HYPERBOREUS

STUDIA CLASSICA

ναυσὶ δ' οὔτε πεζὸς ἰών κεν εὕροις
ἐς Ὑπερβορέων ἀγῶνα θαυμαστὰν ὁδόν

(Pind. *Pyth*. 10. 29–30)

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CONSPECTUS

Статьи сопровождаются резюме на русском и английском языке
Summary in Russian and English

Gauthier Liberman

PETITS RIENS SOPHOCLÉENS : *ANTIGONE* V*
(V. 1095–1099, 1110–1112, 1113–1114, 1127–1130, 1140–1141 ET 1149–1150, 1165–1171, 1206–1211, 1215–1218, 1223–1225, 1226–1230, 1251–1252, 1278–1280, 1344–1346)

Κρ.	ἔγνωκα καὐτὸς καὶ ταράσσομαι φρένας·	1095
	τό τ᾽ εἰκαθεῖν γὰρ δεινόν, ἀντιστάντα δέ	
	ἄτῃ πατάξαι θυμὸν ἐν δεινῷ πάρα.	1097
Χο.	εὐβουλίαν δεῖ, παῖ Μενοικέως, λαβεῖν.	
Κρ.	τί δῆτα χρὴ δρᾶν; φράζε· πείσομαι δ᾽ ἐγώ.	

1096 εἰκαθεῖν Elmsley : εἰκάθειν codd. ‖ 1098 εὐβουλίαν Lloyd-Jones–Wilson in apparatu ; recepit Griffith : εὐβουλίας codd. | λαβεῖν **l**V : λαχεῖν Zf : Κρέον SAzo**t**, K in marg. : Κρέων R.

Voici quelques *emendanda* portant sur les « Petits riens » précédents : 1) « Petits riens sophocléens : *Antigone* II », *Hyperboreus* 28 (2022) 204 n. 3 : le livre correspondant à « Irigoin 2009 » ne figure pas dans la bibliographie, à laquelle on ajoutera « J. Irigoin, *Le poète grec au travail* (Paris 2009) » ; 2) « Petits riens sophocléens : *Antigone* III », *Hyperboreus* 29 (2023) 31 au v. 529. Pour illustrer la correction que je prône, ὅμως ὅ γ᾽ Ἅιδης τοὺς νόμους πᾶσιν ποθεῖ, j᾽aurais dû citer Marc Aurèle, 12. 36. 1, τὸ γὰρ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ἴσον ἑκάστῳ, bien expliqué par Wilamowitz, *Griechisches Lesebuch. Erläuterungen T. II. Halbband* (Berlin ²1902) 200 et *Kleine Schriften* III (Berlin 1969) 506. De même, pour illustrer le v. 704, analysé 44–45, j᾽aurais pu citer Eschyle, *Choeph.* 505–506, παῖδες γὰρ ἀνδρὶ κληδόνος σωτήριοι | θανόντι ; 3) « Petits riens sophocléens : *Antigone* IV », *Hyperboreus* 29 (2023) 173 n. 1 : ajouter, sur ἄγος, P. Ragot, « Régicide, matricide et souillure chez les Atrides selon Eschyle : considérations nouvelles sur la signification de ἄγος (*Ch.* 155) et de ἄγνισμα (*Eu.* 327–328) », *REG* 124 (2011) 1–20, même si sa version du passage des *Choéphores* ne m᾽agrée nullement, comme je le préciserai dans « Architecture et texte du thrène des *Choéphores* d᾽Eschyle » (article à paraître dans la *REA*). Relativement à la leçon fautive τῶν μεγάλων πάρεδρος ἐν ἀρχαῖς θεσμῶν (797–798) que j᾽examine *ibid.*, 174–176, je m᾽avise avec étonnement que Wilamowitz, *Aristoteles und Athen* II (Berlin 1893) 330 n. 1 la conserve en donnant un sens « personnel » à θεσμῶν, comme, selon lui, ce mot désigne les Aréopagites chez Eschyle, *Eum.* 571 (il changea d᾽avis plus tard sur ce passage) et 615.

Si Griffith a raison d'écarter (tacitement !) la conjecture ludique Ἄτης πατάξαι θυμὸν ἐν λίνῳ πάρα que Lloyd-Jones–Wilson n'ont pas craint de mettre dans leur texte, il a certainement tort de donner pour du Sophocle ἐν δεινῷ πάρα et de prétendre que ces mots peuvent signifier « this too is terrible ». Il accepte l'expédient de Jebb consistant à expliquer, si l'on peut encore appeler cela « expliquer », que Sophocle mélange deux constructions, πάρα = πάρεστιν (« often found in S. of bad circumstances ») et ἐν δεινῷ ἐστι, ce qui est censé signifier « it is a matter of terror » et être analogue à l'idiotisme bien connu ἐν καλῷ (cf. *El.* 384 νῦν γὰρ ἐν καλῷ φρονεῖν). Il est à mes yeux clair que le sens attendu est « il est terrible de céder, mais il est pire, en ne cédant pas, de fracasser dans les affres de la ruine son ardeur à résister ». La correction idiomatique de Seyffert 1865 δεινοῦ πέρα[1] rend le sens qui convient en ne laissant pas trop loin derrière elle les données de la tradition.[2] La formule de gradation restituée par Seyffert se trouve chez Démosthène 45, 73, δεινόν, ὦ γῆ καὶ θεοί, καὶ πέρα δεινοῦ et chez Maxime de Tyr, *Diss.* 27, 1, δεινόν γε, ὦ θεοί, καὶ δεινοῦ πέρα.[3] Reste la question de savoir quel mot restituer devant δεινοῦ πέρα, car Jebb a raison de critiquer ἓν δεινοῦ πέρα (Seyffert), où ἓν est censé renforcer δεινοῦ πέρα comme si l'on avait ἓν δεινότατον, « unum maxime terribile ». L'adverbe αὖ,[4] déjà conjecturé par Blaydes 1859, paraît approprié : comparer 1281, τί δ' ἔστιν αὖ κάκιον ἐκ κακῶν ἔτι; Il n'est pas anormal qu'il soit éloigné du début du vers et de la proposition : cf. 1070–1071, ἔχεις δὲ τῶν κάτωθεν ἐνθάδ' αὖ θεῶν | ἄμοιρον, ἀκτέριστον, ἀνόσιον νέκυν. Griffith dit lapidairement à propos du v. 1098 « simplest is emendation to εὐβουλίαν ».[5] C'est peut-être simple et préférable au texte transmis, où l'infinitif λαβεῖν est censé être explétif, mais la phraséologie εὐβουλίαν λαβεῖν ne paraît guère satisfaisante, au contraire de εὐβουλίας δεῖ. Le mot λαβεῖν pourrait, quoi qu'en ait Jebb, être une faute par persévérance due à λακεῖν (1094).[6] Lloyd-

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[1] Jebb attribue πέρα à Musgrave et δεινοῦ à Martin et δεινοῦ πέρα à Seyffert, qui dit améliorer δεινῶν πέρα de Nauck.

[2] Voir Liberman 2010, 212. Je discute le passage de Sophocle à l'occasion d'un examen de la correction palmaire de Wieseler πέρας ἅμα pour παρά | σᾶμα chez Pindare, *Nem.* 7, 19–20.

[3] Voir aussi, par exemple, fr. 189, 1 Radt, ὦ πᾶν σὺ τολμήσασα καὶ πέρα, γύναι.

[4] Sur δὲ… αὖ, voir Klotz 1842, 208–210 ; Bäumlein 1861, 45–46.

[5] Selon Muff 1877, 116, le v. 1098 est dit par le premier parastate, le v. 1107 par le second.

[6] Jebb objecte que le copiste du Laurentianus a écrit λαβεῖν à la place de λακεῖν (1094) sous l'influence de λαβεῖν (1098), qui se trouvait donc dans son modèle. L'objection est sans valeur : la faute par persévérance dont je parle se sera produite à un stade antérieur.

Jones–Wilson citent la conjecture de Rauchenstein τὰ νῦν, locution qui apparaît à la fin du vers dans *Phil.* 613. Une possibilité plus attrayante, car τὰ νῦν a un peu trop l'air d'un bouche-trou, est λίαν, « il n'est que trop besoin d'une décision adéquate » (cf. fr. 951, 1–2 Radt ὅστις δὲ θνητῶν θάνατον ὀρρωδεῖ λίαν, | μῶρος πέφυκε). Le mot λακεῖν a pu d'autant plus facilement amené la faute par persévérance que les vers 1096–1097 doivent, à mon avis, être transposés après le v. 1099. Il me paraît clair qu'ils développent la raison pour laquelle Créon est décidé à suivre le conseil que lui donnera le chœur et à céder aux instances de Tirésias :

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Χο.	εὐβουλίας δεῖ, παῖ Μενοικέως, λίαν.	1098
Κρ.	τί δῆτα χρὴ δρᾶν; φράζε· πείσομαι δ' ἐγώ.	1099
	τό τ' εἰκαθεῖν γὰρ δεινόν, ἀντιστάντα δέ	1096
	ἄτῃ πατάξαι θυμὸν αὖ δεινοῦ πέρα.	1097

Κρ.	ὁρμᾶσθ' ἑλόντες εἰς ἐπόψιον τόπον.	1110
	ἐγὼ δ', ἐπειδὴ δόξα τῇδ' ἐπεστράφη,	
	αὐτός τ' ἔδησα καὶ παρὼν ἐκλύσομαι.	

Créon invite toute sa suite à se précipiter vers le flanc de colline où se trouve Polynice. « Antigone's rock tomb, écrit Griffith, is in a hillside adjacent to it (773–4, 1215–18n.) ». Son émotion et la précipitation font-ils perdre à Créon la précision de son langage et dire τόπον au lieu de πάγον (411 ; πεδίον ἐπ' ἄκρον, 1197[7]) ou τόπον est-il un lapsus de copiste ? On trouve εἰς προσόψιον (v. l. ἐπόψιον) πάγον dans *Oed. Col.* 1600–1601. Les passages auxquels Griffith renvoie ne prouvent pas la position adjacente de la tombe d'Antigone par rapport à la colline où gît Polynice. C'est ce que ne prouve pas non plus le passage reproduit ci-dessus. À première vue, en effet, l'opposition entre la suite de Créon, associée à l'ἐπόψιος τόπος / πάγος où se trouve Polynice, et Créon lui-même, qui va libérer Antigone, cette opposition, dis-je, ferait, telle qu'elle est libellée, plutôt attendre l'association de Créon à une aire différente de celle indiquée par ἐπόψιος τόπος / πάγος. S'il est vrai que, comme on l'admet, ἐπόψιος τόπος / πάγος désigne l'aire où se trouvent le frère et la sœur, alors il me paraît plausible de supposer, avec Hermann,[8] la perte, entre le v. 1110 et le v. 1111, de vers où Créon disait que Polynice

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[7] Voir la note topographique de Jebb.
[8] Hermann 1830, 260–261.

se trouvait dans ledit ἐπόψιος τόπος / πάγος, qu'il accompagnerait sa suite chargée de donner sépulture à Polynice mais que c'est lui en propre qui irait délivrer Antigone, enchaînée du fait de ses ordres. Jebb rejette l'hypothèse de Hermann sans percevoir la difficulté du texte transmis si l'on admet la proximité des lieux où se trouvent Polynice et Antigone. Seyffert 1865 écarte aussi l'idée de Hermann, mais il évite l'écueil que Jebb heurte en admettant une opposition implicite entre ἐπόψιος τόπος, « conspicuus locus », et la κατῶρυξ στέγη (1100) d'Antigone. Le texte me paraît exprimer trop peu nettement une telle opposition pour que l'explication de Seyffert soit plausible.

> Κρ.   δέδοικα γὰρ μὴ τοὺς καθεστῶτας νόμους
> ἄριστον ᾖ σῴζοντα τὸν βίον τελεῖν.   1114

Impressionné par les paroles menaçantes de Tirésias, Créon se demande s'il ne vaut pas mieux vivre en observant les lois immuables qu'Antigone lui disait préférer à ses décrets à lui. Jebb et Griffith ne commentent pas καθεστῶτας, mais Lübker[9] et Seyffert 1865 sont sensibles à ce qu'a de remarquable l'emploi de ce mot : les lois « établies » sont bien celles qui dictent sa conduite à Antigone et non les siennes, qu'il qualifiait de τοὺς προκειμένους ; les premières ne relèvent pas que du « devoir être ». Le superlatif ἄριστον s'est-il substitué au comparatif ἄμεινον, qui semble offrir un sens meilleur ? La forme ἄρειον expliquerait mieux la faute, mais on la trouve non chez Sophocle et Euripide mais une fois chez Eschyle (*Sept.* 305) et dans le *Prométhée* (420). La confusion entre ἄριστον et ἄμεινον n'est pas inconnue.[10] Par ailleurs – Seyffert l'avait déjà vu ! – le sens paraît appeler δέδοικα μὴ non avec le subjonctif[11] mais avec l'indicatif, « je me demande avec crainte si… ne… pas » :

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[9] Lübker 1851, 48–49.

[10] Voir Richards 1911, 331–332. Il cite un vers de Philémon, Θανεῖν ἄριστόν ἐστιν ἢ ζῆν ἀθλίως (fr. 203 Kassel–Austin), où la leçon des mss. de Stobée est κράτιστόν ἐστιν. Faut-il supposer un processus de faute tel que ἄμεινόν < ἄριστόν < κράτιστόν ? Je ne tiens pas pour satisfaisante la correction de Blaydes citée par Austin et Kassel δὲ κρεῖττον, malgré Ménandre, *Monost.* 415 Jäkel, Κρεῖσσον τὸ μὴ ζῆν ἐστιν ἢ ζῆν ἀθλίως.

[11] Jebb et Griffith citent *Oed. rex* 747, δεινῶς ἀθυμῶ μὴ βλέπων ὁ μάντις ᾖ, mais là le subjonctif est parfaitement justifié. Griffith remarque quand même à propos de notre passage « the indicative is more common, as implicitly at 278–9 ». Dans *Phil.* 30, ὅρα καθ' ὕπνον μὴ καταυλισθεὶς κυρῇ, Seyffert 1867 voit aussi qu'il faut l'indicatif (Schaefer). Lloyd-Jones–Wilson ont tort de garder le subjonctif.

cf. *Aiax* 278–279, ξύμφημι δή σοι καὶ δέδοικα μὴ 'κ θεοῦ | πληγή τις ἥκει ;[12] *Ant.* 278–279, ἄναξ, ἐμοί τοι μή τι καὶ θεήλατον | τοὔργον τόδ' ἢ ξύννοια βουλεύει πάλαι (avec la note de Griffith) ; 1253–1254, ἀλλ' εἰσόμεσθα, μή τι καὶ κατάσχετον | κρυφῇ καλύπτει καρδίᾳ θυμουμένη.[13] Seyffert invoquait la scholie ancienne δέδοικα, φησί, μὴ οὐκ ἔστι καλὸν τὸ νομοθετεῖν καινά, ἀλλ᾽ ἄριστόν ἐστι τὸ πείθεσθαι τοῖς ἀρχαίοις νόμοις. Si Seyffert et moi-même avons raison, il faut envisager de lire non ᾗ mais ἦν (Seyffert) ou de remplacer ᾗ σῴζοντα par un terme fort plusieurs fois employé par Sophocle, ἐκσῴζοντα, tétrasyllabe qui répond d'une manière expressive au tétrasyllabe καθεστῶτας, et admettre la même « ellipse » du verbe « être » qu'au vers 278 de l'*Antigone*. La correction ἦν est plus plausible : je n'en disconviens pas. C'est l'imparfait « didactique » du grec et du latin :[14] « l'expérience a montré qu'il vaut mieux vivre en respectant les lois établies ».

<div style="text-align:center">

Χο.   σὲ δ᾽ ὑπὲρ διλόφου πέτρας
        στέροψ ὄπωπε λιγνύς, ἔνθα Κωρύκιαι
        στείχουσι Νύμφαι Βακχίδες,
        Κασταλίας τε νᾶμα…   1130

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1129 στείχουσι Νύμφαι Meineke : N. στ. codd. metro iambico pessumdato ‖ comma omissum ap. Lloyd-Jones–Wilson et Griffith restituo.

L'*Antigone* est la seule tragédie grecque connue à compter cinq « stasima », selon Séchan.[15] L'examen de la structure de la pièce par Griffith dégage cinq « epeisodia », chiffre normal,[16] mais il méconnaît le retournement opéré, après la « fausse fin heureuse » que marque le dernier

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[12] Voir Finglass 2011 *ad loc.* La tradition manuscrite est partagée entre l'indicatif, le subjonctif et l'optatif.

[13] J'adopte cette leçon de mss. récents, au témoignage de Jebb, pour θυμουμένη. Pour un rapprochement comparable des mots grammaticalement disjoints, voir 1085, ἀφῆκα θυμῷ καρδίας τοξεύματα, « j'ai décoché au cœur des flèches faites pour atteindre le cœur » (Tirésias, dans le style ramassé et hardi de la mantique).

[14] Voir Liberman 2020 à Properce 1, 13, 34. Il tend à échapper non moins aux hellénistes qu'aux latinistes.

[15] Séchan 1930, 190. L'observation de Séchan se tire aussi de l'examen des tables de Masqueray 1895. Aichele 1971, 55 et Rode 1971 attribue cinq « stasima » à d'autres tragédies aussi.

[16] Voir Aichele 1971, 80. Cairns 2016, 31 annonce six « epeisodia », mais son analyse n'en compte que cinq.

« stasimon », par l'« exodos » (1155–1353).[17] « Créon ayant décidé –
trop tard – de ne pas faire mourir la jeune fille, le chœur, persuadé que
tout danger est conjuré, se livre sur un mode très vif à une danse joyeuse
qui contraste avec la fatale nouvelle que l'on va bientôt apporter ».[18]
Dans le contexte festif et bachique[19] de l'antistrophe d'où notre passage
est extrait,[20] la platitude de στείχουσι surprend : opposer par exemple
l'évocation de l'oribasie dans ces anapestes de l'hyporchème de Pratinas,
fr. 3, 2 Snell–Kannicht, ἐμὸς ἐμὸς ὁ Βρόμιος, ἐμὲ δεῖ κελαδεῖν, ἐμὲ δεῖ
παταγεῖν ἀν' ὄρεα σύμενον μετὰ Ναϊάδων. La platitude de στείχουσι
surprend encore plus si ce cinquième « stasimon » est un hyporchème
ou du moins d'inspiration hyporchématique.[21] Selon Muff 1877, la

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[17] Voir Kremer 1971, 131–132 ; West 1990, 25.

[18] Séchan 1930, 192.

[19] « Dionysos ranges the slope of Mt Parnassos above Delphi, where in alternate
years a Panhellenic torch-festival (τριετηρίς) was held, with nocturnal celebrations
by both women and men (so 1129 Νύμφαι) » (Griffith).

[20] Sur la difficulté de l'interprétation métrique de l'ensemble du morceau au
rythme très enlevé, voir Wilamowitz 1921, 123. Je suis dubitativement la colométrie
de Willink 2010, 373–375 (comparer Gleditsch 1883, 117–119), mais j'écarte la
correction, certes légère, du vers 1115 qui permet à Willink d'interpréter 1115
= 1126 comme le vers ($\cup\cup - \cup\cup - \cup -$) qu'il appelle « T » et en lequel il voit, si
j'ose dire, un « para-télésillien » (cf. Wilamowitz 1921, 318). S'il s'agit bien de ce
vers, on en a là une forme « dragged » ($- - -$ à la place de $- \cup -$), ce qui n'est pas
pour étonner dans cette pièce (cf. 1122 ⟨ὁ⟩ ματρόπολιν Θήβαν = 1133 πολυστάφυλος
πέμπει d'après le texte et la colométrie de Willink lui-même). D'autres analyses sont
possibles (séquence dactylique avec acéphalie, séquence anapestique) ; comparer
l'hyporchème attribué à Pindare, fr. 107 a Sn.–M. (voir Liberman 2017, 165–166),
avec le texte de Wilamowitz 1922, 504, vers 2, ἐλελιζόμενος ποδὶ μιμέο (synizèse)
καμ|πύλον μέλος διώκων.

[21] Voir Muff 1877, 116–117 et, sur l'hyporchème tragique en général, Müller
1847, 518–520 (l'expression « hyporchème tragique » est de lui) ; Sommerbrodt
1876, 220–222 ; Müller 1886, 223–224 ; Smyth 1906, lxxiii–lxxv ; Garrod 1920,
133 ; De Falco 1958, 56–88 (sur l'hyporchème sophocléen) ; Dale 1969, 34–40 ;
Pickard-Cambridge 1996, 350–353 (les deux derniers sont sceptiques sur cette notion
d'hyporchème tragique). Boeckh 1884, 238–247 retire au morceau la qualité de
« stasimon » sans l'appeler « hyporchème ». Dans la célèbre scholie à *Trach.* 216 p.
99 Xenis, τὸ γὰρ μελιδάριον οὐκ ἔστι στάσιμον, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς ὀρχοῦνται
(voir Müller 1847, 472 n. 1), je suggère de lire ὑπὸ τῆς ᾠδῆς, « ad cantum » : ce
serait une périphrase de ὑπόρχημα (cf. Sommerbrodt 1876, 263 ; Graf 1889, 75 ;
Crusius 1894, 62). La définition de Latte 1913, 14, « est igitur hyporchema saltatio
chori *aliis* accinentibus », exclut la division en « chœur de danse » et « chœur de
chant » ; un témoignage de Callimaque (*In Delum* 304–306) qu'analyse Latte (68–70)
implique cette division (voir Séchan 1930, 120 et 144–145). Müller 1847, 519 n. 1
est le premier à avoir supposé que l'hyporchème de Pratinas (fr. 3 Snell–Kannicht)

danse d'un demi-chœur accompagnait le chant de l'autre demi-chœur (avec permutation des rôles d'une strophe à l'autre) et cette danse était mimétique de celle des Κωρύκιαι… Νύμφαι Βακχίδες. Wilamowitz[22] condamne fermement l'application à la tragédie du mot « hyporchème », et il est vrai que cette application pourrait résulter de l'intention d'opposer au « stasimon » considéré à tort comme impliquant l'immobilité du chœur[23] un morceau manifestement orchestique. Mais il n'est pas moins vrai que ce chœur de l'*Antigone* ne cadre guère avec l'idée qu'il est permis de se faire d'un « stasimon » : « dans les chants des *stasima* l'émotion reste presque toujours mesurée, contenue, et ce caractère se reflétait sur la danse elle-même : toute pénétrée de la maîtrise que le chœur, sorte de conscience du drame, ne cesse pas, le plus souvent, d'exercer sur les sentiments que lui inspire le spectacle de la passion et de la douleur, l'emmélie se distinguait par la noblesse et la gravité. Très sobre dans ses mouvements, c'était plutôt une suite de pas, de gestes, d'attitudes que ce que nous appellerions une danse, et elle ne comportait que des évolutions harmonieuses et symétriques sans rien de brusque ni de saccadé ».[24] Quoi qu'il en soit, je suggère qu'en στείχουσι il y a banalisation d'une leçon qui fut σκιρτῶσι :[25] rapprocher 1150–1154, σαῖς ἅμα περιπόλοις | Θυίασιν, αἵ σε μαινόμεναι πάννυχοι | χορεύουσι τὸν ταμίαν Ἴακχον ; Euripide, *Bacch.* 169, κῶλον ἄγει ταχύπουν σκιρτήμασι βάκχα ; 446, σκιρτῶσι Βρόμιον ἀνακαλούμεναι θεόν ; Oppien, *Cyn.* 4, 340–342, πίδακι δ' ἐμπέλασαν (les léopards) Βρομιώτιδι καὶ μέγα χανδόν | λάπτουσιν Διόνυσον, ἐπ' ἀλλήλῃσι δὲ πᾶσαι | σκιρτεῦσιν μὲν πρῶτα χοροιτυπέουσιν ὁμοῖαι ; *Orphica* 51, 8, σὺν Πανὶ σκιρτῶσαι ἀν' οὔρεα (Νύμφαι… Βάκχοιο τροφοί) ; Philostrate l'Ancien, *Imag.* 2, 12, 2, ἐλέγοντο δὲ καὶ αἱ Νύμφαι χορεῦσαί οἱ καὶ ἀνασκιρτῆσαι τὸν Πᾶνα.

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faisait partie d'un drame satyrique (voir O'Sullivan-Collard 2013, 242–245). Dale 1969, 39–40, pour qui l'« hyporchème dramatique » (l'expression est encore de K. O. Müller) est impensable, combat l'hypothèse.

[22] Wilamowitz 1907, 76. Le jeune Wilamowitz 1873, 20 se reprochait d'avoir nommé « bachique » l'hyporchème « apollinien » (1872, 20). Il est logique que Wilamowitz 1913, 133 refuse au fr. 3 Snell–Kannicht de Pratinas le statut d'hyporchème et le rattache au dithyrambe. La célèbre note de Wilamowitz 1914, 2 exclut tacitement l'hyporchème tragique.

[23] Voir Wilamowitz 1914, 2 n. 1. Sur l'origine du « stasimon », voir l'hypothèse de West 1990, 21.

[24] Séchan 1930, 190.

[25] Sur le mouvement orchestique visé par ce mot, voir Emmanuel 1895, 55–56. Pour semblable banalisation présumée (*uenio* substitué à *salio* ou *salto*) dans deux textes latins, voir Liberman 2020 à Properce 1, 19, 13. Aussi bien σκιρτῶσι que στείχουσι comportent une « impureté » de responsion vénielle avec le v. 1118, γένος, κλυτὰν ὃς ἀμφέπεις. Le v. 1129 offre une autre « impureté » du même type.

Χο.   καὶ νῦν, ὡς βιαίας ἔχεται   1140
        πάνδαμος πόλις ὑπὸ νόσου   1141
        ....
        παῖ Διὸς γένεθλον, προφάνηθ᾽,   1149
        ὦναξ, σαῖς ἅμα περιπόλοις   1150

1141 πάνδαμος W. Dindorf : πάνδημος codd. | ὑπὸ Musgrave : ἐπὶ codd. ‖ 1149–1150 προφάνηθ᾽ ὦναξ Bergk : προφάνηθι ναξίαις codd.

Je reproduis le texte de Griffith à ceci près que j'adopte la nécessaire correction de Musgrave au v. 1141. Griffith a raison d'écarter le changement symétrique, qu'opèrent Lloyd-Jones–Wilson, de καὶ νῦν en νῦν δ᾽ (1140) et de παῖ Διὸς en Ζηνὸς (1149). Ce changement, qui, certes, simplifie l'analyse métrique, mais en dénaturant la composition du poète,[26] ampute d'une syllabe le colon ennéasyllabique où Griffith reconnaît dubitativement une forme de dimètre choriambique.[27] Mais le colon ne rentre pas dans la typologie du dimètre choriambique.[28] L'analyse provisoire « dochmie + choriambe[29] » est préférable. Rapprocher l'ennéasyllabe que dégage la colométrie de Schroeder[30] et Dale 1981 au sein d'un autre hyporchème supposé,[31] *Aiax* 697 = 711, φάνηθ᾽, ὦ θεῶν χοροποί᾽ ἄναξ, glyconien

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[26] Le colon 1141 = 1150, par lequel débute une nouvelle période (la finale du v. 1148 est « breuis in longo »), commence, comme 1140 = 1149, par trois syllabes longues. Le couple strophe / antistrophe commence par un colon entièrement formé de syllabes longues. Je vois donc, dans les trois longues initiales, la marque de la composition métrico-rythmique du poète. La colométrie courante fait du colon initial une suite de six syllabes longues, erronément interprétée comme dimètre choriambique par Griffith. Il s'agit en réalité d'un pentasyllabe en synaphie syllabique avec un dimètre choriambique octosyllabique et non heptasyllabique : sur le caractéristique « pentamakrôn » sophocléen, voir Willink 2010, 376. Willink corrige le colon initial pour en réduire à cinq les six syllabes mais il est plus plausible d'admettre la synaphie syllabique que je viens d'évoquer.

[27] Son texte porte καὶ νῦν mais l'analyse métrique porte et implique καί νυν, qui se trouve être une correction de Boeckh 1884 effectuée « responsionis causa » et très justement critiquée par Seyffert 1865.

[28] Sur cette typologie, voir Itsumi 1982.

[29] Ainsi Dale 1981 (exactement « dragged hypodochm », parce qu'à ce colon répond l'hypodochmie παῖ Διὸς γένεθ-, mais « spondée + crétique » est une forme connue de dochmie, répertoriée par August Seidler en 1811). Le pentasyllabe initial du couple strophe / antistrophe peut justement être analysé comme un dochmie (cf. Willink 2010, 376 n. 91). Le dimètre choriambique du colon 1144 = 1151 est précédé par une « penthémimère iambique » qui n'est pas sans affinité avec le dochmie.

[30] Schroeder 1930, 63 § 94. Voir West 1982, 66 n. 80.

[31] Idée de Müller 1847, 518.

procéphale dont παῖ Διὸς γένεθλον, προφάνηθ' est pour ainsi dire une version « anaclastique ». La locution καὶ νῦν[32] doit être conservée : elle est idiomatique dans une prière où un appel à paraître en renouvelant le secours déjà porté suit l'évocation des services antérieurement rendus par la ou les divinités invoquées. Il est à plus d'un titre utile de convoquer cette partie d'une prière du chœur de l'*Œdipe roi* :[33]

πρῶτα σὲ κεκλόμενος, θύγατερ Διός, ἄμβροτ' Ἀθάνα,   160
γαιάοχόν τ' ἀδελφεάν
Ἄρτεμιν, ἃ κυκλόεντ' ἀγορᾶς θρόνον εὐκλέα θάσσει,
καὶ Φοῖβον ἑκαβόλον αἰτῶ,
τρισσοὶ ἀλεξίμοροι προφάνητέ μοι·
    εἴ ποτε καὶ προτέρας ἄτας ὑπερορνυμένας πόλῃ   165
    ἠνύσατ' ἐκτοπίαν φλόγα πήματος, ἔλθετε καὶ νῦν.

Le v. 1149 souffre à la fois d'une inégalité de responsion entre καὶ νῦν ὡς et παῖ Διὸς (mot pyrrhique) et de la superfétation παῖ Διὸς γένεθλον. Le προφάνητέ μοι du v. 164 de l'*Œdipe* suggère l'introduction du pronom enclitique μοι : Ζηνὸς μοι γένεθλον, προφάνηθ(ι). J'emprunte Ζηνὸς à Bothe. Δῖον (Seyffert 1865) est bien sûr aussi possible.[34] Comparer *Trach.* 956, τὸν Διὸς ἄλκιμον γόνον, où le mètre iambique impose Ζηνὸς (**t**) ou Δῖον (Nauck).

ΑΓ.   καὶ γὰρ ἡδοναί   1165
    ὅταν προδῶσιν ἀνδρός, οὐ τίθημ' ἐγώ
    ζῆν τοῦτον, ἀλλ' ἔμψυχον ἡγοῦμαι νεκρόν.
    πλούτει τε γὰρ κατ' οἶκον, εἰ βούλῃ, μέγα,
    καὶ ζῆ τύραννον σχῆμ' ἔχων· ἐὰν δ' ἀπῇ
    τούτων τὸ χαίρειν, τἄλλ' ἐγὼ καπνοῦ σκιᾶς   1170
    οὐκ ἂν πριαίμην ἀνδρὶ πρὸς τὴν ἡδονήν.

1165 καὶ γὰρ ἡδοναί Seyffert 1865 post Hartung (cf. sch. ad 1167 laudatum) : τὰς γὰρ ἡδονὰς codd. necnon Athenaeus 280 c,

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[32] Voir Finglass 2018, 219. La modification de καὶ νῦν par Lloyd-Jones–Wilson est, je présume, cause que notre passage n'est pas cité par Finglass. « The καὶ in the manuscrits at 1140 is a connective καὶ », objectent Lloyd-Jones–Wilson 1997, 83, mais il n'y a là qu'une pétition de principe.
[33] Texte et colométrie de Finglass 2018. Comparer Willink 2010, 412–414 et Lachmann 1819, 127 et 141.
[34] Voir Seebass 1880, 18.

547 c ‖ 1166 ἀνδρός] ἄνδρας Zᴏt : ἄνδρες Athenaeus 280 c, 547 c : ἄνδρα Eusthatius 957. 17 supra linea in libro autographo (cf. van der Valk ad loc.) | οὐ τίθημ'] οὔτι φημ' Meineke ‖ 1167 om. codd., praebent Athenaeus et Eusthatius, qui ea dicit extare apud τὰ ἀκριβῆ ἀντίγραφα : οὐ νομίζω ζῆν ἐκεῖνον τὸν ἄνδρα ὃν ἂν προδῶσιν αἱ ἡδοναί sch. L ‖ 1171 ποιοίμην (id est ποοίμην) Gleditsch (cf. πουαίμην Zf teste Dawe).

L'apparat critique, que j'emprunte, à quelques détails près, à Lloyd-Jones–Wilson, illustre le trouble de la tradition du texte de ce passage. Ce trouble est encore plus grand qu'il n'y paraît, car, ainsi que le signale très discrètement la mention de la conjecture de Gleditsch au v. 1171, un problème affecte les v. 1170–1171. « Mais si de tous ces avantages est retranchée la jouissance, le reste (c'est-à-dire, je suppose, les avantages sans la jouissance), moi pour une ombre de fumée je ne les achèterais pas à un homme, par comparaison avec le plaisir (c'est-à-dire, je suppose : 'je serais prêt à payer pour le plaisir accompagnant ces avantages ce que je ne serais pas prêt à payer pour ces avantages sans le plaisir') ». La locution οὐκ ἂν πριαίμην paraît ne pas cadrer avec καπνοῦ σκιᾶς, qui semble appeler non un verbe du sens d'« acheter »[35] mais un verbe du sens d'« estimer » : « les avantages sans la jouissance, je les tiens pour une ombre de fumée ». À la révocation en doute de πριαίμην on pourrait opposer *Aias* 477–478, οὐκ ἂν πριαίμην οὐδενὸς λόγου βροτόν | ὅστις κεναῖσιν ἐλπίσιν θερμαίνεται, si la leçon était incontestable et que Nauck (en 1865) et Madvig,[36] entre autres, ne fussent pas, comme je le crois, fondés à suggérer ποιοίμην (bacchiaque) dans l'*Ajax*. Dans l'*Antigone*, la conjecture de Gleditsch ποιοίμην rend ἀνδρὶ inconstructible et Lloyd-Jones–Wilson aurait dû, comme font Nauck[37] et Jebb, préciser

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[35] « Sehr unpassend, da man für eine καπνοῦ σκιά (d. h. für etwas wesenloses oder völlig werthloses) nichts kaufen kann », écrit Nauck dès la révision de Schneidewin 1852 publiée en 1880.

[36] Madvig 1871, 207 (« et per se ineptum est nec λόγος pretium est, quo quis ematur »). Une écrasante majorité d'éditeurs et de commentateurs gardent et, le cas échéant, défendent la leçon transmise (voir Finglass 2011, 277). Bien sûr, on se sert du passage de l'*Antigone* pour défendre celui de l'*Ajax*. Opposer à ces passages ceux que citent Finglass et Collard 2018, 121 pour illustrer l'idiotisme οὐκ ἂν πριαίμην avec « genetiuus pretii » et où le mot au génitif a une valeur d'échange très petite mais non absolument inexistante (voir l'objection de Nauck cité note précédente). Finglass mentionne Hérodote 1, 33, 9, οὔτε λόγου μιν ποιησάμενος οὐδενὸς ἀποπέμπεται, sur lequel Nauck appuyait sa conjecture.

[37] Nauck 1886, 170, par qui je connais la conjecture.

que Gleditsch lui substitue πάντα : « tout le reste, je ne le tiendrais pas pour ombre de fumée en comparaison du plaisir ». Ces deux corrections inséparables présentent aussi l'avantage de faciliter la compréhension du syntagme πρὸς τὴν ἡδονήν qui, tel que le vers 1171 est transmis, n'est pas sans faire difficulté. Je pense cependant que les deux corrections de Gleditsch sont fourvoyées et semblables à un cautère sur une jambe de bois : il me paraît plus plausible que le vers 1171 ait été forgé, d'après une version déjà altérée du v. 477 de l'*Ajax*,[38] pour rendre intelligible la séquence elliptique τἄλλ' ἐγὼ καπνοῦ σκιᾶς.[39] Tournier,[40] qui supposa l'interpolation, crut pouvoir se tirer de la difficulté de l'ellipse en changeant ἐγὼ en ἄγω, mais le grec ἄγω ne paraît pas être employé comme ποιοῦμαι pour exprimer l'appréciation avec un génitif de prix.[41] Néanmoins la question se pose bel et bien de savoir si la séquence très elliptique que complète censément l'interpolation peut être attribuée telle quelle à Sophocle. Si elle ne le peut pas, je suggère, à la place de τἄλλ' ἐγὼ, ἀξιῶ, c'est-à-dire <ταῦτα> ἀξιῶ καπνοῦ σκιᾶς, « j'attribue à ces avantages la valeur d'une ombre de fumée » (cf. Platon, *Leg.* 917 d, ὁπόσης ἂν τιμῆς ἀξιώσῃ τὸ πωλούμενον et rapprocher la locution οὐδενὸς ἄξιον, « sans aucune valeur »[42]). La sous-entente de ταῦτα tiré de τούτων ne fait pas difficulté ; ma proposition élimine τἄλλ(α), qui n'est pas bien clair. Il serait plus clair en l'absence de τούτων : « si la jouissance n'est pas là, le reste ne vaut rien ».[43] La présence de τούτων rend τἄλλ(α), qui renvoie

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[38] Pour un phénomène identique dans l'*Œdipe à Colone*, voir Liberman 2020, 31.

[39] Sur l'interpolation d'un vers due à l'incompréhension ou au refus d'une ellipse, voir Barrett 2007, 469–472.

[40] Tournier 1875, 125 n° 395. Nauck approuvait Tournier dans la révision de Schneidewin 1852 publiée en 1880.

[41] Nieberding 1875, 11 relève l'emploi sophocléen et hérodotéen de ἄγειν au sens de « achten, schätzen, halten = νομίζειν » : cf. *Ant.* 34–35, τὸ πρᾶγμ' ἄγειν | οὐχ ὡς παρ' οὐδέν. Mais il y a une différence entre ce passage et l'expression qu'admet Tournier.

[42] Voir la scholie ancienne à Aristophane, *Nub.* 252 b (Holwerda), τὰ γὰρ μηδενὸς ἄξια καπνοὺς καὶ σκιὰς καὶ νεφέλας ὠνόμαζον et Leutsch-Schneidewin 1839, 425–426 à *Appendix prouerbiorum* III, 44.

[43] Il vaut la peine de rapprocher Eschyle, *Ag.* 349–350, τὸ δ' εὖ κρατοίη μὴ διχορρόπως ἰδεῖν· | πολλῶν γὰρ ἐσθλῶν τὴν ὄνησιν εἱλόμην. On entend en général soit « je préfère la jouissance <de ce que j'ai> à <la jouissance> de nombreux avantages <que je n'ai pas> » (Fraenkel 1950), sens pertinent mais qui, même si on lit τήνδε avec Hermann, force le grec, soit « j'ai choisi la jouissance de nombreux avantages » (Denniston–Page 1957) ou, pire, « j'ai obtenu (εἱλόμην = ἡρόμην ?) la jouissance de nombreux avantages » (Medda 2017), dans les deux cas sens non pertinent (« sinnlos » Wilamowitz 1962, 439) et peu en accord avec le v. 349, car

au même objet que τούτων, obscur. Si je vois juste, quelque mélecture de ἀξιῶ[44] (en écriture capitale) aura amené non seulement, par une forme de « Binneninterpolation », la fausse correction τἄλλ' ἐγὼ mais en plus son complément pratiquement indispensable, le vers 1171, qui insère le second hémistiche du vers 1170 dans une construction superficiellement acceptable. Athénée cite déjà les vers 1170–1171 tels que nos manuscrits de Sophocle les présentent : la faute est donc ancienne, ce qui ne doit pas surprendre.

> ΑΓ.   φωνῆς δ' ἄπωθεν ὀρθίων κωκυμάτων
>   κλύει τις ἀκτέριστον ἀμφὶ παστάδα,
>   καὶ δεσπότῃ Κρέοντι σημαίνει μολών·
>   τῷ δ' ἀθλίας ἄσημα περιβαίνει βοῆς
>   ἔρποντι μᾶλλον ἆσσον, οἰμώξας δ' ἔπος   1210
>   ἵησι δυσθρήνητον.

Récit du messager. Des sons indistincts, émanant d'Hémon, parviennent à Créon qui se rapproche du lieu où se trouve son fils. L'occurrence de εἰσεβαίνομεν au v. 1205 (cf. aussi [ση]μαίνει v. 1208) et la construction inhabituelle de περιβαίνει avec le datif ont fait peser sur cette leçon le soupçon (Lloyd-Jones–Wilson préfèrent mettre εἰσεβαίνομεν en doute). Les conjectures περισαίνει (Schaefer), περιπίτνει (Hermann), περιπολεῖ

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l'infinitif final-consécutif μὴ διχορρόπως ἰδεῖν vise la distinction entre « un 'tiens' » et « deux 'tu l'auras' » (« mieux vaut un 'tiens' que deux 'tu l'auras' »). Je soupçonne qu'il faut, à la place de πολλῶν, lire ὄντων, qui se trouve dans bien des parallèles cités par Fraenkel II, 179 et par exemple Ménandre, *Kolax* fr. 1, 6–7 Kassel–Austin et Pernerstorfer, τῶν ὄντων τε νῦν | ἀγαθῶν ὄνησιν (sc. διδόναι) : « je préfère la jouissance des avantages qui sont là (à la jouissance de ceux qui ne le sont pas) ». La dernière explication de Wilamowitz (1927), « je préfère la jouissance du succès au succès lui-même », n'est pas moins saugrenue qu'abusive.

[44] Au vers 637, ἀξιώσεται (Musgrave) s'est corrompu en ἀξίως / ἄξιος (non métrique) ἔσται. En revanche, en 1247–1248, ἐς πόλιν γόους οὐκ ἀξιώσειν (Griffith d'après les manuscrits, en n'admettant rien de moins que l'ellipse de γοᾶσθαι) est impossible et ἐς πόλιν γόου οὐκ ἀξιώσειν (Lloyd-Jones–Wilson 1990, 148 d'après une conjecture de Pearson) n'est pas, à mon sens et malgré l'approbation de Housman 1972, 1094, plausible (« simply unbelievable Greek », dit Dawe 2007, 364) : ἐξανήσειν (Blaydes) est une conjecture digne de considération. Elle a entre autres le mérite de pourvoir ἐς πόλιν d'un rattachement : cf. 1094, ψεῦδος ἐς πόλιν λακεῖν ; 1082–1083, φέρων | ἀνόσιον ὀσμὴν ἑστιοῦχον ἐς πόλιν (mais il faut peut-être lire, dans ce passage soupçonné d'être interpolé par Wunder 1846, non πόλιν, possible faute par persévérance due à πόλεις v. 1080, mais πάγον).

(Wunder) n'ont, à mon sens, rien pour séduire. Les sons indistincts se rapprochent de Créon plutôt, je gage, qu'ils ne l'environnent. Je suggère donc προσβαίνει ou, si la reprise d'un composé de βαίνω doit être écartée, προσχρίμπτει, en comparant Pindare, *Pyth.* 12, 21–22, τὸν Εὐρυάλας ἐκ καρπαλιμᾶν γενύων | χριμφθέντα σὺν ἔντεσι μιμήσαιτ᾽ ἐρικλάγκταν γόον.[45] Le simple, transitif, est chez Sophocle (*El.* 721) et le composé, intransitif, n'est attesté que dans les *Orphica* (*Lith.* 53, ποτιχρίμπτοιτο), mais il n'y a pas là d'objection sérieuse.[46] Le simple χρίμπτω, intransitif (« approcher »), est chez Euripide (*Ion* 156 ; *Andr.* 530) et Sophocle a ἐγχρίμπτω intransitif.[47] On admet généralement l'adjectif substantivé ἄσημα[48] et le pléonasme μᾶλλον ᾆσσον, dont Jebb rapproche trois passages empruntés à Eschyle, Euripide et Platon respectivement.[49] Je note que ᾆσσον est employé seul v. 1215. Une scholie explique τὰ κακὰ σύμβολα τῆς βοῆς περιστοιχίζεται, ce que je trouve très frappant : on dira que κακά σύμβολα explique le seul ἄσημα, mais il me paraît possible que κακά explique ἄσημα et que σύμβολα reprenne purement et simplement le mot original. Sophocle emploie le substantif σύμβολον au sens de « signe » (*Ph.* 403–404 σύμβολον σαφὲς λύπης ; *Oed. rex.* 221) :[50] je suggère qu'il a pu écrire ici ἄσημα… βοῆς ἕρποντι σύμβολ(α).[51] Mais σύμβολα est peut-être une variation, effectuée par le scholiaste, de

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[45] Voir Schmidt 1876, 240. Stepantsov 2018 suggère de remplacer χριμφθέντα par χρεμφθέντα, de χρέμπτομαι, non attesté au passif (sur le verbe, voir Tichy 1983, 156–157).

[46] Je relève la conjecture de Dindorf 1873, 302 a (s. v. ποτιχρίμπτομαι) ὅπλων κτύπος ποτιχρίμπτεται (« appropinquat ») chez Eschyle, *Sept.* 84 (contreposer West 1990, 99–101).

[47] *El.* 898, μή πού τις ἡμῖν ἐγγὺς ἐγχρίμπτῃ βροτῶν. Kaibel 1896, 210 veut que le verbe ne soit qu'apparemment intransitif et qu'on supplée πόδα. L'usage emporte l'idée de contact (cf. Schmidt 1876, 239–240), d'attrition et parfois d'entame, ce que confirme l'étymologie (cf. Pott 1861, 778–779 ; Beekes 2010 au mot χρίμπτομαι).

[48] Voir Bruhn 1899, 32 § 23. 2. Nauck eut l'étrange idée de lui substituer la forme dorienne ἄχημα (= ἤχημα). Le passage de l'*Agamemnon* d'Eschyle (1595) qui paraît comporter ἄσημα substantivé est gâté : voir Denniston–Page 1957, 215 et West 1998 contre Fraenkel 1950 et Medda 2017, III, 420 (« ἄσημα δ᾽ αὐτῶν : 'le parti delle loro carni non riconoscibili' » ; « *all* the meats served to Thyestes were (in this sense) *indistinguishable* », protestent Denniston et Page).

[49] Voir Bruhn 1899, 101 § 179.

[50] Voir Kugler 1905, 10.

[51] Pour l'élision ἕρποντι σύμβολ᾽ ᾆσσον, comparer 63 ἔπειτα δ᾽ οὕνεκ᾽ ἀρχόμεσθ᾽ ἐκ κρεισσόνων.

σήματα. Il y a dans l'expression ἄσημα σύμβολα ou ἄσημα σήματα une phraséologie très bien attestée et tout à fait caractéristique.[52]

ΑΓ.	ἴτ' ἆσσον ὠκεῖς, καὶ παραστάντες τάφῳ	1215
	ἀθρήσατ', ἁρμὸν χώματος λιθοσπαδῆ	
	δύντες πρὸς αὐτὸ στόμιον, εἰ τὸν Αἵμονος	
	φθόγγον συνίημ', ἢ θεοῖσι κλέπτομαι.	

Créon, dont le messager retranscrit les propos, ordonne à ses serviteurs d'aller voir si c'est bien la voix d'Hémon entombé avec Antigone qu'il entend. « Standing right by the tomb, traduit Griffith, look, after you enter through the stone-torn seal(?) of the mound into the <tomb's> actual mouth, <and see> whether I <really do> hear Haimon's voice ». Selon le Colonel Mure,[53] Bruhn,[54] Bellermann 1913, Lloyd-Jones[55] et Griffith, les serviteurs doivent s'engager dans un couloir (« dromos ») qui mène à l'entrée proprement dite de la « chamber-tomb (*tholos*) ». Avant de s'engager dans le couloir, « they must first break through an outer wall » : cette explication de Lloyd-Jones–Wilson correspond à leur conjecture ἀγμὸν, « break »,[56] sens exceptionnel de ce mot qui signifie

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[52] Voir Blaydes 1859 à *Oed. rex* 1214, ἄγαμον γάμον ; Bruhn 1899, 120 § 222 ; Meyer 1923, 103–104 ; Wackernagel 1928, 291 ; Fehling 1968 ; Barrett 1974 à Euripide, *Hipp.* 1144.

[53] Mure 1839, 264–270 a identifié et fait connaître le type de monuments dont il est question et il a vu le lien du texte de Sophocle avec l'objet de son étude archéologique. Son analyse, approuvée par Welcker 1850, 369–371, laisse loin derrière elle tout ce qui a précédé mais aussi ce qui a suivi et qui l'oublie.

[54] Bruhn 1913, 35–37. Contre Bruhn, voir Wilamowitz (fils) 1917, 11–14, qui expose les difficultés du passage et nie qu'une solution satisfaisante puisse être trouvée d'après les indications insuffisamment claires du poète. Le père (Wilamowitz 1914, 91, « dessen unklare Abgaben über Antigones Grabgemach ») ne pense pas autrement. « Sophocles was not an archaeologist, remarque Barrett 2007, 329, and I think it mistaken to expect from him a consistent and accurate picture of a particular kind of Mycenaean tomb ». Mure prouve au contraire que les indications de Sophocle sont (même s'il n'était pas archéologue !) très claires ; tel est aussi l'avis de Welcker 1850, 370. « Die von Sophokles dramatisierte Geschichte selbst führt darauf, daß sie nicht erst in Athen erfunden ist. Mir ist das in Theben aufgegangen, als ich dort viele Felsenhöhle sah, wie sie Sophokles als Grab Antigone beschreibt » (Wilamowitz 1914, 92).

[55] Lloyd-Jones–Wilson 1990, 146–147.

[56] Lloyd-Jones–Wilson 1997, 84.

ailleurs « a broken off piece of something » (Griffith). West[57] lui non plus ne se satisfait pas du texte transmis mais préfère à la conjecture ἁγμὸν la correction de λιθοσπαδῆ en *λιθοσχαδῆ (cf. σχάζω), indiquant « that the stones do not fit flush ». West tient ἁρμὸν χώματος λιθοσχαδῆ pour le complément de ἀθρήσατ', « observe the stone-gaping joint » et croit que le sens global est « go and look through a chink at the entrance ». Il y a là, au moins, un contresens de construction et c'est à juste titre que ni Lloyd-Jones–Wilson ni Griffith ne se sont ralliés à cette interprétation. Ils se sont eux-mêmes, je le crains, fourvoyés, les deux premiers en supposant que les serviteurs devaient « first break through an outer wall », le troisième en imaginant que ἁρμὸν désigne « the '(stone) facing' (sc. that 'sealed up' and 'fastened' the burial mound), now 'with stones ripped-out' from it ». Selon Griffith, il s'agit du mur qui scelle l'entrée, στόμιον, « the doorway leading from the *dromos* into the burial-chamber ». Cette explication me paraît incompatible avec ἁρμὸν χώματος δύντες πρὸς αὐτὸ στόμιον, mots qui, si je ne m'abuse, impliquent que les serviteurs s'engagent dans une structure avant de parvenir à l'entrée de la chambre proprement dite.[58] L'expression « énigmatique » ἁρμὸν χώματος[59] désigne, selon Mure, « die architektonische Fronte oder Einfassung (framework) der Eingangsthüre » du « tumulus »[60] et λιθοσπαδῆ se rapporte au déplacement de la pierre « monolithe » bloquant l'entrée – en somme, « tumuli compagem depulso saxo aperiendam ». D'après l'étude serrée de Peter Corssen,[61] en partant de « Fuge zwischen zwei Quadersteinen » et en passant par « der eingefügte Stein selbst », on arrive, pour ἁρμός, au sens de « der Raum, den ein solcher Stein einnahm », d'où ce rendu : « der durch Hervorziehen und Umdrehen des Steines hervorgebrachte leere Raum ».[62] Telle semble être l'explication exacte, perdue de vue par

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[57] West 1979, 109.

[58] Ainsi Mure 1839, 265.

[59] Seyffert 1865 lit avec conviction χάσματος en alléguant 1204–1205, λιθόστρωτον κόρης | νυμφεῖον Ἅιδου κοῖλον ; la redondance χάσματος / στόμιον, qui plaît à Seyffert, me déplaît. Le caractère « énigmatique » de l'expression rappelle Pindare, *Pyth.* 6, 54, μελισσᾶν (…) τρητὸν πόνον (style « dithyrambique »). À la suite de Mure, Welcker 1850, 370 rapproche κατηρεφεῖ τύμβῳ περιπτύξαντες (885–886) de la ruche en paille, ἐν σμήνεσσι κατηρεφέεσσι (Hésiode, *Theog.* 594).

[60] Rapprocher Welcker 1850, 370, « die wohl einfugende schwer aufzuziehende steinerne Pforte ».

[61] Voir Corssen 1913, résumé chez Bruhn 1913, 37.

[62] Le sens de « fente » se trouve entre autres chez Plutarque, *Alex.* 3, 2, ἀποβαλεῖν δὲ τῶν ὄψεων αὐτὸν τὴν ἑτέραν, ἣν τῷ τῆς θύρας ἁρμῷ προσβαλών, κατώπτευσεν κτλ. « Umdrehen » est peut-être dû à la leçon transmise περιαγομένῳ

l'érudition récente. Le second élément du composé λιθοσπαδῆ exprime alors non l'idée d'« arracher »[63] mais celle de « tirer ».[64] Griffith croit qu'il s'agit de pierre(s) déplacée(s) par Hémon pour accéder auprès d'Antigone. Remarquant que Créon ne sait pas encore qu'Hémon a rejoint Antigone, Wunder 1846 suppose que ce sont ses serviteurs que le roi charge de déplacer la (les) pierre(s). En tout cas, il a bien fallu qu'Hémon entre. Robert[65] considère qu'il n'a pu avoir la force de déplacer la (les) pierre(s), admet donc une porte qui s'ouvre seulement de l'extérieur, rapporte ἁρμὸν χώματος au « dromos » et explique dubitativement λιθοσπαδῆ par « aus (herbeigeschleppten ?) Steinen gefügt ». L'interprétation de Mure, qui, entre autres, permet d'expliquer λιθοσπαδῆ d'une manière très satisfaisante, me paraît préférable.

ΑΓ.   τὸν δ' ἀμφὶ μέσσῃ περιπετῆ προσκείμενον,
          εὐνῆς ἀποιμώζοντα τῆς κάτω φθορὰν
          καὶ πατρὸς ἔργα καὶ τὸ δύστηνον λέχος.   1225

Le messager évoque la détresse d'Hémon, qui étreint la défunte Antigone. Si l'on ne veut pas envisager, comme font Lloyd-Jones–Wilson, de supprimer le vers 1225,[66] il faut du moins s'interroger sur la leçon apparemment répétitive λέχος, « marriage » selon Griffith, à qui plaît la conjecture de Bergk λάχος, laquelle introduit un mot eschyléen.[67] Pour ma

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dans un passage de Plutarque que Corssen et Bruhn allèguent, *Philopoim.* 19, 4, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κομίσαντες αὐτὸν εἰς τὸν καλούμενον Θησαυρόν, οἴκημα κατάγειον οὔτε πνεῦμα λαμβάνον οὔτε φῶς ἔξωθεν οὔτε θύρας ἔχον, ἀλλὰ μεγάλῳ λίθῳ *προσαγομένῳ* (conjecture de K. Ziegler) κατακλειόμενον, ἐνταῦθα κατέθεντο, καὶ τὸν λίθον ἐπιρράξαντες ἄνδρας ἐνόπλους κύκλῳ περιέστησαν. Voir la note érudite de Bloomfield 1831, 530–531 à *Euang. sec. Matth.* 27, 60, προσκυλίσας λίθον μέγαν τῇ θύρᾳ.

   [63] Voir νεοσπάς « récemment arraché » dans *Ant.* 1201–1202, ἐν νεοσπάσιν θαλλοῖς.

   [64] Voir *Phil.* 290, νευροσπαδὴς ἄτρακτος, « neruo adducta sagitta » (Cavallin 1875) ; ὁλοσπάδες (mieux que ὁλοσπαδεῖς) fr. 1076 Radt, apparemment « bues d'une traite », « funditus haustas », à en juger par l'explication de Photios ο 241, ὁλοσπάδες· ὅλαι καταπινόμεναι καὶ κατασπώμεναι. Σοφοκλῆς.

   [65] Robert 1915, 373–374.

   [66] Dawe 1996 l'élimine.

   [67] « Substantiuum, décide Seyffert 1865 dans sa note au v. 1303, quo ipse (Sophocles) nunquam usus est ». Si l'on admet la correction de Bergk, la faiblesse, à mon avis frappante, de πατρὸς ἔργα demeure. Dawe 1979 (cf. Dawe 2007, 364) admet λάχος (Bothe) pour λέχος au v. 1303.

part, je trouve très étrange et même suspect l'obscur τῆς κάτω φθοράν, « the ruination of <his> marriage-bed down below » (Griffith), « the ruin of his marriage (which is to be only) in the world below », explication que Jebb repousse et à laquelle il préfère la platitude « the loss of his bride who is with the dead ». Seyffert 1865 contestait cette explication ; selon lui, Hémon regrette la perte de la tranquillité dont il s'attendait à jouir en compagnie d'Antigone dans leur « séjour tombal », dérangé et ouvert par Créon. Une telle interprétation, tirée par les cheveux, a du moins le mérite d'accuser l'obscurité et le caractère insatisfaisant du texte transmis. Sophocle avait-il écrit τὴν καταφθοράν ?[68] Ce substantif se trouve chez Eschyle et Euripide.

ΑΓ.	ὁ δ' ὡς ὁρᾷ σφε, στυγνὸν οἰμώξας ἔσω	1226
	χωρεῖ πρὸς αὐτὸν κἀνακωκύσας καλεῖ·	
	« ὦ τλῆμον, οἷον ἔργον εἴργασαι· τίνα	
	νοῦν ἔσχες; ἐν τῷ συμφορᾶς διεφθάρης;	
	ἔξελθε, τέκνον, ἱκέσιός σε λίσσομαι. »	1230

Le messager décrit à Eurydice la confrontation de Créon et d'Hémon à l'endroit où Antigone, entombée vivante, s'est donné la mort. Griffith rapporte ὁ δέ à Créon, ce qui est évident, et σφε ainsi que αὐτόν à Hémon. « The primary reference, observe-t-il,[69] is clearly to his son, his overriding concern throughout and chief focus of the preceding three lines. Line 1227 αὐτόν confirms this ». Mais ces vues se heurtent à un obstacle incontournable : il est, pour parler avec modération, extrêmement peu plausible de rapporter à Hémon, qui n'a pas encore porté la main contre lui-même, les vers 1228–1229, lesquels sont parfaitement adaptés à Antigone.[70] Il faut, si je ne m'abuse, se rendre à une évidence, très importante pour apprécier le personnage de Créon tel que le façonne Sophocle : le père d'Hémon n'est pas insensible à la mort d'Antigone. C'est le vers 1230 qui est adressé à Hémon. « There is no difficulty in taking 1230 as addressed to Haemon, since the vocative, τέκνον, marks the

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[68] Conjecture anticipée par van Herwerden 1887, 66. Il n'est pas mauvais de la rappeler au souvenir des érudits.

[69] Voir aussi Lloyd-Jones–Wilson 1997, 85, palinodie corrigeant 1990, 147–148.

[70] C'est ce qu'ont déjà vu Broadhead 1968, 77–80 ainsi que Ledbetter 1991 et 1999.

shift of address » écrit Mme Ledbetter.[71] Mais, comme le chœur interpelle
Antigone (855) et Tirésias (1023) Créon au moyen du vocatif τέκνον, la
transition entre 1228–1129, adressés à Antigone, et 1230 peut paraître
insuffisamment nette et l'on pourrait croire qu'il y a lieu de supposer la
perte d'un ou deux vers. Cependant le jeu de l'acteur suppléait au manque
de clarté du changement d'adresse que peut ressentir le lecteur moderne.
Si les vues ici exposées sont, dans leur principe, justes, il suit que σφε
doit être rapporté à Antigone et Hémon et que αὐτὸν doit être changé non
en αὐτοὺς (Broadhead) ou αὐτὼ (encore Broadhead, dont Lloyd-Jones–
Wilson avaient accepté la conjecture, forme non attestée chez Sophocle[72])
mais αὐτὴν (Ledbetter[73]). Boeckh,[74] qui défend une vision équilibrée des
personnages d'Antigone, qu'il ne peint pas tout en blanc, et de Créon,
qu'il ne peint pas tout en noir, aurait profité de la réinterprétation du
passage que nous exposons et qui suggère que Sophocle ne se faisait pas
et ne voulait pas qu'on se fît une idée si absolument négative de Créon.[75]
Car c'est sans doute aussi un préjugé sur Créon qui entretient la cécité
des éditeurs sur ce passage.

        Χο.   οὐκ οἶδ'· ἐμοὶ δ' οὖν ἥ τ' ἄγαν σιγὴ βαρύ
                   δοκεῖ προσεῖναι χἠ μάτην πολλὴ βοή.   1252

Le chœur[76] considère comme de mauvais augure le silence d'Eurydice,
qui, de fait, s'ôtera la vie. Jebb explique « προσεῖναι : so oft. of attendant
circumstances (or of characteristic attributes) : *Tr.* 250 τοῦ λόγου [τῷ λόγῳ
Margoliouth, Lloyd-Jones–Wilson] δ' οὐ χρὴ φθόνον, | γύναι, προσεῖναι. –

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[71] Ledbetter 1991, 29. Il faudrait matérialiser le changement d'allocutaire par
un tiret horizontal. Le changement d'allocutaire opéré chez Eschyle, *Choeph.* 903–
904 est beaucoup plus brutal ; néanmoins les éditeurs ne le signalent pas dans le
texte grec : c'est regrettable.

[72] Hasse 1891, 5 accepte cette forme, restituée par Kaibel, dans *Phil.* 426, mais
Lloyd-Jones–Wilson préfèrent là une autre correction. Selon Griffith, « it may also
be doubted whether Haimon and Ant. qualify for the dual, which elsewhere in this
play is reserved for brothers and sisters ». Lloyd-Jones–Wilson 1997, 85 reviennent
à αὐτὸν.

[73] La conjecture, communiquée à Lloyd-Jones–Wilson 1990, 147–148, se trouve
justifiée chez Ledbetter 1991, 29.

[74] Boeckh 1884, 134–144.

[75] Voir là-contre Ullrich 1853, dont l'opuscule répond à Boeckh. Wilamowitz
1923, 343–345, se situe du côté d'Ullrich.

[76] Le coryphée, selon Muff 1877, 118.

Cp. 720 ».[77] Le grec est, si je comprends bien, censé signifier « le silence excessif non moins qu'une vaine abondance de cris me semble être présent (?)[78] comme une chose lourde (de menace) ». « But to me, at least, traduit Jebb de façon élégante mais lointaine, a strained silence seems to portend peril, no less than vain abundance of lament ». Les « parallèles » allégués par Jebb ne contribuent en rien à résoudre la difficulté de βαρύ, censé signifier « comme une chose lourde de menace ».[79] On peut opposer, pour la construction grammaticale, le v. 767, νοῦς δ' ἐστὶ τηλικοῦτος ἀλγήσας βαρύς, « l'esprit d'un être si jeune, est, sous le coup de la douleur, plein de rancœur » (le chœur cherche à excuser Hémon auprès de son père). La traduction naturelle de Jebb, « portend peril », le rendu des traducteurs en général et la question que Créon pose au chœur, τί τοῦτ' ἂν εἰκάσειας; (1244), et à laquelle celui-ci répond suggèrent la piste d'un « uerbum praenuntiandi » dont βαρύ dépendrait à titre de complément, par exemple προφαίνειν ou προφῆναι, προειπεῖν (Sophocle a εἰπεῖν, ἀντειπεῖν, ἐξειπεῖν et προσειπεῖν) ou encore προφωνεῖν, avec lequel βαρύ pourrait être un accusatif qualificatif, « donner à entendre un son avant-coureur grave, menaçant ». Nous avons signalé la correction τῷ λόγῳ, qui éclaire προσεῖναι dans *Trach.* 251, allégué par Jebb pour expliquer le vers 1252. Les vers 719–720 de l'*Antigone*, γνώμη γὰρ εἴ τις κἀπ' ἐμοῦ νεωτέρου | πρόσεστι, sont un peu difficiles. Sous κἀπ' Jebb préfère avec raison reconnaître, plutôt que ἐπί, ἀπό, qui avait déjà les faveurs de Schneider 1826. Mais l'explication de Jebb, « if I also, younger though I am, can contribute a sound opinion », baigne dans un flou artistique. La mise au point de Cavallin[80] sur le sens de προσεῖναι incite, si elle juste, à comprendre : « si quelque jugement, bien qu'il émane de ma jeunesse, se trouve en moi ». Notre passage est repris par Créon, καὶ τῆς ἄγαν γὰρ

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[77] Voir aussi Jebb 1898 à *Phil.* 129, ὡς ἂν ἀγνοία προσῇ, « may be an attendant circumstance, *i.e.*, may aid our plan ».

[78] La mise au point de Cavallin 1875, 71–72 sur le sens de προσεῖναι (« cum omnino *inesse*, *esse* in aliquo (…), tum *in* alicuius *mente inesse*, *menti obuersari*, *mentem subire* significat ») suggère, si elle est juste, que l'emploi du verbe ici ne va pas sans difficulté, indépendamment du problème que je vais soulever.

[79] L'idiotisme βαρύ = βαρύ τι est connu (cf. Bruhn 1899, 12 § 17). Comparer le type οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη (Brugmann 1925, 174–175). Nous avons déjà vu μεῖζον = μεῖζόν τι au v. 182 (note au v. 190). L'index de Jebb cite καλῶς ἔχον dans γένοιτο μέντἂν χἀτέρῳ καλῶς ἔχον (687), mais la vraie leçon est peut-être χἄτερον (Seyffert 1865 ; Brown 1991, 332–333 remplace ἔχον par φρονεῖν). Lloyd-Jones–Wilson suivent Heimreich en supprimant le vers, ce qui, je crois, est une erreur.

[80] Cavallin 1875, 71–72.

ἐστί που σιγῆς βάρος (1256), si du moins Nauck n'a pas raison d'y voir une interpolation inspirée par notre passage.

> ΕΞΑΓ.[81] ὦ δέσποθ', ὡς ἔχων τε καὶ κεκτημένος,
>   τὰ μὲν πρὸ χειρῶν τάδε φέρεις, τὰ δ' ἐν δόμοις
>   ἔοικας ἥκων καὶ τάχ' ὄψεσθαι, κακά.   1280

> 1279 φέρεις Brunck : φέρων codd. ‖ 1280 ἥκων Brunck : ἥκειν codd.
> ‖ καὶ τάχ' LVZf : καὶ τά γ' AZo : καὶ τάδ' RUY : καὶ τά τ' S.

« Seigneur, en tant que <largement> pourvu et doté de malheurs, tu portes dans les bras les uns, que voici (à savoir Hémon), tandis que, les autres malheurs, qui se trouvent dans ta demeure (il vise Eurydice, laquelle s'est aussi donnée la mort), tu sembles bien, une fois que tu seras arrivé <au palais>, devoir très vite les voir ! ». Je traduis assez près du texte pour en rendre sensible la construction intriquée.[82] Ce qui est, entre autres, remarquable, c'est le rejet en position finale absolue du complément de ἔχων τε καὶ κεκτημένος, à savoir κακά, qui en reçoit un relief extraordinaire.[83] Kovacs[84] critique ὡς et le participe au motif que le sens devrait être non « as one who… » (sens comparatif) mais « on the ground that… ». Rapprocher pourtant *El.* 804–806, ἆρ' ὑμὶν ὡς ἀλγοῦσα κὠδυνωμένη | δεινῶς δακρῦσαι κἀπικωκῦσαι δοκεῖ | τὸν υἱὸν ἡ δύστηνος ὧδ' ὀλωλότα;[85] Kovacs trouve l'explication par ὡς exclamatif (ainsi Griffith) très peu plausible, et considère qu'il manque un participe futur renvoyant aux maux à venir – mais ces maux (la mort d'Eurydice) ne sont pas à venir : ils sont advenus, il reste à Créon à les voir de ses propres yeux ! C'est donc en vain que Kovacs suppose l'omission d'un vers, par

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[81] Je n'obtempère pas aux instances de Brown 1991, 338–339, qui écarte ΕΞΑΓΓΕΛΟΣ : voir Lloyd-Jones–Wilson 1997, 85, sans oublier Müller 1847, 520–522.

[82] Boeckh 1884, 251 traduit « O Herr, der du wie der wahre Inhaber und Besitzer des Unglücks das eine vor den Händen trägst, das andere aber alsbald zu sehen kommst, wie klar ist » et rapproche Platon, *Pol. 3* 82 b, ἔχειν τε καὶ κεκτῆσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος, et *Cratyl.* 393 a, κρατεῖ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ κέκτηται καὶ ἔχει αὐτό. Voir aussi Wex 1829, 315.

[83] Sur la « Wortstellung » sophocléenne τὰ μὲν… τὰ δ'… κακά, voir Sommer 1948, 89.

[84] Kovacs 1992, 17–18.

[85] Voir Moorhouse 1982, 256 : « as expected from (in the manner of) one who is stricken with pain and grief ». Wex 1829, 314 voit dans ὡς l'équivalent de ὥσπερ.

exemple <πένθη κάτισθι χἄτερ' αὖ σχήσων, ἐπεί>, « O master, know that you have a grief and will get yet another ». Les deux corrections que Griffith accepte marquent un progrès à mon avis incontestable. Mais le pronom τάδε, qui introduit une résolution du troisième « longum », formé par un dissyllabe,[86] paraît, après τὰ μέν et devant τὰ δέ, maladroit. Jebb, qui documente l'usage « présentatif » du pronom adjectif, ne cite aucun passage illustrant τὰ μέν… τάδε… τὰ δέ dans un même vers. Eschyle, *Ag.* 427–428, τὰ μὲν κατ' οἴκους ἐφ' ἑστίας ἄχη | τάδ' ἐστὶ καὶ τῶνδ' ὑπερβατώτερα, n'est pas rigoureusement comparable. Faut-il revenir à la leçon transmise φέρων et substituer à τάδε la forme εἶ, de façon à obtenir le fameux « présent périphrastique », bien fait pour insister sur la durée et dont les occurrences sophocléennes sont dûment enregistrées chez Ellendt 1872, 209B ?[87] Soit τάδε bouche le trou laissé par la perte de εἶ soit une abréviation de cette dernière forme n'aura pas été comprise. Une autre possibilité consiste, en adoptant φέρεις, à suppléer devant φέρεις un mot auquel s'oppose καὶ τάχ(α)[88] et susceptible d'avoir disparu après χειρῶν, à savoir νῦν : ἔχω μὲν ἐν χείρεσσιν ἀρτίως τέκνον, | τάλας, τὰν δ' ἔναντα προσβλέπω νεκρόν, dit Créon un peu plus loin (1297–1298), « je viens de prendre[89] dans mes bras son fils, mort, hélas, et voilà que mes yeux la voient vis-à-vis elle, morte ».[90] Postgate a restitué le genre de l'article (τὰν) qui convenait (Griffith adopte la restitution, que Lloyd-Jones–

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[86] Müller 1866, 16 juge « minus numerosi » les trimètres qui contiennent cette « irrégularité ». Il considère πρὸ χειρ|ῶν τάδε| φέρων comme différent d'*Ant.* 55, ἀδελφ|ὼ δύο| μίαν καθ' ἡμέραν et de *Phil.* 1232, ἔλα|βον τάδε| τὰ τόξ(α), en raison d'un défaut prétendu de consolidarité du dissyllabe avec ce qui le suit. L'*Antigone* ne contient que les deux exemples cités de troisième « longum » formé par un mot dissyllabique ; il semble permis de faire valoir que la petite irrégularité du v. 55 accuse le contraste entre δύο et μίαν. Lachmann 1819, 121 considérait comme métriquement irréprochable le vers 1279 mais préférait lire, avec, dit-il, Alde Manuce, τὰ μὲν πρὸ χειρῶν, τὰ δὲ φέρων, τάδ' ἐν δόμοις, « uideris adesse ut et hoc et illud in aedibus suis uideas ». Ce n'est guère satisfaisant.

[87] Voir aussi Bruhn 1899, 61 § 108.

[88] Il n'y a aucune nécessité de remplacer ces mots par αὐτίκ' (Blaydes), qu'approuve Kovacs 1992, 16. Il est vrai que dans καὶ τάχ(α) le premier élément est en général conjonctif, mais son emploi adverbial intensif est bien connu : voir Denniston 1959, 319 (« full soon »). Je désapprouve donc le « may be right » dont Lloyd-Jones–Wilson 1990, 148, qui ajoutent « but is not necessary », honore la conjecture de Blaydes.

[89] Pour l'emploi idiomatique du présent avec ἀρτίως, voir Wilamowitz 1909, 423 ; Wackernagel 1926, 158.

[90] Comparer *Il.* 2, 192–193, οὐ γάρ πω σάφα οἶσθ' οἷος νόος Ἀτρεΐωνος· | νῦν μὲν πειρᾶται, τάχα δ' ἴψεται υἷας Ἀχαιῶν.

Wilson se contentent de mentionner) et Schneider 1826 a vu, chose qui devait échapper à Jebb, que νεκρόν est « en facteur commun ». Toutefois, il se pourrait qu'on ait en ce τάδε un exemple remarquable de l'usage idiomatique de cet adjectif : le démonstratif équivaudrait à *ecce*, *en*[91] de telle manière que le sens présentatif neutralise l'aspect répétitif de τὰ μέν… τάδε… τὰ δέ.

<div style="text-align:center">

Κρ.　　　　　　　　　　　πάντα γάρ
λέχρια τὰν χεροῖν, τὰ δ' ἐπὶ κρατί μοι　　　　　1345
πότμος δυσκόμιστος εἰσήλατο.

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Lamento de Créon, sous la forme de dochmies. « The contrast, explique Griffith, is between 'the visible circumstances and the invisible hand of fate' (Campbell), and perhaps too between 'Haimon, here in my arms' and 'Eurydike'… ; or 'things at hand' vs 'the future' ». Je ne vois pas comment le texte peut exprimer aucune de ces trois oppositions et *a fortiori* les deux premières ensemble. Il n'y a en réalité pas d'opposition : tout le présent qui suit une trajectoire descendante, tous les malheurs qui s'appesantissent sur Créon, à savoir la mort de son fils et celle de sa femme, pour ne pas parler de celle d'Antigone, c'est par eux que le destin lui fond sur la tête ; νῦν δ' ἐς τὸ κείνου κρᾶτ' ἐνήλαθ' ἡ τύχη dit Œdipe dans *Oed. rex* 263 à propos de Laïos. Or (je suis d'accord sur ce point avec Griffith) τὰ δέ emporte une opposition. Je suggère donc de lire ὁ δ' ἐπὶ κρατί μοι πότμος. L'article au nominatif masculin élimine une opposition qui n'existe pas et un accusatif ambigu, dont Griffith ne dit mot mais que l'on a pris soit au sens « relatif » (« accusatiuus respectus ») de « quant aux autres malheurs » soit comme une sorte d'accusatif de l'objet interne, car le verbe εἰσάλλομαι est intransitif. West[92] majuscule Πότμος et s'appuie, entre autres, sur notre passage et sur *Oed. Col.* 1323–1324, τοῦ κακοῦ Πότμου, pour restituer ὁ μέγας Πότμος à la place de ὁ μέγας Νεῖλος chez Eschyle, *Suppl.* 880.

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[91] Voir Buttmann 1822, 136–137 à *Phil.* 822, « velut digito monstrat atque idem valet quod latinum *ecce*, *en* ».

[92] West 1990, 163.

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This is the last of five sets of text-critical, exegetical and sometimes metrical remarks on *Antigone*. These *Sophocleuncula* are not only minute philological notes but they involve broader issues having a bearing on the interpretation and meaning of the drama as a whole. These remarks were composed with a view to drawing attention to a number of forgotten or unseen difficulties and to trying to address a number of seen but unsolved problems more efficaciously. The text and meaning of not a few other passages from other works of Sophocles or of other writers are also dealt with.

Статья представляет собой последнюю из пяти последовательных публикаций, содержащих замечания о критике текста, экзегетических и метрических сложностях в *Антигоне* Софокла. *Sophocleuncula* посвящены не только частным филологическим проблемам, но и более общим вопросам, значимым для интерпретации драмы в целом. Заметки призваны привлечь внимание к ряду забытых или упущенных из виду сложностей и предложить более действенные решения осознаваемых, но нерешенных проблем. К анализу привлекается также немало пассажей из других произведений Софокла и других авторов.

Danil Kossarev

THE CRITICISM OF MONARCHY IN ISOCRATES' *CYPRIAN ORATIONS*[*]

The three orations sent to Nicocles, the king of Salamis, by his former teacher Isocrates are traditionally regarded as one of the most significant praises of monarchy in his works. These orations include: *To Nicocles*, *Nicocles or the Cyprians*, and *Euagoras*. As was suggested by G. Mathieu and É. Bremond, these works were composed from around 370 – a probable date of the first oration in this cycle – to 365 BC, when the third and the last work *Euagoras* was finished. The reason for writing these orations was Nicocles' ascension to the throne,[1] which became possible due to the deaths of his elder brother and his father. Indeed, one may easily find passages overtly stating that monarchy exceeds all other types of constitution (Isoc. *Nicocl.* 12–13, 17, 25); a monarch, especially in Nicocles' words, is shown as a benevolent and wise leader (*ibid*. 31–42). This as well as the criticism of democracy clearly expressed in the second oration of this cycle (*ibid*. 14–25) could create a certain impression about Isocrates' views on monarchical power.

There are two main approaches to Isocrates' evaluation of monarchy in these orations. Some scholars acknowledge the praise of monarchy, while others contest this point. Probably the most radical opinion on the nature of monarchical power in the Cyprian cycle is expressed by N. Baynes,[2] who labels them "laudation of a 'totalitarian' State". This conclusion is based on the passages in which Nicocles demands from his subjects not to create any clubs without the king's permission (*Nicocl.* 55) and not to conceal anything from the king (*ibid*. 52); even an advice to teach children obedience (*ibid*. 57) is regarded as an assault on citizens'

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[1] This is expressed in the speech's hypothesis: see also Forster 1912, 21; Blass 1874, 50–51.

[2] Baynes 1974, 150–151.

rights and freedom. Out of context, these passages could seem a bit authoritarian, but when seen in context, they are perceived differently. In the case of children's obedience, it must be said that these words are followed by the explanation: before one is to rule, one must learn how to be ruled. Nicocles also explains the prohibition of clubs: these organizations are useful in their own way in democratic states, while in a monarchy they might be dangerous. It is true that this explanation leaves much to guess, but it is certainly not an instigation to someone to "practice delation against his fellow-citizens".[3] The main argument in favor of the "totalitarian" approach seems to be the passage in which Nicocles encourages the king's subjects to obey his words as laws. Nevertheless, this might not be a call to fulfill every absurd wish put into words, but rather to regard the king as the supreme authority, whose judgments are more significant and, which is much more important, better than laws whether they are written or not. Isocrates does not hide his practical view of laws: they do not reveal absolute wisdom, and they should be changed if needed.

Other scholars, who tend to have more moderate opinion, believing that these orations contain praise of monarchy, base their arguments first on Isocrates' interest in monarchy in general and his criticism of the contemporaneous Athenian democratic system, which can be traced not only in the Cyprian cycle, but also in other speeches (*Areop.*, *Pac.*), and second on the passage (*Nicocl.* 14–26) in which Isocrates via Nicocles compares the king's power with oligarchy and democracy, preferring monarchy. This could be an allusion to the famous Debate of the Persian Grandees (Hdt. 3. 80–82).[4] The comparison serves the purpose of defending the thesis formulated by Nicocles: monarchy is βελτίστη τῶν πολιτειῶν. This passage is interpreted in different ways. W. Jaeger[5] believes that Isocrates "does more than accept tyranny as a given fact in power-politics. He brings it under an ideal standard; so that he can then fairly explain that monarchy is the best form of constitution". N. Crick[6] suggests that, addressing Nicocles in the first speech, Isocrates describes an ideal ruler, so the orator prefers monarchical power to any form of democracy or oligarchy. E. Frolov thinks that in these speeches Isocrates tries to present and develop an approach to monarchy as the best form

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[3] Baynes 1974, 150.

[4] This similarity was first noticed by E. Maass; however, he concludes that here Isocrates is not referring to Herodotus, see Maass 1887, 586–588.

[5] Jaeger 1986, 87.

[6] Crick 2015, 180–186.

of government.[7] P. Cloché,[8] despite his general opinion that the orator is a man whose political preferences lie between democracy and aristocracy, calls this cycle "un éloge très net et vigoureux, parfois même enthousiaste, de la monarchie, éloge accompagné d'une critique non moins décidée et longuement motivée, elle aussi, des autres constitutions".

There is an important detail that should be also considered – all these words are put into the mouth of the king. It would be strange to hear from a king anything but praise of his own power and an attempt to make his subjects believe that a monarchical constitution is the best. It is also worth mentioning that Isocrates forces Nicocles to admit some statements that could not be regarded as parts of this eulogy. The orator states some of these admonishments himself.

Another approach tends to see in the speech not a laudation of monarchy, but general advice to the king on how he should govern his city. The most radical position is presented by T. Poulakos.[9] He believes that in these orations Isocrates portrays Nicocles not as a hereditary king, to whom all his subjects must obey by his birthright and greater power, but as a citizen of a polis, who must persuade all his citizens to take his side by using his eloquence and mind. This approach would provide a good explanation of the "hymn to *logos*" that opens the second oration (*Nicocl.* 1–9), as well as the attempt to "explain" to his subjects why monarchical power is the best one, which might seem unusual.

It seems, however, that too much attention is paid to the fact of Nicocles' addressing the subjects. Here is what he says (*Nicocl.* 11–12):[10]

> τὸν δ᾿ ἐχόμενον, ἃ δεῖ ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀρχομένους, ἐγὼ πειράσομαι διελθεῖν, οὐχ ὡς ἐκεῖνον ὑπερβαλούμενος, ἀλλ᾿ ὡς προσῆκόν μοι περὶ τούτων μάλιστα διαλεχθῆναι πρὸς ὑμᾶς. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐμοῦ μὴ δηλώσαντος ἃ βούλομαι ποιεῖν ὑμᾶς διαμάρτοιτε τῆς ἐμῆς γνώμης, οὐκ ἂν εἰκότως ὑμῖν ὀργιζοίμην· εἰ δὲ προειπόντος ἐμοῦ μηδὲν γίγνοιτο τούτων, δικαίως ἂν ἤδη τοῖς μὴ πειθομένοις μεμφοίμην. Ἡγοῦμαι δ᾿ οὕτως ἂν μάλιστα παρακαλέσαι καὶ προτρέψαι πρὸς τὸ μνημονεύειν ὑμᾶς τὰ ῥηθέντα καὶ πειθαρχεῖν αὐτοῖς, οὐκ εἰ περὶ τὸ συμβουλεύειν μόνον γενοίμην καὶ ταῦτ᾿ ἀπαριθμήσας ἀπαλλαγείην,

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[7] Isaeva 1994 [В. И. Исаева, *Античная Греция в зеркале риторики: Исократ*], 119–122; Фролов 2013 [Э. Д. Фролов (ed.), *Исократ. Речи. Письма; Малые аттические ораторы. Речи*], 834; 853.

[8] Cloché 1978, 76.

[9] Poulakos 1997, 27–41.

[10] All of Isocrates' works cited here are from the edition Mathieu–Bremond 1967.

ἀλλ' εἰ προεπιδείξαιμι πρῶτον μὲν τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν παροῦσαν ὡς
ἄξιόν ἐστιν ἀγαπᾶν οὐ μόνον διὰ τὴν ἀνάγκην, οὐδ' ὅτι πάντα τὸν
χρόνον μετὰ ταύτης οἰκοῦμεν, ἀλλ' ὅτι βελτίστη τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐστιν.

...what his (ruler's – *D. K.*) subjects must do, I shall attempt to
discourse, not with any thought of excelling him (Isocrates – *D. K.*),
but because this is the most fitting subject for me to discuss with you.
For if I did not make clear what I desire you to do, I could not
reasonably be angry with you if you were to mistake my purpose; but
if, after I have announced my policy beforehand, none of my desires
are carried out, then I should justly blame those who fail to obey me.
And I believe that I should most effectively exhort you and urge you to
remember my words and heed them, not if I should confine myself to
giving you advice and then, after counting out my precepts, make an
end, but if, before doing this, I should prove to you, first, that you ought
to be content with our present government, not only from necessity,
nor because we have lived under it all our lives, but because it is the
best of all governments.[11]

One should take into consideration the overall spirit of this phrase.
The king believes it to be important to clarify what he wants, so that in
the case of disobedience he can punish those who will not follow his
commands. "The approval due to necessity" is also an important part in
this thought. These words are expected from an absolute monarch and
not from a democratic leader. The king is kind to his subjects, but that
does not mean that he will not force them if needed. This addressing is
indeed a peculiar one, but it does not show an attempt of Isocrates to
present Nicocles as the first among equals, ruling by the right of his
outstanding citizen virtues. Both the orator and the king clearly understand
the sovereign position of the latter, and the whole dialogue is formed as
a dialogue between a ruler and his subjects.

A more moderate position seems to explain this cycle better. F. Blass[12]
believes that the goal of Isocrates is not a laudation of monarchy, it is
rather a set of rules for kings as well as subjects serving the only purpose
of the city's prosperity. Y. L. Too,[13] in his introduction to *Nicocles*,
suggests not to regard this oration as an endorsement of absolute or
monarchical ideology. K. Bringmann[14] states that it is unlikely that

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[11] Here and forthwith, G. Norlin's translation of Isocrates' works is used with
minor changes.
[12] Blass 1874, 50–51.
[13] Too 2000, 169.
[14] Bringmann 1965, 108.

Isocrates would see in a monarchical regime the best type of government. Interestingly, S. Usher[15] comments that Isocrates urges Nicocles to use contemporary Athens as an example, namely, to govern Salamis with laws, with full understanding that a tyrant is able to change those laws in his favor. It seems that he refers to the paragraph in which Isocrates tries to convince Nicocles to borrow good institutions from others (*Ad Nicocl.* 17). Οἱ ἄλλοι in that phrase indeed refers to Athens. The orator probably insists on using some good ideas in legislation, but it is unlikely that the Athenian constitution is intended to be regarded as an example for the young king. Athenian democracy is criticized both by Nicocles (*Nicocl.* 18–21) and Isocrates (*Ad Nicocl.* 18); furthermore, the fact that the city will be ruled with laws does not imply that it will be ruled as Athens is. Another phrase that, according to Usher, refers to the Athenian governmental system is Isocrates' call to examine those who will be put into public office: ἀκριβεῖς ποιοῦ τὰς δοκιμασίας τῶν συνόντων (*Ad Nicocl.* 27). Usher believes that the word δοκιμασία is used as a terminus technicus – "a scrutiny of magistrates made after election, to see if they fulfill the legal requirements",[16] but this is hardly the case. A search of the corpus shows that Isocrates uses this word as well as the verb δοκιμάζω (and a variant with prefix ἀπο-) 33 times. It is clearly used as the technical term only once: ἔτι γὰρ καὶ νῦν ἁπάντων τῶν περὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν καὶ τὴν δοκιμασίαν κατημελημένων ἴδοιμεν (*Areop.* 38). It is evident that context and the word αἵρεσις indicate here the terminological usage; however, in other cases, this word is used in a more general sense. The nature of the advice of *Ad Nicocl.* 27 points not to a special examination traditional for Athens, but to the idea of the following passage (*Panath.* 222):

> Χρὴ δὲ τοὺς ὀρθῶς δοκιμάζειν βουλομένους περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἐν ἀρχῇ μὲν ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν καὶ μηδεμίαν δόξαν ἔχειν περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὰν δ' εἰς τὸν χρόνον ἐκεῖνον ἔλθωσιν ἐν ᾧ καὶ λέγοντας καὶ πράττοντας αὐτοὺς ὄψονται καὶ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων καὶ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν, τότε θεωρεῖν ἀκριβῶς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν.

> However, those who desire to form a correct judgement about such people should remain silent and have no opinion about them in the beginning, but when the time comes when they can observe them both speaking and taking action regarding both private and public affairs.

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15 Usher 1999, 310.
16 Usher 1990, 210.

Ὀρθῶς δοκιμάζειν should mean the same as ἀκριβεῖς ποιοῦ τὰς δοκι-μασίας and refer to general comprehension of a person's nature and whether this person is worthy.

This short overview of the main opinions on these orations shows that there is no consensus yet on Isocrates' views of monarchy. The goal of this article is not to solve all the difficulties, but rather to examine some passages in which criticism of monarchy displayed by Isocrates himself or put into Nicocles' words could be found.[17]

It would be easier to start with the criticisms expressed by Isocrates directly. In the oration *To Nicocles* the orator, recounting things that contribute to education of common people, namely necessities of their life, laws, criticism by their friends and enemies, and the precepts of poets, says (*Ad Nicocl.* 3):

> τοῖς δὲ τυράννοις[18] οὐδὲν ὑπάρχει τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ᾽ οὓς ἔδει παιδεύεσθαι μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων, ἐπειδὰν εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν καταστῶσιν, ἀνουθέτητοι διατελοῦσιν.

> for the tyrants there is no such thing (means of education – D. K.), on the contrary, when the men, who should be educated rather than anyone else, gain their power, they spend their life unadmonished.

One could find a similar thought in *Antidosis* (71):

> ἐπιτιμῶ ταῖς μοναρχίαις, ὅτι δέον αὐτοὺς τὴν φρόνησιν ἀσκεῖν μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων, οἱ δὲ χεῖρον παιδεύονται τῶν ἰδιωτῶν.

> I accuse monarchies that despite the fact that they (monarchs – D. K.) must exercise their wisdom more than others, they receive education worse than common people.

In the latter case it is expressed a bit more distinctively and even aggressively, since the author speaks to the Athenian public.

Lack of necessary educational institutions for kings and their own reluctance to be educated are underlined at the end of *Euagoras*, where

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[17] For a survey of monarchy's flaws found in other orations, see Mathieu 1925, 134–135.

[18] Concerning the usage of the words τυραννίς, τύραννος and their meaning, see Parker 1998, 165–166; Alexiou 2010, 113. In short, notice that these terms do not have negative connotations here, rather they mean the absolute power of a king.

Isocrates says to his former student: πρῶτος καὶ μόνος τῶν ἐν τυραννίδι καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ τρυφαῖς ὄντων φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ πονεῖν ἐπικεχείρηκας (78). In the same paragraph, the orator emphasizes that the king will make other rulers envy his παίδευσις, as well. The author compares kingship with priesthood and notices that lots of people believe that any mediocre person can fill both offices, while in reality they are most important and demand extraordinary care (*Ad Nicocl.* 6).

That formula πρῶτος καὶ μόνος should mean that other rulers' education is not enough to fulfill their duties, and consequently they tend to rule their subjects badly. However, it does not imply that all rulers govern their states this way. The author displays two contrary examples of rulers who did not have any special education, but nonetheless succeeded: Theseus and Euagoras.

The problem with one of these examples is obvious: Theseus is a legendary character, so it is difficult to tell the truth from the myth and his figure is used only as an example of a perfect leader. On the other hand, our evidence about the Cyprian king from other authors shows that the Athenian orator was quite liberal with the truth. First, he omits some details about the Cyprian war, namely defeats at sea and in the siege of Salamis.[19] Isocrates also leaves unspoken the fact that when Euagoras returned to the city, he was left by his allies. The war was finished with a defeat and Salamis came under Arthaxerxes' control (*Diod*. 15. 9. 2). Indirect evidence of this could be the pitiful state of the city described by Nicocles (*Nicocl.* 31). The audience hears a description of a crisis, to which the good king finds a solution. How did the city come to this devastated state? Most probably because of the expensive and unfortunate war led by Euagoras. This fact could also partly explain why Nicocles' recounting of all the martial triumphs achieved by monarchical and tyrannical leaders fails to refer to his father's triumphs.

This brings us to the first point about which the monarchical rulers are criticized – their lack of proper education and training and lack of will to acquire it.

The next critical note, which is spoken by the orator himself, could result from the previous one and concerns the quality of a kings' advisors. Kings are surrounded by flatterers (*Ad Nicocl.* 4). Tyrants do not succeed in getting proper education *before* they come to power, and they stay ἀνουθέτητοι *after* they gain it, since there is no one to guide them. Among the things Isocrates says have a positive influence on the education of

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[19] Alexiou 2010, 156; Frolov 2013, 905.

common people, he mentions this: ἔτι δ᾽ ἡ παρρησία καὶ τὸ φανερῶς ἐξεῖναι τοῖς τε φίλοις ἐπιπλῆξαι καὶ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἐπιθέσθαι ταῖς ἀλλήλων ἁμαρτίαις (*Ad Nicocl.* 3). Παρρησία[20] in this case is the possibility for people to criticize each other, while a tyrant is deprived of it due to his high position and others' fear of punishment. The beneficial spirit of constructive critics is underlined here. Undoubtedly, a tyrant is able to criticize others, but he fails to receive criticism in return; furthermore, Isocrates gives the advice: δίδου παρρησίαν τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσιν, ἵνα περὶ ὧν ἂν ἀμφιγνοῇς ἔχῃς τοὺς συνδοκιμάσοντας (*Ad Nicocl.* 28). In both cases, the author uses the term that is usually associated with Athenian democracy; but contrary to the usual practice in Athens, Isocrates insists on giving the right of speech only to οἱ εὖ φρονοῦντες and not the whole demos. This form of elitism is not unusual for him. He speaks about the monarch's duty to care about his people, but at the same time not to lose control over them. This thesis is presented as a πρῶτα καὶ μέγιστα στοιχεῖα χρηστῆς πολιτείας (*Ad Nicocl.* 16). It is also important to realize who are understood as οἱ εὖ φρονοῦντες.

The real political situation[21] in the Cyprian cities shows that the king (βασιλεύς) possessed the main power in the state and ruled the kingdom with the help of the local aristocracy called ἄνακτες. It is not clear enough whether official polis institutes were presented there, but in any case, they played an insignificant role; power was concentrated in the hands of the king, his family, and elites. Most probably the latter are meant when Isocrates mentions freedom of speech. This is supported by a preface to *Nicocles* composed by an anonymous grammarian, who says that the king is addressing πρὸς τοὺς τῶν ὑπηκόων τιμιωτάτους (Hypoth. *Nicocl.*); the reader should understand that before the king's speech, the audience has already heard the orator's advice, as is mentioned by Nicocles himself (*Nicocl.* 11). Usher believes that by mentioning παρρησία and laws, Isocrates is trying to convince Nicocles to rule his state like a Greek polis.[22] It would have been too unwise of the orator to suggest that an absolute king such as Nicocles would give up his power because of the advice from his former teacher. It is more probable that he is trying to convince Nicocles not to suppress any opposition, but to give the elites the right to express their disagreement – it would be παρρησία – and to adjudicate his subjects on a par, so they would know what to expect in

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[20] See more about Isocrates' usage of this word in Giannone 2017.

[21] For a detailed description of the Cyprian political system, see Pestarino–Körner 2017, 217–243.

[22] Usher 1990, 203.

court; the laws would serve this purpose.[23] In that case, the king remains the absolute source of power, but the subjects could expect the king not to act arbitrarily.

The necessity for qualified advisors is additionally stressed at the end of the speech: σύμβουλος ἀγαθὸς χρησιμώτατον καὶ τυραννικώτατον ἀπάντων τῶν κτημάτων ἐστίν (*Ad Nicocl.* 53). Furthermore, in *Euagoras*, Isocrates uses Nicocles' father as an example by saying: "He consulted with his friends, though he had no need of advisors" (*Euagor.* 44).

This is followed by another remark about tyrants. At first it seems a *locus communis*, however it could be connected to the circumstances of the death of the king's father and brother. He says (*Ad Nicocl.* 5):

> ἐπειδὰν δ' ἐνθυμηθῶσιν τοὺς φόβους καὶ τοὺς κινδύνους, καὶ διεξιόντες ὁρῶσιν τοὺς μὲν ὑφ' ὧν ἥκιστα χρῆν διεφθαρμένους, τοὺς δ' εἰς τοὺς οἰκειοτάτους ἐξαμαρτεῖν ἠναγκασμένους, τοῖς δ' ἀμφότερα ταῦτα συμβεβηκότα.

> But when they (the common people – D. K.) reflect on their (monarch's – D. K.) fears and their dangers, and when, as they review the history of monarchs, they see instances where they have been slain by those from whom they least deserved that fate, other instances where they have been constrained to sin against those nearest and dearest to them, and still others where they have experienced both of these calamities.

This could be interpreted as a common criticism of tyrants, who, as they gain power, become cruel even to those closest to them. Describing the difficult position of tyrants in *Encomium Helenae*, Isocrates notes that they do not trust people close to them (*Hel.* 33). In *De pace*, a similar criticism is repeated (111–113), and Xenophon's complaint in Hiero about the miserable position of a tyrant mentions the same things (Xen. *Hier*. 3. 8). It seems as if Isocrates simply resorts to a topos.

It is possible that Isocrates' criticism is confined to a general topos; however, recalling the details of Nicocles' ascension to the throne, note that Euagoras and his elder son Pnytagoras were killed by a eunuch, Thrasideus, for raping the daughter of Nicocreon, another Cyprian king.

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[23] This thought is additionally stressed in *Ad Nicocl.* 18. M. Gianonne does not see here any reference to ἄνακτες. She believes that the only conditions for granting the right to criticize to a person should be legal citizenship and the moral qualities of the speaker. This is of course possible when applied to Athens, while here Isocrates deals with Cyprian reality (Gianonne 2017, 99).

There is no clear evidence of what happened, since the versions all differ in their details. Diodorus says that Nicocles was that eunuch and the killer of Euagoras (15. 47. 8). This is more than doubtful, and there must be a confusion between the king's son and the eunuch. Furthermore, this evidence is not supported by any other authors; it is possible that Diodorus excessively abbreviated his source and thereby made Nicocles the eunuch.[24] Aristotle, on the other hand, gives another version, which is preferable to that of Diodorus, although it lacks details. He states that Euagoras' death was an act of revenge accomplished by this eunuch, for the king's son had taken away his wife (Aristot. *Pol.* 1311 b 5–6). Yet, the uncertainty as to which of the sons is meant here and the oddity of a eunuch having a wife leaves some doubts. The closest to reality seems to be the version of Theopompus, who says the following (Theop. *FrGrH* 115 F 103. 12):

> καὶ ὡς τῇ ἐκείνου παιδὶ καταλειφθείσῃ κόρῃ Εὐαγόρας τε καὶ ὁ τούτου παῖς Πνυταγόρας λανθάνοντες ἀλλήλους συνεκάθευδον, Θρασυδαίου τοῦ εὐνούχου, ὃς ἦν Ἠλεῖος τὸ γένος, αὐτοῖς παρὰ μέρος ὑπηρετουμένου τῇ πρὸς τὴν κόρην ἀκολασίᾳ· καὶ ὡς τοῦτο αὐτοῖς αἴτιον ὀλέθρου γέγονε, Θρασυδαίου τὴν ἐκείνων ἀναίρεσιν κατεργασαμένου.

> And then (he described) how Euagoras and his son Pnytagoras secretly from each other slept with the daughter that he (Nicocreon – *D. K.*) left, while Thrasydeus the eunuch from Elis served them in rotation in their licentiousness towards this girl; and how this resulted in their deaths, for Thrasydeus committed their murder.

This version is the most detailed, and it mentions Pnytagoras, Nicocles' elder brother, who is also mentioned by Isocrates (*Euagor.* 62). It does not contradict Artistotle's version, either. Theopompus' knowledge is not surprising, since he was Isocrates' pupil.[25] However, F. Jacoby rightly notes that this story does not clarify the reasons for Thrasydeus' assassination.[26] This version has more credibility, since the author could have used Isocrates' evidence and knowledge to describe these events.

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[24]   Sherman 1907, 81. He also believes that Nicocles did not participate in the assassination.

[25]   Laqueur 1934, 2181–2182.

[26]   Jacoby 1962, 374.

It is highly unlikely that Isocrates was unaware of these events, since he spent some time teaching the future king.[27] Nicocles for his part stresses his fidelity to his wife[28] when describing his own virtues (*Nicocl.* 36–42). He also mentions that violence against those closest to one has already ruined lots of people (*ibid.* 36). It seems that this phrase was a clear allusion for the audience, whose memory of the deaths of Euagoras and Pnytagoras was still fresh. In an attempt to be perceived as a better ruler, Nicocles intentionally mentions this and pays a lot of attention to it. Given all this, one might assume that this was more than just self-praise. Some vagueness of wording allows those who know the details of the scandalous death to take this hint, and for others it serves as a usual reminder of the perils of monarchy. Death at the hands of a eunuch is indeed a death by the most unexpected person, and forced intercourse that father and son both had with the same woman is surely vice against those closest to one, so Euagoras suffers both of these, which Isocrates alludes to. The necessity for this allusion could have arisen from the fact that the best argument is an example from the life of a close person, which the orator himself states (*Euagor.* 77). The tragic death of his own father would show the importance of this advice.

That is the end of the criticism expressed by Isocrates personally. These are the main theses: (1) tyrants do not receive a proper education; (2) once they gain power, they do not have good advisors; (3) the cruelty of tyrants against even those closest to them leads them to a tragic death. The first two points seem to be the most important, since these are the reasons for such poor governance, and they cause the pitiful condition not only of subjects, but of the tyrants themselves, as well. The question is, however: is this a criticism of monarchy as an institution or admonishments about the perils that lie in a monarch's path? In the case of Isocrates, it is hard

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[27] It is unknown whether Isocrates visited Salamis or if it is Nicocles who was sent to Athens. K. Münscher believes that the orator never visited the island (Münsher 1934, 2189), and Blass thinks it more probable that the prince came to Athens (Blass 1874, 54), but this contradicts the evidence of Ps.-Plut. (*Vit.* F 838), who mentions Isocrates' participation in a symposium held by a Cyprian tyrant, Nicocreon. This could be a misunderstanding of the name Nicocles, but of course this is uncertain. In any case, Isocrates was well-informed about Salamis and its reality.

[28] Other sources portray the young king as a lustful and spoiled tyrant. He is described in this way by Theopompus (*FrGrH* 115 F 114), but it is contested by F. Maier, who believes this to be a stereotypical description of an eastern tyrant (Maier 1994, 328). More evidence of Nicocles' lavish lifestyle is given by Anaximenes (*FrGrH* 72 F 18), who compares him to a well-known spendthrift, Strato of Sidon.

to tell the difference, for he prefers giving advice on general principles rather than sharing practical formulas. It is evident that he does not praise monarchy over other forms of government, and these warnings aim to let others see this. The hidden criticism expressed by Nicocles starts by stating the main principles of the three forms of government (*Nicocl.* 15):

> αἱ μὲν τοίνυν ὀλιγαρχίαι καὶ δημοκρατίαι τὰς ἰσότητας τοῖς μετέ-χουσιν τῶν πολιτειῶν ζητοῦσιν, καὶ τοῦτ᾽ εὐδοκιμεῖ παρ᾽ αὐταῖς ἢν μηδὲν ἕτερος ἑτέρου δύνηται πλέον ἔχειν· ὃ τοῖς πονηροῖς συμφέρον ἐστίν. Αἱ δὲ μοναρχίαι πλεῖστον μὲν νέμουσι τῷ βελτίστῳ, δευτέρῳ δὲ τῷ μετ᾽ ἐκεῖνον, τρίτῳ δὲ καὶ τετάρτῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον. Καὶ ταῦτ᾽ εἰ μὴ πανταχοῦ καθέστηκεν, ἀλλὰ τό γε βούλημα τῆς πολιτείας τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν.

> Oligarchies and democracies seek equality for those who share political rights, and it is praised among them, if nobody is able to have more than the other. It is a benefit for malevolent people. Monarchies on the other hand allot the most to the best, the second-most to the second-best, then to the third and to others with the same order. And even if it is not established everywhere, the principle of this government is such.

There are in fact two main principles – the equality of rights and honors between all who share political rights (only democracies give it to a large number of men, while oligarchies have strict qualifications), on the one hand, and inequality of rights, on the other. The first principle, which was applied in Athens, is criticized as profitable for unworthy people. Inequality, however, should serve better, since this principle grants each citizen rights according to his merits. Without a doubt, this is an ideal situation, when the king has no will to meddle with this system and does not honor those who do not deserve it.

Some questions arise from this point. Foremost, is this a merit of monarchy as a particular institution, or is it the principle that counts, not the form? The second question is whether this principle is already realized or remains to be realized. The latter is easier to answer, since the king acknowledges it himself by saying ταῦτ᾽ εἰ μὴ πανταχοῦ καθέστηκεν. This is a realistic stroke, of course, but is there any evidence of this principle being realized in a monarchical government? The only examples from history that were recalled are Sparta, Carthage, Sicily, and Persia, and all of these examples were used only to show the military strength of monarchies, so it would seem that no examples of the fulfillment of this principle are to be found, or at least Isocrates thinks so.

The first question is more difficult to answer. The same thought occurs in *Areopagiticus* (21–22), where the author attributes the same principle to the Athens of old, which made it superior to other Greek states. There are no doubts that the ancestors of the Athenians were ruled by a democratic regime, but it was stricter than the contemporary one. So, it is not a feature of monarchy as a regime, but rather of any well-functioning government. Βούλημα τῆς πολιτείας should be taken more generally as "a principle of the state that distributes honors according to everyone's merit". The reason for using the word μοναρχία is the nature of this speech – it is a king's speech, so it is expected that he will praise monarchy and his own rule.[29]

The next remark addresses the existence of the Cyprian secret police. It is possible that Isocrates refers to it when he has Nicocles say this (*Nicocl.* 51):[30]

> Ὅ τι ἂν ὑμῶν ἕκαστος αὐτὸς αὑτῷ τύχῃ συνειδὼς, ἡγείσθω μηδ' ἐμὲ λήσειν, ἀλλ' ἐὰν καὶ τὸ σῶμα μὴ παρῇ, τὴν διάνοιαν τὴν ἐμὴν οἰέσθω τοῖς γιγνομένοις παρεστάναι.

> If any of you acknowledges his wrongdoing, let him not think that it will escape my notice, but believe that even in the absence of my body my mind will be present.

The context of this phrase is somewhat terrifying. Describing how his subjects should behave, the young king tries to install the thought of inescapable punishment that will sooner or later reach wrongdoers. Along with the expected warning that even those who conceal their knowledge of any schemes will be punished the same as real conspirators, he assures his people that every criminal will be punished sooner or later. This phrase could simply serve the purpose of installing dread in his subjects and not refer to this police. However, it seems important that Nicocles specifies what kind of wrongdoing his subjects should be looking for. He says: μὴ κατασιωπᾶτ' ἄν τινας ὁρᾶτε περὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν ἐμὴν πονηροὺς ὄντας (53). Undermining his power is his main concern. This line could be interpreted differently. Does it refer to danger to his position as king or to any violation of the king's law, such as petty theft?

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[29] C. Eucken believes that this principle was originally developed by Isocrates for Athenian democracy and then applied to monarchy, so that he does not doubt that this merit is not restricted to monarchies (Eucken 1983, 256–257).

[30] This thought was suggested to me by S. Takhtajan.

Another possible hint can be seen in *Euagoras*, where Isocrates says about the king (42):

> ἀλλ᾽ οὕτως ἀκριβῶς καὶ τὰς πράξεις ᾔδει καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ἕκαστον ἐγίγνωσκεν ὥστε μήτε τοὺς ἐπιβουλεύοντας αὐτῷ φθάνειν μήτε τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ὄντας λανθάνειν, ἀλλὰ πάντας τυγχάνειν τῶν προσηκόντων.

> But he (Euagoras – *D. K.*) exactly knew government affairs and each of the citizens, so neither those who plotted against him took him by surprise, nor did worthy people escape his notice, but everyone got what they deserved.

The reason for this striking awareness could be a well-functioning secret police. However, E. Alexiou believes it to be the philanthropic attitude toward his people that led Euagoras to be aware of everything and escape the usual hatred between demos and tyrants.[31] It is possible and fits well with Euagoras' image as a benevolent king involved in the polis' internal affairs; but nonetheless, if loyal people who wish to show the king their eagerness and loyalty are easy to discern, οἵ ἐπιβουλεύοντες are much harder to recognize, so most probably Euagoras resorted to some kind of secret service. Of course, this does not mean that the king would use this service to investigate his citizens' virtues and try to find those who serve him well; but the presence of such intelligence would be a great help in dealing with hostile conspirators. The idea of giving subjects what they deserve is found also in Nicocles' speech, where he claims that all conspirators will receive a proper punishment and all decent citizens will receive rewards (53).

The main difficulty with this interpretation is that neither Nicocles nor Isocrates speak of this directly. The young king could be speaking about an imaginary situation and exhorting his subjects to act as if he were present and as if even their most secret of thoughts were open to him. The orator, on the other hand, might just be describing the virtues of Euagoras and ascribing to him an unusual wisdom and knowledge of human nature, which should be natural for an ideal monarch. Thus, it is difficult to choose between the two possible explanations, and additional arguments in favor of any interpretation are needed.

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[31] Alexiou 2010, 131.

Evidence of the existence of such police can be found in the following fragments of Clearchus of Soli (fr. 19 Wehrli):[32]

> παραδεδεγμένοι δ' εἰσὶ πάντες οἱ κατὰ Κύπρον μόναρχοι τὸ τῶν εὐγενῶν κολάκων γένος ὡς χρήσιμον· πάνυ γὰρ τὸ κτῆμα τυραννικόν ἐστι. Καὶ τούτων οἷον Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν τινων οὔτε τὸ πλῆθος οὔτε τὰς ὄψεις ἔξω τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων οἶδεν οὐδείς. Διῃρημένων δὲ διχῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ Σαλαμῖνι κολάκων κατὰ συγγένειαν, ἀφ' ὧν εἰσιν οἱ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην Κύπρον κόλακες, τοὺς μὲν Γεργίνους, τοὺς δὲ Προμαλάγγους προσαγορεύουσι. Ὧν οἱ μὲν Γεργῖνοι συναναμιγνύμενοι τοῖς κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ἔν τε τοῖς ἐργαστηρίοις καὶ ταῖς ἀγοραῖς ὠτακουστοῦσι, ὅ τι δ' ἂν ἀκούσωσιν ἀναφέρουσιν ἑκάστης ἡμέρας πρὸς τοὺς καλουμένους ἄνακτας. Οἱ δὲ Προμάλαγγες ζητοῦσιν ἀντὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τῶν Γεργίνων προσαγγελθέντων, οὐκ ἀνάξιον εἶναι ζητήσεως δόξῃ, ὄντες τινὲς ἐρευνηταί.

> All the monarchs in Cyprus have adopted this kind of well-born flatterers as useful; for having them is thoroughly characteristic of tyranny. And like some on the Areopagus Council, no one knows how many they are or what they look like, except for the most distinguished ones. The flatterers in Salamis, who inspired those everywhere else in Cyprus, are divided into two groups by kinship, one called Gergini ["informers"], the others Promalanges ["manipulators"]. The Gergini mingle with the townspeople in their workshops and the markets, listening in on everyone in their role as spies, and whatever they hear they report back to their so-called "lords" every day. The Promalanges then investigate anything reported by the Gergini deemed to warrant investigation, serving as detectives of a sort.[33]

Clearchus states that this is rather a secret organization, which is little known to the common people; even their appearance and number are kept in secrecy. According to the historian, these noble flatterers originate in Salamis. B. Pestarino, for his part, contests this and claims that it could be related to the agenda of the king's court in Salamis.[34] It is interesting that Clearchus mentions the methods of this secret police. After delation, another branch of the service started investigation, while ἄνακτες headed

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[32] Here only the main Greek evidence will be presented; for a more detailed description of this service with inscription sources and parallels from other eastern kingdoms, see Pestarino 2022, 33–35.

[33] The translation of this passage is by T. Dorandi and S. White (see Mayhew et al. 2022).

[34] Pestarino 2022, 33.

this organization, receiving information and giving orders. It seems that
Clearchus himself esteemed their work highly.

Finally, F. Poldrugo[35] claims that Isocrates could be referring to this
police when he advises Nicocles to distinguish between skillful flatterers
and diligent servants (*Ad Nicocl.* 28), but it does not seem to be so. Here
the author mentions παρρησία, which was already discussed, and only
then urges Nicocles to distinguish the two kinds of servants. It is more
likely that here Isocrates means not "professional flatterers", but those
who wish to please the king by agreeing to his every word, in contrast
with those who can see that the king is in fact wrong in his judgment
and disagree with him. The reason for this remark is given by the author
himself: ἵνα μὴ πλέον οἱ πονηροὶ τῶν χρηστῶν ἔχωσιν (*ibid*.). It is an
advice not to use any special services for preventing crimes, but rather to
see through people and take them for what they really are. This is most
applicable to the council, while the intelligence is used to spy on the
common people. This thought could also be related to the advantage of
monarchy that Nicocles claims, namely that tyrannies discern people's
natures and deeds best of all.

As mentioned before, it is more probable that Nicocles refers to this
police by mentioning that, in the absence of his physical body, his mind
will be there. The same motif can be found also in the cited paragraph
of *Euagoras*. The question is, however: what is the orator's attitude
toward this service? Isocrates does not speak about it directly, but some
suggestions can be deduced from the advice to relieve people of their fears
(*Ad Nicocl.* 23). Mathieu and Bremond connect this thought to *Nicocl.* 51,[36]
but they believe it to be used only for the interests of the audience.
Though this is possible, it does not necessarily mean that Nicocles is
not referring to his intelligence service. His audience is ἄνακτες and,
according to Clearchus' evidence, they are aware of its existence, so it is
suitable for the moment when he is warning them about what they must
not do, to mention that the king possesses the means to keep watch over
them. Nevertheless, this suggestion leads to a problem: since it is known
that his audience consists mostly of aristocrats and that Clearchus states
that κόλακες spy on common people and obey those ἄνακτες and their
number and faces are not a secret to them, how can the king threaten the
audience with this service? As Poldrugo[37] rightly claims, Clearchus is
wrong about the secrecy of this police, and inscriptions attest to this. Is

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[35] Poldrugo 2000, 40.
[36] Mathieu–Bremond 1961, 133.
[37] Poldrugo 2000, 40.

it possible that he is also wrong about spying exclusively on the demos? It is difficult to say and this needs a detailed investigation.

Referring back to the original question of Isocrates' attitude, one may say that it is not surveillance that he could oppose, but the nature of this surveillance. If it is used to terrorize the subjects, then indeed it is inappropriate, but to keep an eye on people's moral qualities and not let them overstep the boundaries is something he would refer to later in *Areopagiticus* (36–37), where he says that when this institution watched over Athenians they were generally better. Of course, the perils of such an institution are not a secret to him, but he believes that the perfect king, who Nicocles should be, will use it only for good.

All the main lines of criticism of monarchical power examined, it is now important to match them with the political views of the orator. As mentioned above, it is highly unlikely that Isocrates viewed monarchy as an ideal form of government or even as one suitable for Greeks. He was well aware of the impossibility of its application in a Greek polis, but he uses this opportunity to find flaws in democracy and oligarchy and to give advice on how to overcome them. It seems that Blass[38] formulated Isocrates' position in the best possible way, saying that it is not the form, but rather the spirit that is important for him. This view is further supported by lack of practical formulas for the organization of the state in Isocrates' works. However, to understand his position fully, it is necessary to examine thoroughly the advantages of monarchy that he highlights.

To summarize, one may claim with certainty only the following theses: these three orations indeed contain some criticism of monarchy, and Isocrates does not wish even theoretically to justify the superiority of ideal monarchy over others forms of government.

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[38] Blass 1874, 74.

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The *Cyprian Orations*, addressed by Isocrates to his former student Nicocles on the occasion of the latter's ascension to the throne of Salamis, have caused discussions among scholars about the orator's political thought for a long time. Do these works clearly outline Isocrates' monarchical preferences, or are they nothing but a set of advice to a young king on how, according to Isocrates, he should behave as a king? The aim of this article is to highlight some passages in which Isocrates covertly or openly criticizes monarchical power.

Цикл *Кипрских речей*, посвященных Исократом своему бывшему ученику Никоклу по случаю его восшествия на престол Саламина, давно вызывает споры среди исследователей политической мысли оратора: являются ли эти сочинения прямым указанием на монархические предпочтения Исократа или же это набор советов юному царю о том, как, по мнению автора, должен вести себя монарх? В статье анализируются некоторые места из речей, в которых, как доказывается, Исократ завуалированно или явно критикует монархическое устройство.

Alexander Verlinsky

PLATO'S LAST WORD ON NATURALISM VS. CONVENTIONALISM IN THE *CRATYLUS*. II[*]

I propose that Socrates' definition of habit (434 e 5–8) should be understood quite literally: habit is what secures a transit from a thing in the mind of a speaker to a name that should indicate this thing, and then the reverse transit from an interlocutor listening to this name and grasping the thing that is indicated by this name. The connection between a name and a thing is established in the minds of speakers not because they are able to recognize the similarity of the name to its referent, but because it is *habitual* for both to recognize this connection – they have been habituated to associate this name and this thing. The point of the definition is that a speaker's choice of a name and a listener's understanding due to habit occur automatically, without an analysis of the properties of a name and its referent. Here, for the first time in the whole discussion, we have a sketch of how the communication of mediocre language-speakers proceeds. When, as in the given case, the similarity of the name to its referent is not sufficient for recognition of what this referent is, a competent language-speaker has no other option than to appeal to habit, viz. to the meaning of the name he learned in childhood. A competent language-speaker thus appears to behave in these cases as mediocre language-speakers usually behave.

This supposed explication of what Socrates regards as habit sounds very similar to the conventionalist view to us, who tend to identify the habitual meanings of words with convention. It thus might appear that, for Plato, the appeal to habit means yielding to conventionalism. However, as Plato sees it, we should be not too rushed in identifying habit with conventionalism, as is represented in the dialogue, viz. with the concept of arbitrary agreement on the meaning of names in Hermogenes' theory.

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[*] See *Hyperboreus* 29: 2 (2023) 196–233.

Let us consider what Socrates understands by agreement in this context. As I have said, the argument about agreement appears to be straightforward: since λ makes σκληρότης dissimilar to its referent, the successful indication of 'hardness' to an interlocutor can be accomplished only by means of agreement, because there is no other mode of indication beyond resemblance and agreement. It is surprising that, on the contrary, Socrates does not conclude that Cratylus thus partakes in the agreement with the other language-speakers by which the name σκληρότης has acquired its reference, i.e., 'hardness', but claims instead that Cratylus "agreed with himself" on the meaning of this name.

Most scholars hold the view that this silent agreement with oneself does not differ from agreement in Hermogenes' theory. Thus, according to Ademollo, Socrates has pressed Cratylus to accept that since the name σκληρότης does not have a meaning that would correspond to its intrinsic features, it is necessary to follow a collective convention about its meaning, and this amounts to following Hermogenes' theory of arbitrary agreement. If I understand Ademollo correctly, he thinks that the agreement among language-speakers is not mentioned because this agreement consists of many acts of individual agreement, as Cratylus performs in our case.[1] But this will not do: Cratylus' agreement is an agreement to follow a linguistic habit; this agreement, as well as similar acts of consent made by language-speakers, are of course necessary to make the existing convention valid for all, but such acts cannot constitute the convention itself. The latter had to take place at a certain moment when somebody proposed to assign an arbitrary name to a thing and some companions agreed that this name will have a given meaning from this moment on.[2]

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[1] Ademollo 2011, 401: "…Socrates apparently thinks that Cratylus' adherence to the public convention according to which σκληρόν indicates hardness is *grounded* in his private convention with himself. His point seems to be that, since utterances of σκληρόν do not have a meaning which depends on their intrinsic features and which a hearer is somehow naturally forced to recognize, Cratylus had to decide, as it were, that he would interpret utterances of σκληρόν as indicating hardness. Thereby Socrates seems to view the collective convention as the sum of a plurality of individual decisions".

[2] Ademollo 2011, 401 believes that this understanding of a public convention as a sum of individual decisions like that of Cratylus finds support in Hermogenes' reasoning (384 d – 385 a), "where Hermogenes put a convention among a plurality of speakers on a par with the arbitrary decision of a single speaker"; cf. Ademollo 2011, 46. But in fact Hermogenes has in view only that there is no difference between arbitrary imposition of names by means of agreement in a large collective like a state and in a small one like a house (385 d 7 – e 3). It is true, as Ademollo rightly notices,

I propose instead to understand the idea of an agreement with oneself quite literally: it is not the same as an agreement that is made by language-speakers on the meaning of a name when they assign an arbitrary string of sounds to a certain thing, as proposed by Hermogenes, nor does it stem from such an agreement. It is precisely an agreement made by an individual language-speaker with an already existing meaning of a name as fixed by linguistic habit, no more than this. There is a similarity indeed between the two concepts of agreement: both presuppose a lack of resemblance of the name and its referent, and thus the necessity of an external authority that maintains the meaning of the word. But on the other hand, there is a considerable difference: the agreement with oneself that Socrates introduces here is accomplished by a competent language-speaker, who after considering the name in question, diagnoses the difficulty of determining its meaning by means of its intrinsic features and after that agrees to follow the authority of linguistic habit, which conveys its meaning. A competent language-speaker thus descends to the level on which all mediocre language-speakers always dwell: they simply follow linguistic habit because they have no other option. But at the same time, this competent person, unlike his fellow language-speakers, follows habit only because the resemblance of the name to its referent does not work in the specific cases, like the one under discussion. Socrates' reasoning thus does not invite a competent language-speaker to abandon the consideration of intrinsic features of names in determining their reference in favor of following habit on the whole, but demonstrates that it is commendable to do this only in the cases in which the resemblance of a name to its referent does not work, as this competent person has found through consideration. In this respect, the concept of an agreement with oneself endorses the interpretation of the case of σκληρότης as one that does not undermine the principle of resemblance. I thus agree entirely with Sedley[3] that the case of σκληρότης appears as exceptional, not violating resemblance as the prevailing principle, although I do not think that, in Socrates' opinion, such cases will be rare, as Sedley believes, because

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that Hermogenes can further represent this imposition, without having in view any difference, both as an agreement of some future users of a name, and as an individual decision of a single person which other companions follow (384 d 2–5; 385 d 8–9). Nevertheless, in Hermogenes' theory, both in its initial exposition (384 d 6–7) and in its reformulation by Socrates (433 e 2–9), agreement is treated only as a basis for the imposition of names and for initiating a linguistic habit, not as a way of following already established habit by generations of speakers.

   [3] Sedley 2003, 143–145, see esp. p. 145.

I do not agree that the problem of this word is the *equal* number of letters designating 'hardness' and 'softness'.[4]

It remains to ask what authority stands behind linguistic habit according to Socrates' argument. As I have just said, the agreement of a competent language-speaker with himself about following the meaning of a name that is sanctioned by linguistic habit should be distinguished from Hermogenes' theory of agreement as the assignment of any arbitrary name to any arbitrary referent. Hermogenes' theory as it is formulated in the dialogue stresses the arbitrariness of name meanings and their changeability; he is not interested in how an ordinary speaker follows these multiple and changeable conventions, precisely because the stability of language contradicts his theory to a large extent: there is no visible reason why these arbitrary names should survive through centuries rather than change by new agreements. He of course assumes that linguistic habit stems from such agreements (384 d 5–7) because it is important for him that we rely on agreed, habitual meaning and not on any inherent properties of names; nevertheless, this does not mean that he regards this habit as something stable. Again, he refers to the differences among Greek dialects and between Greek and other languages as a proof that the correctness of names is nothing more than the will of those who assign names to their referents as arbitrarily as they wish (385 d 7 – e 2). But this does not mean that he thinks that these differences entail any idea of the stability of languages, for instance that the meanings of names stem from an initial assignment.

Of course, we still cannot rule out that Hermogenes' arbitrary agreement is involved more distantly as the source of habit. Socrates might have developed his theory to mean that the linguistic habit the language-speakers learn in their childhood stems from some initial arbitrary agreement. But as plausible as this view might appear, it remains true that Socrates' does not adduce the option of a temporally distant agreement in his argument: from the lack of resemblance of the name, Socrates infers that Cratylus agreed with himself to follow linguistic habit, instead of saying that he follows an arbitrary agreement made in the past. Moreover, it is not clear that habit, which was initially an element of Hermogenes theory, still preserves its Hermogenian character at this stage. Hermogenes, as we know, was urged to yield to Socrates' argument that linguistic νόμος has been created by the skillful lawgiver, who possesses the τέχνη of making names appropriate to things (388 e): linguistic habit thus can be now a part of the naturalist stance. It is thus fairly possible that Cratylus appealed to habit just because he had already learned to associate habit with the naturalist position; his

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[4] Cf. Pt. I, p. 221–223.

proposal is something like this: one cannot recognize the resemblance of σκληρότης to 'hardness' in spite of the will of the name-giver to make it resemble its referent, and one is bound to follow the habit according to which σκληρότης indicates hardness, because the name-giver assigned it to 'hardness', the similarity having been lost for some reason.

Socrates' argument is a correction of this view: in spite of Cratylus' attempt to resist, one should concede that the indication in a given case entails lack of resemblance and thus is based on agreement. But he does not abandon Cratylus' appeal to habit, and he shows that the agreement here involved differs from that of Hermogenes: it is the agreement of the competent language-speaker with the meaning of the name as assigned to it by a wise name-giver, who tried to create the name appropriate to its referent. This name-giver failed to achieve an unequivocal resemblance or, alternatively, he was successful, but this resemblance was obliterated in the course of the development of language, as many of Socrates' etymologies imply. Nevertheless, the bond of the name with the thing the name-giver assigned it to is still persistent in habit, as Cratylus may have implied.

My main reason for preferring this option is the premises on which Socrates' argument is built: both interlocutors assume that the name σκληρότης was coined by a competent name-giver who tried to make a word imitating the property of hardness. There is no sign that they abandoned this initial hypothesis, and the result is quite compatible with it: we should agree to the reference that the habit preserved up to our days, although we are not able to detect this reference due to inherent features of the name itself because it lacks (or lost) similarity to the thing. The bond of the name with the referent is thus still in force, but the manifestation of this bond, the descriptive resemblance, became obscure. This situation would hardly be possible if the habit could be reduced to arbitrary and temporary agreements: the bond with the initial reference would have disappeared.

Another, less important reason for my interpretation of agreement here as compatible with naturalism, is that Socrates' reasoning about σκληρότης does not aim to demonstrate that it is an arbitrary name, even in its current form, with the λ that is contrary to properties of the referent. If my previous argument was correct, σκληρότης is composed basically from appropriate letters and syllables,[5] and the authority of habit restores in the mind of a competent language-speaker the true form of the name, which was distorted by the unhappily inserted λ. This would again be impossible if the agreement with oneself meant following an arbitrary agreement of mediocre language-speakers.

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[5] See Pt. I, p. 221–223.

Of course, there is a manifest difficulty for the view I bring forward: Socrates shifts without much ado from the concept of the arbitrary agreement of name-makers, as proposed by Hermogenes, which served throughout the discussion as an antipode of naturalism, to the new kind of agreement, now with a habit that takes its origin from the name-givers who imposed names according to naturalistic principles. I believe that, on consideration, this difficulty is surmountable. After all, both kinds of agreement suggest a lack of resemblance between the name and its referent, and thus restrict radical naturalism. And the reinterpretation of conventionalist concepts in a naturalistic vein is not alien to the dialogue: take for instance Socrates' treatment of language differences, one of the main arguments for conventionalism, both for Hermogenes and after him; Socrates considers this quite compatible with and even inherent in his own concept of naturalism (390 a 5–9).

The interlocutors thus discuss the new concept of linguistic habit that serves as an explanation how language-speakers understand the meaning of words without resorting to the resemblance between a name and its referent. Of course the meaning of the name in such cases is what we today call its referential and conventional meaning, viz. awareness of the object indicated by the name, without any knowledge of the origin of this name (its etymology) and correspondingly of any qualities of its referent as suggested by the name itself (for instance, knowledge of what the name ἄνθρωπος refers to, but without knowing the etymological meaning of the word and the properties of the species 'man'). If this is the case, Plato came closer here than anywhere to our modern concept of conventional language. What is important, however, is that this concept of understanding language as following the authority of habit is essentially different from the conventionalism as defended by Hermogenes, whose crucial point is the arbitrariness of the choice of a name for a thing at the moment of the creation of names.

The agreement of a competent language-speaker with himself turns out to be linguistic habit;[6] to a certain extent, this recalls Socrates'

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[6] Leslie Brown notices the oddity of the concept of agreement with oneself in this part of the dialogue (Brown 2021, 22 f.), but in fact Socrates applies this unusual designation only because it follows from the premises of the discussion that lack of resemblance of the name with its referent entails the presence of agreement on the name's meaning and that, in the absence of a visible partner to this agreement, he supposes that agreement occurred in Cratylus' soul (note again that Socrates does not mention that Cratylus agreed with Socrates or earlier with his compatriots). But this does not imply an absurd idea that Cratylus should "make a promise with oneself", as Brown supposes, only that he in fact agreed with the habit as the higher authority.

famous agreement to follow the laws of Athens in the *Crito*. Contrary
to Plato's usual notion of agreement, which corresponds to the standard
understanding of his contemporaries, namely the agreement of two equal
sides to follow certain rules that the agreeing parties constitute together
and that are equally binding for all who partake,[7] the agreement in the
Crito is the (silent) agreement by which a lower party agrees to follow
the rules set by the higher one (and to get benefits for fulfilling duties
that follow from this agreement).[8] Ademollo[9] connects the concept of
agreement in *Crito* with Hermogenes' conventionalism and supposes that
Socrates' implicit agreement with the Athenian laws in the *Crito* may
imply that, for Hermogenes, linguistic agreement also had its origin in the
earlier speakers' tacit adherence to the usage of one or more speakers. But
in fact, Hermogenes is quite explicit about the open, bilateral (or multi-
lateral), and equal character of linguistic agreement. *Crito's* theory of the
underling's tacit agreement with the will of the higher authority of the
laws is much more similar to Socrates' appeal to agreement with linguistic
habit: in both cases, it is about following the rule, not about creating
it, and the concept is authoritarian: in the *Crito*, once one accepted the
agreement with the laws (by the fact itself of living in the state), he should
obey them unquestionably; in the *Cratylus*, one should accept the meaning
dictated by the higher authority of linguistic law, or habit, for otherwise the
communication fails.

   I believe that this step of the argument sheds light on its overall
purpose. Both Socrates and Cratylus assume that σκληρότης is a name
whose sounds imitate the object this name indicates, even if this name is
not entirely correct. The supporters of the conventionalist interpretation of
the dialogue claim that Socrates' argument destroys this assumption and

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   [7] The most important example of this view of agreement is the theory of 'many'
voiced by Glaucon in Plato's *Republic* 358 e – 359 a, that the initial agreement
neither to do injustice nor to suffer is the essence of justice and that it underlies all
later laws and covenants (the parts of this agreement are ordinary people who thought
that to do injustice is good "by nature", but to suffer injustice is bad); cf. Callicles'
theory in *Gorg*. 483 b–c; 492 c 7 on laws as a creation of the 'weak', made in order
to restrict those who are stronger, and as συνθήματα; for the popular notion of the
law as agreement of citizens see: Hippias in Xen. *Mem*. 1. 4. 12; Anaxim. *Rhet. ad
Alex*. 1. 8. 1422 a 2–4; 2. 13. 1424 a 10; [*Demosth.*] 25. 16.

   [8] See *Crito* 51 c 6 – e 4: a citizen who stays in the city and does not abandon it at
the age of dokimasia or later by this very fact agrees that he approves of its laws and
thus should obey them without demur (see further, 52 c 1–3 and e 3–5 on Socrates
staying in Athens in the course of all his life as a sign that he liked Athenian laws).

   [9] Ademollo 2011, 38 f.

demonstrates that the resemblance of the name to the thing is entirely unnecessary, and that convention can entirely substitute it as the principle of naming.[10] If on the contrary, as I have argued, the agreement Socrates pleads for helps the competent name-speaker to grasp the similarity of the name to its referent with the help of linguistic habit, his reasoning confirms the original assumption that the names are imitations of things and thus are produced by learned name-givers. It also suggests that this habit itself is the creature of the name-giver(s) who both made the (similar even if imperfect) name and established permanently its connection with the thing 'hardness'.

There is one previously unnoticed sign that the discussion of the difficulties associated with the word σκληρότης and the recognition of the need for agreement did not change Socrates' commitment to naturalism. Having proved that linguistic habit presupposes convention, Socrates admits for a moment that his argument is wrong and that habit, as Cratylus had previously believed, does not presuppose convention (435 a 10):

> εἰ δ᾽ ὅτι μάλιστα μή ἐστι τὸ ἔθος συνθήκη, οὐκ ἂν καλῶς ἔτι ἔχοι λέγειν τὴν ὁμοιότητα δήλωμα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔθος – ἐκεῖνο γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ὁμοίῳ καὶ ἀνομοίῳ δηλοῖ.

> But if, which is extremely unlikely,[11] habit is not an agreement, then it will no longer be correct to assert that indication must be made on the basis of similarity, but [it will be correct to assert that it must be made] on the basis of habit: for habit seems to indicate by means of what is similar [to things] and what is not similar.

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[10] See Ademollo 2022, 40: "It is important to be clear that this argument not only is aimed at, but also *depends on*, the naturalist premise that names resemble things. The basic idea appears to be that if naturalism is true, then names (or some names) resemble things; but if names resemble things, then they can do so also in a partial way (as Socrates has already shown), and if so, then they are conventional. Thus there is a sense in which naturalism about names is self-refuting". I believe that Socrates does not make the step from the partial resemblance of names to their (total) conventionality. The names that partially resemble can be better or worse and thus correspond more or less to the naturalist standard. The case of σκληρότης demonstrates only that habit and agreement is a necessary means for grasping the meaning of *some* names, but it is hard to see how this could refute naturalism as a principle.

[11] The understanding of ὅτι μάλιστα as "wholly", "entirely", as it was often rendered, is erroneous, as Ademollo rightly points out. This expression usually introduces an assumption that the speaker does not consider likely or even regards as incorrect (Ademollo 2011, 402 n. 36, with examples), cf. Latin *si maxime* (*OLD* s.v. maxime 5 b); see already Heindorf 1806, ad loc.

In rejecting this assumption, Socrates explicitly makes it clear that the truth of his argumentation guarantees that the preservation of the naturalistic principle of similarity prevails. This step in Socrates' argument and the precise meaning of οὐκ ... ἔτι is usually overlooked. On the contrary, scholars for the most part understand this phrase as saying that in both cases, whether the habit is agreement or not, it *still* would be wrong to claim that the principle of indication is similarity.[12] They give to the main sentence the meaning of a consequence that occurs irrespective of whether the condition formulated in the adventitious sentence occurs or not. However, οὐκ ἔτι normally means that something is *no longer* the case.[13] In reality, the point here is about a consequence that occurs only if the condition is true, and its truth is presented as highly unlikely.[14] Cratylus is thus invited to concede that agreement plays a certain role in the functioning of language, not only because of Socrates' arguments, but also because this ensures that the principle of similarity, dear to Cratylus, is preserved as the basic standard for the correctness of names.

So, if Socrates' reasoning is wrong and habit does not presuppose agreement (agreement of a specific kind), then interlocutors will have to abandon the idea that the standard for language is the similarity of a name

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[12] Already Heindorf 1806, ad loc., noticed that one would expect ὅμως before οὐκ ἂν καλῶς, and in fact the scholars often render the text as if it has done so: Schofield 1982, 77: "Even if habit is very far from being convention*,* it would still not be well to say that it is not resemblance that discloses, but habit; for that, as it seems, discloses, and it does so by both what resembles and what does not resemble"; Reeve 1999, 87: "And even if usage is completely different from convention, still you must say that expressing something isn't a matter of likeness but of usage"; Sedley 2004, 140: "And even if habit is not at all the same thing as agreement, it still would not be right to say that similarity is the means of indication"; Ademollo 2011, 402 f.: "And even if habit were not convention, still it would no longer be right to say that similarity is a means to indicate, but that habit is; for that, it seems, indicates both with something similar and with something dissimilar". Ademollo, who faithfully renders the meaning of οὐκ ἔτι ("it would no longer be right"), nevertheless adds "still", to which nothing in the text corresponds, and he understands the sentence in the same way as the scholars just cited – even if habit differs from contract, it can *still* no longer be said the resemblance is the principle of indicating things.

[13] LSJ s.v. οὐκέτι ("no more, no longer, no further"); for Plato, see Ast, *Lexicon Platonicum*, s.v. οὐκέτι (iam non..., nicht mehr et nicht weiter), with examples.

[14] For the correct translation, see Dalimier 1999, 178: "D'ailleurs, à supposer que l'usage ne soit pas une convention, on ne serait plus en droit de dire que la resemblance est le moyen de faire voir".

to the thing it indicates. Then the only standard would be habit, since it consists in indicating by means of elements of language both similar and dissimilar to their referents, without making any difference between them. The meaning of this dilemma appears to be as follows: let us grant that, as has been proved, the standard of language is resemblance, while indication by means of non-resembling names that owe their meaning to an arbitrary assignment by conventionalist agreement is a worse kind of indication. Now, as the case of σκληρότης demonstrates, situations arise when the resemblance of a name to its referent is not sufficient for successful indication, and a competent language-speaker has no other option but to rely on the habitual meaning of the name, viz. the meaning rooted in tradition and learned by all language-speakers. Resemblance or non-resemblance of a name to its referent is irrelevant for this habitual meaning. If a naturalist like Cratylus does not accept that following the habitual meaning of a name in such particular cases entails the silent agreement of a competent language-speaker with himself, this would mean that even such a person follows linguistic habit automatically, without any analysis of the imitative properties of words. But in this case, a naturalist should admit that even if resemblance is theoretically preferable as the principle of indication, in practice we all, including linguistic experts, simply follow habitual meanings.

If on the contrary, Socrates is right and following habit in such cases entails agreement, i.e., a competent language-speaker follows habit only after having analyzed the structure of a name and recognized that it is impossible to discern the referent of this name relying on the imitative properties of its sounds, then the principle of resemblance stands. The conscious, expertise-based character of following habit in such particular cases guarantees the validity of resemblance as the standard of language and as the criterion for the estimation of names.

This limited concession to agreement is consistent with Socrates' conclusion following these words (435 b 3 – d 1):

> ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταῦτα συγχωροῦμεν, ὦ Κρατύλε – τὴν γὰρ σιγήν σου συγχώρησιν θήσω – ἀναγκαῖόν που καὶ συνθήκην τι καὶ ἔθος συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς δήλωσιν ὧν διανοούμενοι λέγομεν – ἐπεί, ὦ βέλτιστε, εἰ θέλεις ἐπὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐλθεῖν, πόθεν οἴει ἕξειν ὀνόματα ὅμοια ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἐπενεγκεῖν, ἐὰν μὴ ἐᾷς τι τὴν σὴν ὁμολογίαν καὶ συνθήκην κῦρος ἔχειν τῶν ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος πέρι; ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκει μὲν κατὰ τὸδυνατὸν ὅμοια εἶναι τὰ ὀνόματα τοῖς πράγμασιν – ἀλλὰ μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς, τὸ τοῦ Ἑρμογένους, γλίσχρα ᾖ ἡ ὁλκὴ αὕτη τῆς ὁμοιότητος, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ ᾖ καὶ τῷ φορτικῷ

τούτῳ προσχρῆσθαι, τῇ συνθήκῃ, εἰς ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητα. ἐπεὶ ἴσως
κατά γε τὸ δυνατὸν κάλλιστ' ἂν λέγοιτο ὅταν ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ ὡς πλείστοις
ὁμοίοις λέγηται, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ προσήκουσιν, αἴσχιστα δὲ τοὐναντίον.

(1) Since we have agreed on this, for I understand your silence as
consent, it is necessary that *also* the agreement, together with habit,
should contribute to the designation of those things which we think.
(2) For, my dear fellow, if it pleases you to refer to numbers, whence
will you take resembling names to be assigned to each of the numbers,
unless you allow *your* consent and agreement to govern to *some extent*
the correctness of the names. (3) I myself am committed that names
should be (as far as possible) similar to things, but I fear that indeed
this pull of similarity becomes, in Hermogenes' phrase, "viscous", and
that it is necessary to make *additional use* of this crude thing,
agreement, in regard to the correctness of names. (4) For perhaps the
most beautiful way of speaking is when it is expressed by [elements of
speech] similar to [things], that is, corresponding to [them] either
entirely or to as many of them as possible, and the most unsuitable
way is the opposite.

Let us start from the names of numbers. Socrates' treatment of
numbers became an object of intensive discussion. At first sight, the
names of numbers can be nothing but conventional.[15] But Socrates asserts
clearly that agreement in the case of numbers is necessary, precisely
in order to find the names that *resemble* each number (πόθεν οἴει ἕξειν
ὀνόματα ὅμοια ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἐπενεγκεῖν).[16] Note also that he

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[15] Schofield 1982, 79 supposed that the only way to make the names of numbers
resemble their referents would be to make simple numbers like 'one', 'two', 'three'
having one, two, and three syllables; since, however, this demands a convention
that the number of syllables corresponds to the number that the name refers to, the
names of numbers demonstrate that even the representation of thing by a name
(the capacity that the conventional names usually do not have) may be performed
according to conventional rules; Ademollo 2011, 407–411; 2022, 41, denies that
the names of the numbers resemble their referents in any way (cf. already earlier
Robinson 1955/1969, 117; Ackrill 1994/1997).

[16] I here stick with Sedley 2003, 142, to the literal understanding of this
statement. Ademollo 2011, 411 argued *contra* that Socrates' reasoning is a kind of
modus tollens – argument in an elliptical form: (if Cratylus assigns to agreement
some role, he would be able to recognize that a name may not resemble its referent
entirely); if on the contrary he denies a role of agreement totally, then he has to
admit that every name resembles its referent. But there cannot be names similar to

speaks about "your" agreement, which should play a limited role in the "correctness of names" (ἐὰν μὴ ἐᾷς τι τὴν σὴν ὁμολογίαν καὶ συνθήκην κῦρος ἔχειν τῶν ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος πέρι). This shows that Socrates still has in view the agreement of the language-speaker with himself, which is agreement on the validity of linguistic habit in certain cases, not agreement in Hermogenes' sense, namely on the imposition of names that are entirely arbitrary. Where then does this Socratic kind of agreement rule in the case of numbers? Most probably, in evaluating names for basic numbers, just as in the general case of names, the necessity of agreement to which has been maintained for the "first" fundamental names that do not derive from others. There is a limited group of names that correspond to the basic numbers 1–10, 100, and 1000 – those from which all other numbers are formed in the Greek system of counting. We cannot maintain that these names resemble the numbers they indicate, and we thus have no other option than to agree with the linguistic habit that they belong to these numbers.[17] The names of other numbers are derivative from the names of the simple ones and resemble numbers in this derivative sense, viz. as far as they can be reduced to elements that we assume to be

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each number. (Thus, agreement should have some authority concerning correctness.) This reconstruction not only makes the reasoning unduly elliptical, but goes against the immediate linguistic meaning of the passage: namely, that the denial of a role of agreement would render impossible the resemblance of the names to each number they refer to; on the contrary, the acceptance of agreement opens the door for resemblance.

[17] At first glance, ἐπιφέρειν implies that Socrates discusses the way the initial imposition of names for numbers and ὁμολογίαν καὶ συνθήκην should refer to the mode of this imposition by the initial creators of the name; for this meaning of ἐπιφέρειν, cf. 424 d 6. 7; e 4–5 etc. (σὴν ὁμολογίαν καὶ συνθήκην would then have the meaning like "the agreement" you spoke about). But ἐπιφέρειν is a less technical term that τίθεσθαι: for instance, at 432 e 3. 5, ἐπιφέρειν clearly has the meaning "to use a linguistic expression (sound, word, sentence) on account of a certain thing". It is thus entirely possible that in our passage Socrates is discussing not how the names of numbers were initially created, but how a competent language-speaker should interpret them in terms of naturalist theory. This can explain why he is obscure about how precisely these names were created in terms of their resemblance and non-resemblance to their referents: important is only how we today understand and use them. But it is entirely possible that the initial creator of these names operated in the same way: in the absence of names that might resemble the basic numbers, he had no other option than to select arbitrary strings of sounds for them, introducing a habit of considering these strings their names; they were not however the objects of a changeable agreement, since the whole system of further names for derivative numbers was built on the initial assignment.

appropriate to the simple numbers: for instance, if we assume that ἕν in accordance with habit is the correct name for 1 and δέκα for 10, then we can recognize in ἕνδεκα a name that resembles 11.[18] The numbers thus confirm the necessity of agreement with the habit, in the sense maintained above by means of the case of σκληρότης, as the principle additional to that of resemblance.

Now to Socrates' summarizing judgment on the main issue of the discussion. Some scholars see in this judgment an explicit signal of his apparent, though not consistent (Robinson, Schofield) departure from his earlier support of naturalism.[19] Ademollo denies that this signal is present and argues that the reader should himself come to the conclusion that naturalism has been refuted, but nevertheless finds in Socrates' words hints at the abandonment of his earlier position.[20] For all these scholars, reasoning about σκληρότης logically leads to the recognition that the similarity of name and thing is superfluous. Barney claims, on the contrary,

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[18] I agree with Sedley, who argued that the names of numbers are compatible with the naturalist principle (Sedley 2003, 142 f.), but I disagree with his proposal that the names for basic numbers resemble their referents while names for derivative ones indicate them conventionally. On the one hand, it is difficult to imagine how Socrates, who earlier assumed that letters (elementary sounds) imitate physical qualities, could claim that basic names were made of imitative sounds, too. On the other hand, I don't see why Sedley thinks that the names of derivative numbers should be indefinitely long without agreement on their composition: once the names of basic numbers have been imposed, the other numbers acquire quite naturally names that are composed of principal ones.

[19] Robinson 1955/1969, 122 (in Socrates' words, there is only a "vain regret" that the resemblance of names to things is desirable but unattainable; the contract theory is "vulgar", but, as Socrates seems to imply, has no alternative); Schofield 1982, 67–68: when discussing the word σκληρότης, the discovery that the naturalistic theory has to rely on the idea of "pure convention" creates a crucial obstacle for Socrates to accept naturalism; he still claims to endorse the idea of the resemblance of names to things as far as possible, but is aware that the price to be paid to gain confidence in it is too high.

[20] Ademollo 2011, 406–407, 418–421: although Socrates' literal words mean only a partial concession to conventionalism, the role of agreement in the understanding of the word σκληρότης could allow him to speak in favor of full conventionalism. Plato's rejection of this conclusion is necessary to keep the reader interested in the next part of the discussion, in which Socrates discusses Cratylus' thesis that knowledge of names ensures knowledge of things themselves (435 d – 439 b). The refutation of this thesis by proving that names can reflect the mistaken opinions of their creators finally opens the reader's eyes, Ademollo suggests, to the fact that names designate their referents on the basis of convention.

that Socrates, as before, expresses his commitment to naturalism, but recognizes that names, again on the basis of the case of σκληρότης, cannot fully fulfill their purpose of being derived from things.[21] Sedley argued,[22] however, that these statements by Socrates are quite consistent with the qualified form of naturalism that he defends throughout the dialogue: he assigns to agreement only the role of an additional means of designation, necessary where the resemblance of the name to the thing is for one reason or another insufficient to recognize the thing. Sedley's view seems to me in general correct, but some difficulties should be settled.

There is in fact some ambiguity in the concluding sentence of this part: ἐπεὶ ἴσως κατά γε τὸ δυνατὸν κάλλιστ' ἂν λέγοιτο ὅταν ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ ὡς πλείστοις ὁμοίοις λέγηται, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ προσήκουσιν, αἴσχιστα δὲ τοὐναντίον. This can be understood both in the sense that the language consisting of the parts that, as far as possible, resemble their referents is the principle one should follow (in imposing names and in analyzing their meaning in the existing language), but also in the sense that it is theoretically a fine principle, but it cannot be realized. The decision about which horn of this dilemma one should prefer depends on understanding the immediately preceding statement, since the discussion of the case of σκληρότης and of the numbers assign to convention only a limited role, and thus left intact the prevailing role of resemblance:

> ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκει μὲν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ὅμοια εἶναι τὰ ὀνόματα τοῖς πράγμασιν· ἀλλὰ μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς, τὸ τοῦ Ἑρμογένους, γλίσχρα ᾖ ἡ ὁλκὴ αὕτη τῆς ὁμοιότητος, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ ᾖ καὶ τῷ φορτικῷ τούτῳ προσχρῆσθαι, τῇ συνθήκῃ, εἰς ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητα.

The prima facie meaning of this sentence appears to be as follows: Socrates summarizes that he approves the principle he defended throughout the whole discussion that the names should resemble their referents as much as possible, but he admits that resemblance does not work as a single standard for indication, and it is necessary to use additionally agreement (agreement with habit) as a second and subordinate standard (see **καὶ** and **προσ**χρῆσθαι), as has already been asserted above (453 b 3–6).

Ademollo forwards quite a new interpretation both of the literal meaning of this sentence and of its theoretical import.[23] He denies that Socrates here approves resemblance as a theoretical preference.

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[21] Barney 2001, 137.
[22] Sedley 2003, 140–145.
[23] Ademollo 2011, 413–420.

He argues that ἀρέσκειν with the infinitive construction dependent on it is usually employed for the idea that Y believes X where "X" stands for a proposition. Ademollo thus proposes that Socrates refers to the factual state of affairs: he *believes* that names are "as far as possible" similar to their referents, which in turn, according to Ademollo, means that most names resemble their referents; this further construes Socrates' thought as maintaining that although most names resemble their referents, they do it imperfectly and thus they indicate the referents by means of convention, as, for instance, σκληρότης. He further interprets the words γλίσχρα ᾗ ἡ ὁλκὴ αὕτη τῆς ὁμοιότητος as meaning that "resemblance carries little weight with regard to the correctness of names" (p. 417) and comes to the view that the concluding passage on using also convention understates the results of the previous discussion – namely, that convention has already won the field entirely – because of Plato's special strategy (p. 420).

This appears to give the passage a sense that contravenes its most obvious meaning. But let us discuss Ademollo's points in sequence. First, the meaning of the ἀρέσκει phrase (ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκει μὲν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ὅμοια εἶναι τὰ ὀνόματα τοῖς πράγμασιν): I believe that he is right that the infinitive construction corresponds to the proposition that a person approves. But linguistically, it is impossible to distinguish in this construction the approval of a fact from the approval of a principle; only the context helps. At 433 c 9, for instance, Cratylus uses this construction to contravene Socrates' statement that something is a name, even if it is falsely imposed. When saying that he does not like Socrates saying this (a fact), he implies that he does not approve such a statement as a piece of doctrine. And when Socrates responds, asking him whether it appeals to him that a name is the indication of a thing, he asks him, not whether he is happy with the fact that names indicate things (there is no specific reason for Cratylus to be happy with this trivial thing), but whether he admits that it is their standard role. Grant that it is impossible to maintain formally whether Socrates regards resemblance as a fact of language or as a norm of it, the next sentence, which maintains the principle of resemblance as the norm (ἐπεὶ ἴσως κατά γε τὸ δυνατὸν κάλλιστ' ἂν λέγοιτο ὅταν ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ ὡς πλείστοις ὁμοίοις λέγηται, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ προσήκουσιν, αἴσχισται δὲ τοὐναντίον), acquires the decisive role for the meaning of the sentence we are discussing. Moreover, Ademollo's understanding of κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ὅμοια εἶναι τὰ ὀνόματα τοῖς πράγμασιν as "most names resemble their referents", implausible by itself, is refuted by the meaning of κατά γε τὸ δυνατὸν in the next sentence: in both cases Socrates says that he approves that the names should resemble their referents as far as possible.

Now to the second part of the sentence:

> ἀλλὰ μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς, τὸ τοῦ Ἑρμογένους, γλίσχρα ᾖ ἡ ὁλκὴ αὕτη τῆς ὁμοιότητος, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ ᾖ καὶ τῷ φορτικῷ τούτῳ προσχρῆσθαι, τῇ συνθήκῃ, εἰς ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητα.

This is the difficult item. Some scholars take this phrase as undermining the principle of resemblance. After an interesting discussion, Ademollo comes to the following sense: *this* resemblance (viz. the one referred to in the preceding sentence) carries little weight with regard to the correctness of names (p. 415–417). Now, the adjective γλίσχρος has the literal meaning 'sticky', 'glutinous', with further development in different directions – on the one hand, 'clinging fast', as metaphor for thorough or excessively thorough work, and, on the other, to 'greedy' or 'stingy' persons, and from this to 'cheap' things (Ademollo prefers this latter meaning). But "this", αὕτη, in the sentence we are discussing, does not modify resemblance as such, but ἡ ὁλκή, the "dragging" of resemblance. Hermogenes reacted with γλίσχρως to Socrates' overly bold restoration of the initial form of the word. It is thus less probable that Socrates alludes here to the insignificance of resemblance as such (this is certainly not the point Hermogenes made) than to the strained character of some etymologies, and ἡ ὁλκή also favors this option. Socrates is thus paying a tribute to Hermogenes' criticism: this "dragging" of resemblance turns out to be "sticky", i.e., it would be far-fetched to claim resemblance for every name and to search for strained etymologies.[24] This sentence does not attack resemblance as a principle: Socrates merely says that we should not unduly press resemblance in every case; when the resemblance of the name to the thing cannot be safely maintained, it is necessary to be satisfied with a competent language-speaker's agreement with the meaning of this name as constituted by habit. Note that agreement features as "base", "inelegant" (τῷ φορτικῷ τούτῳ), which should not be taken as ironic. Although as I argued this is about agreement with the obscured will of the name-giver, not about conventional agreement, it is not a principle that Plato admires, but one he thinks will inevitably be appealed to.

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[24] Reeve translates it: "I fear that defending this view is like hauling a ship up a sticky ramp, as Hermogenes suggested". This seems to be correct in respect of the immediate metaphoric meaning, but the metaphor Socrates uses is related not to the defense of naturalism, which was not Hermogenes' point, but to the undue defense of resemblance in particular cases. Shorey 1933, 265 rightly renders the meaning of the sentence with its hint at Hermogenes' remark and objects (p. 570) to Jowett's translation "the force of resemblance is a mean thing".

The concluding remark corresponds entirely to this reasoning:

> ἐπεὶ ἴσως κατά γε τὸ δυνατὸν κάλλιστ᾽ ἂν λέγοιτο ὅταν ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ ὡς
> πλείστοις ὁμοίοις λέγηται, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ προσήκουσιν, αἴσχιστα δὲ
> τοὐναντίον.

At first glance it simply reformulates the principle as it was already stated earlier. Reeve, for instance, translates ὁμοίοις as modifying the implied "names". But there is no need to suppose a tautological statement: ὁμοίοις can imply all parts of language and thus refer back to Socrates' summary of the results of his discussion of resemblance with Cratylus (432 d 11 – 433 a 6). According to it, not only can a name contain some inappropriate letters, but also a sentence can contain some inappropriate words, provided that they preserve general resemblance to their referents: the best way of saying something will be by means of all appropriate elements, the worst by means of only a few. This general principle thus remains valid after achieving the new insights into the inevitable role that agreement plays in indication. The sentence justifies (ἐπεί) why agreement should be used only when resemblance is unattainable. This is the case because the best possible way is to use the parts of language that resemble things as much as is possible. Notice that not only the standard itself remains valid; it is also the working standard, contrary to the "pessimistic" understanding of Socrates' naturalism; it would be useless to distinguish between best and worst in respect of resemblance, if Socrates' final position were a pessimistic retreat to arbitrary names because resemblance is desirable, but unattainable.

Ademollo, unlike Robinson and Schofield, admits that Socrates' very statements summarizing his reasoning in this part of the dialogue (435 b 2 – c 6) do not mean literally that naturalism is refuted, but merely concede to convention some role in indicating things, along with resemblance. Ademollo suggests that Socrates, as a character in the dialogue in this part of the conversation, is not yet conscious of what is clear to Plato himself and what should be clear to a competent reader. According to Ademollo, it is only in the final part, after Socrates has demonstrated that words cannot serve as a reliable source of knowledge of things, that conventionalism triumphs definitively: "for if a name may convey false information about its referent, then clearly it can only indicate its referent by convention".[25]

Now it is true that in discussing the case of σκληρότης, Socrates, in connection with it and similar words, does speak of "correctness according

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[25] Ademollo 2011, 419; cf. 2022, 41.

to agreement" (435 a 8, b 6 – c 7), that is, that the use of a name is governed by agreement and not determined by resemblance to a thing. Agreement, then, serves to make up for lack of similarity or to substitute for similarity where it is unattainable, and, at least in this respect, does not in any way, no matter how one understands agreement here, undermine the principle of similarity as a standard for language on the whole. Ademollo is apparently inclined to regard the mistaken names in the final part of the *Cratylus* as something along the same lines. In reality, however, the word σκληρότης is erroneous only in terms of inadequately conveying the language creator's correct judgment about the thing in question, whereas the names in the final section are erroneous because they reflect their creators' false judgments about the world. However, the existence of names in a language that reflect the language creators' mistaken opinions about certain things does not mean that Plato regards all names are mistaken in this sense. Still less does the existence of such words undermine the naturalistic principle itself, based for Plato not on what language actually is, but on the standard to which names must conform according to their purpose, to instruct about the true properties of the things they indicate.

To summarize, the final part of the discussion of the issue of naturalism versus conventionalism does not show any signs that the former principle is abandoned in favor of the latter. The yielding to conventionalism, as I argued, in the case of "agreement", is even less important than is usually understood. According to Socrates, the lack of the name's resemblance to the thing should be compensated not by appeal to convention, viz. the arbitrary agreement of mediocre language-speakers as in Hermogenes' view, but by appeal to the agreement of the competent language-speaker, to linguistic habit. The universal authority of the latter suggests that interlocutors view it as fixing the ancient and permanent bond, created by the ancient name-giver, between the name and the thing it indicates. It also appears plausible that habit owes its permanence to the initial resemblance of names created by name-givers to things, which persists in language in spite of its partial obscuring by later developments. This moderate yielding to "agreement and habit" (not to be confused with conventional agreement) corresponds entirely to Socrates' following summary of the discussion: the naturalist principle of resemblance is not abandoned in theory or practice, but only supplemented by a necessary appeal to habit for the names whose initial resemblance to the things they indicate has been obscured.

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The second part of the article, dealing with the question of Plato's own position in the discussion of naturalism and conventionalism in the *Cratylus* (for part I, see *Hyperboreus* 29: 2 [2022] 196–233), continues with an analysis of a key point in the discussion between Socrates and Cratylus (434 a – 435 c). Cratylus argues that when the descriptive properties of a word conflict with each other and thus make it impossible to establish which "thing" such a word denotes, a competent native speaker capable of analyzing such properties is forced to follow linguistic habit like ordinary speakers. Socrates points out that following the linguistic habit with which a competent native speaker is forced to "agree" is nothing but understanding a word that is *dissimilar* to its referent. This in turn entails, in accordance with the dilemma of the whole discussion, that understanding in such cases can be based only on a "contract", or "agreement" stipulating the meaning of a word, with the competent speaker negotiating it with himself. Cratylus' forced agreement that contract plays a role in linguistic communication is usually understood by scholars as a partial concession to conventionalism on the part of Plato himself, or even as evidence that Plato fully supports the arguments of conventionalism and sees no need for words that have similarities with their referents.

The article substantiates a different understanding of this part of the dialogue. It argues that Socrates agrees with Cratylus in treating linguistic habit as an

independent factor in linguistic communication: understanding a word on the basis of habit does not need a word to resemble its referent through the descriptive and "mimetic" capacities of words; however it does not follow that the meaning of such words derives from the arbitrary "agreement" by which any arbitrary name can be assigned to any thing and at any moment change its name, as according to the theory of Hermogenes. The "agreement" of the competent native speaker with the meaning that a word possesses according to habit applies, first, only to a limited category of words that have no resemblance to their referents (in this the author of the article agrees with David Sedley's understanding). Plato does not mean that understanding according to habit should make the similarity of a word to its referent superfluous: the highest purpose of words is their philosophical purpose as "instruments" for distinguishing the essential properties of things, while linguistic habit provides only knowledge of what a word refers to, but not of the properties of this referent.

Second, the "agreement with oneself" by which a competent native speaker is forced to agree to habit in the course of communication differs significantly from the arbitrary contract of *assigning* meaning to words in Hermogenes' theory. Socrates' argument does not assume that linguistic habit arises from such an establishment of meaning that makes any people, even the most mediocre ones, creators of language. On the contrary, his reasoning about the word σκληρότης is based on the premise that this word was created by one of the wise creators of language who strove to create words similar to the things they designate. This implies that the similarity was either not achieved, through error, or was lost in the course of the long history of language; the habit has nevertheless preserved the word's connection to the thing to which the word was assigned by a "lawgiver" of language (apparently by virtue of his high authority), although the sound composition of the word does not allow us to define this thing by virtue of its intrinsic properties. Following the linguistic habit should thus be understood as an imperfect kind of linguistic communication, a forced retreat from the principles of naturalism, but not as a concession to conventionalism or even as Plato's acknowledgment of its victory.

Во второй части статьи, посвященной позиции самого Платона в дискуссии о натурализме и конвенционализме в *Кратиле* (часть I см. *Hyperboreus* 29: 2 [2023] 196–233), продолжается разбор ключевого места в дискуссии Сократа и Кратила (434 a – 435 c). Кратил утверждает, что в тех случаях, когда дескриптивные или мимические свойства слова конфликтуют между собой и не позволяют установить, какую "вещь" обозначает подобное слово, компетентный носитель языка, способный к анализу подобных свойств, вынужден следовать за языковым узусом, подобно заурядным носителям языка. Сократ доказывает, что следование языковому узусу, с которым вынужден "согласиться" компетентный носитель языка, есть ничто иное, как понимание слова, несходного со своим денотатом. Это в свою очередь предполагает, в соответствии с дилеммой всей дискуссии, что понимание в подобных случаях может основываться лишь на "договоре" о значении слова, причем

компетентный носитель языка договаривается при этом сам с собой. Вынужденное согласие Кратила с тем, что "договор" играет определенную роль в языковой коммуникации, обычно понимается исследователями диалога как частичная уступка конвенционализму со стороны самого Платона или даже как свидетельство того, что Платон полностью поддерживает доводы конвенционализма и не видит необходимости в словах, обладающих подобием со своими денотатами.

В статье обосновывается иное понимание этой части диалога. Доказывается, что Сократ согласен с Кратилом в трактовке языкового узуса как самостоятельного фактора в языковой коммуникации: понимание слова на основе узуса не нуждается в сходстве слова с его денотатом благодаря дескриптивным или миметическим свойствам слов. Из этого, однако, не следует, что значение подобных слов восходит к произвольному "договору", посредством которого можно присвоить любое имя любой вещи и в любой момент изменить ее именование, как предполагает теория Гермогена. "Договор" компетентного носителя языка с тем значением, которым слово обладает согласно узусу, относится, во-первых, лишь к ограниченной категории слов, которые не обладают сходством со своим денотатом (в этом автор статьи согласен с пониманием Д. Седли); Платон не имеет в виду, что понимание согласно узусу должно сделать полностью излишним сходство слова с его денотатом: высшее назначение слов состоит в их философском назначении как "орудий" для различения сущностных свойств вещей, а языковой узус обеспечивает лишь знание самого денотата слова, вещи, на которую указывает слово, но не ее свойств.

Во-вторых, "договор с самим собой", посредством которого компетентный носитель языка вынужден согласиться с узусом в ходе коммуникации, существенно отличается от произвольного договора о *присвоении* слову значения в теории Гермогена. Аргументация Сократа не предполагает, что языковой узус восходит к подобному установлению значений, в котором могут участвовать любые, самые заурядные носители языка. Напротив, в основе его рассуждения о слове σκληρότης лежит посылка, что это слово было создано одним из мудрых творцов языка, стремившихся к созданию слов, подобных обозначаемых ими вещам, но это сходство либо было не достигнуто в силу ошибки, либо было утрачено в ходе длительной истории языка; узус, тем не менее, сохранил связь слова с вещью, которой присвоил это слово "законодатель" языка (очевидно, в силу его высокого авторитета), хотя звуковой состав слова не позволяет определить эту вещь в силу его внутренних свойств. Следование языковому обычаю следует, таким образом, понимать как несовершенный вид языковой коммуникации, вынужденное отступление от принципов натурализма, но не как уступку конвенционализму или даже признание его победы со стороны Платона.

Marco Donato

ARISTOTLE'S 'PLATONIC' EGYPT[*]

> ὦ Σώκρατες, ῥᾳδίως σὺ Αἰγυπτίους καὶ
> ὁποδαποὺς ἂν ἐθέλῃς λόγους ποιεῖς.
>
> Pl. *Phdr.* 275 b 3–4

§ 1. Scientific vs. 'Mythical' Egypt

The presence of Egypt in Aristotle's work is quantitatively important, as a glance at Bonitz's index[1] or a quick search of the online *TLG* will show. However, most of the references to Egypt and Egyptian culture and people in the extant corpus are scattered pieces of information used by the Stagirite in his scientific research,[2] and consist, for example, of reports on the presence of certain animals (e.g. hippopotamus *HA* 502 a 10, crocodile 503 a 1, ichneumon 612 a 16, white and black ibis 617 b 29–31) or on certain phenomena related to animals (e.g. *HA* 562 b 25–26, 608 b 32–35), references to customs and rites such as the cult of Apis (*EE* 1215 b 37 – 1216 a 2), mummification (*EE* 1235 b 1–2), or scant traces of political history such as the building of the pyramids (*Pol.* 1313 b 21–22). Most of this material arguably comes from ethnographic and historical sources, and Herodotus' influence is evident (see e.g. the anecdote in *Rh.* 1417 a 5–7).

There is, however, another function performed by Egypt in the Aristotelian corpus, which is more interesting philosophically and conceives of Egyptian civilization as an imaginary construct, making it the paradigm of a unified cultural and historical horizon to be opposed, contrasted or simply compared with the Greek world. We can therefore speak of

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[1] Bonitz ²1961, 14.

[2] See the Appendix.

a 'scientific' and of a 'mythical' presence of Egypt in Aristotle's works: this 'mythical' Egypt, which can be understood as complementary to the 'scientific' one more often referred to in technical works,[3] allows Aristotle to situate in space and time, if only approximately, the discussion of problems such as the origins of practices and discoveries and the transmission of knowledge through time.

This paper aims to examine the main passages in which the imaginary and mythical presence of Egypt is evident, in order to investigate the background and influences of Aristotle's reflections on memory and time through Egyptian examples. As we will try to show, the legacy of Plato's use of Egypt in the dialogues is manifest in all of these references, Plato's Egypt being the filter through which the Stagirite rediscovers the Egyptian model as a cultural construct and a literary device.

§ 2. Time: Antiquity

The most important element in the 'mythical' representation of Egypt that we find in Aristotle's works is the venerable antiquity of the Egyptians as a civilization. Even if, as Diogenes Laertius (1. 8) reports, in the *Περὶ φιλο-σοφίας* Aristotle had affirmed that the Magi were older than the Egyptians (fr. 6 Rose[3]),[4] primacy in πρεσβύτης is more often strongly assigned to the latter in the corpus. The two key passages referring to the venerable antiquity of Egyptian civilization are in the *Meteorologica* and in the *Politics*.

The short text of the *Meteorologica* (1. 352 b 20–22) comes right after a longer section on the climatic changes that led to the physical formation of Lower Egypt, a passage to which we will return later on. What Aristotle insists on is that the land in which the Egyptians actually live was created

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[3] As we will see, the two approaches are sometimes intertwined, for example in the discovery of sciences such as astronomy or mathematics. Scientific data concerning the reproduction of animals and the fertility of the land (cf. e.g. *HA* 562 b 25–26, 584 b 6–10, 584 b 31; fr. 284 Rose[3] [=280 Gigon]) are certainly influenced by the imaginary construct of the fertility of the Nile region: see Froidefond 1971, 344.

[4] The fact that Diogenes Laertius underlines that, according to this tradition, the Magi were said to be "even more ancient than the Egyptians" (καὶ πρεσβυτέρους εἶναι τῶν Αἰγυπτίων), suggests that Aristotle consciously created a hyperbole by comparing the Magi to the civilization which was usually considered the most ancient of all. On possible influences from Eudoxus and the Academy on *Περὶ φιλοσοφίας*, see Untersteiner 1963, 82–84, Chroust 1965, 575–579, Froidefond 1971, 345; Aristotle's knowledge of Zoroastrianism and the problem of his presumed work entitled Μαγικός is discussed by Rives 2004.

by the Nile, but in passing he reminds the reader that the Egyptians are "the most ancient of men" (ἀρχαιοτάτους … τῶν ἀνθρώπων). As the Stagirite explained in the previous section (351 b 9 – 352 a 17), a relatively recent development of the Nile Valley does not call into question the venerable antiquity of the Egyptians, as they were originally settled in the southern part of the region.

The antiquity of Egyptian civilization is definitely more important in Book 7 of the *Politics*, where Aristotle traces back to Egypt the origin of the separation of castes and, apparently, of all political institution.[5] After having explained that the division of citizenship into γένη is common to Egypt and to Crete, where it was introduced by Sesostris and Minos respectively, the Stagirite develops a digression on several discoveries in human history, assuming that it is undeniable that the priority in the discovery of this organization of the state must be assigned to the Egyptian civilization, since "the reign of Sesostris is of far greater antiquity than that of Minos" (1329 b 23–24).[6] But this does not imply that Minos was inspired by Egyptian laws, since "these and many other things have been invented several times over in the course of ages, or rather times without number" (1329 b 25–27).[7] The development that follows is of particular interest (1329 b 27–33):

> τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖα τὴν χρείαν διδάσκειν εἰκὸς αὐτήν, τὰ δ' εἰς εὐσχημοσύνην καὶ περιουσίαν ὑπαρχόντων ἤδη τούτων εὔλογον λαμβάνειν τὴν αὔξησιν· ὥστε καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας οἴεσθαι δεῖ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον. ὅτι δὲ πάντα ἀρχαῖα, σημεῖον τὰ περὶ Αἴγυπτόν ἐστιν· οὗτοι γὰρ ἀρχαιότατοι μὲν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, νόμων δὲ τετυχήκασιν ἀεὶ[8] καὶ τάξεως πολιτικῆς.

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[5] The whole passage has sometimes been suspected of being an interpolation: for a discussion see Newman 1887, 573–575. Even if we assume that the text is not in its place, there is no proof that Aristotle was not its author, and it can be argued for a general coherence with the rest of the *Politics*: see Weil 1960, 306–308; Schütrumpf 2005, 388–393.

[6] An informed discussion of the historiographical context and Aristotle's aim in this passage can be found in Bertelli's note in Bertelli–Canevaro–Curnis 2022, 391–395.

[7] On this emblematic Aristotelian hypothesis of the polygenetic nature of discoveries, the principles of which are set out in *Metaph.* α 1. 993 a 30 – b 5, see Weil 1960, 328–329 n. 8, with parallels.

[8] ἀεί is an integration independently proposed by Bernays and Susemihl – cf. Susemihl ³1894, 139 – and then adopted by most editions. Without the adverb, the sense would be slightly different, allowing for a period in which the Egyptians

> For necessity may be supposed to have taught men the inventions which were absolutely required, and when these were provided, it was natural that other things which would adorn and enrich life should grow up by degrees. And we may infer that in political institutions the same rule holds. Egypt witnesses to the antiquity of all these things, for the Egyptians appear to be of all people the most ancient; and they have laws and a regular constitution existing from time immemorial.[9]

The first part of the argument, which outlines a 'heurematic' history of the evolution of mankind, finds a relevant and famous parallel in the first book of the *Metaphysics*, as we will see. In the second part, Aristotle cites the history of Egypt as evidence that the emergence of political order cannot be dated. If the Egyptians, the most ancient known civilization, have no memory of a time in which they were not governed by law, this means that the existence of a πολιτικὴ τάξις is to be imagined as one of the first and spontaneous acquisitions of mankind.[10] Egypt's remote, timeless antiquity is used as an image to convey the Aristotelian idea that every human community is naturally led to develop a 'constitutional' and political order.

Through this manipulation of the Egyptian example, Aristotle is already in dialogue, if only implicitly, with Plato's account in the *Timaeus*. While strongly reaffirming the historical primacy of the Egyptians and their legislation, the account of the *Politics* tacitly challenges the fictional chronology put into the mouth of the Egyptian priest, according to which the ancient city of Athens was founded a thousand years before Sais (*Ti.* 23 d 4–e 5).[11] Moreover, as regards the distinction of social γένη, Aristotle contradicts the very possibility of establishing a form of dependence between Egypt's class-system and possible Greek parallels, be it in the sense of a derivation of the Laconian constitutions from the

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would have lived without a political constitution: for a defence of the text of the manuscripts, see Schütrumpf 2005, 400. The necessity of integrating ἀεί is defended by Kraut 1997, 112.

   [9] Translations of Aristotle are reproduced from the revised Oxford translation edited by Barnes 1984. Occasional changes are indicated.

   [10] For a different interpretation of the passage, see Kraut 1997, 112: the Egyptians preserve no memory of the origin or development of their constitution. However, this reading seems to be contradicted by the references to Sesostris as a legendary legislator in the text.

   [11] For the complex relative chronology of Athens and Sais in the *Timaeus*, and the place of the war against Atlantis in this timeline, see Gill [2]2017, 113–114, and Nesselrath 2006, 114.

Egyptian system,[12] or, as Plato has his Solon learn, in that of an Egyptian imitation of an original Athenian model (*Ti.* 24 a 2 – b 3), which was made to correspond to the philosopher's own tripartite elaboration in the *Republic*.[13] While Plato used the venerable antiquity of Egypt to present his history as more ancient than the oldest civilization known to Greece, Aristotle restores the correct order in the *Politics* and, opening himself to the polygenetic discovery of political arrangements, excludes any possible historical interference between Egypt and Greece.

§ 3. Time: Leisure

We have seen how, in the same passage, the introduction of Egyptian history is combined with the outline of a 'heurematology' developed in two steps: the first human discoveries were things that were necessary (1329 b 27), and only afterwards were other practices and things developed that concerned the embellishment and enrichment of existence. This sequence is bound to remind the reader of a more famous 'heurematic' passage in Book A of the *Metaphysics*, a text which introduces a notorious and debated mention of Egypt (981 b 13–25).[14] Wisdom (σοφία), says Aristotle, was attributed to the inventors of the necessary arts not only because of the utility of their findings, but above all because through their discovery they demonstrated a superior capacity for understanding (981 b 13–17). This is shown by the fact that admiration for the inventors

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[12] This had been clearly affirmed, for instance, by Isocrates in the *Busiris* (17–18): on the ancient *quaestio*, already known to Herodotus (2. 167), cf. Livingstone 2001, 139–140. Aristotle's position is summarized by Bertelli in Bertelli–Canevaro–Curnis 2022, 396–397. It should be added that the expressions suggesting derivation (1329 b 22, ἐντεῦθεν, and 1329 b 24, ἐξ Αἰγύπτου) must be interpreted figuratively: see the discussion on *Metaph.* A 981 b 20–25 *infra*, in which we find a similar use of ὅθεν.

[13] Cf. Brisson 2000, 162–163; Herodotus knew of seven classes (2. 164), and Isocrates' account in the *Busiris* (15–22), while possibly influenced by Plato – cf. Livingstone 2001, 48–56 – is not explicit about the tripartite structure. On the possible relationship between the *Timaeus–Critias* and the *Busiris*, see Livingstone 2001, 66–73, and Vasunia 2010, 227–229, and also *infra*. The coherence between the outline of ancient Athens and Socrates' call at the beginning of the *Timaeus*, to 'set in motion' the ideal state of the *Republic*, is explored in detail by Regali 2012, 71–77.

[14] Another interesting parallel is provided by fr. 53 Rose[3] [≈ 74. 1 Gigon] (*apud* Iambl. *Comm. Math.* p. 83 l. 6–22 Festa), alternatively attributed to the *Protrepticus* or to the Περὶ φιλοσοφίας, but the attribution to Aristotle has been disputed: see the discussion in Verlinsky 2018, 145–146 n. 23.

of disciplines is, in fact, inversely proportional to the usefulness of these disciplines. We must therefore imagine that the discovery of the 'unnecessary' arts, which are directed towards recreation, was greeted with more praise than the inventions driven by necessity (981 b 17–20). Aristotle then moves on to the arts which have no other aim than study and knowledge (981 b 20–25):

> πλειόνων δ' εὑρισκομένων τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν μὲν πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα τῶν δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν οὐσῶν, ἀεὶ σοφωτέρους τοὺς τοιούτους ἐκείνων ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς χρῆσιν εἶναι τὰς ἐπιστήμας αὐτῶν. ὅθεν ἤδη πάντων τῶν τοιούτων κατεσκευασμένων αἱ μὴ πρὸς ἡδονὴν μηδὲ πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εὑρέθησαν, καὶ πρῶτον ἐν τούτοις τοῖς τόποις οὗπερ ἐσχόλασαν· διὸ περὶ Αἴγυπτον αἱ μαθηματικαὶ πρῶτον τέχναι συνέστησαν, ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἀφείθη σχολάζειν τὸ τῶν ἱερέων ἔθνος.

> But as more arts were invented, and some were directed to the necessities of life, others to its recreation, the inventors of the latter were always regarded as wiser than the inventors of the former, because their branches of knowledge did not aim at utility. Hence, when all such things were already provided,[15] the sciences which do not aim at giving pleasure or at the necessities of life were discovered, and first in the places where men had leisure.[16] This is why the mathematical arts were founded in Egypt; for there the priestly caste was allowed to be at leisure.

Aristotle's argument is not entirely linear,[17] but its content is clear enough: the progressive discovery of the sciences and arts led to the development of forms of knowledge that had no immediate utility. These sciences first appeared in places where men were allowed to have leisure: in Egypt, the caste system, whose remote origins are mentioned in the *Politics*, allowed the priests to discover mathematics. As is well known, a fierce debate has arisen about the accuracy of Aristotle's information and its value for the history of ancient science, mostly in opposition to Herodotus' account of the practical origins of geometry.[18] But it should

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[15] On the translation of ἤδη πάντων τῶν τοιούτων (981 b 20–21), see Verlinsky 2018, 140.

[16] I am adapting the translation to the text edited by Primavesi 2012, 470; see the discussion in Verlinsky 2018, 158–161.

[17] See Verlinsky 2018 for a detailed analysis.

[18] For an overview of this notorious *quaestio*, see Verlinsky 2018, 135–137.

be kept in mind that the passage from the *Metaphysics* does not aim to provide a factual reconstruction of the circumstances leading to the introduction of the arts. In fact, by introducing this primordial, remote Egypt where αἱ μαθηματικαὶ τέχναι were first discovered, Aristotle seems to be doing just the opposite, that is signalling to the reader that he is not pretending to historical accuracy, but articulating in a mythical and narrative form what is essentially a distinction between types of knowledge: his 'heurematology' is thus exposed as a literary construction in order to present a static tripartition that allows us to locate this specific form of knowledge Aristotle is looking for, which can be identified with 'wisdom' (σοφία).

If our general analysis is correct, we can trace here a powerful application of the 'mythical' Egypt we identified at the beginning: the Egyptian horizon provides a background of venerable antiquity for the higher consideration given to the 'free' theoretical sciences as compared to applied knowledge. Because of its paradigmatic antiquity, Egypt is the perfect setting for indicating a past which is more a matter of abstraction than of chronological precision. So when we discover that the 'heurematic' priority of Egypt was not limited to the invention of things of primary importance for human life (a fact established in the *Politics*, as we have seen), when we realize that this priority also concerns the theoretical sciences, we are led to see that the picture drawn by Aristotle is probably to be understood as being more outside history than before it, exactly as it happens with Plato.[19] Aristotle uses Egypt to introduce the primary necessity of leisure (σχολή) for theoretical observation and the relationship between the ἐλευθερία of science and the σχολή of human beings, a theme already discussed by Plato.[20] In fact, Aristotle follows a similar pattern to Plato's Socrates in the *Phaedrus*, who sets the invention of writing against an Egyptian backdrop,[21] in order to develop his own reflection on the relationship between the written word and philosophical discourse.

Despite the conciseness of the passage, it is perhaps possible to detect a deeper Platonic influence: Aristotle implies that what enables this leisure to give birth to science is a specific form of political organization which, as we have seen, he thinks Egypt was the first civilization to introduce,

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[19] On Plato's use of Egypt as a 'uchronia', see Froidefond 1971, 291–294; similar considerations can be found in Vasunia 2010, 223–226.

[20] Cf. Bénatouïl 2020, 119–158.

[21] The theme of Egypt as a 'civilization of writing' also appears in Aristotle, as we will see *infra*.

namely the division of society into classes.[22] A similar link between the Egyptian constitution and the invention of the sciences can be found in Plato's *Timaeus* (24 b 7 – c 3): it is the νόμος (24 b 7) that Athena gave to the Egyptians that helped them to develop knowledge in divine matters and to apply that knowledge to human matters (24 c 2–3, ἐκ τούτων θείων ὄντων εἰς τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀνευρών), down to the specific arts of divination and medicine (24 c 1–2, μέχρι μαντικῆς καὶ ἰατρικῆς). The importance of the σχολή given to the priests, a theme actually absent but implicit in the *Timaeus*,[23] is echoed in the *Critias*, but this time in relation to the creation of myths and research into the past (110 a 3–4: μυθολογία γὰρ ἀναζήτησίς τε τῶν παλαιῶν μετὰ σχολῆς ἅμ' ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις ἔρχεσθον). Another antecedent, as is well known, is Isocrates' praise of the freedom given to Egyptian priests in the *Busiris* (21–22),[24] a passage to which Plato himself responds playfully in the section of the *Timaeus* that we have quoted.[25]

There can be no doubt that Aristotle was well aware of all these texts and of the various implications that the image of archaic Egypt had for thinking about political structures and their impact on the development of knowledge. Still, he does not mention science in general, nor does he repeat the examples provided by Isocrates in the *Busiris* and Plato in the *Timaeus*. Rather, he chooses to mention 'the mathematical arts', and this in a context where the reader expects to find philosophy. It is perhaps not unreasonable to see in this choice another subtle influence of his Platonic approach to the Egyptian tradition: on the one hand, mathematics – and specifically the theoretical mathematics which Aristotle attributes to ancient Egypt – are propaedeutic disciplines in the education of the philosopher in the *Republic*. The disciplines of arithmetic, geometry and astronomy – three of the arts of this educational program – are listed among the inventions of Theuth in the *Phaedrus* (274 c 8 – d 1), but Plato associates mathematics not only with his mythical Egypt, but also

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[22] Cf. Froidefond 1971, 346–347.

[23] In the *Timaeus* (22 a), the intellectual elite of the Egyptians is clearly represented by the same sacerdotal caste of which Aristotle praises the freedom to dispose of their time. This was an innovation compared to the account in Herodotus' *Histories*: see Verlinsky 2018, 161–162.

[24] Aristotle's text has sometimes been interpreted as a reprise (or a correction) of Isocrates: see Cambiano 2012, 35–36. On the importance of σχολή in the *Critias* and the role of Plato in the debate, see also Froidefond 1971, 310.

[25] See Livingstone 2001, 66–67, specifically for the passage on the invention of sciences.

with the historical one. In *Laws*, Book 7, he cites Egyptian customs as a positive model for teaching the rudiments of mathematics to the citizens of the state from a very young age (819 a 8 – d 3), a choice that frees people "from the deep-rooted ignorance, at once comic and shocking, that all men display in this field" (819 d 1–3).[26]

On the other hand, Aristotle's limitation of Egypt's discoveries to propaedeutic disciplines such as are mathematics diminishes the importance of the reference to this "barbarian" wisdom in the definition of the genuine σοφία sought in the *Metaphysics*, that is to say the science of primary causes and principles: in *Metaphysics* A, all discussion of the history of "this kind of research" (983 b 20–21: τῆς τοιαύτης … φιλοσοφίας) is based on the Greek tradition. This echoes the ambiguous praise found in Plato's dialogues, both in the *Timaeus*, where the positive aspects of the Egyptian constitution are attributed to the influence of the mythical Athens of the past, and elsewhere in the *corpus*.[27]

To conclude this discussion of the *Metaphysics*: the possibility cannot be excluded that, in referring to αἱ μαθηματικαὶ τέχναι, Aristotle had in mind astronomy in addition to arithmetic and geometry, in accordance with the *Phaedrus*. Be that as it may, the eminence of Egyptian astronomy is affirmed in Book 2 of *De caelo* (292 a 7–9), in which the Egyptians, together with the Babylonians, are cited as an ancient and reliable source on each of the stars. In this detail too, Aristotle follows a Platonic-Academic tradition, as shown by the *Epinomis* attributed to Plato,[28] where Egypt and Syria are mentioned as the regions from which the observation of the stars originated, due to the optimal conditions of their sky in the summer, which makes it possible to see each and every one of the celestial bodies (986 e 9 – 987 a 6).[29]

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[26] See Froidefond 1971, 309–315.

[27] Cf. *e.g. Lg.* 747 c–d, on Egyptian and Phoenician πανουργία. On this ambiguity in Plato's treatment of Egypt, see Brisson 2000, esp. 160–161, 166, and already Froidefond 1971, 337–340.

[28] The Platonic authorship of the *Epinomis* was already doubted in Antiquity and nowadays the dialogue is considered spurious. Diogenes Laertius (3. 37) knew of an attribution to Philip of Opus, which is generally accepted by scholars: see Aronadio in Aronadio–Petrucci–Tulli 2013, 173–178; *contra* see Brisson 2005, 21–23.

[29] The *Epinomis* is here part – or possibly the origin – of a wider tradition: see the commentary by Aronadio in Aronadio–Petrucci–Tulli 2013, 372, underlining that Philip, just as we have seen in Plato, wishes to uphold the superiority of Greek culture, as shown just a few lines later by the assertion that the Greeks "have a situation which is about the most favourable to human excellence" (987 d 3–5), a statement reminiscent of *Ti.* 24 c–d. Aristotle, for his part, is not content to repeat

§ 4. Remembering the Past

The mythical and immemorial past evoked by the Egyptian setting is naturally connected to the issue of memory. In this context, we find another sign of the strong influence of the Platonic view of Egypt on Aristotle, and we can specify the use that Aristotle makes of Plato's Egypt as a way of talking about the persistence and transmission of human knowledge.

As we have seen from Book 7 of the *Politics*, Aristotle is perfectly at ease with the theory of independent discoveries, even in the case of spheres as complex as political constitutions. This multiplicity is conceived not only in relation to space, which allows him to suggest, for example, that the Cretans "rediscovered" the division of society already practiced in Egypt, but also in relation to time. Within the same area or civilization, the same thing can be discovered more than once, after a kind of oblivion. Scholars have underlined that this idea stems from the Platonic theory of natural cataclysms, as laid out in the *Timaeus* (22 b – 23 a) and in the *Laws* (3. 676 a – 680 b),[30] but that for Aristotle the slow passage of a long period of time is in itself a force of progressive oblivion.[31] This could have an important consequence: similar dynamics cannot be thought of as sparing people on the basis of their geographical location but should affect more or less everyone. Remarkably, the case of Egypt is explicitly treated by Aristotle in the work in which he deals with these problems most extensively, the *Meteorologica*.

In Book 1, Aristotle expounds his theory of climatic and geographical change on the surface of the earth, arguing for a general regularity and gradualness in such large-scale phenomena of this kind. This involves a well-known dialectic between moist and dry,[32] so that "where there was dry land there comes to be sea, and where there is now sea, there one day comes to be dry land" (351 a 23–25). But such changes develop over periods of time so immense compared with the length of human life that entire civilizations vanish before any traces of their course are recorded (351 b 8–13), nor can their development be reconstructed through the movements of populations associated with these changes,

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the astronomical ideas of the Egyptians, but, when referring to them, stresses the importance of the confirmation brought by experience (cf. *Mete.* 1. 343 b 9–11, 343 b 28–32). See also Froidefond 1971, 317–323. The Egyptians' primacy in astronomy was already hinted at by Herodotus (2. 4).

[30] On Plato's theory of cataclysms, see Long 2021, 55–60.
[31] See Weil 1960, 328–331.
[32] See Wilson 2013, 169–178.

since these too, Aristotle continues, escape historical memory because of their slowness (351 b 22–25). It is in this context that the Stagirite gives the example of Egypt, in a passage which requires closer examination (351 b 22 – 352 a 2):

τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον χρὴ νομίζειν καὶ τοὺς κατοικισμοὺς λανθάνειν πότε πρῶτον ἐγένοντο τοῖς ἔθνεσιν ἑκάστοις εἰς τὰ μεταβάλλοντα καὶ γιγνόμενα ξηρὰ ἐξ ἑλωδῶν καὶ ἐνύδρων· καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα κατὰ μικρὸν ἐν πολλῷ γίγνεται χρόνῳ ἡ ἐπίδοσις, ὥστε μὴ μνημονεύειν τίνες πρῶτοι καὶ πότε καὶ πῶς ἐχόντων ἦλθον τῶν τόπων, οἷον συμβέβηκεν καὶ τὰ περὶ Αἴγυπτον· καὶ γὰρ οὗτος ἀεὶ ξηρότερος ὁ τόπος φαίνεται γιγνόμενος καὶ πᾶσα ἡ χώρα τοῦ ποταμοῦ πρόσ-χωσις οὖσα τοῦ Νείλου, διὰ δὲ τὸ κατὰ μικρὸν ξηραινομένων τῶν ἑλῶν τοὺς πλησίον εἰσοικίζεσθαι τὸ τοῦ χρόνου μῆκος ἀφήρηται τὴν ἀρχήν. φαίνεται οὖν καὶ τὰ στόματα πάντα, πλὴν ἑνὸς τοῦ Κανωβικοῦ, χειροποίητα καὶ οὐ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ὄντα, καὶ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἡ Αἴγυπτος Θῆβαι καλούμεναι. δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος, οὕτως πρόσ-φατος ὢν ὡς εἰπεῖν πρὸς τὰς τοιαύτας μεταβολάς· ἐκείνου γὰρ τοῦ τόπου ποιεῖται μνείαν ὡς οὔπω Μέμφιος οὔσης ἢ ὅλως ἢ οὐ τηλικαύτης.

In the same way a nation must be supposed to lose account of the time when it first settled in a land that was changing from a marshy and watery state and becoming dry. Here, too, the change is gradual and lasts a long time and men do not remember who came first, or when, or what the land was like when they came. This has been the case with Egypt. Here it is obvious that the land is continually getting drier and that the whole country is a deposit of the river Nile. But because the neighbouring peoples settled in the land gradually as the marshes dried, the lapse of time has hidden the beginning of the process. Thus, all the mouths of the Nile, with the single exception of that at Canopus, are obviously artificial and not natural. And Egypt was originally what is called Thebes, as Homer, too, shows, modern though he is in relation to such changes. For Thebes is the place that he mentions; which implies that Memphis did not yet exist, or at any rate was not as important as it is now.

At first glance, the passage seems quite straightforward: Aristotle ar-gues that the Egyptians are the perfect example of a slow migration of people that accompanies climatic changes, and gives details of the reasons for their movement towards the increasingly dry Nile delta, in accordance with the received knowledge of his time and evidently intervening in

debates concerning not only Egyptian history and geography,[33] but also Homeric scholarship.[34] What is especially interesting for us is to determine how this example relates to the general principle affirmed at the beginning of the text we have quoted, concerning the preservation of memory through slow and gradual migrations, and how it relates to what Plato says in the *Timaeus*. One possible interpretation is that Aristotle is here taking a stand against Plato, implying that Egypt is no exception when it comes to the impact of cataclysms and the occurrence of long-lasting, and therefore easily forgotten, changes in both climate and civilization. On the contrary, it is one of the best examples to evoke when dealing with such phenomena. It will be useful to recall the words that Plato attributes to the Egyptian priest speaking to Solon at the beginning of the *Timaeus*: the region of Egypt is protected from all catastrophes by its climate and by the Nile, so that civilization has continued uninterruptedly and has preserved the memory of human history more completely than anywhere else.

According to a reading of Aristotle such as the one here presented – and which has been proposed, among others, by Christian Froidefond in his book on the "Egyptian mirage"[35] and by Malcolm Wilson in his study on the *Meteorologica*[36] – the priest's speech in the *Timaeus* would make no sense, and Aristotle would here be refuting Plato's argument by pointing out the impossibility of believing that a particular civilization could maintain an uninterrupted memory of its history throughout the ages. It is more than likely that Aristotle had the *Timaeus* in mind when writing these pages of the *Meteorologica*, as is also suggested by the mention of the Greek myth of Deucalion and Pyrrha, which occurs in

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[33] The role of the Nile in the development and maintenance of Egyptian civilization was already known to Herodotus (2. 5, with the famous description of Egypt as "a gift of the Nile") and the fact that the delta area was of recent origin was not unknown (2. 10, 15). Herodotus had a different opinion about the antiquity of Memphis (2. 99), but when he affirms that ancient Egypt corresponds to the region called Thebes, Aristotle closely follows the historian, using almost the same wording (2. 15). Aristotle apparently devoted a treatise to the river, the Περὶ τῆς τοῦ Νείλου ἀναβάσεως, of which a medieval Latin epitome survives: on the problem, see De Nardis 1992.

[34] For another example of such a geographical *quaestio* in connection with Homer, see fr. 169 Rose[3] [= 392 Gigon] *apud Schol. Od*. 4. 356 a 1 Pontani.

[35] Froidefond 1971, 345.

[36] Wilson 2013, 174, n. 141: the scholar credits "an anonymous reader" for this intuition.

both texts (Pl. *Ti.* 22 a 7 – b 1; Arist. *Mete.* 1. 352 a 32–33), and this reading cannot be excluded: Aristotle's criticism of the *Timaeus* is well known, and we have already seen that the reaffirmation of the primacy of Egypt in terms of πρεσβύτης that occurs later in the same passage (352 b 10–22) can be understood as a correction of what Plato invents about his mythical ancient Athens.[37] Nevertheless, this reading should probably be tempered, for Aristotle does not say that in a case like that of Egypt all memory of previous events is lost, but only that men do not remember "who came first" (τίνες πρῶτοι), and "when" (πότε), and "what the land was like" (πῶς ἐχόντων … τῶν τόπων): what is forgotten are the details. The persistence of the memory of major events – and of the migration itself – is not called into question, and it should also be noted that Aristotle explicitly refers to a source, Homer, in order to defend his position: this would be proof that a form of memory of these events persists, precisely in the case of Egypt,[38] which makes it a perfect example for imagining lesser known, or entirely forgotten, similar cases.[39]

§ 5. Transmitting Memory

If this is so, how can memory be preserved through change? One last feature that allows us to detect a correlation between Aristotle and Plato's Egypt is the written word. In Plato, the use of Egypt in the discussion of the value of written discourse and its comparison with the living and oral practice of philosophy is well known: the interpretation of the Egyptian tale of the *Phaedrus* has been one of the crucial points in the debate on the hermeneutic procedures we use to read Plato's written dialogues. Writing is also referred to in the *Timaeus* story: the memory of ancient events is entrusted to written records, which are kept in the sacred temples (23 a 1–4), so that they are "saved" (23 a 4: σεσωσμένα) from oblivion. One of the difficulties in preserving the memory of the past in regions such as Greece is the lack of a continuous written record:

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[37] Cf. *supra* pp. 242–243.

[38] Since Aristotle closely follows Herodotus, he could not ignore the fact that the historian attributed to the priests knowledge of the evolution of the country and the Nile region (2. 10, 15).

[39] Such as the case of Argolid, discussed just after Egypt (352 a 9–18): see Verlinsky 2007 [А. Л. Верлинский, "Аристотель о высыхании Арголиды (*Meteor.* I, 14, 352 a 9–13)"].

whole generations are left metaphorically "voiceless" (23 c 3: γράμμασιν … ἀφώνους), because in each of the cataclysms only the illiterate and uncultured part of the population is spared (23 b 1: τοὺς ἀγραμμάτους τε καὶ ἀμούσους). The redaction of written records is therefore of primary importance in the *Timaeus* narrative, but the priest chooses not to rely on them in presenting the ancient history of Athens and Atlantis: he proposes himself to show "briefly" (23 e 5: διὰ βραχέων) the laws and deeds of the ancient Athenians, adding that there will be an opportunity to check the details (τὸ δ' ἀκριβές) in the books themselves, but this will require the appropriate amount of leisure (24 a 1–2: κατὰ σχολήν).[40] In other words, written records are an instrument of transmission, but their use is somewhat limited, and they are only used to confirm and verify a parallel oral tradition:[41] it should not be forgotten that Egypt is the country of both Thamous and Theuth, the birthplace of both writing and the criticism of writing. In the *Timaeus*, too, Egypt is an imaginary geographical setting for the ambivalent value of writing.[42]

The same ambivalence is associated with Egypt in Aristotle, in an ambiguous text from Book 3 of the *Politics*. The Stagirite contrasts the state governed by laws with the state governed by a βασιλεύς[43] and, specifically, gives the arguments of the defenders of kingship.[44] In no case, they argue, should one base the practice of a science on written rules, as this would be utterly foolish (1286 a 12: ἠλίθιον), since laws are not adapted to the contingency of specific situations and concern the universal (1286 a 10: τὸ καθόλου), "hence it is clear that a government acting according to written laws is plainly not the best" (1286 a 14–16). Between the premises and the conclusion of this argument we find a curious example, of which we do not know exactly what to make (1286 a 12–14):

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[40] Reading and writing take time, as Plato never fails to remind us (cf. *Tht.* 143 a 2). Here we possibly have another subtle trace of the σχολή theme associated with the Egyptian priests, on which see *supra* pp. 244–245.

[41] In addition to the γράμματα, the Muses, as daughters of Mnemosyne, ensure transmission through memory: hence the detail that the men who are saved from catastrophes are both ἀγράμματοι and ἄμουσοι.

[42] See already Brisson 2000, 157–158. On the ambiguous role of writing in the transmission of the Atlantis tale, see Tulli 1994, 97–103.

[43] On the Platonic (and anti-Platonic) background of this debate, see Accattino, in Accattino–Curnis 2013, 14–17.

[44] The opposite argument will be set out later, with the reprise of the technical example (1287 a 33–41): see Wexler–Irvine 2006, 14–16.

καί πως ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ μετὰ τὴν τετρήμερον κινεῖν ἔξεστι τοῖς ἰατροῖς (ἐὰν δὲ πρότερον, ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτοῦ κινδύνῳ).

And in Egypt the physician is allowed to somehow alter his treatment after the fourth day, but if sooner, he takes the risk.

The role of the reference to this Egyptian custom is unclear. It is commonly understood that κινεῖν, in the context, must refer to divergence from a written prescription, and it is clear that the overall argument here presented by Aristotle is that in medicine a doctor should not be bound by written prescriptions, as the application of the art concerns in each case the individual and not the universal.[45] A doctor must thus be prepared to adapt his recommended treatment to each specific case. What is not at all clear is whether the Egyptian practice is being invoked as a positive or a negative example in this context, and what the function of this "sandwiched" example is in either case. The positive interpretation of the example is the most common, to the point that Ross decided to make it clear in the text by integrating the adverb εὖ before πως.[46] If we follow this reading,[47] the Egyptian physicians are an example of the possibility of changing the prescribed treatment according to the evolution of the patient's condition over a period of time.[48]

Scholars who interpret the passage as a negative example stress that the νόμος applied here to medicine is not primarily the written prescription from which the physician can be released after the fourth day, but precisely the rule which obliges him to wait four days[49] before changing his treatment,[50] if he does not want to incur a κίνδυνος, which is probably

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[45] Cf. *Metaph.* A 981 a 19–21, with Cambiano 2012, 21–22.

[46] Ross 1957, 100. Other editors have intervened: Newman 1902, 98, followed by Aubonnet 1971, 91, excises πως, interpreting it as the interpolation of a marginal πῶς; by a copyist who did not understand the meaning of the text, while Curnis, in Accattino–Curnis 2013, 124–126, interprets the sentence as a question and prints πῶς … ἰατροῖς; But the function that this (rhetorical?) question would have here is quite unclear: see *infra* n. 53.

[47] See, among others, Tricot 1962, 241, Pellegrin 1990, 262, Mueller-Goldingen 2016, 235, and obviously all the translators and commentators uncritically reproducing the authoritative text printed by Ross 1957.

[48] This period is considered short by the interpreters following this reading: see e.g. Viano 1955, 164 ("dopo solo quattro giorni").

[49] This is considered too long a lapse of time by interpreters following this reading: see e.g. Aubonnet 1971, 91.

[50] See e.g. Aubonnet 1971, 91; Froidefond 1971, 349.

to be read as a legal penalty if the treatment does not work.[51] I find this second interpretation more convincing than the first, as it would show that Aristotle is invoking a proper, juridical νόμος, applied to a τέχνη. But if this reading is correct, the problem of the function of the example is obvious: why is the Stagirite introducing this custom here? Is he suggesting that the Egyptians are ἠλίθιοι? Is he introducing an objection?[52]

We may be able to find a middle ground: in itself, the example is neither entirely positive nor negative, but rather functional to Aristotle's present argument. By claiming that even in strict Egypt some form of exception was contemplated for physicians, Aristotle is able to argue that no civilization, even the strictest, had ever accepted to fully entrust the operation of a *techne* such as medicine to static written prescriptions. The fact that this exception was established by a written νόμος obliging each and every physician to start from the prescription, allowing them to apply a different treatment – even if not radically, as can be suggested by the adverb πως[53] – only after the fourth day, may be ironic, but it once again reflects the portrayal of Egyptian civilization as one based on ancient, unchangeable, and written laws.[54]

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[51] An interesting parallel, which gives a more precise formulation of this law, is found in Diodorus (1. 82. 3). I give the passage in the translation by Oldfather 1933: "the physicians draw their support from public funds and administer their treatments in accordance with a written law which was composed in ancient times by many famous physicians. If they follow the rules of this law as they read them in the sacred book and yet are unable to save their patient, they are absolved from any charge and go unpunished; but if they go contrary to the law's prescriptions in any respect, they must submit to a trial with death as the penalty, the lawgiver holding that but few physicians would ever show themselves wiser than the mode of treatment which had been closely followed for a long period and had been originally prescribed by the ablest practitioners". There are no grounds to the suggestion formulated by Burton 1972, 239–240, who, rather haphazardly, implies that the four-day period mentioned by Aristotle and not found in Diodorus would be the result of a misunderstanding of the three days that elapsed before a corpse was handed over to the embalmers.

[52] This is what seems to be implied in the translation by Curnis in Accattino–Curnis 2013, 126, which interprets the sentence as a question ("e come mai in Egitto ai medici è consentito derogare dalle regole dopo quattro giorni e se lo fanno prima, è a loro rischio e pericolo?").

[53] If we understand this often excised adverb (see *supra* n. 47) as modifying κινεῖν ἔξεστι, we could think that the physician was allowed to change the prescribed mode of treatment only to a certain extent. I thank the anonymous referee of the journal for this suggestion.

[54] On the antiquity and unvarying nature of the Egyptian constitution, see *supra* pp. 241–242.

The Egyptian setting of the example thus seems to be charged with the same symbolic "mythical" role that informed Plato's decision to set his imaginative representation of the reflection on the ambivalence of writing in the same country: it is not unreasonable, I think, to see, even in such a minimal detail, the heritage of the *Phaedrus* and the *Timaeus*.

§ 6. Conclusions

The analysis of selected passages in which Aristotle refers to Egypt has shown that there are traces of a "mythical" function of the Egyptian setting in the Stagirite's works. Egypt is used as a timeless horizon in which the traces of the passage of time itself and its influence on human behaviour and cultural practices can be seen. It is the setting for the origins of both mankind and human expressions in the fields of politics and science, making it the perfect fictional and symbolic location for discussing memory and the transmission of knowledge across the ages. By emphasizing this association with time, tradition and memory, Aristotle treats Egypt as a paradigmatic, semi-legendary backdrop to evoke and discuss the central issues of the acquisition, preservation and renewal of knowledge over time.

Even though specific correspondences are not immediately visible, it is clear that in this use of Egypt as a philosophical tool, Aristotle is inspired by Plato's Egyptian tales in the *Timaeus* and in the *Phaedrus*, but feels free to correct his model and to introduce novel elements that he recovers from the historical or ethnographic tradition. Most strikingly, Aristotle's Egypt, unlike Plato's, is not the paradigm of an entirely ideal and unnatural reality, a singular haven of unity and continuity with tradition, somehow protected from the inexorable rules of tragic and perpetual mutation that affect the rest of the world. Rather, it represents the imaginary construction of an almost unchanging civilization in a world of constant but recurring change.

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Appendix

Mentions of Egypt in Aristotle[55]

Bekker pages	Type	Egypt (place) or Egyptians (people / culture)	Content / context
			Analytica posteriora
98 a 29–34	example	Egypt	example of πρόβλημα concerning the flow of the Nile
			De caelo
274 b 15–16	example	Egypt	"in Egypt" = example of place
292 a 7–9	historical-cultural	Egyptians	ancient and excellent mastery of astronomy (mentioned together with the Babylonians) / sources of knowledge about the stars
298 a 3–4	scientific	Egypt	some stars visible in Egypt (and in Cyprus) are not visible in the North
			Meteorologica
343 b 9–11	scientific / historical-cultural	Egyptians	Egyptian astronomers attest that some of the fixed stars can get a tail, and this is confirmed by observation
343 b 28–32	scientific / historical-cultural	Egyptians	Egyptian astronomers affirm that conjunctions of the planets with one another, and with the fixed stars, can take place, and this is confirmed by observation
351 b 25 – 352 a 2	scientific / historical	Egypt / Egyptians	morphologic and climatic change in the region, northern Egypt generated from a deposit of the Nile, migration of the Egyptians from Thebes towards the Delta
352 b 19–30	scientific / historical-cultural	Egypt / Egyptians	Egyptians are the most ancient of men, their actual land has been produced by the river. History of the aborted attempts to make a canal to the Red Sea (Sesostris and Darius)

			Historia animalium
500 a 4–6	historical-cultural	Egyptians	the Egyptians call some snakes 'horned' even if they do not technically have horns
502 a 10	scientific	Egypt	home of the Egyptian hippopotamus
503 a 1	scientific	Egypt	home of the Egyptian crocodile
557 a 29–31	scientific	Egypt	presence of a specific kind of fish in the sea between Cyrene and Egypt
559 b 1–2	scientific	Egypt	eggs can be hatched spontaneously in the ground, by being buried in dung heaps, as it is done in Egypt
562 b 25–26	scientific	Egypt	in Egypt hens lay twelve times a year
581 a 1–2	scientific	Egypt	home of a specific kind of mice covered with bristles like hedgehogs
584 b 6–10	scientific	Egypt	among the regions in which eight-months' children usually live and are brought up
584 b 31	scientific	Egypt	among the regions in which twin-births are more frequent
597 a 4–6	scientific	Egypt	cranes migrate towards southern Egypt and the sources of the Nile
606 a 21–25	scientific	Egypt	in Egypt some animals are bigger than in Greece, some smaller, some of around the same size
608 b 32–35	scientific	Egypt	in Egypt animals are abundantly fed, thus even the fiercest creatures live peaceably together
612 a 16	scientific	Egypt	home of a species of ichneumon
617 b 29–31	scientific	Egypt	home of the white and the black ibis

Bekker pages	Type	Egypt (place) or Egyptians (people / culture)	Content / context
De generatione animalium			
770 a 33–35	scientific	Egypt	in Egypt most species are multiparous, therefore monstrosity occurs more often
Metaphysica			
981 b 23–25	historical-cultural	Egyptians	birth of mathematics, thanks to the leisure accorded to priests
Ethica Eudemia			
1215 b 37 – 1216 a 2	example / historical-cultural	Egyptians	cult of Apis as an example of animals being given licence to satisfy their desires / argument against a brute form of hedonism (sex and food)
1235 b 1–2	example / historical-cultural	Egyptians	practice of keeping (mummifying) corpses (example in exposition of the 'useful' as ethical criterion)
Politica			
1286 a 12–14	historical-cultural	Egyptians	Egyptian physicians are allowed to deviate from prescribed treatments after the fourth day
1313 b 21–22	historical-cultural	Egyptians	construction of the Pyramids as an example of a means to keep the peasants working and thus avoid conspiracies against the rulers
1329 b 2–5; 22–25	historical-cultural	Egyptians	Egyptian laws (dating back to Sesostris) establish a division into social classes; Sesostris is way more ancient than Minos, so that we must assume that he was the first to propose such division
1329 b 31–33	historical-cultural	Egyptians	Egyptians are the most ancient of peoples, and they have always known laws and institutions
Rhetorica			
1393 a 32 – b 4	example / historical	Egypt	Egypt's strategic position in the Persians' campaigns against Europe (example of persuasion based on historical events)
1417 a 5–7	example / historical	Egyptians	a phrase attributed to the Egyptian mutineers in Herodotus (2. 30)

Athenaion Politeia			
11	historical		Solon, after having passed his legislation, quits Athens and goes to Egypt
Fragmenta (R. = Rose³, G. = Gigon)			
fr. 6 R. = 23 G. (from *De philosophia*; *ap.* D. L. 1. 8)	historical	Egyptians	the Magi are more ancient than the Egyptians
fr. 169 R. = 392 c G. (from *Problemata Homerica, apud Sch. Od.* 4. 356 a 1 Pontani)	historical	Egypt	the head of the Nile anciently used to be located at Naucratis (= solution of a Homeric problem concerning *Od. 4. 354–357*: how can sailing from Pharos to Egypt take a whole day?)
fr. 283 R. = 285 G. (*ap.* Orib. *Coll. Med., CMG* IV, p. 99, 14 – 102, 24 Raeder)	scientific	Egypt	in Egypt eight-months' children usually live and are brought up, due to favourable climatic condition and various other causes (cf. *HA* 584 b 6–10)
fr. 284 R. = 280 G. (*ap.* Str. 15. 22, 695)	scientific	Egypt	cases of quadruplets and septuplets in Egypt; fertility of the Nile region
fr. 347 R. (*ap.* Ael. *VH* 1. 15)	scientific	Egypt	in Egypt hens lay twelve times a year (cf. *HA* 562 b 25–26)
fr. 358 R. = 269 G. (p. 445) (*ap.* Ar. Byz. *Epit.* p. 10, l. 8–11 Lambros)	scientific / historical cultural	Egyptians	description of specific techniques of Egyptian apiculture
fr. 611 R. = Tit. 143, 1 G. (excerpt ἐκ τῶν Ἡρακλείδου Περὶ πολιτειῶν)	historical	Egypt	Solon, after having passed his legislation, quits Athens and goes to Egypt (synthesis of the episode in the *Athenaion Politeia*, ch. 11, cf. *supra*)

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The presence of Egypt in Aristotle's corpus is twofold. On one side, notices about the land and its inhabitants – be them humans or beasts – are vastly exploited in scientific works such as the *History of Animals*. On the other hand, ancient Egypt is less often but more significatively mentioned as a unified cultural and historical horizon, opposed, contrasted or simply compared with the Greek world. The paper examines some examples of this tendency, especially focusing on Aristotle's *Politics*, *Metaphysics* and *Meteorologica*. Insisting on the association with time, tradition and memory, Aristotle treats Egypt as a paradigmatic and semi-legendary background used to evoke and discuss the central issues of acquisition, persistence and renewal of knowledge over time. Doing this, whilst reemploying other elements from ethnographical and historical sources, the Stagirite stays faithful to Plato's literary use of Egypt and more specifically to the Egyptian settings evoked in the *Phaedrus* and in the *Timaeus*, but feels free to correct his model and to introduce novel elements in a similar theoretical framework.

В корпусе сочинений Аристотеля можно встретить два вида упоминаний о Египте. С одной стороны, в таких естественнонаучных трудах, как *История животных*, широко используются сведения о стране и ее обитателях – как людях, так и животных. С другой стороны, менее частыми, но более весомыми представляются упоминания о древнем Египте как культурно-историческом единстве, которому противопоставляется, с которым сопоставляется или просто сравнивается греческий мир. В статье рассматриваются несколько примеров такого рода, в частности, из *Политики*, *Метафизики*

и *Метеорологики* Аристотеля. Подчеркивая роль времени, традиции и исторической памяти, Аристотель использу8т Египет как парадигматический и, вместе с тем, полулегендарный фон, позволяющий поднимать и обсуждать центральные проблемы возникновения, сохранения и обновления научного знания на протяжении веков. При этом Стагирит в целом следует изображению Египта у Платона, особенно в *Федре* и *Тимее*, однако использует, перерабатывая их, также другие этнографические и исторические сведения. С их помощью он корректирует платоновскую версию и вводит новые элементы, сохраняя главные черты теоретического подхода Платона.

Daria Kohler

ON BOOKROLLS, PINTS, AND SOMEWHAT FLAT JOKES: SUET. *DE POETIS* 3. 3. 9[*]

> *The possession of a sense of humor…*
> *is a dangerous thing for a philologist.*[1]

Augustus was famous for his love of witty remarks, many of which have been preserved in various sources, including Suetonius, Quintilian, Plutarch, and Macrobius.[2] This note will focus on one such joke, retold in the biography of Horace (Suet. *De poetis* 3. 3. 9). There, Suetonius comments on Horace's appearance in the following way:

> habitu corporis fuit brevis atque obesus, qualis et a semet ipso in saturis describitur et ab Augusto hac epistula: "pertulit ad me Onysius libellum tuum, quem ego ut excusantem, quantuluscumque est, boni consulo. vereri autem mihi videris ne maiores libelli tui sint quam ipse es. sed tibi statura deest, corpusculum non deest. itaque licebit in sextariolo scribas, quo circuitus voluminis tui sit ὀγκωδέστατος, sicut est ventriculi tui".[3]

> Regarding the bodily appearance, he was short and overweight, as he is described by himself in his hexametres, and by Augustus in the following letter: "Onysius brought to me your little volume, which I find good as an apology, however little there is of it. It seems to me, though, that you are afraid your books might become bigger than yourself. But you lack in height, not in the body. Thus, you could even write *in sextariolo*, so that the girth of your volume is all puffed up, like that of your belly".[4]

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[*] This paper originated from a note in my doctoral thesis (Kondakova 2022) and was first put together as a contribution to a *Festschrift* for Vsevolod Zelchenko in 2022. This article is an update of my views on the matter of *sextariolus*, and benefitted from the generous help of many readers and listeners.

[1] Rolfe 1925, 273.

[2] A series of jokes by Augustus in Macrobius: Macr. *Sat.* 2. 14–31.

[3] Text according to Stachon 2021, who accepts Reifferscheid's *ut excusantem* instead of the transmitted *ut accusantem*. It is difficult to reconcile *ut accusantem* and *boni consulo*, which the conjecture remedies.

[4] Translation is my own.

The general sense of the letter, and the rather unflattering joke therein, is clear even without the preceding commentary. The emperor expresses his dissatisfaction with the length of the book sent to him; a roll of small length can be easily recognised by its diameter.[5] However, Horace should not worry about writing more, because it is hard to create a bookroll with a circumference exceeding that of the poet's waist.

The basis for the joke is thus the comparison of two dimensions, the height and the circumference, of the poet and of a bookroll. Augustus attributes the length of the book to Horace's fear that it "would turn out to be bigger than himself", which is easy to remedy if the other dimension is taken into account: a short roll with a lot of text will resemble the poet's figure.

The switch from one dimension to the other would be even easier to understand if the length of the papyrus roll were close to Horace's height:

1.   Your text is quite short.
2.   Perhaps you are afraid of making a book *longer* than yourself?
3.   You are mistaken: the book may be *longer* than you, since you are short, but even so it will never be *fatter*.

How long would the bookroll in question be? The two candidates suggested for Horace's *volumen* are *Epist*. 2. 1 (270 lines) and the *signata volumina* of *Epist*. 1. 13; in the latter case, the discrepancy in number impedes this interpretation.[6] *Epist*. 2. 1 is also indirectly indicated by the reference to the length of the work at its beginning: *in publica commoda peccem, si longo sermone morer tua tempora, Caesar* (3–4).[7] Due to the lacking knowledge of the formatting of Latin papyri of hexametric poetry, it is impossible to say how many lines a column would usually have. Therefore, the following calculation should be seen as nothing more than a series of not implausible conjectures. The first assumption is to take the only existing example of a Latin hexametric column, *P. Narm*. inv. 66.362 (10 lines per column), to be an exception and adhere rather

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[5] For example, Martial jokes about a book not thicker than an *umbilicus* (Epigr. 2. 6. 10–11: *tam macer libellus, nullo crassior ut sit umbilico*).

[6] E.g. Johnson 1940. T. Frank tries to explain the discrepancy by suggesting that Augustus wrote his answer before opening the gift, a theory far-fetched at best (Frank 1925, 30).

[7] Gelsomino 1958, 332. H. Ohst finds additional parallels between this letter and the text of 2. 1: Ohst 2020, 83–86.

to the more 'standard' measures of ca. 20–25 lines per column which are documented in Greek bookrolls.[8] Calculated in such a way, the text of *Epist*. 2. 1 would take between 10 and 13 columns. The next unknown is the width of the column. Columns of *P.Narm*. inv. 66.362 are 16 cm wide; of *P. Herc*. 817, 16–18 cm; of the Gallus papyrus (*P. Qasr Ibrîm* inv. 78-3-11/1), 13.5 cm.[9] To this, at least 1 cm of an intercolumnium should be added. If the 10-line-per-column layout is considered an outlier, the book Augustus writes about *could* be a roll of 10–13 columns, with a length falling anywhere between ca. 145 cm and 275 cm. If we take the lower estimate, it is possible to compare it to the height of a relatively short person.

The main difficulty lies in the interpretation of the expression *licebit in sextariolo scribas*, which will be the focus of the rest of this paper. This passage is the only secure attestation of the word *sextariolus* in Latin literature, and it is reasonable to assume that Augustus coined it *ad hoc*, given the number of diminutives in the letter.[10] For a regular diminutive formation, the expected base word is *sextarius*, a term denoting a common Roman measure of liquids or grain. Its volume, according to various estimates, was just over 0.5 l, that is, about a pint.[11] It seems that *sextarius* was the basic unit for measuring the volume of wine. In Herculaneum, a dipinto on the wall of a tavern depicts wine vessels and the price per sextarius: it is assumed that different vessels corresponded to wines of different quality.[12] When Horace describes what one could spend a little money on, his modest "shopping list" looks like this: *panis ematur,*

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[8] P. Narm. inv. 66.362 has the text of Verg. *Ecl*. 8. 53–62 and carries 10 lines per column. G. Macedo cautions against taking this roll as a standard due to the lack of comparative material: "we cannot say whether or not short columns were a typical feature of the layout of Latin poetry. The number is considerably higher in bookrolls of Latin prose, whose columns seem to have at least twenty lines" (Macedo 2021, 54–55). As for Greek bookrolls, both of poetry and prose, one can expect between 25 and 50 lines per column (Johnson 2004, 125–126).

[9] All numbers are taken from Macedo 2021.

[10] Stachon also quotes a passage from *Epistula Alexandri ad Aristotelem* (p. 193, 16 Kuebler): *multa gemmea et crystallina, quae potaria fuerunt et sextariola, multa aurea invenimus et rara argentea*. However, the reading *sextariola* is doubtful.

[11] 0,546 ml. Apart from the regular *sextarius*, we know of a *sextarius Italicus* (⅙ of a *congius*) and a *sextarius castrensis* (1½ of the s. *Italicus*, or ¼ of a *congius*): Swift 2017, 217.

[12] In Herculaneum (VI.14), a shop sign was found with an inscription "*Ad cucumas*" and four wine jugs below, each labelled with a price. An illustration can be found in Pagano 1988, Tab. 4.

holus, vini sextarius (*Sat.* 1. 1. 74), implying, perhaps, that buyers usually purchased wine in larger quantities.[13]

The word *sextarius* could also be used to denote a vessel of the appropriate volume.[14] This seems to be the reference in the passage under consideration, as it is difficult to imagine any other combination with the preposition *in*. Even so, the connection between the joke on the length of the text and *in sextariolo scribas* is somewhat enigmatic. Several scholars have followed the line of reasoning which implies transferring the text from the roll onto the vessel's surface. E. Fraenkel comes to the conclusion that Horace is invited to write on a potsherd.[15] R. Gelsomino understands the passage even more literally: the rolls of Horace are so short that their texts could fit on a small bottle.[16] A variant of this interpretation has been recently suggested by H. Ohst, who finds in Augustus' joke an additional reference to the fact that Aristotle calls hexametric verse ὀγκώδης.[17] The logical chain he suggests is as follows: "You apologise for the brevity of the book, but it is actually quite ὀγκώδης, since it is written in hexameters. So, if you want to correct that, write the same text on a small chubby vase". M. Stachon, who has recently edited *De poetis*, understands it similarly; however, he does not mention the reference to Aristotle but only points out the figurative use of ὀγκώδης in Philodemus (in conjecture: only ογκω- is preserved on the papyrus).[18] S. A. Frampton goes further in the search for intertextual connections with Aristotle and the vocabulary of literary criticism, and in doing so renders the link between the sextarius and the physical book merely a loose association.[19]

There are, however, issues with seeing an act of writing on a sextarius in the expression used by Augustus. A literal understanding is not supported by known ancient practices: the only example of a complete literary text written on a vessel can be found in the *SHA* (Treb. *Trig. tyr.* 14. 5): *patera in circuitum omnem historiam Alexandri contineret*. In this case, fitting a long text on a bowl is shown as something extraordinary.

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[13] Cf. Vopisc. *Tacit.* 11. 1: *ipse fuit vitae parcissimae, ita ut sextarium vini tota die numquam potaverit, saepe intr<a h>eminam*.

[14] Varr. *De vit. pop. Rom. ap. Non.* p. 545: *item erant vasa vinaria: sini, cymbia, culignae, paterae, guti, sextarii, simpuvium*.

[15] Fraenkel 1957, 20–21.

[16] Gelsomino 1958, 334.

[17] Aristot. *Poet.* 1459 b 34–35. Ohst 2020, 86.

[18] Philod. *De poemat.* 5. l. 15 (Jensen). "Allein auf diese Weise, also wenn man sie auf ein bauchiges Gefäß schreibt, so schlussfolgert Augustus, könne man ein Werk des Horaz zu einem 'umfangreichen' machen" (Stachon 2021, 232).

[19] Frampton 2019, 131–133.

Fraenkel's potsherd breaks the association between the shapes of the vase, the bookroll, and the poet. Moreover, both the literal and the metaphorical interpretations relying on the writing of the text on the surface of a small pot are hindered by the following *circuitus voluminis tui*, which (1) clearly refers to the volume of a bookroll, not a pot or a vase, and (2) can only be understood literally.

In contrast, some scholars proposed an alternative version, according to which *sextarius* should mean a roll of a particular format. T. Frank and A. Rostagni believe that Augustus is talking about a roll of small height, ⅙ of the "normal size".[20] A. Tovar sees *sextariolus* as a reference to the well-known format of the papyrus sheet, called *charta emporitica* by Pliny, on the grounds that it was six fingers wide.[21] However, the format of the sheets that make up the papyrus roll has no bearing on the ratio of its height to its diameter, which forms the basis of Augustus' joke. The use of wider sheets results in the roll having fewer joins (κολλήσεις), but does not affect either its length or its thickness (see Fig. 1).

Fig. 1. Schematic comparison of rolls of the same length made of sheets of different formats.

The assumption that postulates some sort of *terminus technicus* for a small book not only finds no parallel among the discussions of ancient roll formats known to us but also undermines the joke. Moreover, such an explanation neglects the fact that the word *sextarius* was part of everyday Roman usage, and it is what the reader – and Horace – should have thought of first. Let us return to *sextarius*, the vessel.

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[20] Frank 1925, 29–30; Rostagni 1944, 119.
[21] Tovar 1968.

While the volume of a sextarius is well-documented, it is difficult to establish whether such a vessel had a recognisable shape. I managed to find two vessels of different shapes carrying inscriptions which may indicate that they contained one sextarius. One of them is dated to the 1st century AD, the other, tentatively, to the 3rd century AD. Both are made of bronze. The first one has the form of a little vase, the diameter of which increases in the middle and narrows again towards the neck, and has the letters SEXTAR in silver.[22] The second one is a cylinder, the diameter of which exceeds the height, with the inscription]XTARIVMEXSACIATVMLEGIII along the upper edge.[23] In addition, rectangular glass bottles of a volume of about a *sextarius*, which could perhaps also have been used for measuring or transporting wine, are attested.[24] Of the three shapes I was able to find, the first one is the closest to the time and context of the passage in question. Gelsomino also notes, without a reference to a particular artefact, that he encountered vessels of a similar shape "in museums".[25]

If writing on the surface of a sextarius is not a satisfactory understanding of the passage, what is? In my opinion, the right interpretation lies between the two avenues suggested so far. What Augustus wants to say is "you could have written more". As a consequence, *in sextariolo scribere* should lead to the bookroll becoming larger in diameter. It seems as if Augustus is suggesting that Horace could have chosen a different roll size to make his work look more voluminous.[26] This is not an unlikely scenario: in the case of copies intended to be sent to friends or literary patrons, authors may have made decisions about the quality of the papyrus and, presumably, other elements of the future book. For example, Cicero in *Att.* 13. 25. 3 says that he splurged on expensive papyrus for a copy of the *Academica* intended for Varro: *sed tamen ego non despero probatum iri Varroni et id, quoniam impensam fecimus in macrocolla, facile patior teneri.*[27] While we

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[22] Held in the British Museum, registration number 1918,0101.2. Height: 17.3 cm, diameter: 11.6 cm, volume: 0.99 l. An image can be consulted on the website of the BM: https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection/image/1041705001.

[23] Height: 7.6 cm, diameter: 12.4–12.6 cm (Rothenhöfer 2016, with image).

[24] E.g. a glass bottle with a square bottom, late 1st–3rd century AD, in the collection of Metropolitan Museum (New York), accession number 81.10.22. Height 13 cm, base width 7.9 cm. See also Charlesworth 1966; Swift 2017, 211–227.

[25] Gelsomino 1958, 334.

[26] A modern analogy would be something like "you could even print it in duodecimo", or, in Germany, "you could even publish it in Reclam".

[27] See on this Johnson 2004, 156.

do not have any evidence of a *format* defined by the height of the roll, the existence of a variety of options could mean that there were multiple sizes to choose from when ordering the production of a copy.

Our knowledge of early Latin books and their sizes is sketchy due to the number and the state of preservation of extant Latin literary papyri. Some data can be obtained from the analysis of contemporary papyri from Egypt, especially those of Oxyrhynchus, but Greek and Roman books did not necessarily follow the same principles, especially in matters of *mise en page*.[28] One can only cautiously say that Latin books are characterised by wider margins and greater line spacing. As regards the average size of a Latin roll containing poetic works, most of the fragments of more than one column at our disposal contain texts not otherwise extant, rendering an accurate reconstruction of page heights impossible. For *P.Herc.* 817 (*De bello Aegyptiaco*), Gabriele Macedo estimates the minimum height of a column at 20 cm, and of the whole bookroll at 24–25 cm.[29] Before him, Guillelmo Cavallo named 19–24 cm as the standard height of rolls from Herculaneum.[30] The *sextarius* from the British Museum, 17.3 cm high, is thus a little smaller than the average Latin book.

It seems to me that we should not see literary criticism as the basis of Augustus' not very elaborate joke.[31] It is also certainly unnecessary to calculate how many lines could fit on a sextarius. *In sextariolo* should refer to the shape of sextarius the vessel, but denote a bookroll. Among different possible connotations, diminutives are known to have the potential of a metaphoric usage, whereby they denote something that has a likeness to the base word (e.g. *apriculus*, 'a fish similar to a boar').[32] A voluminous roll about 17–18 cm high would be similar to a sextarius in height, and the pot-bellied shape explains the joke at the expense of the figure of Horace. *In sextariolo* could then mean "on a roll roughly like a sextarius" or "in the shape of a sextarius".

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[28] Hutchinson 2008, 20–25.

[29] Macedo 2021, 39.

[30] Cavallo 1983, 14–16.

[31] *Pace* Frampton and others.

[32] Hakamies 1951, 15; Fruyt 1989, 128. I am grateful to Denis Keyer for pointing this out to me.

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A. Tovar, "Augustus Ridicules Horace's Shortness: A Comment on the Word Sextariolus", *AJP* 89: 3 (1968) 334–341.

This article explores a passage of a letter from Augustus to Horace, quoted in the *vita Horatii* by Suetonius as evidence of him being short and overweight (Suet. *De poetis* 3. 3. 9). In the letter, the emperor jokingly connects the brevity of the work he received with the physical appearance of the poet. He then suggests that Horace could even write 'in sextariolo', an expression that commentators have been struggling to interpret. I argue both against the literal understanding of the expression 'in sextariolo' as 'on a small vase' and the alternative suggestions seeing it as a technical term for a specific kind of bookroll. Instead, I put forward an interpretation based on the similarity between a papyrus roll of a slightly smaller height and the shape of a sextarius.

Эта статья посвящена месту в одном письме Августа Горацию, которое цитирует Светоний в жизнеописании поэта как подтверждение того, что он был невысокого роста и полноват (Suet. *De poetis* 3. 3. 9). В этом письме император в шутку находит связь между длиной полученного от Горация свитка и внешностью поэта, а затем говорит, что Гораций мог бы даже писать in sextariolo – выражение, которое привлекло много попыток истолкования. В этой статье я выступаю как против буквального понимания in sextariolo как "на небольшом кувшине", так и против попыток увидеть в слове sextariolus технический термин для обозначения особого вида свитка. Вместо этого я предлагаю интерпретацию шутки, основанную на визуальном сходстве между свитком несколько меньшей высоты и формой секстария-сосуда.

Daria Zueva, Vsevolod Zeltchenko

PHILOGELOS 23; 130
AND THE MEANING OF οὐ λούει

In the "longer" recension of *Philogelos*, the story about the man who came to the bathhouse at its very opening is attested twice with some lexical variations. *Philogel.* 23, belonging to the section dealing with σχολαστικός, is found in both **A** (*Par. sup. Gr.* 690; 11 c.) and **M** (*Monac. Gr.* 551; 15 c.), while *Philogel.* 130, belonging to the group of jokes about the silly Sidonians,[1] is omitted in **M**, which is generally characterized by the elimination of doublets.

> 23. Σχολαστικὸς κατὰ πρώτην ἄνοιξιν τοῦ βαλανείου εἰσελθὼν καὶ μηδένα εὑρὼν ἔσω λέγει πρὸς τὸν δοῦλον αὐτοῦ· Ἐξ ὧν βλέπω, μὴ οὐ λούει [τὸ βαλανεῖον].

> μηδένα **A**, *Boissonade aliique*; μηδ᾽ ἕνα **M**, *Eberhard* | μή *del. Thierfelder* | τὸ βαλανεῖον *del. Dawe praeeunte Thierfelder (in comm.)* | *in fine punctum* **A**, *Thierfelder aliique; interrogandi signum* **M**, *Boissonade, Eberhard*

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[1] This part of the collection is puzzling because, unlike the Abderites (110–127) or Kymaeans (154–182), the Sidonians never had a reputation for being fools. For a possible solution to this problem, cf. Minunno 2016. In jokes about Sidonians, the protagonist's occupation is always indicated – "a lawyer from Sidon" (129), "a fisherman" (133), "a teacher" (136), "a butcher" (137) etc. – which leads one to suppose a separate origin of the section (Thierfelder 1968, 238; Beard 2014, 192). In two cases, however, commentators recognize this indication as excessive, playing no part in the plot: this is the case with the "Sidonian provincial governor" in 128 and the "Sidonian sophist" in 130 (Thierfelder 1968, 239). In our opinion, for *Philogel.* 128 this conclusion would still be exaggerated: although this joke also has a doublet in the σχολαστικός section (100), it should be noted that even if the story of the runaway mules could have happened to a man of any rank, the figure of the pompous and arrogant ἔπαρχος gotten into trouble gives it a special flavor. Thus, 130 remains the only "Sidonian" joke in the *Philogelos* in which the designation of the profession of the butt of the joke does not seem to be necessary; we will turn to this question in n. 35.

A *scholasticus*, arriving at the bathhouse just before it opens and finding no one inside, says to his slave, "From what I see, [the bath] doesn't seem to wash".

130. Σιδόνιος σοφιστὴς κατὰ πρώτην ἄνοιξιν τοῦ βαλανείου <εἰσελθὼν> [λουόμενος] καὶ μηδένα ἔσωθεν εὑρὼν λέγει πρὸς τοὺς ἰδίους οἰκέτας· Καθὼς βλέπω, οὐ λούει.

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<εἰσελθὼν> [λουόμενος] *Thierfelder (in comm.), Dawe* λουόμενος **A** *Boissonade, González Suárez* λουσόμενος *Eberhard, Brodersen*

A sophist from Sidon, arriving at the bathhouse at its very opening and finding no one inside, says to his slaves: "As I see it, it doesn't wash".

Although the MSS variants as well as the emendations proposed by editors hardly affect the meaning of the joke, it is worth saying a few words about them.

23. The context does not require any special emphasis, so μηδένα is preferable. With a question mark, μή οὐ would have appeared as an equivalent of Lat. *nonne* (cf. *Philogel.* 217); the period, on the contrary, would turn the phrase into a doubtful assertion about a *present* fact introduced by μή or μή οὐ + *ind.*[2] In our opinion, ἐξ ὧν βλέπω makes the interrogative sentence impossible. Thierfelder's deletion of [μή] suggests the simple "The bath does not wash", as in 130; both statements, the categorical one and the one colored by cautious doubt, are equally suitable for the interpretation of the joke that we shall argue, but it seems difficult to explain μή of the MSS if it is not authentic. On the bracketing of [τὸ βαλανεῖον], see below.

130. Even if we accept that the infinitely obtuse σοφιστής, *having already washed* in the bath, still considers it "not washing", λουόμενος is hindered by the following μηδένα εὑρών: the sequence of verbs should be reversed. Eberhard's conjecture provides the correct meaning ("going to wash"), but such a construction is alien to the language of *Philogelos*: *participium futuri* occurs only once in its text (19: ἔσειε τὸ δένδρον ὡς ὑποδεξόμενος τοὺς στρουθούς),[3] in close connection with the predicate and supported by ὡς. So Thierfelder's idea seems to be the best: εἰσελθών, preserved in 23, was accidentally omitted by the copyist in 130, and λουόμενος appeared at a later stage as filling up this lacuna.

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[2] Kühner–Gerth 1898, 224–225 (§ 394, n. 7).
[3] Ritter 1955, 61 n. 139.

Let us now turn to the interpretations of the joke. Jacobus Pontanus rendered its punchline, somewhat vaguely and without any explanation, as *nemo hic lavat*;[4] Charles C. Bubb confessed that he did not understand it.[5] It was Andreas Thierfelder[6] who first demonstrated that, at least from a linguistic point of view, the remark "οὐ λούει (τὸ βαλανεῖον)" is not by itself ridiculous. He adduces two Latin inscriptions giving an almost identical text, evidently an advertising formula: *[b]alineum more urbico lavatur et omnia commode praestantur* (*CIL* XI 721 [= 254 Fagan];[7] Bononia, undated) and *balineus lavatur more urbico et omnis humanitas praestatur* (*CIL* XIV 4015 [= 259 Fagan]; Ficulea, presumably 2nd c. CE). Then Thierfelder cites *CIL* III 1805 (= 189 Fagan; Narona in Dalmatia, 280 CE), an inscription honoring the local benefactor who, among other services to the city, *thermas rei p(ublicae) hiemales [rog]a[nte] populo in ruinam [de]lap[sas] [...] de frugalitate sua [...] [aedifi]cavit et lavantes rei p(ublicae) tradidit.*

Particularly impressive in Thierfelder's argument was the reference to a Byzantine proverb from a small alphabetical collection preserved under the title Αἰσώπου κοσμικαὶ κωμῳδίαι (6 = *Aesopica* vol. I, p. 287, 149 Perry): Βαλανεῖον ἔχω, καὶ οὐ λούει· εἰ εἶχεν, ἔλουεν. According to the previous interpretation by Victor Jernstedt (1893), the explanation εἰ εἶχεν, ἔλουεν[8] is wrong and "the meaning of the proverb is that a bath does not wash itself: whoever wants to bathe in his bathhouse must take care that everything is prepared for it".[9] Instead, Thierfelder persuasively suggested that the proverb should be understood in a different way, namely as a mockery of boasting. A braggart says: "I have a bath, but now it is not working"; if he really had one, it would be working ("Ich habe ein

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[4] Pontanus 1758, 478; a Latin translation of most of the jokes from the longer version of *Philogelos* was first included in the 15th edition of Pontanus' *Progymnasmata Latinitatis* (1620). Cf. "Как видно, здесь нельзя мыться" (Gasparov 1962 [М. Л. Гаспаров (tr., comm.), *Федр. Бабрий. Басни*], 187).

[5] Bubb 1920, 23 ("As far as I can see, it doesn't wash"; cf. n. 2: "I can not grasp the point of the joke"). His reference to Diogenes' bon mot on a dirty bathhouse (DL 6. 2. 47) is completely irrelevant.

[6] Thierfelder 1968, 209–210.

[7] Fagan 1999, 317.

[8] On the irreal apodosis without ἄν, see, e.g., Blass–Debrunner 1961, 182, § 360.

[9] Jernstedt 1907 [В. К. Ернштедт, "Забытые греческие пословицы", in: *Victoris Jernstedt Opuscula: Сборник статей по классической филологии В. К. Ернштедта*], 187: "Смысл пословицы в том, что баня сама собою не моет: кто хочет умыться в своей бане, должен позаботиться о том, чтобы все было к этому приготовлено".

Bad, es funktioniert bloß nicht", commentary: "Wenn er eins hätte, würde es auch funktionieren"). All these parallels brought Thierfelder to the conclusion that οὐ λούει (τὸ βαλανεῖον) in *Philogel.* 23; 130 is idiomatic and means "the bath is not in operation" ("Nach dem, was ich sehe, ist das Bad nicht in Betrieb").

Thierfelder's contribution proved decisive: the subsequent translators of *Philogelos* either follow him literally,[10] or clarify "The bathhouse is closed / out of hours",[11] or, finally, resort to oblique periphrases leading in the same direction.[12] However, there is no joke, not even a flat one: if you go to a public place (e.g. a shop or a restaurant) and no one is there, then even if the door is open and you manage to get in, you naturally conclude that the establishment is not functioning for some reason. The deduction of the σχολαστικός is not silly at all.

A fresh interpretation of the text was offered, in passing, by Hanna Zalewska-Jura in her overview paper on the *Philogelos*. Listing the daily habits of the Greeks reflected in the jokes of the collection, she notes: "There is no reason to come to the bathhouse in the morning, because you will not meet your acquaintances (23, 130)".[13] In this case, the punchline of the story would be that the σχολαστικός goes to the bathhouse to communicate: "the bath is not working" if there are no people to meet.[14] This, however, does not correspond to the nature of the character (however protean, the σχολαστικός is never endowed with the traits of an *homme du monde*) and, as it seems, would have needed a more distinctive expression.

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[10] "As far as I can tell, the public bath is not in operation" (Hansen 1998, 278), "À ce que je vois, ils ne sont pas en service, ces thermes" (Zucker 2008, 16), "It looks to me as if the bath isn't working" (Berg 2008 [26]), "Thierfelder [...] nota che l'espressione [...] potrebbe essere di matrice tecnica" (Braccini 2008, 106–107), "Por lo que veo, el baño no funciona" (González Suárez 2010, 53), "Pelo que veho, o banho não está a funcionar hoje" (Troca Pereira 2013, 28), etc.

[11] "Wie ich sehe, hat das Bad heute Ruhetag" (Löwe 1981, 10; *idem fere* Brodersen 2016, 19), "Jak widzę, łaźnia nieczynna" (Łanowski 1986, 92), "Polo que vexo, parece que está pechado" (Seara–Soto 2016, 20), etc.

[12] "À ce que je vois, on ne lave personne aux bains aujourd'hui" (Noël 2021, 23).

[13] Zalewska-Jura 2010, 108 ("Dlatego nie ma sensu przybywać tam zaraz po otwarciu, bo poza łaziebnymi nie zastanie się znajomych [23, 130]").

[14] Cf. a similar story about Jean Moréas, who refused to enter a restaurant because there were no acquaintances to chat with: "Je me souvenais de cette anecdote parisienne qui m'a contée jadis Paul Fort, le poète. Paul Fort arrachant Moréas au Vachette et le menant déjeuner dans un petit restaurant de la rue Campagne-Première; et Moréas, sur le seuil, ayant ajusté son monocle, et de sa belle voix grecque: *Mais il n'y a personne, ici!* Il n'y avait, en effet, personne, ajoutait Paul Fort. Il n'y avait qu'Apollinaire, Picasso, Lénine et moi..." (Bauër 1967, 35).

The extensive and contradictory comment by Barry Baldwin deserves a separate mention.[15] He adduces the parallel passages from Thierfelder's edition, concluding that "the bath isn't bathing" is "a proverbial expression, and probably technical". Nevertheless, he does not stop there, apparently feeling that the joke lacks a punchline, and observes that the morning hours in the Roman baths were reserved for women and invalids; the σχολαστικός thus is ridiculed for committing "a social solecism". Why, then, has he come "absurdly early"? Baldwin, referring to Lucian (*Lexiph.* 4), explains that he wanted to use clean water, an advantage given to those who came first to the baths.

The notion that the Roman baths of the imperial age during the morning hours were reserved for the ill and disabled persons is based on a single passage from Hadrian's biography in *SHA* (22. 7): *ante octavam horam in publico neminem nisi aegrum lavari passus est*. Garrett G. Fagan dwells on this testimony at length, explaining that it contradicts all available evidence: either this account is unfounded, or it did not refer to all baths, municipal and private, but only to the "imperial controlled *thermae*".[16] As public baths were usually crowded, visitors tried to guess the time when they could wash in comfort: thus, in *Vita Aesopi*, Xanthus asks Aesop to go and see if there are many people in the bathhouse (65–66). Complaints about having to bathe alongside all sorts of rabble form the background of *Philogel.* 149 (where a comparison is made with the Trojan Horse, which was just as crowded, but the society was incomparably more decent) and 150, while the desire to save some clean water for a dear friend is the point of *Philogel.* 163. Finally, *AP* 9. 640, an anonymous epigram of the imperial age, explicitly states that bathing immediately after opening is the best time to do so: Ἀθάνατοι λούονται ἀνοιγομένου βαλανείου, / πέμπτῃ δ' ἡμίθεοι, μετέπειτα δὲ πήματα πάντα.[17] Thus, not only did the

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[15] Baldwin 1983, 59–60.

[16] Fagan 1999, 184–185 (cf. 87). The designation of morning hours for women is attested only for a bathhouse of the imperial mines at Vipasca in Lusitania (*CIL* II 5181$_{20}$ = 282 Fagan; Hadrianic time), which, however, was by no means typical: "Depending on the shifts of the workers, the reservation of the bath for women early in the day could be a dictate of necessity rather than of morality" (*ibid.*, 325–326; cf. Bowen Ward 1992, 140 ff.).

[17] P. Waltz and G. Soury claim that the "immortals" are the emperor and his family (Waltz–Soury 2002, 256), which is implausible: for the members of the imperial house, there were obviously no problems of crowds and dirty water, so they could wash whenever they wanted. In our opinion, ἀθάνατοι here means simply "the lucky ones", ῥεῖα ζώοντες. To visit a public bath in the morning, one had to have free time: neither an artisan, nor a small merchant, nor a clerk could afford that time.

σχολαστικός not do anything inconsiderate by coming to the bathhouse at an early hour, but, on the contrary, he proceeded with foresight.

In our opinion, Thierfelder rightly assumed that the salt of the joke lies in the expression "the bath washes / does not wash" and that this expression is idiomatic;[18] however, the four instances that he collected are heterogeneous. In two of them (*CIL* XI 721; XIV 4015) there is an adverbial of manner (*urbico more*), while in the other two (*CIL* III 1805; *Aesopica* I, p. 287, 149 Perry), the combination is used absolutely, as in *Philogelos*. For each of these groups, the number of examples can be substantially increased.

Let us begin with the first category. Epictetus (*Diss.* 2. 21. 14), enumerating the anxieties that beset an exhausted and irritated man unable to concentrate on self-improvement, mentions καὶ ἐν Νικοπόλει σαπρῶς λούει τὰ βαλανεῖα. Frontinus (*De aquaed.* 2. 107) defines the thermae as *balneae, quae publice lavarent*. The Christian pilgrim Antoninus of Piacenza (570 CE; *Itiner.* 7; 10) describes the hot springs near Tiberias as "natural baths", *termas* [acc. pro nom.] *ex se lavantes salsas*. In all these examples the verb means simply "to fulfil its function", and the main sense is carried by the adverbial.

On the contrary, in the passages belonging to the second group, the exact meaning of the expression has to be reconstructed. Here, as it seems, the examples omitted by Thierfelder are more revealing than the ones he adduces. First of all, the special meaning of λοῦσις and λούω in relation to public baths is well known to the epigraphists and papyrologists. The fact that this technical expression denotes *free access* (without charge) to the baths was first pointed out in 1911 by Édouard Cuq, and then, independently, in 1954 by Jeanne and Louis Robert:[19] in 1968, the authors of the first *Supplement* to the *LSJ*, following Roberts, added to the entry λούω a new meaning I c "provide free baths". The problem was further revisited by Thomas Drew-Beer in a series of critical notes devoted to the treatment of the epigraphic material in the *LSJ Supplement*; he touched on it again in 1980, publishing an inscription from Hypaipa.[20] In the same year at the XVI International Congress of Papyrology, Béatrice Meyer delivered a valuable paper, collecting a large number of examples of the idiom from Greek

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[18] This does not allow one to accept the rather forced explanation of D. Crompton and G. Vergara: "It looks to me as though the water isn't washing properly" (Crompton 2010, 25); "Il sapientone […] non si rende conto che la capacità dell'acqua di lavare non può variare da bagno a bagno" (Vergara 2011, 65). The σχολαστικός does not say, "The water here does not wash", but "This bath does not wash".

[19] Cuq 1911, 190; Robert–Robert 1954, 139.

[20] Drew-Bear 1970, 208–209; Drew-Bear 1980, 523 and n. 70.

inscriptions and papyri; her interpretation, however, is more generalized: "faire fonctionner le bain" ("la notion de gratuité […] réside essentiellement dans la nature des documents où ces expressions apparaissent").[21]

The syntax of the expression varies. In some honorary inscriptions, the subject of λούω is the benefactor who paid for access to the baths and provided all the necessaries, while the object, expressed or implied, is the δῆμος.[22] In other instances, where the formula has the same meaning, τὸ βαλανεῖον appears as a direct object of λούειν, so that the literal translation would be "NN washed the baths" (in fact, as Meyer has pointed out, the verb is used in a causative sense).[23] Finally, Meyer has rightly identified a third construction: τὸ βαλανεῖον λούει, or λούει *tout court.* Her example includes *PFlor* III 384$_{28-31}$ (Alexandria, 489 CE), where the lessee undertakes to avoid provoking complaints that the two parts of the baths are closed to the public (ἐνεδρε[ῦ]σαι λούειν τὰ δύο μέρη τοῦ αὐτοῦ βαλανίου) but to "keep them available every day without exception" (ἀλλὰ τα[ῦτα] ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστης ἡμέρας ἀδιαλίπτως λούειν),[24] *PGiss* I 50$_{13-16}$ (Oxyrhynchus, 259 CE), where the *capsarii* are subjected to the φόρος τοῦ λούοντος βαλανείου,[25] and the famous *PLond* III 1177$_{32}$ (Fayum, 113 CE), where, when listing the

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[21] Meyer 1981, 213–214.

[22] So, *IGR* IV 555$_{3-4}$ (= 329 Fagan; Ankyra, 1st c. CE) honors a local magistrate ἀλίψαντα τὸν δῆμον ἐκ λουτήρων καὶ λούσαντα ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων ("who anointed people and washed them with his own money"). Cf. *Demitsas Μακεδ.* 51$_{4-5}$ (Beroia, Roman time): ἀλείψαντα καὶ λούσαντα δι᾽ ὅλης ἡμέρας πανδημεί; *SEG* 42 (1992) 582$_{34}$ (Kalindoia, 68–98 CE).

[23] See an honorary inscription from Kys in Caria, *BCH* 2 [1887] 306–308$_8$ (40 CE): λούσας δὲ καὶ τὸ βαλανεῖον, a contract for the rent of the baths *PMich* V 312$_{17-19}$ (34 CE): λούσωσι τὸ βαλανῖον κατὰ μῆνα ἕκαστον μίαν παρὰ μίαν οἱ αὐτοὶ μεμισθωμένοι καὶ ταῖς ἑωρτὲς ("the tenants themselves shall provide free baths every month every other day, and on holidays also") or a statute of an association of ἐριοπῶλαι καὶ λινύφοι *SEG* 30 (1980) 1382$_{14-15}$ (= 330 Fagan; Hypaipa, 301 CE): τὸ βαλανεῖον λούειν μελέτω τοῖς ἐπιμελη[ταῖς *lac. circa 7 litt.*] τοὺς κατοίκους ("the overseers should take care to ensure the functioning of the bath without charge for the local population"). Cf. Drew-Bear 1980, esp. 523; in 1996, this inscription was added to the examples of λούω "provide free bath" in the revised *LSJ Suppl.*

[24] The public status of these "two parts" is specified above, l. 23–25: καὶ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν λοῦσιν τῶ[ν] δύο μερῶν τοῦ αὐτοῦ βαλανίου καὶ τὴν ὑπόκ[α]υσιν [ἀπ᾽ ἰδ]ίων σου ἀναλωμάτων; the tenant is free to use the other parts of the bathhouse for his private needs, but two must be open gratis to all local people. This example convinces us (*pace* Meyer) that it is not the mere functioning of the bathhouse that is involved, but the provision of free access to it; cf. also λούειν τοὺς κατοίκους in *SEG* 30 (1980) 1382$_{14-15}$ (quoted in the previous note).

[25] "Le φόρος payé par les *capsarii* ne l'est pas pour chaque utilisation du bain, mais pour les périodes où l'établissement est en activité" (Meyer 1981, 211).

water supply expenses incurred by the magistrates, it is stated that on certain days there was no bathing: ἀπὸ ις ἕως λ (sc. τοῦ Μεσορή) μὴ λελουκέναι. To this set of instances[26] we may add the colloquial expression *balineum lavat*, which is mentioned, without any context, by Roman grammarians condemning its solecistic counterpart *balineum lavatur* (Charis. p. 352, 6 Barwick; *GL* 4. 437. 28; 7. 104. 14 etc.).[27]

Let us now turn from τὸ βαλανεῖον λούει to οὐ λούει and adduce a close parallel to the text of *Philogelos*, which seems to provide the key to its interpretation. The historian Olympiodorus of Thebes tells of an elaborate prank initiation ("mascarade qui symbolise les risques d'un échec de carrière")[28] to which Athenian students of the 4th–5th c. subjected newcomers: they were led by a crowd to the baths, while another crowd of students rushed and shouted at them, trying to push them away (28 Müller [*FHG* IV 64] = Phot. *Bibl.* 80. 60b):

> τῶν μὲν ἔμπροσθεν τρεχόντων καὶ κωλυόντων, τῶν δὲ ὠθούντων καὶ ἐπεχόντων, πάντων δὲ τῶν κωλυόντων ταῦτα βοώντων· Στᾶ, στᾶ, οὐ λούει…

> Some ran forward and prevented them [from entering], others pushed and directed them towards the bath, and all those who prevented them shouted: "Stop, stop, οὐ λούει!"…

Such translations of Στᾶ, στᾶ, οὐ λούει as "Stop! Stop! Don't take the bath!",[29] "Arrête-toi, arrête-toi, tu ne te baignes pas!",[30] "Stop, stop,

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[26] We do not discuss the corresponding nominal collocation ἡ λοῦσις τοῦ βαλανείου (for a list of epigraphical examples, v. Drew-Bear 1970, 208; Meyer 1981, 210–213), grammatically ambiguous because of the amphiboly of the *genetivus subiectivus / obiectivus*.

[27] *ThLL* VII 2 (1973) 1049. 26 sqq. The longest passage of this kind belongs to Pompeius (5th or 6th c.; *GL* VI, p. 233, 25 sqq.): "*Ecce puta* lavo: *puta de me ipso possum dicere* lavo ego *et* lavor ego. *De balineo quid possum dicere? Balineum lavat. Hoc bene dicimus.* Balineum lavatur *quem ad modum possumus dicere? Nam lavat balineum nos. Numquid a nobis balineum lavatur? Homo enim lavatur*". As we have seen, *balineum lavatur* is attested by inscriptions (*CIL* XI 721; XIV 4015).

[28] Bernardi 1992, 155 n. 3. Iohannes Meursius, the first to collect, in his *De ludis Graecorum* (1622), the extant information about this initiation procedure, likens it to the *depositio cornuum* in the universities of his day (Meursius 1744, 1005).

[29] Blockley 1983, 193; DeForest 2011, 323–324. Cf. "Stop, stop! Don't bathe!" (Rothhaus 2000, 92), "Fermati, fermati, non bagnarti" (Baldini 2004, 57), "Стой, стой, не мойся" (Vasilik 2021 [В. В. Василик (пер., комм.) *Фотий. Библиотека* I], 108) *etc.*

[30] Kugener 1904/1905, 353 (obviously, Kugener understands λούει as 2 *sing. med.*).

he must not wash",[31] or "Стой! Стой! Он не моется!" ("Stop! Stop! He is not washing!")[32] are evidently misleading: the implied subject of οὐ λούει is not the novice, but τὸ βαλανεῖον (cf. the same ellipsis in *Philogel.* 130).[33] This is clear from a parallel provided by Gregory of Nazianzus, who experienced this unpleasant ritual some sixty years before Olympiodorus' visit to Athens (*Orat.* 43. 16. 5): κελεύει δὲ ἡ βοὴ μὴ προβαίνειν, ἀλλ' ἵστασθαι ὡς τοῦ λουτροῦ σφᾶς οὐ παραδεχομένου. Then the students start banging on doors (closed from the inside by their accomplices), intimidating the novice, until finally everyone is allowed in the bathhouse: καὶ ἅμα τῶν θυρῶν ἀρασσομένων, πατάγῳ τὸν νέον φοβήσαντες, εἶτα τὴν εἴσοδον συγχωρήσαντες.

What situation is being simulated here, and what is the meaning of Gregory's words "as if the bathhouse would not receive them" (ὡς τοῦ λουτροῦ σφᾶς οὐ παραδεχομένου), equivalent to Olympiodorus' οὐ λούει? Obviously, the victim of the hoax must think that the bathhouse is for some reason inaccessible to ordinary visitors: for example, that it is entirely rented by some large company or by a rich person, or that the owner bathes there with his family and friends, etc. Indeed, if the bath were not in operation, with unfired stoves and unheated water, it would make no sense to break the doors and there would be no κωλύοντες. Nor does it seem plausible to assume that οὐ λούει means "you can't wash here for free": in this case visitors would not be chased away, but asked for money. An exact counterpart to the scene staged by the pranksters is Theodoret of Cyrus' account of Eunomius, an Arian bishop of Samosata: when he went to the public baths, his servants locked the doors and turned away visitors until an outraged crowd gathered at the entrance and the bishop ordered everyone to be let in (*Hist. Eccl.* 4. 15. 2, p. 235, 15 sqq. Parmentier–Scheidweiler): ἐπειδὴ γὰρ λούσασθαι βουληθέντος οἱ οἰκέται τοῦ

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[31] Freese 1920, 142.

[32] Bolgova 2018 [А. М. Болгова, "Посвящение в студенты и другие неформальные ритуалы позднеантичных Афин", *Научные ведомости БелГУ. История, политология*], 432; the author cites, without any attribution, the translation by Helena Skrzynska (Skrzhinskaja 1958 [Е. Ч. Скржинская (tr., comm.), "Олимпиодор. История", *Византийский временник*], 228). The previous Russian version by Spyridon Destounis was closer to the truth, although evasive: "Стой, стой, не вымоешься" ("Stop, stop, you will not be able to bathe": Destunis 1860 [С. Ю. Дестунис (пер., примеч.), *Византийские историки Дексипп, Эвнапий, Олимпиодор, Малх, Петр Патриций, Менандр, Кандид, Ноннос и Феофан Византиец*], 202).

[33] "No bathing here!" (Walden 1910, 302), "Pas de bains!" (Henry 1959, 178), "Niente bagno!" (Maisano 1979, 46 = Mugelli 2000, 106) *et sim.* are therefore grammatically correct.

βαλανείου τὰς θύρας ἔκλεισαν τοὺς εἰσελθεῖν βουλομένους κωλύοντες, πλῆθος δὲ πρὸ θυρῶν θεασάμενος ἀναπετάσαι ταύτας ἐκέλευσε.[34]

As we suggest, the exact meaning of the idiomatic οὐ λούει in *Philogel.* 23 and 130 is, as in Olympiodorus' passage, "the bathhouse *is not accessible, is occupied, closed for an event*". The σχολαστικός, as often in the *Philogelos*, applies twisted logic: if there are no visitors in the baths, it means that they are not allowed in; if they are not allowed in, it means that there is some special event going on – a deduction that is absurd because no one is in the bathhouse at all.[35] Imagine a person who comes into a completely empty restaurant and says: "As far as I can see, there is a gala banquet being held here."

In conclusion, it is worthy of notice that in Olympiodorus, as in *Philogel.* 130, the subject of οὐ λούει is omitted,[36] just as it is omitted in modern "CLOSED" signs. This makes one agree with Thierfelder's assumption, "οὐ λούει dürfte die Phrase der Umgangssprache gewesen sein, τὸ βαλανεῖον in § 23 ein mehr literarischer Zusatz",[37] as well as with Dowe's deletion of τὸ βαλανεῖον[38] at the end of *Philogel.* 23.[39]

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[34] Cf. the analysis of this story in the context of bathing habits of Late Antiquity: Maréchal 2012, 55; Zytka 2019, 51; 95.

[35] Ἐξ ὧν / καθὼς βλέπω provide an additional comic touch; perhaps it was this intonation of elaborate reasoning that gave the Sidonian in *Philogel.* 130 the profession of σοφιστής.

[36] Cf. the same ellipsis in *PLond* III, 1177, 32 (v. *supra*), where, however, μὴ λελουκέναι has the non-specific meaning "keine Badebetrieb stattfand" (Habermann 2000, 9). The proverb from *Aesopica* (βαλανεῖον ἔχω, καὶ οὐ λούει) does not allow a judgment to be made.

[37] Thierfelder 1968, 239.

[38] "The final τὸ βαλανεῖον sounds superfluous, and comparison with 130, which ends καθὼς βλέπω, οὐ λούει, confirms this suspicion. Ἤγουν μνῆμα in 26, and ᾔτει τὴν σφαῖραν, deleted in 33 by Thierfelder, are other intrusions in the vicinity" (Dawe 1997 [but the text is dated "January 1999"] 308).

[39] We are deeply obliged to Alexey Belousov, Elena Chepel, Denis Keyer, Alexandra Pimenova, Maria Pirogovskaya, Yakov Podolny, and Kristina Rossiianova for bibliographical assistance.

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In two almost identical jokes from *Philogelos* (23; 130), a σχολαστικός (or a "Sidonian sophist"), on arriving at a bathhouse at its very opening, when no one else is in it, says: "As far as I can see, οὐ λούει". According to Andreas Thierfelder, whose interpretation has prevailed in recent scholarship, the technical expression οὐ λούει (τὸ βαλανεῖον) means "the bath does not work". With this understanding, however, the joke loses any salt: for even if the entrance doors are open, the sight of an empty bathhouse might naturally lead a visitor to think that it is not functioning for some reason. The authors deal with examples of the idiom (τὸ βαλανεῖον) λούει / *balineum lavat* meaning *free access to the baths*, which epigraphists and papyrologists have discussed more than once. As the closest parallel, a passage from the historian Olympiodorus (28 Müller [*FHG* IV 64] = Phot. *Bibl.* 80. 60b) is first invoked, describing the initiation procedure to which newcomers were subjected in fourth- and fifth-century Athenian schools. In endeavoring to prevent the novice from entering the deliberately locked bath, students shout, "Στᾶ, στᾶ, οὐ λούει": as a parallel passage from Gregory Nazianzinus (*Orat.* 43. 16. 5) shows, this does not imply "the bath is not in operation", but "there is no access", "the bath is occupied". Thus, the σχολαστικός, applying perverse logic, concludes that the visitors are not allowed into the bath because same "special event" is taking place there: in a completely empty bathhouse, these words sound absurd, which seems to restore the punchline to the joke.

В двух дублирующих друг друга анекдотах из позднеантичного сборника *Филогелос* (23; 130) схоластик (или "сидонский софист"), придя в баню к самому открытию, когда в ней никого нет, говорит: "Насколько я вижу, οὐ λούει". Согласно интерпретации Андреаса Тирфельдера, возобладавшей у позднейших переводчиков, техническое выражение οὐ λούει (τὸ βαλανεῖον) означает "баня не работает". При таком понимании, однако, шутка лишается соли: ведь даже если входные двери открыты, вид пустующей бани естественно может навести посетителя на мысль, что она по каким-то причинам не функционирует и помыться не получится. Авторы разбирают примеры конструкции (τὸ βαλανεῖον) λούει / *balineum lavat*, не единожды исследованной эпиграфистами и папирологами и означающей *свободный доступ* в баню. В качестве наиболее близкой параллели впервые привлекается пассаж из историка Олимпиодора (28 Müller [*FHG* IV, 64] = Phot. *Bibl.* 80, 60b), рассказывающий о процедуре инициации, которой студенты в Афинах IV–V вв. подвергали новоприбывших. Стараясь не пустить новичка в нарочно запертую баню, его специально подученные однокашники кричат "Στᾶ, στᾶ, οὐ λούει", что, как показывает параллельное место из Григория Назианзина (*Orat.* 43, 16, 5), подразумевает не "баня не работает", но "в баню нет доступа", "в бане занято". Таким образом, схоластик из *Филогелоса*, применяя извращенную логику, заключает, что посетителей не пустили в баню, поскольку там проходит "специальное мероприятие": в совершенно пустом помещении эти слова звучат абсурдно, что, как представляется, возвращает анекдоту пуанту.

S. Douglas Olson

PHILOLOGICAL NOTES ON THE LETTER *LAMBDA* IN A NEW GREEK-ENGLISH DICTIONARY III. ΛΗΝΑΙΟΣ – ΛΟΓΟΣ[*]

S.v. **ληναῖος**, the *Dictionary* – repeating and to some extent garbling the material in LSJ s.v. – asserts that the Lenaia festival at Athens was held "in the month of Ληναιών or Gamelion, with dramatic competitions, usually comic", and glosses **τὸ Λήναιον** (*sic*) as the "area in which the Lenaian festival took place at Athens". In fact, Athens had no month called Lenaion (although a number of Ionic cities did); inscriptional records leave no doubt that the Lenaia festivals always featured both comedy and tragedy, at least in the classical period; and while there was a place in the city called the Lenaion, all competitions were held in the Theater of Dionysus. *IG* II^2 1496$_{74}$ [ἐγ] Διονυσίων τῶν [ἐπὶ Λ]ηναίω[ι] – cited in an outdated fashion, again following LSJ, as "*Syll*.^{3} 1029.9" – appears to represent a fossilized expression preserved also at Ar. *Ach*. 504 (with Olson 2002 *ad loc*.). S.v. **Ληναιών**, replace the outdated reference to "*Syll*.^{3} 1014.94" (drawn from LSJ s.v.) with *I.Erythrai* 201$_{94}$, and add e.g. *ID* 290$_{47}$ (246 BCE); *IG* XII 6 1. 133$_1$ (Samos, 2nd c. BCE).

S.v. **ληνοβάτης** assigns the word to "Anacr. 4.16 (*IEG*)". It is instead found in the *Carmina Anacreontea* (= [Anacr.]), which are not included in West's *Iambi et Elegi Graeci* but were edited by him in a separate 1984 Teubner volume.

What s.v. **λῆξις** 1.2 "*share, portion, assigned* or *attributed domain* without any kind of draw, delegated *residence*", with reference to [Arist.] *Mund*. 401 b 20 κατὰ δὲ τὸ μέλλον Λάχεσις – [εἰς] πάντα γὰρ ἡ κατὰ φύσιν μένει λῆξις ("Lachesis takes charge of the future; for its natural allotment awaits everything"; of the relationship of the individual Fates to existence) is supposed to mean is unclear. But this looks like a confused and unsuccessful attempt to rewrite LSJ s.v. I.3 "without the notion of lot or chance, *assigned sphere*". S.v. λῆξις 1.3 "Att. jur. λ. δίκης absolute λ.

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[*] See *Hyperboreus* 29: 1 (2023) 133–156; 29: 2 (2023) 299–325.

written accusation presented to the Archons in a private suit Plat. Rp. 425d Is. 11.10 Aeschn. 1.63 | rar. in public cases Demosth. 39.17 ‖ request to enter into possession of an inheritance Is. 3.2" has similarly been taken straight from LSJ s.v. II.1 "as law-term, λ. δίκης or λ. alone, written complaint lodged with the Archon, as the first step in private actions ... Pl. R. 425d, Is. 11.10, Aeschin. 1.63 ...; very rarely of public actions, as in D. 39.17" + s.v. II.2 "λ. τοῦ κλήρου, an application to the Archon (required of all except direct descendants) to be put in legal possession of an inheritance". This lemma and others like it in the *Dictionary* raise intriguing questions regarding the ethics and obligations of lexicon-production that are however beyond the scope of this paper.

λήπτης is a noun and thus means not "*who takes* or *accepts*" (as if the word were an adjective) but "*one who takes* or *accepts*" (~ LSJ s.v.).

θεὸς οὐχὶ ληπτός· εἰ δὲ **ληπτός**, οὐ θεός (adesp. tr. fr. 168) is not a bit of Christian moralizing, even if it accidentally opens itself up to such interpretation. It thus means not "God cannot be understood; if he were comprehensible, he would not be God", but "a god cannot be understood/captured, and if he is understood/captured, he is not a god".

ληρεία (glossed "*talking nonsense, verbiage*") is an abstract and refers to "nonsense" generally; **λήρησις** (glossed "*verbiage, saying or doing nonsensical things*") is the equivalent of a gerund and means "talking nonsense" or "acting nonsensically"; and **λήρημα** (glossed "*verbiage, non-sensical prattle*") is a concrete noun and refers to a specific bit of nonsense. **λῆσις** (glossed "will") is likewise equivalent to a gerund ("exercising one's will, making a choice"). The word is attested already at Epich. fr. 178, where it is contrasted with λῆμα; Hsch. λ 902 offers βούλησις as an equivalent.

Ar. *Pl.* 517 **λῆρον** ληρεῖς (Chremylus responds to Penia's claim that it is better to be poor than rich) means not "you are saying trivialities" (*sic*), but "you're talking nonsense"; *Ra.* 1497 is not another example of the expression. X. *An.* 7. 7. 41 Ἡρακλείδῃ γε λῆρος πάντα δοκεῖ εἶναι πρὸς τὸ ἀργύριον ἔχειν ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου means not "everything seems trifling to Heraklides, as long as he can make any kind of profit" but "everything seems to be nonsense to Heraklides in comparison to getting money by any means possible".

The speaker at Luc. *Lex.* 9 is a goldsmith who explains his tardiness by saying ἐγὼ ... λῆρόν τινα ἐκρότουν καὶ ἐλλόβια καὶ πέδας τῇ θυγατρὶ τῇ

ἐμῇ ("I was forging a *lêros* and earrings and bracelets" – or "anklets?" – "for my daughter"); this does not mean that a **λῆρος** (glossed "*gold ornament*") was necessarily made of gold, only that it could be.[1] Central to the wit of *Lexiphanes* is the title-character's absurd fondness for recherché Attic vocabulary. ἐλλόβιον is a certain example (Poll. 2. 84; Ael. Dion. ε *33), and **λῆρος** likely is as well; most easily taken as an extended sense of the normal meaning "nonsense" (thus "bauble" *vel sim.*).

λησμοσύνη (a poeticism attested before the late Roman period only at Hes. *Op*. 55 λησμοσύνην τε κακῶν; S. *Ant*. 151 ἐκ μὲν δὴ πολέμων / τῶν νῦν θέσθε λησμοσύναν; contrast common λήθη) is glossed "*oblivion*". **λῆστις** (also glossed "*oblivion*") is likewise poetic (attested before the Roman period only at E. *Cyc*. 172 κακῶν τε λῆστις; S. *OC* 584; Crit. fr. 6. 11 West[2]).[2] In colloquial English, however, "oblivion" means a general sense of unconsciousness ("they drank themselves into oblivion") or of being forgotten ("the idea slipped into oblivion"), whereas with an objective genitive the normal term is "forgetfulness".[3]

S.v. **λῃστής**, Hdt. 6. 17 λῃστὴς κατεστήκεε ... Καρχηδονίων δὲ καὶ Τυρσηνῶν means not "I made attacks of piracy at the expense of Carthaginians and Tyrrhenians" but "he set himself up as a plunderer of ...", i.e. "he raided ..."

"Privateer" is not a high-style equivalent of "pirate" but refers to a legal arrangement under which a state grants a private individual a "letter of marque" allowing him to raid the state's enemies at his own risk and for his own profit.[4] A pirate, by contrast, operates outside the law. D. 23. 148 **λῃστικὸν** ... πλοῖον ἔχων ἐλήζετο τοὺς ὑμετέρους συμμάχους (an incident in Charidemus' supposedly ugly past) thus means not "he plundered your allies with a privateer" but "he plundered your allies with a pirate ship". τὸ λῃστικὸν τῶν Πελοποννησίων at Th. 2. 69. 1, by contrast, is a reference

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[1] The *Dictionary* also cites Hedyl. *AP* 6. 292. 2 ληρῶν οἱ χρύσεοι κάλαμοι ("the gold reeds of the *lêroi*"; in a list of expensive items of clothing), where the "reeds" might be e.g. pins in an ornament designed to hold up a woman's hair.

[2] That the word is preserved only in the nominative and accusative singular is best understood as an historical accident of attestation; there is no reason to doubt that other forms were available, if anyone chose to use them.

[3] S.v. **λῃστεύω**, standard English says not "infested by" but "infested with".

[4] Article 1 Section 8 of the United States Constitution, for example, empowers Congress to issue letters of marque.

to something more like privateering, since the target is the Athenians and their allies, to the general benefit of the Peloponnesian forces.[5]

Λητοΐδης in reference to Asclepius at Hes. fr. 51. 3 M–W (fr. 55. 3 Most) means not "*son of Leto*" but "descendent of Leto" (*sc.* through his father Apollo).

ἡ τοῦ μισθοῦ **λῆψις** at Pl. *R*. 346 d means not "payment" but "the receipt of a wage". Arist. *EN* 1107 b 9 δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λῆψιν means not "the use and acquisition of wealth" but "giving and getting money".

Ephipp. fr. 14. 3 † λιψιγομισθω † τέχνη is corrupt, and Adam's **ληψολιγομίσθῳ** τέχνη (glossed "the art of receiving low pay") was printed by Kaibel and lemmatized by LSJ (followed by the *Dictionary*). But the line is part of an extended description of a fashionable young man who has got a training in various philosophical schools, and this is accordingly the wrong sense. Meineke's ληψιλογομίσθῳ τέχνη (glossed "the art of getting paid to speak"), which is better from this perspective, is mentioned but for some reason not given a lemma. Kassel–Austin simply print the word surrounded by cruces (as above).

S.v. **λίην**, *Il*. 5. 362 λίην ἄχθομαι ἕλκος means not "the wound hurts too much" but "my wound is extremely painful". Arist. *EN* 1118 b 20 οἱ λίαν ἀνδραποδώδεις means not "men who are overly material" but "men who are too slavish".

S.vv. **Λιβανῆΐς** and **Λιβανῖτις**, the name of the country is oddly given a definite article ("*of the Lebanon*"), as in e.g. Italian but not contemporary English.

λίβανος is attested already at Sapph. fr. 44. 30 (omitted) and means not "*incense*" but "frankincense";[6] see discussion of the substance and its source in Olson–Sens 2000 on Archestr. fr. 60. 4–5 (with bibliography). The etymology of the word is garbled: the Phoenician equivalent is not "*ebn-ti*" (*sic*) but *lebônat*, cf. Hebrew לְבוֹנָה.

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[5] **λῃστοσαλπιγκτής** is lemmatized (appropriately) in the singular but glossed in the plural ("trumpet-playing plunderers"), as in Men. fr. 620 (the only attestation of what is apparently a comic nonce-word).

[6] Similar corrections are needed s.vv. **λιβανίδιον, λιβανίζω, λιβανοειδής, λιβανομάννα,** and in a dozen additional cognates that follow.

The *Dictionary* is aware that **λιβανωτίς** (glossed "*rosemary*") is a different plant from **λίβανος**, but nonetheless translates κάρπιμος λίβανος at Thphr. *HP* 9. 11. 10 as "rosemary bearing incense as fruit" (*sic*); read "fruit-bearing rosemary". At *IG* II² 840₇,₁₅, etc., the word is used instead to mean a stand for burning frankincense (glossed "*incense burner*") or the like. The alternative gloss "*thurible*"[7] (also offered s.vv. **λιβανωτός** and **λιβανωτρίς**) refers specifically to an incense censer that hangs from chains and is swung e.g. in Catholic services, and is probably inappropriate in a classical Greek context.

The subject of **λίγ'** ἄειδεν at *Od*. 10. 254 is Circe, and the words mean not "he was singing sweetly" but "she was singing in a clear voice". The text at A. R. 4. 837 reads not ζεφύρου λίγα κικυμένοιο but ζεφύρου λίγα κινυμένοιο, and the sense is not "the Zephyr blowing softly" but "if the West Wind blows vigorously".

λίγδος is glossed "*lathe*" with reference to Poll. 10. 189. Pollux is discussing the so-called "lost wax" method of casting bronze, and what he says is τὸ πήλινον ὃ περιείληφε τὰ πλασθέντα κήρινα, ἃ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ πυρὸς προσφορὰν τήκεται, καὶ πολλὰ ἐκείνῳ τρυπήματα ἐναπολείπεται, μίλιγδος καλεῖται· ὅθεν καὶ Σοφοκλῆς ἔφη ἐν Αἰχμαλώτισιν· ἀσπὶς μὲν ἡ μίλιγδος ὣς πύκνωμά τι ("the clay casing that surrounds the molded wax, which is melted when the fire is applied, and many holes are left in it [*sc*. to allow the wax to escape], is referred to as a *miligdos*. Sophocles (fr. 35) accordingly said in *Captive Women*: † the *miligdos* shield like some dense mass †"). The Sophocles fragment (ignored) was emended by Nauck and Bentley to read ἀσπὶς μὲν ἡμὴ λίγδος ὣς πυκνομματεῖ ("our shield is dense with eyes" – i.e. "full of holes" – "like a *ligdos*"), which requires that Pollux' μίλιγδος in turn be corrected to λίγδος. On this basis, LSJ s.v. II glosses the word "*clay mold*". The lexicographers, meanwhile, agree that a λίγδος is some sort of mold used for casting, but seem understandably confused about exactly what process is in question and how it worked.[8]

λιγυπτερόφωνος is a *hapax* at *Or. Sib*. fr. 10; the sense is not "*with wings that resound harmoniously*" but "with wings that sound shrill" (~ Lampe s.v.).

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[7] Cognate with Greek θύω, θύος, and θύον.

[8] Esp. Phot. λ 300 **λίγδος**· χῶνος τρήματα ἔχων συνεχῆ, τῷ Δ παραπλήσια, δι' ὧν ὁ χαλκὸς ἠθεῖται ("*ligdos*: a mold with numerous holes, resembling a Δ, through which the bronze is filtered"; = Ael. Dion. λ 15).

λιγυρίζω is attested only at Luc. *Lex*. 2 κατέλαβον γὰρ τοὺς ἐργάτας λιγυρίζοντας τὴν θερινὴν ᾠδήν ("I caught the hired workmen *ligyrizontes* their summer song"; the title-character is speaking again, see above on **λῆρος**) and Hsch. λ 978, where the verb is glossed μελῳδεῖ ("sings"), hence LSJ s.v. "*sing loud or clear*", which makes better sense of the passage in Lucian than the *Dictionary*'s "*intone*".

S.v. **λιγυρός** (glossed "*clear, shrill*" by LSJ s.v.; poetic), the *Dictionary* attempts to give the word the new meaning "*sweet, harmonious, melodious*". None of the passages cited – *Il*. 14. 290 (of a bird singing from a tree in the mountains); *Od*. 12. 44 (the Siren's song); Hes. *Op*. 659 (the path of song upon which the Muses set the poet); Arist. *HA* 616 b 32 (a bird's call); Theoc. 17. 113 (the song of a poet) – require this sense. The same is true of s.v. **λιγύς** (glossed "*clear, shrill*" by LSJ s.v.; also poetic), to which the *Dictionary* similarly gives the additional meaning "*sweet, melodious, harmonious*", citing e.g. *Il*. 8. 186 (Achilleus' lyre); 24. 63 (a Muse singing at Achilleus' funeral); *Od*. 20. 274 (Telemachus' speech as characterized by Antinoos, scarcely praise); s.v. **λιγύφθογγος** (glossed "*clear-voiced*, in Hom. always epith. of heralds" by LSJ s.v.; also poetic), to which the *Dictionary* gives the additional meaning "*harmonious-voiced*" (*sic*), citing e.g. Thgn. 242 (of pipes, which are normally said to "drone" *vel sim*.); Bacch. 10. 10 (of a bee); and s.v. **λιγύφωνος** (glossed "*clear-voiced, loud-voiced ... also of sweet sounds*" by LSJ s.v., noting for the supposed exceptional sense Hes. *Th*. 275, 518 and Theoc. 12. 7, in both of which "clear" would do just as well), where the *Dictionary* offers the omnibus definition "*with a clear* or *sonorous* or *harmonious voice*".[9]

Despite s.v. **Λιγυστίς**, Liguria and Tyrrhenia were separate parts of Italy; whoever the ancient Ligurians were, they were not Etruscans.

λιθαγωγία (glossed "*carrying stones*"; better "transport of stones") at *IG* I³ 436₂₄ (from the Parthenon accounts, 447/6 BCE) is cited with the outdated reference "*IG* I² 339. 25". The cognate adjective **λιθαγωγός** at *IG* I³ 395₉ (450–445 BCE) is similarly cited with the outdated reference "*IG* I² 336. 8" (following LSJ s.v.).

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[9] S.v. **Λίγυς**, the normal English term for an inhabitant of Liguria is not a "Ligur" but a "Ligurian" (as s.v. **Λιγυστικός** and **Λιγυστῖνος**).

τὸν χρυσὸν ἐς τὴν παῖδα ἐλίθαζον at App. 1. 4 means not "they threw the gold at the girl as stones" but "they threw the gold at the girl as if it were stones", i.e. "they stoned the girl with the gold".

λιθόβασις at ~ *ID* 1423 face A. 10 is glossed "*stone base of a tripod*", following LSJ s.v., including for the outdated reference to *BCH* 29. 541. In fact, λιθόβασις – attested nowhere else – is a restoration in the original publication and is replaced in *ID* by [ἀκρόβασιν], making λιθόβασις a ghost word that ought to be deleted from both lexica.

On **λιθίασις** and **λιθιάω** (referring to kidney stones, gallstones, and the like), see s.v. **λευκερινεός/λευκίσκος** (*Hyperboreus* 29: 2 [2023] 316). **λιθογόνος** at Dsc. *Eup*. 2. 118 (of water) is related to this use of **λίθος** and means not "*which generates rocks*" but "which tends to produce kidney stones / gallstones / bladder stones". So too a **λιθολάβος** (glossed "*surgical instrument for removing stones*") is used specifically for removing stones from the bladder.[10]

As LSJ s.v. notes implicitly, the etymology of **λιθόδενδρον** (literally "stone-tree") – identified at Dsc. 5. 121 as a term sometimes used for κουράλιον – along with the description of it at Thphr. *Lap*. 38 (compared to ὁ Ἰνδικὸς κάλαμος ἀπολελιθωμένος, "the petrified Indian reed"), makes it clear that the word refers not just to "*coral*" but specifically to "*branching coral*".

δικεῖν at Pi. *O*. 10. 72 μᾶκος ... ἔδικε πέτρῳ is glossed "*strike*" by LSJ s.v., but the text actually says "he hurled a distance" – an internal accusative – "with a stone" in reference to a discus-thrower. This would seem to support the notion that **λιθοδικτῶ** (poetic?) at *Suda* λ 516 means "*throw stones*" or perhaps "throw a stone", as opposed to "throw stones at, pelt with stones" (thus the *Suda* ἐκ τοῦ δίκω τὸ βάλλω, "from *dikô* meaning 'pelt'" and more explicitly Zon. p. 1312. 18 λιθοδικτῶ. λίθοις βάλλω, followed by LSJ s.v.).

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[10] Cf. s.vv. **λιθοτομέω** (glossed "*to remove a calculus*") and **λιθουλκός** (glossed "*instrument for extracting calculi*"), which use technically correct medical vocabulary that is nonetheless too obscure to be helpful. S.v. **λιθουρικός** ("having to do with bladder stones", and thus as a substantive "one who suffers from bladder stones"), the cross-reference to **λιθοφορέω** should be struck; the verb means not "afflicted with bladder stones" *vel sim*. but "carry rocks" (e.g. to construct walls).

λιθόδμητος (glossed "*built out of stone*") is attested not just in an epigram of Philodemus (*AP* 9. 570. 4, of a grave cut out of living rock) but already in a mid-3rd-century BCE list of poetic vocabulary (*SH* 991. 90).

λιθοεργός at Man. 1. 77 is glossed "*that builds out of stone*". The sense is actually "that works stone" and thus when used substantively "stonemason" (thus LSJ s.v.), precisely like the more common contracted form **λιθουργός**.

λιθοκέφαλος in Arist. fr. 294 Rose (of various varieties of fish) means not "*having a head as hard as a rock*" but "having a stone in its head".

λιθοκόλλητος at S. *Tr*. 1261 λιθοκόλλητον στόμιον ("a *lithokollêtos* bit", for a horse; lyric) is glossed "*made of cement, cemented*, fig. *extremely hard*". But the object in question has just been described in the preceding line as χάλυβος, "made of steel"; cement is not a particularly durable substance in any case; and since the word elsewhere always means "set with stones", that is probably the idea here as well; LSJ s.v. adds "to make it sharper".

[λιθ]οκομικόν ("involving the transport of stone") at *IG* I^3 395$_{10}$ – a virtually certain restoration, given its appearance in the middle of a catalogue of other items all having to do with the handling and cutting of stone – is omitted.

λιθολαμπής (of a crown) is glossed "*having gleaming, shining stones*"; better "gleaming with gems".

λιθοτόμος ("stone-cutter", i.e. "stone-mason") is not attested in literary sources before Xenophon (below) but appears in inscriptions already in the middle of the 5th century (e.g. *IG* I^3 144$_{270}$; 463$_{84–86}$). The word is not a "conjecture" at X. *Cyr*. 3. 2. 11 but is drawn from Poll. 7. 118 λιθοτόμον δὲ Ξενοφῶν ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ τῆς Παιδείας εἴρηκεν ("Xenophon uses *lithotomos* in Book 3 of the *Education*"). The manuscripts' **λιθοδόμος**, by contrast, is attested nowhere else before Procopius, and in the classical period one would expect that word to have the strange meaning "one who constructs rocks" (cf. οἰκοδόμος, "one who constructs houses").

λιθουλκία (glossed "*transport of stones*"; better LSJ *s.v.* "haulage of stone") at *IG* I^3 444$_{272}$ (447/6–433/2 BCE, from the Parthenon accounts; spelled λιθολκία) is cited with the outdated reference "*IG* I^2 347. 38" (following LSJ s.v.).

LSJ s.v. I notes that **λιθουλκός -όν** is attested at Poll. 7. 118 in an otherwise unattested sense and glosses "quarrying stones"; the *Dictionary* offers instead "*that extracts stones*". The context in Pollux involves words having to do with the construction of buildings, and with stone-working in particular, and the sense ought accordingly to be "that hauls stones", i.e. "that transports stones". But this is the reading in only one set of manuscripts in any case; the others have a form of λιθουργός (printed by Bethe); and the reference should be struck from both lexica.

λιθουργία (cited from Roman-era sources) is attested already at *IG* I³ 444₂₇₃ (spelled λιθοργία; 447/6–433/2 BCE). The word (mis-leadingly glossed "*sculpting*") is an abstract, and the sense is "stone-working". The cognate adjective **λιθουργικός** is likewise attested already at e.g. *IG* I³ 476₇₂ (spelled λιθοργικός; 408/7 BCE), while **λιθουργός** is attested already at *IG* I³ 395₁₁ [λιθ]οργοῖς (a virtually certain restoration given the context, which is entirely concerned with stone-working; 450–445 BCE).

Adesp. com. fr. 385 **λιθωμόται** is glossed "who swear on an altar", i.e. a βωμός. But Hsch. λ 1003 (which preserves the fragment) explains that it refers to δημηγόροι ἐπὶ τοῦ λίθου ὀμνύντες. ὁ δὲ λίθος τὸ ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων ἐκκλησίᾳ βῆμα ("political leaders who swear upon the 'stone'; the 'stone' is the speaker's stand in the Athenian assembly").

λιθῶπις is attested only once (Nonn. *D*. 30. 265) but is in any case a type of adjective restricted to female objects; the common equivalent is **λιθώπης**.

λιθωτός (glossed "*made of stone*") is attested only as a v.l. for a form of **λιθινός** at Hdt. 2. 69. 2 and ought not to have been lemmatized.

κανοῦν, the word Hsch. λ 1017 uses to define **λίκνον**, is glossed "*basket*". But a κανοῦν is specifically the sacred basket containing sacrificial implements that was carried at the head of Athenian processions (e.g. Ar. *Ach*. 244 with Olson 2002 *ad loc*.; Men. *Epitr*. 438–439 τὸ τῆς θεοῦ φέρειν / κανοῦν; cf. the sacred λίκνα of some sort mentioned at S. fr. 844. 2–3). **λικνοφόρος** (cf. D. 18. 260; Harp. λ 21; Phot. λ 319) is thus simply another word for the more common κανηφόρος, while **λικνοφορέω** is equivalent to κανηφορέω. **λικνοστεφεῖ** (a *hapax* = adesp. tr. fr. *591 b) at Hsch. λ 1018 is glossed "*take part in a sacred ceremony involving a winnowing-fan decorated with garlands*". But the note in

Hesychius reads λίκνον στεφανούμενος θρησκεύει (~ "someone wearing a garland shows reverence for a winnowing fan"), and with the compound verb this accordingly looks like a high-style way of saying ~ "a garlanded individual serves as **λικνοφόρος** / κανηφόρος".

λιλαίομαι (glossed "*yearn, have desire*") is epic vocabulary (attested outside of Homer and Hesiod at *Cypria* fr. 9. 7, p. 50 Bernabé, and subsequently picked up at e.g. Matro fr. 1. 66 Olson–Sens = *SH* 534. 66; Euphorion fr. 44. 1, p. 38 Powell; Nic. *Th*. 58; and repeatedly in Apollonius). *Od*. 1. 315 λιλαιόμενον ... ὁδοῖο means "longing for the road" and thus only by extension "long to leave". λιλαίεο at *Od*. 11. 223 ἀλλὰ φόωσδε ... λιλαίεο is a second-person imperative, and the text thus says not "he yearns to return to the light" but "be eager to return to the light!"

λιμαγχέω (medical vocabulary) means not "*weaken by diet*" generically but "weaken by extreme hunger", i.e. "starve". See below s.v. **λιμός**.

λιμακώδης appears once in Galen (XIX. 118. 16 K.), where it is nominally a term used by Hippocrates. But Hippocrates always has **λειμακώδης** (< λειμών); the error is a common, easy one, reflecting the fact that ει and ι eventually came to be pronounced alike; and the lemma should be dropped.

LSJ s.v. glosses **λιμενήοχος** at A. R. 2. 965 λιμενήοχον ἄκρην as "*closing in the harbour*", i.e. "enclosing the harbor, protecting the harbor"; cf. epic πολιήοχος = πολιοῦχος ("guarding the city"); poetic γαιήοχος ("protecting the land"). It might perhaps be taken to mean "having a harbor", but there is no reason to believe that it means "*having many harbors*".

λιμενηρός is the middle term in a strained etymology at Str. 8. 6. 1: Apollodorus claimed that Λιμηρὰ Ἐπίδαυρος got its odd name εὐλίμενον δὲ οὖσαν βραχέως καὶ ἐπιτετμημένως λιμηρὰν εἰρῆσθαι ὡς ἂν λιμενηράν ("because it had a good harbor and was referred to as *limêra* in abbreviation and summarily, as if it were *limenêros*", i.e. "fitted with a harbor" < λιμήν + ἀραρίσκω). This is thus a nonce-formation which does not in any case mean "*having many harbors*".

λιμένιος (a divine epithet) means "*of the harbor*" (thus LSJ s.v.) and only by extension "protector of the harbor". The same is true of **λιμενίτης** and the exclusively feminine **λιμενῖτις** (both also used as divine epithets).

λιμένιον (glossed "*a small harbor*") is cited from Strabo but is attested over a century earlier at *IG* IV² 1 76$_{27}$ (mid-2nd century BCE).

If **λιμενόσκοπος** means "*who keeps watch over the harbor*" at e.g. Call. *H*. 3. 259, one would expect instead λιμενοσκόπος, as in LSJ.[11]

λιμενοφύλαξ at Aen. Tact. 29. 12 is glossed "*guardian of the harbor*". But the individuals in question are "harbor-masters" or the like, who go on and off boats inspecting the goods being transported. The word is also attested at *IG* XII 9 8$_2$ (Carystus, 2nd c. BCE); 9$_2$ (Carystus, 1st c. BCE), where these are certainly members of an official board.

Λιμέντερος (glossed "*hungry belly*", perhaps better "Starve-guts") at Alciphr. 3. 23 is described as a "male name". The individual in question is a fictional parasite, and it seems unlikely that any real person was ever called this. The same is true of **Λιμοπύκτης** (the supposed author of Alciphr. 3. 34, a failed parasite who has taken to working as a highway-robber to avoid starvation).

As Beekes 2010, 862 f. (following Hsch. λ 1035) notes, **λίμινθες** (glossed "worms") appears to be a variant form of ἕλμινθες (substrate vocabulary). Beekes adds that "Influence of λιμός 'hunger'" – hesitantly suggested by the *Dictionary* – "seems improbable".

Λίμνα is treated repeatedly in Euripides' *Hippolytus* as a place in Troezen where the hero drives his horses (149, 228, 1132; all lyric, hence the Doric form). Barrett 1964 on *Hipp*. 148–150 – who has a perhaps overly concrete sense of the topography of the play – identifies this as "the Σαρωνὶς (or Φορβαία) λίμνη of Paus. 2. 30. 7, a large shallow salt lagoon which lies behind the shore north of Trozen and is separated from the sea by a long sandbar". It is in any case extravagant to maintain that the Λίμνα is instead an otherwise unattested "gymnasium at Troizen".

The *Dictionary* notes both that there was an area in Athens called **Λίμναι** (lit. "Marshes") and that Dionysus in Athens had the epithet **Λιμναῖος**. It fails to connect the two points by noting that he was called

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[11] "accent -σκόπος Nonn. *D*. 3.57" at the end of the note only makes matters more confusing by suggesting that this is an exceptional case and implying that accentuation is fixed in ancient texts rather than being primarily a matter of editorial convention guided by various best practices.

"Dionysus of the Marshes" because he had a sanctuary in Limnai; see s.v. **λιμνομάχης** below, and in general Dover 1993 on Ar. *Ra.* 216–217.

λιμνάς (glossed "*of the swamp*") is an exclusively feminine poetic variant of prosaic **λιμναῖος**. **λιμνακίς** (a *hapax* in the Orphic Hymns) is likewise exclusively feminine, as is **λιμνῆτις**.[12]

λιμνιάρχης or **λιμνίαρχος** (glossed "*superintendent of lakes*", following LSJ s.v.; attested nowhere else) is no longer read at *POxy.* I 117. 20 (λιμενάρχου).

λιμνομάχης (a *hapax* at Hsch. λ 1040; better capitalized) is glossed obscurely "a fighter in Λίμναι". Hesychius (who gives the word in the plural) actually says that it means παῖδες οἱ πυκτεύοντες <ἐν> τόπῳ Λίμναις καλουμένῳ ("boys who box" – i.e. who engage in a boxing match – "in a place referred to as Limnai"), probably as part of a Dionysiac festival; see s.v. **Λίμναι** / **Λιμναῖος** above. LSJ s.v. seemingly takes the term to be figurative and to have been misunderstood by the lexicographic tradition, glossing "*candidate for the prize at the Lenaea*" (thus in reference to comic or tragic poets). An adespota comic fragment?

λιμνοσώματος (glossed "*whose flesh tastes like a swamp*") is not a "v.l." at Eub. fr. 36. 2 but the paradosis, and is printed by Kassel–Austin. The reference is to Boeotian eels; the λίμνη in question must accordingly be Lake Copais; and the adjective is a bit of mock-dithyrambic bluster ("lake-bodied") that is intended to sound appealing rather than disgusting.

λιμνοθάλασσα appears to have at least three different senses not effectively distinguished in the *Dictionary* or in LSJ s.v.: (1) "estuary", i.e. the place where a river meets the sea, producing a mix of salt and fresh water and generally characterized by fast, strong currents (Str. 4. 1. 8, 2. 1; 5. 1. 5; Gal. VI. 711. 11 K.), also referred to as a στομαλίμνη; (2) "salt-marsh", i.e. low-lying, swampy land regularly flooded by tides, often produced by rivermouth silting (e.g. Arist. *GA* 761 b 7; Str. 13. 1. 31); (3) "saltwater pond" or "salt lake", of a sort that is isolated inland and fed by underground sources or the like (Str. 1. 3. 4; 3. 4. 6; 7. 4. 7).

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[12] S.v. **λίμνησις**, the cross-reference should be to **ἀδάρκης** rather than **ἀδάρκη** (as in LSJ s.v., where ἀδάρκη and ἀδάρκης are however dealt with under a single lemma).

That the word ever means "*lagoon*", in reference to a shallow body of coastal water separated from the sea by sand dunes, barrier islands or the like, is unclear.[13]

A κίμβιξ is a "miser", and a **λιμοκίμβιξ** (obscurely glossed "*one who hungers out of greed*"; = adesp. com. fr. 219) must be someone who starves because he is too cheap to buy food.

λιμός is glossed "*hunger*" but is stronger than that ("ravening hunger, starvation" *vel sim*.); in Aristophanes, for example, as well as in many of the passages cited s.v., one perishes of λιμός (esp. *Ach.* 743, 1044 ἀποκτενεῖς λιμῷ 'μέ; *Pax* 843 ὑπὸ τοῦ γε λιμοῦ ... ἐξολωλότες; *Av.* 186 τοὺς δ' αὖ θεοὺς ἀπολεῖτε λιμῷ Μηλίῳ; *Pl.* 1174 ἀπόλωλ' ὑπὸ λιμοῦ). That the word (normally masculine) is feminine at Ar. *Ach.* 743 probably reflects the fact that the speaker is non-Athenian (from Megara) and is thus characterized by odd linguistic habits.

λινάρμενον is glossed "*veil*" at *POxy.* XVII 2136. 6. But the word is part of what appears to be a standard catalogue of the items associated with a ship (σὺν τῇ τούτου ἐξαρτίᾳ πάσῃ καὶ ἱστῷ [κ]αὶ λιναρμένῳ καὶ κ[έρ]ασι) and clearly means "sail" (thus LSJ s.v.), as also in *PLond.* 3 1164h. 7 διὰ νέως σὺν ἱστῷ κ(αὶ) κέρατι κ(αὶ) λιναρμένῳ.

λίνδομαι (a *hapax* at Hsch. λ 1054) is glossed "*fight*". But Hesychius actually defines the verb ἀμιλλᾶσθαι, "to compete, vie, contend".

λίνδος (a *hapax*) appears in a catalogue of aromatic substances at Mnesim. fr. 4. 63. Whether it is specifically "*an aromatic plant*" (a gloss borrowed from LSJ s.v.) is impossible to say.

According to Hsch. λ 1060 ~ Phot. λ 323, **λινεύς** (Call. Com. fr. 6. 2) is another name for the κεστρεύς ("*mullet*"). What the *Dictionary* intends by further defining this as a "*hammerfish*" (*sic*) is unclear.

S.v. **λινόδετος**, Ar. *Nu.* 763 λινόδετον ὥσπερ μηλολόνθην τοῦ ποδός means not "with a scarab tied to a thread by its foot", but "like a big beetle with a string tied to its foot" (referring to something done by ancient children to keep themselves – although perhaps not the beetle – amused).

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[13] S.v. **λιμνώδης** for "swampniess" read "swampiness".

λίνον at *Od*. 13. 73, 118 is not a "*linen garment*" but something to sleep on (a "sheet" *vel sim*.). At *Il*. 9. 661 λίνοιό τε λεπτὸν ἄωτον, the word – there as well glossed "*linen garment*" – is used to describe the material out of which the ἄωτος ("blanket" *vel sim*.) is made.

λινοπλόκος at Nonn. *Ev*. 21. 9 is used to describe the apostle Peter, who was a fisherman. The obvious sense of the adjective would seem to be not "*that interweaves* or *folds nets*" but "who weaves nets", the idea being that Peter manufactures the fishing-nets that are central to his trade. Cf. Nonn. *D*. 23. 131 λινορραφέων ἁλιήων ("fishermen who knit nets").

λινοπόρος at E. *IT* 410 (of αὖραι – "breezes" rather than "winds" – acting on ships; a high-style lyric *hapax*) is glossed "that inflates sails", with the second element in the word taken to be from πείρω ("pierce, run through"). It is better connected with πόρος and περάω, and the sense would seem to be "that conveys by means of sails".

λινόσαρκος (literally "*linen-fleshed*"; a mock-dithyrambic *hapax*) at Antiph. fr. 51 is explained "figurative *tender*". But hunks of cheese are in question, and the more obvious figurative sense is "white".[14]

S.v. λιπαίνω, the reference to "Ath. 5.219c" is actually to Herodic. *SH* 495. 5, where the text reads not χαρᾶς ὕπο σῶμα λιπάνθη (translated "the body was wet with sweat out of joy", as if σῶμα were the subject), but χαρᾶς ὕπο σῶμα λιπαίνω (lit. "I am wet in respect to my body out of joy"). Anaxil. fr. 18. 1 μύροις χρῶτα λιπαίνων means not "anointing his body with ointments" but "anointing his skin with perfumes".

S.v. λιπαρός, Ar. *Pl*. 616 λιπαρὸς χωρῶν ἐκ βαλανείου means not "emerging perfumed from the bath" but "emerging oiled from a bathhouse" (scented and unscented olive oil being ideologically very different matters, and a βαλανεῖον being the place one takes a bath rather than the bath itself). Arist. *de An*. 421 a 31 λιπαρὰ ... ὀσμή is part of a comparison of tastes and smells (e.g. sweet, bitter, sour) and is not a "penetrating smell" but literally "a fatty smell" and thus probably the olfactory equivalent of umami.

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[14] S.v. λινοτειχής (glossed "*surrounded by walls of linen*"; of the mysterious Indian city of Gazos), the outdated "St.Byz. s.v. Γάζος" is a reference to St. Byz. γ 15. But Stephanus is in any case simply quoting Dionys. Perieg. fr. 4 Heitsch (3rd century CE).

λιπαρότης at Arist. *Long*. 467 a 8 is paired with γλισχρότης ("sticki-ness") as a moisturing element that makes plants generally more long-lived than animals. The reference is not specifically to vegetables, and nothing suggests that the word means "*humor*" (*sic*, as if this were a concrete noun) or "*abundance of humor*", as opposed to the expected "oiliness" or "fattiness". Likewise, at Thphr. *CP* 6. 8. 8, the word is used in a discussion of olive trees and the like and their fruit, and again means "fattiness, oiliness". Cf. S. fr. 398. 4 λίπος τ᾽ ἐλαίας (= "olive oil").

λιπαρόχροος (thus the manuscripts at Theoc. 2. 165; a papyrus offers instead a form of λιπαρόθρονος) is glossed "*shining*", which ignores the poetic force of the word (literally "with oiled skin", as if the personified Moon had just bathed and anointed herself before mounting into her chariot; cf. **λιπαρόχρως** of an attractive young man at Theoc. 2. 102). **λιπαρώψ** at Philox. *PMG* 836 b 1 εἰς δ᾽ ἔφερον διπλόοι παῖδες λιπαρῶπα τράπεζαν is similarly glossed with the flat "*splendid*" rather than the literal "with a shining face".

λιπαυρεῖ (a *hapax*) at Hsch. λ 1092 is glossed "*there is not enough wind*". Hesychius actually explains that the verb means αὔρα ἐπιλέλοιπεν ("a breeze fails", i.e. "the wind has died, there is no wind"). LSJ rightly lemmatizes as λιπαυρέω.

Servius on Verg. *Ecl*. 5. 68 *craterasque duo statuam tibi pinguis olivi* comments: *pinguis olivi quod Graeci* **λιπέλαιον** *dicunt* ("rich olive oil: what the Greeks refer to as *lipelaion*"). This is merely a misunderstanding of the Homeric line-end formula λίπ᾽ ἐλαίῳ, as at e.g. *Il*. 14. 171 ἀλείψατο δὲ λίπ᾽ ἐλαίῳ /. But Servius in any case takes the supposed word to refer to olive oil of some particularly rich variety, not "*a large olive*".

λιπερνῆτις is an exclusively feminine form of **λιπερνής**. Cf. above s.vv. **Λημνίς** / **ληστρίς**.

λιπόγαμος at E. *Or*. 1305 (of Helen; lyric) would have to mean "who abandons her marriage". This is the paradosis; the *Dictionary*'s "*who abandon's one's consort*" (better "spouse-abandoning") assumes West's **λιπογάμετος** (omitted, but printed in the text of Euripides for metrical reasons).

λιπογράμματος at *Suda* λ 261 is unhelpfully glossed "*lacking a letter*" (cf. LSJ s.v. "*wanting a letter*"). The word means "omitting a letter", in this case in reference to an *Iliad* by a certain Nestor that

scrupulously avoided one letter of the alphabet, *sc*. as a display of virtuoso compositional technique. The *Suda* describes ἀστοιχείωτος (lit. "without a στοιχεῖον [letter]"; omitted in this sense, as also in LSJ) as a synonym. Cf. Lasos of Hermione's asigmatic poetry (*PMG* 704).

λιποδεής (a *hapax*) at [Pythag.] *Ep*. 2 μέτριος ἀνὴρ καὶ λιποδεὴς Σικελικῆς τραπέζης οὐδὲν προσδεῖται ("a man who is moderate and *lipodeês* has no need for a Sicilian table", a symbol of extravagance) is glossed "*lacking what is necessary, poor*". It actually means "with few wants" (thus LSJ s.v.) or "who has no needs".

λιπόδερμος is described at Gal. XIX. 445. 11–12 K. as the absence of a foreskin, with no reference to circumcision; cf. Sor. 2. 34. 4 εἰ δὲ ἄρρεν τὸ νήπιον ὑπάρχον φαίνοιτο λειπόδερμον ("if a male infant should appear to lack a foreskin"). Dsc. 2. 82. 2 similarly refers to λιποδέρμους ... τοὺς μὴ ἐκ περιτομῆς ("those who lack a foreskin not as a result of circumcision"), making it clear that this is a general term that does not mean specifically "*circumcized*".

λιποστρατία and **λιποταξία** are both glossed "*desertion*", but appear to be different phenomena. The former is a general accusation of joining a military expedition but then abandoning it (Hdt. 5. 27. 2; Th. 1. 99. 1; 6. 76. 3), whereas the latter is a specific Athenian legal charge that involves being required to present oneself somewhere (e.g. in camp) but failing to appear there, or being posted somewhere but abandoning one's position (Pl. *Lg.* 943 d; [Lys.] 50. 5–7; D. 21. 103).

λίσγον (glossed "*spade*") is attested only in § 22 of the so-called "Farmer's Law"[15] (Byzantine period), where it is a digging tool of some sort and is distinguished from a δίκελλα ("mattock"). Whether the word is masculine or neuter is impossible to say. **λισγάριον** (glossed "*small hoe or spade*") is formally a diminutive of λίσγον, but – as is true of many such pairs (cf. s.vv. **λεκανίδιον** / **λεκάνιον** / **λεκάνη**, *Hyperboreus* 29: 2 [2023] 308) – there may well be no actual difference of meaning between them.

λίσκος is glossed δίσκος at Hsch. λ 1116. This is a simple majuscule error (ΛΙΣΚΟΣ for ΔΙΣΚΟΣ) mistaken for a rare word by an ancient lexicographer, and the lemma should be deleted. Cf. s.v. **λυμνός** (part IV, in print).

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[15] Ashburner 1910; 1912.

S.v. **λίσσομαι**, E. *Tr.* 1045 πρὸ κείνων καὶ τέκνων σε λίσσομαι does not mean "I ask you in their name and in that of their children" but "I ask you in their name and in that of my children".

λίσσω is traced to Hesychius and glossed "*leave*". This seems to be a garbled reference to Hsch. λ 1125, where λίσσωμεν is said to mean ἐάσωμεν ("let us allow" and thus perhaps "let us let (it) go, let us ignore"). Presumably the basic sense of the verb is "smooth" and so by extension "make no trouble about". A **λίσσωμα** is thus the smooth section of one's hair, i.e. the place where it parts, and a **λίσσωσις** is a "parting" of this kind.

λίσπος is used at Ar. *Ra.* 826 of a rhetorically practiced tongue, and Dover *ad loc.* (comparing Pl. *Smp.* 193 a, where **λίσπαι** are supposed to be dice or knucklebones that are sawn in half to serve as recognition tokens) suggests that the adjective means "'of half-thickness', either from wear and tear or from deliberate bisection". Poll. 2. 184 reports that λίσπος also means ἐνδεῶς πυγῶν ἔχων ("being in need of buttocks", i.e. "lacking buttocks"), while Moer. λ 6 (oddly cited from Pierson's 19th-century edition) reports that **λίσφος** was the Attic equivalent of ἄπυγος ("having no butt"). Pollux adds that the Athenians were described as **λισπόπυγοι** by the comic poets (= adesp. com. fr. 767), and Ar. *Eq.* 1366–1368 (where the word used is ὑπόλισφος) suggests that this was a joke that had to do with wearing one's rear end out on a rowing bench in the fleet. Hsch. λ 1134 preserves an aorist middle infinitive of **λισφόομαι**, which the *Dictionary* (seemingly taking account of the various words discussed above) reports is defined there as "*become thin*". But Hesychius' gloss is in fact ἐλαττώσασθαι ("to diminish"), which more or less matches "worn-down (through constant use)" as the meaning of the cognate adjective.

λιτανευτός (a gloss in the feminine accusative singular[16] on the similarly obscure ἀμφιλίτην at Hsch. α 4054, and in the feminine nominative singular – substantive? – on λιτή, "supplication" *vel sim.* at Hsch. λ 1146; attested nowhere else) is glossed "*prayed, begged*"; read "prayed for, begged for". **λιτός** is similarly glossed "*prayed, begged*", where the intended sense would seem to be "prayed for, begged for".

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[16] Pace LSJ s.v. ἀμφιλίτην, which reports that Hesychius has τὸν λιτανευτήν, which would make this a first-declension masculine noun λιτανευτής.

λιτοίμην is an aorist middle optative of λίσσομαι at *Od*. 14. 406, while λιτέσθαι is an aorist middle infinitive of the same verb at *Il*. 16. 47. Either might easily be taken for a present, which would seem to be the basis on which **λίτομαι** came to be treated as an elevated alternative present form of λίσσομαι at *HHymn* 16. 5; Demodoc. fr. 5. 5 West[2]; Ar. *Th*. 313, 1040 (both paratragic lyric), and repeatedly in the Sibylline Oracles (e.g. 3. 2).

For **λίτρα** as a type of Sicilian coin or value of a coin (hence the attestations of the word in Epicharmus and Sophron), note also Arist. frr. 476 (in Acragas); 510 (in Himera), both *ap*. Poll. 4. 174–176; Paus. Gr. λ 21 (= Hsch. λ 1160 etc.). LSJ Supplement s.v. adds further archaeological and inscriptional evidence. A **λιτροσκόπος** is a "*money-changer*" but scarcely an "*exchange bureau*".

Hsch. λ 1179 specifically identifies **λιχάζω** in the sense "throw" as Cretan vocabulary.[17]

Hsch. λ 1167 reports that **λιχάδες** was a term for ὄστρεα πάντα ("bivalves of all sorts", i.e. "oysters and the like"), but that some authorities said that it referred to λίθοι καὶ ψῆφοι καὶ κογχύλια ("stones and pebbles and seashells"; i.e. voting tokens?).

λιχμάζω (Hesiodic vocabulary; later picked up by Nicander, Moschos, and Oppian) and **λιχμάω** (attested in 5th-century comedy in passages reminiscent of Hesiod and once in Euripides; subsequently in Theocritus, Euphorion, and Nicander) are both poetic vocabulary.

λιχνός (normally "*gluttonous, greedy*") is glossed "*curious*" at E. *Hipp*. 913 ἡ γὰρ ποθοῦσα πάντα καρδία κλύειν / κἂν τοῖς κακοῖσι λίχνος οὖσ' ἁλίσκεται ("for the heart, which longs to hear everything, is convicted of being *lichnos* even in the midst of trouble") and "*tasty, delicious*" at Sophr. fr. 62 λιχνοτέρα τᾶν πορφυρᾶν ("more *lichnos* than purple shellfish") and Gal. V. 31. 10 K. πλακοῦντος ἤ τινος ἄλλου τῶν λίχνων ὄψων ἀπολαύειν ("to enjoy a cake or one of the other *lichnos* dainties"). In Euripides, the word is instead used in a straightforward extended sense: to be "greedy to hear" is to be curious; cf. E. fr. 1063. 8 ἀεὶ τοῦ κεκρυμμένου λίχνον ("always *lichnos* for what is hidden"); Call. fr. 196. 45–46 λίχνος ἐσσὶ [γὰρ] / καὶ τό μευ πυθέσθαι ("for you are *lichnos* to question me").

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[17] S.v. **λιχάς**, correct "lenght" to "length".

Kassel–Austin cite Plin. *Nat*. 9. 132, who suggests that purple shellfish were trapped in ways that relied on their *aviditas* ("greed"), so in Sophron it probably also means simply "greedy". In Galen, on the other hand, the sense has become passive and refers to what one is greedy *for*.

A τένθης is a "glutton", and a **λιχνοτένθης** (glossed "*greedy*"; a *hapax* at Poll. 6. 122) is thus probably a "greedy glutton" (LSJ s.v.), but in any case a noun rather than an adjective. Otherwise unattested comic vocabulary?

If **Λοβρίνη** (correctly described as an epithet of Rhea, but left otherwise unexplained) at Nic. *Al*. 8 deserved a lemma, then so did Λόβρινον, which the *scholia ad loc.* claim was the name of a mountain or other spot in Phrygia or Cyzicus from which the goddess got her epithet.

The non-word **λόβωσις** at Sophron. *Lives of Cyril and Ioannes* 24 is of "dubious significance" because it is corrupt and the proper reading is the well-attested λώβησις. The lemma should be struck.

According to Hephaestion *Encheiridion* 24, 29, **λογαοιδικός** – literally "speech-song" – is applied to meters that include not only those that combine dactyls and trochees (thus also LSJ) but also those that combine anapaests and bacchiacs, i.e. iambs.

Suda λ 638 claims that **λογάριον** (glossed "*little speech, small reasoning*") at Ar. fr. 950 means λόγος, i.e. that there is no difference in meaning between the primitive and its formal diminutive; cf. above on **λίσγον** / **λισγάριον**. D. 19. 255, on the other hand, uses the word as a deteriorative, which would match Aristophanes' use of ῥημάτιον at e.g. *Ach*. 444 (with Olson 2002 *ad loc.*).

λογίατρος at e.g. Gal. X. 582. 15; XV. 160. 1 K. is not a "*verbal* or *theoretical doctor*" but much more pejoratively someone who talks like a doctor but does not understand the field. **λογιατρεία** at Philo *Congr*. 53, by contrast, seems in fact to mean "*verbal* or *theoretical medicine*", in contrast to the practical aspects of the business.[18]

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[18] ἐν ἰατροῖς ἡ λεγομένη λογιατρεία πολὺ τῆς τῶν καμνόντων ὠφελείας ἀποστατεῖ – φαρμάκοις γὰρ καὶ χειρουργίαις καὶ διαίταις, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ λόγοις, αἱ νόσοι θεραπεύονται ("among physicians, what is referred to as *logiatreia* has very little to do with helping those who are sick; for sicknesses are cured by drugs and surgery and diets, not by words").

λογίδριον is lemmatized, with λογύδριον treated as a variant. But -ύδριον is a common diminutive suffix (e.g. καλύδριον < κάλως, νεανισ-κύδριον < νεανίσκος, νεφύδριον < νέφος, στηλύδριον < στήλη, τειχύδριον < τεῖχος), whereas -ίδριον is not, and the arrangement of the words should be reversed (as in LSJ).

λογίζομαι ψήφοις (cited at e.g. Hdt. 2. 16. 1; Ar. *V*. 656) is literally "calculate with stones", but the sense is "use an abacus". [Arist.] *Ath*. 48. 3 τοὺς λογιουμένους τ[αῖς ἀ]ρχαῖς κατὰ τὴν πρυτανείαν ἑκάστην is presented as an example of the verb + dat. meaning "*verify accounts* of someone"; this is instead a dative of advantage ("for the magistracies"). X. *HG* 2. 4. 28 λογισάμενος ὅτι οἷόν τε εἴη means not "thinking it to be possible" but "thinking that it would be possible". X. *HG* 6. 4. 6 ἐλογίζοντο ὡς εἰ μὴ μαχοῖντο, ἀποστήσοιντο μὲν αἱ περιοικίδες αὐτῶν πόλεις means not "they considered that if they had not fought, the surrounding cities would have defected" but "they calculated that if they did not fight, the cities that surrounded them would revolt". Pl. *Ap*. 21 d πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν ἀπιὼν ἐλογιζόμην ὅτι τούτου μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφώτερός εἰμι means not "when I went home, I thought that I knew more than that man" but "as I went off, I thought to myself 'I'm wiser than this person'". Philo *Somn*. 2. 30 οὐκ ἐλογίσατο παρ' ἑαυτῷ, ὅτι δούλων ... ἥδε ἐστὶν ὑπηρεσία means not "he did not reason with himself that this service is for slaves" (*sic*) but "he did not take into account that this work is performed by slaves". X. *HG* 6. 1. 5 ὅτι ... τὴν ὑμετέραν πόλιν δυναίμην ἂν παραστήσασθαι ἔξεστί σοι ἐκ τῶνδε λογίζεσθαι does not mean "you can deduce from this that I could enslave your city" but "you can deduce from the following points that I could bring your city over to my side". X. *HG* 6. 1. 19 ὁπλῖται δὲ ἐλογίσθησαν οὐκ ἐλάττους δισμυρίων means not "it was estimated that there were no less than 20 000 hoplites" but "hoplites were calculated at no fewer than 20 000".

λογίσκος (glossed "*little conversation* or *debate*", following LSJ Supplement s.v.) is a conjecture by Kock at Antiph. fr. 205. 2[19] for the paradosis λογισμός (glossed "*calculation, reckoning*"; in a list of symposium activities). That λογίσκος is not attested elsewhere – i.e. that Kock has made the word up – makes it problematic to accept it into the text (or to regard it as deserving of a lemma in a lexicon). The speaker's language is odd and opaque throughout, and Kassel–Austin retain the paradosis (likely to be taken as referring in a precious fashion

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[19] Miscited as fr. 207. 2, which is the old Kock number.

to conversation and intellectual debate), comparing Lyc. *TrGF* 100 F 3. 3 ὁ σωφρονιστὴς ... ἐν μέσῳ λόγος ("modest conversation in the middle"; a symposium activity).

S.v. **λογισμός**, Th. 2. 11. 7 οἱ λογισμῷ ἐλάχιστα χρώμενοι means not "those who reflect little" but "those who reflect the least". Th. 6. 34. 4 ἂν αὐτοὺς ... ἐς λογισμὸν καταστήσαιμεν ὅτι ὁρμώμεθα means not "we induced them to think we had moved" but "we would make them think that we were setting out". Io. *HIo*. 8. 144 a τῶν λογισμῶν τὴν ἀσθένειαν ἀφέντες τὴν κάτω means not "leaving behind the lower regions of the weakness of reasoning" but "abandoning the low-land weakness of logical arguments". Th. 2. 40. 5 οὐ τοῦ ξυμφέροντος μᾶλλον λογισμῷ ἢ τῆς ἐλευθερίας τῷ πιστῷ means not "not valuing utility, but rather having faith in freedom" but ~ "not with a calculation of utility, but with our faith in our freedom". X. *HG* 3. 4. 27 τοῦτο δ' ἐποίησαν ... τοιῷδε λογισμῷ, ὡς ... τό τε πεζὸν πολὺ ἂν ἰσχυρότερον εἶναι means not "they did this because they considered that the infantry would have been much stronger" but "they did this out of a calculation of the following sort: that the infantry would be much stronger".

S.v. **λογιστέον**, the text of D. 27. 36 is inappropriately condensed to ἀπὸ τῶν ἑβδομήκοντα μνῶν καὶ ἑπτὰ λογιστέον and thus misleadingly translated as "it is necessary to calculate subtracting from 77 mina" (*sic*). Read τὴν μὲν τοίνυν τροφὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἑβδομήκοντα μνῶν καὶ ἑπτὰ λογιστέον, "it is necessary to charge their living expenses to the 77 minas".

λογογράφος (glossed "*logographos,*[20] *writer of history*") at Th. 1. 21. 1 is contrasted specifically with ποιητής ("poet") and thus means simply "prose-author", as in Aristotle, even if the reference is certainly to prose-authors who write about what we today would call historical or semi-historical topics.

λογοδαίδαλος at Pl. *Phdr*. 266 e is an adjective rather than a noun and thus means not "skillful constructor of speeches" but ~ "skilled at making speeches elaborate" or "skilled at verbal ornamentation".

λογόδειπνον at Ath. 1. 1 b (a characterization of the work as a whole) is probably not just a "*literary banquet*", i.e. a banquet at which literature

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[20] An example of translation via transliteration, which is not translation at all.

is a central topic, but has the figurative sense "a banquet of words", i.e. a sort of banquet in which the reader is offered an enormous assortment of philological dainties rather than actual food and drink (something about which Larensius' guests in fact complain occasionally, when too much conversation interrupts the dinner-service).

At Poll. 2. 125, only B has the otherwise unattested **λογοδιδάσκαλος**, which was nonetheless printed by Bekker and accepted in LSJ (followed by the *Dictionary*). All other manuscripts have **λογοδαίδαλος**, which is found in Plato (see above) and is thus certainly correct, and which is printed by Bethe. λογοδιδάσκαλος is accordingly a ghost word, and the lemma should be struck.

λογοθεσία in the sense "*examination of accounts*" is cited from Justinian's *Lawcode* (6th century CE), but is already well-attested in papyri four centuries earlier (e.g. *BGU* IV 1019. 7–8). The same is true of the cognate noun **λογοθέτης** (e.g. *BGU* I 77. 10).

λογοθέσιος is glossed "*narrator*" in a list of occupations at Palch. *CCA* 1. 95. 26 διδασκάλου ἢ νομικείου ἢ τραπεζίτου ἢ λογοθεσίου ("a teacher or a lawyer or a banker or a *logothesios*"), but the context makes clear that it means "accountant" (thus LSJ s.v.) *vel sim*. The word is lemmatized as an adjective (λογοθέσιος -ον) but glossed as a noun (as in LSJ s.v.), with τὸ λογοθέσιον (duplicating the immediately preceding lemma) then described as a substantive use of the same word.

Herodotus – the earliest author in whom the word is preserved – uses **λογοποιός** four times, once of Aesop (2. 134. 3; glossed "*writer of fables*") and three times of Hecataeus (2. 143. 1; 5. 36. 2, 125. 1; glossed "*writer of history, historian*"), about whose abilities he has no very high opinion. The word ought accordingly to be translated ~ "*story-teller, fabulist*" at every point; cf. "*peddler of false news, liar*" at D. 24. 14; Thphr. *Char*. 8. 1.

λογοπράκτωρ ("auditor" or "accountant") is widely attested in papyri (e.g. *POxy*. LXI 4123. 3–4; early 4th c. CE) but is ignored, as is the cognate verb **λογοπραγέω** in the sense "audit" (citations in Trapp s.v.).

S.v. **λόγος**, at Luc. *Alex*. 10 the omission of the main verb from the citation of the text has caused the translation to be garbled: read διαφοιτῆσαι ... τὸν λόγον τοῦτον εἰς πᾶσαν τὴν Βιθυνίαν ... ἐποίησαν, "they caused this story to spread throughout all of Bithynia" (not "to

spread the news throughout Bithynia"). NT *Matthew* 8:16 ἐξέβαλεν τὰ πνεύματα λόγῳ ("he expelled the spirits with a *logos*", not "his word"; of Jesus healing demoniacs) is not an example of λόγος in the sense "*revealed word*" but simply means "with a verbal command", i.e. Jesus told the spirits to leave and they did. Hdt. 1. 21. 1 προπεπυσμένος πάντα λόγον does not mean "the whole matter being known beforehand" but "having inquired into the entire matter ahead of time". Mac. *Apoc*. 4 τῆς λειτουργίας τὸν λόγον πληρώσασα does not mean "once the liturgical function had been brought to completion" but "after it fulfilled the liturgical function". Hdt. 3. 120. 3 ἐν ἀνδρῶν λόγῳ (εἶναι) does not mean "to be considered male name of value" (*sic*) but "to be a man of value".[21] Hdt. 3. 45. 3 οὐδὲ λόγος αἱρέει ... τοῦτον ... ἐσσωθῆναι means not "it is not even logical to think that he had been defeated" but ~ "it is illogical that he was defeated". Alciphr. 1. 13. 2 λόγου θᾶττον means not "quicker than thought" but "quicker than a word", i.e. "no sooner said than done" (thus Benner–Fobes); Chariton (e.g. 7. 4. 9) and Heliodorus (e.g. 9. 3. 3) both use the phrase repeatedly, suggesting that it was taught as good Greek style in the Roman period. Pl. *Phd*. 62 b means not "perhaps it may have some foundation" but "perhaps it has some foundation". Ar. *Nu*. 1042 αἱρούμενον τοὺς ἥττονας λόγους ... νικᾶν means not "to get the better despite choosing the weakest arguments" (*sic*) but "to win one's case despite choosing the weaker arguments". Hdt. 3. 36. 5 κατακρύπτουσι τὸν Κροῖσον ἐπὶ τῷδε τῷ λόγῳ ὥστε means not "hiding Croesus with the intention that" but "they conceal Croesus with the following intention, that". E. *Ba*. 940 παρὰ λόγον means not "against all (your) belief" (*sic*) but "contrary to expectation". Hdt. 8. 6. 2 τῷ ἐκείνων λόγῳ means not "according to their project" but "by their calculation".[22]

To be continued.

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[21] This strange error and others like it elsewhere in the *Dictionary* appear to be the product of a clumsily executed universal search-and-replace (presumably in connection with personal names that were first glossed "a man" and then altered to the more appropriate "male name").

[22] In the translation of Pi. *O*. 7. 68, read "occurred" for "ocurred". "Λ. Logos, *an eon* Ir. *Haer*. 1.1.1" is garbled. At Hdt. 8. 102. 3, read not πάθη but πάθη.

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Part III. Two generations ago, Robert Renehan published a series of articles expanding, refining, and correcting entries in the 9th edition of the monumental Liddell–Scott–Jones *Greek-English Lexicon* (1940) as supplemented by Barber and his fellow editors (1968). These notes on the letter *lambda* in the new *Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek* are offered in a similar spirit.

Часть III. Полвека тому назад Роберт Ренеган опубликовал ряд дополнений, уточнений и поправок к девятому изданию монументального словаря Liddell–Scott–Jones, *Greek-English Lexicon* (1940), дополненного группой издателей во главе с Барбером (1968). Настоящие заметки к леммам на букву *лямбда* призваны сыграть аналогичную роль по отношению к новому *Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek*.

KEYWORDS

Donato

Aristotle; Egypt; *Meteorologica*; *Phaedrus*; Plato; *Timaeus*
Аристотель; Египет; *Метеорология*; Платон; *Тимей*; *Федр*

Kohler

ancient humour; Horace and Augustus; papyrus roll formats; *sextariolus*
античный юмор; Гораций и Август; размеры папирусных свитков;
sextariolus

Kossarev

*Cyprian Oration*s; Isocrates; monarchy; political thought
Исократ; *Кипрские речи*; монархия; политическая мысль

Liberman

Greek grammar and language; Greek meter; Greek tragedy; Sophocles;
textual criticism
греческая грамматика; греческая метрика; греческая трагедия;
Софокл; критика текста

Olson

definition; dictionary; lexicography; lexicon; philology
лексикография; лексикон; определение; словарь; филология

Verlinsky

agreement; conventionalism; *Cratylus*; naturalism; Plato
конвенционализм; *Кратил*; натурализм; Платон; соглашение

Zueva, Zeltchenko

Ancient Greek jokes; bathing habits in Late Antiquity; Olympiodorus of Thebes; *Philogelos*; λούω,

банные обычаи поздней античности; древнегреческие анекдоты; Олимпиодор; *Филогелос*; λούω

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