπιστέλλω, in the beginning of some letters, a construction in *acc. cum. inf.* occurs where the logical subject implies the addressee of the letter. In line 2 of the letter to Aristonymos, we see, firstly, ΤΑΣ, then the infinitive ἀποτέσασθαι, i.e. a construction in *acc. cum. inf.* similar to constructions in the letters of Lesis and Mnesiergos.⁸ The verb ἀποτίνω in the active voice means ‘pay’ (debt, tax, fine) or ‘indemnify’ (damages, expenses).⁹ In the medial voice, this verb means ‘get money, payment, demand an exaction, exact a penalty’ (LSJ s.v.). No cases of the use of medial forms have been found in the epigraphic evidence so far. As for literary sources, according to LSJ, there is only a single example of the use of ἀποτίνομαι with words designating monetary units – this is in a fragment from the comedy *Κόλακες* by

⁵ Cf. a crasis in the vocative ῶριστόκρ<α>τες in the letter to Kledikos from Hermonassa: Pavlichenko–Kashaev 2012, 231, no. 26.

⁶ Dubois 2006, 85, no. 43; *SEG* 32, no. 723; Tajlenko 1982 [В. П. Яйленко, *Греческая колонизация. VII–III вв. до н. э.*], 259–267; *LGPV* IV, s.v. Ἀριστώνυμος.

⁷ Pantikapaion, 1st century AD (*CIRB* 356); Euboea, 4th–3rd centuries BC; Samos, 7th–6th centuries BC (*LGPV* I, s.v.), Athens, 4th century BC (*LGPV* II, s.v.).

⁸ Cf.: Jordan 1996, 95, 98; *Syll.*³ 1259.

⁹ See e.g.: Dem. 18. 105. 10; 24. 127. 7 etc.; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 54. 2, as well as this verb in the texts of decrees and enactments of the 6th–5th centuries BC: *IG* I³ 78 a. 58 (Eleusis, ca 422 BC); Hallof 1993, 61, no. 19 (Attica), 127, no. 44 (Eleia), 138, no. 45 (Delphoi), 241, no. 65 (Amorgos), 325, no. 85 (Megara Hyblaea), 342, no. 94 (Crete). The same verb is used also in the formula πάσχειν ἢ ἀποτίνειν, i.e. ‘endure a physical punishment or pay a fine’ (cf. e.g. Plat. *Leg.* 843 b).

Eupolis, surviving in Eustathius' Commentary on the *Odyssey*: κατ' ἀντιβολίαν δέκα τάλαντ' ἀπετισάμην (Eust. 1406. 27). In their edition, R. Kassel and C. Austin cite A. Nauck and C. G. Cobet, who emended the verb into ἀπετείσαμεν or ἀπετίσαμεν, i.e. into an active instead of the medial form, but apparently Kassel and Austin do not consider the form ἀπετισάμην to be impossible.¹⁰ I. Storey also adopts the reading ἀπετισάμην.¹¹ In other cases, medial forms have the meaning of 'take vengeance' or 'punish the guilty'.¹² Thus, in Euripides' *Heraclidae* (852), Iolaos asks Zeus and Hebe for the possibility to punish his enemies – κάποτείσασθαι δίκην ἐχθρούς. This instance is especially interesting for us, since here the medial form of ἀποτίνομαι is used with two accusatives that denote the persons affected and the penalty that is exacted from them. A similar construction with two accusatives occurs also with the verbs meaning 'exact, receive payment' from someone.¹³ Obviously, the same construction and the same meaning should be supposed for ἀποτέσασθαι in the letter published here, with the accusatives of persons who should pay and the accusatives of sums of money that should be exacted, arranged in decreasing order, in one case with the addition of an ἀνδράποδον.¹⁴ Probably, an addressee of the letter must exact some debts, fines or fees from a number of persons. Hence, taking into account that the noun implied at ΤΑΣ must be of feminine gender and used in plural, it remains to suppose that the article is employed elliptically,¹⁵ instead of e.g., τὰς ζημίας, ἐπιβολάς¹⁶ or, more probably, τιμὰς.¹⁷ Anyway, given the lack of close analogies, the meaning of τὰς remains unclear.

¹⁰ PCG V. 388, no. 168 (317).

¹¹ Storey 2003, 195, 196.

¹² Arph. *Thesm.* 686; PCG IV. 125, no. 6 (Cratinus); Eur. *Her.* 882; Xen. *Anab.* 3. 2. 5; *Cyr.* 5. 4. 35; Dem. 19. 225. 26.

¹³ See e.g.: Xen. *Mem.* 1. 2. 60; Dem. 59. 19; 20. 32.

¹⁴ It is possible to add to the lists of private persons contributing certain sums of money (Saprykin–Maslennikov 2007, 135) a Nymphaion fresco from the second quarter to the middle of the 3rd century BC (Vinogradov 1990, 555, no. 590).

¹⁵ Cf. ὥς οἱ παρεδόθη τὸ παιδίον κεκοσμημένον τὴν ἐπὶ θανάτῳ (Hdt. 1. 109. 1, see also 3. 119. 2; 5. 72. 4); and further Gildersleeve 1901, 12–13, § 34, cf. Kühner–Gerth 558 § 596. 4.

¹⁶ Hdt. 2. 65; Plut. *Lys.* 27; Athenian inscription of the Poletai: Langdon 1991, 115, no. P 26, face B fr. b, col. IV 506 (342/1–339/8 BC); IG I³ 82. 27 (Attica, 421/420 BC); *Lys.* 30. 3. 5.

¹⁷ ...ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἀνδραπόδων πιπρασκομένων παρά τε Θηριπίδου καὶ Δημοφῶντος τὰς τιμὰς ἐλάμβανεν (Dem. 27. 13); ...τὸ δ' ἐργαστήριον κεκαρπωμένων αὐτὸν καὶ τὴν πρόσοδον οὐκ ἀποφαίνοντα, τῶν δ' ἄλλων τὰ μὲν πεπρακότεα καὶ τὰς τιμὰς οὐκ ἀποδεδωκότα... (*ibid.* 47).

Lines 2–5. Three of Pistos’ debtors – Δημῶναξ, Ἡρακλείδας, Σῆμος – bear names that were commonly used in many Greek poleis throughout different historical periods.¹⁸ After ἀποτέσσασθαι, one and the same scheme is repeated four times. And since Σῆμον κἀρακλείδην (a crasis of the conjunction καί and Ἡρακλείδην) and Δημῶνακτα undoubtedly are forms of the accusative of personal names, then ΣΑΠΑΣΙΝ, also carved after ἀποτέσσασθαι, must be a name in accusative. It is probable that Σαπασιν (Σαπασις, Σαπασιος?) is a derivative of the ethnonym Σάπαι.¹⁹

Line 3: ἀνδράποδον. In the Classical and Hellenistic periods, ἀνδράποδον was one of the commonly used terms for slaves.²⁰ Strabo is the only literary source concerned with the northern Black Sea littoral who mentions ἀνδράποδον (11. 2. 3). In epigraphic material of the northern Black Sea region, ἀνδράποδον did not occur before.²¹ In the absence of a context that might elucidate the exact meaning of ἀνδράποδον in the letter, we translate it neutrally as a ‘slave’. The use of ἀνδράποδον in the Patraeus letter is probably one of the earliest examples of this term in the inscriptions.

So, Sapasis was to give to Pistos a *slave* bought, probably, at a slave market in one of the Black Sea cities. The existence of such markets in the Bosphorus is attested by Strabo (11. 2. 3), albeit for a later time, who mentions the delivery by nomads of ἀνδράποδα along with other “goods”

¹⁸ CIRB 1137 A II, 27, the feminine variant of the name Δημῶναξ – Δημῶνασσα – is registered in Myrmekion in the 5th century BC and in Olbia in the 6th to 5th centuries BC (*SEG* XLVIII, 1007; Dubois 1996, 144, no. 92); cf. the feminine variant of the name Σῆμος in Phanagoria found on a graffito on the bottom of a black gloss kylix from 500–480 BC (Vinogradov 2001, 103–104; Zavoykina 2013 [Н. В. Завойкина, “Фанагорийское общество”, in: В. Д. Кузнецов, *Материалы по археологии и истории Фанагории*], 280, no. 120, fig. 9).

¹⁹ The tribe of Sapai (Sapaioi) is mentioned by Steph. Byz. s.v. Σάπαι; Hdt. 7. 110; Strabo. 7. fr. 17. 27 Radt; 10. 2. 17; 12. 3. 20. In lapidary inscriptions, this ethnonym occurs, for example in the Delphian list of theorodokoi of 230–220 BC (Plassart 1921, 18, col. III. 83) and in a dedication to Apollo from Dodoparon of the 2nd to 3rd century AD, where Σαπαικὴν ἐρίβωλον is mentioned (*IGBR* III, no. 1794; *SEG* 37, 608, cf. Dimitrov 2009, 69 with a date from the 2nd to 1st century BC). See also Kazarow 1935, 647–649.

²⁰ Poll. 3. 74–78; Gschnitzer 1964, 12–15; Mactoux 1980, 54–62; Garlan 1988, 20–21; Vlassopoulos 2011, 120. The historical commentary on the term ἀνδράποδον see also in: Zavoykina–Pavlichenko 2016, 235–243.

²¹ In the inscriptions on ceramics and lead from the late archaic and classical periods from this region, the terms usually used to designate slaves were δοῦλος, οἰκέτης, παῖς; *SEG* XLII, 710; Dubois 1996, no. 24; Saprykin–Fedoseev 2010, 50–51, line 7; Dana 2007, 75–76; Vinogradov 1998, 154–157, no. 1, 161 ff.; Zavoykina 2013, 282, no. 127, fig. 10.

to Tanais. The slaves delivered to the towns of the northern Black Sea littoral were primarily local barbarians, but also the inhabitants of the inner regions of Asia Minor and Thrace.²² The gender, age and professional characteristics of the unnamed ἀνδράποδον could have been stipulated by Pistos and Sapis beforehand. Notably, the largest sum of debt, including also an ἀνδράποδον slave, was to be received from Sapis – the sole bearer of a non-Greek (Thracian?) name among Pistos' debtors.

Lines 2–3: στατήρ χρυσῶ, ἡμιστατήρ χρυσῶ. There is no doubt that the letter deals with units of money rather than measures of weight. This is suggested by a specially stipulated formula prescribing the payment of sums of a gold *stater* and a *hemistater* (this is specified probably to keep Aristonymos, the counteragent of Pistos, from confusing gold staters for silver ones). The letter does not inform us what minting the gold coins must have been. Evidently, this was already known both to the author of the letter and to its addressee.

It is of note that where, in the opinion of the author of an inscription, the term 'stater' did not need any more precise definition because what was meant was monetary units constantly used in the given polis, the word στατήρ could be used in the text without any additions.²³ This is the case, e.g., in *Plutus* by Aristophanes (408 BC), which speaks of servants playing 'odd and even' στατήρσι χρυσοῖς (v. 816) or in decrees from the 5th and 4th centuries BC from Iasos (*Ilasos*.1) and Erythrai (*IEry*. 1, 2, 17) in Asia Minor or in the graffito Ἰπικράτης : ἀναίρ(ε)ῖται : στατήρας : πεντήκοντα on a fragment of the Ionian black-gloss cylix from Pantikapaion (the last third of the 6th century BC).²⁴

Since the context of the letter itself does not unambiguously imply the place of minting of the gold staters, we are justified only in proposing more or less well-grounded suppositions about this issue based on the peculiarities of monetary circulation in the Bosphorus during the period

²² Finley 1983, 168–175, Gavrilyuk 2003, 77–80; Avram 2007, 239–241.

²³ In those cases where the payment is carried out in several monetary units, the denomination is usually defined more precisely: e.g., at the transfer of payments to the Spartan military fund, στατήρας Αἰγινάιος and δαρικός are mentioned (Meiggs–Lewis 1969, 182 no. 67. 10, 16, ca 427 BC), while in the list of temple contributions from cities and private persons in Delphoi ἀττικὰς δραχμὰς and στατήρα χρυσίον Ἀβυδηνόν are specified (*Syll.*³ 239 C, coll. III. 20. 21, 364/63 BC). In the reports on the construction of the Parthenon, χρυσῶ στατήρες [Λαμψο]ακενοί and χρυσῶ στατήρες Κ[υζικην]οί are stated (Meiggs–Lewis 1969, 162, no. 59. 13, ca. 434–433 BC, see also: *IG* I³ 436. 30, 439. 67, 440. 87, 447/46 – 433/32 BC).

²⁴ Agafonov 2017 [A. A. Агафонов, “Пантикапей. Торговые связи”, in: В. Д. Кузнецов, В. П. Толстиков, *Пантикапей и Фанагория. Две столицы Боспорского царства*], 306, no. 185.

under consideration.²⁵ The moneys circulated on the internal market of Bosphorus were for the most part silver coins minted during that period in Pantikapaion and coins with the legend ΑΠΟΑ.²⁶ From the last third or quarter of the 5th century BC, they were supplemented by the coinage of Nymphaion and Theodosia and by coins with the inscription ΣΙΝΔΟΝ.²⁷ Staters from Kyzikos were used to conduct large trading operations (including import and export).²⁸ Precisely these staters took the role of an interlocal monetary unit that from the mid-sixth century BC until the 330s BC dominated the international trade space in the middle part of the Aegean basin, the western coast of Asia Minor, Thrace and cities on the coasts of the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea, including the Bosphorus.²⁹

If for the earlier period (from the second half of the 6th to the first decades of the 5th century BC) there are certain grounds to note the circulation of the coins of some Ionian centres along with *kyzikenoi* in the Bosphorus,³⁰ no information of this kind is available for later periods.³¹ In our opinion, this decreases the probability that our letter implies gold staters of any centres other than Kyzikos.

²⁵ It is clear that our lead letter is not referring to Pantikapaion gold staters, because they were not minted before the beginning of the second quarter of the 4th century BC (Zograf 1951 [А. Н. Зограф, *Античные монеты*], 164–168; Abramzon–Frolova 2007–2008 [М. Г. Абрамзон, Н. А. Фролова, *Корпус боспорских кладов античных монет*], 22; Frolova 2010 [Н. А. Фролова, *Античные золотые монеты в собрании Государственного Исторического Музея. От античности до Византии*], 232–233).

²⁶ Zavoykin 2013, 352–357.

²⁷ Kuznetsov 2016 [В. Д. Кузнецов, “Фанагория и Синдика: некоторые заметки”, in: А. А. Завойкин, *Материалы по археологии и истории Фанагории*], 256 f.

²⁸ Zograf 1951, 41; Abramzon–Frolova 2007–2008, 22, 27–29.

²⁹ Shelov 1956 [Д. В. Шелов, *Монетное дело Боспора в VI–II вв. до н. э.*], 52; Abramzon–Frolova 2007–2008, 22. On the list of Bosporan hoards of the mid-6th century to the 340s–330s BC containing *kyzikenoi* and their fractions, see: Abramzon–Frolova 2007–2008, 23–27.

³⁰ For instance, during excavations at Phanagoria in 2005, a silver *hemiobol* of an “unknown Ionian centre” was found with a lion’s muzzle baring its teeth, left, and *quadratum incusum*, dated to ca. 480–470 BC (Abramzon 2013 [М. Г. Абрамзон, “Античные иноземные монеты из раскопок Фанагории”, in: В. Д. Кузнецов, *Материалы по археологии и истории Фанагории*], 66, Fig. 4. 105).

³¹ Notably, even for the period of active trade contacts between the Bosphorus and Athens, the silver coin of the latter is very rarely encountered in the finds from Bosporan sites and, moreover, these include only coins of the 5th century BC (see: Abramzon–Frolova–Gorlov 1999 [М. Г. Абрамзон, Н. А. Фролова, Ю. В. Горлов, “Таманский клад серебряных монет VI–IV вв. до н. э.”, *ВДИ*], 45–46, Table IV. 53; Strokin 2007 [В. Л. Строкин, “АПОЛ[лония Боспорская] или [храм] АПОЛ[лона]?”, *Древности Боспора*], 358, n. 6).

Among the monetary finds from the second half of the 6th to the 5th century BC, along with the staters of Kyzikos are found (more rarely) their fractions. Thus, at the Patraeus town site, *hektai* and *hemihektai* were found.³² Fractions of staters are repeatedly mentioned in the business records of residents of cities in the northern Black Sea littoral of that and earlier periods.³³ The information presented above suggests with fair confidence that the Patraeus letter refers to stater and hemistater of Kyzikos. Thus, Sapasis was to pay to Pistos, in addition to the slave (ἀνδράποδον), one gold stater of Kyzikos, and to Simos half a *kyzikenos*.

Lines 4–5: τρεῖς τετάρτας ἀργυρῶ, τρίτην ἀργυρῶ. Since according to its content, Pistos' letter falls within the category of private business correspondence in which the realities of the second half of the 5th century BC are reflected, evidently it must contain everyday business vocabulary that Bosphoran merchants and traders used in their informal language. Following the logic of the text, after the aforementioned gold staters, the word ἀργυρῶ must imply silver coins. As in the case of the gold staters (hemistaters), the content of the letter proper does not make it possible to define with certainty exactly which monetary system this silver belonged to. Although the palaeography of the letter published here seems to indicate its Bosphoran origin, we are not able to affirm this with complete confidence. Nevertheless, independently of the place where this record was written, it is evident that it is concerned with commercial activities in some territory of the Bosphorus (because, after all, the letter was found in a layer of a Taman site). As mentioned before, the money circulating in the Bosphorus was the locally minted silver. Hence, the probability that denominations of non-Bosphoran coins are specified in this note is rather small.³⁴ Firstly, we will

³² Zakharov 2009 [Е. В. Захаров, “Монеты VI–V вв. до н. э., найденные на поселении Гаркуша I (Патрей)”, *Древности Боспора*], 207; 215–216; Abramzon–Frolova 2007–2008, 61–62 (hoard of 1998).

³³ Cf., for example, ἔκτην and ἡμιέκτην in the graffito from Berezan, representing a record of a trader of the 6th century BC (Karyshkovskij 1988 [П. О. Карышковский, *Монеты Ольвии*], 10; Vinogradov 1990, 556, no. 593; Vinogradov 1999, 139, 140); ἐπτά καὶ εἴκοσιν στατῆρες from the Olbian letter of Apatourios to Leanax of the late 6th century BC (Karyshkovskij 1988, 10; Dana 2004, 6, 12); ἔκτας from the Olbian letter of the 1st half of the 5th century BC (Mitina 2017 [В. В. Митина, “Письмо, найденное в Ольвии в 2010 году”], 259–260). According to a new interpretation proposed by S. Saprykin and A. Maslennikov, a graffito of the 5th to early 4th century BC from Zeno's Chersonesos also mentions such denominations of *kyzikenos* as *hektai* and *hemihektai* (lines 7–8) (*SEG* XL, 643; Saprykin–Maslennikov 2007, 137–139, no. 694).

³⁴ Of note in this connection is the decree of Kanobos (*IOSPE* I², 24) regulating the conditions of trade in the territory of the Olbian polis in the third quarter of the 4th century BC. According to this decree, all traders were obliged to use only the local coin (Karyshkovskij 1988, 10–15).

try to establish exactly what denominations of Bosphoran silver coins are implied by the expressions τρεῖς τετάρτας ἀργυρῶ and τρίτην ἀργυρῶ. Although drachm was the basic monetary unit, in the identified coin series of Pantikapaion of the 5th century BC, smaller denominations definitely prevail quantitatively (*diobol*, *hemibol*, *tetartemorion*).³⁵ Since we suppose that, in Pistos' letter, fractions of the Pantikapaion drachm (equal to six obols) are implied,³⁶ correspondingly the *three quarters* of a Pantikapaion drachm must have equalled 4.5 *obols* (= 3 trihemibols or 2 diobols and a hemibol), while a third of a drachm equalled 2 obols (= 1 diobol). Thus, Herakleides was to pay to Pistos 4.5 obols and to Demonax 2 obols in silver (it does not matter in what denominations).

So the following translation of the text of the letter under study can be proposed:

O, Aristonymos! Pistos sends to you (this letter) so that you exact the following (fines / debts?): from Sapisis a stater of gold and a slave, from Simos a hemistater of gold, from Herakleides three quarters of silver, from Demonax a third of silver.

Unfortunately, Pistos did not explain why Sapisis, Simos, Herakleides and Demonax were indebted to him. We are probably dealing with a list of debtors with enumeration of the sums to be exacted. In any case, the letter published here belongs to the category of business correspondence and thus enriches our knowledge of commodity-money relations in the private sphere in the Bosphorus of the second half of the 5th century BC.

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³⁵ Shelov 1956, 63–65.

³⁶ Few silver coins were minted by Nymphaion in the last quarter of the 5th century BC compared with the volume of emissions of Pantikapaion, so that they could not meet the trade-economic needs of cities in the region of the Cimmerian Bosphorus (Shelov 1956, 52, 62–63). Phanagoria and Theodosia also started to strike their coins no earlier than the last quarter of the 5th century BC (*ibid.*, 52). Hence, only coins with the legend ΑΠΟΛ can be considered an alternative. These were minted from the middle to the end of the 5th century BC (cf. Zavoykin 2013 [А. А. Завойкин, *Образование Боспорского государства. Археология и хронология державы Спартокидов*], 353 ff.).

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In 2012 in the part of ancient Greek settlement Patraeus submerged by the waters of the Taman Bay (the modern village Garkusha of the Krasnodar Kray, Russia) a lead letter was found. The letter belongs to the category of business correspondence and contains a list of debtors with enumeration, in decreasing order, of the sums to be exacted. The gold *staters* mentioned in the letter are most likely *kyzikenoi*. In addition, the letter contains an accusative of a personal name that has not been encountered before: Σαπασιν (Σαπασις, Σαπασιος?).

В 2012 г. в затопленной водами Таманского залива части городища Патрей (совр. поселок Гаркуша, Краснодарский край, РФ) было найдено письмо на свинцовой пластине. Письмо относится к категории деловой переписки и содержит список имен должников и перечисление, в порядке убывания, денежных сумм, которые должны быть взысканы. Упоминаемые в письме золотые статеры, вероятнее всего, являются кизикинами. Кроме того, в письме имеется аккузатив до сих пор не встречавшегося личного имени – Σαπασιν (Σαπασις, Σαπασιος?).

SOUND MIMICRY: AN OLD TRAIT OF THE NEW MUSIC?*

Introduction

Onomatopoeic imitation of non-musical sounds, such as the noises of a storm, animal voices, squeaks of wheels and so on, has often been identified¹ as a characteristic of the so-called New Music (an avant-garde trend in Greek art in the second half of the fifth and the early fourth century BC severely attacked by critics²).

Meanwhile there is evidence that sound mimicry existed in archaic Greek music from at least the start of the sixth century BC.

At the Pythian Games auletes competed in performances of the Pythian nome from 584 BC and citharists from 558 BC (Paus. 10. 7. 4, 7; Strab. 9. 3. 10, p. 421). Descriptions of this piece note the marked mimetic elements in its structure: when depicting the struggle of Apollo with Python instrumentalists would imitate the signals of a salpinx (τὰ σαλπιστικά κρούματα)³ and the teeth-gnashing (ὀδοντισμός)⁴ or hissing (σύριγγες, ὑποσυριγμός, σύριγμα)⁵ of the expiring serpent.

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¹ Pickard-Cambridge 1927, 68; Schönewolf 1938, 13; 59; Richter 1968, 7–8; Defradas 1969, 27; 31; Restani 1983, 188; 189; Zimmermann 1984, 78; 79; 157; Zimmermann 1988, 44; Zimmermann 1989, 28; Kugelmeier 1996, 257; 261; Hordern 2002, 38–39.

² Among the most informative overviews of the New Music are: Schönewolf 1938, 17–36; West 1992, 356–372; Csapo 2004; see also Barker 1984, 93–98.

³ Poll. 4. 84.

⁴ Poll. *ibid.*: τὸν ὀδοντισμὸν ὡς τοῦ δράκοντος ἐν τῷ τετοξεῦσθαι συμπρίοντος τοὺς ὀδόντας.

⁵ Strab. 9. 3. 10, p. 422: σύριγγας δὲ τὴν ἔκλειψιν τοῦ θηρίου, μιμουμένων ὡς ἂν καταστρέφοντος ἐσχάτους τινὰς συριγμούς. Dem. Lac. *De carminibus*, *PHerc.* 1014, col. XLVIII, l. 12–15: [ὕ]ποσυ[ρ]ιγμόν, ἔχον το[ῦ] δράκοντος ἐν τῷ [καταστρέφειν] τάδ' ἐσ[χα]τα συρίγματ[α]. *Sch. Pind. Pyth.* hypothes. a, vol. II p. 2 l. 15 Dr.: σύριγμα δὲ διὰ τὸν τοῦ ὄφεως συριγμόν.

The invention of the Many-headed nome is attributed to the legendary aulete Olympus or his pupil Crates (Ps.-Plut. *De mus.* 1133 D–E). Its performance in the early fifth century (most probably at the Pythian Games of 490 BC, see *Sch. Pind. Pyth.* 12, II p. 263, 23–25 Dr.) is testified by Pindar. It is evident from the twelfth Pythian ode that a characteristic feature of this auletic nome, possibly even the reason for its name, was the mimicking of the woeful and threatening cries of the gorgons and the hissing of snakes on their heads after Medusa's death.⁶

Ancient critics of the New Music are quite benevolent to Olympus: in their eyes, the decline of music resulted from the departure from his standards. Aristoxenus' report of how this legendary musician invented the enharmonic γένος comes to the following conclusion (Ps.-Plut. *De mus.* 1135 B–C = Aistoxen. fr. 83 Wehrli):

φαίνεται δ' Ὀλυμπος αὐξήσας μουσικὴν τῷ ἀγένητόν τι καὶ ἀγνοούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν εἰσαγαγεῖν, καὶ ἀρχηγὸς γενέσθαι τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς καὶ καλῆς μουσικῆς.

It is apparent that Olympus extended the resources of music by introducing something which previously did not exist and was unknown to his predecessors, and that he was the founder of the noble style of music that is specifically Greek.⁷

In Ps.-Plut. *De mus.* 1137 A–B Olympus, Terpander and their followers who have consciously chosen severe simplicity (στενοχωρία καὶ ὀλιγοχορδία) are contrasted with the vulgar innovators with their πολυχορδία τε καὶ ποικιλία, traits typical of the New Music.

Even Plato refers positively to the music of Olympus (which he identifies with that of Marsyas, his teacher). As a matter of fact, the reference is by Alcibiades, but it forms part of the famous eulogy to Socrates in which the author most probably shares his character's point of view. It takes the form of a complimentary comparison: Socrates' words

⁶ τέχνη, τάν ποτε / Παλλὰς ἔφευρε θρασειᾶν <Γοργόνων> / οὐλίον θρήνον διαπλέξαις' Ἀθάναν / τὸν παρθενίους ὑπὸ τ' ἀπλάτοις ὀφίων κεφαλαῖς / ἄιε λειβόμενον δυσπενθέι σὺν καμάτῳ (lines 6–10); αὐλῶν τεύχε πάμφωνον μέλος, / ὄφρα τὸν Εὐρυάλας ἐκ καρπαλιμῶν γενύων / χριμφθέντα σὺν ἔντεσι μιμήσαιτ' ἐρικλάγκταν γόον. / εἶπεν θεός· ἀλλὰ νιν εὐροῖς' ἀνδράσι θνατοῖς ἔχειν, / ὠνύμασεν κεφαλὰν πολλὰν νόμον... (lines 19–23).

⁷ Translation: Barker 1984, 217–218. The same point is repeated below (*De mus.* 1141 B): τὸν Ὀλυμπον ἐκεῖνον, ᾧ δὴ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς τε καὶ νομικῆς μούσης ἀποδιδόασιν.

and the music of Marsyas, as mastered by Olympus, both inspire divine possession in the listeners (Plat. *Symp.* 215 c; cf. Ps.-Plat. *Minos* 318 b).

Thus sound mimicry featured in time-honoured traditional music dedicated to the gods, such as the nomes of Olympus. Is it possible, then, that the same convention was both accepted as part of a revered tradition and yet also dismissed as a trait of the avant-garde trend of 450–400 BC?

Remarkably, the same modern scholars who consider sound mimicry a particular feature of the New Music are usually aware that it had previously been utilized by Sacades at the first Pythian auletic contest, but their comments are far from exhaustive. The change that would have annoyed ancient conservative critics has been identified as its more widespread occurrence;⁸ its accentuation and osmosis into other music genres;⁹ its less “trivial” forms;¹⁰ or the transfer of a traditional device of instrumental music into monodic and choral lyrics.¹¹

In order to clarify this point, this paper aims to review all existing evidence on musical mimicry in the Classical period and consider possible connections to the New Music. Here it is important to distinguish between vocal and instrumental sound imitation. It should also be noted that mimetic terminology, notorious for its ambiguity,¹² can be applied to at least three musical phenomena in our sources. First, theoretical thought since Damon has ascribed the capacity to imitate a certain ethos to the melody and rhythm of a musical composition (this was considered the most complex matter for analysis, since we can perceive music as having a certain “character”, but it is hard to explain what the “similarity” consists in and what the “imitation” is based on). Second, one can speak in mimetic terms of the penetration of “theatrical” dramatization into

⁸ Schönewolf 1938, 13: “Das [sc. die ‘musikalische’ Mimesis] ist aber das Grundprinzip der ganzen Kunst des neuen Dithyrambos. Es ist an sich keine Erfindung der neuen Dichter, es ist ein ursprünglich musikalisches Prinzip, und dem νόμος Πυθικός des Sakadas wird man μίμησις ἡθῶν sicher zuzuschreiben haben. Aber es scheint, dass die bewusste Ausdehnung des Grundsatzes auf das gesamte Kunstwerk die bezeichnendste Tat der jungattischen Dithyrambiker war”.

⁹ Mureddu 1982, 82 with n. 24.

¹⁰ Csapo 2004, 214 n. 28: “The nome had already developed some trivial forms of performative mimesis” (there follows a reference to the Pythian nome of Sacades).

¹¹ Hordern 2002, 38: “One of the strongest trends often associated with late classical lyric, both choral or monodic, is an increasing interest in musical imitation <...>. This should clearly be associated with the New Music, and thus with Timotheus <...>. For instrumental music this mimetic element appears to have been traditional <...>”.

¹² See e.g. Halliwell 2002.

the genres of dithyramb and nome, for example elements of pantomime on behalf of the musician. Third, mimetic vocabulary is applied to the onomatopoeia itself, that is, the mimicry of non-musical sounds by musical means.¹³ Thus each time we find a reference to “mimesis” we have to separate onomatopoeic effects from its other manifestations, which do not concern us here.

I. Sound mimicry in the New Music

Passages directly related to famous representatives of the New Music are short and therefore difficult to interpret.

(1) Onomatopoeia is traditionally observed in *Semele's Birth-Pangs* by Timotheus of Miletus.¹⁴ Athenaeus (8. 45, p. 352 a) quotes a joke by Stratonicus the citharist¹⁵ (hardly a conservative himself¹⁶) which makes clear that Timotheus imitated the cries of a woman in childbirth:

ἐπακούσας δὲ τῆς Ὠδίνος τῆς Τιμοθέου “εἰ δ’ ἐργολάβον, ἔφη, ἔτικτεν καὶ μὴ θεόν, ποίας ἂν ἠφίει φωνάς”.

Having heard *The Birth-Pangs* by Timotheus, he said: “And if she were giving birth to a contractor and not to a god, what cries would she utter?”

However a passing simile by Dio Chrysostomus (78. 32) points to dramatic rather than sound mimesis. He compares Alcmaeon, who, burdened as he is with gold, can hardly drag his feet as he leaves the treasury of Croesus, with an aulete performing *Semele's Birth-Pangs* (μόλις ἔξω βαδίζειν, ὥσπερ αὐλοῦντα τὴν τῆς Σεμέλης ὠδίναν). Unfortunately it is not clear whether Dio is referring to a contemporary performance or a literary source, and indeed if he means *Semele's Birth-Pangs* by Timotheus or a later piece of the same name.

¹³ Cf. the three spheres affected by mimesis in Plat. *Resp.* 3. 395 b–d: ἢ οὐκ ἥσθησαι ὅτι αἱ μιμήσεις, ἂν ἐκ νέων πόρρω διατελέσωσιν, εἰς ἔθνη τε καὶ φύσιν καθίστανται καὶ κατὰ σῶμα καὶ φωνάς καὶ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν;

¹⁴ Fr. 792 Page = Campbell = Hordern. The complete title (“τὰρ Σεμέλαρ ὀδίναν”) is mentioned in a forged decree of Spartan ephoroi cited by Boetius, *Inst. mus.* 1. 1, p. 182 Friedlein.

¹⁵ Ca. 410–360; see Stephanis 1988 [I. E. Στεφανής, *Διονυσιακοὶ τεχνίται· συμβολές στην προσωπογραφία του θεάτρου και της μουσικῆς των αρχαίων Ελλήνων*], no. 2310; West 1992, 367–368.

¹⁶ Stratonicus was credited with introducing πολυχорδία into solo cithara-playing (Athen. 8. 46, p. 348 d) and commented respectfully on the nomes of Timotheus (Athen. 8. 45, p. 352 b).

Both Dio and Alcaeus of Messene (*AP* 16. 7. 2–3) indicate that an aulete took part in the performance of *Semele's Birth-pangs*. If they are referring to the work by Timotheus or at least to a piece in the same genre, it follows that *The Birth-Pangs* by Timotheus was a dithyramb and not a citharodic nome. The same is further attested by Boethius: in the forged Laconian decree cited by him the verb διδάσκει, which is commonly used to describe the training of a chorus, is applied to this piece.¹⁷ Did the onomatopoeia belong to the part of the aulete or the voice (of the chorus or the coryphaeus)? Dio's passage implies that the pregnant woman was impersonated by the aulete who (ab)used actors' devices. Such attempts at pantomimic impersonation had been used by aulos-players since at least the time of Aristotle (who condemned them as displaying bad taste).¹⁸ If so, it is difficult to imagine that a singer pronouncing the text on behalf of Semele took part in the performance alongside the aulos-player. In this case we are dealing with instrumental mimesis. On its own, it could hardly be considered an innovation – if indeed something frustrated conservative critics about it, it might have been a startling object of mimicry or the expanded role of the aulos in dithyramb in general.

(2) Next, we have evidence of the imitation of a sea storm in *Nauplius* by Timotheus.¹⁹ Once again it is a witticism, this time by the conservative aulete Dorion²⁰ (Athen. 8. 19, p. 338 a):

ὁ αὐτὸς Δωρίων καταγελῶν τοῦ ἐν τῷ Τιμοθέου Ναυπλίου χειμῶνος
ἐφασκεν ἐν κακκάβῃ ζεοῦσα μείζονα ἑωρακεῖναι χειμῶνα.

Ναυπλίῳ Casaubon : Ναυτίλῳ codd.

The same Dorion, ridiculing the storm in Timotheus' *Nauplius*, said that he had seen a bigger storm in a boiling stew-pot.

¹⁷ Hordern 2002, 10–11.

¹⁸ Aristot. *Poet.* 26, 1461 b 30–32: οἷον οἱ φαῦλοι ἀνὰ ληταὶ κυλιόμενοι ἂν δίσκον δέη μιμεῖσθαι, καὶ ἔλκοντες τὸν κορυφαῖον ἂν σκύλλαν ἀνὰ λῶσιν. Gomperz 1887, 87–88, comparing the passages of Aristotle and Dio, boldly concludes that an aulete in the New Dithyramb had the dramatic task of impersonating one of the main characters, whereas the chorus-leader played the other. Csapo 2004, 214 seems to agree: “Late fifth- and early fourth-century comedy shows a clear trend towards ‘metatheatrical’ inclusion of the piper in the performance”.

¹⁹ Fr. 785 Page = Campbell = Hordern.

²⁰ 3rd quarter of the 4th cent. (contemporary of Philippos and Alexander of Macedon), see Stephanis 1988, no. 805; West 1992, 369. On his opposition to the fashionable trend: Ps.-Plut. *De mus.* 1138 A–B.

According to Suetonius (*Nero* 39. 3), a piece called *Nauplius* was performed by Nero. If it was the one by Timotheus or at least from the same genre, it follows that *Nauplius* was a monody, i.e., probably a citharodic nome. Two epigrams, *AP* 9. 429 and 11. 185, also mention a solo citharodic piece. The same may be inferred from the *Suda*, where it is mentioned separately from the dithyrambs of Timotheus, but next to the *Persians*, which is clearly a nome.²¹ Still no conclusions can be drawn about the role of the cithara and the human voice in imitating the sound of a storm.

(3) The scholia to Aristophanes' *Plutus* 290 report that the amoebean song in 290–301 parodied the famous dithyramb *Cyclops* by the innovator Philoxenus. The slave Cario starts a buffoonish dance of joy and announces that he will imitate the Cyclops – twang! (θρεττανελο, *Plut.* 290) – while the chorus-members should play the part of his herd, βληχώμενοι τε προβατίων αἰγῶν τε κινάβρωντων μέλη – “bleating the songs of stinking sheep and goats”. The chorus does not leave this unanswered: dealing with the Cyclops – twang! (θρεττανελο, *Plut.* 296) – they will better play the companions of Odysseus and blind him.

As for θρεττανελο (the onomatopoeic imitation of a stringed instrument), the scholia say that Philoxenus made Polyphemus play a lyre (κιθαρίζοντα) to express his love for Galatea (*Sch. Aristoph. Plut.* 290 c α 12–15 [see n. 25]; β 4–5; γ 5–7 Chantry). Still it is not clear whether the word θρεττανελο first appeared in the dithyramb²² or in Aristophanes' parody.²³ The assumption that the Cyclops' lyre-playing was only referred to in the narrative part of the dithyramb may be discounted,²⁴ since this explains neither the indelible impression reflected in the records nor the onomatopoeia: for Philoxenus it would have been unnecessary and for Aristophanes' audience, unintelligible, if not for an allusion to a key feature of Philoxenus' production. One version of the scholia explicitly claims that θρεττανελο was introduced by Philoxenus;²⁵ the other

²¹ Suid. τ 620. See Hordern 2002, 11.

²² Berglein 1843, 49–50; Holland 1884, 192; Pianko 1954, 34; Defradas 1969, 30–31; Zimmermann 1992, 127; Zimmermann 1993a, 31; Zimmermann 1993b, 47; Dobrov – Urios-Aparisi 1995, 170; Kugelmeier 1996, 257; Hordern 1999, 451; 453; Sommerstein 2001, 156; Csapo 2004, 215; Power 2013, 238; 254.

²³ Bergk 1882, 612–613; Holzinger 1940, 111; Mewald 1946, 281; Henderson 1957, 396; Richter 1968, 14; Wölffe 1981, 115; Zimmermann 1984, 59–60.

²⁴ Pace Webster in Pickard-Cambridge 1962, 46.

²⁵ *Sch. Aristoph. Plut.* 290 c α Chantry: Φιλόξενον τὸν διθυραμβοποιὸν – ἢ τραγωδοδιδάσκαλον – διασύρει, ὃς ἔγραψε τὸν ἔρωτα τοῦ Κύκλωπος τὸν ἐπὶ τῇ Γαλατείᾳ· εἶτα κιθάρας ἦχον μιμούμενος ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι, τοῦτό φησι τὸ ῥῆμα θρεττανελό. ἐκεῖ γὰρ εἰσάγει τὸν Κύκλωπα κιθαρίζοντα καὶ ἐρεθίζοντα τὴν Γαλατείαν (the subject of φησι must be the same as that of ἔγραψε and εἰσάγει, that is, Philoxenus, as noted by Holland 1884, 192 n. 1). Cf. *ibid.* γ.

appears to disagree.²⁶ Those who ascribe it to Philoxenus argue that the uncouth ogre who did not know how to play the lyre could only mimic its sound now and then between poetic lines.²⁷ Yet I find it problematic to imagine such a performance. Polyphemus' love song hardly lacked accompaniment, and a standard accompaniment – that by an aulos – would prevent any possibility of a recognizable imitation of the lyre²⁸ (given the fact that dithyrambic singers did not perform in costume, even increasing dramatization could not go so far as to supply a character with a lyre prop). It seems more plausible that a real chordophone was used by Philoxenus, be it a chelys-lyre suiting an amateur performer of a Cyclops' level of training²⁹ or a sonorous cithara appropriate for a public performance. We lack direct evidence of such an extravagant practice,³⁰ but many scholars³¹ feel it corresponds to what we know of the New Dithyramb. Cithara-playing occurred in tragedy when the plot dictated it,³² and the same may also apply to the dithyramb once solo songs were introduced into it:³³ the

²⁶ *Sch. Aristoph. Plut.* 290 p. 341 l. 11–13 Dübner (= 290 e β, 292 a α Chantry) τὸ δὲ θρεττανελὸ ποιὸν μέλος καὶ κρουμάτιόν ἐστι· τὸ δὲ “ἀλλ’ εἶα τέκεα θαμίν’ ἐπαναβοῶντες” ἐκ τοῦ Κύκλωπος Φιλοξένου ἐστὶ. The second particle δέ implies that θρεττανελο, unlike the following phrase, does not come from the *Cyclops*, as noted by Bergk 1882, 613.

²⁷ Berglein 1843, 49–50.

²⁸ *Pace Power* 2013, 254. Aulos- and cithara-players may have emulated and adopted each other's technical achievements, but even a masterly performance can hardly conceal the timbre of a wind instrument to an extent that would make the audience members believe that they were listening to a stringed instrument (by the way, *Power ibid.*, 243–244 and 254 speaks of the “aulization” of the cithara, not vice versa, and Plato *Resp.* 397 a names only wind instruments among objects of imitation).

²⁹ It is possible that the sound θρεττανελο was meant to reflect the primitive nature of the performance by Polyphemus who could only strum on the strings with his thumb: Holzinger 1940, 111; Mewald 1946, 281. Cf. *Sch. Aristoph. Plut.* 290 f Chantry: τινὲς τοῦτο ἀγροικικὴν φωνὴν εἶναι λέγουσιν.

³⁰ I doubt that the enigmatic expression of Plato (*Leg.* 700 d) καὶ αὐλῳδίας δὴ ταῖς κιθαρῳδίαις μιμούμενοι referred to the introduction of citharodic solos into dithyramb, for the term αὐλῳδία only ever seems to have concerned solo nomic singers: see Almazova 2008.

³¹ Pickard-Cambridge 1927, 61; Mewald 1946, 281; Richter 1968, 14; Zimmermann 1984, 60; Sutton 1983, 42; De Simone 2006, 71–72; see below n. 35.

³² For evidence on the occasional use of stringed instruments in drama, see Pickard-Cambridge 1968, 165–166; Wilson 2005, 185–186.

³³ It is generally accepted (Smyth 1900, 461; Pickard-Cambridge 1927, 61; Schönewolf 1938, 22; McEvelley 1970, 270; Sutton 1983, 40; 42), albeit not on quite firm grounds, that Philoxenus introduced solo songs into dithyramb. The main reason is the passage *Ps.-Plut. De mus.* 1142 A = *Aristoph. fr.* 293, although it is corrupted at the most important point.

central episode of the famous “Marsyas” by Melanippides (Philoxenus’ predecessor) must have been the contest between the satyr playing his aulos and Apollo playing his cithara,³⁴ and I do not see how it could be produced without using both instruments. I therefore believe that Philoxenus introduced a real lyre into his dithyramb, a novelty which illustrates the blurring of genre boundaries.³⁵ Onomatopoeic *θηρεττανελο* must be the work of Aristophanes: his characters allude to this impressive feature of the *Cyclops*, and since they do not have a lyre at hand they “play” on their lips.

However elsewhere in the same passage there is another hint of sound mimicry, this time employed by Philoxenus. Aristophanes quotes Polyphemus as he addresses his herd: “ἀλλ’ εἶα τέκεα θαμίν’ ἐπαναβοῶντες” (292), and next to the direct quotation³⁶ there is an appeal to *bleat*³⁷ the songs of sheep and goats (293–294). The word *βληχώμενοι* is repeated in the replica of the chorus-members (297) – even though bleating is not appropriate to the role of Odysseus’ companions, which they are going to play at that moment, – and is thus singled out.³⁸ This is most likely a reference to another experimental device used by Philoxenus: that is, he must have made the dithyrambic chorus mimic the voices of Polyphemus’ animals.³⁹ If this hypothesis is correct, we have a case of vocal sound mimicry.

Evidence directly connecting onomatopoeia with the New Music is limited to the three passages analyzed above. By analogy it has been assumed that the authors following this trend used sound mimicry in other cases as well, but it is important to remember that this is mere guesswork.

³⁴ See Boardman 1956, 19–20.

³⁵ Henderson 1957, 396; West 1992, 365–366; De Simone 2006, 71–72; 76.

³⁶ *Sch. Aristoph. Plut.* 292 a α: ὁ δὲ “ἀλλ’ εἶα τέκεα θαμίν’ ἐπαναβοῶντες” ἐκ τοῦ Κύκλωπος Φιλοξένου ἐστί.

³⁷ *Sch. Aristoph. Plut.* 293 b α: “βληχᾶσθαι” τὸ τὰ προβάτια ποιᾶ φωνῇ κε-χρηῆσθαι. – Bergk 1882, 612 *ad loc.* proposed an emendation of *βληχώμενοι* to *βληχόμενων* in *Plut.* 293, which does not change the sense. See Sommerstein 2001, 157.

³⁸ Holzinger 1940, 113.

³⁹ Klingender 1845, 46 (erroneously supposing that the bleating was imitated by numerous musical instruments); Hartung 1846, 415–416; Holzinger 1940, 113; Mureddu 1982, 80: “la qualità della mimesi messa in atto da Filosseno costituisce qui l’oggetto della sua parodia”; 82 n. 24; Zimmermann 1995, 125; Sommerstein 2001, 157; De Simone 2006, 67–68. A fragment of Hermesianax may also imply that sheep and goats somehow expressed their feelings in the *Cyclops*: in order to revive memories of Philoxenus’ work he mentions μέγαν πόθον, ὃν Γαλατεῖη / αὐτοῖς μηλείοις θήκαθ’ ὑπὸ προγόνοις (fr. 7 Powell = fr. 3 Lightfoot, 73–74).

For instance, “sound painting” might have seemed appropriate⁴⁰ in the scene of the naval battle in Timotheus’ *Persians*, the only citharodic nome where the text has partly survived. Th. J. Mathiesen even indicates a suitable expressive means: accumulation of sibilants in the section that describes the sea and the shore (Tim. *Pers.* fr. 19. 104–113 Edmonds = fr. 791. coll. II–IV. 95–104 Hordern), and thus relates the onomatopoeia with the vocal part.⁴¹

It has been assumed that instrumental sound mimicry was used in the *Scylla* which Aristotle refers to twice in the *Poetics* as an example of bad taste (most likely he means the dithyramb of Timotheus).⁴² It should be noted that the Stagirite is evidently referring to dramatic rather than sound mimesis: inferior auletes assume the role of the monster and try to grab at the chorus-leader. However, it is reasonable to believe that if an aulete fancied being a Scylla, he was led to it by his musical part and only passed from imitating κατὰ φωνάς to imitating κατὰ σῶμα. Still one should not forget that such an assumption is not as grounded as it is sometimes believed to be.⁴³

Besides, our sources mention certain instrumental effects or techniques whose very names imply that they would suit onomatopoeic purposes perfectly, although we cannot claim that their application lay only in sound mimicry or that it was their primary purpose. Some of these effects have been associated with the New Music authors.

⁴⁰ Henderson 1957, 396: “The bombastic libretto of Timotheus’ *Persae* was written for programme-music of the sort which attempted (Plato says) to make the noises of thunder, wind, hail, cats, dogs, cattle, bird-songs, and all kinds of instruments, with frequent and startling modulations”. Hordern 2002, 38–39: “The narrative of the Persian fleet’s destruction in Timotheus’ *Persae* would also be ideal for a display of the sort of musical mimesis described by Plato”. Cf. Zimmermann 1989, 30: “die teilweise lautmalerische Schilderung der Seeschlacht”.

⁴¹ Mathiesen 1999, 69.

⁴² *Poet.* 26, 1461 b 30–32 – see above n. 18. Collation of *Poet.* 15, 1454 a 30–31 with a papyrus fragment *Pap. Graec. Vind.* 26008 + 29329 (fr. 1, col. 2, l. 26 – 32, see the edition of Oellacher 1938, 135–181), in which the author of *Scylla* is named, proves that Aristotle is referring to the work of Timotheus when discussing the lament of Odysseus, and therefore probably also below when speaking of the auletes’ acting. See Tim. fr. 793 Page = Campbell = Hordern.

⁴³ West 1992, 363: “It was probably in Timotheus’ *Scylla* that auletes would make a show of grabbing at the chorus-leader, in imitation of the monster grabbing at Odysseus’ sailors. Homer describes Scylla as yelping like a young puppy, and Timotheus **no doubt** tried to achieve this effect in the aulos part”. Csapo 2004, 213: “Timotheus’ piper <...> made a mime of dragging off the *koryphaios* in *Scylla*, **doubtless** while reproducing the monster’s wild hisses and roars through his instrument” (my emphasis. – N. A.).

A comedy fragment by Diphilus cited by Athenaeus claims that Timotheus' auletes perform with a 'goose style' (Athen. 14. 74, p. 657 e = Diphil. fr. 78 K.-A.):

χηνίζειν δὲ εἶρηται ἐπὶ τῶν αὐλούντων. Δίφιλος Συνωρίδι·
ἐχηνίασας· ποιοῦσι τοῦτο πάντες οἱ
παρὰ Τιμοθέω.

The word 'to goosise' is applied to aulos-players. Diphilos in the *Synoris*:
"You have goosised! All the followers of Timotheus do that".

According to the interpretation of S. Hagel, the musicians are mocked for adopting a characteristic feature of the cackling of geese – "interspersed squeaks, where the voice suddenly, and only for a fraction of a second, breaks into a much higher pitch range, producing a sound that is much more clearly pitched, only to return immediately to its normal mode". Hagel notes that the enrichment of the musical range with sounds that were unusually high and startling rather than pleasant would have been typical of the New Music.⁴⁴

Philoxenus is credited with introducing certain νίγλαροι into his music (Ps.-Plut. *De mus.* 1142 A). This term occurs rarely and is hard to interpret. Lexicographers explain it with the help of τερετισμός or τερετίσματα, derivatives of τερετίζω (Hesych. *Lex.* v 559 s.v. νιγλαρεύων, 560 s.v. νίγλαροι; Phot. *Lex.* v 215 Theodoridis s.v. νιγλαρεύων, 216 s.v. νιγλάρους, 217 s.v. νίγλαροι; Suid. v 366 s.v. νίγλαροι), which literally means the chirping of a cicada or the twitter of a swallow (Hesych. 517, 518 s.vv. τερετίζοντα, τερετίσματα; Phot. *Lex.* 171 Theodoridis s.v. τερετίσματα; Suid. τ 338 s.v. τερετίσματα). Semantic analysis of these terms⁴⁵ shows that they were applied to singing and aulos-playing with elaborate melismata (lyre-playing is not explicitly referenced until the fifth to sixth centuries AD). In the case of singing this made the words unintelligible. The exact kind of embellishment implied is impossible to say; the significance of τερετισμός as a technical term is defined only in musical treatises of late antiquity and Byzantine times (Anon. *Bell.* 2; 10; 92; Bryenn. p. 481. 8 sqq., cf. 310. 24 sq. and 312. 11 sq. Jonker) in which it means a staccato repetition of the same note. In fact this effect is similar to the mimetic reproduction of a natural cicada's sound. A fragment from a comedy by Phrynichus⁴⁶ with

⁴⁴ Hagel 2010–2011, 496–497; 510–511.

⁴⁵ Restani 1983, 186–190; Rocconi 2003, 81–98.

⁴⁶ Athen. 2. 21, p. 44 d = Phrynich. fr. 74 K.-A.: <καὶ νιγ>λάρους θρηνεῖν, ἐν οἷσι Λάμπρος ἐναπέθνησεν, / ἄνθρωπος <ὦν> ὕδατοπότης, μινυρὸς ὑπερσοφιστής, / Μουσῶν σκελετός, ἀηδόνων ἠπίαιλος, ὕμνος "Αἰδου.

<νιγ>λάρους plausibly restored by Th. Bergk⁴⁷ suggests the same interpretation: the expression ἀηδόνων ἡπίαλος can create associations with the juggling of a nightingale, and the epithet μινυρός, with the high timbre of νίγλαροι.⁴⁸ The belief that νίγλαροι served for mimetic purposes⁴⁹ is shared by the *Suda*, where the term is thought to be onomatopoeic, though further explanation is not provided (ν 366: ἔοικεν ὀνοματοπεποιῆσθαι).

It is natural to describe such effects on the basis of their similarity to animal noises. Yet we cannot know whether they were invented and used purposefully to imitate such sounds. Known titles of Philoxenus' and Timotheus' works make one doubt that they systematically demanded mimicking of cicadas or geese (even more so since in the case of χηνίζειν we are dealing with teasing rather than a technical term). We therefore lack information about what these techniques were actually used for.

On the whole, there is hardly any doubt that the composers of the New Music used onomatopoeic effects, both vocal and instrumental, yet nowhere is it claimed that this characteristic was specifically innovative. What is more, two jokes out of three could not have arisen purely from the fact that sound mimicry was used: the conservative Dorion seems to say that its use in *Nauplius* was insufficient and thus unconvincing, whereas the avant-garde Stratonikus, on the contrary, ridicules the exaggerated violent realism in *Semele's Birth-Pangs*, which he likely believed was not appropriate for the divine subject.⁵⁰ As for Aristophanes, his allusion to Philoxenus' *Cyclops* may well be a kind of *Komplimentzitate*, rather than an explicit criticism.⁵¹

⁴⁷ Bergk 1838, 375–376.

⁴⁸ Hagel 2010–2011, 496 n. 16: “This passage ... contributes associations of feebleness and whining (μινυρός), while the expression ἀηδόνων ἡπίαλος adds substance to the idea of a staccato element, which is a plausible result of nightingales shivering from ague”.

⁴⁹ Restani 1983, 189: “Originariamente, si può pensare che νίγλαροι indicasse un suono imitativo di qualche stridulo o tintinnante verso di animale, coerente con la prassi mimetica musicale dei rappresentanti di tale indirizzo” (sc. the New Music).

⁵⁰ Cf. Privitera 1979, 320 n. 160: “Dorione derideva la tempesta del *Nauplio* per difetto...; Stratonico biasimava le gride di Semele, nel *Parto di Semele*, per eccesso”. Power 2013, 249–250: Dorion is not ridiculing sensational musical mimesis in general, but rather publicizing its lacklustre effect.

⁵¹ Cf. Nesselrath 1990, 251–252: “die Parodie auf den Κύκλωψ des Philoxenos ... ist ... kaum ein Angriff auf Philoxenos (dessen Name gar nicht fällt), sondern in Gegenteil fast eine Hommage an den großen Erfolg seines Κύκλωψ”.

II. Evidence of sound mimicry in Plato

Arguments that onomatopoeia was a characteristic of the New Music are usually backed with references to Plato. Indeed, it is in his works that we find the most extensive testimonies to sound mimicry in music.

First it is important to look again at the famous discussion on what must and must not be imitated in the poetry of an ideal polis (*Resp.* 3).

The second section of this discussion (392 c – 398 b) is dedicated to poetic expression (λέξις), that is, the two ways in which a poet presents his material: ‘imitation’ (μίμησις) and ‘narration’ (διήγησις). In 394 c Socrates names some of the literary genres he has in mind,⁵² and it is evident that they were not chosen on the base of whether they were connected to music or not: tragedy and comedy contain sung and spoken parts, dithyramb is entirely musical, while epos lacks singing.⁵³ Participants in the dialogue do not begin discussing specifically musical means until 398 c⁵⁴ (though harmony and rhythm are already mentioned in 397 c as additional expressive means used by poets). In 395 d – 396 b a list is compiled of what the guardians (and accordingly the poets composing for them)⁵⁵ must not imitate: women, slaves, debased people, madmen, handicraft workers. Then, quite unexpectedly, the following undesirable objects of imitation are added (396 b):

⁵² ...τῆς ποιήσεώς τε καὶ μυθολογίας ἡ μὲν διὰ μιμήσεως ὅλη ἐστὶν ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις **τραγωδία** τε καὶ **κωμῳδία** ἡ δὲ δι’ ἀπαγγελίας αὐτοῦ τοῦ ποιητοῦ – εὐροῖς δ’ ἂν αὐτὴν μάλιστά που ἐν **διθυράμβοις** – ἡ δ’ αὖ δι’ ἀμφοτέρων ἐν τε τῇ **τῶν ἐπῶν ποιήσει**, πολλαχοῦ δὲ καὶ **ἄλλοι**...

⁵³ The hypothesis on singing epic poetry (see West 1971, 308; West 1986, 45–46) does not seem applicable to the fourth century BC. For Aristotle ἐποποιία evidently belongs to ψιλομετρία (*Poet.* 1148 a 11), ἔξω μελοποιίας (1459 b 10), cf. 1462 a 14–16: πάντ’ ἔχει [sc. ἡ τραγωδία] ὅσαπερ ἡ ἐποποιία ... καὶ ἔτι οὐ μικρὸν μέρος τὴν μουσικὴν. According to the source of Ps.-Plut. (most probably Heraclides), the ancient citharodic practice of singing ἔπη (ὅτι δ’ οἱ κιθαρωδικοὶ νόμοι οἱ **πάλοι** ἐξ ἐπῶν συνίσταντο, which he takes pains to prove, see *De mus.* 1132 D–E; 1133 C) only lasted until the innovations of Phrynis and Timotheus (1132 D–E; 1133 B–C; cf. Procl. ap. Phot. *Bibl.* 320 b 5–11 Bekker).

⁵⁴ *Resp.* 3. 398 b 6 – c 2: Νῦν δὴ <...> κινδυνεύει ἡμῖν τῆς μουσικῆς τὸ περὶ λόγους τε καὶ μύθους παντελῶς διαπεπεράνθαι· ἅ τε γὰρ λεκτέον καὶ ὡς λεκτέον εἴρηται. <...> Οὐκοῦν μετὰ τοῦτο <...> τὸ περὶ ᾧδης τρόπου καὶ μελῶν λοιπόν;

⁵⁵ In the *Republic* Plato causes problems for interpreters by indiscriminately describing the acts of composing, performing, and perceiving of poetic work as μίμησις. For an attempt at explanation see Havelock 1963, chapters III and IX.

Τί δέ; ἵππους χρεμετίζοντας καὶ ταύρους μυκωμένους καὶ ποταμοὺς
 ψοφοῦντας καὶ θάλατταν κτυποῦσαν καὶ βροντὰς καὶ πάντα αὖ τὰ
 τοιαῦτα ἢ μιμήσονται;
 Ἄλλ' ἀπείρηται αὐτοῖς, ἔφη, μήτε μαίνεσθαι μήτε μαινομένοις
 ἀφομοιοῦσθαι.

Well then, will they imitate horses neighing, bulls bellowing, rivers
 gurgling, the sea roaring, the thunder and everything of that kind?
 But they have been forbidden, he said, to be mad or to act like madmen.

The homogeneous series of examples is interrupted: instead of dealing with the imitation of persons, it deals with the imitation of the sounds of nature. No wonder the readers of the passage may feel confused. H. Koller even claimed that Plato had suddenly changed the meaning of *μίμησις* as well as the argument and started quoting a treatise of Damon on entirely musical matters, thus anticipating the following section.⁵⁶ Yet it is hardly plausible that Socrates simply lost his train of thought: a little later he knows exactly what stage of the argument they have reached (see n. 54). Thus the phrase should not be analyzed beyond its broader context (that is, discussing *λέξις*).

It is clear from Socrates' explanations (392 e – 394 a) that *διήγησις* means narrative in the third person, and *μίμησις* means the dramatic impersonation in direct speech: when Homer speaks on behalf of Chryses in *Il.* 1, he imitates, whereas to say: "Chryses came and started to plead..." would be a narration. Therefore in our passage Plato considers the possibility that a poet (or a performer) might not say, "And the hungry sea was roaring, and a storm was on its deep",⁵⁷ but would rather utter the sounds of wild nature himself. The ironic response by Adeimantus makes this even more evident: one can liken a person who bellows or howls to a madman, but not someone who simply narrates the story of a bull or a tempest.

The same possibility occurs again in 397 a: a worthy performer will only imitate irreproachable people, while a debased and unscrupulous one will not be so restrained.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ μὴ τοιοῦτος αὖ, ὅσῳ ἂν φαυλότερος ᾖ, πάντα τε
 μᾶλλον διηγήσεται καὶ οὐδὲν ἑαυτοῦ ἀνάξιον οἰήσεται εἶναι, ὥστε
 πάντα ἐπιχειρήσει μιμεῖσθαι σπουδῇ τε καὶ ἐναντίον πολλῶν, καὶ ἃ
 νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, βροντὰς τε καὶ ψόφους ἀνέμων τε καὶ χαλαζῶν καὶ
 ἁζόνων τε καὶ τροχιλιῶν, καὶ σαλπίγγων καὶ αὐλῶν καὶ συρίγγων
 καὶ πάντων ὀργάνων φωνάς, καὶ ἔτι κυνῶν καὶ προβάτων καὶ ὀρνέων

⁵⁶ Koller 1954, 18–21.

⁵⁷ J. T. Field, "The Tempest".

φθόγγους· καὶ ἔσται δὴ ἡ τούτου λέξις ἅπανσα διὰ μιμήσεως φωναῖς τε καὶ σχήμασιν, ἢ μικρόν τι διηγήσεως ἔχουσα;
Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, καὶ τοῦτο.

“Well then”, I said, “the man who is not like this will go right through everything, and the more so the more despicable he is. He will think nothing unworthy of him, so that he will make great efforts, before large audiences, to imitate everything, as we were saying just now – thunder, and the noises of winds and hail and axes and pulleys, and the voices of salpings and auloi and syringes and instruments of every kind, and even the sounds of dogs and sheep and birds: and his diction will consist entirely of imitations by voice and gesture, or will include just a smattering of narration”.

“That is inevitable as well”, he said.⁵⁸

As we remember, at this point Plato is examining poetic expression (λέξις); he has not yet dealt with specifically musical means, and, more generally, he does not regard instrumental music without words as suitable education. It follows that he ascribes sound mimicry to the human voice. In the previous passage (396 b) one might still have thought that Plato implied using all expressive means at a poet’s disposal, including instrumental interludes between sung phrases. However, in the present case (397 a) musical instruments are themselves listed among the objects it would be unwise to imitate. The context does not even encourage one to consider using one instrument to imitate the sounds of another (such as *σαλπιστικά κρούματα* played on an aulos in the Pythian nome), because the aulos, normally the only instrument used in drama or dithyramb (the genres mentioned above, 394 c), is itself included in the list of forbidden objects.⁵⁹ Besides, the means of imitation – *φωναῖς τε καὶ σχήμασιν* – are indicated; a combination of *φωναί* with movements or postures also makes one think of the physical possibilities of the human body. One further argument is presented by W. B. Stanford:⁶⁰ he draws attention to 395 d, where it is specifically stated that imitation affects a person in relation to body, voice and mind (*καὶ κατὰ σῶμα καὶ φωνὰς καὶ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν*). The examples that follow involve first the condition of mind (women, slaves, cowards, madmen) and then bodily gestures (manual workers), so it is natural to expect that the third group will deal with the human voice.

⁵⁸ Translation: Barker 1984, 128.

⁵⁹ However it is hard to raise an objection to Power 2013, 244 n. 30, who considers a possibility of a citharistic imitation of the aulos.

⁶⁰ Stanford 1973, 186.

Thus we see that the *Republic* depicts a surprisingly widespread use of sound mimicry in poetry, as known to Plato.

The question arises of what genres are implied. By now we can exclude the effects of instrumental music or stage machinery⁶¹ and are still left with a broad choice (in fact Plato must have had in mind every kind of poetry that contains mimetic effects). For the most part, scholars think that the musical (or partly musical) genres mentioned in 394 c (see n. 52) – dramatic performances (or just comedy)⁶² and contemporary dithyramb⁶³ – are implied. In addition, there is enigmatic evidence of skilled sound imitators that may be relevant, though we are not told of the circumstances in which they practiced their art: Pseudo-Aristotle (*De audib.* 800 a 25–29) mentions people who are able to imitate the voices of horses, frogs, nightingales, cranes and “almost all other animals”; Plutarch (*De aud. poet.* 18 c) says that Parmenon was particularly good at imitating a pig’s squealing, and Theodorus, the noise of a pulley.⁶⁴ F. Ademollo suggests that these are performances of mimes.⁶⁵

Stanford⁶⁶ proposed a revisal of this traditional interpretation, claiming that Plato’s primary target is Homeric epos with the “sound painting” observed by ancient critics. Although he rightly argues that both Platonic passages deal with poetic texts and not instrumental music, his conclusion that no musical genre was intended at all is an obvious overstatement: he does not take into account that the syncretism of music and poetry was natural for Plato. Nevertheless, the evidence that he collected on Homeric poems is worth examining.

⁶¹ Proposed by Adam 1969, 151.

⁶² Atkins 1952, 37 (comedy); Adam 1969, 151; Zimmermann 1984, 79 with n. 52; Ferrari 1989, 116; Burnyeat 1999, 270; Prauschello 2014, 218–219; for literary evidence, see below part III.

⁶³ Adam 1969, 151; Murray 1996, 180; for literary evidence, see above part I.

⁶⁴ Parmenon was probably a comic actor (Stephanis 1988, no. 2012), and Theodorus a tragic actor (*ibid.*, no. 1157) in the mid-fourth century BC. However “imitation of the disagreeable noise made by a windlass or block and tackle mechanism seems remote from tragic acting” (Hunter–Russell 2011, 101). Nor does a performance that made Παρμένωντος ὄς proverbial resemble a comedy: we infer from a more detailed account of Plutarch (*Quaest. conv.* 5. 1. 2, 674 c) that Parmenon had rivals who tried in vain to outdo him publicly.

⁶⁵ Ademollo 2011, 273. Cf. imitation διὰ τῆς φωνῆς mentioned in Aristot. *Poet.* 1447 a 20, which is probably different from musical genres such as tragedy, comedy, dithyramb, aulos- and cithara-playing.

⁶⁶ Stanford 1973, followed by Murray 1996, 177–178. Confronting in 397 c examples of sounds which are not mentioned in Homer, both admit that Plato extends the scope of his discussion to include some contemporary literature.

To my mind, one part of this evidence can be set aside at once, and that is the use of words etymologically based on sound imitation (onomatopoeia in the linguistic sense). Some learned readers of Homer believed that he was aware of the rules followed by the first inventors of names and applied them to his own word-making which reflected Nature itself (Dion. Hal. *De comp.* 16; Dio Chrys. 12, 68: *καναχάς τε καὶ βόμβους καὶ κτύπον καὶ δοῦπον καὶ ἄραβον πρῶτος ἐξευρὼν καὶ ὀνομάσας*; Ps.-Plut. *De Hom. vita et poesi* 16). Lists of sounds that are named with such words (including that of the sea, rivers, winds, animals, birds and musical instruments) overlap – for natural reasons – with lists of the objects of sound mimicry in *Resp.* 396 b – 397 c. This leads Stanford to conclude that Plato’s discussion was the starting point for later authors who believed that he was referring to the onomatopoeic language of Homer.⁶⁷ However, if the writers of Roman times did indeed believe that they were developing Platonic argument, they were wrong. A lack of precision in various respects can be demonstrated in their direct references to Plato: despite Dio’s aberration of memory⁶⁸ or Dionysius’ superficial reading,⁶⁹ nowhere in the *Republic* is there a single reference to etymology or Homer the sound imitator, and in *Cratylus* ὀνοματοποιοί are by no means related to Homer and have nothing to do with sound mimicry. In response to Stanford one may object that using etymologically onomatopoeic words does not involve impersonation, and from the point of view displayed in *Resp.* 3 it would be διήγησις and not μίμησις. Socrates himself cannot do without them (*χρεμετίζοντας, μυκωμένους, ψοφούντας, κτυποῦσαν, βροντάς*), so it is hardly likely that he would consider such generally accepted “sound imitation” as a sign of madness or bad taste.

Having rejected this kind of evidence, we must turn to a much more subtle matter indicated by Stanford, that is, “sound painting” or, as R. Nünlist puts it, the “iconic relation between form and content”:⁷⁰ by accumulating certain vowels or consonants, arranging long or short

⁶⁷ Stanford 1973, 187; 188: “From the similarity between these passages in Dionysios and Dion, and the two in *Republic* 396 b – 7 c it would seem that the two later writers had the earlier discussion in mind and were answering Socrates’ objections from the point of view of the poet, while defending Homer’s use of onomatopoeia as a poetic device”.

⁶⁸ Dio Chrys. 53. 5: ὁ δὲ Πλάτων ἅμα αἰτιώμενος αὐτόν (sc. Ὅμηρον), ὡς εἶπον, καὶ τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ θαυμαστήν τινα ἀποφαίνει τῆς ποιήσεως, ὡς εἰκόνα ὄντα παντὸς χρήματος καὶ **πάσας ἀτεχνῶς ἀφιέντα φωνάς, ποταμῶν τε καὶ ἀνέμων καὶ κυμάτων** (there follows a reference to *Resp.* 398 a).

⁶⁹ Dion. Hal. *De comp.* 14–16 (with a reference to the *Cratylus* and “many other places” in 16); for a discussion of his erroneous understanding of Plato, see Belardi 1985, 24–53, esp. 44; 46–48; 52–53.

⁷⁰ Nünlist 2009, 215.

syllables, accentuating or concealing word-endings, using particular forms of words etc. a poet can depict through sound the content of the passage or the action described within.⁷¹ Stanford offers a collection of examples from Greek literature,⁷² that for the most part lack the acknowledgment of ancient readers. Yet this technique was not unknown in antiquity, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus teaches it, drawing examples from Homer (*De comp.* 15–16; 20). He argues that certain passages depict movements (*Il.* 21. 240–242; *Od.* 9. 415–416; 11. 593–598), appearance (*Od.* 17. 36–37; 6. 162–163; 11. 281–282), and emotions (*Il.* 22. 476; 18. 225). There are also images of two conjoining rivers (*Il.* 4. 452–453: ὥς δ' ὅτε χεῖμαρροι ποταμοὶ κατ' ὄρεσφι ῥέοντες / ἐς μισγάγκειαν συμβάλλετον ὄβριμον ὕδωρ) and of the sea beating against the shore (*Il.* 17. 267: ἡϊόνες βοόωσιν ἐρευγομένης ἀλὸς ἔξω) – the same objects of sound imitation as mentioned in the *Republic*. The latter verse was famous in antiquity for its clear visualization of the content through the use of βοόωσιν (e.g. Aristot. *Poet.* 1458 b 31; Ps.-Plut. *De Hom. vita et poesi* 16); it was even claimed that Plato (or Solon) burned his own poetry after reading this unsurpassed line.⁷³ So are we to agree with Stanford that Plato had in mind this complex “sound painting” in unsung poetry rather than simple sound-for-sound imitation that was likely set to the music?

My impression is that in the *Republic* Plato refers to well-known examples that would have been easily recognizable (it must not be more difficult to notice an imitation of a horse whinnying than to notice speaking, say, on behalf of a woman in love). Revealing Homer’s “sound painting” is a much more complicated matter that requires special philological interest and skill. As Stanford himself admits, such subtle mimetic effects are not easy to detect (a case postulated by one listener may seem imaginary to another); there is no agreed scientific basis to appreciate

⁷¹ Etymologically onomatopoeic words often occur in such passages, but the device under consideration is not tantamount to simply using them (Stanford 1973 does not mark the difference).

⁷² Stanford 1967, 99–116.

⁷³ *Sch. Hom. Il.* 17. 263–265: οὐ μόνον ῥεύματι ποταμοῦ οὐδὲ κύματι θαλάσσης εἶκασε τὸν ἦχον, ἀλλ' ἄμφω συνέπλεξε. καὶ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν κῶμα μέγα θαλάσσης ἐπιφερόμενον ποταμοῦ ῥεύματι καὶ τῷ ἀνακόπτεσθαι βρυχώμενον, καὶ τὰς ἐκατέρωθεν τοῦ ποταμοῦ θαλασσίας ἡϊόνας ἠχούσας, ὃ ἐμιμήσατο διὰ τῆς ἐπεκτάσεως τοῦ βοόωσιν. αὕτη ἡ εἰκὼν Πλάτωνος ἔκαυσε τὰ ποιήματα· οὕτως ἐναργέστερον τοῦ ὁρωμένου τὸ ἀκουόμενον παρέστησεν. *Ibid.* 265: Σόλωνά φασι τὸν νομοθέτην, μιμησάμενον τὴν Ὀμήρου ποίησιν ἐν ἅπασιν, ἐνθάδε γενόμενον καὶ προσ<σ>χόντα τῷ στίχῳ σφόδρα κατ' εὐταξίαν ἐπιτετευγμένῳ διαπορῆσαι καὶ θαυμάσαντα κατακαῦσαι τὰ ἴδια σκέμματα· τῆς γὰρ ἐπαλλήλου τῶν ὑδάτων ἐκβολῆς ἢ τοῦ βοόωσιν ἀναδίπλωσις ὁμοίαν ἀπετέλεσε συνφθόρον.

adequacy in verbal sound-imitation, and for the most part it is unclear whether the poet's use was deliberate.⁷⁴ Though our earliest examples derive from the Homeric scholia,⁷⁵ it cannot be ruled out that some of Plato's contemporaries and even the sophistic tradition before him might already have revealed interest in the topic.⁷⁶ Yet in this case I believe that the philosopher would have felt it necessary to provide a theoretical introduction analyzing the imitative possibilities of the στοιχεῖα of human speech. Dionysius did so for his phonosymbolical studies (*De comp.* 14–15), as did Plato himself in *Cratylus* during an experiment to see whether letters and syllables can express the essence of things (starting with 424 b: ὁρθότατόν ἐστι διελέσθαι τὰ στοιχεῖα πρῶτον).

At this point it seems sensible to address one more Platonic passage, this time from *Cratylus*. The participants in the dialogue must define the ὀνομαστική τέχνη, identifying it by what it is *not* (423 c–d):

EPM. ...ἀλλὰ τίς ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, μίμησις εἴη τὸ ὄνομα;

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐκ ἔάν καθάπερ τῇ μουσικῇ μιμούμεθα τὰ πράγματα οὕτω μιμώμεθα, καίτοι φωνῇ γε καὶ τότε μιμούμεθα· ἔπειτα οὐκ ἔάν ἅπερ ἡ μουσικὴ μιμεῖται καὶ ἡμεῖς μιμώμεθα, οὐ μοι δοκοῦμεν ὀνομάσκειν. λέγω δέ τοι τοῦτο· ἔστι τοῖς πράγμασι φωνὴ καὶ σχῆμα ἐκάστω, καὶ χρώμα γε πολλοῖς;

EPM. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἔοικε τοίνυν οὐκ ἔάν τις ταῦτα μιμηται, οὐδὲ περὶ ταύτας τὰς μιμήσεις ἡ τέχνη ἡ ὀνομαστικὴ εἶναι. αὗται μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἡ μὲν μουσικὴ, ἡ δὲ γραφικὴ.

HERM. But, Socrates, what sort of imitation should the name be?

SOCR. It seems to me that we shall not be naming, first, if we imitate the objects as we imitate them in music – although there too we imitate them with the voice – and secondly, if we imitate the very items which music imitates. What do I mean thereby? Do the objects have each a sound and a shape, and many of them a colour as well?

HERM. Of course.

SOCR. It seems, then, that the onomastic art is not involved if one imitates these features, and does not concern these imitations. For the arts involved therein are respectively music and painting.⁷⁷

⁷⁴ Stanford 1967, 99–100. Most examples adduced by Dionysius would be hard to understand without his explanations. He also takes pains to prove that the sound effects noted by him are not incidental: καὶ ὅτι ταῦτα οὐ φύσεώς ἐστιν αὐτοματιζούσης ἔργα ἀλλὰ τέχνης μιμήσασθαι πειρωμένης τὰ γινόμενα, τὰ τούτοις ἐξῆς λεγόμενα δηλοῖ (*De comp.* 20).

⁷⁵ See Richardson 1980, 283–287; Nünlist 2009, 215–217.

⁷⁶ See Ademollo 2011, 282.

⁷⁷ Translation: Ademollo 2011, 273–274

A reader cannot help noticing that the definition of music suggested here is unsatisfactory:⁷⁸ surely the art of music cannot be reduced to imitating, through sounds,⁷⁹ only those sounds produced by objects or associated with them. Attempting to do justice to Plato, one might suppose that he did not mean to define all existing music as such and was rather saying that imitation of the sounds of objects falls within the realm of music. In any case, two important conclusions arise from this passage. First, sound mimicry was common enough in music to afford such a reference. Second, if the imitation of sounds is the province of music for Plato in *Cratylus*, this must also be the case for the *Republic*: when speaking of mimicking bulls, horses, rivers, the sea, thunder, etc., he implies poetic genres set to music rather than Homeric epos.

We are not aware how exactly the poets performed this sound imitation. Modern experience strongly suggests that musical means played an important part, but we are in no position to confirm this. Since sound mimicry involved the voice, one might expect to find its traces in extant texts. However, this is not the case in known archaic and classical lyrics,⁸⁰ except in comedy (see part III below). One possible explanation might be that onomatopoeic sounds were inarticulate, performed *extra metrum* and therefore not written down;⁸¹ another is, that there is not a significant archive of early lyric poetry, so the lack of sound mimesis in extant pieces is accidental.⁸² Otherwise it can be assumed – in accordance with Hordern and those commentators who relate Plat. *Resp.* 396 b and 397 a to the later dithyramb⁸³ – that *vocal* sound mimicry in high poetry first and only

⁷⁸ Ademollo 2011, 275.

⁷⁹ Ademollo 2011, 275 n. 30 interprets φωνή in this passage first as ‘voice’ (καίτοι φωνῇ γε καὶ τότε μιμούμεθα implies “like in naming”) and then more generally as ‘any sound whatsoever’ (ἔστι τοῖς πράγμασι φωνή). I prefer to admit the generic meaning for both cases, which includes both singing and musical instruments.

⁸⁰ The famous case of the Deliads in *Hymn. Hom.* 3. 162–164 (πάντων δ’ ἀνθρώπων φωνὰς καὶ κρεμβαλιαστὸν / μιμεῖσθ’ ἴσασιν· φαίη δέ κεν αὐτὸς ἕκαστος / φθέγγεσθ’· οὕτω σφιν καλὴ συνάρηρεν αἰοιδή), I believe, deals with observing the folk traditions of various Greek peoples in song and dance, and not with sound mimicry. Cf. Pozdnev 2010 [M. M. Позднев, *Психология искусства. Учение Аристотеля*], 89–91.

⁸¹ For instance, one could imagine a mimetic illustration accompanying Alcman’s words οἶδα δ’ ὀρνίχων νόμῳ παντῶν (fr. 40 Page) or γεγλωσσαμένην κακκαβίδων ὅπα συνθέμενος (fr. 39 Page).

⁸² One exception is Archilochus’ τήνελλα (fr. 324 IEG) imitating the sound of a cithara, see *Sch. Pind. Ol.* 9. 1, l. p. 267, 1–13 Dr. However, this might already have been a traditional acclamation of a victor by Archilochus’ time. West 1992, 67 n. 86, compares τήνελλα before καλλίνικε with the cue *hip-hip* before *hooray*.

⁸³ See above n. 11; 63.

became widespread under the influence of the New Music. The genres most affected by this trend were dithyramb and citharody; tragedy was also influenced, though the tragedians are never referred to as pioneers.⁸⁴ It is well known that little has remained of its authors' verse, let alone the music. Yet even scarce fragments lead one to conclude that sound-play gained unprecedented importance among them and was sometimes used to mimic sense:⁸⁵ e.g., Timotheus seems to have accumulated sigmas to imitate the sea and dental mutes to depict the wailing of the naked frozen Persians (fr. 19. 104–119 Edmonds = fr. 791. coll. II–VI. 95–109 Hordern);⁸⁶ Euripides portrays barbaric speech by means of anadiplosis, anaphora and alliteration (*Phoen.* 678–681).⁸⁷ The mimetic effect of such sound figures was probably enhanced by music.

Finally, let us turn to a discussion of musical art in the *Laws* (*Leg.* 2. 668 a – 670 d). Clearly, Plato is referring to contemporary practice when he indicates two widespread errors made by composers, which the Muses never would have committed. The first (669 c–d) consists of a wrong combination of mimetic elements:

(I) οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖναί γε <sc. Μοῦσαι> ἐξαμάρτοιέν ποτε τοσοῦτον ὥστε ῥήματα ἀνδρῶν ποιήσασαι τὸ χρῶμα γυναικῶν καὶ μέλος ἀποδοῦναι, καὶ μέλος ἐλευθέρων αὐτῶν καὶ σχήματα συνθεῖσαι ῥυθμοὺς δούλων καὶ ἀνελευθέρων προσαρμόττειν, οὐδ' αὐτῶν ῥυθμοὺς καὶ σχήματα ἐλευθέριον ὑποθεῖσαι μέλος ἢ λόγον ἐναντίον ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς, (II) ἔτι δὲ θηρίων φωνὰς καὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὀργάνων καὶ πάντας ψόφους εἰς ταῦτόν οὐκ ἂν ποτε συνθεῖεν, ὥς ἔν τι μιμούμεναι· ποιηταὶ δὲ ἀνθρώπινοι σφόδρα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐμπλέκοντες καὶ συγκυκλῶντες ἀλόγως, γέλωτ' ἂν παρασκευάζοιεν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅσους φησὶν Ὀρφεὺς λαχεῖν ὥραν τῆς τέρψιος. ταῦτά γε γὰρ ὀρώσι πάντα κυκώμενα.

For the Muses would never make so gross an error as to compose words suitable for men, and then give the melody a colouring proper to women, to put together melody and postures of free men and then fit to them rhythms proper to slaves and servile persons, or to start with rhythms and postures expressive of freedom, and to give them a melody or words of opposite character to the rhythms; nor would they ever put together in the same piece the sounds of wild beasts and men and instruments, and

⁸⁴ West 1992, 357.

⁸⁵ Csapo 2004, 222–223.

⁸⁶ Mathiesen 1999, 69.

⁸⁷ Csapo 2004, 222–223.

noises of all sorts, as though in imitation of a single object. But human composers, weaving and jumbling all such things nonsensically together, would be laughed at by everyone who, as Orpheus puts it, ‘has attained the full bloom of joyfulness’. For they can see all these things jumbled together.⁸⁸

The description of this mistake includes two points: with ἔτι δέ the phrase is clearly divided into two parts (marked as I and II here), each depending upon a verb in optative mood + ἄν with the negation οὐ ... ποτε. Both points specify the same error: the combining of different objects of imitation. Neither part inquires which object is good and which is bad (it is only by adducing passages from the *Republic* for comparison that we can guess that the Muses, in Plato’s opinion, would not imitate a base character or an animal voice).

Still, there is also a difference. The first part (I) deals with the means of imitating an ethos – words, “colouring”,⁸⁹ melody, rhythm, and postures (ῥήματα, χρώμα, μέλος, ῥυθμός, σχήματα): female devices are not to be mixed with male, nor noble with servile. It is clear that none of these components are ruled out as unnecessary in a composition (Plato approves of syncretic art, see 669 d–e) – one merely has to ensure they are all suitable and compatible in regard to the object of imitation, that is, the ethos. If one puts together a “male” melody with a “female” rhythm, the result will be not two different artistic images, but rather no one imitated properly. The lack of poetic mastery is evident here in the inability to define correctly the ethos of a certain expressive means.

As for sound mimicry (II), surely it would not be difficult for an author or his audience to understand what sounds must be imitated. Oddly, Plato argues that one should not introduce the imitation of different sounds (such as human and animal voices) into the same composition, since this would destroy the unity of the whole. His aim is apparently to prevent an excessive variety of expressive means and modulations (*Resp.* 397 b–c).⁹⁰ However, taken alone, this passage does not mean that onomatopoeia is in itself unacceptable.

⁸⁸ Translation: Barker 1984, 154.

⁸⁹ Barker 1984, 154 n. 80: “*Chroma*, possibly here in the sense related to tuning” (cf. 143 n. 62: “Metaphorical references to ‘colouring’ in music seem to refer to expressive effects involving either ‘tone-colour’ or nuances of tuning”).

⁹⁰ West 1992, 369: “All this can only be done by using a whole range of different scales, rhythms, and changes of one to another. Once it is excluded, there will be no need of polychordy and omnimodality in the music, or of instruments such as harps or auloi that yield excessive numbers of notes and scales, or of complex rhythms”.

The reference to the imitation of human voices is curious. Perhaps it relates to the performance of any vocal part in the first person. Yet in the same list containing the imitation of animals and instruments, Plato may be implying any conscious changing of the voice, such as performing a woman's part in a high register⁹¹ or imitating barbaric speech. Nor can mimicking the human voice with a musical instrument be ruled out, especially inarticulate groans and cries (such as those of a woman in childbirth by Timotheus).

It is unclear from this passage whether Plato meant vocal or instrumental sound mimicry, or both.

The composers' second mistake consists in violating the syncretism of poetry, music and dance (669 d – 670 a):

καὶ ἔτι διασπῶσιν οἱ ποιηταὶ ῥυθμὸν μὲν καὶ σχήματα μέλους χωρὶς, λόγους ψιλοῦς εἰς μέτρα τιθέντες, μέλος δ' αὖ καὶ ῥυθμὸν ἄνευ ῥημάτων, ψιλῇ κιθαρίσει τε καὶ αὐλήσει προσχρώμενοι, ἐν οἷς δὴ παγχάλεπον ἄνευ λόγου γινόμενον ῥυθμὸν τε καὶ ἁρμονίαν γινώσκειν ὅτι τε βούλεται καὶ ὅτῳ ἔοικε τῶν ἀξιολόγων μιμημάτων· ἀλλὰ ὑπολαβεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ὅτι τὸ τοιοῦτόν γε πολλῆς ἀγροικίας μεστὸν πᾶν, ὅποσον τάχους τε καὶ ἀπταισίας καὶ φωνῆς θηριώδους σφόδρα φίλον ὥστ' αὐλήσει γε χρῆσθαι καὶ κιθαρίσει πλὴν ὅσον ὑπὸ ὄρχησίν τε καὶ ᾠδῇν, ψιλῷ δ' ἑκατέρῳ πᾶσά τις ἀμουσία καὶ θαυματουργία γίγνεται ἂν τῆς χρήσεως.

And further, the composers tear rhythm and posture away from melody, putting bare words into metres, setting melody and rhythm without words, and using the cithara and the aulos without the voice, a practice in which it is extremely difficult – since rhythm and *harmonia* occur with no words – to understand what is intended, and what worthwhile representation it is like. It is essential that we accept the principle that all such practices are utterly inartistic, if they are so enamoured of speed and precision and animal noises that they use the music of the aulos and the cithara for purposes other than the accompaniment of dance and song: the use of either by itself is characteristic of uncultured and vulgar showmanship.⁹²

⁹¹ Such as the part of Electra in Euripides: see *Sch. Eur. Or.* 176, p. 116, 14–16 Schwartz.

⁹² Translation: Barker 1984, 154.

This is the famous Platonic passage in which music that is purely instrumental is condemned, with reasons adduced. The participants in the dialogue have to confess that in spite of their working hypothesis about the mimetic character of any kind of music (668 a–c) it is difficult to recognize the mimesis when the text is missing (though they believe that true connoisseurs would be able to do so). Annoyed, the Athenian remarks: <anyway this task is not even worth our efforts, since> there is nothing good in music which aims only at displaying masterly technique (τάχος καὶ ἀπταισσία) and sound-mimetic tricks (φωνὴ θηριώδης).

This phrase clearly shows that onomatopoeia is the acknowledged forte of instrumental music:⁹³ virtuoso musicians were even willing to sacrifice poetic text and dance in order to perform it perfectly.

Thus Plato provides the following information: musical mimicry was common in his time; it was particularly typical of instrumental music, but also occurred in vocal forms. The philosopher dismisses imitating the inarticulate sounds of nature as senseless trickery.

Is it reasonable to connect Plato's evidence to the New Music? The culmination of this phenomenon dates to the second half of the fifth century BC, whereas the *Republic* was composed ca. 380–370, and the *Laws* ca. 360–347. Yet, firstly, it is plausible that the innovations introduced proved to be irreversible and influenced the further development of Greek music;⁹⁴ secondly, Plato's aesthetic predilections perhaps took shape in his young years and scarcely changed later on; in addition, reproducing a situation in the age of Socrates would suit the Socratic dialogues.⁹⁵ It cannot be denied that an overview of everything that Plato found unacceptable in this art closely matches known features of the New Music.⁹⁶ However, it should be noted that the passages considered above contain no references to any recent degradation (such as in *Leg.* 659 b–c or 700 a – 701 b). If Plato dislikes some aspects of music, one can hardly make the New Music responsible for everything he

⁹³ There is nothing new in claiming that a programmatic character and sound-mimetic elements were typical features of Greek instrumental music (see e.g. Guhrauer 1904; West 1992, 368 n. 49; Hagel 2010–2011, 497; Rocconi 2014). Cf. Aristot. *Poet.* 1447 a 14–16: καὶ τῆς αὐλητικῆς ἢ πλείστη καὶ κιθαριστικῆς πᾶσαι τυγχάνουσιν οὔσαι μιμήσεις τὸ σύνολον.

⁹⁴ See Henderson 1957, 397–398; West 1992, 371–372.

⁹⁵ I owe this observation to Prof. A. Verlinsky.

⁹⁶ Csapo 2004, 236: “Plato makes no secret of his tastes in music. If there is one thing that characterizes them all, it is violent antipathy to every feature of New Musical style” (a series of examples follows).

disapproves of. For example, he does not accept melody without words (*Leg.* 669 d – 670 a), but no one would conclude that instrumental music was first separated from the text in his time or a little before, since it was already the subject of musical contests in the sixth century. He may not welcome the aulos (*Resp.* 399 d, cf. *Gorg.* 501 e), but this is no reason to doubt the long history of Greek wind instruments before they played an important part in the musical “revolution” of the fifth century.⁹⁷ Plato is not claiming that the use of sound mimicry in music was innovative. However, its relatively recent penetration into sung poetry may be conjectured with caution.

III. Onomatopoeia in comedy

There are reasons to suspect that artists of the New Music were not the first to apply vocal sound mimicry, just as they were not the first to use it in instrumental pieces: one cannot help but notice its repeated use by Aristophanes. The imitation of a stringed instrument occurs not only in *Plutus* (θερεττανελο 290, 296), but also in the *Frogs* (τοφλαττοθρατ τοφλαττοθρατ as a refrain in 1286–1295), in a parody of Aeschylus’ chorus songs, which seem to be taken “from the citharodic nomes” (1282). At the beginning of the *Knights* the flogged slaves imitate an auletic duet, howling a nome of Olympus to express their suffering (μυμῦ μυμῦ μυμῦ μυμῦ μυμῦ μυμῦ 10). In the *Birds*, the peculiarity of the Hoopoe’s song as well as that of the chorus’ lyrics in the parabasis is the imitation of various bird-calls,⁹⁸ and in the *Frogs*, the zest of the frog chorus is the croaking (βρεκεκεκεξ κοαξ κοαξ as a refrain in 209–268). Of note, sound mimicry occurs mainly in the sung rather than the spoken parts (*Eq.* 10 is transmitted as an iambic trimeter, but I believe that the characters actually sang the original music of Olympus with its own rhythm). This supports the hypothesis that music was considered a necessary aid to such effects.

⁹⁷ On the role of the auloi see Csapo 2004, 211–212.

⁹⁸ Hoopoe’s call-song: ἐποποποί, ποποποποί ποποί, ιὼ ιὼ ιτὼ ιτὼ ιτὼ ιτὼ 227–228; τιο τιο τιο τιο τιο τιο τιο τιο 237; τριοτό τριοτό τοτοβρίξ 243, τορο τορο τορο τοροτίξ, κικκαβαῦ κικκαβαῦ, τορο τορο τορο τορο λιλιλίξ 260–262; τοροτίγξ τοροτίγξ 267 (attributing some of these lines to the Hoopoe or to the birds that respond to his call is debatable, see e.g. Fraenkel 1950, 82–84; Sifakis 1971, 113–114 n. 3). The chorus: ποποποποποποποπο ποῦ 310; τιτιτιτιτιτιτι τίνα 313; τιο τιο τιο τιο 738=770, 743=775, τιο τιο τιο τίγξ 741=773, 751/2=784, τοτοτο τοτοτο τοτοτο τίγξ 746/7=779. There are also replicas of the birds-messengers: ποῦ ποῦ ὅτι, ποῦ ποῦ ποῦ ὅτι, ποῦ 1122; ιὼ ιὼ, ιὼ ιὼ, ιὼ ιὼ 1170. (The text is cited from the edition of Dunbar 1995.)

The only exception is the sound of *crepitus ventris* in the *Clouds*, in anapestic lines (παππάξ παππάξ, παπαπαππάξ 390, 391).

Attempts have been made to interpret some of these passages as pastiches or parodies of the New Music.

(1) The significance of the frogs' scene (*Ran.* 209–268) within Aristophanes' comedy is debated; some scholars assume that it foreshadows the main theme of the play – the debate over what constitutes good and bad poetry.⁹⁹ Indeed these frogs are no strangers to the poetic realm: Charon introduces them as βάτραχοι κύκνοι and their songs as κάλλιστα and θαυμαστά (205–207), and they boast about their musical art (εὐγῆρυν ἑμὴν ᾠοδᾶν 213–214) and the favour of divine patrons of music – the Muses, Pan and Apollo (229–232). J. Defradas¹⁰⁰ presented the argument that the frogs represented poets of the New Dithyramb. His reasons were as follows: (a) the expression βάτραχοι κύκνοι is in line with later dithyramb images; (b) the use of extravagant compound neologisms, such as κραιπαλόκωμος (218), πολυκολύμβοισι (246) and πομφολυγοπαφλάσμασιν (249), is typical of avant-garde compositions; (c) the chorus song contains allusions to the Dionysian feast of the Anthesteria, which leads Defradas to conclude that it is a dithyramb; (d) the epithets πολυκολύμβοισι μέλεσιν (245) and χορείαν αἰόλαν (247–248), as well as the opposition of Dionysus' trochees to the chorus' iambs, are interpreted as alluding to ποικιλία and καμπαί of the New Music. G. Wills¹⁰¹ defended the same idea arguing that Dionysus defeated the frogs in a competition over poetic "beauty" (judged from the frogs' point of view) by producing sounds even more disgusting than their croaking – that is, farting. E. Rocconi¹⁰² tried to expand on this argument, claiming that the frog chorus shows signs of a work-song, and since Euripides is accused of borrowing his lyrics from low genres (1301–1303), this might well be an accusation leveled against the New Music in general and implied by Aristophanes in this scene.

⁹⁹ For an overview see Campbell 1984 (with convincing criticism); Rocconi 2007, 137–138 n. 5. For the most part the frogs are thought to impersonate inferior poets of various kinds; only Whitman 1964, 248–249, places them among Aristophanes' champions (*pace* Campbell): their music is somewhat monotonous, but at least it does not suffer from decadent multiformity, and they make Dionysus learn the rowing rhythm of the Athenian fleet, whereas Euripides teaches the sailors only to talk back to their commanders (*Ran.* 1071–1072).

¹⁰⁰ Defradas 1969, followed with more restraint by Zimmermann 1984, 157; 159; 161.

¹⁰¹ Wills 1969.

¹⁰² Rocconi 2007.

This hypothesis is interesting; however, none of its arguments are truly compelling, and some are far-fetched.¹⁰³ Stylistic analysis of the passage reveals peculiarities that suggest objects of parody other than the New Music.¹⁰⁴ In particular, compounds are an effective means of comic language itself¹⁰⁵ and at the same time a characteristic feature of choral lyrics and tragedy (Aristophanes regularly uses them for paratragic effect, and in the agon of the *Frogs* it is Aeschylus and not Euripides who is responsible for heavy, powerful compounds¹⁰⁶). Refrains are used in cult invocations, magical spells and popular songs,¹⁰⁷ and they are also typical of Aeschylus (see *Ran.* 1264–1277). Alternation and contest between the soloist and the chorus is reminiscent of a folk tradition, particularly the amoebaeon singing agon.¹⁰⁸ The characteristics of an elevated style such as the Doric long alpha, the choice of poetic words, archaisms, circumlocutions, and dactylo-epitrite verse¹⁰⁹ are traditional features of choral lyrics, including the kind used by Pindar or Aeschylus,¹¹⁰ and they are often intended to provide the sort of comic effect beloved by Aristophanes: a combination of high and low styles.¹¹¹ The frogs' scene is perfectly entertaining even without being

¹⁰³ For objections to Wills, see MacDowell 1972, 4; Kugelmeier 1996, 132–134; to Defradas, Dover 1993, 56 n. 2; Kugelmeier 1996, 134–135; concerning (c) it may be added that dithyrambic contests cannot be proved for the Anthesteria (Pickard-Cambridge 1968, 16–17; Robertson 1993, 244 n. 133), and associations with Dionysus have practically disappeared in the New Dithyramb. – The idea of Rocconi is not convincing. Beyond the fact that the frogs sing during the rowing, traits of a rowing song are in short supply: it is Charon and not the frogs who commands the rhythm (208); the soloist rows instead of commanding; no part responds with only a rhythmic cry to the song of another; the rhythm is irregular (note also that, since Dionysus rows alone, he does not need to keep up the same rhythm); the frogs do not mention Dionysus' activity and on the whole do not communicate with him before he addresses them. Facing this evident lack of similarity to a work-song, Rocconi sophisticatedly refers to it as 'deformazione comica' (p. 141). Besides it has yet to be demonstrated that it was a well-known trait of the New Music to borrow from low genres, rather than a peculiarity of Euripides' tragedy first observed by Aristophanes, and that such an allusion could be made clear enough by imprecisely imitating just one such piece outside an elevated context.

¹⁰⁴ Zimmermann 1984, 157; Rocconi 2007, 139–140.

¹⁰⁵ Campbell 1984, 165; Kugelmeier 1996, 134; admitted also by Defradas 1969, 31.

¹⁰⁶ E.g. *Ran.* 929, 937, 1056; McEvilly 1970, 274.

¹⁰⁷ Dover 1993, 219; Kugelmeier 1996, 138.

¹⁰⁸ Zimmermann 1984, 163; Kugelmeier 1996, 257.

¹⁰⁹ Radermacher 1954, 171; 172; Zimmermann 1984, 157–160; Dover 1993, 219; Kugelmeier 1996, 138–140.

¹¹⁰ Campbell 1984, 164–165; Zimmermann 1984, 157–158; Dover 1993, 219.

¹¹¹ Zimmermann 1984, 81; 158; 161; Rau 1967, 13.

a musical pastiche or parody: an elevated poetic style and high self-esteem is funny when coming from frogs, as is its juxtaposition with the croaking and the tone-lowering remarks of Dionysus.¹¹²

In addition, we have enough examples of the care Aristophanes took to show his parodistic intentions:¹¹³ he names his targets¹¹⁴ and uses quotations from their works, either direct or comically distorted, but still recognizable.¹¹⁵ Thus the lack of an explicit reference might be considered an argument against parody. Nevertheless, the possibility of parody cannot be excluded, as it might have been evident to the audience through the music, which has since been lost.¹¹⁶

However, even if the frogs' chorus did satirize the New Music, it is impossible to prove and hard to imagine that the croaking in Aristophanes' comedy reflected the sound mimicry in the parodied dithyrambs. Defradas himself argues that the onomatopoeia is a *metaphorical* representation of avant-garde music designed to show the contrast between the result of the frogs' creativity – hoarse cacophonous sounds – and their own artistic claims placed back-to-back with their βρεκεκεκεξ κοαξ κοαξ.

(2) The sung parts of the parabasis in the *Birds* embellished with birds' twittering (737–752, 769–784)¹¹⁷ show a striking resemblance to the frogs' song. Both choruses praise themselves and refer to the gods (partly the same) whom they please with their songs, and G. M. Sifakis believes these themes are characteristic of performances of animal choruses from the early stages of their development on.¹¹⁸ Animal sounds could be used for parody, but we do not need a parody to explain and enjoy their use.¹¹⁹ After all, it is more than natural to chirrup for a chorus of birds and croak for a chorus of frogs.

Extant evidence is very limited, but there is little reason to doubt that sound mimicry was mastered by authors of comedy for their own buffoonish aims, rather than absorbed from some other genre. One might

¹¹² Stanford 1958, 94 ad 210 ff.; Campbell 1984, 164; Kugelmeier 1996, 137; cf. 141: “parodistische Lyrik (auch ohne besonderes Objekt der Parodie)”.

¹¹³ See Schlesinger 1937; id. 1936.

¹¹⁴ Classes 1–3 in Schlesinger. The principle of personal invective is observed at least until the transitional period from Old to Middle comedy (Nesselrath 1990, 250). If Aristophanes mocks the representatives of the avant-garde style as a whole, the group is also clearly indicated: *Nub.* 333 κυκλίων χορῶν ὁσματοκάμπτας; *Pax* 829 διθυραμβοδιδασκάλων.

¹¹⁵ Classes 4–6 in Schlesinger.

¹¹⁶ MacDowell 1972, 5; Campbell 1984, 164.

¹¹⁷ Parody character was assumed for this chorus by A. Barker, see below n. 136.

¹¹⁸ Sifakis 1971, 95–97; 101–102.

¹¹⁹ Kugelmeier 1996, 143; 313.

suppose that its use seemed appropriate whenever the chorus consisted of animals, although our sources for theriomorphic choruses in Attic tradition outside of Aristophanes are limited to vase-paintings and titles of non-extant comedies,¹²⁰ which obviously provide no information on onomatopoeic effects. Yet there is one piece of evidence proving that the mimicking of sounds in comedy existed before the New Music. In Aristoph. *Eq.* 522–523 Magnes, the comic poet active ca. 475–450 BC, is praised for being able to utter “all kinds of sounds”:

πάσας δ' ὑμῖν φωνὰς ἰεῖς καὶ ψάλλων καὶ πτερυγίζων
καὶ λυδίζων καὶ ψηνίζων καὶ βαπτόμενος βατραχειοῖς

...though he produced every kind of sound for you, twanging the lyre, flapping wings, speaking Lydian, buzzing like a gall-fly and dying himself frog-green...¹²¹

(3) Similar issues with the frogs' scene can be found within the call-song of the Hoopoe in the *Birds* (227–262). Features that may be associated with the New Music have been observed there too: first, it is a monody of the late Euripides' type, which probably required virtuoso singing,¹²² unusually long for a drama and with no observance of strophic correspondence;¹²³ second, it presents an unusual variety of rhythms that change in every movement of the song.¹²⁴ However, the prevailing opinion is that this piece was not intended as parody.¹²⁵ The Hoopoe is surely not a dithyrambic poet, but a paratragic hero, Tereus the king,¹²⁶ and his monody is composed as a κλητικὸς ὕμνος¹²⁷ in conventional high

¹²⁰ See Sifakis 1971, 73–75 and 76–77 respectively.

¹²¹ Translation: Sommerstein 1981, 61.

¹²² Russo 1984, 245; Zimmermann 1984, 70 n. 3.

¹²³ Mazon 1904, 99; Henderson 1957, 393.

¹²⁴ Händel 1963, 172 n. 2; Zimmermann 1984, 77–78. Pretagostini 1988 completes his analysis with a conclusion that appears contrary to his own observations: according to him, in the call-song Aristophanes rejected all fashionable contemporary innovations. Meanwhile, of the innovations listed on p. 194, two (“la preminenza riservata al ruolo dell’auleta” who provides a solo piece and “il *mélange* di metri e ritmi”) are certainly present, and three others (“l’uso sempre più ampio delle modulazioni vocalizzate della melodia”, “il ricorso ai superallungamenti per cui il lungo poteva valere anche più di due tempi” and “il progressive prevalere del dato musicale su quello linguistico”) are impossible to judge without the music.

¹²⁵ Mazon 1904, 99; White 1912, 593–594; Zimmermann 1984, 72; 81; 82; Zimmermann 1989, 28; Zimmermann 1993b, 48; Kugelmeier 1996, 143.

¹²⁶ Zimmermann 1984, 72; cf. Dunbar 1995, 161 ad v. 92.

¹²⁷ Zimmermann 1984, 77.

lyric style, including compound epithets¹²⁸ and archaizing words.¹²⁹ Here again we see a combination of low and high style particularly typical of Aristophanes' autonomous "comic-fantastic" lyrics:¹³⁰ elevated poetry is sung by a hoopoe, addressed to the birds rather than the gods and mixed with the birds' sounds and realities. There appears to be little reason to interpret the bird-calls of the Hoopoe as allusions to typical features of a parodied musical trend rather than as devices used for their own sake.

Stylistic similarities between some Aristophanic passages and those of Euripides were observed long ago (Cratinus invented a verb εὐριπιδαριστοφάνειν for this purpose, fr. 342 K.–A.). It is well known that Aristophanes, who was sometimes the harshest critic of the New Music, was also inclined to adopt many of its characteristics in his own writings.¹³¹ Two explanations of this paradox have been proposed. According to Th. McEvilley, it was only the sense-bearing aspect of the avant-garde trend that annoyed Aristophanes – namely, its bombastic and nonsensical poetry; however, he readily embraced most of the technical musical innovations.¹³² B. Zimmermann¹³³ argues that the poet was well aware of the boundaries of his own genre in relation to others: in his opinion, devices apt for comedy were out of place in a dithyramb, nome or tragedy.

(4) A. Barker¹³⁴ sees parody of the New Music in the wordless part of the Nightingale in the *Birds*. Attempts to find hints at such parody in the Hoopoe's wake-song addressed to his spouse (Av. 209–222) are not very convincing.¹³⁵ Still, an appealing assumption is that Procne is

¹²⁸ Zimmermann 1984, 79 refers them to characteristic features of the New Music.

¹²⁹ Zimmermann 1984, 79–80.

¹³⁰ Pucci 1961, 393; Rau 1967, 13; Silk 1980, 129–130; 151 ("realistic-fantastic lyric"); Zimmermann 1984, 72; 81; 158 ("komisch-fantastische Lyrik").

¹³¹ Mazon 1904, 99; McEvilley 1970, 270–276; Zimmermann 1993b, 40; 48.

¹³² McEvilley 1970, 273; 275.

¹³³ Zimmermann 1988, 44–45; Zimmermann 1995, 125; 128–129.

¹³⁴ Barker 2004.

¹³⁵ The supposed hint at confusing genres (Barker 2004, 192–193) may be called into question. The terms ὕμνος and νόμος are synonymous for 'song', and θρήνος and ἔλεγχος, for 'sorrowful song'. Apollo's lyre sounds in respond to the nightingale, but mourning is impossible on behalf of the blessed gods, so the music that sounds on the Olympus is probably different (σύμφωνος can mean that the chorus of gods and Apollo are in tune with each other and not with Procne). A certain discrepancy between the lament of the nightingale and the gods' ὀλοολυγή as a reaction to it cannot be denied, but in fact "it may seem plausible to read this as an essentially unproblematic piece of poetic rhetoric, harmlessly expanding its praises of the nightingale beyond what could literally be true" (Barker 2004, 192). Barker's second point (*ibid.*, 194–195: ἀντιψάλλων is associated with exotic musical instruments

represented as a cheap auletris and shares the symbolism with the Muse of Euripides in the *Frogs* (*Ran.* 1305–1308) – that is, the vulgarity of the fashionable style of music.¹³⁶ I would even suggest going one step further. If her appearance (demonstrated to the characters and the public with a meaningful retardation, only after v. 666) is a sort of commentary on the aulos interlude performed by her after v. 222, it might well be that, rather than a stylization composed by Aristophanes, Procne played a potpourri of famous pieces of the New Music or even one such piece: as there is no clear indication of parody in the text, I believe that this would be the only way to make the joke understandable to the public. Since Procne is a nightingale, sound imitation of this bird's voice in the aulos *intermezzo* seems unavoidable (cf. *Sch. Aristoph. Av.* 222: μιμεῖται τις τὴν ἀηδόνα). Perhaps a popular composition existed in which an aulete masterly mimicked the warbling of a nightingale – or else the νύγλαροι and τερετίσματα of Philoxenus' kind regularly created such associations? This would then be another example of the use of onomatopoeic effects in the New Music. Unfortunately, this is pure guesswork.¹³⁷

On the whole, barring *Plutus* (290–301) a relation between the New Music and sound mimicry in comedy cannot be proved. Interpreting Aristophanes' passages with this kind of mimesis as pastiches or parodies, some of which are aimed at the New Music, is still possible to a certain extent. However, it should be emphasized that those who propose such interpretations consider onomatopoeic effects not as *objects* of mockery, but as a *means* of ridiculing the parodied works. The only probable case in which onomatopoeia must be traced to Aristophanes' target rather than

discussed in Athen. 14. 34–38, p. 634 b – 636 c, and thus with oriental flavour and with the New Music) seems quite unconvincing. The author evaluates the credibility of his own arguments with customary sobriety: "I cannot yet claim to have proved that the nightingale stands here as an emblem of the excesses of the 'new wave' composers" (p. 195).

¹³⁶ Since Barker assumes that the aulete in the *Birds* continued to play the part of Procne until the end of the comedy (which I strongly doubt), he must conclude that all the songs accompanied by him – at least from v. 676 – had an extravagantly populist and decadent character: "She would be the perfect accompanist for such figures as the Poet and Cinesias in the later episodes, and would effectively undercut any temptation to take seriously the various musical offerings of the chorus" (Barker 2004, 203; 204 with n. 35). Thus the birds' chorus becomes a portrait of the musical avant-garde.

¹³⁷ If we accept the conclusion of Th. McEvilley (see above n. 132) that all Aristophanes refuted in the New Music was the obscuring of the poetic text, then his criticism of purely instrumental music becomes improbable if not impossible.

himself is the *Cyclops* of Philoxenus alluded to in *Plutus* – and this is the exception that proves the rule: in a case when the bleating of the chorus sounded in the original, Aristophanes only refers to it and does not repeat it himself.

This unique case is the only positive evidence available to support the hypothesis that vocal sound mimicry in high lyrics was a novelty that first appeared in the New Music. Following Zimmermann,¹³⁸ we may suppose that Aristophanes felt this device appropriate only for comedy. In this case, his parody was used to show that onomatopoeia, particularly from a human voice, has a potentially comic effect and its use in elevated genres such as dithyramb can yield unintentional ludicrous results. However, this is not an inevitable conclusion: first, I believe that in the *Cyclops* Philoxenus was deliberately using comic methods to produce a comic effect;¹³⁹ and second, Aristophanes' allusion does not sound like criticism, but rather like a tribute to the work's fame.¹⁴⁰

Still, this hypothesis is plausible and may well be correct, even with no support other than *argumentum ex silentio* (vocal mimicry is widespread in the time of Plato and may be postulated for the authors of the New Music, but there is no evidence of it in earlier high lyric poetry). It does not presuppose that “serious” genres borrowed vocal sound mimicry from comedy – it could very well have been adopted under the influence of instrumentalists.

To sum up: sound mimicry was not in itself a novelty – it was long ago mastered by instruments in solo aulos- and cithara-playing, and by voice in comedy. However, its use in the New Music may perhaps illustrate other notorious features of this style: the confusion of genres, the increasing importance of instrumental parts in dithyramb, tragedy and sung nome, and πολυχорδία – the use of a larger number of notes and scales.

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¹³⁸ See above n. 133.

¹³⁹ Cf. Hartung 1846, 417: “Die Weise, in welcher Aristoteles Poet. 2, 4 [1448 a 15–18] diesen Kyklops des Philoxenos als Beispiel eines komischen Dithyrambos erwählt, beweist uns, dass keineswegs alle Dithyramben dieser Periode von solcher Art gewesen sind”.

¹⁴⁰ See above n. 51.

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The use of musical means to imitate non-musical sounds is often identified as a characteristic of the New Music (an avant-garde trend reported to have developed in Ancient Greece beginning around 450 BC), although it can be traceable to an earlier period (at least to 584 BC). This paper reviews existing evidence on sound mimicry in the Classical period and considers its possible connections with the New Music. Particular attention is paid to distinguishing between vocal and instrumental sound imitation, and separating onomatopoeic effects from other types of mimesis somehow connected with music in texts. (I) The limited evidence that focuses directly on famous artists of the New Music (Timotheus and Philoxenus) leaves no doubt that they used sound mimicry, probably both by means of voice and instruments. However, there is no clear indication that the use of such effects was criticized for its innovation. (II) According to Plato, in his time sound mimicry through the human voice was unexpectedly widespread in poetry; he also speaks of it as a recognized feature of purely instrumental virtuoso music. Plato disapproved of such senseless trickery, but his condemnations are not related to his complaints about the recent degradation in music, and on the whole the New Music cannot be blamed for everything Plato disliked in this art (such as wind instruments or melodies without words). Still, in view of the fact that earlier lyrics, as far as we know, showed little evidence of sound mimicry, it may be cautiously conjectured that it was propagated in “high-style” sung poetry during the second half of the fifth century BC. (III) Vocal onomatopoeic effects were mastered by Old Comedy, it may be postulated, even prior to Aristophanes. Even if some passages that contain sound imitation may be interpreted as Aristophanes’ pastiches or parodies of the New Music, it is impossible to prove that this device was an object, rather than a means, of mockery. If indeed it began to spread in monodic and choral lyrics in the second half of the fifth century, we need not think that it was borrowed from comedy rather than instrumental music. Perhaps some critics felt that sound mimicry, with its comic potential, especially on human lips, was as much out of place in serious poetic genres as it was at home in comedy, but we have no evidence that specifically claims this. Onomatopoeia was not in itself a novelty, but its use may illustrate features of the New Music such as the confusion of genres, the increasing importance of instrumental parts and the growing numbers of sounds and scales.

Отображение немusических звуков музыкальными средствами часто включается в перечень отличительных признаков т.н. Новой музыки (авангардистского направления, развивавшегося в Древней Греции с середины V в. до н.э.), хотя известно, что этот прием применялся значительно раньше (по меньшей мере с 584 г. до н.э.). В статье рассматриваются все существующие свидетельства звукоподражания в классическую эпоху и возможность связать их с Новой музыкой. Особое внимание при этом уделяется, во-первых, разграничению между звукоподражанием вокальными и инструментальными средствами, а во-вторых – отделению свидетельств об имитации звуков природы от прочих упоминаний о “мимесисе” в музыкальной сфере. (I) Немногочисленные сообщения, прямо связывающие звукоподражание с представителями

Новой музыки (Тимофеем и Филоксеном), не оставляют сомнений, что они использовали этот прием, но никто не критикует его как нововведение. (II) Платон свидетельствует, что в его время неожиданно широкое распространение получило звукоподражание посредством человеческого голоса; кроме того, оно было характерной чертой виртуозной инструментальной музыки. Философ не одобряет его как бессмысленные фокусы, однако нигде не связывает с деградацией недавнего времени, и в целом не все, что осуждает Платон в этом искусстве (например, духовые инструменты или мелодии без слов), можно связывать с воздействием Новой музыки. Тем не менее, поскольку в более ранней лирике звукоподражание практически не засвидетельствовано, можно с осторожностью предположить, что оно проникло в “высокую” музыкальную поэзию на протяжении 2-й пол. V в. (III) В Древней комедии вокальное звукоподражание, по-видимому, практиковалось еще до Аристофана. Хотя некоторые содержащие его аристофановские строки можно интерпретировать как пародию на Новую музыку или стилизацию под нее, не удастся доказать, что этот прием когда-либо был объектом, а не средством осмеяния. Если он и в самом деле стал распространяться в монодической и хоровой лирике ок. 450 г., заимствовать его поэты могли скорее из инструментальной музыки, чем из комедии. Возможно, кто-то из античных критиков чувствовал, что звукоподражанию, особенно в исполнении человеческого голоса, присущ потенциальный комический эффект, а потому оно уместно в комедии, но никак не в серьезных жанрах, однако прямо такое мнение никто не высказывает. Итак, подражание звукам природы само по себе не являлось нововведением, но его применение в Новой музыке может иллюстрировать такие особенности этого стиля, как смешение жанров, возрастание роли инструментальной музыки и числа используемых звуков и звукоподражаний.

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FRA ALCIDAMANTE E LA TRADIZIONE
BIOGRAFICA OMERICA
E L'ORIGINE DELLA *VITA PS.-ERODOTEA**

Alcidamante e la genesi del *Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi*

L'ipotesi di Nietzsche (1870–1873) sul ruolo del retore Alcidamante (V–IV a.C.) nella formazione del *Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi* mostra come siano fragili le basi dei nostri tentativi di ricostruire le opere perdute (e la *Quellenforschung* che ne è alla base): personalmente, se non avessimo il papiro di Karanis (pubblicato da Winter nel 1925, quindi più di 50 anni dopo il lavoro di Nietzsche), non avrei alcun dubbio a liquidare (con E. Meyer, Vahlen e Wilamowitz¹) come infondata l'idea di Nietzsche che il *Museo* di Alcidamante contenesse il *Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi*. Del *Certamen* noi possediamo completa solo una redazione di età imperiale, giuntaci nel *Laur.* 56. I, di certo successiva ad Adriano, come mostra la menzione di un oracolo ricevuto dallo stesso imperatore (32–43 A.). Nietzsche credeva che quanto leggiamo nel *C(ertamen) L(aurentianum)* risalisse in ultima analisi al *Museo* di Alcidamante e si basava su due indizi: circa la morte di Esiodo il *CL* cita due versioni, attribuendone una al *Museo* di Alcidamante, l'altra a Eratostene (240 A.); inoltre, Stobeo (4, 52, 22) cita ἐκ τοῦ Ἀλκιδάμαντος Μουσείου i famosi vv. secondo cui la miglior cosa per gli uomini sarebbe non nascere o morire il prima possibile e questi vv. vengono pronunciati anche da Omero nel *CL* (78–79 A.).

Orbene, questi due indizi per se stessi non autorizzano in alcun modo a trarre le conclusioni di ampia portata che ne traeva Nietzsche. I vv. comuni al *Museo* (secondo Stobeo) e al *CL* dimostrano poco, poiché essi occorrono anche nel *corpus Theognideum* (425–428) e vengono citati

* Citerò il *C(ertamen) L(aurentianum)* da Allen 1912, non per il valore del testo (assai mediocre), ma perché numera le linee in continuità, la biografia omerica dello ps.-Erodoto (*VH*) da Vasiloudi 2013, Proclo da Severyns 1963, Plutarco (*Sept sap. conv.*) da Paton–Wegehaupt 1925, ps.-Plutarco (*De Homero*) da Kindstrand 1990, Tzetzes da Wilamowitz 1916, Alcidamante da Avezzù 1982. Ringrazio A. Verlinsky per osservazioni e suggerimenti.

¹ Meyer 1892, 378; Vahlen 1911, 127 n. 1; Wilamowitz 1916, 400–401.

anche altrove.² Anche la citazione del *Museo* all'interno del *CL* non fa sospettare un uso ampio dell'opera alcidamantea. Nel *CL* di solito non vengono citate le fonti utilizzate, mentre a proposito della morte di Esiodo vengono contrapposte le versioni di Alcidamante e di Eratostene. La morte di Esiodo segue quasi immediatamente la sua vittoria nell'agone con Omero (210–217 A.):

τῆς μὲν οὖν νίκης οὕτω φασὶ τυχεῖν τὸν Ἡσίοδον καὶ λαβόντα
 τρίποδα χαλκοῦν ἀναθεῖναι ταῖς Μούσαις ἐπιγράψαντα·
 Ἡσίοδος Μούσαις Ἑλικωνίσι τόνδ' ἀνέθηκεν
 ὕμνῳ νικήσας ἐν Χαλκίδι θεῖον Ὅμηρον.
 τοῦ δὲ ἀγῶνος διαλυθέντος διέπλευσεν ὁ Ἡσίοδος εἰς Δελφοὺς
 χρησόμενος καὶ τῆς νίκης ἀπαρχὰς τῷ θεῷ ἀναθήσων.

Seguono quindi le notizie sulla morte di Esiodo e l'opposizione delle versioni di Alcidamante ed Eratostene. Nel passo che ho trascritto si osserva facilmente una sutura: la dedica del tripode alle Muse dell'Elicon è alternativa a quella a Delfi. La spiegazione più semplice che viene in mente è che il pezzo che inizia con τοῦ δὲ ἀγῶνος διαλυθέντος sia tratto da una fonte diversa da quanto precede, probabilmente da una biografia esiodea.³ D'altra parte, la menzione di Alcidamante si trova proprio all'interno di questo pezzo; di conseguenza, tale menzione sembrerebbe derivare da una biografia esiodea, non dalla fonte da cui deriva il resto del *CL*.

Delle due prove, che secondo Nietzsche mostrerebbero l'origine alcidamantea del *CL*, nessuna è dunque davvero significativa: i vv. comuni al *CL* e al *Museo* sono celebri e si trovano anche altrove, la sezione in cui il *CL* cita Alcidamante sembra, a prima vista, derivare da una fonte diversa da quella da cui deriva il grosso del *CL*. Questa era la documentazione disponibile fino al 1925;⁴ quando, dunque, Wilamowitz

² Cfr. Theognis 425–428; Epic. *apud* Diog. Laert. 10, 126; Sextus Emp. *Hyp. Pyrrh.* 3, 231; Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 3, 15, 1; *Paroem. Gr.* I, 214, 12; II, 148, 4; *Schol. Soph. OC* 1224.

³ Così Wilamowitz 1916, 398.

⁴ Già nel 1891 Mahaffy aveva pubblicato la *Pap. F. Petrie XXV.1* (= *P. Lond. Lit. 191*): si tratta di un papiro del III sec. a. C. (cfr. Bassino 2013, 61–70), che si sovrappone col *CL* 69–101 A., ma presenta notevoli divergenze nella sezione in prosa. Questo papiro mostra che nel III sec. a. C. circolava una versione del *Certamen* affine a quella di *CL*, ma *per se ipsum* nulla ci insegna circa Alcidamante. Avezzù 1982, 38–40 attribuisce il testo del papiro Petrie ad Alcidamante, ma, a differenza che per il papiro di Karanis (di cui dirò subito), non ci sono legami sicuri con il retore: entrambi i papiri presentano somiglianze strette con *CL*, il papiro di Karanis è probabilmente una copia della fonte di *CL* (cioè il *Museo* di Alcidamante); se anche il papiro Petrie sia copia del *Museo* non è certo; sicuramente nessuno poteva ragionevolmente ipotizzare questo nel 1891.

nel 1916 a proposito di *CL* scriveva (401): “Bei einiger Besonnenheit kann man nicht mehr schließen, als daß Alkidamas von Hesiods Tod erzählt und dabei auch aus dem Gedichte von Agon eine Stelle entnommen hat”, valutava la documentazione esistente in modo corretto: nulla lasciava, all’epoca, immaginare che nel *Museo* di Alcidas fosse narrato il duello poetico di Omero ed Esiodo né che quanto leggiamo nel *CL* derivi in ultima analisi da Alcidas.⁵ Se dovessimo valutare la *Quellenforschung* di Nietzsche e Wilamowitz *per se ipsas*, quella del secondo risulta di gran lunga più convincente.

La situazione mutò completamente nel 1925, quando Winter pubblicò un papiro di Karanis (*Pap. Mich. Inv. 2754*, II–III s. p. Ch.), che presenta un pezzo del *Certamen* e che porta la *subscriptio* Ἀλκιδάμαντος περὶ Ὀμήρου. Nel papiro si legge quanto segue:⁶

οἱ δὲ ὄρων[τες αὐ]τὸν ἐσχεδίασαν τόνδε [τὸ]ν στίχον·
 ὅσσ’ ἔλομεν λ[ι]πόμεσθ’, ὅσσ’ οὐχ ἔλομεν | φερόμε[σ]θα.
 ὁ δὲ οὐ δ[υν]άμενος εὐρεῖν τὸ λε[χ]θὲν ἤ[ρ]ετο αὐτοῦς ὅ τι λ[έ]γοιεν.
 οἱ δὲ ἔφασαν ἐ[σ]φ’ ἀλκίαν οἱ[χ]όμενοι[ι] ἀγρ[ε]ῦσαι μὲν οὐδέν,
 καθήμενοι [δ]ὲ φ[θ]ειρ[ί]ζε[σθαι]. τῶν δὲ φθειρῶν οὐς ἔλαβον
 αὐ[τ]οῦ καταλιπεῖν, οὐς δ’ οὐκ ἔλαβον ἐν | τοῖς τρίβωσιν ἐ[ν]απο-
 φέρειν. ἀναμνησθεῖς δὲ | τοῦ μαν[τείου], [ὅτι] ἡ καταστροφή αὐτῶ
 τοῦ ¹⁰βίου ἦκεν, [ποι]εῖ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἐπίγραμ[μα] τόδε·
 ἐνθάδ[ε] τὴν [ιέρη]ν κεφαλὴν κατὰ γαῖα κάλυ[ψε]
 ἀνδρῶν ἡρώων κοσμήτορα θεῖον Ὅμηρον[.]
 καὶ ἀν[α]χωρῶν π[α]λαιοῦ ὄντος ὀλισθάνει καὶ πε[σὼν] ἐ[π]ὶ πλευρὰν
 οὕτως, φασίν, <τριταῖος> ἐτελεύτησεν¹⁵. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτου ποι-
 εῖσθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἡμῶν, μάλιστα δ’ ὄρων τοὺς ἱστορικοὺς
 θαυμάζομένους. Ὅμηρος γοῦν διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ζῶν | καὶ ἀποθανὼν τε-
 τίμηται παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις· ταύ[τ]ης οὖν αὐτῷ τῆς παιδ<ε>ίας
 χάριν ἀποδίδω[μι], τὸ γένος αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν ἀλλή[ν] ποι[έ]σιν δι’
 ἀκριβείας μνήμης τοῖς βουλομένοις φι[ca. 5]εῖν τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἰς
 τὸ κοινὸν | παραδῶ[σιν]. |

Ἀλκιδάμαντος | Περὶ Ὀμήρου

ἔλομεν ... ἔλομεν Winter (cfr. *CL* 328 A.; Plut. *De Hom.* 1, 57 K.; *VH* 148, 10 V.) : ἔλ[αβ]ον ... ἔλαβον *Pap.* καταλιπεῖν Winter (cfr. *CL* 331 A.) : κατα[λί]ποιεν *Pap.* ἀναποφέρειν Körte : ἐ[ν]θ’ ἀποφέρειν Winter : ἔνθεν ἀποφέρειν Avezzù ἀνδρῶν *ita Pap. corr. s. l., qui antea*

⁵ Su come Wilamowitz e Nietzsche hanno valutato la menzione di Alcidas ed Eratostene (*CL* 240 A.) cfr. anche Vogt 1959, 201–203.

⁶ Il testo che segue si basa su una revisione del papiro (nella fotografia disponibile sul sito della University of Michigan Library). Le integrazioni non registrate in apparato sono di Winter. Su questo papiro cfr. da ultimo Bassino 2013, 70–80.

ἄνθρωπον *scripserat* ὅτι ... ἦκεν del. West ἦκεν : ἦκοι Lucarini coll. CL 333 <τριταῖος> add. Lucarini μὲν οὖν τούτου Lucarini : τούτου μὲν οὖν Pap. ποιεῖσθαι ... ἥ ποιήσομεν† ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν πειράσομαι Avezzù *prae-euntibus* Solmsen (πειράσομεν) Page (πειρασόμεθα), fort. recte : {ποιεῖσθαι} τὴν ἀρετὴν ποιήσομαι Körte : πονεῖσθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν ποιήσομαι Dodds : ποιεῖσθαι <δεῖν ἡγοῦμαι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν, ἄφ' οὗ Μούσαις φίλην> τὴν ἀρετὴν ποιήσομεν West ὁρῶν<τες> Winter : ὁρῶ Dodds ταύτης Körte : ταύτην Winter παιδ<ε>ίας Körte ἀποδίδω[μι] Avezzù : ἀποδιδῶμεν Winter : ἀποδιδόντες Page : ἀποδιδούς West τὸ γένος Page : ἀγῶνος Winter : ἀφέμενος West : ἀρξάμενος Richardson δι' ἁ[κριβ]είας Körte : δι' ἀγχιστείας Winter : διὰ βραχείας West φι[λοκαλ]εῖν Hunt apud Winter : φιλοδοξεῖν Richardson : φιλομαθεῖν Lucarini εἰς *littera* -ς s. l. *addita* παραδο[ύς] Avezzù : παραδώσω West : παραδῶμεν Winter

Fino alla l. 10, anche grazie al parallelo del CL (cfr. *infra*), il testo non pone gravi problemi. Alla l. 10 è strano che l'ottativo obliquo ἦκοι sia presente nel CL (nel greco imperiale tale modo tende a scomparire), se esso non era in Alcidas. Ho integrato <τριταῖος> per la ragione chiarita *infra* p. 96.

Koniaris⁷ osserva giustamente che Alcidas usa sempre μὲν οὖν in seconda posizione, mai in terza; lo studioso statunitense crede questo una prova di paternità non alcidasica, ma su questo punto è in errore. Inoltre in greco si dice sempre περὶ μὲν οὖν τινος non περί τινος μὲν οὖν (cfr. Thuc. 4, 118, 4; Antipho, *In nov.* 13; Andocid. *In Alcib.* 7; Aeschines, *In Timarch.* 3; Isocr. *In Euthydemum* 16; Trapez. 34; *Antidosis* 270; Dem. *Contra Phorm.* 3; *Contra Aphob.* 4; *Philippi epist.* 11, 1; Plut. *Lycurg.* 19, 4; *Marc.* 8, 10); per questo motivo ho emendato il testo del papiro.

ποιεῖσθαι ... ποιήσομεν è corrotto: c'è stata un'assimilazione fra ποιεῖσθαι e ποιήσομεν; dal momento che ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν, sebbene non attestato altrove, dà un buon senso ('crearsi la fama'⁸) e trova un parallelo contenutistico in un altro passo di Alcidas (*Περὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν* 29, ove il retore afferma di cercare di εὐδοκιμεῖν παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν), è ragionevole supporre che sia corrotto ποιήσομεν. Occorre un verbo che regga l'infinito ποιεῖσθαι e una forma da πειρᾶν / πειρᾶσθαι sembra la più indicata; πειράσομαι (Avezzù) mi pare la soluzione più felice, poiché è forma singolare, come ὁρῶν che segue (il passaggio dal singolare al plurale, sebbene accolto da molti nel nostro passo, è poetico, cfr. e. g. Eur. *Her. f.* 1207 sgg.: ἰκετεύομεν ... προπίτνων, cfr. K.—G. II, 1, 84).

⁷ Koniaris 1971, 110.

⁸ Per ἀρετή nel senso di 'fama, celebrità' cfr. LSJ s. v. ἀρετή III; cfr. anche Renehan 1971, 104 n. 22.

Mentre non ci sono dubbi sulla necessità di leggere ταύτης e παι-δ<ε>ίας, più problematico è il seguito, soprattutto le forme di ἀποδίδωμι / παραδίδωμι e il loro rapporto sintattico. Dalla fotografia del papiro mi pare certo che la lettera che segue ἀποδιδ- sia ω, di cui si vede la prima asta (che non prosegue verso destra, come farebbe ο). Dopo παραδ- si vede un semicerchio che lega con δ- e, a destra, dopo una lacuna, un tratto d'inchiostro; potrebbe certo trattarsi della prima e della seconda asta di ω (come intende Winter), ma la somiglianza con il legamento di -δο- di δ' οὐκ (l. 7: si osservi anche come il semicerchio destro di questo ο potrebbe corrispondere al tratto d'inchiostro che segue immediatamente la lacuna dopo παραδ-) mi induce a leggere παραδούς (Avezzù), che è ottimo anche da un punto di vista sintattico: Alcідamante dice quindi di aver espresso la debita gratitudine a Omero tramite l'opera che ha scritto (e che si sta concludendo), in cui sono contenuti τὸ γένος καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ποίησις del poeta.

Alla l. 19 la prima lettera dopo la lacuna sembra ε,⁹ il che rende certa l'integrazione τὸ γένος (Page, peggiorato da Koniaris e Avezzù con τό τε γένος, troppo lungo), che anche da un punto di vista sintattico è perfetta, in quanto dà a καὶ τὴν ἄλλην il necessario sostantivo cui coordinarsi. Tutte le altre integrazioni mi sembrano decisamente improbabili: ἀγῶνος (Winter: come si regge qui un genitivo? Peggio ancora αἰῶνος di Kirk). I participi ἀφόμενος (West), ἀρξάμενος (Richardson) sono impossibili per ragioni sintattiche e logiche: fra l'altro, la proposta di West si basa sull'assunto che Alcідamante preannunci una trattazione di Omero in un'opera successiva, ipotesi poco verisimile, poiché Alcідamante dice (l. 19–20) che la sua opera contiene γένος καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ποίησιν Ὀμήρου, che certo si riferisce all'opera che si sta concludendo (cfr. *infra* p. 109) e la stessa *subscriptio* lascia supporre che la trattazione su Omero finisse qui.

Il testo appena trascritto si sovrappone parzialmente al *CL*. Alla fine di quest'ultimo leggiamo (322–338 A., indico in corsivo le coincidenze letterali col papiro di Karanis):

ὁ ποιητὴς εἰς Ἴον ἔπλευσεν πρὸς Κρεώφυλον κάκει χρόνον διέτριβε
πρεσβύτης ὢν ἦδη. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς θαλάττης καθήμενος παίδων τινῶν
ἀφ' ἀλείας ἐρχομένων, ὥς φασι, πυθόμενος:

ἄνδρες ἀπ' Ἀρκαδίας θηρήτορες, ἦ ῥ' ἔχομέν τι;
εἰπόντων δὲ ἐκείνων

ὅσσ' ἔλομεν λιπόμεσθα, ὅσ' οὐχ ἔλομεν φερόμεσθα,

⁹ Cfr. Koniaris 1971, 108; Bassino 2013, 80.

οὐ νοήσας τὸ λεχθὲν ἤρετο αὐτοὺς ὅ τι λέγοιεν. οἱ δὲ φασιν ἐν ἀλείᾳ μὲν ἀγρεῦσαι μηδέν, ἐφθειρίσθαι δέ, καὶ τῶν φθειρῶν οὐδὲ ἔλαβον καταλιπεῖν, οὐδὲ οὐκ ἔλαβον ἐν τοῖς ἱματίοις φέρειν. ἀναμνησθεῖς δὲ τοῦ μαντείου ὅτι τὸ τέλος αὐτοῦ ἦκοι τοῦ βίου, ποιεῖ τὸ τοῦ τάφου αὐτοῦ ἐπίγραμμα. ἀναχωρῶν δὲ ἐκεῖθεν, ὄντος πηλοῦ ὀλισθὼν καὶ πεσὼν ἐπὶ τὴν πλευράν, τριταῖος, ὥς φασι, τελευτᾷ· καὶ ἐτάφη ἐν Ἰφῷ. ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα τόδε·

ἐνθάδε τὴν ἱερὴν κεφαλὴν κατὰ γαῖα καλύπτει,
ἀνδρῶν ἡρώων κοσμήτορα θεῖον Ὀμηρον.

Come si vede, i due testi si sovrappongono fino al punto in cui nel papiro inizia una riflessione generale di Alcidamante (περὶ τούτου μὲν οὖν). Nel papiro l'opera di Alcidamante ha il titolo *Περὶ Ὀμήρου*, mentre sia Stobeo sia il *CL* parlano del *Μουσεῖον*, ma è probabile che il primo titolo corrisponda a una sezione del *Μουσεῖον*.¹⁰ Ne segue che quanto Nietzsche aveva ipotizzato su basi molto fragili è reso certo dal papiro di Karanis: in Alcidamante si trovava già, almeno parzialmente, il *Certamen*. Alcuni hanno cercato di negare questo, supponendo che solo l'ultima parte del papiro (cioè da περὶ τούτου μὲν οὖν in poi) derivi da Alcidamante e che quanto precede abbia invece un'origine diversa e più tarda; in altre parole, il papiro di Karanis sarebbe un'antologia di almeno due brani di origine diversa.¹¹ A dimostrazione di questo si è osservato che nella prima sezione del papiro (e non nella seconda) vi sono iati, che Alcidamante nell'orazione *Περὶ σοφιστῶν* evita, e che alcuni usi linguistici sembrano più tardi di Alcidamante. In realtà non c'è ragione di credere che Alcidamante avesse un comportamento costante circa lo iato in tutte le sue opere (ne possediamo una sola!), né è possibile dimostrare che la lingua sia successiva al IV s. a. C.¹²

Di conseguenza, non resta che accettare che quanto leggiamo nel *CL* fosse in qualche modo già in Alcidamante e che quindi Nietzsche avesse ragione: gli indizi in favore della sua tesi risultano schiacciati, quando si sommi la corrispondenza fra la citazione di Stobeo e il *CL* al papiro di Karanis. Questo comporta che anche l'ipotesi di Wilamowitz (a prima vista assai attraente), che la sezione sulla morte di Esiodo (215–254 A.) fosse in origine estranea al *Certamen* e che derivi da una biografia esiodea, vada respinta: è infatti proprio la prima delle due versioni circa la morte

¹⁰ Cfr. Gallavotti 1929, 36; Abramowicz 1938, 477–478; 484–485; Vogt 1959, 211–212; West 1967, 438; Avezzi 1982, 86.

¹¹ Così Körte 1927, 264; Kirk 1950; Dodds 1952; Koniaris 1971.

¹² Cfr. West 1967, 434 sgg. e soprattutto Renehan 1971 e 1976, 144–159, la miglior analisi a me nota del problema. I fr. 10–11 A. di Alcidamante contengono iati.

di Esiodo che il compilatore dice derivare dal *Museo* di Alcidamante, e questo ci impedisce di ipotizzare un'origine diversa per questa sezione rispetto al resto del *Certamen* (dal momento che esso sembra derivare da Alcidamante). Nietzsche aveva visto giusto ipotizzando che il compilatore, di solito assai parco nel citare le sue fonti, abbia fatto i nomi di Alcidamante ed Eratostene (240 A.) poiché, mentre di solito seguiva il solo Alcidamante, qui riportava anche una notizia di altra origine; è stata cioè la presenza (inusuale) di una fonte diversa da Alcidamante che lo ha spinto a fare il nome della sua fonte abituale (appunto Alcidamante). D'altra parte, la sutura osservata da Wilamowitz nel momento successivo alla fine dell'agone (210 sgg. A.) a me sembra innegabile. Io credo che l'*Einlage* non sia, come credeva Wilamowitz, la sezione sulla morte di Esiodo (215–254 A.), ma quella sulla consacrazione del tripode (210–214 A.). Il testo senza queste righe procede benissimo: appena ottenuta la vittoria Esiodo se ne va a Delfi a consacrare le ἀπαρχαί.¹³ Non si sente alcun bisogno della notizia sul tripode e le Muse dell'Elicon; d'altra parte, tale notizia era molto celebre e trae spunto da un passo dello stesso Esiodo (*Op. et dies* 654–659): non è quindi strano che una delle varie rielaborazioni subite dal *Certamen* la abbia introdotta, sebbene in modo un po' maldestro.¹⁴

Oltre alla versione del *CL* e del papiro di Karanis noi possediamo una terza fonte circa gli ultimi momenti della vita di Omero a Ios, cioè la vita omerica di Proclo (70, 30–71, 44 S.):

λέγουσιν οὖν αὐτὸν εἰς Ἴον πλεύσαντα διατρίψαι μὲν παρὰ Κρεω-
φύλῳ, γράψαντα δὲ Οἰχαλίας ἄλωσιν τούτῳ χαρίσασθαι, ἥτις νῦν
ὡς Κρεωφύλου περιφέρεται. καθεζόμενον δὲ ἐπὶ τινος ἀκτῆς θεα-
σάμενον ἄλκιυς προσειπεῖν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἀνακρίναι τοῖσδε τοῖς ἔπεσιν·

ἄνδρες ἀπ' Ἀρκαδίας θηρήτορες, ἦ ῥ' ἔχομέν τι;
ὑποτυχόντα δὲ αὐτῶν ἓνα εἰπεῖν·

οὗς ἔλομεν λιπόμεσθ', οὗς δ' οὐχ ἔλομεν φερόμεσθα.
οὐκ ἐπιβάλλοντος δ' αὐτοῦ διελέσθαι τὸ αἶνιγμα, ὅτι ἐπὶ ἰχθυῖαν
καταβάντες ἀφήμαρτον, φθειρισάμενοι δὲ ὅσους μὲν ἔλαβον τῶν
φθειρῶν ἀποκτείναντες ἀπολείπουσιν, ὅσοι δὲ αὐτοὺς διέφυγον,
τούτους ἀποκομίζουσιν, οὕτω δ' ἐκείνον ἀθυμήσαντα σύννου
ἀπιέναι, τοῦ χρημοῦ ἔννοιαν λαμβάνοντα καὶ οὕτως ὀλισθόντα
περιπταῖσαι λίθῳ καὶ τριταῖον τελευτῆσαι.

¹³ Cfr. anche 319–323 A., ove alla recitazione a Delo segue immediatamente τῆς δὲ πανηγύρεως λυθείσης ὁ ποιητὴς εἰς Ἴον ἔπλευσεν.

¹⁴ Il distico del *CL* (213–214 A.) ha avuto fortuna autonoma, cfr. la *Pap. Freib. I. 1b* (inv. 12) del II–I s. a. C.: cfr. Bassino 2013, 83–85.

Che i tre testi dipendano in ultima analisi dalla stessa fonte è evidente. È altresì evidente che Proclo conserva particolari assenti nel *CL* e nel papiro:¹⁵ solo Proclo ci informa che Omero rimase profondamente rattristato per non aver capito il senso dell'esametro e che per questo inciampò e morì. Anche la menzione dell'*Οἰχαλίας ἄλωσις* si trova in Proclo, ma non nel *CL* (nulla possiamo dire su Alcідamante). Il particolare che Omero morì tre giorni dopo la caduta si trova, invece, in Proclo e nel *CL*, ma non nel papiro di Alcідamante; io credo necessario integrare <τριταῖος> nel papiro, sicché tale notizia sia presente anche in Alcідamante. Chi crede (come gran parte della critica e io stesso) che il *CL* derivi in ultima analisi da Alcідamante e che il papiro di Karanis sia Alcідamante non può, mi sembra, fare a meno di tale integrazione: come avrebbe potuto, infatti, il *CL* inserire τριταῖος (la cui originarietà è garantita da Proclo) se esso non era in Alcідamante?¹⁶

Vi sono altri indizi che mostrano che il *CL*, quale lo leggiamo noi, è un compendio di un testo più lungo.¹⁷ Gli Argivi per onorare Omero istituiscono un sacrificio quinquennale da celebrare a Chio (307–308 A.): nel *CL* si era parlato di Chio solo all'inizio (13–15 A.), per ricordare che i Chii credevano Omero loro concittadino. Si tratta di una sezione ormai lontana da 307–308 A. e che non è sufficiente a giustificare l'introduzione *ex abrupto* di Chio nel nostro passo. Tutto lascia pensare che, in uno stadio anteriore della tradizione, nella sezione precedente vi fosse una menzione dei rapporti fra Omero e Chio. Questo è confermato da un altri indizi: nel *CL* leggiamo (254 sgg. A.) che dopo la sconfitta nell'agone Omero andava in giro (περιερχόμενος) recitando i suoi poemi, che i figli di Mida gli chiesero di comporre un epigramma per il loro padre e che Omero ottenne come ricompensa per l'epigramma una coppa, che egli offrì

¹⁵ Cfr. Wilamowitz 1916, 399–400.

¹⁶ Se non si accetti la mia integrazione, bisogna immaginare che nel *CL* sia confluito materiale presente nella fonte di Alcідamante, cioè nel βίος omerico che è alla base delle notizie biografiche del *CL* (cfr. *infra* p. 97 sgg.), ma non accolto da Alcідamante stesso nel *Museo*: probabilmente tale βίος circolava ancora in età imperiale e quindi, teoricamente, il *CL* avrebbe potuto usarlo, ma il *CL* rispecchia di solito una versione che è frutto di un compendio avvenuto molto tempo prima (cfr. *infra* p. 105) e non ci sono altre tracce che il *CL* abbia integrato tale compendio con notizie attinte a fonte anteriore.

¹⁷ Tzetzes (*Vita Hesiodi* 48, 21 sgg. W.-M. = 222, 1 sgg. A.) presenta una stretta somiglianza con *CL* 54 sgg. A. Nietzsche 1982, 274 sgg. credeva che Tzetzes attingesse a una redazione del *Certamen* diversa da quella laurenziana e più ampia, ma la Abramowicz 1938, 485–487 ha mostrato che Tzetzes conosce la stessa versione del *Certamen* che leggiamo noi. Il testo di Tzetzes è stato attribuito anche a Proclo, ma cfr. da ultimo Bassino 2013, 46–50.

ad Apollo a Delfi. Dove si trovava Omero dopo la sconfitta nell'agone, quando ricevette la richiesta dei figli di Mida?¹⁸ Si supporrebbe in Asia, come suggerisce anche il racconto parallelo della *VH* (120, 10 sgg. V.). Eppure, nel *CL* nulla indica chiaramente che il poeta ha lasciato la Grecia e è tornato in Asia. La stessa ambigua sintenticità si incontra molto prima, quando leggiamo che Omero ed Esiodo si incontrarono in Aulide, dopo che Omero, composto il *Margite*, aveva cominciato ad andare in giro recitando i suoi poemi e si era recato a Delfi (55–58 A.).¹⁹ Questa notizia si spiega bene alla luce di quanto leggiamo precedentemente, che cioè i Colofoni indicavano un luogo, ἐν ᾧ φασιν αὐτὸν [scil. "Ομηρον] γράμματα διδάσκοντα τῆς ποιήσεως ἄρξασθαι καὶ ποιῆσαι πρῶτον τὸν Μαργίτην (16–17 A.). Quanto leggiamo alle ll. 55–58 A. presuppone il quadro biografico di 16–17 A., che cioè Omero inizi la propria attività poetica a Colofone componendo il *Margite*. Dunque anche in questo caso il *CL* non rammenta il passaggio dall'Asia all'Europa, che pure è presupposto.

Nelle notizie biografiche circa Omero del *CL* sono dunque evidenti le tracce del compendio. Questo problema si collega a un problema fondamentale per la genesi del *Certamen*, i rapporti cioè fra la sezione biografica e quella propriamente agonale: infatti, se, come io credo, le due sezioni avevano in origine vita indipendente, si potrebbe ipotizzare che la compendiazione sia avvenuta nel momento stesso in cui la sezione agonale è stata unita a quella biografica. Che le due sezioni avessero in origine vita indipendente lo mostrano le seguenti osservazioni. Durante l'agone Panede ordina a Omero ed Esiodo di recitare τὸ κάλλιστον ἐκ τῶν ιδίων ποιημάτων (178 A.); Omero recita un passo dell'*Iliade* (191 sgg. A. = N 126 sgg.). Questo contraddice quanto dice espressamente la sezione biografica, secondo la quale all'epoca dell'agone Omero aveva composto solo il *Margite* (55 A., cfr. anche 275–276 A.).²⁰ È chiaro che, se la sezione agonale e quella biografica fossero state concepite insieme, una tale contraddizione sarebbe stata evitata: per evitarla, bastava o far recitare a Omero un pezzo del *Margite* o porre l'agone in un momento della vita del poeta successivo alla composizione dell'*Iliade*.²¹

¹⁸ Cfr. Wilamowitz 1916, 399.

¹⁹ *CL* 55–58 A.: ποιήσαντα γὰρ τὸν Μαργίτην "Ομηρον περιέρχεσθαι κατὰ πόλιν ῥαψωδοῦντα, ἐλθόντα δὲ καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς περὶ τῆς πατρίδος αὐτοῦ πυθάνεσθαι τίς εἴη.

²⁰ Cfr. Heldmann 1982, 65.

²¹ È probabile che a un certo punto della tradizione ci si sia accorti di questo e da qui tragga origine l'informazione di 275–276 A., secondo cui l'*Il.* era già stata composta quando Omero compose l'*Od.*: si tratta di un *Notbehelf* escogitato da qualcuno che ha osservato l'incongruenza con la presenza di vv. dell'*Il.* nell'agone.

Questo rapporto fra sezione biografica e sezione agonale si lega a un altro problema capitale per le genesi del *Certamen*, quello cioè sulle ragioni della vittoria di Esiodo. Nel *CL* l'agone inizia con Esiodo che chiede a Omero quale sia la cosa migliore per i mortali e quale la cosa più bella. Omero risponde nel miglior modo possibile, guadagnandosi l'ammirazione di tutti. Esiodo ne è irritato e inizia a proporre all'avversario domande difficili e singoli vv. apparentemente illogici, di cui Omero deve inventare un seguito che ne ristabilisca la logica. Anche in questa sezione (che è la più ampia dell'agone) Omero riesce a rispondere sempre perfettamente e tutti i Greci vorrebbero dichiararlo vincitore (176–177 A.), ma Panede ordina ai due poeti di recitare la parte più bella dei loro poemi: Esiodo recita un pezzo sull'agricoltura (*Op. et dies* 383 sgg.), Omero sulla guerra (N 126 sgg.). I Greci vorrebbero anche sulla base di questi due brani dare la vittoria a Omero, ma Panede decide di darla a Esiodo, poiché i vv. di quest'ultimo esortano all'agricoltura e alla pace, quelli di Omero alla guerra.²² C'è un'aporia di fondo: il narratore vuole continuamente sottolineare l'eccezionale bravura di Omero e che la vittoria, da un punto di vista di valore poetico, spetterebbe sicuramente a lui. La vittoria di Esiodo è dovuta a un motivo che non ha nulla a che fare con le qualità poetiche. Come spiegare tutto questo?

È probabile che l'origine del *Certamen* vada cercata in ambienti rapsodici vicini a Esiodo;²³ certamente l'ispirazione di fondo nasce da un passo degli *Op. et dies* (650 sgg.), in cui Esiodo dice di aver vinto un tripode in una gara poetica in onore di Amfidamente a Calcide e di averlo consacrato alle Muse dell'Elicona.²⁴ Dunque il vincitore dell'agone era fin dall'inizio Esiodo e tale dato di fondo non poteva essere modificato.

È evidente, tuttavia, che la contraddizione con la notizia sul *Margite* resta (55 A.); inoltre nell'agone sono presenti anche vv. dell'*Od.* (1 6 sgg. = 84 sgg. A.). Cfr. anche West 1967, 447.

²² Il confronto fra Omero ed Esiodo è già presente in Simon. (Test. 91 a–b Poltera), è attribuito a Cleomene I (re di Sparta dal 520 al 490, cfr. Plut. *Apophth. Lac.* 1, 223 a: Κλεομένης ὁ Ἀναξανδρίδης τὸν μὲν Ὅμηρον Λακεδαιμονίων εἶναι ποιητὴν ἔφη, τὸν δὲ Ἡσίοδον τῶν εἰλώτων· τὸν μὲν γὰρ ὡς χρηὴ πολεμεῖν, τὸν δὲ ὡς χρηὴ γεωργεῖν παρηγγελκέναι) e si incontra in Aristoph. *Ran.* 1033–1036: in queste tre testimonianze è costante l'opposizione fra Omero poeta della guerra ed Esiodo poeta dell'agricoltura. Non ci sono ragioni forti per sospettare della genuinità della notizia circa Cleomene.

²³ Sui rapsodi e la critica letteraria cfr. da ultimo Pozdnev 2016.

²⁴ C'è anche chi ha supposto che le cose siano andate in maniera opposta, che cioè i vv. di *Op. et d.* siano stati interpolati in base alla leggenda del *Certamen*, ma si tratta di un'ipotesi infondata, cfr. Kirchhoff 1892, 871; Abramowicz 1938, 479 (“dubitari enim nequit, quin, si quis eos versus in poema ob celebrem casum inseruisset, Homeri nomen certe adiecisset”).

Il fatto che tutto sia partito da questi vv. di Esiodo (in cui non vi è alcuna traccia di Omero), e che si sia costruito un agone esametrico in cui lo sconfitto era Omero, lascia supporre che l'intenzione originale fosse quella di esaltare le qualità poetiche di Esiodo, capace di sconfiggere addirittura Omero (la cui fama era evidentemente altissima).²⁵ Nel *CL* la vittoria di Esiodo avviene contro ogni aspettativa e a dispetto dei reali meriti poetici: questo è molto probabilmente frutto di una rielaborazione.²⁶ Plutarco probabilmente conosce una versione dell'agone precedente alla rielaborazione. Purtroppo il testo presenta una incertezza in un punto fondamentale (*Sept. sap. conv.* 153 F):²⁷

ἀκούομεν γὰρ ὅτι καὶ πρὸς τὰς Ἀμφιδάμαντος ταφὰς εἰς Χαλκίδα
τῶν τότε σοφῶν οἱ δοκιμώτατοι συνῆλθον. [...] ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ παρεσ-
κευασμένα τοῖς ποιηταῖς ἔπη χαλεπὸν καὶ δύσκολον ἐποίει τὴν
κρίσιν διὰ τὸ ἐφάμιλλον, ἥ τε δόξα τῶν ἀγωνιστῶν Ὀμήρου καὶ
Ἡσιόδου πολλὴν ἀπορίαν μετ' αἰδοῦς τοῖς κρίνουσι παρεῖχεν,
ἐτράποντο πρὸς τοιαύτας ἐρωτήσεις, καὶ ἔπρουβάλλομεν ὥς φησι
Λέσχης†

Μοῦσά μοι ἔννεπε κεῖνα τὰ μήτ' ἐγένοντο πάροιθε
μήτ' ἔσται μετόπισθεν

ἀπεκρίνατο δ' Ἡσίοδος ἐκ τοῦ παρατυχόντος

ἄλλ' ὅταν ἀμφὶ Διὸς τύμβῳ καναχήποδες ἵπποι
ἄρματα συντρίψουσιν ἐπειγόμενοι περὶ νίκης,

καὶ διὰ τοῦτο λέγεται μάλιστα θαυμασθεῖς τοῦ τρίποδος τυχεῖν.

Il contesto è, come nel *CL*, quello dei giochi in onore di Amfidamante, ma, a causa della corruzione testuale che precede la citazione, non è chiaro quale fosse il ruolo di Omero e Lesche.²⁸ Comunque vada ricostruito il

²⁵ L'origine "filo-esiodea" del *Certamen* è già ipotizzata da Wilamowitz 1916, 404, e poi posta su più solide basi da Gallavotti 1929, 45 sgg. e, soprattutto, da Grossardt 2016, 60 sgg.

²⁶ Wilamowitz 1916, 404: "So wird der Sieg für Hesiod im Grunde zu einer Demütigung. Das kann nicht das Ursprüngliche sein".

²⁷ La miglior trattazione del passo plutarcheo si trova in Grossardt 2016, 51 sgg.

²⁸ La tradizione è divisa fra προύβαλε μέν / προυβάλλομεν e φασι / φησι. Se si accetta προύβαλε μέν e φασι è Lesche che si rivolge a Esiodo; in questo modo diviene necessario espungere con Wilamowitz Ὀμήρου καὶ Ἡσιόδου e Omero scompare. Tuttavia, di un agone fra Esiodo e Lesche non sentiamo parlare altrove ed esso è "inherently improbable" (West 1967, 439). Se si accetta προύβαλε μέν e φησι Lesche diviene riferitore dell'agone, ma questo è improbabile, anche perché manca il soggetto di προύβαλε. La soluzione a mio avviso più sensata è espungere Ὀμήρου καὶ Ἡσιόδου (triviale glossa) e correggere Λέσχης in Ὀμηρος (Bergk, West), anche se non si riesce a spiegare come Λέσχης abbia sostituito Ὀμηρος.

testo, una cosa è certa: in questo passo plutarcheo un altro poeta (sia egli Omero o Lesche) chiede a Esiodo di cantare le cose che non sono accadute e non accadranno ed Esiodo è in grado di rispondere brillantemente e per questo vince l'agone. Nel *CL* (94–102 A.) incontriamo la stessa domanda e la stessa risposta (sebbene il testo dei quattro esametri presenti alcune differenze), ma a parti inverite, poiché Esiodo pone la domanda e Omero trova subito la brillante risposta. Come ha ben visto Grossardt, la versione plutarchea conferma quanto si può congetturare per altre ragioni circa l'origine del *Certamen*:²⁹ in Plutarco, a differenza che nel *CL*, la vittoria di Esiodo non è conseguenza di un giudizio che sovverte i reali meriti poetici dei due contendenti, ma rispecchia il loro reale valore. È probabile che la versione plutarchea sia più vicina all'*Urcertamen* di quella del *CL* e forse questo va collegato all'origine beotica di Plutarco. Se è così, il *CL* rappresenta una versione che, rispetto all'*Urcertamen*, è stata modificata a favore di Omero.³⁰

Questa “filo-omerizzazione” del *Certamen* va forse messa in relazione con il suo inserimento all'interno di un βίος omerico. Il *CL*, infatti, inserisce l'agone all'interno di un βίος omerico:³¹ dopo aver riportato varie opinioni circa la patria e i genitori di Omero e l'oracolo che ricevette

²⁹ Grossardt 2016, 62 sgg.; in passato si era per lo più creduto che la versione di Plutarco fosse una innovazione, cfr. Grossardt 2016, 62 nota 139 (ai nomi citati va aggiunto Erbse 1996, 314). Sulla linea di Grossardt già Milne 1924, 57 sgg.; Abramowicz 1938, 489 sgg.; Richardson 1981, 2; Kawasaki 1985, di cui posso leggere solo l'*abstract* (l'articolo è in giapponese); O'Sullivan 1992, 80–81.

³⁰ Cfr. Vogt 1959, 199: “Offensichtlich liegt es in der Absicht der Erzählers, durch die jeweilige Erwähnung des Beifalls der versammelten Festgemeinde, die dem Agon beiwohnt, das Urteil des Panedes als flagrantes Unrecht erscheinen zu lassen. Er zeigt eine besondere Vorliebe für Homer und hätte, wie es scheint, am liebsten ihn, den großen Improvisator, siegen lassen, war aber andererseits durch eine auf den Versen Erga 654 ff. beruhende Tradition an einen feststehenden Ausgang des Kampfes gebunden”; sulla stessa linea O'Sullivan 1992, 98. Anche Nietzsche 1982, 299–302 riconosce il tono anti-esiodico e filo-omerico del *CL*, ma, poiché crede che il *Certamen* sia invenzione di Alcideamante e che il *CL* rispecchi fedelmente il *Museo*, non crede esistesse una versione anteriore filo-esiodica. In realtà, il *CL* non è anti-esiodico se non nella misura in cui questo serve a esaltare Omero, cfr. Erbse 1996, 309 sgg. Cfr. anche Heldmann 1982, 22–23.

³¹ Busse 1909, 108: “Denn was uns hier vorliegt, ist tatsächlich eine in zwei Teile zerschnittene Homervita, in deren Mitte die Darstellung des Wettkampfes zwischen Homer und Hesiod und der Bericht über Hesiods Tod und Bestattung eingefügt sind”. Heldmann 1982, 21: “Der Bericht von Hesiods Sieg über Homer ist eingebettet in eine Erzählung, in der das quantitative und qualitative Übergewicht Homers geradezu erdrückend ist. [...] Als Ganzes betrachtet ist das *Certamen* in der überlieferten Form ein Werk über Homer, in dem Hesiod fast nur im Bezug auf Homers Leben und Homers Leistung interessiert”.

l'imperatore Adriano, l'anonimo compilatore passa a discutere il rapporto cronologico fra Omero ed Esiodo (44 sgg. A.). Vengono quindi citate due opinioni: secondo la prima (45–53 A.), Omero è figlio del fiume Melete e della figlia di Meone, Meone è figlio di Perse, fratello di Esiodo: in questo modo Omero è quindi bisnonno di Esiodo.³² Secondo l'altra opinione Omero ed Esiodo sono stati contemporanei e hanno gareggiato (54 A.: *τινὲς δὲ συνακμάσαι φασὶν αὐτούς ὥστε ἀγωνίσασθαι*). Tutto il seguito del *CL* si basa su questa ipotesi, che cioè i due poeti siano stati contemporanei. Contemporanei non significa però coetanei, poiché quando i due poeti si incontrano Omero è ancora giovanissimo (egli ha composto il solo *Margite*), mentre Esiodo è già vecchio: infatti, Esiodo muore subito dopo l'agone, mentre Omero alla fine dell'agone è appena all'inizio della carriera. Anche questa cronologia relativa dei due poeti sembra ben spiegabile all'interno della “filo-omerizzazione” che caratterizza il *CL*: è, infatti, evidente che rappresentare Omero giovanissimo ed Esiodo vecchio è un modo per esaltare la precocità del primo.³³

Da quanto detto risultano tre cose:

- 1) il *CL* deve molto ad Alcidamante;
- 2) la sezione biografica del *CL* è stata compendiata;
- 3) il *CL* rappresenta una versione “filo-omerizzata” di un originale (*Urcertamen*) filo-esiodico e la sezione biografica del *CL*, in origine separata, sembra essere stata unita all'agone, che essa attualmente racchiude, da un autore filo-omerico.

Circa (2) diremo a p. 105. Esistono buone ragioni per mettere in relazione (1) e (3), vale a dire per attribuire ad Alcidamante la “filo-omerizzazione” del *Certamen*. Proprio il papiro di Karanis offre indizi utili in tal senso. Purtroppo, le ultime righe del papiro, quelle che contengono le riflessioni di Alcidamante (da *περὶ τούτου* in poi), sono mal tradite, ma è comunque certo che il retore concentrava la propria attenzione su Omero, non su Esiodo. Alcidamante inserisce Omero fra gli *ἱστορικοί* e afferma di rendergli il dovuto ringraziamento per la *παιδεία*. Quale è la *Gedankenfolge* del retore? Purtroppo di Alcidamante non sappiamo molto, ma possediamo un discorso (*Περὶ τῶν τοὺς γραπτῶν λόγων γραφόντων ἢ περὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν*) che riguarda una tematica centrale anche nel *Certamen*, quella cioè della capacità di parlare improvvisando, senza essersi preparati prima.³⁴ Alcidamante, infatti,

³² Cfr. l'albero genealogico in Graziosi 2002, 109.

³³ Come osserva la Graziosi 2002, 171.

³⁴ È l'unico discorso integrale di Alcidamante che possediamo; l'altro attribuitogli dalla tradizione (*Ὀδυσσεύς. Κατὰ Παλαμήδους προδοσίας*) è quasi certamente spurio, cfr. da ultimo O'Sullivan 2008; *contra* Muir 2001, XVII–XVIII.

sostiene che la vera qualità di un oratore consiste nell'improvvisare, non nel ripetere discorsi preparati in precedenza, poiché l'improvvisazione richiede più ingegno, si adatta meglio al mutare delle circostanze durante le discussioni e desta maggiore ammirazione e benevolenza nel pubblico. All'inizio del discorso leggiamo: ἐπειδὴ τινες τῶν καλουμένων σοφιστῶν ἱστορίας μὲν καὶ παιδείας ἡμελήκασιν καὶ τοῦ δύνασθαι λέγειν ὁμοίως τοῖς ἰδιώταις ἀπείρως ἔχουσιν. Esattamente come nelle ultime righe del papiro di Karanis (cioè nel *Museo*), anche qui ἱστορία e παιδεία compaiono insieme, e si afferma che i sofisti incapaci di improvvisare ne sono privi. Il papiro lascia pensare che Alcідamante attribuisse a Omero proprio ἱστορία e παιδεία, cioè quella stessa capacità di cui sono privi i sofisti di *Περὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν* (§ 1), la capacità di improvvisare (αὐτοσχεδιάζειν).³⁵ Questo è ben comprensibile, poiché l'agone fra Omero ed Esiodo è proprio in gran parte basato sulla capacità di improvvisare una risposta adeguata a quanto proposto dall'avversario. Sembra dunque del tutto ragionevole mettere in relazione la centralità che per Alcідamante (nel *Περὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν*) ha la capacità di αὐτοσχεδιάζειν con la centralità che tale capacità ha nel *Certamen*.³⁶

Può quindi ben darsi che la centralità che Omero aveva agli occhi di Alcідamante abbia spinto quest'ultimo a "filo-omerizzare" il *Certamen* e che tale "filo-omerizzazione" sia consistita proprio nel mostrare Omero

³⁵ Clearco di Soli (fr. 63, I Wehrli = Athen. 457 C) mette in relazione παιδεία e capacità di risolvere γρίφοι (τῶν γρίφων ἡ ζήτησις οὐκ ἄλλοτρία φιλοσοφίας ἐστὶ, καὶ οἱ παλαιοὶ τὴν τῆς παιδείας ἀπόδειξιν ἐν τούτοις ἐποιοῦντο), cioè proprio la capacità di cui Omero dà prova nel *CL*, cfr. Busse 1909, 116–117.

³⁶ Cfr. in questo senso Nietzsche 1982, 299 sgg.; Vogt 1959, 214–216. Si osservi come αὐτοσχεδιάζειν e affini siano termini centrali nel *Περὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν*: § 8, 29: αὐτοσχεδιαστικοὺς λόγους; § 13: τὰς τῶν αὐτοσχεδιαζόντων ἐρμηνείας, τοὺς αὐτοσχεδιάζοντας; § 14: ὅταν τις τὰ μὲν αὐτοσχεδιάζη; § 16: εἰς τοὺς αὐτοσχεδιαστικοὺς ἔλθῃ λόγους; § 18, 20, 23: οἱ αὐτοσχεδιασμοί § 22: τοὺς αὐτοσχεδιάζοντας; § 30, 33: αὐτοσχεδιαστικὴ δύναμις § 31, 33, 34: αὐτοσχεδιάζειν. Nel papiro di Karanis, a proposito dei ragazzi che pongono a Omero l'indovinello fatale, leggiamo ἐσχεδίασαν τόνδε τὸν στίχον (significativo che nel *CL* l'espressione non occorra così). Qualcuno crede che σχεδιάζω del papiro di Karanis sia indizio della non paternità alcідamantea (che nel *Περὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν* usa sempre αὐτοσχεδιάζω), ma cfr. Renehan 1976, 147. Recentissimamente Grossardt 2016, 79 sgg., in un libro di grande valore, ha proposto di ricondurre il *Certamen* al maestro di Alcідamante, Gorgia di Leontini. Mancano, tuttavia, indizi seri per tale ipotesi: l'unico indizio è che Gorgia, al pari del suo allievo, sembra stimasse molto la capacità di improvvisare (Philostr. *Vitae soph., prooem.* 3, 22–33 Stefec). In generale, la tesi di Grossardt (peraltro non nuova) che *Certamen* e *VH* risalga ad ambienti sofistici ateniesi degli anni '20 del V sec., non è dimostrabile; le nostre conoscenze ci permettono di affermare solo che il *Certamen* era già noto ad Atene nel 421 a. C. (cfr. n. 41) e che esso era stato inserito da Alcідamante nel proprio *Museo*.

campione dell'αὐτοσχεδιάζειν, virtù importantissima per Alcідamante e sinonimo di παιδεία e ἱστορία.³⁷ È significativo che in Plutarco (cioè nell'*Urcertamen*) la capacità di rispondere ἐκ τοῦ παρατυχόντος venga esplicitamente attribuita a Esiodo (*Septem sap. conv.* 153 F), il quale ottiene la vittoria proprio per questo motivo. La stessa espressione incontriamo nel *Περὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν* (§ 3), ove si afferma che εἰπεῖν ἐκ τοῦ παραντύκᾳ περὶ τοῦ παρατυχόντος ἐπιεικῶς è segno di particolare παιδεία. Orbene, nel *CL* (94 sgg.) la sequenza domanda-risposta che in Plutarco porta alla vittoria di Esiodo è capovolta e la risposta brillante è attribuita a Omero: è lecito supporre che sia stato proprio Alcідamante a fare tale capovolgimento, funzionale alla sua intenzione di mostrare la παιδεία di Omero: l'αὐτοσχεδιάζειν era centrale anche nell'*Urcertamen*, ma mentre in quest'ultimo era Esiodo campione di αὐτοσχεδιάζειν, in Alcідamante è divenuto Omero.

Nel *CL* Panede concede la vittoria a Esiodo per una ragione puramente contenutistica, che nulla ha a che fare con le qualità poetiche dei contendenti, e pare essere una innovazione, se nell'*Urcertamen* Esiodo vinceva per meriti poetici. Nel *Certamen* non vi è alcuna recriminazione contro il giudizio di Panede e non sembra si voglia mettere in cattiva luce Panede.³⁸ La superiorità poetica di Omero è indiscussa, ma anche il giudizio di Panede ha una sua legittimità, in quanto non si basa su un fraintendimento

³⁷ West 1967, 443, che crede, come Nietzsche, il *Certamen* una *freie Erfindung* di Alcідamante (su questa tesi, sicuramente erronea, cfr. n. 41), nega che il *CL* esalti le qualità di improvvisatore di Omero e che il *CL* rappresenti una versione modificata di un originale in cui Esiodo vinceva per meriti poetici. West ritiene addirittura che il tono generale del *CL* sia filo-esiodeo, ma anche questo è certamente errato, cfr. O'Sullivan 1992, 96–98.

³⁸ Michele Apostolio, nella sua *Συναγωγή παροιμιῶν* (*Cent.* XIV, 11 = *Paroem. Gr.* II, 606 Leutsch) parla del Πανίδου ψῆφος come sinonimo di ἀμαθῶς ψηφίζεσθαι. Si tratta, a quanto pare, di una *freie Erfindung* di Apostolio, nata dalla sua personale riflessione sul *Certamen* quale lo leggiamo noi, cfr. Heldmann 1982, 26. Anche Heldmann crede (giustamente) che nell'*Urcertamen* (che egli data alla fine del V sec. a. C.) Esiodo vincessse per meriti poetici e che in seguito l'opera sia stata “filo-omerizzata”, ma ipotizza che il giudizio di Panede sia stato introdotto nel II sec. d. C., dopo Dione Crisostomo, il quale (*Orat.* 2, 11–12) mostrerebbe di conoscere una versione del *Cert.* in cui giudicavano privati cittadini, non un βασιλεύς come Panede (anche Abramowicz 1938, per ragioni interne, crede il giudizio di Panede sia stato introdotto dall'autore di *CL*). Non c'è in realtà modo di mostrare che Dione conosca una versione del *Certamen* diversa da quella che leggiamo noi, cfr. Kirchhoff 1892, 873–874; Richardson 1984, 308; Bassino 2013, 31 n. 53. Anche Luciano (*Hist.* v. 2, 20–22), Filostrato (*Her.* 56, 5 sgg. De Lannoy), Temistio (*Or.* 30, 1 = vol. 2, 182, 1 sgg. Downey–Norman), Libanio (*Apol. Socr.* vol. 5, 50, 4 sgg. Foerster) conoscono una versione analoga a quella del *CL*, cfr. Kirchhoff 1892, 880–882.

delle qualità poetiche dei contendenti, bensì su un altro metro di giudizio. Nel passaggio dall'*Urcertamen*, in cui Esiodo vinceva grazie alle sue qualità poetiche, al *Certamen*, in cui la volontà di esaltare Omero rendeva necessario motivare diversamente la vittoria del poeta di Ascra, si spiega benissimo l'invenzione del giudizio di Panede, che decide di assegnare il premio in base non alla bravura poetica, ma al contenuto dei brani recitati. Anche questa innovazione potrebbe risalire ad Alcidamante, la cui ideologia "pacifista" è stata più volte collegata al giudizio di Panede.³⁹ Anche in questo caso, le nostre informazioni circa il pensiero di Alcidamante sono scarsissime: da due fr. del *Μεσσηνιακός* (fr. 3–4 A.) ricaviamo che egli condannava la schiavitù ed esortava alla pace,⁴⁰ ma sono indizi labilissimi. In ogni modo, se non si voglia collegare il giudizio di Panede con un'ideologia pacifista, anche il solo desiderio di esaltare l'eccellenza di Omero nell'improvvisazione può aver spinto Alcidamante a inventare il giudizio di Panede quale lo leggiamo nel *CL*, dal momento che era necessario inventare una ragione per la vittoria di Esiodo che non mettesse in ombra le qualità poetiche di Omero. Alcidamante ha dunque dato una nuova *Prägung* al *Cert.* e quanto leggiamo nel *CL* rispecchia tali innovazioni.⁴¹

³⁹ Cfr. Momigliano 1974, 28; Avezzù 1982, 82–83; *contra* Hess 1960, 59–60; Erbse 1996, 310.

⁴⁰ Fr. 4 A.: εἰ γὰρ ὁ πόλεμος αἴτιος τῶν παρόντων κακῶν, μετὰ τῆς εἰρήνης δεῖ ἐπανορθώσασθαι.

⁴¹ Erbse 1996, 311: "Improvisation und Nutzen der Poesie, diese beiden Prinzipien des Alkidamas prägen unser *Certamen* (ab § 5 [= 54 A.]) und halten es fest zusammen". Quanto ho fin qui detto circa le modifiche che Alcidamante avrebbe fatto dell'*Urcertamen* esclude l'idea che l'agone fra Omero ed Esiodo sia *freie Erfindung* di Alcidamante; questa tesi è stata sostenuta da più di uno studioso (per es. Nietzsche, 1982; Kirchhoff 1892; West 1967; Erbse 1996. *Contra* Meyer 1892; Wilamowitz 1916; Vogt 1959; Di Benedetto 1969; Richardson 1981) ma essa è senza alcun dubbio errata. A mostrarlo basta il confronto fra *Cert.* 107–108 A. (δεῖπνον ἔπειθ' εἵλοντο βοῶν κρέα καὶ χένας ἵππων / ἔκλυον ἰδρώοντας, ἐπεὶ πολέμου ἐκόρεσθον) e Aristoph. *Pax* 1282–1283 (ὥς οἱ μὲν δαίνυντο βοῶν κρέα, καὶ χένας ἵππων / ἔκλυον ἰδρώοντας ἐπεὶ πολέμου ἐκόρεσθον). In Aristofane i due vv. vengono pronunciati dallo stesso personaggio (il figlio di Lamaco), nel *Cert.* il secondo è il proseguimento che Omero fa del v. propostogli da Esiodo. È del tutto evidente che la situazione originaria è quella del *Cert.*, poiché la natura stessa del testo presuppone che i due vv. vengano distribuiti fra due personaggi diversi, dal momento che ogni v. è un γῆφος che deve essere "risolto" da chi pronuncia il v. successivo; evidentemente al tempo di Aristofane questi vv. del *Cert.* erano già ben noti: cfr. Bergk 1872, 66; Meyer 1892, 379; Di Benedetto 1969. West 1967, 440 afferma che "there is nothing to suggest that Aristophanes associated the lines with Homer and Hesiod", ma cosa potremmo aspettarci che ci fosse a rendere chiaro il legame? Quanto fin qui detto è sufficiente a mostrare che il *Certamen* ha avuto una "preistoria".

Se è stato Alcidamante a “filo-omerizzare” il *Certamen*, si può supporre che anche l’inserzione dell’agone all’interno del βίος omerico risalga ad Alcidamante; abbiamo, infatti, visto che tale inserzione è avvenuta in maniera decisamente filo-omerica. Tale inserzione comportò di certo interventi redazionali sul βίος: le tracce di compendiazione che abbiamo notato in tale βίος risalgono anch’esse ad Alcidamante? Chi crede che tutto ciò che leggiamo nel papiro di Karanis derivi da Alcidamante credo debba rispondere affermativamente a questa domanda: abbiamo visto come alcuni particolari presenti in Proclo siano assenti sia dal papiro di Karanis che dal *CL*, e il modo più semplice di spiegare questo è che essi siano stati eliminati da Alcidamante. La *Pap. Ath. Soc. Pap. inv. M2* è anteriore al 100 a.C. e conserva la narrazione della morte di Esiodo (= *CL* 226–235 A.):⁴² si tratta di una sezione che sicuramente il *CL* deriva dal *Museo* di Alcidamante (cfr. 240 A.) e le differenze fra il *CL* e il papiro ateniese sono minime. Ne segue che prima del 100 a.C. circolava già un testo quasi identico al *CL* e tutto lascia pensare che esso risalga ad Alcidamante.

Come circolasse il *Certamen* prima di Alcidamante non è dato sapere. L’unico passo che offre un’indicazione precisa è Aristoph. *Pax* 1282–1283 (cfr. n. 41), che però mostra solo che una coppia di vv. del *Certamen* era nota ad Atene nel 421. Il celebre agone poetico fra Eschilo ed Euripide nelle *Ran.*, invece, non è di alcuna utilità per la nostra indagine:⁴³ anche qui abbiamo una gara fra due poeti, con un vincitore indicato alla fine da un giudice, ma nulla fa pensare a un rapporto fra il *Certamen* e l’agone delle *Ran.* Nel secondo i γρίφοι (che dominano nel primo) sono assenti; nel *CL* la decisione di Panede di attribuire il premio secondo un criterio contenutistico e utilitaristico è come un *fulmen in cauda*, che capovolge tutte le aspettative. In Aristofane, al contrario, Eschilo ed Euripide dicono fin da principio (1008 sgg.) che il miglior poeta è colui che βελτίους ποιεῖ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν. Nelle *Ran.* il piano estetico e quello utilitaristico restano confusi, senza che si arrivi mai a distinguerli con coerenza (anche se alla fine Dioniso giudica esplicitamente in base al secondo, 1419 sgg.); i due contendenti e il loro giudice Dioniso sembrano ritenerli importanti entrambi. Inoltre, in Aristofane è il vincitore, Eschilo, che è indicato come poeta della guerra (1016 sgg.), senza che questo gli pregiudichi in alcun modo la vittoria. Io credo che, se Aristofane avesse conosciuto il *Certamen* nella versione giunta a noi e avesse voluto alludervi, non avrebbe lasciato vincere Eschilo, chiaramente indicato come poeta della guerra, senza che questo causasse una reazione da parte di

⁴² Cfr. Bassino 2012 e 2013, 80–83.

⁴³ Sul problema cfr. Radermacher 1954, 337–338; Lefkowitz 2012, 22.

Euripide: in altre parole, che Eschilo venga indicato *en passant* come poeta della guerra, senza che questo abbia alcuna conseguenza, esclude che Aristofane conoscesse un *Certamen* in cui Omero perde perché poeta della guerra; o, per lo meno, esclude che Aristofane volesse alludere a tale *Certamen*. Resta aperta la questione se le *Ranae* contengano una qualche allusione a un *Urcertamen* diverso dal *CL* e se Alcidamante abbia subito una qualche influenza da parte di Aristofane. A queste domande noi non abbiamo alcuna possibilità di rispondere.

Noi possiamo credere con relativa certezza che al tempo di Alcidamante circolava già una gara fra Omero ed Esiodo, che si concludeva con la vittoria di quest'ultimo; Alcidamante ha inserito questa gara nel proprio *Museo*, introducendo alcuni mutamenti sostanziali in senso filo-omerico. È possibile sapere qualcosa di più sulle intenzioni di Alcidamante? Nel fr. 10 A. leggiamo:

Πάντες τοὺς σοφοὺς τιμῶσιν· Πάριοι γοῦν Ἀρχίλοχον καίπερ βλάβσφημον ὄντα τετιμῆκασιν, καὶ Χίοι Ὅμηρον οὐκ ὄντα πολίτην, καὶ Μυτιληναῖοι Σαπφῶ καίπερ γυναῖκα οὔσαν, καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Χείλωνα καὶ τῶν γερόντων ἐποίησαν ἥκιστα φιλόλογοι ὄντες, καὶ Ἰταλιῶται Πυθαγόραν,⁴⁴ καὶ Λαμψακηνοὶ Ἀναξαγόραν ξένον ὄντα ἔθαψαν καὶ τιμῶσιν ἔτι καὶ νῦν.

Il parallelo fra questo fr. e le ultime linee del papiro di Karanis è evidente: in entrambi i passi Alcidamante parla dell'onore che ricevono poeti e sapienti. Il retore si inserisce così in una discussione che era assai viva nella Grecia del tempo, cioè se i meriti intellettuali ottengano il giusto riconoscimento.⁴⁵ Già molto prima, Senofane lamentava (2 D.–K.) gli eccessivi onori attribuiti alla *ρόμη* degli sportivi in confronto alla *σοφία* di Senofane stesso e il tema torna all'inizio del *Panegirico* di Isocrate (ca. 380 a. C.) e vi si allude anche nel *CL* (65 A.).

Particolarmente interessante è un passo Platone (*Resp.* 598 D sgg.). Secondo Platone/Socrate, i poeti, in quanto *μιμηταί* della realtà sensibile, sono lontani tre passi dalla *ἀλήθεια*. A 599 D Socrate si rivolge ironicamente a Omero chiedendogli se, dal momento che egli parla di cose importantissime (quali le guerre, l'amministrazione delle città e *παιδείας περί ἀνθρώπου*), qualche città è stata amministrata meglio grazie a lui. Glaucone afferma che nemmeno gli Omeridi potrebbero affermare

⁴⁴ Καὶ Ἰταλιῶται Πυθαγόραν va forse espunto, cfr. Kassel 1971, 139–140.

⁴⁵ Cfr. Richardson (1981) 5 sgg.; a proposito del tema in questione, il contributo di Richardson non ha goduto dell'attenzione che merita: esso è senz'altro il miglior tentativo di contestualizzare il papiro di Karanis nella cultura del IV sec. a. C.

questo. Socrate chiede poi se Omero sia stato ἡγεμὼν παιδείας ζῶν e se abbia avuto seguaci (come ad esempio Pitagora). Glaucone risponde di no, e che, anzi, Creofilo, quando Omero era presso di lui, non lo curò molto.⁴⁶ Socrate chiede dunque (600 C): ἀλλ' οἶει, ὦ Γλαύκων, εἰ τῷ ὄντι οἶός τ' ἦν παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους καὶ βελτίους ἀπεργάζεσθαι Ὅμηρος, ἅτε περὶ τούτων οὐ μιμεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ γινώσκειν δυνάμενος, οὐκ ἄρ' ἂν πολλοὺς ἐταίρους ἐποιήσατο καὶ ἡτιμᾶτο καὶ ἡγαπᾶτο ὑπ' αὐτῶν; Socrate fa quindi un paragone con Protagora e Prodicò, attorno ai quali si raccolgono discepoli desiderosi di ricevere da loro la παιδεία; Omero ed Esiodo, invece, hanno passato la vita andando ῥαψωδοῦντες di città in città, cosa che non sarebbe accaduta, se i loro contemporanei avessero sperato di ottenere da loro la παιδεία.

Gli argomenti qui toccati da Socrate presentano una somiglianza stretta con quanto leggiamo nel papiro di Karanis, ma il punto di vista di Platone e Alcідamante è opposto: per Alcідamante Omero è fonte di παιδεία e ha ricevuto onori sia da vivo che da morto, mentre per Socrate Omero non è fonte di παιδεία e da vivo non ha ricevuto onori. L'opposizione fra quanto dice Socrate e quanto dice Alcідamante è di tutta evidenza: il problema è se fra il passo di *Resp.* e quello del *Museo* vi sia una relazione diretta (e, se sì, in quale senso) o se Platone e Alcідamante prendano posizione (indipendentemente l'uno dall'altro) rispetto a problemi ampiamente dibattuti. Purtroppo, una risposta sicura non è possibile.⁴⁷ La discussione sulla funzione educativa della poesia risaliva molto indietro⁴⁸ e Alcідamante e Platone potevano inserirvisi senza alcun bisogno che il primo influenzasse il secondo o viceversa. Tuttavia, che nel papiro di Karanis e in *Resp.* 600 la discussione sulla παιδεία si leghi a quella circa gli onori che Omero (ed Esiodo) hanno ricevuto fa sospettare che uno dei due testi sia stato scritto in polemica con l'altro, ma una *Prioritätsbestimmung*

⁴⁶ Questa notizia, mi pare, è in qualche relazione con quella della *VH* (126, 10–11 V.), secondo cui Testoride di Focea, trascritti i poemi di Omero, οὐκέτι ὁμοίως ἐν ἐπιμελείᾳ εἶχε τὸν Ὅμηρον: sia Testoride che Creofilo sono poeti che ospitano Omero, ma si impradoniscono delle sue opere. Non è possibile per noi capire cosa si celi dietro queste tradizioni.

⁴⁷ Richardson 1981, 8–9 crede che *Resp.* risponda al *Museo*. Non crede a rapporti diretti fra *Resp.* e *Museo* Avezzù 1982, XXX–XXXI; scettico O'Sullivan 1992, 64–66. Il problema dei rapporti fra Platone e Alcідamante è molto difficile anche per quanto concerne *Περὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν* *Phaedrus*: in entrambe le opere si affronta il problema scrittura / oralità (le posizioni dei due scrittori sono in questo caso abbastanza simili), ma è difficile stabilire la priorità di una delle due opere, cfr. O'Sullivan 1992, 23 sgg.

⁴⁸ Essa è illustrata molto bene da Weinstock 1927. È un vero peccato che un recente vol. interamente dedicato a Platone e ai poeti, Destrée–Hermann 2011, non dedichi alcuna attenzione al *Museo* di Alcідamante e al papiro di Karanis.

è difficilissima. *Resp.* 2–10 vengono ragionevolmente datati a metà degli anni '70,⁴⁹ ma sulla data del *Museo* non sappiamo nulla.⁵⁰ Se è vero che Platone nella discussione sulla παιδεία che può venire dalla poesia ha avuto un ruolo centrale, in quanto è stato il primo a rifiutare qualsiasi tentativo conciliatorio (quali per esempio quelli allegorici),⁵¹ pare probabile che sia stato Alcidamante a rispondere a Platone. Una delle cose che più colpiscono nel papiro di Karanis è che Omero venga definito ἱστορικός. Cosa significa? Per Richardson Alcidamante alluderebbe al fatto che Omero ha conoscenze storiche e psicologiche.⁵² Più probabilmente, l'uso di ἱστορικός va qui collegato alla capacità di improvvisare di Omero, che è centrale nel *Cert.* e che anche nel *Περὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν* (§ 1) è legata all'ἱστορία. Tuttavia, l'aggettivo ha un valore più generale e indica una conoscenza reale e approfondita di qualcosa.⁵³ D'altra parte Platone (*Resp.* 602 A–B) nega al poeta μιμητής qualsiasi ἐπιστήμη. È vero che Platone non usa mai il termine ἱστορικός in opposizione ai poeti, ma da quanto dice si potrebbe arguire che egli negasse che i poeti potessero essere ἱστορικοί. Se, d'altra parte, è stato proprio Platone il primo a negare ai poeti (e in particolare a Omero) la conoscenza reale, è ben possibile che Alcidamante, usando a proposito di Omero l'aggettivo ἱστορικός, volesse in tal modo opporsi a Platone. Certo, la pericope che noi abbiamo del *Museo* non è sufficiente per contestualizzare il pensiero di Alcidamante: non solo il testo è lacunoso e corrotto, ma sembra anche probabile che il retore trattasse questi temi anche in una sezione precedente dell'opera, poiché è improbabile che a un tema di tale importanza venissero dedicate solo poche righe alla fine. Nel complesso, mi sembra piuttosto probabile che Alcidamante nel *Museo* abbia polemizzato con Platone, in particolare con *Resp.* 10, ma certezze non possiamo averne.

⁴⁹ Cfr. Erler 2007, 203 sgg.

⁵⁰ Renehan 1976, 154–155 lo data dopo il 362, ma si basa sul presupposto che il fr. 11 A., che sembra effettivamente successivo alla morte di Epaminonda (362), appartenga al *Museo*, ipotesi del tutto aleatoria. Certo, se fosse vera questa datazione, ne seguirebbe che, se fra le due opere c'è rapporto diretto, è il *Museo* che risponde alla *Resp.* (così pensa, per es., Apfel 1938, 250 e la cosa sembra anche a me verisimile).

⁵¹ Cfr. Weinstock 1927, 124.

⁵² Richardson 1981, 6: “ἱστορικός may suggest that Alcidas sees Homer either as a faithful recorder of tradition, or as an accurate observer of life. In the *Iliad* he would be primarily the first, in the *Odyssey* the second” e richiama il fr. 34 A.: Ὀδύσσεια καλὸν ἀνθρώπινου βίου κάτοπτρον.

⁵³ Cfr. Aristot. *Rhet.* 1359 b 32: τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εὐρημένων ἱστορικόν εἶναι, ove il termine vale “buon conscitore, esperto”. Platone stesso (*Soph.* 267 E) parla di una ἱστορική τις μίμησις, cioè di una μίμησις basata sull'ἐπιστήμη e non sulla δόξα (come la δοξομιμητική μίμησις).

Le fonti del *CL* e i suoi rapporti con la *VH*

Quanto di ciò che leggiamo nel *CL* risale ad Alcidamante? Alcuni credono che la sezione alcidamantea inizi con 54 A.,⁵⁴ ma tale ipotesi non ha fondamento. Che fra questo punto e quanto precede vi sia una cesura è certo, ma io credo si tratti solo di un cambio di fonte: siamo cioè al passaggio fra la sezione genealogica e quella agonale, ma non c'è ragione di escludere che la sezione genealogica fosse già in Alcidamante. Io credo, anzi, che ci sia un indizio decisivo che prova che anche quanto precede 54 A. doveva essere già (almeno parzialmente) nel *Museo*. Nel papiro di Karanis leggiamo γένος αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ποίησιν⁵⁵... παραδο[ύς. Se l'integrazione è corretta, ne segue che già nel *Museo* si parlava del γένος di Omero, dunque che anche una parte di quanto precede 54 A. doveva essere in Alcidamante; del resto, il titolo di *CL* è Περὶ Ὀμήρου καὶ Ἡσιόδου καὶ τοῦ γένους καὶ ἀγῶνος αὐτῶν.⁵⁶

Il *CL* inizia affermando (1–6 A.) che tutte le città vorrebbero poter dire che Omero ed Esiodo sono stati loro cittadini, ma che nel caso di Esiodo non possono farlo poiché egli stesso ha nominato Ascrea (*Op. et dies* 639–640). Nel caso di Omero, prosegue il *CL* (7–17 A.), sia Smirne sia Chio sia Colofone dicono Omero loro cittadino e ciascuna città porta una prova. Seguono le opinioni di Ellanico, Κλεάνθης, Εὐγαίων, Callicle, Δημόκριτος ὁ Τροιζήνιος⁵⁷ e altri circa i genitori di Omero, poi l'oracolo ricevuto da Adriano, secondo cui Omero era Itacese, figlio di Telemaco ed Epicaste (18–43). Inizia quindi la discussione dei rapporti fra Omero e Esiodo: alcuni dicono Omero più anziano (43–44), altri affermano che i due fossero parenti e Esiodo un po' più anziano (45–53), altri li credono contemporanei (54 sgg.). Come ho già detto, non

⁵⁴ Così West 1967, 449; Avezzù 1982, 38.

⁵⁵ Cosa significa ἄλλη ποίησις? Secondo Dodds 1952, 188: “what else he wrote besides the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*”. Io credo che Alcidamante alluda agli esametri del *Certamen* che precedono; essi sono ἄλλη ποίησις in quanto si oppongono alla produzione omerica normalmente letta: non solo dunque *Il.* e *Od.*, ma anche *Inni* e opere del *Ciclo*, se qualcuno li riteneva omerici (problema sul quale Alcidamante non prende posizione).

⁵⁶ Su questo titolo cfr. Busse 1909, 108.

⁵⁷ Κλεάνθης va probabilmente corretto in Νεάνθης, storico di Cizico della fine del III sec. a.C. (cfr. *FrGrHist* 84, F 40). Εὐγαίων va probabilmente corretto in Εὐάγων, storico samio (*FrGrHist* 535). Nulla di preciso sappiamo di Callicle, anche se la polemica contro di lui (?) di Alceo di Messene farebbe pensare alla seconda metà del III sec. a.C. (cfr. Jacoby 1919). Δημόκριτος va forse corretto in Δημήτριος (cfr. *Suppl. Hell.* fr. 378) e, se è così, siamo in età augustea. Su questi autori cfr. anche O'Sullivan 1992, 79 n. 101.

c'è alcuna ragione di pensare che con 54 A. inizi una sezione di origine diversa: la notizia sul *Margite* (55–56 A.) presuppone 15–17 A. e la stessa affermazione *τινὲς δὲ συνακμάσαι φασὶν αὐτοὺς* presuppone 44–53 A., cui si oppone.⁵⁸ Ne segue che 44 sgg. A. e 15–17 A. derivano dalla stessa fonte; d'altra parte, non c'è ragione di staccare 15–17 A. da quanto precede.⁵⁹ Dunque, 1–17 A. e 44 sgg. derivano dalla stessa fonte. Da tale fonte non può derivare 32–43 A. (l'oracolo di Adriano), evidente aggiunta del compilatore antonino. Che 18 sgg. abbiano origine diversa da quanto precede è evidente: 7–17 citano tre città che pretendono di essere patria di Omero, nel caso di Smirne vengono citati anche i nomi dei genitori. Con 18 sgg. si iniziano a citare nomi di storici ed eruditi, si citano alcuni nomi di possibili genitori di Omero e lo stesso nome di Melesigene, senza che questo venga messo in alcuna relazione con 9–12 A., ove pure si erano fatte affermazioni sullo stesso tema. Ne segue che fra 17 A. e quanto segue c'è una sutura e tutto lascia pensare che il compilatore antonino che ha inserito l'oracolo di Adriano (32 sgg.) abbia introdotto anche 18 sgg. Che tale compilatore copiasse materiale precedente senza curarsi troppo dell'insieme che ne nasceva lo mostra bene che egli affermi di credere (41–43 A.) all'origine itacese di Omero, di cui poi non si fa più parola; egli non stabilisce nemmeno un collegamento fra l'oracolo di Adriano e 23 sgg. A., ove pure si afferma l'origine itacese di Omero.

In conclusione, a me pare che 18–43 A. siano un'aggiunta del compilatore antonino all'interno di un testo coerente; è dunque altamente probabile che 1–17, 44 sgg. A. derivino da Alcidas. C'è qualcosa nella sezione successiva a 44 A. che non deriva da Alcidas?

Nel fr. 10 A. Alcidas dice che Omero non era di Chio e che, nonostante questo, i Chii lo onorarono; nel *CL* (307 sgg. A.) leggiamo che gli Argivi onorarono Omero disponendo un sacrificio in suo onore a Chio. Qualcuno pensa che queste due notizie siano in contraddizione e che, di conseguenza, l'episodio di Argo e Chio nel *CL* (287–315) non possa derivare da Alcidas.⁶⁰ In realtà, Alcidas afferma che

⁵⁸ L'opposizione fra *συνακμάσαι* (54 A.) e *προγενέστερον / νεώτερον* (44–45 A.) mostra che i due passi derivano dalla stessa fonte.

⁵⁹ West 1967, 444 crede che 1–8 A. abbiano origine diversa da quanto segue e che derivino dalla fonte comune a Velleio Patercolo (*Hist.* 1, 5–7) e Proclo (*Vita Hom.* 4 sgg. S.). Le coincidenze fra Velleio e Proclo sono realmente significative e presuppongono una fonte comune, ma non c'è ragione per dire che anche *CL* 1–8 usi tale fonte: *CL* afferma semplicemente che Esiodo, a differenza di Omero, ha nominato la propria patria, cosa che può venire in mente a chiunque legga Hes. *Op. et dies* 639–640.

⁶⁰ Così West 1967, 448 sgg. seguito da Avezzù 1982, 48 e O'Sullivan 1992, 99.

i Chii onoravano Omero e *CL* parla di onori attribuiti al poeta a Chio; in entrambi i casi si presuppone che Omero sia onorato a Chio, mentre nulla viene detto circa l'origine del poeta (essere onorati in una città non significa esserne originari). Non esiste dunque contraddizione fra *CL* 287–315 e Alcidamante; di conseguenza, cade uno dei pilastri su cui basa la *Quellenanalyse* di West–Avezzù: questi studiosi suppongono che sia l'episodio di Argo e Chio sia quelli limitrofi di Atene, Corinto, Delo (275–321 A.) non derivino da Alcidamante.⁶¹ Contro questa *Quellenanalyse* si possono obiettare almeno tre cose:

1) Nel *CL* l'agone è posto all'interno di un βίος omerico: tale βίος narrava che Omero da giovane aveva composto il *Margite* e era andato poi a Delfi, ove l'oracolo gli aveva detto che sua madre era di Ios (55–60 A.). Nel *CL* a queste notizie segue l'agone; dopo l'agone e la morte di Esiodo riprendono le notizie biografiche su Omero e tutto lascia pensare che esse derivino ancora dal βίος utilizzato a 55–60 A.: il poeta si trova in Grecia, è ancora giovane e ha composto il solo *Margite*; anche l'oracolo circa Ios compare nel seguito (321 sgg. A.). Non è dunque metodico attribuire un'origine diversa a 275–321 A. e le altre sezioni biografiche del *CL*.

2) Alcidamante nel papiro di Karanis parla di onori ricevuti da Omero in vita ed è evidente che egli deve averne trattato nella parte precedente: se fosse corretta l'analisi di West–Avezzù, all'agone in cui Omero viene sconfitto sarebbe seguita, in Alcidamante, la morte del poeta a causa della sua incapacità di risolvere il γρίφος propostogli dai ragazzi di Ios. Questo a me pare del tutto improbabile: il *Museo* sarebbe in questo modo un repertorio di umiliazioni subite da Omero, mentre dal papiro di Karanis si deduce l'opposto. Nel *Museo* doveva essere presente la sezione sui soggiorni ad Atene, Corinto, Argo e Delo: è lì, infatti, che Omero riceve gli onori cui allude il papiro di Karanis.

3) Nel *CL* Omero arriva a Ios dopo un lunghissimo soggiorno in Grecia; la *VH* polemizza sia contro il soggiorno del poeta in Grecia sia contro il soggiorno a Ios come descritto nel *CL* (cfr. *infra* p. 112–113); se ne deduce che la *VH* aveva davanti un testo in cui 321 A. e quanto precede erano già uniti. Certo, si può ipotizzare che la conflazione fra 321 A. e quanto precede sia avvenuta prima della *VH* ma dopo Alcidamante, ma pare probabile che la *VH* polemizzi contro lo stesso βίος omerico che è confluito, tramite Alcidamante, nel *CL*.

⁶¹ A differenza di West, Avezzù 1982, 48 nega ad Alcidamante anche la parte su Mida (260–274 A.).

Non pare quindi ragionevole ipotizzare per 275–321 A. una fonte diversa da quella da cui deriva quanto precede e quanto segue, cioè Alcідamante. Da quanto fin qui detto risulta che il *CL* deriva interamente dal *Museo* di Alcідamante, con l'eccezione di 18–43 A., 240–247 A. (che deriva esplicitamente da Eratostene) e, probabilmente, di 210–214 A. (cfr. *supra* p. 95).⁶²

Alla base del *CL* (e, se la nostra ricostruzione è corretta, del *Museo*) stanno l'*Urcertamen* e un βίος omerico. Io credo che contro tale βίος polemizzi spesso la *VH*. Secondo il *CL* (55 A.) Omero compose come prima opera il *Margite*. Questa è tradizione colofonia, come mostra il (*CL* 15–17 A.), ove si dice che i Colofoni indicavano un luogo ove Omero aveva iniziato a comporre poesia e aveva composto il *Margite* (καὶ ποιῆσαι πρῶτον τὸν Μαργίτην).⁶³ Contro questa tradizione polemizza la *VH* (118, 1–3 V.): ἐκ δὲ τῆς Κολοφῶνος τυφλὸς ἔων ἀπικνέεται ἐς τὴν Σμύρναν, καὶ οὕτως ἐπεχειρεῖ τῇ ποιήσει. È evidente che chi ha scritto questo conosceva la tradizione secondo cui Omero aveva iniziato a poetare a Colofone e voleva smentirla;⁶⁴ con questo si accorda bene anche che nella *VH* si dica (134, 16–17 V.) che Omero compose tutti i suoi παίγνια a Chio (dunque nessuno, nemmeno il *Margite*, a Colofone). Nel *CL* (322 sgg. A.) leggiamo che Omero a Ios soggiornò per un certo tempo presso Creofilo, che morì per non aver saputo risolvere il γρίφος propostogli dai fanciulli e che scrisse il suo epigramma funebre. Tutto questo viene esplicitamente smentito dalla *VH* (146, 21 sgg. V.): Omero non soggiorna a lungo a Ios (Creofilo non è presente nella *VH*), la sua morte è dovuta a malattia, non al γρίφος, e l'epigramma non è composto dal poeta stesso. Secondo la *VH* (138, 6 sgg. V.) Omero, mentre si trova a Chio, divenuto ormai famoso per la sua poesia, medita di andare in Grecia, e, dato che nei suoi poemi vi sono molte menzioni di Argo e nessuna di Atene, decide di aggiungerne una in favore di quest'ultima città. Nel *CL* (276 sgg. A.) Omero si trova in Grecia e viene ricevuto con onori prima ad Atene, poi (dopo un breve passaggio a Corinto) ad Argo. Che fra le due narrazioni vi sia un rapporto è evidente. Sembra che l'originale sia quanto leggiamo nel *CL*: mentre, infatti, un passaggio da Atene a Argo è del tutto naturale, ci si chiede perché, ancora a Chio, Omero avrebbe dovuto pensare proprio a queste due città (in cui, secondo la *VH*, non andrà mai). Più in generale,

⁶² Anche il numero di vv. di *Tebaide*, *Epigoni*, *Il.* e *Od.* (255, 258, 275–276) hanno probabilmente un'origine post-alcідamantea.

⁶³ Per la tradizione che faceva di Omero un colofonio, propugnata da Antimaco e Nicandro, cfr. Hillgruber 1994, 85.

⁶⁴ Cfr. Wilamowitz 1916, 421.

sembra che la *VH* voglia smentire che Omero abbia mai messo piede nella Grecia continentale: si dice, infatti, che Omero salpò verso la Grecia (146, 18 sgg. V.), ma che il viaggio si interruppe per la morte del poeta a Ios. È evidente che si vuole in questo modo mostrare che tutto quanto leggiamo nella sezione biografica del *CL* è falso, dal momento che lì Omero trascorre gran parte della propria vita in Grecia, non in Asia. Si osservi che qui non si tratta di un dettaglio: la *VH* affermando che Omero aveva intenzione di andare in Grecia, ma non riuscì ad arrivarci, contraddice e smentisce in maniera chiara e inequivocabile tutte le notizie biografiche presupposte nel *CL*.⁶⁵

Abbiamo osservato come nel *CL* sia confluita una tradizione colofonia circa il *Margite* e l'inizio della carriera poetica di Omero e come la *VH* polemizzi contro tale tradizione. Vi è forse un altro punto in cui è riconoscibile una polemica anti-colofonia. La *VH* narra che Omero, mentre si trovava a Samo, partecipò alle Apaturie (140, 1 – 142, 8 V.). Erodoto dice (1, 147) che ὄσοι ἀπ' Ἀθηνέων γεγόνασι καὶ Ἀπατούρια ἄγουσιν ὁρτήν sono Ioni e aggiunge che, fra gli Ioni, solo gli Efesi e i Colofoni non celebrano le Apaturie. Dal momento che abbiamo già trovato un indizio di polemica anti-colofonia nella *VH*, forse anche la partecipazione di Omero alle Apaturie va letta in questa prospettiva: fare cioè partecipare Omero alla cerimonia che secondo Erodoto definisce l'identità ionica e che, sempre secondo Erodoto, i Colofoni non celebrano, può essere da parte di chi vuole fingersi Erodoto un modo per sottolineare che Omero non ha nulla a che fare con Colofone.⁶⁶

Non è facile comprendere che ruolo giocasse l'origine colofonia di Omero nel βίος che è alla base del *CL*, ma pare che tale βίος affermasse l'origine ionica di Omero: gli Ioni lo fanno κοινὸν πολίτην (319 A.),

⁶⁵ Su questa linea già Wilamowitz 1916, 430–431. Cfr. anche Hess 1960, 26 sgg. È completamente in errore la Lefkowitz 2012, 26 a credere che la *VH* ignori la tradizione del *CL* sul soggiorno continentale di Omero. Grossardt 2016, 123 (che è uno dei pochi, assieme a Wilamowitz, ad avere chiaro che tra il *CL* e la *VH* c'è una polemica) crede che il *Certamen* sia opera di Gorgia, che presuppone la *VH*, opera di Ippia. Non credo, in generale, alla teoria di Grossardt, che data *Certamen* e *VH* all'Atene del V sec., ma, anche se tale teoria dovesse essere vera, credo bisognerebbe invertire l'ordine del *Certamen* (almeno della sezione biografica) e della *VH* (che sarebbe, in astratto, possibile, anche all'interno del quadro generale ipotizzato da Grossardt).

⁶⁶ Per la tendenza anti-colofonia di Erodoto cfr. Asheri 2007, 179. Nella *VH* sono riconoscibili altri punti di polemica: a Chio Omero sposa una donna del luogo, da cui ha due figlie, una delle quale muore ἄγαμος, l'altra si sposa con un uomo di Chio (134, 21–26 V.). Il bersaglio della polemica è evidentemente la tradizione secondo cui Omero avrebbe dato una figlia in sposa al poeta Stasino, dandole in dote i *Cypria*, cfr. Wilamowitz 1916, 428; Ruiz Montero – Fernández Zambudio 2005, 40.

l'oracolo afferma che sua madre è di Ios (59–60 A.), isola ionica, mentre non si trova alcuna allusione all'Eolia.⁶⁷ Anche qui l'opposizione con la *VH*, che afferma l'origine eolica di Omero (112, 3 sgg. V.; 150, 3 sgg. V.), è palese e forse si spiega così anche che la *VH* non citi mai l'oracolo sulla madre di Omero e motivi l'arrivo a Ios del poeta in altro modo.

Quale è il rapporto dell'anonimo autore con il vero Erodoto? Quest'ultimo (2, 53, 2) crede che Omero ed Esiodo siano contemporanei, ma nella *VH* nulla si dice circa Esiodo; anzi, sembra chiara la tendenza a isolare Omero da tutti gli altri epici arcaici (cfr. n. 66 e p. 116); inoltre, Erodoto (*loc. laud.*) pone Omero verso l'850 a.C., mentre la *VH* lo pone attorno al 1100. Questo ha portato a ipotizzare che in origine lo scritto non fosse attribuito a Erodoto e che le righe introduttive che contengono l'attribuzione allo storico di Alicarnasso siano state inserite successivamente.⁶⁸ In realtà, in molti punti la *VH* si collega a tendenze presenti in Erodoto; oltre ad alcune caratteristiche formali,⁶⁹ quanto abbiamo detto circa le Apaturie e Colofone mi pare si spieghi bene immaginando che l'anonimo volesse sembrare Erodoto, di cui ereditava l'antipatia per Colofone. La *VH* dichiara esplicitamente (150, 3 sgg. V.) che Omero era eolico, non ionico né dorico. È ovvio che la polemica è diretta contro gli Ioni, non certo contro i Dori, che non potevano avere reali pretese su Omero; si tratta di un punto di importanza centrale per la *VH* e forse anche qui è possibile vedere una *Anspielung* dell'anonimo a una delle tendenze di fondo di Erodoto, cioè l'anti-ionismo.⁷⁰

Non c'è quindi dubbio che la *VH* sia stata scritta da qualcuno che voleva sembrare Erodoto e che sviluppava alcune caratteristiche di fondo dello storico di Alicarnasso per inserirsi nelle discussioni omeriche.⁷¹ D'altra parte, la contraddizione cronologica fra la *VH* e il vero Erodoto è seria. La spiegazione più probabile è che l'anonimo, per quanto concerne

⁶⁷ Se non a 31–32 A., sezione aggiunta, cfr. *supra* p. 110.

⁶⁸ Così Bergk 1872, 443; *contra* Grossardt 2016, 89.

⁶⁹ Per le quali cfr. Grossardt 2016, 89, 99 n. 277.

⁷⁰ Sull'avversione di Erodoto agli Ioni, cfr. Asheri 2007, 176.

⁷¹ Nel *CL*, oltre all'*Il.* e all'*Od.*, vengono attribuiti a Omero, il *Margite* (55 A.), la *Tebaide* (256 A.), gli *Epigoni* (258 A.), l'*Inno ad Apollo* (317 A.). Nella *VH*, oltre ai due poemi maggiori, la *Spedizione di Amfiarao contro Tebe*, gli *Inni* (113–114 A.), la *Piccola Iliade* (203 A.), i *Cercopi*, la *Batracomimachia*, la *Psaromachia*, la *Eptapactiche*, le *Epicicliidi* (332–332 A.), la *Focaide* (126, 7 V.). Erodoto nega (2, 117) la paternità omerica dei *Cypria*, dubita (4, 32) di quella degli *Epigoni*. È difficile capire se nella *VH* vi sia a questo proposito qualche spunto polemico contro la tradizione confluita nel *CL*; che la *VH* non citi *Cypria* e *Epigoni* si spiega probabilmente con l'influenza erodotea. C'è un'indagine recentissima sulla presenza di Erodoto nei grammatici imperiali (epoca cui risale la *VH*): Tribulato 2016, 175–176.

la genealogia di Omero, seguisse una tradizione fissata, “die sich nahtlos in die Erzählung von der äolischen Wanderung von Thessalien ins nord-westliche Kleinasien einfügte”.⁷²

La data della *VH* è incerta.⁷³ Un *terminus ante quem* sicuro è Taziano (ca. 160 d.C., *Ad Graecos* 31, 3), che inserisce Erodoto fra i biografici omerici. Grossardt⁷⁴ ha cercato di attribuire la *VH* a Ippia di Elide, ma che Ippia (fr. 18 D.–K.) e la *VH* credano Omero cumano dimostra poco: tutta la tradizione, diffusa e antica,⁷⁵ che crede alla parentela fra Omero ed Esiodo, deve postulare l’origine cumana del primo a causa dei legami sicuri con Cuma del secondo. Grossardt crede Ippia volesse parodiare l’opera erodotea, pubblicata da poco. In questo modo, tuttavia, diviene necessario postulare che anche la *facies* linguistica ionico-erodotea risalga al V sec.,⁷⁶ ma questo è impossibile, poiché la lingua della *VH* non può risalire così indietro.⁷⁷ Inoltre, è difficile immaginare che una biografia omerica che circolava sotto il nome di Erodoto non venga citata da nessuno prima del II sec. d.C.

Io non vedo ragioni serie per datare la *VH* prima del II sec. d.C. In tale epoca le dispute circa la patria di Omero erano assai vive: il medico Ermogene di Smirne⁷⁸ scrisse due opere omeriche, intitolate

⁷² Grossardt 2016, 96.

⁷³ Cfr. Vasiloudi 2013, 3 n. 15; Grossardt 2016, 85 sgg.

⁷⁴ Grossardt 2016, 94 sgg.

⁷⁵ Cfr. Ellanico (*FrGrHist* 4 F 5), Damaste (*FrGrHist* 5 F 11), Ferecide (*FrGrHist* 3 F 167).

⁷⁶ Come, infatti, Grossardt 2016, 103–104 coerentemente fa; egli, sulla scia di Gigante 1996, 14, ritiene che solo la fine della *VH* (150, 3 – 152, 6 V.) sia stata aggiunta nel II sec. d.C., poiché la datazione per arconti ateniesi (152, 4–5 V.) non è immaginabile nel V sec. (cfr. già Schmidt 1876, 206–207). In realtà, non c’è alcuna ragione per separare l’ultima parte della *VH* da quanto precede.

⁷⁷ Da un punto di vista linguistico, la *VH* presenta usi che non sembrano risalire oltre il IV sec. inoltrato, alcuni addirittura di età imperiale (qualche osservazione in questo senso già in Schmidt 1876, 101 sgg. e Ruiz Montero – Fernández Zambudio 2005, 51; molto superficiale su questo punto Grossardt 2016, 105–106): ἄδυνάτως ἔχειν (= ‘stare male’) da ps.-Dem. (*Contra Call.* 14, 1) e ps.-Plat. (*Axioch.* 364 B) in poi; ἀποσχολάζειν (114, 26; 148, 2 V.) da Aristot. (*EN* 1176 b 17) in poi; διαλογή (148, 21 V.) da Aristot. (*Pol.* 1268 b 17) in poi; εἰσαόριον (142, 8 V.) greco imperiale; ἐκπεριπλέω (136, 14 V.) da Polyb. (1, 23, 9) in poi; ἐκτενέως (116, 16; 136, 3 V.) da ps.-Aristot. (*Magna mor.* 2, 11, 31) e Polyb. (5, 5, 5) in poi; ἐπικλεής (122, 6 V.) da Ap. Rh. (4, 1472) in poi; θαυμαστής (θωυμ.) (122, 3 V.) da Arist. (*Rhet.* 1384 b 37) in poi; ἱεροποιΐα (150, 8; 156, 23 V.) da Aen. Tact. (*Poliore.* 17, 1) in poi; μαλακῶς ἔχειν (= ‘stare male’) tipico del greco imperiale (cfr. Plut. *Cic.* 43, 6); παραχειμάζω (144, 17 V.) da Dem. (*Contra Phorm.* 8) in poi; πολύφορτος (112, 5 V.) in Mosch. (*Eur.* 83) e poi in età imperiale.

⁷⁸ Su di lui cfr. Petzl 1982, 237–239 e Gossen 1912.


περὶ τῆς Ὀμήρου σοφίας e περὶ τῆς Ὀμήρου πατρίδος. Luciano (*Demosth. enc.* 9) parla dell'ἔρις circa la patria di Omero di tutte le città che si contendevano il poeta (Ione, Colofone, Cuma, Chio, Smirne, Tebe egizia). Elio Aristide, egli stesso di Smirne, crede anche Omero oriundo da tale città⁷⁹ e allude alla lingua omerica come testimonianza dell'origine attica (attraverso Smirne, colonia ateniese) del poeta (*Panath.* 328). L'origine ionico-attica del poeta era dunque difesa nel II sec. d.C. e non meraviglia che la *VH* vi polemizzi contro, per difendere l'origine eolica di Omero. La *VH* polemizza contro la tradizione ionico-attica secondo la forma che essa ha assunto nella sezione biografica del *CL*. In che forma leggeva l'autore della *VH* tale tradizione? Aveva egli a disposizione la biografia confluita nel *Certamen* o il *Certamen* stesso? Nella *VH* non vi è alcuna allusione né al *Certamen* né a Esiodo né ad alcun altro poeta, cui venissero attribuiti poemi epici; sembra si voglia sottolineare l'unicità di Omero, negando qualsiasi suo contatto con gli altri poeti; l'unica eccezione è Testoride, ma di questo poeta non circolavano opere e dunque si poneva in una posizione diversa rispetto a Esiodo, Stasino, Creofilo, poeti volutamente taciuti dalla *VH* (cfr. n. 66).⁸⁰ Non c'è dubbio che l'anonimo autore della *VH* conoscesse la leggenda dell'agone fra Omero ed Esiodo, ma che egli desumesse i dati biografici contro cui polemizzava dal *Certamen* (in qualsiasi forma esso fosse) non è sicuro; potrebbe, infatti, aver avuto a disposizione la biografia confluita nel *Certamen*. Come ha mostrato il papiro di Karanis, *Certamen* e biografia erano già riuniti in Alcidamante. Tuttavia, Proclo leggeva ancora la biografia nella forma originaria, non nella versione compendiate (cfr. *supra* p. 96). Inoltre, mentre la *VH* polemizza chiaramente contro i rapporti di Omero con Stasino e Creofilo, non si trovano segni di polemica contro l'agone con Esiodo. Certo, è un indizio *ex silentio* che non può darci alcuna sicurezza, ma non si comprende come un autore così incline alla polemica come l'anonimo autore della *VH* non abbia fatto alcuna allusione al *Certamen*, se esso era incorporato nel βίος omerico contro cui egli polemizzava. Pare quindi più probabile che la *VH* polemizzi direttamente contro tale βίος.

Da quanto fin qui detto segue il seguente stemma:⁸¹

⁷⁹ Cfr. Kindstrand 1973, 193.

⁸⁰ La Lefkowitz 2012, 26 crede che la *VH* non faccia alcun accenno all'agone con Esiodo per esaltare Omero; questo è *per se ipsum* vero, ma si inserisce nella tendenza generale della *VH* a isolare Omero rispetto agli altri poeti.

⁸¹ Le linee continue indicano la trasmissione di testi e notizie, le linee tratteggiate rapporti polemici.



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This paper investigates the relationship between the *Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi*, Alcidas and the Homeric biographical tradition. The *Certamen* is preserved in a late abridgment (*Certamen Laurentianum*), which derives from an *Urcertamen* and a lost Homeric biography. The *Urcertamen* was favourable to Hesiod, and I believe that Plutarch (*Sept. sap. conv.* 153 F) depends on it. The Karanis-papyrus has shown rather paradoxically that F. Nietzsche was right in assuming that the rhetor Alcidas played an important role in the creation of our *Certamen*, and I suggest that it was Alcidas who first combined the *Urcertamen* and the lost Homeric biography, giving the new work a pro-Homeric tendency. It is possible that Alcidas' praise of Homer was provoked by Plato's attack on poetry. The *Vita Herodotea* (which I date to the second century AD) polemizes against the biographical source used by the *Certamen*; its author adopts a Herodotean attitude towards the Colophonians. A new critical edition of the Karanis-papyrus and a detailed *Quellenanalyse* of the *Certamen Laurentianum* are also provided.

В статье исследуется связь между “Состязанием Гомера и Гесиода”, Алкидамантом и биографической традицией о Гомере. “Состязание” дошло до нас в позднем кратком пересказе (*Certamen Laurentianum*), восходящем к пра-“Состязанию” и недошедшей биографии Гомера. В пра-“Состязании” симпатии автора были на стороне Гесиода, и из него, вероятно, исходил Плутарх (*Sept. sap. conv.* 153 F). Каранисский папирус доказывает, что, как ни парадоксально, Ф. Ницше был прав, приписывая важную роль в создании дошедшего до нас “Состязания” ритору Алкидаманту. Очевидно, именно Алкидамант первым соединил материал из пра-“Состязания” и из недошедшей биографии Гомера, придав новому сочинению прогомеровский характер. Не исключено, что прославление Гомера у Алкидаманта стимулировали платоновские нападки на поэзию. Жизнеописание Геродота (которое я датирую II в. н.э.) полемизирует с биографическим источником “Состязания”; его автор принимает геродотовское отношение к колофониям. В статье также содержится новое критическое издание Каранисского папируса и подробный анализ источников *Certamen Laurentianum*.

THE END OF THE *EPITYMBIA* SECTION IN THE MILAN PAPYRUS AND PAIRING OF EPIGRAMS IN POSIDIPPUS

Since the publication of the *P. Mil. Vogl.* VIII, 309 preserving a book of epigrams that can with a high degree of certainty be attributed to Posidippus, it has been noticed that among both the newly found epigrams and the previously known poems, adjacent pieces sometimes appear as a pair. Two such pairs have been studied by Dirk Obbink. The first is preserved on the Firmin-Didot papyrus (*P. Louvre* 7172) dating from before 161 BCE, discovered and first published in the XIXth century:¹ two epigrams specifically ascribed to Posidippus by the compiler and celebrating two remarkable seaside monuments of Ptolemaic Egypt: the first, *Ep.* 115 Austin–Bastianini = *Ep.* 11 Gow–Page, speaks of the lighthouse constructed by Sostratus of Cnidos, the second, *Ep.* 116 Austin–Bastianini = 12 Gow–Page, of the shrine of Arsinoe-Aphrodite set up by Callicrates of Samos. The epigrams are placed side by side;² they are of equal size (10 lines) and are thematically and compositionally interconnected, so that there is little doubt that their appearance together in the Firmin-Didot papyrus is not a matter of chance but reflects the compiler’s recognition of the connection existing between the two poems that he took over from an earlier collection where they appeared side by side.³ The second pair of epigrams studied

¹ The *editio princeps* of this papyrus appeared in Weil 1879, 28. The more recent editions of Posidippus’ two epigrams include Page 1941, I, 444–449, no. 104 a–b; Gow–Page 1965, I, 169–170, no. 11–12 and II, 489–492; Turner 1971, 82–83, no. 45 (with reproduction of the papyrus); Austin–Bastianini 2002, 142–145, no. 115–116.

² Cf. Obbink 2004a, 22: “Thus I argue that the epigrams are paired, both here on the papyrus in a manner of a mini-anthology, and in composition, as evidenced by the framing references to (i) Greekness and Sostratus at the beginning of AB 115 and (ii) Greekness and Callicrates at the end of AB 116. However, in this case the physical separation of the two monuments precludes that they were ever actually paired in an inscribed monumental context, for the two monuments in question were hundreds of miles apart. Rather, they must have originally been paired in a book”.

³ On the interests, personal motivation and concerns of the compiler of the personal mini-anthology that the Firmin-Didot papyrus preserves, see the detailed discussion by Thompson 1987, 112–116.

by Obbink appears in the Milan Papyrus (*P. Mil. Vogl.* VIII 309) in the section Τρόποι (*Ep.* 102 and 103 Austin–Bastianini): the epigrams contrast two dead men to the passerby’s interest or lack thereof; once again, the juxtaposed epigrams are of equal length (4 lines), and the recognition of their thematic and compositional links adds greatly to the appreciation of both pieces and the appraisal of the two speakers’ voices.⁴

Despite the fact that pairing of epigrams has drawn certain attention, Posidippus’ use of this technique as a literary and compositional device seems to be still understudied, even though the Milan papyrus manifestly offers further examples of this sort (e.g., *Ep.* 6 and 7 Austin–Bastianini, both describing the jewels of a certain Niconoe). Naturally, each such pair will demand careful examination and argumentation in order to prove that the epigrams were indeed intended as a pair. The aim of this article is to analyze epigrams at the end of the Ἐπιτύμβια section⁵ of the Milan papyrus, with special focus on *Ep.* 59 and 60, and to bring out the literary allusions which show that they were meant to be read together. It will be shown that acknowledging the presence of an archaic intertext in these epigrams helps to understand the arrangement of the pieces at the end of the Ἐπιτύμβια section and sheds light on its coherence as a whole.

The Ἐπιτύμβια section in the Milan papyrus is a large one, comprising twenty epigrams (*Ep.* 42–61 Austin–Bastianini) most of which celebrate women, and only three are dedicated to men: the centrally positioned *Ep.* 52 which describes the tombstone of a certain Timon bearing a statue of a maiden with a sundial, and the last two epigrams of the section which will be analyzed below (*Ep.* 60 and 61).⁶ Despite differences in sex, age, social standing, number of children, the motif that recurs through these twenty epigrams and binds them together, is the recognition of the deceased by his community and family.⁷ The first three epigrams of

⁴ Obbink 2004b, 293: “The first [dead man] is unfriendly and unwelcoming; Menoetius of Crete is portrayed through his speech as a misanthrope or δόσκολος. The second is similarly critical of the passerby for ignoring him, and instead demands attention and sympathy. [...] The second is a more or less symmetrically balanced, perfect reversal of the first, an inverted variation on exactly the same theme”; cf. also Obbink 2005, 113.

⁵ The title of the section that comprises epigrams 42–61 of the Milan papyrus has not been preserved as such, and must therefore be reconstructed. The obvious title Ἐπιτύμβια has been suggested in the first edition of the papyrus (see Bastianini–Galazzi 2001, 157) and has been accepted by scholars and editors ever since (cf. most recently Petrovic–Seidensticker *et al.* 2015, 184).

⁶ On *Ep.* 52 and its central placement in the Ἐπιτύμβια section, see Gutzwiller 2005, 295–299.

⁷ Cf. Gutzwiller 2005, 294.

Ἐπιτύμβια (*Ep.* 42–44) have been distinguished as a separate group, as the women they celebrate all were initiates of mysteries.⁸ There have been similar, though less conclusive, attempts to discover coherence in the epigrams at the end of the section. As *Ep.* 58–61 are of equal length (6 verses each), it has been surmised that they are meant to be read as a group,⁹ alternatively, the fact that *Ep.* 60 and 61 present epitaphs for men, as opposed to the previous epigrams that had been dedicated to women, has led to view them as a distinct pair.¹⁰

Ep. 59 commemorates an old woman, Menestrate, who died at the age of eighty. Her epitaph is the last in the series of epitaphs for women in the section:¹¹

Ὀλβια γηράσκουσα Μενεστράτῃ [- ∪ ∪ - ∪
 ὀγδοάτην ἐτέων εἶδες ὅλην [δεκάδα,
 καὶ δύο σοὶ γενεαὶ παίδων ἐπιτή[δεον ὄρθουν
 σηκόν· ἔχεις ὀσίας ἐκ μακάρων χάρι[τας·
 γρη῏ φίλῃ, μετάδος λιπαροῦ μεγα[λοφρονέουσα
 γήρως τοῖς ἱερὸν σῆμα παρερ[χομένοις.

Blessedly growing old, Menestrate, (?) you saw the full eighth decade of years, and two generations of children have set up for you this appropriate burial-place. Indeed, you have received pious gifts from the blessed ones! Dear old woman, in your generosity share such splendid old age with all those who pass by your sacred tomb.

⁸ Thus, Dignas 2004, 179; cf. Gutzwiller 2005, 295.

⁹ Cf. Gaulty 2005, 36: “Den Kern des Abschnittes bilden vor allem Grabepigramme auf junge Frauen und Mädchen, bevor die letzten vier Epigramme wieder die Erwartung thematisieren, nach dem Tod unter den Seligen zu weilen; zudem sprechen sie alle von dem Glück, ein hohes Alter in guter Gesundheit erreicht zu haben”.

¹⁰ Cf. M. di Nino 2010, 46 who notes of the defuncts of *Ep.* 60 and 61, “Mnesistrato e Aristippos sono, infatti, gli unici due individui di sesso maschile ricordati nella sezione, e i loro epitafi hanno tutta l’aria di essere intenzionalmente posti in clausola in una sorta di *climax* di autoreferenzialità”. For the gender-based distinction of the last two epigrams from the rest of the section, see Dignas 2004, 179 and Krevans 2005, 95 who saw a parallel to their being singled out in the arrangement of the Ἀναθηματικά. Gutzwiller 2005, 293 tried to reinforce the gender-based link by noting that both Mnesistratos and Aristippos lived fairly long lives and were survived by children. This is an overstatement: Mnesistratos only lived to sixty years, while Aristippos’ age is not mentioned at all, and as for children, they are mentioned in most epitaphs of the section, except, obviously, ones that commemorate girls who died before wedlock (49–51, 53–55).

¹¹ Cf. Zanetto–Pozzi–Rampichini 2008, 151: “L’epigramma 59 conclude circolarmente la lunga serie di *Epigrammi sepolcrali* dedicati a donne, riproponendo il tema della morte sopraggiunta in età avanzata con cui l’intera sezione si era aperta (cf. gli epigrammi 42 e 43)”.

Although the text of the epigram contains some minor lacunae, the overall structure is sufficiently well preserved for the proposed restitutions to be fairly certain.¹² Mnesistrate's age ὀγδοάτην ἑτέων εἶδες ὅλην [δεκάδα... is indicated in terms close to the wording of the previous epigram (*Ep.* 58), where Posidippus preferred to stress longevity of Protis' marriage rather than state her age, ἀλλ' ἐνιαυτ[ὼν / πέντ]ε φιληθείσας ἀνδρὶ συνῆν δεκά[δας] "but she lived with her husband for five decades of years, filled with love" (*Ep.* 58. 3–4). Despite the similarity in wording and the fact that *Ep.* 58 also bears six verses, epigrams 58 and 59 do not seem to be specifically matched: while the transition from the one to the other is smooth and even though the poems share a number of similar traits, the deceased women having lived to a ripe old age and having been blessed with children and grandchildren, these are points that are common to many of the epitaphs of the section. On the contrary, the relationship of *Ep.* 59 with the following epigram appears to be much more meaningful and complex.

Ep. 60 which ends the section of Ἐπιτύμβια is an epitaph of a jovial man, Mnesistratos, who died at the very onset of old age; the epitaph consists of three distiches, the same length that Menestrate's epitaph had:

Τοῦτ' ἐπαρασάμενος Μνησίστρατ[ος] ἄρτι κέλευθον
 τὴν ἀπὸ πυρκαϊῆς εἰς Ἀΐδεω κατέβη·
 "Μὴ κλαύσητέ με, τέκνα, φίλην δ' ἐπὶ πατρὶ κονίην
 ψ[υχρ]ῶι παππώϊως χῶσατ' ἐπ' ἐσχατιῆς·
 ἔξακον]ταέτης γὰρ ἀπ' ἡέρος οὐ βαρύγηρος
 ἔρχομ' ἐπ' ε]ὐσεβέων ἀλλ' ἔτι κοῦφος ἀνὴρ".

Having prayed the following prayer, Mnesistratos has only just descended down the road which leads from the pyre to Hades: "Do not weep for me,

¹² Most missing passages of this epigram are easy to fill: χάρι[τας in v. 4 and παρερ[χομένοις in v. 6 are the only possible restitutions of the text; there can be little doubt that the last word of v. 2 was δεκάδα (cf. *Ep.* 58. 4); in v. 3 the adjective ἐπιτήδεος must be reconstructed in the accusative (ἐπιτή[δεον... σῆκόν), and the verb ὄρθουν is the natural choice for the end of the line. The participle μεγα[λοφρονέουσα was reconstructed for v. 5 by C. Austin to complement, both in idea and in expression, the imperative μετάδος; alternatively, μέγα πένθος ἔχουσιν was proposed by M. Gronewald. The only lacuna impossible to fill with certainty appears in the last two feet of the first verse. However, the syntactic structure of v. 1–2 and generic conventions of epitaphs suggest that the end of the v. 1 either referred to Menestrate's profession or else indicated her origins: thus, Austin and Bastianini proposed either ἐν συνερίθοις "among fellow-workers, helpmates" (approved by Bär in Petrovic–Seidensticker *et al.* 2015, 240; cf. *ibid.* 238) or some form of ethnic, like Ἀδραμυτηνέ "from Adramyttion" that appears in Posidip. *Ep.* 105. 3.

children, but on your father, <already> cold, spread dear dust in our grandfathers' way, on the edge of his tomb; for at the age of sixty I leave this world (*literally*, 'the air') for the dwelling of the pious, a man not weighed down by old age, but still light".

Once again, the text demands minor restitutions: the end of the first verse which, as the next line shows, must have mentioned the road to Hades was reconstructed with support of an epigram by Hegesippus from the *Palatine Anthology*,¹³ more importantly for our argument, the papyrus is mutilated at the point where Mnesistratos' age was indicated (v. 5), but the reconstruction ἐξἄκον]ταέτης, proposed by Bastianini and Galazzi in the *editio princeps* of the Milan papyrus, is certain,¹⁴ as the context makes it clear that the number of years has to be placed at the very beginning of old age, for which sixty was a traditional boundary.¹⁵

It is the way the respective ages of Menestrates and Mnesistratos are indicated in *Ep.* 59 and 60 that, as we will argue, helps to notice that these epigrams as having been intentionally paired by the editor of the epigram collection (whether it was the poet himself or not), the other indicators being the fact that their names are sound-alikes and, obviously, the equal length of the two epitaphs. The indication of Mnesistratos' age as ἐξἄκονταέτης would surely have reminded Posidippus' readers of Mimnermus' wish to die at sixty – the first, and an extremely well-known context, where this adjective appears. The adjective ἐξἄκονταέτης was particularly brought into light by Solon's subsequent modification (Diog. Laert. 1. 60–61 Dorandi):¹⁶

¹³ Τὴν ἐπὶ πυρκαϊῆς ἐνδέξιά φασι κέλευθον / Ἑρμῆν τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἰς Ῥαδάμανθον ἄγειν, "it is said that Hermes leads the just to Rhadamanthus by the path that lies to the right of the pyre" (*Anth. Pal.* 7. 545. 1–2); Hegesippus' wording is indeed very similar to the remnant parts of Posidippus' distich, and this parallel renders the restitution of κέλευθον in Posidip. *Ep.* 60. 1 fairly secure; there have been several proposals as concerns filling the lacuna before κέλευθον: the most popular options are adverb ἄρτι (thus, Bastianini–Galazzi 2001, 183 who note that ἄρτι is only one among many possibilities; cf. Austin–Bastianini 2002, 82) or the verb ἦλθε (thus, Bär 2013; cf. *idem* in Petrovic–Seidensticker *et al.* 2015, 241).

¹⁴ The reconstruction ἐξἄκον]ταέτης is accepted by other editors of the text: cf. Austin–Bastianini 2002, 82; Zanetto–Pozzi–Rampichini 2008, 36 and 152, Bär in Petrovic–Seidensticker *et al.* 2015, 241 and 242.

¹⁵ Cf. Strab. 10. 5. 6 (citing Menander fr. 797), Herond. 10. 1; cf. Bär in Petrovic–Seidensticker *et al.* 2015, 242. For an overview of Greek theories on the stages of life, see Binder–Saiko 1999, 1210.

¹⁶ We have reproduced the text of the latest edition of Diogenes Laertius by Tiziano Dorandi 2013, 102, even though the text of the poetic fragments (in particular, Solon's) is under discussion: see Noussia–Fantuzzi 2010, 402–404.

Φασὶ δ' αὐτὸν καὶ Μιμνέρμου γράψαντος,
 αἶ γὰρ ἄτερ νούσων τε καὶ ἀργαλέων μελεδωνέων
 ἔξηκονταέτη μοῖρα κίχοι θανάτου,
 ἐπιτιμῶντα αὐτῷ εἰπεῖν·
 ἄλλ' εἴ μοι κἄν νῦν ἔτι πείσεαι, ἔξελε τοῦτο
 (μηδὲ μέγαίρ', ὅτι σέο λῶον ἐπεφρασάμην)
 καὶ μεταποίησον, Λιγυστάδῃ, ὥδε δ' ἄειδε·
 “ὀγδωκονταέτη μοῖρα κίχοι θανάτου”.

They also say that, in answer to Mimnermus' having written, “Would that, without illness or grievous cares, my fated death would overtake me at the age of sixty” (Mimn. fr. 6 West), [Solon] said, correcting him respectfully: “But, should you trust me even now, remove that – and do not begrudge me having discovered a better thought – and modify, o Ligyastades [literally ‘clear-singing’], and sing thus: may my fated death overtake me at the age of eighty” (Sol. fr. 20 West).

It is worth noting that ἔξακονταέτης in Posidippus (*Ep.* 60. 5) is placed at the beginning of a distich, in the exact position it occupied in Mimnermus' preserved couplet. More subtly, the periphrastic indication of Menestrates' age as “completed eighth decade” would have probably suggested the association with the calculation of the stages of an ordinary human life by ten hebdomads in Solon (fr. 27 West), as well as his suggestion that Mimnermus should modify his verse so as to posit the age of eighty as the right moment to die (Sol. fr. 20. 4 West).

The allusion to Mimnermus' and Solon's poetic debate on the best age to die is, in fact, supported by other associations with the two poets that the two epitaphs contain. Associations with Solon in *Ep.* 59 are more evident (the reason will be discussed below) and thus easier to grasp.¹⁷ Thus, the description of Menestrates' long and happy old age (ὄλβια γηράσκουσα, v. 1) obviously echoes the importance of ὄλβος both for Solon's poetry and thought,¹⁸ as well as his idea of the value of aging well and actively (γηράσκω δ' αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος, Sol. fr. 18 West; cf. Plut. *Sol.* 29. 4). The fact that Menestrates was honored by two generations of children who set up her tomb rhymes with

¹⁷ Cf. Gutzwiller 2005, 295 who sees in epigrams 60 and 61 “a Hellenistic version of Solon's story about the Athenian Tellus (Hdt. 1. 30)”.

¹⁸ For ὄλβος in Solon's poetry, see fr. 13. 3; 23. 1; for ὄλβος in the tradition of Solon the Sage, see Hdt. 1. 30–32, Plut. *Sol.* 27. 4. For the discussion of what ὄλβος meant for Solon, see Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010, 144–145, with references to earlier research; for the presentation of Solon's ideas on ὄλβος in Herodotus' *Histories*, see Shapiro 1996.

the story of the Athenian Tellus as told by Solon to Croesus in Herodotus' *Histories* (Hdt. 1. 30). In *Ep.* 60, on the other hand, the evidence for deliberate association with Mimnermus, other than the highly recognizable ἐξακον]ταέτης, is less direct, or at least less easily recognized (this may in part be due to the fact that Mimnermus' poetry is less well preserved than Solon's). However, Mnesistratos' injunction to his children to shed no tears over him bears strong resemblance to a viewpoint that has been reconstructed for Mimnermus from a summary in Plutarch (*Comp. Sol. et Publ.* 1. 5):

Ἦτι τοῖνον, οἷς πρὸς Μίμνερμον ἀντειπὼν περὶ χρόνου ζωῆς
ἐπιπεφώνηκε,
Μηδὲ μοι ἄκλαυστος θάνατος μόλοι, ἀλλὰ φίλοισι
ποιήσαιμι θανὼν ἄλγεα καὶ στοναχάς,
εὐδαίμονα τὸν Ποπλικόλαν ἄνδρα ποιεῖ.

Furthermore, the very words uttered by Solon in his response to Mimnermus on the duration of life, "Nor let my death come without tears, but in my friends let my passing away produce grief and lament" (Sol. fr. 21 West), show that Publicola was a happy man.

Most editors place this quotation right after Solon's answer to Mimnermus on old age,¹⁹ and it has been surmised that Plutarch's wording suggests that Solon's desire to be celebrated by his friends' tears, pain and laments may also have been expressed in opposition to a wish of an easy departure without pain for the loved ones that had been formulated by Mimnermus.²⁰ Returning to Posidippus and the comparison of *Ep.* 59 and 60, the assumption that μὴ κλάυσητέ με, τέκνα might be associated with Mimnermus' views on death, may seem speculative: however, it is worth noting that a contrast of this kind between a death decried by friends and loved ones and a death which leaves the family with good memories, rather than tears, is implied by the reconstruction proposed by Michael Gronewald²¹ for the end of *Ep.* 59. 5 μέγα πένθος ἔχουσιν which would oppose the grief of all grieving for Menestrates to Mnesistratos' express wish to escape lament. Finally, the contrast between

¹⁹ They appear as fr. 20 and 21 in West's edition, as fr. 26 and 27 in the editions of Gentili-Prato and of Noussia-Fantuzzi.

²⁰ On this suggestion, see the clear and succinct summary of the discussion in Allen 1993, 65–66.

²¹ Cf. Gronewald 2003, 66; his reconstruction of the end of the hexameter has recently been defended by Bär in Petrovic-Seidensticker *et al.* 2015, 239 and 240.

the physical lightness of a man such as Mnesistratos (οὐ βαρύγηρος... ἀλλ' ἔτι κοῦφος ἄνθρωπος), who died at the right moment, and the heaviness that normally accompanies an old man, although not directly attested in Mimnermus, would not be out of place in his poetry. If these associations may be difficult to prove, it should be stressed once more that they must be viewed against the indication of Mnesistratos' age as ἐξακονταέτης: thanks to Solon, the adjective was one of those intrinsically connected to Mimnermus; had Posidippus simply wished to state Mnesistratos' age, he had any number of alternative expressions at his use.

It can thus be argued that the epigrams 59 and 60 comprising an equal number of verses and bearing on two defuncts whose age and circumstances of passing away evoke the archaic poetic debate between Solon and Mimnermus actually reflect an intentional pairing by Posidippus (or an editor of the collection of epigrams preserved on the Milan papyrus).²² Given that Mimn. fr. 6 West and Sol. fr. 20 West were transmitted together as parts of a single biographical anecdote, Posidippus' contrasting of death in highly advanced old age and death at the very onset of old age in juxtaposed epigrams *Ep.* 59 and 60 would have been perceived by Posidippus' readers as an allusion at the two elegists' debate on the best age to die, or, to put it differently, as two 'case-studies', illustrating the opposed points of view on aging. In that case the last epigram of the Ἐπιτύμβια section, also comprising six lines, may be read as Posidippus' own take on the subject (*Ep.* 61 Austin–Bastianini):²³

ἴσχε πόδας παρὰ σῆμα, τὸν εὐγερῶ τε προσεῖπον
 πρέσβυν Ἀρίστιππον – τῇδε γάρ ἐστι θανάων –
 καὶ τὸν ἀδάκρυτον βλέψον λίθον· οὗτος ἐκείνῳ
 τῷ κατὰ γῆς ὁ λίθος κοῦφον ἔπεστι βάρος·
 τέκνα γὰρ αὐτὸν ἔθαπτε φιλαίτατον ἀνδρὶ γέροντι
 κτῆμ', ὁ δὲ θυγατέρων εἶδε καὶ ἄλλο γένος.

²² The question of whether the epigram collection was arranged by Posidippus himself or by a separate editor is not easy to answer with certainty – cf. Seidensticker–Stähli–Wessels 2015, 15–16. Krevans 2005, especially 81–82, takes the more prudent approach of using the term “editor” while admitting that the editor might have been the poet himself. The question obviously has important implications for the composition of the collection: as Seidensticker, Stähli and Wessels note, “sollte Poseidipp die Sammlung konzipiert haben, könnte er natürlich einzelne Epigramme oder auch ganze Sektionen eigens dafür geschrieben haben” (Seidensticker–Stähli–Wessels 2015, 16 n. 50).

²³ The programmatic value of *Ep.* 60 and 61 has been noted by di Nino 2010, 46.

Check your steps at this tomb, and address the elderly Aristippos in his blooming old age – for this is where he lies dead – and look at the stone that no tears have washed; this stone is a light weight on him who lies underground. For <his own> children buried him – and no possession can be dearer than that to an old man – and he had seen <not only them, but also> a second generation born from his daughters.

This epigram bears unmistakable thematic and lexical links to both preceding pieces (*Ep.* 59 and 60). Just as Menestrates, Aristippos was blessed with children and grandchildren, and their love for him is manifest in their caring for his tomb; and while the adjective εὐγηρως that describes his sense of fulfilment in old age, may be less emphatic than the participial construction that had been used for Menestrates, ὄλβια γηράσκουσα (*Ep.* 59. 1), it seems to carry nevertheless Solonian associations, not only in its general idea, but also in its expression²⁴ – suffice it to think of the sequence of compound epithets with εὖ- and ὅ- in the description of a blessed life in Solon's dialogue with Croesus (*Hdt.* 1. 32. 6–7):

ταῦτα δὲ ἡ εὐτυχίη οἱ ἀπερύκει, ἄπνηρος δέ ἐστι, ἄνουσος, ἀπαθὴς
κακῶν, εὖπαις, εὐειδής· εἰ δὲ πρὸς τούτοις ἔτι τελευτήσει τὸν βίον
εὖ, οὗτος ἐκεῖνος τὸν σὺ ζητεῖς, <ὅ> ὄλβιος κεκλησθαι ἄξιός ἐστι...

but good fortune guards [the fortunate man] from these (i.e. calamity and desire), and he lives unmaimed, knowing no sickness or evil, but blessed with children and fair to see; should such a man furthermore end his life well, he is the man that you are searching for, the one who is worthy to be called blessed.

On the other hand, Aristippos' passing away did not leave his family in distress (ἀδάκρυτον... λίθον), so that their reaction echoes Mnesistratos' admonition to his children in *Ep.* 60. 3 (μὴ κλαύσητέ με, τέκνα...); the adjective ἀδάκρυτος is emphasized by its position in the verse, which brings out its paradoxical usage in the most positive sense – Aristippos has children and grandchildren who buried him and care for his tomb, but his death was associated only with sadness and love, not acute grief; at the same time, the importance of Aristippos' having been buried by his own

²⁴ Bär in Petrovic–Seidensticker *et al.* 2015, 245 notes that εὐγηρως recurs regularly in Hellenistic and later epigrams. From the point of view of Posidippus, it is perhaps more important that εὐγηρως is attested in Callimachus (*Ep.* 40. 6 Pfeiffer = *Ep.* 48. 6 Gow–Page), and that the exact meaning of the notion of εὐγηρία had been explained by Aristotle: εὐγηρία δ' ἐστὶ βραδυτῆς γῆρως μετ' ἄλυσίας (*Aristot. Rhet.* 1361 b 26).

children is presented emphatically in the form of a maxim.²⁵ On the lexical level, the lightness of Aristippos' tombstone, described by the oxymoron κοῦφον... βάρος (*Ep.* 61. 4) would obviously remind Posidippus' reader of Mnesistratos' physical and spiritual lightness at the moment of his death (οὐ βαρύγηρος... ἀλλ' ἔτι κοῦφος ἄνηρ, *Ep.* 60. 5–6).

At the same time, there is no mention of Aristippos' age at the moment of his death, which seems to reflect Posidippus' approach to Mimnermus' and Solon's poetic debate on the optimal lifespan. By omitting the number, Posidippus was able to reconcile Mimnermus' and Solon's positions, focusing solely on the points he deemed essential for happiness: at whatever age one's life ends, a good end will include being loved and cared for by one's children and grandchildren and leaving behind good memories rather than tears. We cannot, of course, exclude the possibility that *Ep.* 61 was an actual epitaph, but its placement at the end of the Ἐπιτύμβια section and the allusions connecting it with epigrams 59 and 60, suggest that it was a piece carefully chosen (if not actually written) to present and highlight by contrast Posidippus' idea of what distinguishes a life that can be called happy; viewed in this light, the name of the defunct celebrated by *Ep.* 61, Ἀρίστιππος, may well be a *nomen loquens*. Finally, it should also be noted that the life described in the epitaph for Aristippos was close to Posidippus' own views on aging and happy demise, as a comparison of *Ep.* 61 with the ending of the so-called "Seal of Posidippus" shows.²⁶ In this piece the epigrammatist speaks of the end he would wish for himself (*Ep.* 118. 24–28 Austin–Bastianini):

μηδέ τις οὖν χεῦαι δάκρυον· αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ
γῆραι μυστικὸν οἶμον ἐπὶ Ῥαδάμανθυν ἰκοίμην
δῆμῳ καὶ λαῷ παντὶ ποθεινὸς ἔων,
ἀσκήπων ἐν ποσσὶ καὶ ὀρθοεπῆς ἀν' ὅμιλον
καὶ λείπων τέκνοις δῶμα καὶ ὄλβον ἐμόν.

Thus, let no one shed a <single> tear: but as for me, may I arrive in my old age to Rhadamanthys by the mystic path (*or* by the path of the initiates), longed for by citizens <of my city> and to all men, standing

²⁵ Cf. Gutzwiller 2005, 295: "We can further assert that Aristippos' tombstone with its emphasis on familial relationships, appropriately ends the epitaphic section by enunciating a kind of thematic motto: buried by one's children, it proclaims, is the dearest possession for an old man (φιλαίτατον ἀνδρὶ γέροντι κτῆμα', AB 61. 5–6)".

²⁶ This poem of 28 lines, preserved on two wax tablets from Egypt, was first published by Hermann Diels in 1898. For recent editions, see Lloyd-Jones 1963 (with a list of preceding editions on p. 75); Lloyd-Jones–Parsons 1983, 340–343; Austin–Bastianini 2002, 148–151; Zanetto–Pozzi–Rampichini 2008, 80–81, 215–217.

firmly on my feet, and speaking adroitly before the crowd, and leaving to my children my house and my wealth.

Resemblance in thought and wording is indeed striking.²⁷ The *sphragis* and *Ep.* 61 offer the same combination of elements that warrant a happy end of life: the promise of being accepted among the Blessed in the Underworld;²⁸ absence of tears at the funeral as sign of fond memories, not of oblivion and neglect, given the continuing love from one's fellow citizens; presence of children to whom the poet's house and wealth may be bequeathed. The *sphragis* stresses the poet's wish for good physical and mental state at the moment of passing away,²⁹ combining, as did *Ep.* 61, the best of Solon's and Mimnermus' positions on the right moment to die while avoiding the mention of age altogether.

The epigrams that conclude the Ἐπιτύμβια are thus centered around the motif of the happy life end that recurs through all the epitaphs of the section but, because of the intertextual links to Solon and Mimnermus in *Ep.* 59 and 60, is given a broader, more generalized treatment, expressive of Posidippus' views on life and aging. Of the four six-verse epigrams (*Ep.* 58–61) the epitaph of Protis is a fairly standard representative of the Ἐπιτύμβια section, whose principal role in the arrangement was to provide a smooth transition from the bulk of the section to the last on a woman, Menestrata (*Ep.* 59). The epitaphs 59 and 60 that provide contrasting depictions of a happy passing away, reminiscent of Solon's and Mimnermus' debate on aging on the other hand, seem to be meant to be read together. *Ep.* 59 pictures a life and death that are reminiscent of Solon's view of what a harmonious and happy end should be: Menestrata dies surrounded by numerous children and grandchildren that will see to her tomb and having reached the age of eighty in happiness. *Ep.* 60, on the

²⁷ Unsurprisingly, Posidippus' *sphragis* is regularly evoked in discussion of the Ἐπιτύμβια (especially, of the concluding epigrams): see Dignas 2004, 184–185; Gauly 2005, 35–36; di Nino 2010, 45–46.

²⁸ Writing before the discovery of the Milan papyrus, Lloyd-Jones 1963, 94 had suggested that in speaking of the μυστικός οἶμος ἐπὶ Παδάμανθον Posidippus may have been positioning himself as an initiate of the Muses. However, Dignas 2004, 185–186 was right to point out the importance of the Dionysiac mysteries in the Ἐπιτύμβια (especially the opening epigrams of the section), and it is likely that the μυστικός οἶμος may have alluded both to Posidippus' participation in actual mysteries, and to his poetic initiation; her conclusions have been widely accepted (cf. di Nino 2010, 21–27).

²⁹ See ἀσκήπων ἐν ποσσὶ καὶ ὀρθοεπὴς ἀν' ὄμιλον; for the discussion of the two elements of this antithesis, see Lloyd-Jones 1963, 94–95.

other hand, presents a lifeline that follows Mimnermus' view of a happy life that should end before the onset of the hardships of old age, both physical and mental (in Mnesistratos' case, he was granted death at the age of sixty, the lifespan Mimnermus coveted for himself). Because of the deliberate pairing of epigrams 59 and 60, they serve as a pivotal point in this group of epigrams that conclude the section comprising for the most part women's epitaphs: the Ἐπιτύμβια ends with a second epigram on a man, Aristippos, that "answers" both *Ep.* 59 and 60. Without specifying Aristippos' age at the moment of his death, Posidippus presents his end as happy, since he was granted a combination of the best points among those that had been required by Mimnermus and Solon; a comparison with *Ep.* 118. 24–25 shows that this corresponded to Posidippus' own views. The concluding epigrams of the Ἐπιτύμβια section (*Ep.* 59–61) thus engage with the famous poetic debate between two archaic elegists, and at the same time allow Posidippus to formulate his own position on the issue of εὐγηρία.

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The article analyses the concluding epigrams of the Ἐπιτύμβια section of the Milan papyrus (*P. Mil. Vogl.* VIII, 309) containing a collection of poems attributed to Posidippus of Pella. It is argued that *Ep.* 59 and 60 were intentionally paired by the poet and meant to be read together. The circumstances evoked in the epitaph of Menestrates (*Ep.* 59) show an old woman who lived a life close to Solon's ideal (Sol. fr. 27 and fr. 20 West), while the details of the epitaph of Mnesistratos (*Ep.* 60) present a jovial man who died at the age of sixty, at the very onset of old age, a fate that Mimnermus had coveted for himself (Mimn. fr. 6 West). *Ep.* 59 and 60 would seem then to illustrate the opposed positions on the best moment to die that were associated with Solon's debate with Mimnermus; once this intertextual link is recognized, the last epigram of the Ἐπιτύμβια section, epitaph of Aristippos (*Ep.* 61) can be read as Posidippus' own take on the question of what can be considered a happy old age (εὖγηρία).

Статья посвящена заключительным эпиграммам секции Ἐπιτύμβια Миланского папируса (*P. Mil. Vogl.* VIII, 309), сохранившего сборник эпigramм, принадлежащих с высокой степенью вероятности Посидиппу из Пеллы. В ней доказывается, что поэт намеренно представил *Ep.* 59 и 60 (Austin–Bastianini) как парные эпigramмы, с расчетом, что они будут читаться вместе. Эпитафия Менестраты (*Ep.* 59) рисует портрет женщины, прожившей долгую и счастливую жизнь и дожившей до восьмидесяти лет в соответствии с пожеланием Солона Мимнерму (Sol. fr. 20 West). Напротив, эпитафия Мнесистрата (*Ep.* 60) представляет человека, ушедшего из жизни в шестьдесят лет, в самом начале старости и полном расцвете сил – судьба, о которой мечтал для себя Мимнерм (Mimn. fr. 6 West). Ввиду соседства этих эпigramм и литературной игры, которую они обнаруживают, представляется, что *Ep.* 59 и 60 призваны проиллюстрировать два подхода к вопросу о том, какой возраст лучший для ухода из жизни, соответствующие позициям Солона и Мимнерма. Признание данного интертекста в эпigramмах *Ep.* 59 и 60 позволяет прочесть последнюю эпитафию секции, *Ep.* 61, как ответ Посидиппа своим предшественникам: оставляя в стороне вопрос о возрасте как несущественный, Посидипп выделяет те детали, которые делают старость и смерть Аристиппа действительно счастливыми. Предположение о том, что судьба Аристиппа близко соответствовала представлениям самого Посидиппа о наилучшем конце жизни, может быть подкреплено сравнением с заключительными стихами сфрагиды Посидиппа (*Ep.* 118, 24–28).

ARISTOTLE ON THE ORIGIN OF THEORETICAL SCIENCES (*MET.* A 1–2)*

For Georg Wöhrle

1. The problem

Aristotle's brief reasoning that the emergence of theoretical sciences in Egypt was due to the appearance of leisure is often cited in books on the history of ancient philosophy and science. Nevertheless, over the last century, contemporary scholars have substantially changed their attitude toward the correctness of Aristotle's explanation. Thus, T. Gomperz expressed a considerable measure of agreement with Aristotle, arguing that the castes of priests played the decisive role everywhere in the emergence of theoretical knowledge, but that the first steps of science in most countries were at the same time the last ones, since the priests were inclined to identify scientific doctrines with religious teaching and to transform them into dogma. The Greeks were happy that they had predecessors who possessed an organized priestly caste but did not possess such a caste of their own.¹ Somewhat later, an expert on the history of ancient mathematics, T. Heath, cited Gomperz as having shed light on Aristotle's statement: the priestly caste in Egypt, as well as in Babylon, was a necessary precondition for the emergence of systematic scientific studies, *inter alia* in mathematics. Heath, however, corrected this theory, in view of contemporary progress in the study of Egyptian mathematics, most of all of the Rhind papyrus, pointing out that mathematics in Egypt was not theoretical: geometry in Egypt did not advance beyond the practical art of mensuration.² Heath believed that Proclus (*in Eucl.* 65. 7–11) provides better evidence than Aristotle does that only with Thales did geometry become a deductive science founded on the axiomatic principles, i.e. that Proclus was aware of the difference between Greek and Egyptian

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¹ Gomperz 1922, 37 (first edition: 1895).

² Heath 1921, 8–9; 122; 128; cf. Ross 1953, I, 118.

mathematics that Aristotle failed to notice.³ Somewhat later, again due to growing knowledge of Near Eastern mathematics, Aristotle's view that the caste of priests played the decisive role in the origin of mathematics came under fire, too. In his posthumously edited *Mathematics in Aristotle*, Heath noted against Gomperz's explanation (and, implicitly, Aristotle's, too): "there is no particle of evidence that in early times Egyptian mathematics were in any sense in the hands of the priests, whatever may be the case in Aristotle's days"; however, he admitted that "the orientation of temples, which would involve some geometry, no doubt rested with priests, as also astronomical observations". With his statement "Egyptian mathematics arose simply out of the necessities of administration and of daily life", Heath again rebutted Aristotle's claim that Egyptian mathematics emerged as a theoretical science.⁴

Since that time, the attitude of scholarship to Aristotle's explanation seems to be unanimous. It is usually understood as the statement that leisure is a necessary precondition for the development of theoretical knowledge. This is regarded as a considerable achievement of Aristotle, the product of his analysis of the development of knowledge in Greece. Modern scholars agree that the appearance of leisure in Greece was an important, although not a sufficient condition for the emergence of theoretical knowledge and its rapid progress. They agree at the same time that Aristotle not only errs when he finds in Egypt a form of mathematics (or geometry, at least) whose deductive character and theoretical purposes resembles geometry in Athens, but also that he ignores Herodotus' correct view that Egyptian geometry was purely practical. Accordingly, the scholars believe that the role he ascribes to priests' leisure in the emergence of theoretical mathematics is an inaccurate extrapolation onto Egypt of the important condition for theoretical knowledge that the Greeks possessed.⁵

³ Heath 1921, 128; approximately at the same time, Burnet 1930, 19, referring also to the Rhind papyrus, came to the view that Egyptian mathematics was merely practical; he believed that he found evidence for this in Plato's description of the learning of calculation in Egypt in the *Laws* 819 b 4 ff.: according to Burnet, the passage implies that the Egyptians had the science that the Greeks called λογιστική, the practical art of calculation, and that they did not have the science that the Greeks called ἀριθμητική, the scientific study of numbers: "The geometry of the Rhind papyrus is of a similar character; and Herodotus, who tells us that Egyptian geometry arose from the necessity of measuring the land afresh after the inundations, is clearly far nearer the mark than Aristotle, who says it grew out of leisure enjoyed by the priestly class".

⁴ Heath 1949, 194 f.; he referred to the authority of T. E. Peet, the editor of the *Rhind Mathematical Papyrus* (1923), and to O. Neugebauer.

⁵ Apart from the works cited in previous notes, see Guthrie 1962, 35, who is most explicit; cf. also Wehrli 1969, 114 f.; Lloyd 1979, 230 n. 13.

Of course this assessment is basically correct, and nobody will today deny that Egyptian mathematics lacked an axiomatic-deductive structure; equally, Aristotle certainly overstates the role of priests in the development of mathematics in Egypt.⁶ However, while rightly criticising Aristotle's explanation, the scholars too readily ascribe to him concepts of their own that he and his predecessors and contemporaries did not in fact share. The purpose of my paper is to put Aristotle's explanation of the origin of theoretical knowledge in the context of his *Metaphysics* and of his thought about the development of knowledge and civilisation in general. I hope to show that Aristotle's explanation is more complex than is usually presented, that, in spite of its shortcomings and mistakes, it is less opposed to the views current in his time (it is not in conflict with Herodotus and the tradition that stems from him), and that he counterposes the social preconditions for the beginning of theoretical knowledge in Greece and Egypt rather than foisting the former on the latter. In a word, we shall see that Aristotle made statements that today are known to be false, but he did not make a biased misinterpretation of the data his contemporaries possessed.

2. The development of τέχναι and the invention of mathematics

The passage on the origin of theoretical sciences is part of a long and a complex argument that occupies chapters 1–2 of the *Metaphysics*. Aristotle presents the scale of human cognitive capacities: perception – experience – productive knowledge (τέχνη) – theoretical knowledge (ἐπιστήμη).⁷ The very next higher capacity on this scale supersedes the lower, previous one in terms of knowing causes and other qualities, such as universality or remoteness from practical use, and just for this reason the *opinio communis* (of course, the implicit one) regards it as wiser than the lower one. This indicates (see 1. 981 b 27 – 982 a 3) that wisdom is associated with the knowledge of *certain* causes and principles (not of

⁶ In today's view, practical geometry, most of all land surveying, was not in the hands of priests, but in the hands of ἄρπεδονάπται, who were secular specialists (Zhmd 2006, 39). The priests, at least at a later time, were preoccupied with astronomical observations, see Clagett 1995, 310 f. on the astronomic records of Egyptian priests of Hellenistic times, which go back to a much more remote age; *ibid.*, 489 f. on the Hellenistic statue of the stargazer who was at the same time the priest; cf. Zhmd 2006, 39: "In late Egypt (i.e. in the time of Herodotus), calendar astronomy was in the hands of priests".

⁷ Apart from the standard commentaries (Bonitz, Ross), see now Cambiano 2012 on ch. 1 and Broadie 2012 on ch. 2.

facts like perception and experience). In the next step (ch. 2) Aristotle argues that the features that, again, *opinio communis* associates with wisdom, taken all together, point to the single science of the first causes and principles (see 982 b 7–10), and this is the science whose pursuit is the object of the whole project of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, viz. the 'first philosophy' (983 a 21–23). But, together with this declared purpose, his argument also has another, no less important one: it is a demonstration that human development, both individual and collective, starts from knowledge that is at first glance entirely particular and utilitarian, but in fact contains the germs of future theoretical knowledge, and that this knowledge grows more universal and less utilitarian with every next stage, until it attains the stage of theoretical sciences and their crown, metaphysical knowledge.

Let us now look at the statement on the origin of mathematics in Egypt in its immediate context (*Met.* A 1. 981 b 13 – 982 a 3):

τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον εἰκὸς τὸν ὁποῖανοῦν εὐρόντα τέχνην παρὰ τὰς κοινὰς αἰσθήσεις θανμάζεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων μὴ μόνον διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι τι τῶν εὐρεθέντων ἀλλ' ὡς σοφὸν καὶ διαφέροντα τῶν ἄλλων· πλείονων δ' εὐρισκομένων τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν μὲν πρὸς τὰναγκαῖα τῶν δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν οὐσῶν, αἰεὶ σοφωτέρους τοὺς τοιούτους ἐκείνων ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς χρήσιν εἶναι τὰς ἐπιστήμας αὐτῶν. ὅθεν ἤδη πάντων τῶν τοιούτων κατασκευασμένων αἱ μὴ πρὸς ἡδονὴν μηδὲ πρὸς ἀναγκαῖα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εὐρέθησαν, καὶ πρῶτον ἐν τούτοις τοῖς τόποις οὐπερ⁸ ἐσχόλασαν· διὸ περὶ Αἴγυπτον αἱ μαθηματικαὶ πρῶτον τέχναι συνέστησαν, ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἀφείθη σχολάζειν τὸ τῶν ἱερέων ἔθνος.

At first he who invented any art whatever that went beyond the common perceptions of man was naturally admired by men, not only because there was something useful in the inventions, but because he was thought wise and superior to the rest. But as more arts were invented, and some were directed to the necessities of life, others to recreation, the inventors of the latter were naturally always regarded as wiser than the inventors of the former, because their branches of knowledge did not aim at utility.

Hence when all such things had been already provided, the sciences which do not aim at giving pleasure or at the necessities of life were discovered, and first in the places where man first began to have leisure. This is why the mathematical sciences were first founded in Egypt; for there the priestly caste was allowed to be at leisure.⁹

⁸ οὐπερ α (Jaeger, Primavesi); οὐ πρῶτον β (Ross).

⁹ Tr. by Ross 1928, modified.

The primary purpose of Aristotle's argument in the cited passage is clear: he attempts to prove that the repute of knowledge as wisdom increases as utility diminishes. The inventor of τέχνη, practical knowledge, in medicine for instance, was admired not only because his invention was useful, but also because he himself was regarded as wiser than the empirical practitioners in the same field. Later, in the process of discovering further τέχναι, both those that produce necessary things and those that produce the things that are pertinent to recreation, the inventors of the latter were in every case esteemed wiser than the inventors of the former, because the knowledge that constitutes these arts was not "for the sake of utility". Afterwards, when the crafts of both kinds had produced all things that were necessary and that were pertinent to pleasures (viz. of recreation), the sciences were invented that did not serve either utility or pleasure, viz. theoretical sciences (cf. the similar statement A 2. 982 b 22). This happened the earliest in the lands where people had leisure. Accordingly, mathematical sciences were discovered earliest in Egypt, because there leisure was granted to the class of priests.

Aristotle's reasoning on the gradual diminishing of the utility of knowledge in the course of its historical development and the simultaneous growth of its repute as wisdom is clear to this extent. It is far less obvious what he wants to say when he uses the causal term ὅθεν to connect the sentence on the invention of theoretical sciences with the previous sentence on the development of both kinds of τέχναι, those of necessary and of pleasurable things, and the repute of the latter superseding the repute of the former. Although Aristotle's commentators correctly understand the causal meaning of ὅθεν, they usually do not stop to comment on it.¹⁰ Bonitz,¹¹ for instance, paraphrases Aristotle as if it is only about the temporal sequence of three kinds of knowledge and notes only the temporal posteriority of less utilitarian types of knowledge and their priority in repute. This is correct in respect to the main thrust of Aristotle's argument, but ignores the causal ὅθεν, and thus creates the impression that Aristotle takes the progress from utilitarian to pure knowledge to be natural.¹² Bonitz, however, further points out that *after* the τέχναι of both kinds have been invented,¹³

¹⁰ See Bonitz, Ross and Reale in their translations.

¹¹ Bonitz 1849, 36; 44–46 ad 981 b 13.

¹² Cf. recently Mansfeld 2017, 116: "In Book A of the *Metaphysics*, physics and the first attempts at first philosophy develop in an entirely natural way out of the necessary and luxury arts that preceded them". We shall see that Aristotle's view is more complicated.

¹³ Bonitz understood ἤδη πάντων τῶν τοιούτων κατεσκευασμένων as the invention of the τέχναι of both kinds (see further).

theoretical sciences originated due to leisure, like that of Egyptian priests (p. 45). He thus seems to have believed that, apart from the natural progress of knowledge, Aristotle treats the appearance of leisure for scholars as an additional or probably the decisive condition for the emergence of theoretical science. Although Bonitz was surely right in taking the development of both τέχναι and leisure as parts of Aristotle's explanation, his understanding of the roles of both is not clear enough, and is certainly partially incorrect. The other commentators of the *Metaphysics* are even less explicit on this point.

To the best of my knowledge, only W. Spoerri questioned this traditional interpretation.¹⁴ He pointed out the significance of ὅθεν, which introduces the final stage, that of theoretical sciences (p. 62 with n. 33); this word has the causal force, but it is not clear how the invention of theoretical sciences follows from the immediately preceding statement on the gradual invention of crafts that produce necessary things and things of refinement and on the higher esteem for the inventors of the latter than of the former. Precisely for this reason, Spoerri diagnosed the distortion of Aristotle's genuine view. According to him, Aristotle's explanation of the origin of theoretical sciences has nothing to do with leisure: the real explanation is just the evolution of society, which goes through three stages: (1) securing necessary things; (2) securing the things that furnish refined pleasures; (3) after that, when all necessary things and things of comfort have been provided, people are able to devote themselves to the pursuit of non-utilitarian, theoretical knowledge. Spoerri calls this scheme (A): according to him it is contained in the condensed form in the sentence ὅθεν ἤδη πάντων τῶν τοιούτων κατεσκευασμένων αἱ μὴ πρὸς ἡδονὴν μηδὲ πρὸς ἀναγκαῖα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εὐρέθησαν; the same concept of historical development underlies the statement at A 2. 982 b 22–25: σχεδὸν γὰρ πάντων ὑπαρχόντων τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ πρὸς ῥαστώνην καὶ διαγωγὴν ἢ τοιαύτη φρόνησις ἥρξατο ζητεῖσθαι.¹⁵ Spoerri argued

¹⁴ Spoerri 1985, 45–68. I use this occasion to acknowledge my debt to the learning and acumen of Walter Spoerri in this and other studies devoted to *Kultur-entstehungslehren*; although I cannot agree with the extremities of his analytical approach (in the spirit of the 'analysis' as applied to Homer by the school to which Spoerri belonged), none of his painstaking studies can be neglected.

¹⁵ Spoerri also rightly noticed that given the parallel of 982 b 22–25, τῶν τοιούτων at 981 b 21 refers not to the crafts that produced necessary things and those that produced refinement (as Bonitz and most other commentators understood this), but these two kinds of things themselves. In fact, Aristotle normally uses κατασκευάζειν for equipping with something (Bonitz 1870, 374 f.), not for inventing something (Ross' "Hence when all such inventions were already established" is an unhappy compromise between these two options; Cambiano 2012 follows Ross).

that this scheme was inserted in the *Met.* A 1–2 from another context, probably from a different treatise by Aristotle;¹⁶ ὅθεν accordingly lost its antecedent, and it now refers meaninglessly back to the idea that the people esteemed the inventors of the crafts of embellishment more than of those that produced vitally useful things. The latter corresponds to the genuine purpose of Aristotle's reasoning in A 1–2, viz. to demonstrate the gradual development of the concept of wisdom in the history of humanity, in order to prove that all people, without being aware of this, associate wisdom with the science of first causes. For this purpose, Aristotle built his scheme A: as the σοφοί were regarded (1) the inventor of the τέχνη as compared with perceptual knowledge; (2) the inventors of the crafts of embellishment as compared with the crafts of necessary things; (3) the inventors of theoretical knowledge. However, instead of introducing this third stage – now the inventors of theoretical sciences are admired as wise – Aristotle or a redactor of his text substituted it with the third stage of the scheme B – when all necessary things and things of comfort have been provided, people are able to devote themselves to the pursuit of non-utilitarian theoretical knowledge.¹⁷ According to Spuerri, there are further signs of awkward compilation in that passage. Thus, the mention of leisure is superfluous, because providing necessary things and things of comfort is sufficient for the development of theoretical knowledge.

¹⁶ Throughout his paper, Spuerri treats *Met.* A 1–2 as non-homogenous text, but leaves the question open whether this is a feature of Aristotle's original version or a result of later editorial additions (see p. 67 f.); at p. 54 n. 19, he cites the scholars who believed that Aristotle draws on one of his published treatises, the *Protrepticus* or *On Philosophy*, for the Kulturentstehunglehre of the *Met.* A 1–2, but does endorse such views.

¹⁷ According to Spuerri 1985, 53–62, the whole section 981 b 13–25 is something alien to the preceding reasoning, since it changes the perspective: up to this point, Aristotle depicted the scale of mental activities in a systematic way, and now he switched to a historical treatment of human knowledge under the aspect of its growing autotelic feature ('Selbstzweckhaftigkeit'), as is reflected in the change of meaning of the σοφός; the gradation of knowledge according to apprehension of the higher causes that dominated previously now disappears. In fact, the alleged change of perspective at 981 b 13 is illusory. Already at 981 a 5–12, the difference between ἐμπειρία and τέχνη was treated from the historical point of view. Further, according to 981 b 13–16 (the beginning of allegedly different treatment), the first inventor of τέχνη was esteemed higher ("more wise") than representatives of experience in the same field, in accordance with the preceding reasoning, viz. not only because his achievement superseded the previous empirical stage in utility, but also since it entailed the cognition of causes (cf. 981 a 24–30): οὖν at 981 b 13 clearly has both resumptive and inferential force; it connects this piece with the preceding reasoning, interrupted by the parenthesis 981 a 30 – b 13, and introduces the inference.

This attempt to reappraise the classic text is interesting in its diagnosis of difficulties, but the proposed solution – its dissolving into heterogeneous pieces – does not hold up to examination. In order to see what is wrong with charging Aristotle or his redactor with such a contamination of heterogeneous concepts, let us see why it is not reasonable to ascribe to Aristotle Spoerri's 'scheme A', viz. the idea that theoretical sciences owe their origin to the satisfaction of material needs both necessary and luxurious. Let us look first at the theories that, according to Spoerri, anticipate Aristotle's explanation. Thus, Democritus claimed that the arts like music were invented at a later stage of development, because they do not arise from necessity, but from superfluity.¹⁸ In the *Republic* (2. 372 e – 373 e), Plato assigns the origin of the 'fine arts' to that stage of development when the vital material needs (vegetarian food, primitive clothes and shoes, undecorated houses) have been satisfied due to the appearance of the corresponding skills and division of labour (the 'city of pigs'); one only entertainment of leisure at this stage are non-professional hymns to the gods; but desires for more expensive things now begin to develop in some people who now wish more luxury furniture, food, clothes and shoes, and also painting, sculptures and embroidery to decorate their houses, and further arts that are pertinent to luxurious and refined life – hunting, dancing, music, poetry with its performers, rhapsodes and actors etc. In a less moralistic vein, in the later *Critias* (110 a), Plato related the origin of the fine arts to the stage at which the elementary material needs have already been satisfied: after the destruction of civilisation by the recurrent cataclysm, development always starts from scratch; over the course of many generations, people are motivated to engage in occupations that are indispensable for survival, and only much later, together with attaining leisure, do the myths, viz. epic poetry, appear together with interest in the events of the past.¹⁹

¹⁸ See 68 B 144 DK (from Philodemus, *On Music*), with improvements on Philodemus' text as proposed by Delattre–Morel 1998, 21–24, and further by Hammerstaedt 1998, cf. Menn 2015, 17. Note that Democritus' theory does not necessarily imply a flourishing society with its leisure class as a precondition for the development of fine arts; his statement may concern only the origin of music and similar arts at the stage when the most urgent needs are satisfied by already invented primitive agriculture and husbandry and when people have pauses for recreation; this stimulates the invention of skills for entertainment, as according to Plato's earliest 'city of pigs' and Epicurean theory in Lucr. 5. 1379–1411.

¹⁹ The primary purpose of this note of Plato's is to explain why there is no reliable tradition about earlier events than those depicted in epic poetry, viz. about the previous, pre-cataclysmic civilisation and the cataclysm that destroyed it. I return later to this piece's alleged relevance to Aristotle's concept of leisure in *Met.* A 1.

Both Democritus and, more definitely, Plato thus formulate the general pattern that civilisations follow in their development: there are kinds of knowledge and skills that are not related to elementary material needs (the fine arts among them); they emerge at a certain stage of the development of civilisation, namely when the most stringent material needs have already been satisfied. Democritus could already imply (as is assumed by the Epicurean theory that followed him) and Plato states overtly in the *Critias* that prosperity contributes to the origin of non-utilitarian skills via the appearance of leisure for non-utilitarian preoccupations, in the sense that the general level of prosperity allows people to devote time to non-profitable activities. Desires for more refined things and for more refined entertainments are taken to be inherent in human nature; they are either suppressed until the more basic material needs are satisfied or appear at the moment of their satisfaction. The internal reasons for the rise of crafts that satisfy these growing desires are not discussed: it is taken for granted that capacities to carry them out are inherent in some representatives of humankind and that these abilities develop in response to the new appetites of society.

There is also some difference between Democritus' and Plato's views on the social aspect of the origin of non-utilitarian preoccupations: Plato (less explicitly in the *Critias*, more openly in the *Republic*) treats the development of professional arts in response to the growing appetites of the elite; Democritus, to the degree that later Epicurean theory helps to restore his thought, had in view rather the origin of non-professional arts like music, singing and dancing as a means of self-delectation by a more primitive human society that has no elite yet. Aristotle duly acknowledges the inherent human capacity for artistic imitation by means of rhythm and melody in the origin of arts (*Poet.* 4) and the inherent cognitive abilities in the origin of crafts and sciences, as well as different individual gifts in all these fields. However, in the part of his theory that we are now discussing, he is more concerned with the development of professional arts, crafts and sciences, those that already overstep the level of experience, and thus is closer to Plato, having in view primarily the role of social approval in their development.

One more Platonic notion appears to be helpful for understanding Aristotle's concept: in the *Republic*, Plato points to a definite limit to what is necessary for human beings and to the group of crafts that satisfy such needs. In spite of apparent sympathy with the moderate and peaceful life that is constituted by such modest desires, Plato demonstrates his awareness that people would be never satisfied with the level of prosperity that such crafts provide and will crave luxury and refinement and the corresponding crafts and arts that produce them. The notion of limit, how-

ever, is helpful in demarcating which desires go beyond necessity, which are the crafts and arts that satisfy these excessive desires and what kind of state corresponds to these occupations and corresponding representatives of them (the ‘feverish city’ versus the primitive ‘city of pigs’).²⁰

Aristotle himself takes recourse to this kind of historical pattern when explaining the general tendencies of historical development, both of human needs and of the discoveries that satisfy them (*Pol.* 7. 10. 1329 b 25–31):

σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δεῖ νομίζειν εὐρῆσθαι πολλάκις ἐν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ, μᾶλλον δ’ ἀπειράκις. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖα τὴν χρεῖαν διδάσκειν εἰκὸς αὐτήν, τὰ δ’ εἰς εὐσχημοσύνην καὶ περιουσίαν ὑπαρχόντων ἤδη τούτων εὐλογον λαμβάνειν τὴν αὐξήσιν· ὥστε καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας οἶεσθαι δεῖ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον.

Like Plato, he takes it for granted here that society’s primary needs are limited and that, when they are satisfied, both society’s desires and its intellectual efforts would turn to the pursuit of what is “pertinent to decorum and abundance” in the new direction of the constituents of a refined mode of life.

To sum up, neither Democritus (at least as far as Philodemus’ citation implies) nor, more definitely, Plato or Aristotle take recourse to the satisfaction of material needs to explain the origin of theoretical knowledge. Their statements are plausible in that they rely on the observation that the society cannot allow itself more refined entertainments while it is badly in need of urgently needed things like food, protection from the cold, safety etc. Nevertheless, a theory like this cannot explain why the society that is fully equipped both with products that are vitally necessary and those that make human life refined now turns to the pursuit of theoretical knowledge. As far as I can see, Democritus²¹

²⁰ More complicated is the problem of the extent to which the ideal state should return to the mode of life of the city of pigs. The project of the Kallipolis does not present an attempt to arrest this development, but rather a proposal for the reform of the advanced society by means of restrictions placed mainly upon the ruling class; but even the life of the highest class, that of the rulers and their auxiliaries, is not meant to be reduced to the minimal desires of the ‘first city’; the fine arts that were absent in the latter should be reformed but remain in the Kallipolis (401 a – 403 c) and used to educate rulers; the desires of the ‘third class’ would be restricted in the ideal state, but presumably it would enjoy many of luxuries of the ‘feverish city’.

²¹ Menn 2015, 17–22, ascribes to Democritus the idea of the third stage of development, that of discoveries of causes “that explain the practices of both necessary and superfluous arts”, and connects this with Aristotle’s three stages in *Met.* A 1. Such discoveries correspond to what Democritus actually did, according to Menn’s penetrating analysis, like his optics-based explanation of the illusion of three-dimen-

and Plato²² did not attempt to give an explanation of the origin of theoretical knowledge in historical terms.

Thus the omission of ‘scheme A’, which Spoerri regarded as a sign of contamination, seems to be, on the contrary, a part of Aristotle’s explanatory strategy: he is well aware of the validity of the principle “first necessity, then pleasure”, but he does not make the next step to argue that the satisfaction of desires pertinent both to necessary needs and to refinement leads to pursuit of theoretical knowledge.²³

sionality as it was achieved in practice and described in treatise by Agatharchus. Nevertheless, the question remains open whether Democritus gave such activity a place in his philosophy of history and provided explanations for its origin, as Aristotle did for theoretical sciences. That according to Menn Aristotle, like Democritus, believed “that investigating the causes of the arts also leads to causes of natural things, and in some cases we would not discover these causes apart from the arts” (p. 20), is in my view quite probable. But when he speaks about knowing the causes of what is done by crafts (980 a 30 – 981 b 6, Menn refers to this statement), he has in view only the distinction between ‘architectonic’ art and handicrafts in terms of the aim and general plan of doing (like that of the architect vs. that of the carpenter or mason), not the investigation of the causes of natural things as the primary purpose of theoretical knowledge.

²² Philosophy, mathematics and other sciences are notoriously absent from the account of the growth of the feverish city in the *Republic*; nor is there any indication that their appearance somehow corresponds to inborn human desires. Notice the uncertainty in the *Statesman* (272 b–d) whether philosophy existed in the era of the rule of the god in the myth, when humankind enjoyed an extraordinary natural environment, peace and the absence of any manual labour: it implies that lack of material need and leisure all day are neither sufficient nor probably the optimal condition for the emergence of theoretical knowledge. On the other hand, unlike the useful crafts, its existence is not denied – utilitarian knowledge is thus not necessary for the development of philosophy.

²³ The *Kulturentstehungslehre* in Iamblichus, *De comm. math. sc.* p. 83. 6 = fr. 8 Ross, which refers to the same three stages of development as *Met.* A 1–2, was often regarded as a return to Aristotle’s *Protrepticus* or *On Philosophy* and regarded as a sort of auto-citation in the *Metaphysics* (see Spoerri 1985, 57 n. 26; Zhmud 2006, 52 n. 34 on scholarship; Zhmud himself regards the piece as Aristotelian, 35 n. 59, 211 nn. 214, 218; 212 n. 225, and Menn 2015, 21 n. 26; see also Primavesi 473 ad *Met.* A 2. 982 b 23; Spoerri is more cautious): Νεώτατον οὖν ὁμολογουμένως ἐστὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἢ περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀκριβολογία. μετὰ γὰρ τὴν φθορὰν καὶ τὸν κατακλυσμὸν τὰ περὶ τὴν τροφήν καὶ τὸ ζῆν πρῶτον ἡναγκάζοντο φιλοσοφεῖν, εὐπορώτεροι δὲ γενομένοι τὰς πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἐξειργάσαντο τέχνας, οἷον μουσικὴν καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας, πλεονάσαντες δὲ τῶν ἀναγκαίων οὕτως ἐπεχείρησαν φιλοσοφεῖν. Since Iamblichus does not mention leisure in this context, he creates the impression that, in *Met.* A 1, leisure is either equivalent to Iamblichus’ state of prosperity, which is wrong, or even alien to the context (Spoerri). But of course, even if this passage went back to Aristotle, it would be no guarantee that leisure did not play a role in the treatise by Aristotle that Iamblichus draws on. However, I hope to show elsewhere that evidence for ascribing

Now, Spoerri is surely right to stress the causal force of ὅθεν at 981 b 20, which was usually neglected, but is mistaken when he treats it as a sign of a distortion of the original context. Cambiano's recent attempt to deal with this problem is also not acceptable: he supposes that according to Aristotle, τέχναι provided the necessary conditions of leisure having satisfied necessary needs.²⁴ This ignores that πάντων τῶν

Iamblichus' piece to Aristotle is weak and that it rather looks like a contaminated paraphrase of Plato's and Aristotle's passages on cataclysms and the development of civilisation, including those in *Met.* A 1–2 (for the similar origin of reasoning on five kinds of wisdom in Philoponus' *In Nicom. Isag.* 1. 1, which was also treated as Aristotle's fragment, *De philos.* fr. 10 Ross, and other similar 'developmental' accounts in Aristotle's commentator see Haase 1965; Hutchinson–Johnson 2005, 201 f. rightly exclude chapters 26–27 of *De comm. math. sc.* from their reconstruction of Aristotle's *Protrepticus*). For the present purpose, I content myself with a possible indication that Iamblichus' passage is a paraphrase of *Met.* A 1–2. Although Iamblichus assigns to the first stage the acquisition of necessary things and to the second the development of arts aiming at pleasure, he unexpectedly connects the appearance of theoretical knowledge with an abundance of necessary things, not with an abundance of both necessary and pleasurable ones. This awkwardness can be explained by the text of *Met.* A 2. 982 b 22–24, as transmitted by the manuscripts: σχεδὸν γὰρ πάντων ὑπαρχόντων τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ πρὸς ῥαστώνην καὶ διαγωγὴν ἢ τοιαύτη φρόνησις ἤρξατο ζητεῖσθαι. Although the text certainly implies two categories of goods – τὰ ἀναγκαῖα and τὰ πρὸς ῥαστώνην καὶ διαγωγὴν (cf. *Met.* A 1. 981 b 17–25) – it can also be taken as relating to τὰ ἀναγκαῖα to πρὸς ῥαστώνην καὶ διαγωγὴν. It thus appears that Iamblichus understood the syntax according to the latter option and employed τὰ ἀναγκαῖα in the wider meaning of things useful both for survival and for leisure entertainments. Proclus, in *Eucl.* p. 29. 1–3 Friedlein, too, associates the invention of mathematics with the provision of necessary things, apparently following here Iamblichus (on Proclus' drawing on Iamblichus' *CMS* in his *Commentary*, see Mueller 1987, esp. 335–338). Jaeger emended the text, adding τῶν before πρὸς (Jaeger 1917, 495; 1960, 488; 1957; see also Spoerri 1985, 56 n. 25, who approves this emendation; Primavesi 2012, 473 follows Jaeger). Although Jaeger's emendation is correct to the sense, there is some doubt that it is necessary, because Aristotle sometimes omits the article with the second member (Bonitz 1870, 109 b 44–56). Jaeger pointed in favour of his emendation to Alexander (in *Met.* p. 16. 21 ff. Hayduck), who in his paraphrase opposes τὰ ἀναγκαῖα and τὰ πρὸς ῥαστώνην. However, immediately afterwards, Alexander uses τὰ ἀναγκαῖα in a relative sense and connects it with πρὸς διαγωγὴν (apparently in a general sense of 'life course'): δῆλον ὡς ἐπ' οὐδενὸς ἀναγκαίου τῶν πρὸς διαγωγὴν τοῦ βίου συντελούντων εὐρέσει τὴν ζήτησιν ἐποιοῦντο. Asclepius (in *Met.* p. 20. 17–19 Hayduck) cites Aristotle's text with τῶν before πρὸς, but this does not necessarily mean that he had the corresponding version of the text. Thus, against Jaeger, who used Iamblichus' passage as evidence in favour of his emendation, it rather serves as a testimony of the text as transmitted by the manuscript tradition.

²⁴ Cambiano 2012, 35 n. 65: ὅθεν "has primarily a temporal sense, but means also that *technai* were necessary conditions for the development of sciences, inasmuch as the acquiring of *scholē*... requires that almost [all?] the primary needs have been met

τοιούτων κατεσκευασμένων refers to satisfaction with products of both kinds of τέχνηαι, those of necessary things and of pleasurable ones (this is further confirmed by *Met. A 2*, σχεδὸν γὰρ πάντων ὑπαρχόντων τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ πρὸς ῥαστώνην καὶ διαγωγὴν ἢ τοιαύτη φρόνησις ἥρξατο ζητεῖσθαι). It is also not correct to treat the leisure of priests simply as the result of economic prosperity, as we shall see.²⁵

The causal connection between Aristotle's two statements is in fact plain enough. He points to the *social* precondition for the emergence of theoretical knowledge – the gradual growth of appreciation of less and less utilitarian kinds of knowledge in the course of social development. The first inventor of τέχνη (apparently of the craft that produces something of vital necessity for humankind) was admired not only for the utility of this invention, but also for the intrinsic value, the 'wisdom' of this achievement. Aristotle's point is that even at the stage when the pursuit of knowledge was inevitably utilitarian, the knowledge was nevertheless appreciated, in part for its intrinsic value. As the example from medicine shows, while experience collects the multitude of instances of successful cases of medical treatment (and, presumably, unsuccessful cases, too), the progress from experience to τέχνη consists in grasping those universals that explain why a particular medicine helped a number of patients who suffered from a certain disease: they all belong to the types with the prevalence of phlegm or black bile, who suffer from καῦσος, a kind of fever (981 a 7–12). The invention of τέχνη entails the discovery of a number of such causal explanations, and, although some of them could be useful, the inventor was admired also because the set of knowledge he discovered superseded in value the earlier experience: this was the case because people esteem knowledge of causes as wiser than knowledge of

by means of useful *technai*". In fact, the primary meaning of ὅθεν is not temporal, but local, pointing to the origin – 'whence', 'from which' or 'from whom'; the causal meaning develops most naturally locally, as in English 'whence' (see LSJ, s. v. II); the employment of ὅθεν in both local and causal meanings is well attested in Aristotle's treatises.

²⁵ It appears that Cambiano takes the main sentence (ὅθεν αἱ μὴ πρὸς ἡδονὴν μηδὲ πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εὐρέθησαν) as describing the effect of the *genetivus absolutus* sentence (ἤδη πάντων τῶν τοιούτων κατεσκευασμένων). It would be possible, if it were not anaphoric ὅθεν in the beginning of the main sentence, which refers primarily to the effect of what is described by the preceding sentence; the *gen. abs.* sentence should be taken only as a subsidiary condition or as a temporal reference. The rise of theoretical sciences is thus primarily the result of the appearance of crafts of two kinds, crafts that provide necessary things and those that provide pleasures, and the greater repute of the inventors of the latter crafts. The *gen. abs.* sentence refers, accordingly, only to the additional cause.

facts, and also because τέχνη can be transmitted by way of teaching, while experience cannot.²⁶

After that, more and more crafts were invented, those that are ‘for necessary things’ (πρὸς τὰναγκαῖα) and those that are πρὸς διαγωγὴν. The inventors of the latter kind of crafts were invariably esteemed as ‘wiser’ than those of the crafts for necessary things, because knowledge of crafts for luxuries was less utilitarian (981 b 17–20). Scholars understood this statement in two different ways, although the difference was not explicitly articulated: either Aristotle opposes to the crafts producing things that satisfy absolutely urgent needs those that discriminately furnish all that is pertinent to civilised and flourishing life, i.e. arts that produce refined food, wine, furniture, houses and those that serve for amusement, like painting, sculpture, music and literature,²⁷ or alternatively he opposes to the crafts of the first kind more narrowly only the last mentioned crafts that are pertinent for entertainments of leisure, the ‘fine arts’.²⁸ In favour

²⁶ Aristotle assumes that the evaluation of the intrinsic merits of τέχνη in his time was valid also in the time of its origin. The ground for this belief is not only the implied constancy of human nature, but may be even more his explicit statement that the bearers of causal knowledge are not necessarily more practically successful than purely empirical practitioners (981 a 12–24): medical craft in his time often appears not to supersede experience in practice, because it is possible to know the universal rules of craft but to commit mistakes due to lack of experience, viz. because one does not recognize in individual patients or individual symptoms the general types as grasped by the craft. On the contrary, the experienced practitioner is successful because, without knowing universals, he possesses in memory a great number of successful treatments of certain individuals: I take it that he keeps in memory (or in written form) the individual cases with the individual features of cured patients and the symptoms of their diseases and thus can recognise the next patient with those features and symptoms, to whom a given medicine will be helpful or not. Of course, the first inventor of the craft, unlike its later “school” connoisseurs, was himself a very experienced person. Nevertheless, the first generalizations of the craft he invented were obviously few (see below Aristotle’s statement on the difficulty of the initial phase in every τέχνη and on its modest character), and thus could not change considerably the character of medical treatment and could not change seriously the character of treating patients. Thus, as he saw it, the fact of progress in explanatory knowledge itself, in spite of the originally insignificant practical results it provided, especially in the beginning, pointed to its acknowledgement and encouragement by other people.

²⁷ This understanding of πρὸς διαγωγὴν definitely prevailed, see Bonitz 1849, 45 (“vitae cultu[s] and quaecumque ad voluptatem et oblectationem...pertinent”); 1890 “für den Genuß des Lebens”; Taylor 1907, 71 (“social refinements”), Spoerri 1985, 55 (“die einen verfeinertem Lebensgenuß dienenden [*technai*]”, Cambiano 2012, 34: “dimensions of human life that develop beyond mere survival”.

²⁸ Ross 1953, I, 118: “almost = fine arts”; “arts... directed... to recreation”, in his translation; see also Zhmud 2006, 211.

of the first understanding is the description of the same crafts in the next sentence as those ‘for pleasure’ (ὄθεν ἤδη πάντων τῶν τοιούτων κατεσκευασμένων αἱ μὴ πρὸς ἡδονὴν μηδὲ πρὸς ἀναγκαῖα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εὐρέθησαν), and the already cited passage from the *Politics* with the opposition of the necessary inventions and those that furnish all that constitute ‘decorum and abundance’.²⁹ It would also be in accord with Plato in the *Republic*, who opposes the earlier developed skills that satisfy the most urgent needs to the crafts, both of luxury and fine arts, that appeared together with the grown desires (see above).

But these considerations do not outweigh the decisive one: the word διαγωγή by itself in Aristotle’s works never refers directly to something like ‘luxurious or civilised life’ or the pleasures of such life. Aristotle uses this word sometimes in the neutral meaning of ‘a way of life’, ‘spending time’ (*HA* 534 a 10 f.; 589 a 16 f., on ways of life and habitats of animals); but more often, even when the word is modified by an adjective, participle or adverbial expression, it is used in contexts in which it refers to time free of necessary activities.³⁰ The absolute employment of διαγωγή, as in *Met.* A 1. 981 a 18 and 2. 982 b 23, occurs elsewhere only in the *Politics*, and here it refers invariably to ‘time free of political duties or private business’ or ‘activities that fulfil such a time’.³¹ The importance of this

²⁹ *Pol.* 7. 10. 1329 b 27–28: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖα τὴν χρεῖαν διδάσκειν εἰκὸς αὐτήν, τὰ δ’ εἰς εὐσχημοσύνην καὶ περιουσίαν ὑπαρχόντων ἤδη τούτων εὖλογον λαμβάνειν τὴν αὐξήσιν, cited by Spoerri 1985, 57 as the direct parallel. Cf. also *Pol.* 4. 4. 1291 a 2–4 on two kinds of crafts that are indispensable for the polis: δεύτερον δὲ τὸ καλούμενον βάνανσον (ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ περὶ τὰς τέχνας ὧν ἄνευ πόλιν ἀδύνατον οἰκείσθαι· τούτων δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν τὰς μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν δεῖ, τὰς δὲ εἰς τρυφὴν ἢ τὸ καλῶς ζῆν).

³⁰ Οὔσης δὲ καὶ ἀναπαύσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ, αἱ ἐν ταύτῃ διαγωγῇ μετὰ παιδίας, *EN* 4. 14. 1127 b 34 f.; καταφεύγουσι δ’ ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διαγωγὰς τῶν εὐδαιμονιζομένων οἱ πολλοί, διὸ παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις εὐδοκιμοῦσιν οἱ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς εὐτράπελοι, 10. 6. 1176 b 12–14 (on pleasant amusements, παιδιαί); οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς ἡ εὐδαιμονία, ἀλλ’ ἐν ταῖς κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείαις, on corporeal pleasures, 1177 a 9–11; δοκεῖ γοῦν ἡ φιλοσοφία θαυμαστάς ἡδονὰς ἔχειν καθαριότητι καὶ τῷ βεβαίῳ, εὖλογον δὲ τοῖς εἰδόσι τῶν ζητούντων ἡδῶν τὴν διαγωγὴν εἶναι, 10. 7. 1177 a 25–27; λείπεται τοίνυν πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγὴν, *Pol.* 8. 1. 1337 a 21 f. on the purpose of musical education).

³¹ χρήσιμοι δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἰσι πρὸς τὴν σχολὴν καὶ διαγωγὴν ὧν τε ἐν τῇ σχολῇ τὸ ἔργον καὶ ὧν ἐν τῇ ἀσχολίᾳ, *Pol.* 7. 15. 1334 a 16–18; ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι δεῖ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολὴν μανθάνειν ἅττα καὶ παιδεύεσθαι, 8. 3. 1338 a 21–22; ἢ πρὸς διαγωγὴν τι συμβάλλεται καὶ πρὸς φρόνησιν (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τρίτον θετέον τῶν εἰρημένων), 8. 4. 1339 a 25–26; ἡ δὲ πρώτη ζήτησις ἐστὶ πότερον οὐ θετέον εἰς παιδείαν τὴν μουσικὴν ἢ θετέον, καὶ τί δύναται τῶν διαπορηθέντων τριῶν, πότερον παιδείαν ἢ παιδιὰν ἢ διαγωγὴν. εὐλόγως δ’ εἰς πάντα τάττεται καὶ φαίνεται μετέχειν. ἢ τε γὰρ παιδιὰ χάριν ἀναπαύσεως ἐστὶ,

concept for Aristotle's political ideal is well known, and its relevance for his reasoning in the *Met.* A 1–2 will be discussed in the next section, but it is appropriate to warn here against associating the word with leisure as a part of Aristotle's political ideal.³² More relevant are the contexts in which Aristotle speaks about leisure as the result of economic and social prosperity and peace (see e.g. *Pol.* 7. 1326 b 31; 8. 1341 a 28).

The arts that are pertinent to διαγωγή are thus not ones that produce objects of luxury and fine arts, but more specifically 'fine arts' for the amusements of leisure.³³ The crafts that provide comfort (on which see above n. 29) are probably not mentioned in this context because they less vividly demonstrate the advance to non-utilitarian knowledge. That this is about the invention of 'fine arts' like music, literature etc., not about crafts of luxury, may explain Aristotle's otherwise strange characteristic of these arts as 'not for use' (διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς χρήσιν εἶναι τὰς ἐπιστήμας αὐτῶν).³⁴ Strictly speaking, this is not correct: Aristotle further notes that

τὴν δ' ἀνάπαυσιν ἀναγκαῖον ἡδεῖαν εἶναι (τῆς γὰρ διὰ τῶν πόνων λύπης ἰατρεία τίς ἐστίν), καὶ τὴν διαγωγὴν ὁμολογουμένως δεῖ μὴ μόνον ἔχειν τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν, 8. 5. 1339 b 11–19. This absolute usage in the narrow meaning of leisure time seems to be specifically Aristotelian: in the earliest attested instances of the noun διαγωγή (Eur. fr. 1117. 1 Nauck² [dubium]; Plato; Isocr. *ep.* 4. 2), it is used only in the neutral meaning of a mode of life or a certain way of spending time or behaviour. The verb διάγω with αἰῶνα, βίον etc. is attested much earlier, see LSJ sub v. II (*H. Hom.* 20. 7, Aeschylus, Sophocles, etc.)

³² It is not quite correct that the meaning of the word in general is, as Schütrumpf 2005, 501 puts it, 'sinnerfüllte Lebensgestaltung'; rather this is the pregnant meaning that Aristotle in time assigns to it, when he discusses the leisure of the ruling class in his ideal state in *Politics*, Books 7–8.

³³ The later implicit description of these crafts as those that produce what is pertinent πρὸς ῥαστώνην καὶ διαγωγὴν (2. 982 b 23) is not very helpful, because ῥαστώνη is ambiguous and can mean making life or some activities easier and thus imply the crafts that produce technical improvements or objects of comfort ('the things that make for comfort and recreation', Ross), but it can also mean 'relief from activities', 'rest', and imply the arts that provide leisure entertainments. Aristotle uses ῥαστώνη in both of these senses (see *De inc. an.* 713 a 21, *Pol.* 1256 a 26 for the former, and *DC* 284 a 29–32; cf. fr. 197 Rose = fr. 159 Gigon = Porph. *VP* 42). Jaeger 1910, 495 and 1957, ad loc. took it as virtually synonymous with διαγωγή, which he correctly understood as rest from business activities. In fact, the absolute employment of ῥαστώνη favours the latter meaning, and the pair presumably means something like 'rest and the accompanying leisure activities'.

³⁴ Both the designation of these arts as pertinent to διαγωγή and as not pertinent to χρήσις confused Alexander of Aphrodisias, who supposed that Aristotle was already speaking about theoretical sciences; he thus had to assume that Aristotle did not explicitly mention the arts that produce pleasure, and he (tacitly) assumes Aristotle is speaking of the arts 'of necessary things' (δείκνυσιν τὴν ἐπὶ τὴν σοφίαν καὶ τὴν τελειοτάτην γνῶσιν ὁδόν, καὶ πῶς παρήλθεν εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἡ σοφία

the fact that the pursuit of theoretical knowledge did not begin until what is pertinent to necessity and to leisure entertainments had been already provided proves that theoretical knowledge does not serve any practical need (φανερὸν ὅτι διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ἐδίωκον καὶ οὐ χρήσεώς τινος ἔνεκεν, 2. 982 b 22–25). Moreover, in the present context, he immediately adds that the fine arts serve ‘pleasure’. The fine arts thus cannot be considered ‘useless’ *tout sens*, but Aristotle’s point is that they are appreciated not primarily for the utility they produce, viz. not in respect of the quantity of pleasure, but for the skill (‘knowledge’) that is applied. They thus come closer to theoretical sciences than the crafts for necessary things in terms of the intrinsic value of knowledge involved.

The ‘competition’ between the inventors of two kinds of arts demonstrates that the intrinsic value of knowledge grows as its practical utility diminishes. This appears to be the causal link that connects the development of two kinds of crafts (which are both ‘productive’ in Aristotle’s strict sense) with the origin of theoretical sciences: hence, Aristotle says, due to this growing esteem for knowledge for its own sake, even at the stage when all knowledge is still productive, at a certain point when all things pertinent either to necessary needs or to entertainment and pleasure had been provided, theoretical sciences were invented, and this happened for the first time in Egypt.³⁵ Aristotle thus uses the repute of the inventors of the fine arts as part of his historical explanation of the origin of theoretical

καὶ ἡ τῶν τιμιωτάτων ζήτησις τε καὶ θεωρία, ὅτι μετὰ τὴν τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ χρεωδῶν εὑρεσιν περιττότερόν τι καὶ ἐλεύθερον ἤδη νοεῖν σχολαζόντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων. τὰς δὲ τῶν ἡδέων ποριστικὰς τέχνας καὶ αὐτὰς ταῖς χρειώδεσιν ἐγκατατάττει· ὥς γὰρ δεόμενοι καὶ χρεῖαν ἔχοντες ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἀναπαύσεως τὰ ποιητικὰ αὐτῶν ἐξήτουν). Alexander nevertheless rightly takes πρὸς ῥαστώνην καὶ διαγωγὴν (2. 982 b 23) as related to the arts ‘for pleasure’, viz. for recreation, and thus understands διαγωγὴ differently in the second instance. Schwegler 1847, 19 f. attempted to ‘improve’ this inconsistency and argued that πρὸς ῥαστώνην καὶ διαγωγὴν does not refer to πάντων ὑπαρχόντων, but to ἡ τοιαύτη φρόνησις, viz. to theoretical knowledge, but Bonitz rightly refuted this. At 981 b 20 f. πάντων τῶν τοιούτων κατεσκευασμένων, which precedes the invention of theoretical sciences, clearly refers both to crafts that produce necessary things and to those that are pertinent to διαγωγὴ; thus, πάντων ὑπαρχόντων τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ πρὸς ῥαστώνην καὶ διαγωγὴν should have the same meaning.

³⁵ Aristotle is also well aware elsewhere that the development of crafts and sciences entails both the existence of individuals with the corresponding gifts and society’s approval of their efforts. When explaining the development of the art of poetry, he points not only to the extraordinary mimetic capacities of humankind (this is crucial for the origin of literature and the arts), but also to the inherent pleasure that human beings experience when they observe others’ mimetic actions, recognising who and what is imitated (this is crucial for the stimulation and progress of arts), see *Poet.* 4. 1448 b 4–8, 20–24 for the first and b 8–19 for the second.

sciences: the admiration for the inventors of these arts, which exceeds that for the inventors of the crafts of necessary things, demonstrates human society's growing appreciation of less utilitarian knowledge and of course its readiness to support materially those who further advance these arts. This prepares the decisive step: the society is now ready to support the development of theoretical knowledge, which is even less useful than the 'fine arts'.

Now let us look at another important element of Aristotle's explanation, the notion of limit. In the passage of the *Politics* 7. 10. 1329 b 27 ff. cited above, Aristotle refers to the limit of society's satisfaction with necessary things; when it has been attained, intellectual efforts were naturally directed at things that serve refinement and the moral improvement of social life.³⁶ The same notion of limit underlies his statement in the *Met.* A 1: the invention of the fine arts was posterior to the invention of crafts for necessary things and the higher repute of the first was natural, because the need for necessary things had already been satisfied by the second.³⁷ More definitely, Aristotle points out that theoretical sciences were invented when all 'such things', viz. what was pertinent to the necessities of life and to leisure recreations, had already been provided by the two corresponding kinds of crafts.

³⁶ In the *Poetics* 4, Aristotle uses a similar explanation for the advance of the dramatic genres: after the genres of tragedy and comedy became distinctive, as opposed to the earlier non-professional improvisations in both (dithyrambs and phallic songs), the professional poets of the earlier genres of epos and iambic poetry now 'rushed' to the new genres, in correspondence with their natural gifts, because these new genres were on a larger scale and *more prestigious* than the earlier ones (1449 a 2–7).

³⁷ Spoerri 1985, 57 f. supposed that, in *Met.* A 1 (differently from the *Politics*), Aristotle has in mind the synchronous development of two kinds of *crafts* pointing to the present participles and especially to ἀεί, which seems to imply 'competition' between the inventors in these two categories in one and the same epoch (πλειόνων δ' εὕρισκομένων τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν μὲν πρὸς τὰναγκαῖα τῶν δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν οὐσῶν, ἀεὶ σοφωτέρους τοὺς τοιοῦτους ἐκείνων ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς χρῆσιν εἶναι τὰς ἐπιστήμας αὐτῶν). However, it is not credible that Aristotle should ascribe the higher repute of non-necessary inventions to the time when the need for necessary things was not yet satisfied. Rather, the present participles are used to emphasise the overall continuity of the process of inventions of both kinds; and ἀεί looks like Aristotle's idiomatic term, which he often uses in general statements when comparing the relative qualities of two objects (see Bonitz 1875, 11 a 42). The evidence for this statement on the relative reputation of the inventors of two kinds of crafts is of course the then-current reputation of their practitioners (the sentence depends on τὸ εἰκός 981 b 13, like the preceding one, on the reputation of the first inventor of any craft as opposed to empirical practitioners, which is also the inference from the then-current state of affairs).

Aristotle recapitulates this thought in his discussion of the distinctive features of wisdom that is unconsciously pursued by all of humankind. This, he argues, should be the science of first principles, viz. the ‘first philosophy’ or metaphysics. He adds that this science is not a ‘productive’ science (982 b 11), and this feature is in accord with the universal but vague notion of ‘wisdom’ as knowledge that is sought for its own sake and not for its products (see 982 a 14–16). To prove this, he refers to the problems that were attacked by ‘the first who philosophized’, i.e. by the first theoretical scientists:³⁸ these were at first quite ordinary problems (πρόχειρα), but gradually the scientists advanced to the major ones, for instance they studied the causes of unusual astronomic phenomena, like eclipses, or the causes, viz. the original principles of the universe. Problems like this are not aligned to any practical need, and thus the only motive for pursuing them is the feeling of wonder at something extraordinary, which can be satisfied only by discovering the cause of such a phenomenon.

In this argument about the unproductive character of theoretical knowledge, Aristotle uses not only the main argument about its psychological roots, but also a proof ‘from what had happened’, viz. from history: the pursuit of theoretical knowledge started only when *all* things pertinent to need and to leisure entertainment had already been invented (*Met.* A 2. 982 b 19–28):

ὥστ' εἴπερ διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν ἄγνοιαν ἐφιλοσόφησαν, φανερόν ὅτι διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ἐδίωκον καὶ οὐ χρήσεώς τινος ἔνεκεν. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ συμβεβηκός· σχεδὸν γὰρ πάντων ὑπαρχόντων τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ πρὸς ραστώνην καὶ διαγωγὴν ἢ τοιαύτη φρόνησις ἤρξατο ζητεῖσθαι. δῆλον οὖν ὡς δι' οὐδεμίαν αὐτὴν ζητοῦμεν χρεῖαν ἑτέραν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος, φαμέν, ἐλευθέρος ὁ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου ὄν, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὴν ὡς μόνην οὐδ' ἄν ἐλευθέραν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν· μόνη γὰρ αὕτη αὐτῆς ἔνεκ' ἐστίν.

As mentioned above, Spoerri was certainly wrong to understand this statement as similar to Plato's thought that the satisfaction of material needs is the precondition for the development of crafts of luxury or fine arts. Plato had in view the growth of desires together with the satisfaction of the most urgent needs, and it is obvious that Aristotle does not relate the pursuit of theoretical knowledge to the appearance of desire for such knowledge or for its products on the whole. Aristotle's idea can be seen in

³⁸ Aristotle is aware that theoretical knowledge may be practically useful, but according to him, this utility is only accidental and has nothing to do with the motives that influence the scientist in his pursuit of knowledge (the anecdote on Thales, *Pol.* 1. 11. 1259 a 5–18).

his statement on the growing repute of ‘fine arts’ in their competitions with crafts of necessary things: he has in view that admiration for the achievements of the former arts came naturally to an end when this field was exhausted, just as the achievements of the crafts that produced necessary things were exhausted earlier. This opens the path to admiration for and, of course, to encouragement of inventions in the next and final field of application of human cognitive capacities – theoretical knowledge of mathematics, astronomy, natural philosophy and, lastly, metaphysics.

It is important that in Aristotle’s proof about the unproductive character of metaphysical knowledge, the argument ‘from history’ on the time when the pursuit of theoretical knowledge started is merely subsidiary to the more general psychological argument on the feeling of wonder as a psychological motive for this pursuit, which has nothing to do with any practical need. Apparently, Aristotle does not mean that this feeling did not appear in humankind until substantial progress in two earlier branches of knowledge already ceased. He definitely assigns the search for causes already to the stage of purely utilitarian knowledge, and it is clear that the discovery of explanations in medicine that marked the advance from experience to τέχνη was moved at least partially by the same feeling of wonder. The idea is rather that only at this stage could the desire to solve theoretical problems count on admiration and support from society and that this admiration and support led the pursuit of theoretical knowledge to become systematic and successful.

As is well known, Aristotle was committed to the view that development both in particular fields of knowledge and in scientific knowledge as a whole has certain limits.³⁹ At one point, he even states that *all* kinds of theoretical and practical knowledge attained their zenith many times, only to perish together with all of civilisation in a cataclysm (κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς πολλάκις εὐρημένης εἰς τὸ δυνατόν ἐκάστης καὶ τέχνης καὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ πάλιν φθειρομένων, *Met.* Λ 8. 1074 b 10–14).⁴⁰

³⁹ See Aristotle’s passages on the attainment of perfection by certain branches of knowledge and crafts in Edelstein 1967, 122–125 and Zhmud 2006, 210 n. 211.

⁴⁰ In Aristotle’s usage, the plural φιλοσοφίαι means the branches of theoretical science. Edelstein 1967, 125 is certainly right that εἰς τὸ δυνατόν means ‘to the utmost limit’, not ‘as possible’. This is suggested both by the expression itself and by the context: Aristotle here points out that tradition preserves in a dim form, disguised under mythical additions, traces of a meta-cosmic theory similar to his own, which he considers the crowning achievement in this field. The theory he detects should thus represent the almost entirely forgotten highest stage of development in the relevant field in the past. The destruction implies Aristotle’s theory of periodic floods (but, contrary to Plato, affecting only limited areas of the earth and not simultaneously), which throw developed civilisations back to a primitive level (for evidence, see *Meteor.* 1. 14,

This idea of a necessary sequence of stages of intellectual development, of the limitedness of every stage and of overall development is applied in explaining the origin of theoretical sciences in the *Met.* A 1–2: progress, first in utilitarian crafts of necessary things and after that in the ‘fine arts’, should sooner or later attain its limit, after which no considerable improvements can be expected, and the society will then encourage the inventions that constitute theoretical sciences. This happens because the society has now been duly ‘trained’ to support non-utilitarian knowledge, first by appreciating the inventors of useful crafts that do not mark a considerable progress in utility in comparison with experience, and second by becoming increasingly appreciative of the inventors of fine arts, here because the intrinsic value of the involved knowledge supersedes that of utilitarian crafts.

It may seem awkward that Aristotle refers to the limit of development in the fine arts at the time when Greek arts were still intensively developing. However, he does not have in view, at least not primarily, the perspectives of the fine arts and of theoretical knowledge in Greece.⁴¹ His aim is to

discussed in Verlinsky 2006, 51–68). The productive crafts, which are irrelevant for the context of the *Met.* A (only theoretical knowledge is pertinent), are mentioned because Aristotle hints at floods that *totally* destroy the civilised population of cities (but spare uneducated inhabitants of the mountains, according to the more explicit views of Plato, *Tim.* 22 d–e, *Criti.* 109 d, *Leg.* 677 b, and Theophrastus, F 184. 172–204 FHS&G; according to Aristotle, *Meteor.* 1. 14. 352 a 35 – b 4, Greek civilisation developed from such mountain survivors from the previous age). The passage thus attests to Aristotle’s faith in the stage of a civilisation when *all* branches of knowledge attain the limits in their development. This does not necessarily mean that Aristotle believes that a cataclysm necessarily occurs when this stage had been attained, in the way in which Plato treats cataclysms as benevolent cleansers of advanced and inevitably morally degenerated civilisations. Aristotle rather thinks that civilisations that are able to attain this stage are destined sooner or later for destruction by periodic cataclysms, and for this reason we know only of the development in our own cycle. For him, as for Plato, Egypt is a civilisation that is spared by floods and other cataclysms (its first inhabitants were not survivors of the flood, but people who gradually settled on the land yielded by the receding sea), albeit not by gradual drying up (see *Meteor.* 1. 14. 351 b 22 – 352 a 3), and thus demonstrates uninterrupted development, which, however, stopped in the remote past.

⁴¹ One should not, however, neglect to mention that Aristotle envisages in the near future the attainment of a limit in the development of the fine arts, but the powerful progress of theoretical sciences. For some indications for this, see a lamentation of the epic poet Choerilus (fr. 2 Bernabé) that poetic art (primarily of epic poetry, of course) had already attained its limit, which Aristotle cites as an example of the *captatio benevolentiae* typical in this time (*Rhet.* 3. 1415 a 1). On Aristotle’s own statement in the *Poetics* that epic and iambic genres were already abandoned by their outstanding (potential) poets, who turned instead to tragedy and comedy, see above

explain the *origin* of theoretical sciences, in the land in which they were first invented, Egypt. Aristotle thus appears to believe that the systematic pursuit of theoretical knowledge started in Egypt after the fine arts in this land had already ceased developing. The reasons for this belief can be easily presented. On the one hand, Aristotle shares the conviction of his contemporaries that Egyptian civilisation is the most ancient of all existing ones, and thus had at its disposal enormous time to develop crafts and arts (as well as to accumulate vast experience in the fields of mathematics and astronomy, which is the prerequisite for the discovery of scientific explanations in these fields).⁴² On the other hand, Egyptian conservatism in various fields of culture was renowned. Plato praised the lack of novelty in Egyptian music and other fine arts (*Leg.* 656 d – 657 d, cf. 660 a 1; on strict regulations in dances and songs in honour of gods in Egypt, see also 799 a–b). A view like Plato's can be the basis for Aristotle's belief that the fine arts ceased developing in Egypt long ago, before the invention of theoretical sciences.⁴³

n. 36. But according to Aristotle, the forms of tragedy itself in his own time is no longer changing, because it has attained its 'nature' (καὶ πολλὰς μεταβολὰς μεταβαλοῦσα ἢ τραγῳδία ἐπαύσατο, ἐπεὶ ἔσχε τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν, *Poet.* 4. 1449 a 14 f.). This concerns the formation of tragedy only as a genre and does not rule out further development (so, rightly, Edelstein 1967, 124 n. 145), but for Aristotle, the pinnacle, Sophoclean art, also already belongs to the past. Although he presumably expects that some of the generalisations of the *Poetics* may help to improve the then-present tragedies of which he is more critical (Aristotle leaves open the question whether all elements of tragedy are already perfect, 1449 a 7–9), there is no sign that he expects essential improvements from contemporary poets themselves. The same tenor is found in the statements of Aristotle's approximate contemporaries who were specialists in the τέχναι of 'necessary things'. Thus, according to Hipp. *De locis in hom.* 46 (cited by Zhmud 2006, 59), the art of medicine in general is already discovered; this of course does not imply the complete exploration of the field, but is still significant.

⁴² See *Meteor.* 1. 14. 352 b 20–23 on the ancientness of Egyptian civilisation; in the *Politics*, 7. 10. 1329 b 22–31, Aristotle refers to the Egyptian division of the class of farmers from that of warriors (the caste system) as evidence of the ancientness of all useful inventions, which appear recurrently in different civilisations; the logic of his reasoning is not entirely clear, but he appears to argue from the most ancient character of Egyptian civilisation and from the changelessness of its caste system since the tradition began.

⁴³ As for conservatism in other fields, Diodorus of Sicily (1. 82. 3) reports on the prohibition for Egyptian physicians to depart from the rigid rules of their craft, which seems to be the standard view of ancient Egyptian medicine (and largely corresponding to reality, see von Staden 1989, 41). Aristotle cites the different opinion that it was prohibited only up to the fourth day of illness (*Pol.* 3. 15. 1286 a 9–16), as part of an argument against the domination of written laws, which he does not in general approve. This looks like an *a fortiori* argument (even in Egypt the rules are not absolutely rigid!),

3. Leisure

The prevailing view today is that Aristotle explains the appearance of theoretical sciences, both in Egypt and Greece, by the appearance of a leisure class in these countries, which arose in Egypt earlier and in Greece later. According to Guthrie, who gives a more explicit version of this view, Aristotle implies that the priests who performed the duties of scribes were released from all other obligations and thus had leisure for their scholarly occupations; the economic foundation of this freedom was the ownership of land the temples enjoyed.⁴⁴ Since Guthrie believes at the same time that Aristotle finds in Greece the same favourable conditions for the development of theoretical knowledge, he obviously assumes that leisure, which the Greek higher class enjoys, is something on a par with the imagined leisure of Egyptians priests, namely that Aristotle believes that, at a certain stage of social and economic development, the higher class or a part of it attains the possibility to pursue knowledge or to engage in other occupations that bring no utility.

It is true that such a view of the ruling class' leisure as a result of economic prosperity and peace can be found in Greek literature of the fourth century. In Plato's *Critias* (110 a), there is a reasoning, already mentioned above, that scholars usually consider an anticipation of Aristotle's view on the origin of theoretical knowledge:⁴⁵ when civilisation gradually emerges after a recurring cataclysm destroys a previous civilisation, for many generations people are engaged exclusively in occupations that are indispensable for survival and only much later, together with attaining leisure, do myths and interest in the events of the past appear. A similar concept appears in Aristotle himself, when he relates the discriminate learning of various non-utilitarian kinds of knowledge to the increasing leisure time of the ruling class after the Persian wars, due to the growth of wealth.⁴⁶ In the *Met.* A 1 itself, when mentioning the

thus rather testifying to the general opinion that Egypt was extremely conservative. Even this 'softer' version is of course a striking conservatism in comparison with Greek practice and with the way of healing that Aristotle approves of, which is reasoning from general principle to a particular case, not the rigid application of general rules (*Met.* A 1. 981 a 21–24; Z 7. 1032 b 15–23; *EN* 3. 3. 1112 b 15–20).

⁴⁴ Guthrie 1962, 35.

⁴⁵ See, most recently: Zhmud 2006, 211 n. 217, Nesselrath 2006, 151.

⁴⁶ *Pol.* 8. 6. 1341 a 28–32: σχολαστικώτεροι γὰρ γιγνόμενοι διὰ τὰς εὐπορίας καὶ μεγαλοψυχότεροι πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἔτι τε <καὶ> πρότερον καὶ μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ φρονηματισθέντες ἐκ τῶν ἔργων, πάσης ἥπτοντο μαθήσεως, οὐδὲν διακρίνοντες ἀλλ' ἐπιζητοῦντες. The result of this obsession was the introduction of the αὐλητικὴ in the education of the ruling class, later abandoned.

encouragement of fine arts that were pertinent to διαγωγή, certainly Aristotle has in view that Egypt at that time had already attained the stage of prosperity associated with leisure and the development of arts that are pertinent to it.

This notion of leisure should nevertheless be duly distinguished from the leisure that, in the next sentence, Aristotle assigns to Egyptian priests. Aristotle does not attribute the origin of theoretical sciences to leisure in the aforementioned sense: he says that Egypt is the country where the class of priests had been *released* to have the σχολή. This looks like a reference to a specific institution, rather than to the leisure attained naturally due to peace and economic flourishing.⁴⁷ Moreover, the Egyptian priests, unlike the leisure class in Greece, as Guthrie rightly noticed, not only attained freedom from care about their personal material needs but, apparently, also from duties like military or administrative service.

That Aristotle is thinking of a concept of leisure that differs from the leisure of the ruling class in favourable economic conditions is quite natural: he certainly recognizes that leisure of this kind arose in many countries at a certain level, but did not result in the appearance there of theoretical sciences. Like Plato, he believes that such leisure necessarily produces the encouragement of fine arts, rather than of mathematics and astronomy. Aristotle thus has in view that, next to encouragement of and support for such non-utilitarian kinds of knowledge as fine arts, the ruling class in Egypt gave its admiration and support to inventors of theoretical knowledge.

Thus it is plausible that Aristotle treats the Egyptian priests not as the earliest counterpart of the leisure class that appeared later in Greece, but rather as a special case of the encouragement society provides for the representatives of theoretical knowledge. Egypt is thus something that corresponds to what most Greek states did not have, state patronage of science, which was only partially compensated by the sponsorship of monarchs, such as Aristotle himself enjoyed in Atarneus and later at the Macedonian royal court.

This understanding of Egypt as having either unique or very rare conditions for giving birth to theoretical sciences accords better with the reading of the manuscripts of the family α of the *Metaphysics* οὔπερ (accepted by most of the editors, most recently by Primavesi), than does

⁴⁷ For the same reason, Aristotle's emphasising leisure in this statement should not be confused with Democritus' view, which was discussed above (contra Menn 2015, 21).

οὗ πρῶτον of the family β (preferred by Ross).⁴⁸ On the reading of the version α, Egypt is the place where a special kind of leisure exists.⁴⁹ Leisure in this case is not freedom from material cares that the higher class enjoys at a certain level of economic and social development, but a unique institution that releases some part of society not only from the material cares, but also from political duties, and that obliges them instead to cultivate the sciences. This provision did not exist in Greece, of course, or in most other countries, either. According to the β, Aristotle points out that mathematics were discovered in the land where leisure *first* appeared; this does not rule out the later appearance of this kind of leisure also in other countries; here, the point is only Egypt's chronological priority, which is the reason why mathematics were discovered here, although they might be discovered later in some other places.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Both Ross and Jaeger used only the *Parisinus* 1853 (E) and the *Laurentianus* 87. 12 (A^b) as representatives of two families of manuscripts, α and β respectively, for this part of the text (the other independent member of α, the *Vindobonensis* J, begins only in 994 a 6). Due to D. Harlfinger's findings, nowadays eleven independent members are known for the family α and four for β, see Primavesi 2012, 398, for the stemma. Two families correspond to two different ancient versions of the text. Contrary to Jaeger, who treated them as Aristotle's own two redactions of his lecture courses, Primavesi proved that they are of a late origin, that Alexander did not know two alternative versions and that version β is influenced by Alexander. Primavesi left the question open whether version α antedates or postdates Alexander (p. 458), but, most recently, Kotwick 2016, esp. 4 f., 280, argued that Alexander's commentary influenced the version that was the ancestor of α and β and dated this ancestor version between 250 and 400 AD.

⁴⁹ Two other πρῶτον (981 b 22 and 23) are compatible with both kinds of understanding: they go with εὐρέθησαν and συνέστησαν and point to the 'first', viz. original invention (the 'first' in such expressions is often pleonastic in Greek), it need not imply that mathematics were discovered later in other countries, as well.

⁵⁰ It is difficult to say whether the different readings in this case are the result of a scribe's mistake or of a purposeful revision of the text. But whatever was the reason for this divergence, it corresponds to Aristotle's commentators' divergent understanding of his thought. Ross, who in this case preferred the reading of β, noted in his apparatus, says that the reading of α corresponds to the paraphrase of this passage in the commentary of Asclepius of Thralles. In fact, Asclepius not only omits πρῶτον in the paraphrase (his testimony can be added to the apparatus of Primavesi), he also treats leisure as the specific privilege granted to the Egyptian priests – they were equipped with all things necessary for life and could devote themselves solely to scientific work (*in Met.* p. 12. 20–29 Hayduck): λέγει δὲ τὰ μαθήματα, γεωμετρίαν, ἀριθμητικὴν, μουσικὴν, ἀστρονομίαν. ἐζήτησαν γὰρ διὰ τί ποτὲ μὲν γίνονται μεγάλαί αἱ ἡμέραι, ποτὲ δὲ μικραί, καὶ διὰ τί ποτὲ μὲν θέρος, ποτὲ δὲ χειμῶν, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. καὶ μάλιστα τὰ τοιαῦτα κατωρθώθησαν ἐν τοῖς τόποις, ἐν οἷς ἐσχόλαζον τούτοις οἱ ἄνθρωποι. λέγει δὲ τὴν Αἴγυπτον· ἐκεῖσε γὰρ πρῶτον συνέστησαν αἱ μαθηματικαὶ ἐπιστήμαι, ἐπειδὴ οἱ ἱερεῖς τὰ ἀναγκαῖα εἶχον

It thus appears that this reading of the version α should be preferred not only as better testified by manuscript tradition,⁵¹ but also as closer to what Aristotle actually had in view. In this version, Aristotle of course points to general conditions for the origin of theoretical sciences (the growing repute of less utilitarian knowledge and the attaining of limits in the development of fine arts). But although he regards the leisure granted to Egyptian priests to pursue theoretical knowledge as the result of this progress, the no less important condition for the appearance of leisure is the Egyptian caste system itself, and this is a rare institution, of course.⁵² Aristotle admits that civilisations, such as the Egyptian or the Greek ones, develop separately, each from a primitive state, according to the same pattern but having started at different times (and moving forward, presumably, at different paces). Nevertheless, the development of science in a way oversteps the borders between countries.⁵³ Although Aristotle assumes that the progress of mathematics in Greece implies a certain level of development of this civilisation, it was not invented here but was imported from Egypt, since Egypt admittedly had unique conditions

ἄλλοθεν αὐτοῖς παρεχόμενα καὶ ἐσχόλαζον μόνοις τοῖς μαθήμασιν· διὸ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἱερογλυφικοῖς γράμμασι ταῦτα εἶχον γεγραμμένα. By contrast, Alexander of Aphrodisias, whose commentary Asclepius used along with the lost commentary of his teacher Ammonius, the main source of his learning, treats the beginning of theoretical knowledge due to leisure rather as a certain stage in the development of humankind as a whole (ἅμα δὲ διὰ τούτων δείκνυσιν τὴν ἐπὶ τὴν σοφίαν καὶ τὴν τελειοτάτην γνῶσιν ὁδόν, καὶ πῶς παρήλθεν εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἡ σοφία καὶ ἡ τῶν τιμιωτάτων ζήτησις τε καὶ θεωρία, ὅτι μετὰ τὴν τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ χρειωδῶν εὑρεσιν περιττότερόν τι καὶ ἐλεύθερον ἥδη νοεῖν σχολάζοντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, p. 6. 19–22 Hayduck) and does not mention the privileged position of Egyptian priests; in fact, according to Alexander, Aristotle mentioned them only to show the advance from experience to science (ὅτι δὲ καὶ αἱ μαθηματικαὶ ἐπιστήμαι ἐξ ἐμπειρίας ἤρξαντο, ἐνεδείξατο διὰ τῶν ἱερέων τῶν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ, οἱ τῷ σχολάζειν διὰ τῶν τηρήσεων τῶν κατ' οὐρανὸν γιγνομένων ἐμπειρίαν πρῶτον ἔσχον, εἶτα τέχνην συνεστήσαντο). It is not certain whether this difference can be explained by the text Alexander used (he does not paraphrase) or by the fact that he confuses the invention of arts pertinent to διαγωγή with theoretical sciences (see above, n. 34).

⁵¹ Latin translation favours reading οὐπερ (see the apparatus of Primavesi), and in general the version α is more reliable.

⁵² The plural ἐν τοῦτοις τοῖς τόποις 981 b 22 f. may imply that a similar institution and, accordingly, an independent invention of mathematics might have appeared also in some other place apart from Egypt, but later; Babylon might be such a place, since Aristotle mentions how long the Babylonians have engaged in astronomic observations (*DC* 292 a 7 f.), and it had also a caste of priests, according to the standard view in antiquity. It is not clear, however, whether Aristotle considers Babylonian astronomy as having attained the level of science or having remained purely empirical.

⁵³ Aristotle often operates with the notion of civilisations as existing separately in different lands, but, of course, he admits that civilisations borrow from one another.

for the emergence of this science (apart from its caste system, he may imply also the longevity of Egyptian civilisation and accordingly of its development of crafts and arts).

Two pieces of reasoning by Aristotle's older contemporaries, certainly well known to him, give indirect support for the view that Egyptian conditions for the emergence of theoretical sciences are not common, but unique. Since these pieces were already compared with Aristotle's statement in the *Metaphysics*,⁵⁴ I will concentrate only on some significant details that have not been duly appreciated.

The first relevant piece is Isocrates' epideictic speech *Busiris*. According to Isocrates, Busiris, the beneficial king and legislator of Egypt, divided Egyptian society into three classes – warriors, those who are occupied with τέχναι, and priests (ch. 15). For the sake of cultivating wisdom, he granted to priests incomes from sacrifices, released them from military and other service to the state and gave the laws that regulated their moderate way of life. He also prescribed to the younger priests the study of astronomy, arithmetic and geometry⁵⁵ and to the older ones the most important political tasks, including legislation (ch. 21–23). Due to these privileges, the priests invented the art of medicine and (it is implied) made great advances also in mathematical disciplines and in political art; they also created religious faiths and practices that were of the outmost benefit for human society (the topic on which Isocrates dwells in detail, ch. 24–27), like oaths, purifications and the worship of animals. Pythagoras, who was a pupil of Egyptian priests, introduced both the sciences and the religious rites of the Egyptians to Greece.

The seriousness of this description, as well as the relation of the political and educational system of Plato's *Republic* and his *Timaeus–Critias* to that of the *Busiris* were much disputed.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, it is

⁵⁴ See Eucken 1983, 186 n. 62; Livingstone 2001, 145; Zhmud 2006, 226 n. 61; Cambiano 2012, 36.

⁵⁵ Isocrates cites the divergent opinions about mathematical knowledge – either that it is practically useful or that it contributes to virtue – but he is noncommittal as to which is correct (ch. 23).

⁵⁶ The most important discussion is that of Eucken (1983, 172–212), who argues that *Busiris*, which he dates to the 370s rather than to the traditional earlier date, is polemics containing the ideas of the *Republic* before the publication of the latter dialogue (Plato's ideal state is anticipated by Egyptian institutions), and that *Timaeus'* description of the Egyptian and Athenian states is Plato's response to Isocrates (the primeval Athenian institutions, which are in many respects similar to the Kallipolis, are prior to the Egyptian and were the object of imitation by the latter). In fact, there are many points of similarity or possible allusion, and on general grounds it is more credible that Isocrates alludes to the *Republic* or to its ideas before its publication

certain that Isocrates attempts to make his desperate case of defence of Busiris more convincing than that of Polycrates (ch. 4–6, cf. 33), and he makes clear that his presentation of Egyptian political and educational system appeals to the current views, even if its ascription to Busiris is his new and disputable point (ch. 32). Relevant from the point of view of Isocrates' contemporaries in the present context, however, are only the theoretical implications of this reasoning, not their reliability: first, the privilege of the priests is not only freedom from care for material needs, but also from the greater part of civic duties; and second, this privilege is regarded as something that is peculiar to Egypt; for this reason it serves, at least implicitly, as an explanation why sciences did not emerge in Greece, but in Egypt (the superiority of Egyptian institutions is stressed, even in the case of the caste system in Sparta, which was imported from Egypt but is far inferior to its prototype). At the same time, another passage in the *Busiris* (ch. 28) implies that, after theoretical sciences emerged, the Greeks not only borrowed them, but also developed them further. Isocrates, by no means a proponent of the intrinsic value of scientific knowledge, pleads openly for the utility of the scholarly preoccupations of priests: they are either useful for physical health (medicine) or for applications in practical fields (mathematics) or at least, not being useful directly, for contributing to the mental and moral development of those who learn them. Nothing like their value as the disinterested pursuit of truth is assumed.

As already mentioned, Plato never points clearly to the general causes of the emergence of theoretical knowledge. There is, however, one passage in Plato's dialogues that is relevant for Aristotle's explanation, although the notion of leisure does not appear here. In the story of Atlantis in the *Timaeus* and the *Critias*, the storyteller, Critias, claims that all aspects of the political system of the primeval Athenian state, which existed 9000 years ago and then perished in the cataclysm, resembled the political system of the Egypt of his day. The Athenian goddess Athena created both

than that Plato rearranged the picture of the Egyptian state in the *Busiris* for his own purposes. Livingstone (2001, 54 f.), who does not dispute the priority of the *Republic*, tends to stress the parodying features of the *Busiris*, but this seems to contradict the purpose of the speech, a refutation of Polycrates. It should be noted, however, that in one point Isocrates differs considerably from Plato: Isocrates' Egyptian state is ruled by the king, not by the philosophers who previously went through the whole scale of administrative activities, including military ones, as described in Plato's *Kallipolis*; on the contrary, the younger priests are engaged only in scientific and religious matters. The scope of administrative duties of the older priests is unclear, except for legislation, and although Isocrates mentions that the most important state affairs are commissioned to them (23 init.), they are, of course, the senior counsellors of the king, not sovereign rulers.

systems, but 1000 years earlier in Athens than in Egypt. The foundation of both states was the caste system, more precisely, the establishment of the separate hereditary classes of soldiers, priests, shepherds, farmers, craftsmen and hunters (*Tim.* 24 a–b). This system is close to the project of the ideal state in Plato's *Republic*, although not completely identical to it.⁵⁷ According to the storyteller, the law in Egypt led to the appearance of the whole system of sciences, from the divine science of the universe, as the divine knowledge, to the human sciences founded on this science of cosmos, like medicine and mantic; this system of sciences that exists in the contemporary Egypt emerged even earlier in primeval Athens (24 b 7 – c 3).⁵⁸ The causes of these extraordinary achievements of both nations are, first, the perfection of the political system established by Athena, and, second (at least in the case of Athens), the wonderful climate, which should produce the most intelligent people (*Tim.* 24 b–d; *Critias* 109 c).

The philosophical message of this fictional story (which Plato hardly wants to be apprehended as fictional, in my view), seem to be as follows: the high level of knowledge of Egypt and Athens is something unique.

⁵⁷ The summary of the system of the *Republic* is given in the beginning of the *Timaeus* in reference to Socrates' reasoning on the previous day; on the class division, see 17 c – 18 d. Pace Naddaf 1994, 196, I do not think that the differences between the systems of primeval Athens and Egypt, on the one hand, and the state of the *Republic*, on the other, should be explained by changes in Plato's ideal system. It is indisputable that the importance of cosmic theory and cosmic theology grew considerably in the later dialogues (although astronomy was important already in the *Republic*), but Plato never abandoned the theory of Forms, and dialectic plays an important role in the philosophical curriculum of the *Laws*. The absence of study of the Forms in the ancient states of the *Timaeus*–*Critias* suggests rather that Plato gives a hint that the theory of Forms is his own achievement and had no counterpart in the past. The educational system of Athens and Egypt, founded on astronomic theology, would thus be only an approximation to Plato's ideal, which remains essentially the same as in the *Republic*.

⁵⁸ 24 b 7 – c 2: τὸ δ' αὖ περὶ τῆς φρονήσεως, ὅρας που τὸν νόμον τῇδε ὅσιν ἐπιμέλειαν ἐποίησατο εὐθὺς κατ' ἀρχὰς περὶ τε τὸν κόσμον, ἅπαντα μέχρι μαντικῆς καὶ ἱατρικῆς πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἐκ τούτων θεῶν ὄντων εἰς τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀνευρών, ὅσα τε ἄλλα τούτοις ἔπεται μαθήματα πάντα κτησάμενος. On this difficult sentence, see (after Stallbaum) Taylor 1928, 54 ad loc., who rightly stresses that Plato has in view both the Egyptian state's total regulation of all sciences and that he bases all of them on cosmology (which is theology at the same time). The remarkable feature of Egyptian and, correspondingly, primeval Athenian achievements is thus not only the universality of the knowledge, but also the subordination of all kinds of knowledge to the science of the universe. This cosmological and theological orientation of the whole system of knowledge entirely corresponds to the ideal of the late Plato, see the *Tim.* 90 c–d on the necessity for the individual to assimilate the motions of the soul to the cosmic motions and ultimately to the god, by learning cosmology (on this passage, see the valuable comment of Sedley 2000, 798–801).

The causes of these achievements are a peculiar political system, namely, the caste division of the society, which provides due specialization of each class in its specific functions, including specialization in sciences, and the best system of education and special natural gifts in both peoples.⁵⁹ The story possibly also gives a hint in the form of the prophecy that the Greeks might attain results comparable to their ancestors and to the Egyptians, provided that the right political system would be established along with the state system of education and care for scientists. Note also that although Plato overestimates the scientific achievements of the Egyptians and is certainly beyond the mark when ascribing to Egypt an all-embracing system of sciences, he does not attribute any purely theoretical character to them.

As is well known, Plato was not satisfied with the pace of scientific progress in contemporary Greece (nor with the lack of unity of sciences in Greece or with their subordination to the supreme science, such as he finds in Egypt). In the *Republic* (7. 528 b 8 – c 4), he points out that the problems of stereometry, first of all the Delian problem of doubling of cube, were not solved for two reasons: first, because the geometers have no state encouragement and, second, because they lack a state-appointed ἐπιστάτης, or superintendent of their studies.⁶⁰ According to Plato, it is next to certain that the state patronage of science that must provide further progress can be realized only in his ideal state.

This shows us the gradual growth of the idea, still unknown to Herodotus, that the sciences in Egypt are the monopoly of the caste of priests and owe their flourishing to this institution. Both Isocrates and Plato stress the advantages of the position of scientists in Egypt in contrast to that in Greece, rather than implying a similarity between the two countries. Nor do they have in view the freedom from material care of a certain class of people (this is not specifically an Egyptian feature), but the division of functions among the hereditary classes, which did not exist in other countries (both stress that the class of scientists is released from military duty). It is thus plausible that Aristotle, who unlike Isocrates and Plato tries to give a *general* explanation of the origin of sciences and attempts to draw the course of development that leads to their emergence, also

⁵⁹ It is not said directly that the sciences are the privileged field of the priests, and one may wonder whether the other higher class, the soldiers, are engaged in them.

⁶⁰ Adam 1902, II, 123: it is “perhaps the earliest demand in literature for the State-encouragement – we might almost say – the State endowment – of pure science”. Adam compares Plato’s reproach to the Greeks for their ignorance of stereometry in *Leg.* 7. 819 d ff. The situation in Greece is contrasted in the latter passage to the proper state system of mathematical education in Egypt (819 c).

regarded the priests' freedom from daily duties as his predecessors did – not as an example of the leisure the ruling class enjoys at a certain level of economic development and in the presence of slavery, as in Greece, but as a specific and rare or even unique institution. Another, indirect support for this reading is provided by Aristotle's design for the best state in the *Politics*. The Egyptian caste system is explicitly adduced here as the precedent for his own project, whose advantages are proved by experience (7. 10): the caste system, being a comparatively rare institution, was happily invented and purposefully introduced to Egypt by Sesostris and independently also in other places, Crete and Italy.⁶¹ It is thus a recurrent phenomenon, and this proves both its usefulness and practicability, in contrast to theoretical proposals, such as the community of children and property proposed by Plato (7. 10. 1329 a 40 – b 35).⁶²

In spite of the relevance of Isocrates' and Plato's ideas for Aristotle's view of the origin of theoretical sciences, we should not underestimate the originality of his thought. Neither Isocrates nor Plato lay down specific requirements for the development of theoretical knowledge, as opposed to practical knowledge (both regard medicine and mathematics as the occupations of priests). Moreover, released from concern for their daily needs, the priests are burdened by political duties, at least according

⁶¹ According to Herodotus and Isocrates, who followed him, the Spartan division of classes stems from the Egyptian one. By contrast, Aristotle, in spite of misleading ἐντεῦθεν, is thinking of the independent origin of this institution in Italy and Crete (see Schütrumpf 2005, 398 on 1329 b 22, cf. 399 on 1329 b 25).

⁶² Aristotle finds the separation of warriors from farmers not only in Crete and Egypt, but also in Sparta (*Pol.* 2. 5. 1264 a 10–11) and Thessaly. He considers the separation's arrangement in Sparta, Crete and Thessaly (the farmers cultivate the land of the members of the ruling class) better than Plato's proposal (in which the farmers cultivate their own land and pay a quota of their production to the guardians), because the latter system should make them less obedient (1264 a 32–36). But in general all three states failed to find a secure system of keeping the class of farmers, slaves or serfs in obedience (2. 9. 1269 a 34 – b 12); the Cretan system owes its relative tranquillity not to provisions of the legislator, but to felicitous coincidence: all Cretan states have serfs and thus have no reason to support subaltern rebellions in neighbouring states (1269 a 39 – b 5, 1272 a 18–19). Aristotle does not approve the Cretan system of holding the serfs on almost equal footing with citizens (1264 a 20–22), at least as a generally applicable measure, see 1269 b 9–10. But in *Pol.* 7. 10 Aristotle mentions only Egypt and Crete as examples of the caste system, not Sparta and Thessaly, apparently because he regards the first two as more ancient (the Spartan system is borrowed from Crete, 2. 10. 1271 a 22–24; on the Cretan πολιτεία as the most ancient Greek polis, see Arist. fr. 611. 14 Rose), and thus as justified in claiming independent origin. Lack of criticism of the Egyptian caste system in the *Politics* appears to imply that it corresponds more than the other caste system to Aristotle's criteria of security; the Cretan caste system, not commendable as such, is approved only as corresponding to the conditions in Crete.

to Isocrates. The problem of the historical origin of the pursuit of truth that has no utility, material or moral, is typically Aristotelian, and he accordingly adduces explanations.

Also, there is no reason to ascribe to Aristotle an ample overestimation of Egyptian scientific achievements as is typical of his predecessors, especially Plato. Nothing like an all-embracing set of sciences with astonishing achievements in all of them appears to correspond to Aristotle's view: only once does he refer to Egyptian medicine, in a context that implies only its rigidity (see above, n. 43), and as for theoretical sciences, he mentions only Egyptian mathematics; it is not clear whether he thought Egyptian astronomy could advance beyond the purely observational stage of experience (cf. n. 69). When he refers to the progress of theoretical science from the most trivial to the advanced problems, he cites as examples of the latter those that occupied the Pre-Socratics – unusual astronomic phenomena, like eclipses, and the origin of the universe (*Met.* A 2. 982 b 11–17). It is quite possible that the point of the *Met.* A 1–2 is only the first step in the creation of explanatory science and only in mathematics that occurred in Egypt, not the appearance of developed science, much less sciences as existing in Greece. This first step in all crafts and sciences, however, as Aristotle notes, is extraordinary difficult,⁶³ and it is not surprising that he looks for its unique prerequisites, ones that are not necessary for its further advance.⁶⁴ The modicum of reality in his imagining Egypt as a paradise for sciences is the state system of medical care, which has no analogy in Greece, and the state-supported astronomers and geometers – this could give an idea that the state encouraged not only useful knowledge, but also the pursuit of non-utilitarian knowledge.⁶⁵

Some scholars supposed that Aristotle's explanation tacitly rejects Herodotus' classic account of the origin of Egyptian geometry in the practical tasks of measuring land.⁶⁶ I see no reason to believe that Aristotle

⁶³ See *SE* 34. 183 b 16–34 on the difficulties and smallness of beginning in comparison with the ease of further progress (on the importance of this idea for Aristotle, cf. Mansfeld 1985, 128 f.). The starting point Aristotle has in view here is the invention of τέχνη as opposed to previously existing experience in this field (see below 183 b 36 – 184 b 8 on the lack of τέχνη of argumentation that could be taught before his *Topics*; see Mansfeld 2016, 117 on the problems related to this claim).

⁶⁴ It is quite possible that, contrary to the unanimous view, Aristotle's designation of mathematics in Egypt as τέχνη is meaningful and implies that, although the decisive step to theoretical sciences was made here, on the whole Egyptian mathematics still preserved its practical orientation (I hope to return to this question).

⁶⁵ Von Staden 1989, 23 f.

⁶⁶ See most recently Cambiano 2012, 36. Wehrli 1969, 114 f. opposes Aristotle's explanation (theoretical mathematics emerged due to the leisure of priests) of the

deviated from Herodotus' view, which became traditional.⁶⁷ Aristotle previously stated that theoretical sciences, as well as productive crafts, arise from experience (981 a 1–3). This corresponds to his otherwise well-attested view that the crucial point for finding the principles of any science, productive or theoretical, is the accumulation of experience in the related field (*APr.* 1. 30. 46 a 3–10): ἐμπειρία, specific for every τέχνη and for every ἐπιστήμη, provides the premises for proofs in both mathematics and astronomy (46 a 17–24).⁶⁸ It is beyond doubt that the systematic accumulation of observed facts, which amounts to experience, takes place in practice: this is suggested by the previous reasoning on the empirical origins of medical craft (981 a 7–9); and Aristotle's example of the

practical origin of Egyptian mathematics in Eudemus and Herodotus. According to Wehrli, Eudemus did not follow Aristotle, but Democritus' idea that need gives the first impulse to the development of culture. Meier 2002, 249 doubted Eudemian provenience of this passage in Proclus, in part precisely because Eudemus diverged from Aristotle on this point. I also doubt this, in spite of Zhmud's vigorous defence of Eudemus' authorship of this passage (Zhmud 2002), but because of the typically Neo-Platonist and Proclus' ideas of the passage, not because of its alleged contradiction of Aristotle's view.

⁶⁷ This was rightly noticed by Zhmud 2006, 211, against Wehrli and Meier (see the previous note). The evidence he cites to endorse his statement (*Met.* 981 a 12 f.; 981 b 10 f.; *EN* 1139 a 17 f.) is, however, irrelevant to the problem. In two passages from the *Met.* A 1, Aristotle admits that there are perceptual and empirical origins of crafts, but not of mathematics or theoretical sciences in general; the *EN* passage is hardly relevant at all.

⁶⁸ It is sometimes stated that Aristotle thought that the principles of mathematics are non-empirical and are not attained by induction, see Kullmann 1974, 221 with n. 1 (but see *ibid.* 241 on the possibility that mathematics, ideally, also needs induction to find its principles); Fiedler 1978, 170. But *EN* 6. 9. 1142 a 11 ff., on which this view is based (the ἀρχαί of mathematics do not come from experience, but from abstraction), is related to learning already discovered principles, not to their discovery or justification; the underlying idea seems to be that the principles of mathematics can be learned in abstraction from the facts, whereas in ethics and physics it would be a purely formal knowledge; *EN* 7. 9. 1151 a 16 ff., adduced by Kullmann in this context, says that the principle of moral action is not the subject of reasoning, but is present beforehand in a moral agent because of his virtue or vice, just as in mathematics the starting point is not proven, but taken as a *hypothesis* (hypothesis here is a general principle of mathematics, rather than a hypothetical assumption, see Heath 1949, 278 f.). Yet the point of comparison is that deductive reasoning should have a starting point that is not demonstrated by this reasoning, not that it cannot be demonstrated at all. Thus although there is no evidence for Aristotle's view of the origin of the first principles of mathematics, I see no reason to admit that mathematics is an exception from his teaching that the principles of all sciences have empirical origins and can be justified only inductively, by reference to all pertinent instances of experience (*APr.* 1. 30. 46 a 3–10; *APo.* 2. 19. 100 a 3 – b 5).

transformation of experience into theoretical science is astronomy, the discipline whose empirical stage has distinctively practical purposes (*APr.* 1. 30. 46 a 19–21). Accordingly, Aristotle had no reason to deny Herodotus' established view that the practical needs of land surveying were the primary impulse for the development of Egyptian geometry (presumably, nor had he reason to deny that Egyptian arithmetic and astronomy had equally empirical and practical origins).⁶⁹ Aristotle's point in the *Met.* A 1–2 is not to reject, but to correct the current view, which simply explains the origin of mathematical knowledge by practical need; he stresses what escaped the notice of his forerunners: the emergence of mathematics beyond experience means the beginning of a new branch of knowledge, a theoretical one, and this cannot be understood as a response to need and as a product of experience only. For this reason, he concentrates on explanations differing from those of Herodotus – the disinterested search for explanations, the growing encouragement of non-utilitarian achievements, the attainment of the limit to development of earlier knowledge and the state's provision of leisure to the Egyptian priests, which enabled mathematical knowledge to advance from the empirical stage to the level of science.⁷⁰ This of course does not mean that the experience that was sufficient to make this step was acquired due to this leisure; its source was practical preoccupations.⁷¹ The false premise of this reasoning, the existence of theoretical mathematics in Egypt, does not diminish its interest for the history of ideas.

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⁶⁹ The longevity of astronomic observation in Egypt and in Babylon is all that Aristotle mentions of Oriental achievements in this field (*DC* II. 12. 292 a 7–9); this, however, does not necessarily mean that he thought astronomy in these countries stopped at the purely empirical level.

⁷⁰ It is better to leave open the question whether Aristotle attributes the earlier empirical stage of Egyptian mathematics also to priests or to secular specialists in the measurement of land, the ἀρπεδονάπται, who might also have been known to him.

⁷¹ Already Alexander, who relied on *APr.* 1. 30. 46 a 17–22, supposed that Aristotle implies the empirical origin of mathematical sciences in Egypt (*in Met.* p. 7. 3–9): leisure allowed priests both to conduct astronomic observations and survey land and also (by discovering the universal principles) to transform accumulated experience into τέχναι of astronomy and geometry. He is certainly right about Aristotle's general view of the empirical origin of mathematics, but not about the philosopher's view of acquiring experience and his treatment of leisure in *Met.* A 1–2.

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In his classic statement in the introductory part of the *Metaphysics* (ch. 1), Aristotle asserts that theoretical knowledge emerged earliest in the countries where leisure has been attained and adds that, for that reason, the mathematical sciences appeared first in Egypt, because there the priests were allowed to have leisure. According to the scholarly view prevailing nowadays, Aristotle assigns to the appearance of leisure the crucial role in the emergence of theoretical knowledge. Scholars agree that the appearance of leisure in Greece was an important, although not the sole condition for the emergence of theoretical knowledge and for its rapid progress. They maintain at the same time that Aristotle errs when he finds in Egypt mathematics that resembled Greek mathematics both in their deductive character and in their theoretical purposes and that he errs when he assigns to priests the decisive role in the development of mathematical knowledge. On the contrary, W. Spoerri used the preceding part of Aristotle's reasoning to prove that his genuine explanation consists in the gradual development of practical kinds of knowledge: they satisfied material needs and released human forces for the pursuit of the non-utilitarian truths of theoretical sciences; according to Spoerri, the leisure of Egyptian priests is superfluous for this explanation and was probably inserted from another of Aristotle's treatises.

The author argues that both these interpretations are unjust to the text of the *Metaphysics* and to the complexity of Aristotle's explanation, which embraces both general social-psychological preconditions for the emergence of theoretical knowledge and specific favourable ones for its emergence precisely in Egypt. Aristotle notices that already the inventors of the earliest crafts, which produce vitally necessary things, were admired not only because of the utility of their inventions (this utility does not greatly surpass the experience that had already been accumulated in the same field), but because of the intrinsic value, the 'wisdom' of their achievements – the classification of recurrent phenomena that have been fixed by experience, the grasping of their causes and the new capacity to transmit knowledge to other persons who do not have their experience. At the next stage of development, the inventors of the τέχναι that were pertinent to leisure amusements (music, poetry, painting, sculpture) were esteemed as 'wiser' than the inventors of necessary things, because the society grew to value the excellence of knowledge more than its practical utility.

Aristotle explains the beginning of the pursuit of theoretical knowledge (along with the factors inherent in knowledge – the accumulation of experience due to practice in the fields of mathematics and astronomy) by the attainment of the limit

in the development of both kinds of τέχνη. Once this limit had been attained and further improvements did not evoke more admiration, the inborn human desire to find explanations now turned systematically to problems that were not related to practical utility. The society was also now prepared to ‘admire’, viz. to encourage and materially support, the intellectual search in the field of non-practical knowledge.

These generalisations are valid for the development of knowledge as a whole, but when speaking about Egypt as the land in which mathematics appeared, Aristotle also has in view the specific Egyptian institution, the caste system: it provided to the Egyptian priests freedom from military and administrative duties and released them from care for their material needs. This probably means that, due to these favourable conditions, the priests became the kind of people among whom the first theoretical scientists appeared when the society was prepared to encourage their studies. Aristotle is mistaken, of course, when he finds theoretical mathematics in Egypt, but he does *not* extrapolate to Egypt the leisure this is typical of Greece – the leisure of intellectuals as dependent on accidental family conditions, payment for teaching or the generosity of sponsors. The leisure Aristotle has in view is the unique product of Egypt’s extraordinary political system, viz. state support for scientific knowledge.

В своем классическом рассуждении во вступительной части “Метафизики” (гл. 1) Аристотель утверждает, что теоретическое знание зародилось ранее всего в тех странах, в которых появился досуг, и добавляет, что по этой причине математические науки впервые появились в Египте – там жрецам был предоставлен досуг. Современные ученые обычно полагают, что Аристотель отводит именно досугу решающую роль в зарождении теоретического знания. Они соглашались с Аристотелем в том, что появление в Греции досуга было важным, хотя и не единственным условием для развития теоретического знания. Вместе с тем, они констатируют, что Аристотель заблуждался, находя в Египте дедуктивную по методам и теоретическую по своим целям математику, которая впервые появилась лишь в Греции; он также ошибался, отводя жрецам важную роль в развитии математического знания. Напротив, В. Шперри попытался доказать, что аристотелевское объяснение возникновения теоретического знания состоит в постепенном развитии ремесел и искусств (τέχνη), обеспечивших материальные условия жизни и освободивших силы людей для поиска теоретического знания, а упоминание о досуге египетских жрецов является излишним, возможно, вставкой из другого сочинения Аристотеля.

В статье доказывается, что оба понимания упрощают аристотелевское объяснение, которое охватывает и общие социально-психологические условия возникновения теоретического знания и специфические благоприятные предпосылки для возникновения его именно в Египте. Согласно Аристотелю, уже изобретатели первых, жизненно необходимых ремесел и искусств были открывателями причинных объяснений, основанных на классификации практического опыта (например, в медицине), и потому вызывали восхищение не только благодаря пользе этих достижений, но и их “мудрости”, внутренней ценности. Изобретатели τέχνη на следующей ступени развития, служивших

для услаждения досуга (Аристотель имеет в виду музыку, литературу и изобразительные искусства), вызывали восхищение в качестве более “мудрых”, чем изобретатели необходимых τέχναι, ввиду возросшей способности общества ценить совершенство знания больше его практической пользы. Начало систематического поиска в области теоретического знания Аристотель объясняет достижением предела в развитии τέχναι двух первых видов (наряду с имманентными факторами – накопление опыта в практической сфере, достаточного для поиска научных объяснений). Благодаря этому, врожденный человеку интерес к поиску объяснений и обобщений направился на систематический поиск объяснений, не имевших практического значения; общество же, научившееся одобрять все менее утилитарные виды знания, оказалось готовым “восхищаться”, т.е. поддерживать, в том числе материально, интеллектуальные достижения в области чистого, не приносящего практической пользы знания.

Хотя эти условия определенно относятся к развитию научного знания в целом, Аристотель, говоря о Египте как стране, где впервые возникла математика, благодаря досугу, предоставленному жрецам, имеет в виду специфический политический институт, кастовую систему. Кастовый строй обеспечил египетским жрецам свободу и от военных и административных обязанностей, и от материальных забот о существовании. Вероятно, Аристотель подразумевает, что благодаря этим условиям среди египетских жрецов появились первые представители теоретического знания, а египетское общество было готово поддержать эти усилия, благодаря длительному предшествующему развитию τέχναι в Египте. Аристотель, таким образом, ошибается, находя теоретическую, то есть дедуктивную математику в Египте, но не экстраполирует на Египет досуг в той форме, которой он был типичен для Греции – досуг ученых, зависящий от наличия семейных средств, учеников, платящих за обучение, или щедрости благотворителей. Аристотель имеет в виду специфический вид досуга, который обеспечивает кастовая система, то есть государственную поддержку научного знания.

Ключевые слова

ALMAZOVA

древняя аттическая комедия, звукоподражание в музыке, Новая музыка,
Платон
musical mimicry, the New Music, Old Attic comedy, Plato

COUPRIE

Anaxagoras, flat earth, Moon, Presocratic cosmology
Анаксагор, космология досократиков, Луна, плоская Земля

DETTORI

Anyte, Nicander Colophonius, ὀρέγω, Plato
Анит, Никандр Колофонский, ὀρέγω, Платон

KAZANSKAYA

arrangement of Posidippus' collection of epigrams, epitaphs, Greek views on
aging and death, intertextuality, Mimnermus, Posidippus, Solon
взгляды древних греков на старость и смерть, интертекстуальность,
Мимнерм, организация сборника Посидиппа, Посидипп, Солон, эпитафия

LUCARINI

Alcidas, ancient biography, contest among poets, Hesiod, Homer
Алкидамант, апнтические жизнеописания, Гесиод, Гомер, поэтические
состязания

PAVLICHENKO, ZAVOYKINA

Bosporus, kyzikenos, letter on lead tablet, stater, Patraeus
Боспор, кизикин, Патрей, письмо на свинцовой пластинке, статер

VERLINSKY

Aristotle, *Metaphysics* A 1–2, origin of theoretical sciences, leisure
Аристотель, досуг, зарождение теоретического знания, *Метафизика*
А 1–2

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