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STUDIA CLASSICA

ναυσὶ δ' οὔτε πεζὸς ἰὼν κεν εὗροις
ἐς Ὑπερβορέων ἀγῶνα θαυμαστὰν ὅσον
(Pind. *Pyth.* 10. 29–30)

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CONSPECTUS

GAUTHIER LIBERMAN

Petits riens sophocléens : *Antigone* IV (v. 773–777, 795–802, 857–861, 883–888, 902–903, 925–928, 955–961, 970–976, 1019–1022, 1029–1030, 1033–1039, 1039–1043, 1074–1076) 173

ALEXANDER VERLINSKY

Plato's Last Word on Naturalism vs. Conventionalism in the *Cratylus*. I . . . 196

SOFIA EGOROVA

How Ancient Were Vitruvius' *veteres architecti* (*De arch.* 1.1.12–13)? . . . 234

DENIS KEYER

Trimalchio's Superstitions: Traditional Customs or Their Distortion? I . . . 241

TOMMASO BRACCINI

Sulla rotta di Taprobane: nuove allusioni geografiche nelle *Storie vere* . . . 265

JAN SHAVRIN

Bemerkungen zum Kondolenzbrief *P. Ross. Georg.* III 2 293

S. DOUGLAS OLSON

Philological Notes on the Letter *lambda* in a New Greek-English Dictionary. II. λασιόκνημος – λημψαπόδοσις 299

Keywords 326

Gauthier Liberman

PETITS RIENS SOPHOCLEÏENS : *ANTIGONE* IV*
(v. 773–777, 795–802, 857–861, 883–888, 902–903,
925–928, 955–961, 970–976, 1019–1022, 1029–1030,
1033–1039, 1039–1043, 1074–1076)

Κρ. ἄγων ἐρήμος ἔνθ' ἂν ἦ βροτῶν στίβος
κρύψω πετρώδει ζῶσαν ἐν κατώρυχι,
φορβῆς τοσοῦτον ὡς ἄγος μόνον προθείς, 775
ὅπως μίasma παῖς' ὑπεκφύγη πόλις.
κάκει τὸν Ἄιδην, ὃν μόνον σέβει θεῶν...

Griffith conserve le texte transmis et entend « providing only so much food as <to be> expiation » mais, même si l'on admettait ce sens de ἄγος, qui, Griffith l'observe, signifie d'ordinaire presque le contraire, à savoir « violation du sacré », ¹ la phraséologie resterait problématique. D'un côté, μόνον répète inutilement τοσοῦτον « juste assez pour » ² et est superfétatoire ; de l'autre, il manque un mot qui permette de donner son vrai sens à ἄγος (cf. 256, λεπτή δ' ἄγος φεύγοντος ὡς ἐπὶ κόνις) : il n'est que trop clair qu'il faut rétablir avec Hartung et Blaydes, suivis par Lloyd-Jones–Wilson, l'idiomatique τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἄγος φεύγειν (ou peut-être φυγεῖν), ³

* Voir *Hyperboreus* 28 : 1 (2022) 29–52; 28 : 2 (2022) 203–227 ; 29 : 1 (2023) 29–49.

¹ Mais voir Hésychios A 734 : ἄγος· ἄγνισμα, θυσία, Σοφοκλῆς Φαίδρα (fr. 689 Radt) et Wilamowitz 1896, 167 ; Kugler 1905, 61. Sur ce mot, citons Porzig 1942, 291 : « Nur eines scheint einen nichtdinglichen Gegenstand zu meinen : ἄγος, ai. *āgas*- “ Sünde, Unrecht”. Der Gedanke liegt aber nahe, daß den Indogermanen ein **āgos* ein Ding so wie ein **elkos* war ».

² Sur τοσοῦτον (hors corrélation) = τοσοῦτον μόνον, voir Lobeck 1866, 280 à *Aiāx* 748.

³ Blaydes améliore ὡς ἄγος φεύγειν de Hartung. Chez Sophocle on trouve τοσοῦτον ὥστε, *Aiāx* 1062–1063, σθένων | τοσοῦτον ὥστε σῶμα τυμβεῦσαι τάφῳ, où le sens (« assez pour ») n'est pas restrictif (« juste ce qu'il faut pour »). Opposer *Oed. rex* 1189–1191, τίς γάρ, τίς ἀνὴρ πλέον | τὰς εὐδαιμονίας φέρει | ἢ τοσοῦτον ὅσον δοκεῖν. Dans sa note à ce passage, Finglass 2018 dit que τοσοῦτον ὅσον « so much as is enough to » est pour τοσοῦτον ὥστε, mais ce n'est pas exact. Si c'était exact, on pourrait, dans notre passage, accepter ὡς (cf. Wilamowitz 1909, 489) ou lire ὥστ(ε), mais ὅσον ajoute une nuance importante où s'exprime le cynisme de Créon.

« juste ce qu'il faut pour éviter l'impiété ».⁴ « But then 776 merely repeats 775 », objecte Griffith à la correction exposée : il a raison, mais, loin que cette répétition prouve la fausseté de la correction, elle suggère que le v. 776 fut introduit pour éclairer le vers 775 après que la faute *ώς...* *μόνον* en eut obscurci et même offusqué le sens. Sans le vers 776,⁵ les v. 775–777 se succèdent et *μόνον* se retrouve au dessus de *μόνον*. Il y a là une explication possible de la présence intrusive de ce mot au v. 775 : il s'agirait d'une anticipation fautive par parablepsie. Cette explication ne saurait valoir pour un autre passage où *μόνον* est suspect, *Oed. Col.* 789–790, ἔστιν δὲ παισὶ τοῖς ἑμοῖσι τῆς ἑμῆς | χθονὸς λαχεῖν τοσοῦτον, ἐνθανεῖν μόνον.⁶ La syntaxe grecque et la construction du passage réclament là aussi la substitution de ὅσον à μόνον.⁷ Là, il se peut que l'introduction de μόνον résulte de la mésintelligence de la construction idiomatique τοσοῦτον ὅσον + infinitif, construction que la place de ὅσον rendait un peu plus difficile à identifier.

Χο.	νικᾷ δ' ἐναργῆς βλεφάρων ἵμερος εὐλέκτρον νύμφας, τῶν μεγάλων ἥπαρεδρος ἐν ἀρχαῖς† θεσμῶν· ἄμαχος γὰρ ἐμπαίζει θεὸς Ἀφροδίτα.	795 800
	νῦν δ' ἤδη ἔγω καὶ τὸς θεσμῶν ἔξω φέρομαι τὰδ' ὀρῶν (...)	

799 ἐμπαίζει] ἐμπαίει Lievens, def. Dawe 2007, 362.

Fin de l'antistrophe⁸ du très célèbre premier couple strophe / antistrophe du troisième « stasimon », et début du premier système anapestique. La notoire « crux » viole sens et mètre, puisque *πάρεδρος ἐν ἀρχαῖς* devrait former un adonien, comme *φύξιμος οὐδεις* dans la strophe.⁹ La conjecture

⁴ Dawe 1996 substitue ἄκος (Madvig) à ἄγος mais c'est ce dernier mot qui s'impose. Dawe 2007, 361 trouve que la solution à laquelle Lloyd-Jones–Wilson se rallient « dynamite les manuscrits » : c'est un expert qui parle ; le jugement de Dawe n'est ici pas moins exagéré que drôle.

⁵ Lloyd-Jones–Wilson mentionnent la suppression de ce vers par W. Dindorf.

⁶ Au témoignage de Lloyd-Jones–Wilson 1990, 241, Reeve propose de supprimer ces vers. À l'avis des deux éditeurs et au mien, ils ne sont pas interpolés mais, comme on va voir, gâtés, en un endroit.

⁷ Jebb 1889 cite cette conjecture en l'attribuant à L. Lange.

⁸ Je suis la colométrie de Willink 2010, 362–363 (cf. Lachmann 1819, 169).

⁹ Le jugement de Lloyd-Jones–Wilson 1990, 136, « However, the text gives good sense, and one cannot be sure that it is wrong », ne laisse pas de m'étonner.

de Griffith παρβασιᾶσιν¹⁰ a du moins le mérite d'indiquer le sens, car Griffith semble avoir raison de penser que le chœur vise la transgression des lois et conventions par l'amour.¹¹ Mais cette conjecture s'écarte trop de la tradition et je crois une apposition au sujet du verbe plus plausible qu'un substantif signifiant « transgression » au datif. Dans un bon essai sur la théologie et l'éthique de Sophocle, Lübker¹² oppose notre passage et *Oed. Col.* 1381–1382, ἐστὶν ἡ παλαίφατος | Δίκη ξύνεδρος Ζηνὸς ἀρχαίοις νόμοις : « Wenn aber diesem Gesetze gegenüber die durch sinnliche Empfindung bedingte Willkühr (*sic*) des Menschen steht, so sind auch ohne Zweifel die höchsten Vertreter derselben, Eros und Aphrodite selber, von dem obersten Rathe jener ewigen Gesetze¹³ und Ordnungen ausgeschlossen. Hierdurch würde die von <W.> Dindorf zu Antig. 790 f. vorgeschlagene Aenderung : τῶν μεγάλων οὐχὶ πάρεδρος θεσμῶν eine (...) wesentliche Bestätigung empfangen ». Mais τῶν μεγάλων οὐχὶ πάρεδρος θεσμῶν ou τῶν μεγάλων οὐ τι πάρεδρος θεσμῶν¹⁴ est une caractérisation trop faible pour cadrer avec la victoire d'Éros et l'invincibilité d'Aphrodite. Il n'empêche que Dindorf et Lübker étaient sur la bonne voie ; c'est en la suivant que je suggère τραχὺς ἔφεδρος, « adversaire résolu », métaphore empruntée au vocabulaire de la lutte. Pour le génitif avec ἔφεδρος, rapprocher [Euripide], *Rhes.* 954–955, ἐγὼ δὲ γῆς ἔφεδρον Ἑλλήνων στρατόν | λεύσσω.¹⁵ L'expression τραχὺς ἔφεδρος (ἔφεδρος, « tertiarus »)¹⁶ se lit chez Pindare, *Nem.* 4, 96, τραχὺς δὲ παλιγκότοις ἔφεδρος. La métaphore cadre très bien avec νικᾷ et ἄμαχος ... ἐμπαίζει. Sophocle emploie ἔφεδρος dans un sens non hostile à propos de Cybèle, ταυροκτόνων λεόντων ἔφεδρε (*Phil.* 400–401) et

¹⁰ Ainsi déjà Blaydes 1899, 187.

¹¹ Je ne comprends pas ἐν ἀρχαῖς dans la proposition de Willink 2010, 364 τῶν μεγάλων ἐκτὸς ἐν ἀρχαῖς θεσμῶν.

¹² Lübker 1851, 49–50.

¹³ Lübker vient de discuter, entre autres passages, *Oed. rex* 865–868, νόμοι ... ὑπὶ ποδες, οὐρανία ἔναι αἰθέρι τεκνωθέντες, ὧν Ὀλυμπος πατήρ μόνος. Les commentateurs de Sophocle ne remarquent pas qu'avec Ὀλυμπος πατήρ Sophocle retrouve le sens de la formule indo-européenne sous-jacente à Ζεῦ πάτερ, **Dyēus ph₂tēr*, « Vater Himmel » (voir Schmitt 1967, 149–152).

¹⁴ Headlam 1902, 221, selon qui « Sophocles is alluding to the proverb θεσμὸν Ἔρως οὐκ οἶδε βημάχος used by Paul Sil. *A. P.* v. 193 in his clever answer to Agathias, *ib.* 192 ».

¹⁵ Voir Fries 2014, 759.

¹⁶ Voir la scholie ancienne à Aristophane, *Ran.* 792 (Chantry), ἔφεδρός ἐστιν ὁ μαχομένων δύο τινῶν παρακαθήμενος καὶ μέλλων τῷ νενικηκότι μαχέσσεσθαι ; Mommsen 1846, 35 à Pindare, *Ol.* 8, 68.

peut-être d'Ajax (*Aiāx* 609–610), καί μοι δυσθεράπευτος Αἴας ξύνεστιν ἔφεδρος.¹⁷ Il y aura eu permutation des composantes de τραχὺς ἔφεδρος et τραχὺς, sous l'influence de ἐναργῆς,¹⁸ se sera corrompu en ἦν ἀρχαῖς†, qui en conserve peut-être la trace. Rapprocher encore *Prom. uinct.* 324, τραχὺς μόναρχος οὐδ' ὑπεύθυνος κρατεῖ, à propos de Zeus.¹⁹

Griffith s'appuie sur νῦν δ' ἤδη ᾧ καὶ τοὺς θεσμῶν ἔξω φέρομαι pour déterminer le sens de la séquence ἡπάρεδρος ἐν ἀρχαῖς† et cela me paraît juste jusqu'à un certain point. En effet, si je crois avec Jebb que ἔξω φέρομαι est emprunté au vocabulaire de la course, je me demande si la seconde occurrence de θεσμῶν n'est pas une faute par persévérance pour σταθμῶν ou στάθμας, « en dehors des lignes / de la ligne », « au-delà des lignes / de la ligne », l'équivalent de ἐλαῶν chez Aristophane, *Ran.* 995, μή σ' ὁ θυμὸς ἀρπάσας ἐκτὸς οἴσει τῶν ἐλαῶν, ou « en dehors des pistes / de la piste ».²⁰

Av. ἔψαυσας ἀλγεινοτάτας
 ἐμοὶ μερίμνας,
 πατρὸς τριπόλιστον οἶτον
 τοῦ τε πρόπαντος ἀμετέρου δόμου 860–861
 κλεινοῖς Λαβδακίδαισιν.

859 οἶτον K^{pc}, conī. Brunck : οἶκτον cett. : οἶκον lemm. schol. L ||
 861 δόμου Hartung : πότμου codd., glossemate, ut puto, illius οἶτον intruso.

¹⁷ Ainsi Finglass 2011, 318, mais, emboitant le pas au scholiaste, Blaydes 1875, 140 prend ἔφεδρος dans un sens hostile, dérivé du vocabulaire technique de la lutte.

¹⁸ Earle 1912, 51 conjecture ἐναργῶς, mais ἐναργῆς « predicative » (l'une des explications envisagées par Griffith) peut donner le même sens. Earle allègue Thucydide 7, 55, 1 γεγενημένης δὲ τῆς νίκης τοῖς Συρακοσίοις λαμπρῶς, où ce mot est une correction (K. W. Krüger) de λαμπρᾶς que ne mentionne pas le dernier éditeur, G. B. Alberti, mais qu'avaient acceptée et bien défendue J. Classen et J. Steup. Le passage de Thucydide corrigé est un étai douteux pour ἐναργῶς, car Thucydide veut dire que la victoire n'est pas douteuse et il ne veut dire que cela. Ce n'est pas le cas de Sophocle.

¹⁹ Voir Wilamowitz 1880, 60.

²⁰ Voir Dissen chez Boeckh 1821, 404 à Pindare, *Nem.* 6, 7 : « στάθμαν, metaphora ducta a cursu, in cuius principio γραμμὴ est et in fine » et, en sens contraire, sur le même passage de Pindare, Gerber 1999, 48–50, pour qui « there is no evidence that στάθμη could be used for the finishing line » et qui rapporte, d'après G. W. Most, le mot à « the straightness of a path to be walked or a race-course to be run ». Rapprocher de l'interprétation de Dissen Euripide fr. 169 Kannicht (*Antigone* !), ...ἐπ' ἄκραν ἤκομεν γραμμὴν κακῶν. Sophocle emploie le mot στάθμη avec un autre sens que celui admis par Dissen dans un fragment de l'*Oenomaüs* : voir Liberman 2021, 690–691.

Griffith et Willink²¹ critiquent à juste titre le texte des v. 859–861 (antistrophe du second couple strophe / antistrophe du « kommos »²²) adopté par Lloyd-Jones–Wilson,²³ mais je considère comme impossibles et le texte de Griffith, πατρός τριπόλιστον οἶκτον τοῦ τε πρόπαντος ἀμετέρου πότμου, et l'analyse qu'il en donne. Selon lui, ἀλγεινοτάτας μερίμνας est un génitif (car, dit-il, ψαύω ne se construit pas avec l'accusatif²⁴) et οἶκτον est « internal acc. in apposition to the sentence » (il semble qu'il y ait là conjonction de deux explications différentes). Je lis οἶτον,²⁵ qui implique la modification de πότμου en δόμου : ... « des préoccupations très douloureuses pour moi, le destin tant ressassé de mon père et celui de toute notre maison à nous les illustres Labdacides ». C'est à dessein que je n'ai pas traduit ἔψαυσας : μερίμνας doit être un accusatif pluriel et, s'il est vrai que l'accusatif est impossible avec ψαύω, qui n'est rien moins que rare au sens propre chez Sophocle, c'est un autre verbe que le poète a dû employer. Blaydes suggère ἔμνας et rapproche *Phil.* 1169–1170, πάλιν πάλιν παλαιὸν ἄλγην ὑπέμνας. Mais le passage de ἔμνας à ἔψαυσας n'est pas plausible. Au v. 619, προσψαύση est une variante fautive de προσάψη, qui a heureusement survécu dans L et dont nous avons exposé le véritable sens. Sous ἔψαυσας se cacherait-il un autre composé rarissime

²¹ Willink 2010, 365–367. L'abrègement en hiatus (τριπόλιστον οἶτον Lloyd-Jones–Wilson) est réputé proscrié quand une syllabe longue précède et suit.

²² Je suis la colométrie de Willink (cf. Lachmann 1819, 238), plus satisfaisante que celle de Griffith.

²³ Voir Lloyd-Jones–Wilson 1990, 137.

²⁴ Au v. 961, τὸν θεὸν n'est pas le régime de ψαύων. Dindorf 1870, 522 et Griffith me paraissent avoir raison sur ce point. Ellendt 1872, 792B défend la thèse contraire et aussi μερίμνας acc. pl. avec ἔψαυσας.

²⁵ Willink conjecture οἶμον « thème », construit ἔψαυσας ἀλγεινοτάτας ἐμοὶ μερίμνας πατρός, τριπόλιστον οἶμον, τοῦ τε πρόπαντος et met entre croix ἀμετέρου πότμου κλεινοῖς Λαβδακίδαισιν. La correction qu'il propose ensuite de cette séquence est à mes yeux un pur charabia. Il conteste la grécité de ἀμετέρου... κλεινοῖς Λαβδακίδαισιν, mais le datif Λαβδακίδαισιν développe ἀμετέρου comme si l'on avait le datif possessif ἅμιν, « notre maison », et que Λαβδακίδαισιν fût apposé à ce pronom. Il est vrai que le génitif surprendrait moins ceux qui se rappellent l'idiotisme τὰμὰ δυστήνου κακά (*Oed. Col.* 344) allégué par Jebb, mais le datif ne peut pas être raisonnablement considéré comme contraire aux lois de la langue, puisqu'elle connaît le datif adnominal marquant la possession (Delbrück 1893, 303–306). Comparer latin *mea mihi* « ma maîtresse à moi » (voir Liberman 2020a à Properce 1, 6, 9). Si le texte transmis est juste, le parallèle que demande Willink se trouve v. 453–455, οὐδὲ σθένειν τοσοῦτον φόβον τὰ σά | κηρύγμαθ' ὥστ' ἄγραπτα κάσφαλῃ θεῶν | νόμιμα δύνασθαι θνητὸν ὄνθ' ὑπερδραμεῖν : on tire de σά le sujet de l'infinitive (σε) auquel se rapporte θνητὸν ὄντα.

du verbe αὔω, ἔζηυσας, « tu viens d'aviver » ? Le *DGE* s. v. ἐξάουμαι cite Pseudo-Callisthène 1, 26 Γ, τὴν ὑπ' Ἀναξάρχου τοῦ πατρός σου ἐξασθεῖσαν ὀργὴν κατέσβεσας, qui devrait plutôt se trouver au mot ἐξάύω. Le même verbe, cette fois au sens d' « extraire », qui représente le sens primitif (« *exhaurio* »),²⁶ ἐξάυσασα, s'est corrompu en ἐγκλαύσασα dans le papyrus de Bacchylide 5, 142, corrigé en 1905 par Wackernagel.²⁷

Κρ. ἄρ' ἴστ' αἰοιδὰς καὶ γόους πρὸ τοῦ θανεῖν
ὥς οὐδ' ἄν εἷς παύσαιτ' ἄν, εἰ χρεῖη, λέγειν;
οὐκ ἄξεθ' ὥς τάχιστα, καὶ κατηρεφεῖ 885
τύμβῳ περιπτύξαντες, ὥς εἴρηκ' ἐγώ,
ἄφετε μόνην ἐρῆμον, εἴτε χρῆ θανεῖν
εἴτ' ἐν τοιαύτῃ ζῶσα τυμβεύειν στέγη·

884 χρεῖη Dawes : χρεῖ' ἢ codd. || 887 de ἄφετε et χρῆ ipsos Lloyd-Jones et Wilson uide sis || 888 ζῶσα] ζῶσαν KSRZo contra metrum | τυμβεύειν LSVRz : τυμβεύει a : τυμβεύσει t.

Une faute par persévérance due à τύμβῳ a certainement substitué le répétitif τυμβεύειν (889), dont l'emploi intransitif unique (« être entombé » au lieu d'« entomber ») choque,²⁸ au sarcasme doublé d'ironie tragique νυμφεύειν, qui reprend ce que dit Créon à Hémon, ἀποπτύσας οὖν ὥστε δυσμενῇ μέθες | τὴν παῖδ' ἐν Αἰδοῦ τήνδε νυμφεύειν τινί (653–654) et ce que dit Antigone elle-même, Ἀχέροντι νυμφεύσω (816). Cette conjecture évidente fut déjà proposée par Reiske (νυμφεύσειν) et Morstadt ; Jebb et Lloyd-Jones–Wilson la mentionnent : l'éditeur qui, comme Nauck 1886 et Bruhn 1913, la mettra dans le texte aura bien mérité de Sophocle. C'est aussi un sarcasme (883–884) qui précède l'ordre donné par Créon d'emporter Antigone. Griffith rend ainsi le texte reproduit ci-dessus : « Don't you know that, if it were required to utter songs and lamentations before dying, nobody would ever stop ? ». Griffith lui-même s'étonne du propos (« strange notion ») qu'il met sur le compte de la « crass mentality » de Créon ou du

²⁶ Le sens d'« aviver » résulte du sens d'« allumer » qui fut associé au verbe αὔω à cause de l'expression πῦρ αὔω « prendre du feu ». Voir Osthoff 1884, 487 ; Schulze 1934, 190–194. Osthoff tend, non sans vraisemblance, à ramener les passages qu'il analyse au sens primitif ; il ne connaît pas le témoignage du Pseudo-Callisthène. Les dictionnaires (y compris étymologiques) sont très défectueux sur les verbes intéressés.

²⁷ Voir Wackernagel 1979, 1634–1635.

²⁸ Je rejette absolument l'explication au moins forcée « to keep on holding funerals » que Griffith envisage.

caractère fautif du texte. Il apprécie le changement de λέγειν en χέων, que Lloyd-Jones–Wilson adoptent en l’attribuant à Blaydes. Mais la difficulté des deux vers subsiste, car le sens requis est non « s’il le fallait, personne ne s’arrêterait d’émettre des chants plaintifs avant de mourir » mais « si cela pouvait éviter la mort, personne ne s’arrêterait d’émettre des chants plaintifs avant de mourir ». Griffith a raison de reprocher à Jebb de traduire abusivement εἰ χρεῖν par « if it profited to utter them ». Il ne semble pas facile de remédier à ce défaut du texte par des corrections de mots.²⁹ Le peut-on, je me demande quand même si les deux vers ne sont pas une interpolation gauche, en l’état, destinée à noircir encore le personnage de Créon. L’ordre abrupt que Créon donnerait alors immédiatement après avoir entendu le lamento d’Antigone fait bien voir sa brutale insensibilité.

Av. νῦν δέ, Πολύνεικες, τὸ σὸν
δέμας περιστέλλουσα τοιάδ' ἄρνυμαι. 903

Antigone a déjà pratiqué les rites funèbres qu'elle évoque³⁰ et νῦν ne se réfère qu'à ἄρνημαι. Rapporté par erreur au participe, l'adverbe de temps a causé la substitution du présent à l'aoriste, περιστείλασα,³¹ qu'on lit d'ailleurs dans un texte cité par Jebb, *Od.* 24, 292–293, οὐδέ ἐ μήτηρ | κλαῦσε περιστείλασα πατήρ θ', οἳ μιν τεκόμεσθα.

Αν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν οὖν τὰδ' ἐστὶν ἐν θεοῖς καλὰ, 925
παθόντες ἂν συγγοῖμεν ἡμαρτηκότες·
εἰ δ' οἷδ' ἁμαρτάνουσι, μὴ πλείω κακά
πάθοιεν ἢ καὶ δρῶσιν ἐκδίκως ἐμέ.

Antigone met en œuvre, aux v. 925–926, le proverbe *πάθει μάθος*³² et le vers 925 signifie, comme le veulent Jebb et Griffith, « ayant pâti nous saurons

²⁹ J'ai songé à εἰ κέρδος (cf. 1032 et fr. 845, 2 Radt) ; encore faut-il admettre l'ellipse de εἴη. Le fr. 845, 2 suggère εἰ κέρδος φέροι, « si cela amenait un profit » (αἰοιδὰς καὶ γόους sont alors COD de παύσαιτ' ἄν, construction sophocléenne). Mais la corruption de κέρδος φέροι en χρεῖ' ἧ λέγειν est dure à expliquer. Peut-être εἰ λῡοι (= λυσιτελοῖ, usage sophocléen [*El.* 1005]), χέων est-il plus satisfaisant de ce point de vue.

³⁰ Voir Willink 2010, 688–689. Je ne suis pas sûr que sa substitution de τε à (vũv) δέ soit un progrès.

³¹ Ainsi déjà Rottmanner, cité par Lloyd-Jones–Wilson, et Dawe 1979.

³² Voir Eschyle, *Ag.* 177 avec la note de Medda 2017, II, 127–128 ; *N. T. H.* 5, 8, ἔμαθεν ἀφ’ ὧν ἔπαθεν. Nauck a cherché à introduire le proverbe chez Alcée fr. 371 (voir Liberman 2002 *ad loc.*).

que nous nous sommes trompée ». ³³ Mais le verbe que Sophocle emploie pour exprimer le savoir acquis par un individu n'est pas συγγιγνώσκω, qu'on ne trouve chez le dramaturge qu'au sens de « pardonner » (*Trach.* 279 ; fr. 352, 3 et 679, 1 Radt) et auquel il manque le pronom ἡμῖν pour que ce verbe ait le sens requis. Le tétrasyllabe ξυνειδεῖμεν étant exclu, le verbe qui conviendrait est celui qui se trouve dans une des expressions du proverbe, Δίκα δὲ τοῖς μὲν παθοῦσιν μαθεῖν ἐπιτρέπει (Aesch. *Ag.* 250), et qui est l'occasion d'une très belle paronomase ³⁴ : μάθοιμεν. Une sorte d'haplographie a pu faire disparaître μάθ- après παθ- et on a pu compléter -οιμεν avec le mauvais verbe. ³⁵ La substitution d'une glose au mot original est une autre possibilité ; dans *Phil.* 22, ἄ μοι προσελθὼν σῖγα †σήμαιν'† εἴτ' ἔχει, Dawe suggère que la leçon σήμαιν', qui viole la loi de Porson, est une explication (σημαίνου, selon Dawe) insérée qui a chassé μάνθαν'. Ici, la glose γνοῖμεν, substituée à μάθοιμεν, aura été complétée « metri causa », mais au détriment du sens. Pour le participe avec μάθοιμεν, voir *El.* 1342, εἷς τῶν ἐν Ἄιδου μάνθαν' ἐνθάδ' ὦν ἀνὴρ.

Xo.	ζεύχθη δ' ὀξύχολος παῖς ὁ Δρύαντος,	955
	Ἥδωνων βασιλεύς, κερτομίοις	
	ὀργαῖς ἐκ Διονύσου	
	πετρώδει κατάφαρκτος ἐν δεσμῷ.	
	οὔτω τὰς μανίας δεινὸν ἀποστάζει	
	ἀνθηρόν τε μένος. κεῖνος ἐπέγνω μανίας	960
	ψαύων τὸν θεὸν ἐν κερτομίοις γλώσσαις.	

Dans l'antistrophe du premier couple strophe / antistrophe du quatrième « stasimon », le chœur ³⁶ évoque, en rapport avec Antigone entombée, l'inconduite de Lycurgue vis-à-vis de Dionysos et la punition du fils de Dryas. ³⁷ Je reproduis, sans apparat critique, le texte de Griffith, ³⁸ car la

³³ Voir, sur l'usage du masculin par un locuteur féminin, Pott 1856, col. 430A ; Wackernagel 1926, 99–100 ; Barrett ⁴1974, 366–369 ; Moorhouse 1982, 9–10.

³⁴ Voir par exemple Bruhn 1899, 142 § 243 I.

³⁵ Comparer l'émendation de Wilamowitz 1971, 366 n. 1, hélas écartée par les éditeurs, dans les *Limiers* (fr. 314, 366–367), ἀ[λλ'] αἰὲν εἴ σὺ παῖς· νέος γὰρ ὦν ἀνὴρ | π[ώγ]ωνι θάλλων ὥς τράγος κνήκῃ χλιδᾶς : peut-être, πάλαι (Wilamowitz) ayant disparu après παῖς, le vide fut-il comblé au moyen de νέος, qui fait contresens.

³⁶ Plus précisément, selon Muff 1877, 114, le second demi-chœur. Lammers 1931 nie l'emploi du demi-chœur dans les pièces intégralement conservées de Sophocle.

³⁷ Selon West 1990, 32, l'évocation de Sophocle reflète les *Edonoi* d'Eschyle.

³⁸ Je suis la colométrie de Griffith (voir, pour 955–958, Willink 2010, 370), mais celle de Lachmann 1819, 172 mérite considération.

tradition ne varie pas s'agissant du point qui m'intéresse, la répétition de κερτομίους, épithète tantôt de ὀργαῖς, tantôt de γλώσσαις. Jebb assure que la répétition est inoffensive et il rapproche les cas de οὐδὲν ἔρπει 613 = 618 et de ἐκτὸς ἄτας 614 = 625. Ces rapprochements ne sont pas rassurants, car la répétition de ἔρπει et, nous l'avons remarqué, de lui seul, non de οὐδὲν ἔρπει, est, elle, intrinsèquement inoffensive, et la reprise de ἐκτὸς ἄτας est toute différente en ce que cette locution clôt la strophe et l'antistrophe.³⁹ Le changement de cas, de fonction et de nombre de μανίας / μανίαις (« accès de folie ») et la parfaite pertinence du mot dans les deux passages rendent incomparables la reprise de μανία et la répétition de κερτομίους.⁴⁰ L'anticipation, par la première occurrence de cet adjectif, de l'explication livrée par la seconde ne paraît pas heureuse. Si la formule homérique κερτομίους ἐπέεσσι illustre le plus hardi κερτομίους⁴¹ γλώσσαις, il y a lieu, je crois, de mettre en doute κερτομίους ὀργαῖς,⁴² οὐ κερτομίους n'est peut-être qu'une faute par anticipation qui a fait disparaître une épithète telle que αἰκελίους, « inconvenants accès de courroux » (cette forme se trouve chez « Homère », Théognis, Solon ; Euripide, *Andr.* 131, parties lyriques). Sophocle a αἰκῆς, αἰκῆς, αἰκῶς, αἰκεία, αἰκίζω.⁴³

³⁹ Voir Jacob 1866, 43. Muff 1877, 102 veut qu'elle corrobore l'attribution de chacune à un demi-chœur.

⁴⁰ Van Herwerden 1887, 68 ne craint pas d'introduire une répétition d'un vers à l'autre dans 1089–1090, γνῶ τρέφειν τὴν γλῶσσαν ἡσυχαιτέραν | τὸν νοῦν τ' ἀμείνω τῶν φρενῶν ὧν νῦν φέρει, par la substitution de τρέφει (mentionné par Lloyd-Jones–Wilson) à φέρει. Liberman 2020b, 179 suggère une correction analogue dans *Oed. Col.* 1230, κούφας ἀφροσύνας φέρον et van Herwerden lui-même émende de la même manière Pind. *Pyth.* 6, 29, νόημα τοῦτο φέρων. On jugera que l'inconvénient d'une répétition de τρέφω aux vers 1089–1090 de l'*Antigone* prouve l'authenticité de φέρει (cf. latin *magnum animum ferre prae se*) et que les passages où φέρω est transmis se corroborent les uns les autres. Ce raisonnement semble se tenir, et pourtant une faute n'est pas exclue au moins dans le passage de l'*Oedipe à Colone*.

⁴¹ Cet adjectif est un composé, si j'ose dire, « à redoublement synonymique expressif », fait de deux mots signifiant « couper » (voir García Ramón 2007).

⁴² « Bursts of fury in which he reviled Dionysius » traduit Jebb. Sur le sens de ὀργή, voir Porzig 1942, 320. Comparer Naevius fr. 21 Schauer, *ne ille mei feri ingeni <iram> atque animi acrem acrimoniam* (Lycurgue parle), et fr. 33 Schauer, *caue seis tuam contendas iram contrad com irad Leiberi* (c'est Orphée qui parle à Lycurgue). Je reproduis le texte choisi par West 1990, 29 et tiens compte de sa discussion (ignorée par Schauer 2012 !) des fragments du *Lycurgue* de Naevius servant à la reconstitution des *Edonoi* d'Eschyle.

⁴³ Je sacrifie aux (mauvaises) habitudes, car il faudrait écrire αἰκῆς etc. comme on écrit ᾄδω > ἀείδω (voir West 1998, XLV), c'est-à-dire αἰκῆς (West adscrit l'*iota*).

Xo.	ἀγχίπολις Ἄρης	970
	δισσοῖσι Φινεΐδαις	
	εἶδεν ἀρατὸν ἔλκος	
	τυφλωθέν ἐξ ἀγρίας δάμαρτος	
	ἀλαδὸν ἀλαστόροισιν ὀμμάτων κύκλοις	
	ἀραχθέντων ὑφ' αἱματηραῖς	975
	χεῖρεσσι καὶ κερκίδων ἀκμαῖσιν.	

970 ἀγχίπολις RSzt : ἀγχίπολις cett. || 974 ἀλαστόροισιν] ἀλαστόροις
 t || 975 ἀραχθέντων Seidler et Lachmann 1819, 157 : ἀραχθέν ἐγγέων
 fere codd.

Dans le second couple strophe / antistrophe du quatrième « stasimon », le chœur rapproche du sort d'Antigone celui de Cléopâtre, première épouse de Phinée dont les deux fils⁴⁴ eurent les yeux crevés par Eidothéa,⁴⁵ seconde épouse de Phinée : « Arès, voisin de Salmydessos, vit la maudite blessure aveuglante, par une sauvage épouse infligée aux deux fils de Phinée, aux orbites qui crient vengeance de leurs yeux arrachés par des mains sanguinaires et des pointes de navettes ». Je suis la colométrie de Willink⁴⁶ et admetts en ἔλκος τυφλοῦν un accusatif de l'objet interne, « pratiquer une blessure qui crée la cécité ».⁴⁷ La construction des deux datifs δισσοῖσι Φινεΐδαις... ἀλαστόροισιν κύκλοις appartient à un « schème » dont l'emploi est moins étroit qu'on ne le se figure. Jebb voit avec raison dans Φινεΐδαις un datif d'intérêt dépendant de τυφλωθέν, mais, comme d'autres avant lui, il a tort de reconnaître dans κύκλοις un datif dépendant de ἀλαδόν, « sightless for the orbs, *i.e.*, making them sightless ». Il s'agit d'un double datif dépendant de τυφλωθέν, ce qu'a bien vu Wunder 1846, et ce double datif relève de la construction dite ἐκ παραλλήλου, qui met en vis-à-vis le tout et la partie⁴⁸ et pas seulement sous la forme d'un double

⁴⁴ Selon Muff 1877, 115, c'est le premier demi-chœur qui évoque le sort malheureux des fils (strophe, dont je tire l'extrait ci-dessus) et le second qui a en charge celui de leur mère (antistrophe).

⁴⁵ Eidothéa n'est pas nommée, mais il est possible que, conformément à un usage ancien de l'anagramme (voir Liberman 2020a, 313–314), le poète fasse allusion à ce nom en répartissant les éléments qui, mis ensemble, l'évoquent (εἶδεν, -θέν et le chapelet d'*alpha* qui suit). Même chose pour Cléopâtre : πάθαν κλαῖον ματρὸς (979–980).

⁴⁶ Willink 2010, 372–373. Comparer Lachmann 1819, 156–157.

⁴⁷ Voir là-contre Wunder 1846, 107 : « ne Graecum quidem ».

⁴⁸ Voir Lobeck 1866, 185 et l'index s. v. ὅλον κατὰ μέρος (accusatif et autres cas) ; Delbrück 1893, 385 (double accusatif, en védique, grec et peut-être en allemand) ; Bruhn 1899, 132 § 225 (double accusatif et double datif) ; Wilamowitz

accusatif (« schema καθ' ὅλον καὶ κατὰ μέρος », « schema Ionicum », « schema Colophonium »). Eur. *Phoen.* 88, ὃ κλεινὸν οἴκοις Ἀντιγόνη θάλος πατρί, cité plus haut, est un magnifique exemple de double datif ἐκ παραλλήλου.⁴⁹

Τε. κατ' οὐ δέχονται θυστάδας λιτὰς ἔτι
 θεοὶ παρ' ἡμῶν οὐδὲ μηρίων φλόγα, 1020
 οὐδ' ὄρνις εὐσήμους ἀπορροιβδεῖ βοάς,
 ἀνδροφθόρου βεβρωτες αἵματος λίπος.

1022 βεβρωτες] βεβρωτος Lsl Y | λίπος] λίβος Blomfield, sed uide Fraenkel 1950, III, 672 ad Aesch. *Ag.* 1428.

Tirésias constate que la présence, sur les autels et les foyers, de chair humaine ingérée par les oiseaux et les chiens entraîne chez les dieux le rejet des sacrifices. Le passage du singulier ὄρνις au pluriel βεβρωτες, enregistré par toutes les syntaxes détaillées et bien connu des latinistes grâce à un célèbre texte de Virgile⁵⁰ mais réputé être, tel quel, un

1909, 253 (traitement le plus large, accusatif et autres cas ; exemples à contrôler parfois) ; 1922, 431 n. 1 (double accusatif) ; Schwyzer–Debrunner 1950, 81 (double accusatif) ; Fraenkel 1950, II, 438 à *Ag.* 965 (double datif, non admis par Medda 2017, III, 93) ; Lloyd-Jones–Wilson 1997, 116–117. West 1998 rejette chez Eschyle, *Ag.* 429–431 le double datif ἐκ παραλλήλου énergiquement défendu par Wilamowitz 1921, 184 et accepté par Fraenkel 1950, II, 226, mais sa discussion du passage (West 1990, 186–187) laisse de côté l'explication de Wilamowitz. C'est un cas plus difficile que le double datif de notre passage mais je voudrais être sûr que West a raison. Medda 2017 (traduction I, 277 et commentaire II, 269–270) accepte les deux datifs συνορμένους<ι> et δόμοις, dont le second est une correction du texte transmis (gén. pl.), mais n'identifie pas un « schema ἐκ παραλλήλου » (« per coloro che mossero dalla terra greca, spicca nelle case di ognuno dolore dal cuore paziente » ; « dolore per coloro che si raccolsero per partire »). Il faut peut-être reconnaître cette figure chez Pindare *Ol.* 13, 7–10, καὶ ἐγὼ νέκταρ χυτὸν, Μοισᾶν δόσιν, ἀεθλοφόροις | ἀνδράσιν πέμπων, γλυκὺν καρπὸν φρενός, | ἰλάσκομαι (sc. αὐτούς), | Ὀλυμπία Πυθοὶ τε νικῶντεςσιν, « envoyant un nectar poétique et musical aux vainqueurs des concours, aux olympioniques et aux pythioniques, je me concilie leur faveur » (ainsi, sauf pour l'identification du « schema », Verdenius 1987, 49). Une correction antique ou moderne ou une explication erronée masque plus d'un cas au moins possible de ce « schema ».

⁴⁹ Mastronarde 1994, 180 a raison de nier que οἴκοις dépende de κλεινὸν et πατρί de θάλος, mais ses rendus « Antigone, scion in the house who brings glory to your father » ou « Ant., scion who brings glory to the house for your father » ne correspondent pas à la construction véritable.

⁵⁰ *Buc.* 4, 62–63 (le texte courant n'est en fait nullement garanti). La syllepse selon laquelle un singulier collectif est le sujet d'un verbe au pluriel est plus régulière.

« unicum » dans la tragédie,⁵¹ a amené l'hypothèse de l'interpolation de 1021–1022 (Paley) ou du seul vers 1021 (Reeve⁵²). Il me paraît préférable d'intervertir les v. 1021–1022 :

θεοὶ παρ' ἡμῶν οὐδὲ μηρίων φλόγα	1020
ἀνδροφθόρου βεβρωτες αἵματος λίπος,	1022
οὐδ' ὄρνις εὐσήμους ἀπορροιβδεῖ βοάς.	1021

La transposition implique que le rejet divin des sacrifices est consécutif à l'ingestion par les dieux de sang humain. Voilà qui donne un relief particulier à οὐ δέχονται ... ἔτι : les dieux refusent après avoir goûté. On comprend ainsi mieux, me semble-t-il, pourquoi, dans sa réponse à ce qui lui paraît être une exagération de Tirésias, Créon (1040–1044⁵³) feint d'imaginer que les aigles de Zeus emportent les restes de Polynice

⁵¹ « No close parallel in tragedy for such a shift » (Griffith). Lloyd-Jones–Wilson 1990, 140 sont du même avis. Ils sont plus coulants (193–194) s'agissant du passage du pluriel au singulier. Wrobel 1865, 36 admet le texte transmis du passage de l'*Antigone* sans relever sa spécificité.

⁵² Reeve 1973, 170, suivi par Dawe 1979. La facture de ce vers est très rare : césure trihémimère, trisyllabe molossique à la fin du premier hémistiche et, au début du second hémistiche, tétrasyllabe = épitrite premier, en l'occurrence un verbe très rare, repris par Nonnos. Cette facture est, en dépit de l'absence de césure penthémimère, sophocléenne et irréprochable : voir Schmidt 1865, 24, en retranchant de la table *Oed. rex* 598, 640, 856 ; *Aiax* 855, et en ajoutant fr. 670, 1 Radt. J'explique le recours à une facture inhabituelle non par l'interpolation (*Oed. rex* 738, ὦ Ζεῦ, τί μου δρᾶσαι βεβούλευσαι πέρι; n'a jamais été et ne saurait être suspecté : voir Schein 1979, 38), mais par l'intention d'exprimer une sorte de dissonance en rapport avec l'idée exprimée. Pour une étude de l'impact sur la coupe du vers de l'utilisation d'un mot de la forme d'un épitrite premier, voir Baechle 2007, 209–225, avec la bibliographie. Cette excellente étude structurale de métrique verbale ne remplace pas plus que l'essai de Schein 1979 la dissertation de Schmidt 1865. Ce dernier classe les exemples de vers non césurés à la penthémimère en fonction de la configuration des hémistiches. La table mentionnant le vers 1021 comprend les trimètres « quibus etiam non adiuncto sententiae aliquo fine rhythmus infringitur eo, ut uoces plurium syllabarum duorum uersus membrorum comparium unum concludant alterum incipiant ». Schmidt ne tient pas compte de la présence ou de l'absence de césure trihémimère ; ce qui compte en effet est la conformation du dernier mot du premier hémistiche (la note de Liberman 2020b, 188 est au moins confuse). En cas d'absence caractérisée de césure penthémimère, de présence de la diérèse centrale et d'un mot au moins dissyllabique à la fin du premier hémistiche, le second hémistiche commence par un mot tétrasyllabique (*Ant.* 1021, *Aiax* 1091, *Oed. rex.* 738 et 785, *El.* 330, *Phil.* 736 et 1369) ou pentasyllabique (*Aiax* 994) ou il est fait d'un hexasyllabe (fr. 670, 1 Λήθην τε τὴν πάντων ἀπεστερημένην, facture très expressive).

⁵³ J'étudie plus bas ce passage.

afin de les servir à leur maître ; même dans ce cas, dit-il, il ne craint pas la souillure qui s'ensuivrait, car il part du principe (dont la suite lui démontrera l'inanité) que les hommes ne peuvent pas souiller les dieux.⁵⁴ Il n'est donc pas du genre à croire au récit selon lequel Zeus punit la souillure que lui infligea Lycaon en lui servant la chair d'un de ses fils.⁵⁵

Τε. ἄλλ' εἴκε τῷ θανόντι, μηδ' ὀλωλότα
κέντει. τίς ἀλκή τὸν θανόντ' ἐπικτανεῖν; 1030

Τῷ θανόντι désigne Polynice, mais τὸν θανόντ(α) doit désigner « celui qui est mort », « un mort » en général : « à quoi sert-il de tuer un mort une seconde fois ? ». Si τὸν θανόντ(α) désigne encore Polynice, τίς ἀλκή τὸν θανόντ' ἐπικτανεῖν; devient, après μηδ' ὀλωλότα κέντει,⁵⁶ par trop oiseux. Mais le changement de sens du participe substantivé répété est très gauche. À cela s'ajoute la difficulté posée par εἴκε τῷ θανόντι, « cède au mort ». Le mort ne demande rien à Créon⁵⁷ et c'est, en ce moment, à lui-

⁵⁴ Je me borne à renvoyer là-dessus à Wilamowitz 1909, 459–460 et à Reinhardt 1933, 99.

⁵⁵ Voir Welcker 1850, 167–168 (tirés de son célèbre article sur la lycanthropie) et Burkert 1983, 86. Les mots grecs et latins des textes cités par Welcker ne laissent pas de doute : Zeus est bien censé avoir mangé. Xénoclès a triomphé en 415 avec une tétralogie comprenant une tragédie *Lycaon*. La première *Olympique* de Pindare atteste, en la combattant énergiquement, la popularité de l'idée de la gloutonnerie cannibale (γαστριμαργία) des dieux. « No parallel comes to hand for the idea that the gods actually eat sacrificial meat, but it lends a peculiar horror to Tiresias' discomfiting speech » (Reeve 1973, 173 n. 52). Il me suggère dans un échange du 14/4/2021 que le v. 1021 a justement pu être introduit « to save the gods from a gruesome meal ». Les dieux des Grecs, qu'est censée nourrir l'ambrosie, ne boivent pas le sang des autels, dit Eitrem 1915, 434 (cf., dans le même sens, Ekroth 2011), et, selon Schoemann 1885, 278, il ne faut prendre ni au sérieux Aristophane et Lucien quand ils disent que les dieux doivent, pour n'avoir pas faim, boire et manger ce qui leur est offert en sacrifice ni littéralement les épiclèses qui le font accroire. Schoemann affirme la même chose de Jéhovah : Eitrem dit le contraire en s'appuyant sur un passage des *Psaumes*. Les Érinnyes d'*Aïax* 844 sont invitées à « goûter » toute une armée (ce qui a déplu à Thomas Magister, qui corrige le texte) et les morts sont pour Hadès un festin (*El.* 543).

⁵⁶ Sur cette expression proverbiale, voir Fraenkel 1950, II, 402 à Aesch. *Ag.* 885.

⁵⁷ Antigone elle-même ne dit pas répondre à une demande de son frère. Cela est vrai de la pièce de Sophocle et même de l'imitateur de Sophocle à qui l'on doit la fin interpolée des *Sept contre Thèbes* et qui met en scène un Polynice subissant contre son gré la privation de sépulture : cf. 1033–1034, τοιγὰρ θέλουσ' ἄκοντι κοινώνει κακῶν, | ψυχὴ, θανόντι ζῶσα συγγόνῳ φρενί, « donc, mon âme, prends volontairement ta part des maux que souffre malgré lui ton frère, lui mort, toi vivante, animée par un esprit fraternel » (voir Barrett 2007, 337).

même que Tirésias peut d'une manière vraisemblable demander à Créon de céder, comme on peut s'en aviser en lisant les v. 1023–1027. Il est donc probable que τῷ θανόντι est une faute par anticipation de τὸν θανόντ(α) et Lloyd-Jones–Wilson ont raison de mentionner la correction νουθετοῦντι :⁵⁸ comparer 1031, εὖ σοι φρονήσας εὖ λέγω ; *Phil.* 1322–1323, ἐάν τε νουθετῇ τις εὐνοία λέγων, | στυγεῖς. Si la correction avait été faite au XVI^e s. ou même par Brunck, elle aurait rencontré plus d'écho. Wecklein,⁵⁹ que Housman estimait, en est l'auteur et Griffith ne la mentionne pas plus qu'il ne se fait l'écho d'aucune difficulté liée à εἶκε τῷ θανόντι, « a striking paradox » dont il rapproche 524–525, lesquels n'ont qu'un rapport lointain. Je vois aussi une difficulté dans le passage où, après avoir dit qu'Antigone tient de son père son caractère « sauvage » (ὠμόν),⁶⁰ le chœur observe εἵκειν δ' οὐκ ἐπίσταται κακοῖς (472). Les mots que dit le chœur à Ulysse et qui qualifient la rhèse de Philoctète, βαρύς τε καὶ βαρεῖαν ὁ ξένος φάτιν | τήνδ' εἶπ', Ὀδυσσεῦ, κοῦχ ὑπείκουσιν κακοῖς (1045–1046),⁶¹ sont comparables mais le contexte diffère. S'agissant d'Antigone, il est question d'obtempérer aux lois de Créon, comme celui-ci le rappelle dans sa réponse au chœur, et Antigone elle-même vient d'expliquer que pour qui, comme elle, vit ἐν πολλοῖσιν ... κακοῖς (463), la mort est un bien. Le mot κακοῖς est peut-être une faute par persévérance ;⁶² dans ce cas, je suggère εἵκειν δ' οὐκ ἐπίσταται τάχα, « elle est incapable de céder promptement, facilement ». Dans sa note à ce passage Griffith observe que « céder » est un leitmotiv de la pièce ; le mot grec correspondant est utilisé sans complément au datif dans les passages qu'il cite, sauf aux v. 472 et 1029. Créon semble presque reprendre l'adverbe nié τάχα (toujours à la fin du trimètre chez Sophocle) dans la première partie de sa réponse, qui consiste à dire que tout finit par céder pour peu qu'on emploie les bons moyens. Une métaphore qu'il emploie, σμικρῷ χαλινῷ δ' οἶδα τοὺς θυμουμένους | ἵππους καταρτυθέντας (477–478), rappelle l'évocation de Cassandre par Clytemnestre, *Ag.* 1066–1067, χαλινὸν δ' οὐκ ἐπίσταται φέρειν | πρὶν αἵματηρὸν ἐξαφρίξεσθαι μένος, passage qui illustre et peut-être corrobore la correction que je propose.

⁵⁸ Sept occurrences chez Sophocle, sans compter une du substantif νουθέτημα.

⁵⁹ Wecklein 1869, 72.

⁶⁰ Voir Wilamowitz 1923, 343.

⁶¹ Voir Cavallin 1875, 212. West 1990, 227–228 et 1998 fait bien d'adopter la correction de Madvig πεπρωμένοις πρὶν παθεῖν εἴξαντες chez Aesch. *Ag.* 1657–1658.

⁶² Chez Valerius Flaccus 4, 308 (description d'un pugilat), *ceditque malis* et *ceciditque malis* sont deux variantes fautives pour ce qui fut peut-être, comme je l'exposai jadis, *crepitant malae*. La formule se justifie parfaitement dans le virgilien *tu ne cede malis sed contra audentior ito, | qua tua te fortuna sinet*.

Κρ. ὦ πρέσβυ, πάντες ὥστε τοξόται σκοποῦ
τοξεύετ' ἀνδρὸς τοῦδε, κοῦδὲ μαντικῆς
ἄπρακτος ὑμῖν εἰμι· τῶν δ' ὑπαὶ γένους 1035
ἐξημπόλημαι κάκπεφόρτισμαι πάλαι.
κερδαίνειτ', ἐμπολᾶτε τὰπὸ Σάρδεων
ἤλεκτρον, εἰ βούλεσθε, καὶ τὸν Ἴνδικόν
χρυσόν·

1035 δ' om. Laur. 31.1^{ac}, del. Brunck, recte ut uid. || 1036 κάκπε-
φόρτισμαι L^{sl}, Λ, cett. : κάμπεφόρτισμαι L in linea, sch. || 1037 τὰπὸ
Blaydes : τὰ πρὸ L in linea : τὸν πρὸ L^{sl}, Λazo : τὸν πρὸς SVRZf
Eustathius bis.

La difficulté de ce passage mal entendu est notoire. Il semble y avoir solution de continuité entre « la tribu des prophètes fait commerce extérieur et exportation de moi depuis un certain temps » (1035–1036, entendus presque littéralement⁶³) et « faites du profit ; faites, si le cœur vous en dit, commerce de l'électrum en provenance de Sardes et de l'or indien : vous n'arriverez pas à me faire donner une sépulture à Polynice » (1037 et suivants). La cohérence semblerait restaurée si le texte portait τῶν ὑπαὶ γένους | ἐξημπόληται κάκπεφόρτισται πάλαι (passif impersonnel), « cela fait longtemps que la tribu des prophètes fait commerce extérieur et exportation ». Alors Créon reproche simplement leur mercantilisme et leur avidité à Tirésias et aux autres, qu'il croit avoir été achetés, selon toute vraisemblance par les Argiens pour faire obtenir une sépulture à Polynice et aux autres chefs défunts.⁶⁴ Tout le

⁶³ « He feels himself 'bought and sold' » (Griffith). Jebb brode sur les paroles de Créon en le prenant au mot, d'une manière qui, selon moi, frise le ridicule : « he (Tirésias) is to deliver me into their hands (celles des Thébains). I am like a piece of merchandise which has been sold for export, and put on board the buyer's ship (κάμπεφόρτισμαι) ». Comparer fr. 583, 6–8 Radt, ὅταν δ' ἐς ἡβην ἐξικώμεθ' ἔμφορες, | ὠθοῦμεθ' ἔξω καὶ διεμπολώμεθα | θεῶν πατρώων τῶν τε φουσάντων ἅπο (Procné évoque le sort des femmes jeunes) ; *Trach.* 536–538, κόρη γάρ, οἶμαι δ' οὐκέτ', ἀλλ' ἐζευγμένην, | παρεσδέδεγμαι, φόρτον ὥστε ναυτίλος, | λωβητὸν ἐμπόλημα τῆς ἐμῆς φρενός (voir Davies 1991, 150–151). Fraenkel 1950, III, 686 considère λωβητὸν ἐμπόλημα τῆς ἐμῆς φρενός comme un écho d'Eschyle, *Ag.* 1447, †εὐνῆς† (κριτὸν e. g.) παροψώνημα τῆς ἐμῆς χλιδῆς.

⁶⁴ Voir Jebb au v. 10, πρὸς τοὺς φίλους στείχοντα τῶν ἐχθρῶν κακά (la privation de sépulture dont sont victimes les chefs des Argiens [voir là-dessus Wilamowitz 1914, 90–92] s'étend au frère d'Antigone et d'Ismène) et les v. 1080–1083 avec la note de Jebb, non sans se souvenir que Wunder 1846, 118 a contesté l'authenticité de ces vers (voir le long examen où Brown 2016 cherche à établir l'interpolation).

passage aurait alors été vicié par des retouches faites en fonction d'une idée fausse : πάντες ὥστε τοξόται σκοποῦ | τοξεύειτ' ἀνδρὸς τοῦδε aura paru impliquer que Créon lui-même dit être l'objet dont il est fait commerce, alors qu'il disait seulement être la victime de la vénalité du prophète et de ses séides. Toutefois on peut se demander si ce n'est pas précisément cela que signifie le vers 1036 tel qu'il est transmis, mais non tel qu'il est compris par les commentateurs récents. Le scholiaste de Sophocle, tributaire d'une source érudite et intelligente, cite ce que cette source estimait être un parallèle callimachéen, ἐποιήσαντό με φόρτον, mots que nous savons aujourd'hui être tirés des *Aitia* (fr. 7c, 13 Harder). Nous savons aussi que c'est Éète qui les prononçait et nous pouvons croire⁶⁵ qu'il portait contre les Argonautes l'accusation d'avoir acheté Médée afin d'obtenir le concours de cette dernière au détriment de son père. Tel est aussi le sens véritable des métaphores ἐξημπολήμαι κάκπεφόρτισμα⁶⁶ πάλαι : « la gent des prophètes fait depuis un certain temps des tractations à mes dépens », autrement dit « elle me promène, me 'mène en bateau', cherche à me tromper ». ⁶⁷ Comparer le v. 1063, ὥς μὴ ἔμπολήσω ἴσθι τὴν ἐμὴν φρένα, « sache que ton traficotage ne se jouera pas de mon esprit »⁶⁸ (Créon à Tirésias) ; il ne s'agit pas non plus ici d'« acheter » Créon et la glose ἐξαπατήσω (p. 176 Xenis) est juste. *Phil.* 978, πέπραμαι κάπόλωλ', semble signifier « me voilà fait et refait ».⁶⁹

Sans eux, Seyffert 1865 au v. 10 aurait, ce semble, raison de dire que Sophocle ne dit que « tecte », à mots couverts, que l'ordre de Créon relatif à Polynice concerne aussi tous les autres chefs des Argiens. Kaibel 1897, 21 veut, il est vrai, que le propos des v. 1080–1083 soit général, « omnes autem omnino urbes infortuniis conturbari solent dis inuisae, ubi corpora mortuorum a canibus uel uulturibus dilaniata uiuis sepulcris conduntur ». Il est très remarquable que Sophocle ne dise pas en termes exprès que Créon soupçonne les Argiens d'avoir acheté Tirésias entre autres (cf. 221–222, 294, 302, 310–312, 326) pour donner une sépulture à leurs chefs morts au combat.

⁶⁵ Voir Harder 2012, 158.

⁶⁶ Sur la reprise très sophocléenne du préverbe concerné, voir Liberman 2021, 691.

⁶⁷ « Figurato sensu haec Callimachum quoque dixisse ('deceperunt me') Sophoclis locus cui apposita sunt manifesto docet » (Schneider 1873, 675, avec une attribution dubitative et fourvoyée à l'*Hecale*).

⁶⁸ Comparer *Trach.* 151, λωβητὸν ἐμπόλημα τῆς ἐμῆς φρενός, et Blaydes 1871, 118. Jebb et Griffith sont très évasifs sur le vers 1063 et Davies 1991 l'est encore plus sur le vers des *Trachiniennes* et sur celui de l'*Antigone*, qu'il cite.

⁶⁹ Voir Collard 2018, 153–154, dans une rubrique intitulée « ?*ἐμπολᾶν 'have one's business go along', 'fare' ». Cet idiotisme et celui que j'ai en vue doivent être distingués l'un de l'autre.

Créon n'est pas plus qu'Éète à proprement parler « bought and sold » (Griffith).⁷⁰ Si l'on admet cette explication, le texte transmis du vers 1036 est impeccable, mais la séquence κούδὲ μαντικῆς ἄπρακτος ὑμῖν εἰμι, « et je ne suis pas non plus sans faire l'objet de manigances de la part de votre (? ; ὑμῶν Broadhead⁷¹) mantique », reste problématique : le génitif qui indique l'agent (μαντικῆς) avec un adjectif en ἄ-τος dérivé d'un participe doit correspondre à un COD,⁷² impossible avec πράσσειν au sens absolu d'« intriguer ». ⁷³ La conjecture la plus fréquemment citée est ἄτρωτος (Pallis),⁷⁴ mais Créon disait peut-être être ballotté⁷⁵ comme une marchandise par Tirésias et ses pairs, et (c'est un des sens de σείω en attique⁷⁶) soumis par eux à une forme de chantage et d'extorsion : κούδὲ μαντικῆς ἄσειστος ὑμῶν εἰμι, « et je ne suis pas non plus sans être secoué par votre (cupide) mantique ». La métaphore préparerait celle du v. 1036. Cependant Sophocle paraît utiliser πράσσειν transitif dans un sens qui, octroyé à ἄπρακτος, pourrait aussi préparer la métaphore ἐξημπόλημαι κάκπεφόρτισμαι : voir *Aiāx* 445–446, νῦν δ' αὖτ' (ὄπλα) Ἀτρεΐδαι φωτὶ παντουργῶ φρένας | ἔπραξαν, « but, as things are, the Atridae have made them over (« aoristus confectiuus », précisé-je) to a man depraved in his character »

⁷⁰ Comparer, pour l'image et la construction, *Phil.* 578–579, τί φησιν, ὦ παῖ; τί με κατὰ σκότον ποτὲ | διεμπολᾷ λόγοισι πρὸς σ' ὁ ναυβάτης; Philoctète veut savoir ce que le marchand dit à voix basse à Néoptolème et qui le concerne : « que manigance-t-il à mon sujet en te parlant en aparté ? ». Cavallin 1875 et Lloyd-Jones–Wilson 1990, 193 remplacent τί με par la correction τί δὲ de Seyffert 1867 : « Philoctetes can hardly say that the 'merchant', who has just learned who he is, is selling him ». Mais ce n'est pas ce que veut dire διεμπολᾷ et la correction méconnaît un idiotisme. La scholie laurentienne (λάθρα ἀπατᾷ) et les notes de Buttmann 1822, 114–115 et de Ellendt 1872, 172B sont moins fourvoyées. Schein 2013 et Manuwald 2018 gardent τί με mais n'expliquent pas διεμπολᾷ d'une façon pleinement satisfaisante.

⁷¹ Brown 1991, 337 réemploie la conjecture ὑμῶν en en faisant un génitif partitif dépendant de μαντικοῖς (Semitelos), qu'il substitue à μαντικῆς. « Hardly Greek » objectent (à juste titre, je crois) Lloyd-Jones–Wilson 1990, 141.

⁷² Sur la construction, voir la synthèse de Cavallin 1875, 216–217.

⁷³ Sens admis par Jebb et Finglass 2011, 269.

⁷⁴ Jebb critique ἄπρατος d'H. Estienne (« would forestall the taunt which now forms the climax, ἐξημπόλημαι ») et mentionne ἄγευστος (Nauck) et ἄπληκτος (Pallis).

⁷⁵ Comparer πολλῶ σάλῳ σείσαντες v. 163.

⁷⁶ Voir Aristophane, *Pax* 639 ; Taillardat 1965, 419–420 ; Olson 1998, 203. Ce dernier n'omet pas de signaler que l'expression se trouve chez Antiphon.

(Finglass⁷⁷). Il n'est peut-être pas inutile de renvoyer aux belles pages où Bekker⁷⁸ étudie l'émergence du sens commercial dans homériques *πρηκτήρ* et *πρηξίς*. Les mots *ἐξημπολόγημαι* *κάκπεφόρτισμαι* semblent teindre rétrospectivement *ἄπρακτος* d'une nuance « commerciale ».

Κρ. (...) τάφῳ δ' ἐκεῖνον οὐχὶ κρύψετε,
οὐδ' εἰ θέλουσ' οἱ Ζηνὸς αἰετοὶ βοράν 1040
φέρειν νιν ἀρπάζοντες ἐς Διὸς θρόνους·
οὐδ' ὥς μίασμα τοῦτο μὴ τρέσας ἐγὼ
θάπτειν παρήσω κεῖνον·

1040 οὐδ' εἰ codd. plerique (etiam Λ) : οὐ δὴ L | οἱ om. azo.

Créon répond à Tirésias et à tous ses séides. Il me paraît clair que, comme dans les passages homériques cités par Jebb, la conditionnelle introduite par οὐδ' εἰ se rapporte non à ce qui la précède mais à ce qui suit et qu'il faut reponctuer le passage comme suit :

(...) τάφῳ δ' ἐκεῖνον οὐχὶ κρύψετε.
οὐδ' εἰ θέλουσ' οἱ Ζηνὸς αἰετοὶ βοράν 1040
φέρειν νιν ἀρπάζοντες ἐς Διὸς θρόνους,
οὐδ' ὥς μίασμα τοῦτο μὴ τρέσας ἐγὼ
θάπτειν παρήσω κεῖνον·

Même si les aigles de Zeus ont l'intention d'emporter comme nourriture les restes mortels de Polynice vers le trône de Zeus, même dans ce cas il n'y a aucune chance de me voir moi trembler à l'idée de cette souillure et vous laisser lui donner sépulture.

⁷⁷ Finglass 2011, 269. Il écarte la correction de Hartung *ἔπρασαν*, « vendirent ». Sans le passage de Sophocle, cet emploi de *πράσσειν* avec COI et un COD indiquant ce qui doit être livré serait, signale Finglass, « post-classique » : voir Schweighaeuser, *TGL VII 1570A* (« prodere alicui urbem »). Le même article, mais non la même plume (1568D), explique *ἔπραξαν* chez Sophocle autrement que Finglass (« livrer au terme de manigances ») : « efficere ut quis potiatur armis », « impetrare », sans l'idée de manigancer. Le COD indiquant l'objet des tractations se trouve chez Thucydide 4, 114, 3, *τοὺς πράξαντας πρὸς αὐτὸν τὴν λῆψιν τῆς πόλεως*, « ceux qui négocierent avec Brasidas la prise de la cité », mais *πράσσειν τινί* (3, 4, 6 peut-être ; 4, 106, 2 et 110, 2 ; 5, 76, 3 ; 8, 5, 4) signifie « négocier avec qn. ».

⁷⁸ Bekker 1974, 464–467 (originellement publié en 1865). Ces pages sont destinées à réfuter la substitution par Cobet de **πρητῆρες* = *πρατῆρες* à *πρηκτήρες* dans *Od.* 8, 162.

Lloyd-Jones–Wilson citent $\theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omega\varsigma$ ’ de Bergk pour $\theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ ’ et, si l’indicatif fait difficulté (Jebb traduit spontanément « should bear » et Griffith rend $\theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ ’ par « are ready to », ce qui facilite l’indicatif au moyen d’une liberté de traduction),⁷⁹ je préférerais οὐδ’ εἰ θέλοιεν Ζηνὸς αἰετοὶ βοράν. Au lieu d’avoir, comme dans les passages d’Homère cités par Jebb, l’optatif dans la protase et dans l’apodose, on aurait l’optatif dans la protase et dans l’apodose un futur expressif de la détermination de Créon. Comparer *Oed. rex* 851–853, εἰ δ’ οὖν τι κἀκτρέποιτο τοῦ πρόσθεν λόγου, | οὔτοι ποτ’, ὦναξ, τόν γε Λαΐου φόνον | φανεῖ δικαίως ὀρθόν.⁸⁰ Lloyd-Jones–Wilson citent la correction Δίους θρόνους (Wecklein) au lieu de Διὸς θρόνους, mais, si l’on croit devoir, peut-être à juste titre, remédier à la répétition du nom de Zeus, il est préférable de suggérer εἰς αὐτοῦ θρόνους, οὐ αὐτοῦ, qui occupe plusieurs fois l’avant-dernier pied du trimètre chez Sophocle, se sera vu substituer la glose Διὸς.

Τε. τούτων σε λωβητῆρες ὕστεροφθόροι
 λοχῶσιν Ἄιδου καὶ θεῶν Ἑρινύες, 1075
 ἐν τοῖσιν αὐτοῖς τοῖσδε ληφθῆναι κακοῖς.

Tirésias explique à Créon qu'il n'échappera pas à la loi du talion : il rendra mort pour mort. Le vers 1076 est communément ainsi entendu, avec l'infinitif final-consécutif : « that thou mayest be taken in these same ills » (Jebb), et cette interprétation de τοῖσδε est possible, comme le suggère *Aiāx* 687–688, ὑμεῖς θ', ἑταῖροι, τὰντὰ τῇδέ μοι τάδε | τιμᾶτε, « And you, my comrades, I ask to honour these my wishes just as she does » (Finglass 2011). Ce même passage fait voir qu'il est aussi possible de reconnaître en τοῖσδε le « datif d'identité » idiomatique avec ὁ αὐτός (τὰ αὐτὰ κακὰ τοῖσδέ σε λαβεῖν), ce que j'entends ainsi : « tu seras pris dans les mêmes maux que ceux que tu fais subir à l'Hadès et aux dieux, que vengeront leurs Érinnyes ». C'est qu'en effet « les morts ne relèvent ni de toi ni des dieux d'en haut, mais c'est toi qui modifies cet état de fait en faisant violence à ces dieux » (ὧν οὔτε σοὶ μέτεστιν οὔτε τοῖς ἄνω | θεοῖσιν, ἀλλ' ἐκ σοῦ βιάζονται τάδε, 1072–1073), « toi qui as envoyé chez les dieux d'en bas un être relevant de ceux d'en haut et privé des honneurs dûs un être qui relevait des dieux d'en bas » (je synthétise

⁷⁹ *Trach.* 1218, εἰ καὶ μακρὰ κάρτ' ἐστίν, ἐργασθήσεται, « même si la faveur à accorder est fort grande, je te l'accorderai », diffère car la condition y est envisagée d'une autre manière.

⁸⁰ Voir Moorhouse 1982, 279. Cette particularité n'attire l'attention ni de Jebb 1887 ni de Finglass 2018 au passage de l'*Ædipe roi*.

les v. 1068–1071⁸¹). L'interprétation que je défends met en exergue le fait que les dieux d'en haut et d'en bas sont en personne atteints par Créon, que leur vengeance est « personnelle » et non seulement un rétablissement pour ainsi dire impersonnel de l'ordre divin. C'est ce que donne à entendre l'expression Ἄιδου καὶ θεῶν Ἐρινύες.⁸² Mais, comme dans ces vers Tirésias exprime des menaces claires dans un langage parfois obscur, méphitique et non dépourvu d'ambiguïté, je ne nierais pas la possibilité que Sophocle ait voulu l'ambiguïté de τοῖσδε.

À suivre.

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This is the fourth of five sets of text-critical, exegetical and sometimes metrical remarks on *Antigone*. These **Sophocleuncula* are not only minute philological notes but they involve broader issues having a bearing on the interpretation and meaning of the drama as a whole. These remarks were composed with a view to drawing attention to a number of forgotten or unseen difficulties and to trying to address a number of seen but unsolved problems more efficaciously. The text and meaning of not a few other passages from other works of Sophocles or of other writers are also dealt with.

Статья представляет собой четвертую из пяти последовательных публикаций, содержащих замечания о критике текста, экзегетических и метрических сложностях в *Антигоне* Софокла. **Sophocleuncula* посвящены не только частным филологическим проблемам, но и более общим вопросам, значимым для интерпретации драмы в целом. Заметки призваны привлечь внимание к ряду забытых или упущенных из виду сложностей и предложить более действенные решения осознаваемых, но нерешенных проблем. К анализу привлекается также немало пассажей из других произведений Софокла и других авторов.

Alexander Verlinsky

PLATO’S LAST WORD ON NATURALISM VS.
CONVENTIONALISM IN THE *CRATYLUS*. I

For David Sedley

*non ita certandi cupidus quam propter amorem
quod te imitari aveo...*

Plato’s position in the debate in the *Cratylus* about the principle of naming things remains debatable in scholarship. Is he a supporter of naturalism as the course of the discussion in the dialogue appears to show? And if he is, does he believe that the Greek language fits the principles of naturalism? Or doesn’t it fit, and Plato has a project of a reform of the Greek language on naturalist principles? Or doesn’t he accept either option and, being a supporter of naturalism, is he pessimistic about the existence of a natural language? Or, since Socrates reveals in the dialogue manifest difficulties about naturalism, does Plato after all endorse conventionalist claims, as some passages in the dialogue may indicate, and – even more – as a reader with a penetrating and trained eye may recognize even beyond what Socrates literally says? Or maybe Plato endorses a compromise between these two positions, represented in the dialogue by both Cratylus and Hermogenes? And finally, when one considers this continuous debate without any solution, maybe it is necessary to suppose that Plato sees little importance in the issue itself of naturalism vs. conventionalism, in comparison with the question whether the best way of enquiring about things is through their names, or if there is a direct way to do this?

The variety of possible solutions just mentioned is related not only to our understanding of the line of Socrates’ argumentation in his discussion, first with Hermogenes and then with Cratylus. The position different scholars hold depends also on their understanding of the relation between Socrates’ reasoning in each part of the discussion.

Let me recall the issue of Cratylus and Hermogenes in the dialogue and sketch the following debate. Cratylus claims that there are correct names “according to nature” for everything that exists, the same names for Greeks and barbarians. He distinguishes between the current names, which are appropriate to their bearers, such as Socrates’ and Cratylus’ names, and those that are inappropriate, like Hermogenes’, but leaves obscure

what this correctness or appropriateness consists in (383 a 4 – 384 a 4). It is clear only that he believes that a name itself should reveal what object it really belongs to, and one may guess that Cratylus hints at etymological meanings of names. Cratylus' view thus has germs of what is usually called "linguistic naturalism", that is, a theory according to which there is an objective ("natural") criterion for using a name as a designation of a given object.

The opposed view of Hermogenes is on the contrary open and clear-cut:¹ there is no inherent correctness of names that would make them appropriate or inappropriate. Any arbitrarily chosen name can be assigned to any thing once language-speakers agree to employ it as the designation of this thing. The agreement is unstable, precisely because it is an arbitrary one – the language-speakers may make another agreement and change designations; new ones will function as successfully as the previous ones, as long as a new agreement will be in force (384 d 2–5). In the interim between one and another renaming, a name belongs to a thing in virtue of the custom and habit of those who made these names accustomed and who use them: οὐ γὰρ φύσει ἐκάστῳ πεφυκέναι ὄνομα οὐδὲν οὐδενί, ἀλλὰ νόμῳ καὶ ἔθει τῶν ἐθισάντων τε καὶ καλούντων (384 d 6–7). Notice that the linguistic custom established by those who made an agreement on naming a certain thing is here limited to the participants of this agreement.² By the same token, not all language-speakers need to be the participants of one and the same agreement. It is quite possible to make several agreements on one and the same thing, and nothing prevents anyone from calling it officially by one name and privately by another (385 a). The different

¹ Hermogenes' theory is usefully discussed and liberated *inter alia* from the undue accusations of modern scholars that he holds the "extremist" view that any person may use any name at any moment of communication, by Barney 2001, 31–41; Sedley 2003, 51–54; Ademollo 2011, 37–48.

² Together with Ademollo (2011, 41 f.) I take here ἐθίζω to be transitive and as having as its implied object ὄνομα, rather than people, but I disagree with his proposal that τῶν ἐθισάντων τε καὶ καλούντων refers to two categories of people, those who made the agreed-upon name habitual in their own use and those subsequent users who inherited this name. The article these participles share favors the option that it is one and the same category, those who have agreed and made the name habitual (aorist), and those who keep using this name (present). The examples Ademollo cites (42 n. 17) show that one article can unify two different categories, but this happens mostly when these categories are unified by some preceding word, which is not the case here. The renaming of slaves, which precedes the statement we discuss and which is used as an empirical basis for it, implies rather that τῶν ἐθισάντων τε καὶ καλούντων is a narrow linguistic community that both established and follows the habit.

languages and dialects of Greek testify that assigning a name to a thing depends entirely on the will of the imposers and that various names, arbitrary ones in Hermogenes' view, can be accordingly assigned to the same referents (385 c 5 – e 3).

Hermogenes' position is called conventionalism, and rightly so, because it is an example, historically the first attested one, of language philosophy according to which the assignment and using of a name is determined entirely by the will of language-speakers, their agreement or convention, and need not depend on any inherent properties of language units (words can be etymologically related to their referents, but this is irrelevant for full-fledged communication³). Let us, however, keep in

³ Strictly speaking, we don't know Hermogenes' attitude toward etymology. Ademollo 2011, 42 says rightly that there is no stringent evidence to ascribe to him the view that names are only accidental strings of sounds without any etymology at all. He proposes instead that Hermogenes denies that names have "any necessarily appropriate etymological meaning". This may well be so, but we have no direct evidence that he holds such a view, either. One passage in the etymological section of the dialogue appears to be pertinent for Hermogenes' attitude (414 b 7 – 415 a 2). Here Socrates proposes a bold etymology of the word τέχνη that entails the insertion and deletion of four letters, upon which Hermogenes reacts with the word γλίσχρως, which I take to mean that Socrates' etymologizing is strained and evokes doubts (see part II for the discussion of this passage). Socrates justifies his restoration by reminding his listeners that the first names were distorted by the later users, so that in some cases it is already impossible to maintain what meaning they now have. Nevertheless, Socrates warns against arbitrary restorations of the initial form of a word and expresses his hope that Hermogenes would serve as a "wise supervisor" to keep Socrates' etymologizing in the bounds of moderation; Socrates asks him nevertheless to be not too exact, or Socrates' etymological drive may be arrested by excessive criticisms. It has been discussed how pertinent Hermogenes' criticism, Socrates' self-defence, and the latter's warning are for evaluating Plato's attitude toward Socrates' etymologizing on the whole (Ademollo 2011, 240 f.). But it has not been duly noticed that Hermogenes is represented, just in virtue of his being a confessed conventionalist (before the conversation with Socrates at least), as a critic of etymologists, who has a vigilant eye to strained and unconvincing etymologies. Socrates' reference back to Hermogenes' γλίσχρως at 435 c 4–7, in the moment he argues that claims of naturalism should be restricted, shows that he takes Hermogenes' criticism seriously and that it is pertinent for the issue of naturalism and conventionalism. Hermogenes' attitude (or that of his real prototypes) toward etymology is thus not a direct denial that words have etymology, even not that that they have an "appropriate" etymological meaning as a naturalist claims, but is rather a critical attitude toward the reliability of etymologizing. Of course, this attitude is instrumental in his rejection of naturalism, but rather by means of doubting the methods by which naturalists prove that names have an "appropriate" meaning.

mind that Hermogenes defends a specific variant of conventionalism: he does not simply say that any inherent properties of words are indifferent from the point of view of communication, but insists that they are both assigned to things and should be assigned arbitrarily. Perhaps for this reason he has nothing to say on how this agreement expands beyond those who initially made it or how it is preserved through generations.⁴ In fact, within the framework of his theory in which the arbitrary name is imposed by a voluntary agreement, even made by the whole society, it would be difficult to explain what would make other persons who did not partake in this agreement adhere to the established use of the name rather than initiate a new agreement.⁵

⁴ His reference to the variety of languages (385 d 9 – e 3) may prove the contrary, namely after all that he views languages as going back ultimately to a single act of legislation that preserves its force through generations. But this reference appears as a part of an argument that any imposition of a name is valid only for those who imposed it, in which imposition by a whole people is on a par with temporal and changing imposition by individuals. Thus, it cannot be ruled out that, for Hermogenes, the differences between languages are the result of the permanent process of imposing and changing names in large communities, like in private use.

⁵ Ademollo 2011, 38 rightly notices that Hermogenes concentrates one-sidedly on the agreements on the imposition of names and ignores the question how this agreement is preserved. He notices additionally that Hermogenes never considers explicitly the problem how the names were originally imposed, viz. how the initial agreement of all future language-speakers took place, and he pertinently opposes Hermogenes' view of different kinds of suppositions in classical texts on how the original establishing of linguistic and moral laws took place (39 n. 5). However, I see no foundation for Ademollo's proposal (made in analogy to Socrates' implicit agreement with Athenian laws, *Crito* 51 d – 52 b) that, for Hermogenes, the mechanism of preserving linguistic usage is an implicit agreement that takes place whenever a language speaker adheres to an established linguistic custom, and that by a similar implicit agreement the name invented arbitrarily by one speaker is gradually accepted by the other. There is no sign in the text that the idea of a person's silent agreement with an already established custom plays any role in Hermogenes' theory. That one should follow publicly the current Greek names (385 a 5–10) is a part of Socrates' argument, not Hermogenes' own view. In my view, the character of Hermogenes' theory suggests rather that in it there are no grounds for accepting any authority, and accordingly no reasons to adhere to previous agreements (see n. 3). Presumably, he has no quarrel with the view that one may adhere to the linguistic usage established by the authority of the state for the sake of convenience, but there is no basis for this in terms of his theory of arbitrary and temporally and spatially limited agreements. Lack of any idea of Hermogenes' on how names are passed on to us from our ancestors (388 d 9–11, see below n. 8) suggests rather that the horizon of his view is reduced to such limited agreements.

Socrates, who is invited to solve the issue, starts with a quick and apparently effective refutation. The preliminary discussion reveals that Hermogenes is opposed to Protagorean relativism and assumes that at least some things have their intrinsic properties, their own nature that is independent of persons who treat them. He thus has to agree that handling things in different crafts has an objective basis – the things are handled according to their nature, not according to a craftsman's will. Speaking of things and naming a thing as part of speaking is also a kind of handling things and accordingly must be as appropriate as cutting, burning, etc. them (385 e 4 a – 387 d 8).⁶

The next step of this refutation is the discussion of what the function of the name is. Relying on the same analogy with crafts, Socrates argues that the name is an “instrument” and must have its appropriate function, like a drill or κερκίς, a pin-beater, the instrument used for separating the weft and the warp in weaving, which otherwise entangle.⁷ Contrary to the conventionalist doctrine that the only function of the name is to point out to an interlocutor what thing a speaker has in mind, Socrates claims that the name is an instrument by which we are teaching one another and separating things in respect of their properties, just as a pin-beater separates threads. The name is thus the instrument appropriate for teaching and separating “being” (387 d 10 – 388 b 11). This is a clue to Socrates' understanding of the function of the name, which is of course a matter of scholarly debates. However, it seems to be clear at this provisional stage that, according to Socrates, the name is inherently related to the thing it indicates, its referent: it should by itself, due to its own properties, disclose properties of this referent to the extent that we will be able to distinguish one named object from another by the true properties of these objects.

The perfect user of the name is an expert in the craft of naming things. But before identifying this expert, Socrates turns to the production of the instruments of the craft, the names. As in the other crafts, to perform his job perfectly, this person needs an instrument made by the perfect craftsman. The person of this craftsman is a mystery, but Socrates proposes that since νόμος, the “law”, “from generation to generation trades us the names”, the creator of the names should be one who has established this “law”.

⁶ Sedley criticises the standard understanding of this argument and proposes an alternative understanding of it, which I follow (Sedley 2003, 54–58).

⁷ See Ademollo 2011, 108–110 for the argument, on the whole convincing, that κερκίς is a pin-beater, not a shuttle, as usually understood, and for discussion of remaining difficulties.

Here for the first time in the dialogue, the figure of the linguistic lawgiver appears, which plays the central role in Socrates' naturalist teaching.⁸ This person should be a connoisseur of the legislative craft, viz. a person which appears most rarely among the people (388 e – 389 a). Socrates maintains that one of the conventionalist theory's claims is thus refuted, namely that any ordinary person at any time has the right to arbitrarily impose and change names; he says that naming is an expert handling of things and thus is in need of craftsman's expertise in a manner similar to the handling of things by other crafts, with the difference that the expert in naming occurs most rarely among all crafts. Implicitly, due to this conclusion, the answer to the question that a conventionalist is not able to give is provided – why the language in use is one we inherit from our ancestors; it is so because of the unique authority of its creators, masters of name-giving. This does not mean that conventionalist naming does not occur (remember Hermogenes' example of naming foreign slaves), but Socrates' view throughout the whole dialogue is obviously that language on the whole is an inheritance from the remote past.

Socrates now argues that this linguistic legislator who produces a name for a thing should possess the knowledge of the Form, of the essence of the name as the appropriate tool of naming, like the craftsmen possess the generic knowledge of the tool they produce (examples from crafts). He would be also able, like the other craftsmen, to implement this generic Form in the material he uses, to acquire a species of this tool that is needed for a particular kind of work. The linguistic legislator thus implements the generic Form of the name in the phonetic material he uses, letters and syllables, in order to acquire an appropriate name for a particular thing (389 a 5 – d 8).

This argument, which maintains the priority of form over matter in every production, helps further to reject the argument based on the differences among languages that Hermogenes earlier used to prove that names are normally assigned to things arbitrarily. Socrates draws again an analogy from crafts: making different words for one and the same thing is on a par with making instruments for the same operations, like a drill for drilling. The different kinds of drills can be produced from

⁸ Note that Hermogenes is represented as entirely puzzled by Socrates' asking, "What gives us the names which we use?" The reason is probably that his theory, which claims that names are nothing else than products of agreements made by ordinary people, has no answer to the questions of the mechanism that makes these agreements binding for the whole society and of the mechanism making them stable across generations (see above n. 5).

different kinds of iron, but they all remain appropriate to the degree that they all correspond to the general Form of drill. By the same token, the different names for one and the same thing in various languages remain appropriate to the respective things to the degree that the general Form of this name is implemented in varying material, i.e. different syllables (389 d – 390 a).⁹

As the final step in refuting Hermogenes, Socrates now returns to a person who uses the names made by the lawgiver. A person should be capable of judging whether a name, produced by the linguistic lawgiver, is appropriate for the thing this name should indicate. Similar to other crafts, in which a perfect user of the tool produced, i.e., the perfect representative of the craft that needs this tool, is the person who is most qualified to judge the legislator's production and is the master of correct questioning and answering, viz. the philosopher-dialectician. The dialectician, and he only, is thus able to supervise the work of a lawgiver, among both Greeks and barbarians (390 b 1 – d 7). Thus, as Socrates sums up, Cratylus appears to be right: names belong to their referents by nature and creators of names are not ordinary persons, but only those who are able to grasp the name that naturally belongs to each referent and to implement the Form of each name (universal for all) in letters and syllables.

The necessity for names to be appropriate for their referents is thus formally proved. Socrates next demonstrates what this appropriateness consists in. Starting with being puzzled about this, he soon finds a dim answer in the Homeric opposition of human and divine names – the latter being presumably more correct than the former and at least one, that of Astyanax, having an obvious etymological meaning, “a lord of a city”, one

⁹ It is unclear why Socrates mentions the same Form of the drill, and accordingly the same Form of the name in different materials. One possible answer is that, as in a previous portion of his reasoning, the instruments in different lands differ in their specific functions (the names would be different since the referents are not quite identical, but differ, like Indian and African elephants). Yet in that case, Socrates would speak of different sub-Forms of instruments rather than of different kinds of material, and on the contrary, he stresses that the issue is one and the same Form, and only the material, like iron, is different. Hence, Socrates has in view that for the same Form of a name that should be implemented, the same material is not available in every land; for instance, iron ore is not the same everywhere. Thus, in all probability, Socrates here anticipates his theory that the names can be analyzed into semantically meaningful letters and syllables; note that the lawgivers in different countries, even if they use the same letters to convey the same ideas, may combine them in different syllables and in different names; for details of this theory and for other interpretations, cf. Sedley 2003, 66 f.; 130 f.; Ademollo 2011, 136 f.

that is appropriate, at least *in spe*, to its bearer. Thus, the appropriateness of an etymological meaning to properties of the name's referent is what makes the name "correct". Socrates maintains at the same point that the same idea is expressed by a quite different string of sounds in the name of Hector, Astyanax's father, which allegedly derives from ἔχω and means "possessor of a city" (392 c – 393 b). He thus sets an important principle of his naturalism: one and the same referent does not necessarily have only one appropriate name (see above on the variety of languages as being compatible with naturalism).

Socrates now begins his examination of all kinds of names, from the proper names of heroes and ordinary people, through the names of gods, religious concepts, physical objects, to epistemological and ethical concepts. Most etymologies (but not all) sound fanciful to modern readers of the dialogue. Two important findings of Socrates' emerge in the course of his etymologizing. The first finding has a "linguistic" character: many contemporary names have lost their original form given to them by ancient lawgivers, because they were distorted by later users either for the sake of euphony or simply because of incompetence; etymologizing is for this reason a complicated procedure of restoring the initial form by means of inserting the lost letters and deleting the redundant ones (414 c–e). The second finding concerns the philosophical background of ancient lawgivers: it becomes apparent that they were proto-Heracliteans, who came to the view that all things are in constant flux, and they therefore brought the accompanying idea of movement into the concepts they encoded into the names they created, in that all that they consider positive was related to movement and rejected the cessation of movement (411 b – 412 d).

At last, the question emerges that appears to endanger the whole enterprise: etymologically analyzing names into their component elements inevitably leads to simple names that cannot be further analyzed and whose appropriateness for their referents is thus beyond proof. But Socrates finds a solution: the simple word, which is the "first" chronologically in name-giving, should be composed of "letters" that themselves correspond to properties of things, like "hard", "soft", "large", etc. (421 c 3 – 427 d 2).¹⁰

The etymological section here ends with the approval of both Hermogenes and – even more so – Cratylus, who finds himself in total

¹⁰ See below p. 221–223 for details of this theory of Socrates' on mimetic sounds and on its relevance to the issue of naturalism and conventionalism.

agreement with Socrates' reasoning on the whole. Socrates, however, is far less certain and finds it necessary to reexamine what he said before. But he does not do so, at least not directly, and he turns instead to the refutation of Cratylus' naturalist claims, whose radicalism goes beyond the naturalism that Socrates defended. The course of this discussion and its result as concerns the issue of naturalism and conventionalism are what primarily interests me in this paper, and they will be scrutinized in what follows.

A few words on the ultimate part of the conversation with Cratylus, which I will not discuss in detail. In it, Socrates argues that Cratylus' unconditional belief in the value of names as sources of philosophical truth is untenable: first because the philosophical message of names is inconsistent – while many names for positive concepts indeed point out that the world is in permanent flux, others rather suggest that it is at rest; second because one should assume that the ancient name-givers apprehended philosophical truth before they implemented names – thus, there should be a direct way of enquiry, not through names, and a better one, because it would be an enquiry into things themselves, not their resemblances. This refutes the claims that names, as primary bearers of philosophical truth, should be accepted without examination, which of course does not deny the value for enquiry of names that are appropriate for their referents (435 d 4 – 439 b 9).

In the remainder of the dialogue, Socrates considers the last issue – granted that names on the whole point to all things being in constant motion, one comes to a lamentable view of the world in which nothing is stable and accordingly there are no objects of knowledge and no knowledge itself. But if on the contrary there *are* objects of knowledge and knowledge itself, and there are Forms like that of beautiful and good, then Heracliteanism is wrong. Although it still remains to investigate which horn of this dilemma is true, it is clear at least that one cannot rely on names to solve a question as important as this (439 b 10 – 440 e 7).

It is impossible here to go into the details of the long history of the study of the dialogue. It is sufficient to sketch the main positions and their main arguments, as well as the current results of scholarly debates. The arguments themselves will be weighed in appropriate places in this paper.

Different opinions on the subject appeared already in the 19th century. Of course, many or probably most scholars believed that Plato, in agreement with Socrates' argumentation throughout the dialogue, was on the side of naturalism, but that the last part of his discourse, directed against Cratylus, led ultimately to a compromise between radical

naturalism and radical conventionalism.¹¹ This position corresponds to the literal meaning of the words with which Socrates concludes his refutation of the radical version of naturalism presented by Cratylus (435 b 2 – c 2). I will return to this passage in due time.

However, not all scholars were satisfied with this simple solution. Already F. Schleiermacher maintained that it is not easy to grasp Plato's own position in the debate.¹² Later, some scholars supposed that in spite of his formal proclamation of a compromise, Plato is inclined at the end to the view that agreement is a sufficient principle and that natural resemblance is superfluous; see for instance J. Deuschle¹³ and, after him, H. Steinthal.¹⁴ Wilamowitz argued that Plato finally comes to endorse conventionalism entirely.¹⁵

Praechter drew the conclusion from the discussion of σκληρότης that language-speakers understood each other by means of the names that *correspond only partially to their referents* due to linguistic habit and convention and this signifies that Hermogenes was partially right although Plato remains convinced that Hermogenes' imposition of arbitrary names cannot stand as the principle of language: he solves this discrepancy by supposing that convention, which reigns the field of language, should in Plato's views not be a pure arbitrariness (in the imposition of names), but that it is necessary to distinguish the impositions which better and worse resemble their referents.¹⁶

¹¹ This view was held by many prominent 19th-century scholars of Plato, among them Tenemann 1799, 341–342; Ast 1816, 264 ff.; Stallbaum 1835, 13; Zeller⁴ 1889, 632 (1846), and later Friedländer 1964, 197; 328 n. 28. They understood the exact character of this compromise very diversely, of course. The earlier discussion on this subject was surveyed well by Benfey 1866, 198–208.

¹² Schleiermacher 1857, 9 f. (1807).

¹³ Deuschle 1852, 70; see contra Benfey 1866, 202 f. (the discussion of the key passage on σκληρότης).

¹⁴ Steinthal 1890, I, 106 f. (1863).

¹⁵ Wilamowitz 1920, I, 289 (at the end of the dialogue, Plato supports Hermogenes' view of names as arbitrary signs that can freely change their reference; he stands for the same view in his later *Seventh Letter*, 343 b; his disappointment in etymology is reflected in the *Verachtung der Wörter* that he expresses in *Pol.* 261 e, as well as in his rejection of constant scientific terminology).

¹⁶ Praechter 1926, 256–258. Praechter's interpretation is marred by his wrong understanding of the initial collision of the dialogue: he ascribes to Cratylus the view that language is a *Naturzeugnis* (on this confusion, which often occurs in old scholarship, see Ademollo 2011, 5–6) and thus uses the word "convention" in the broad sense of the imposition of names as opposed to their natural origin; this imposition can be either arbitrary or one that respects the name's resemblance to its

Richard Robinson was the first to argue consistently and transparently in favor of Plato's conventionalism. He claimed that Plato was committed to conventionalism, although, as he admits, there is no direct indication of such an attitude in the dialogue itself and although the theory of language developed by Socrates in the dialogue corresponds "to the letter" to naturalism from beginning to end.¹⁷ Nevertheless, Robinson refers to indirect indications: the absence in Plato's other dialogues of any sympathy for the theory of the "correctness of names by nature"; Plato's *Seventh Letter*, on the contrary, contains a passage that points to the variability of words and expressions for the same things (343 b), which is in line with Hermogenes' views. In addition, Robinson tends to believe that all of Socrates' arguments in defense of naturalism against Hermogenes at the beginning of the dialogue contain logical errors, and errors of a kind that Plato could not fail to notice. Finally, Robinson finds an acknowledgment of Plato's commitment to conventionalism in the very part of the text that seemingly testifies that agreement serves only as an auxiliary means to understand the referents of words when the similarity of the word to the thing denoted proves insufficient (435 a–c).¹⁸

referent. Praechter thus takes Socrates' argumentation as the defense of the second kind of imposition. This however begs the question: if the lack of resemblance of names opens the door to conventionalism, it can be only conventionalism that makes any resemblance superfluous. But if it is the case, how can Socrates' defense of the imposition of names that resemble their referents retain its force? In spite of Praechter's obvious mistakes, one can find here a dilemma that continues embarrassing the scholars of *Cratylus*: if most names are only imperfect resemblances of the things they indicate and understanding them is due to habit and convention, then what prevents us from taking this latter principle as the only one and from removing any desire of resemblance entirely?

¹⁷ Robinson 1969, 118–125.

¹⁸ It is beyond the scope of this article to examine critically all of Robinson's arguments; I focus only on his point that the defense of naturalism in *Cratylus* has no parallel in Plato's dialogues. Here it is worth remembering that in Plato's *Charmides*, written earlier than *Cratylus*, Socrates, at the end of the discussion, expresses disappointment that his interlocutors have failed to grasp the "thing" for which the "lawgiver" has established the name σωφροσύνη (175 b 2–4). This passage implies that Socrates considers this name (and apparently also other names) to have been established by the lawgiver, not through the variable agreement of native speakers, and to have a stable reference due to this establishment, which apparently took place in ancient times. This statement, despite its brevity, is close enough to the basic assumptions of Socratic naturalism in the *Cratylus* as argued in his refutation of Hermogenes. Also, the passage from the *Seventh Letter*, although its emphasis is different from that in the much earlier *Cratylus*, does not contradict the views expressed by Socrates in *Cratylus*, as I hope to show.

Malcolm Schofield's paper¹⁹ in favor of Plato's final conventionalist position was more detailed and sophisticated. He argued briefly that the etymological section shows, first, that there is no reliable method of analyzing an actual language like Greek ("for the most part Socrates is occupied in a curious form of amusement, pursued with a good deal of frivolity and with frequent acknowledgment of the forced, arbitrary, fanciful and tendentious character of many of his derivations"), and second, that any analysis reveals not the truth of things, but only the opinions of name-givers: their belief that things are involved in constant flux (p. 63). The section on the "first names", those that cannot be analyzed into more primitive words and thus should disclose the nature of their referents by means of the sounds ("letters") and syllables they are composed of, contains the indirect retroactive criticism of the etymological section: whereas in the former Socrates largely ignored the phonetic composition of names, he now acknowledges its importance for non-primitive names as well (p. 64–65).²⁰

¹⁹ Schofield 1982.

²⁰ Schofield's attempt to present the etymological section as discrediting possibilities of reliable etymological analysis, which is not of course new with him, remains debatable (see further p. 209–212). His detecting a self-criticism of the earlier etymological analysis in the section on mimetic capacities of sounds seems also problematic: evidence Schofield cites (425 a 6 – b 3, 426 a 3 – b 2, 427 c 8–9) shows only Socrates now demanding that the correctness of non-primitive names depends crucially on their resembling the capacities of primitive ones, viz. on the capacities of their phonetic resemblance; he does not demand here that the non-primitive names that could be etymologized should be reduced directly to mimetic letters. More difficult is whether there is in fact a contradiction between Socrates' "soft" naturalism, according to which one and the same referent can be indicated by several etymologically correct names that have entirely different phonetic composition (see Socrates' explanation how the differences in the words for the same things in various languages can be accounted for on naturalist principles, 389 d – 390 a, and his claim that the names in the same language, Hector and Astyanax, which have different phonetic composition, refer in equal measure to the "holder of city", 393 a–d), and the theory of imitative letters, from which the "first names" are composed. However, we need not suppose a contradiction here. The theory of imitative letters assumes that the name-givers noticed the similarity between the work of speech organs when they pronounced a certain letter and some "thing" in the world, like "sweet", "large", "crushing", etc.: the primitive names were composed of such letters unified in meaningful syllables and then in names (426 e 4 – 427 d). This theory does demand that such mimetic letters went into strictly determined combinations of syllables and further of words, see below p. 221–223 on the details of this theory (here I differ from Sedley 2003, 130 f., who objects to Schofield, supposing that for a Greek-speaker the sounds of Persian might appear so alien that they lead him to imagine quite different sound systems in which the sounds have different mimetic capacities).

And the analysis of the first names is itself put in doubt by Socrates' own remarks that it appears ridiculous to him (see 425 d 1–3; 426 b 5–6).²¹ Much more detailed and important for this paper is Schofield's discussion of the final part of the dialogue, Socrates' conversation with Cratylus. Schofield argued that in this part of the dialogue, Socrates not only refutes the radical version of naturalism that Cratylus defends, but also attacks his own theory that he defended in previous passages. His discussion of a problematic word σκληρότης is the most extreme plea against naturalism in general: Cratylus' forced recognition of the need for convention in those cases when the descriptive properties of the word are insufficient to understand it questions the very principle of the word's similarity to the thing it designates (p. 77 f.).

This line of interpretation is based on the fact that many of Socrates' arguments in favor of naturalism are not sustainable for us and that the naturalist theory itself, as it appears in the dialogue, contains a number of unrealistic demands on language: words ("names" in the terminology of the dialogue) must serve as philosophically true definitions of things, which are "encoded" in their etymology; the creators of language must act under the guidance of a philosopher-dialectician; understanding the meaning of words ideally consists not in grasping their referents due to linguistic habit, but in decoding their etymology or in recognizing the symbolic meanings of the sounds ("letters" in Plato's terminology) from which the simplest words are composed. It seems unlikely that Plato could have failed to see the price to be paid for putting such a view into practice.

Clearly, this interpretation of the dialogue as a hidden defense of conventionalism is attractive because it reveals Plato's greater sobriety about the descriptive possibilities of language and thus his greater proximity to our time. However, there are serious obstacles to accepting it: first, the lack of direct evidence in the text that conventionalism ultimately prevails in Socrates' eyes makes such constructions inevitably subjective, relying on indirect indications that allow for different interpretations even among the proponents of this view. Second, there is nothing in Plato's

²¹ The fact that, in spite of these remarks, Socrates goes ahead with the analysis of the words into the mimetic sounds diminishes seriously their significance: instead of putting this procedure in doubt, they rather expose it as ridiculous for non-experts but inevitable for one who investigates all consequences of the thesis that the names should resemble their referents; see already Grote 1865, 541 n. p, who pertinently compares *Rep.* 452 a–e (the proposal to educate women in gymnastics, the art of war, etc. will appear ludicrous, but one who has recognized its usefulness would not find it so).

dialogues similar to the situation when Socrates, throughout the dialogues, proves the truth of a view by means of arguments that the reader himself, without Plato's help, must ultimately recognize as untenable. Finally, it is difficult to imagine that Plato, who sought to subordinate any field of human activity that fell within the scope of his interests to the sovereign authority of knowledge operating in that field, could accept that in language the only criterion of correctness will be the agreement of ordinary people who are able to give any name to any thing.²²

Of course, one of the reasons for believing that the end result of the dialogue is the victory of conventionalism was the etymological part of the dialogue. For a long time, the view of Socratic etymologies in the *Cratylus* as parodies directed against the search for higher wisdom in language by Plato's contemporaries prevailed almost unchallenged in scholarship. The "lack of seriousness" of the Socratic explication of how words can be likenesses of the things they designate also casts a shadow on the sincerity

²² Ademollo 2022, 45 f., who argues that Plato is a proponent of conventionalism (see below p. 212 f.), notices this remarkable departure from his usual belief that reason is capable of comprehending any domain of reality and of dictating to it the appropriate criteria of achievement and failure. And he supposes that Plato was aware of the specific character of language as the field of subjectivity: "As Hermogenes suggests in the first pages of the dialogue, 385 e – 386 a, the subject-dependent nature of the relation between names and things is actually compatible with the subject-independent nature of things themselves. I surmise that Plato viewed this as an interesting anomaly and that this prompted him to investigate the issue as thoroughly as he could. He did so by lending the naturalist theory, to which he was instinctively attracted for entirely general reasons, the best support he could think of before eventually discarding it". All this is quite comprehensible from a psychological point of view, but it begs the question why Plato as writer behaves so misleadingly. The position Ademollo here assumes for Plato – the compatibility of arbitrary name-giving with the subject-independent nature of things – is in fact never stated in the dialogue: Socrates points out to Hermogenes the contradiction of the first view, which contradiction Hermogenes obviously was not aware of before (385 e – 386 a), and then he builds his reasoning that refutes Hermogenes' conventionalism on the premise that the objects have a subject-independent nature (reasoning about the name as an "instrument" whose properties must objectively correspond to its function, that is, to be the description of the essence of the thing to which the name is assigned, see above). Socrates thus presumes that if the latter, anti-Protagorean view, which both interlocutors share, is right, then conventionalism is arguably wrong. If we assume with Ademollo that Socrates' argument against conventionalism, which maintains his naturalist thesis, was invalid, then this does not mean that conventionalism is compatible with the subject-independent nature of things – rather it would refute the anti-Protagorean view of things, and we remain with conventionalism as founded on Protagorean relativism.

of the Socratic defense of the very naturalistic principle of likeness.²³ Moreover, in the final part of the dialogue, Socrates demonstrates to Cratylus that the etymologies of at least some words show that the creators of language were not in all cases supporters of the Heraclitean doctrine of universal changeability, but rather endorsed rest and had a negative attitude toward motion, which implies that words cannot be a source of consistent knowledge of things and that they must be known directly, not through words. Proponents of the ultimate victory of conventionalism in the dialogue see in these arguments an indirect refutation of Socrates' argument in the first part of the dialogue that names are tools that serve to instruct about the nature of the things they designate. But even those who argue in favor of naturalism as Plato's ultimate word saw in the lack of seriousness of etymologies a sign that the naturalism that wins finally does not show Socrates' exemplifications of how names "reveal" the nature of things in the etymological section.

This almost unanimous scholarly view of Socrates' etymologies has been challenged by David Sedley,²⁴ who made a strong case against understanding etymologizing in the dialogue as a parody and covered the criticism of prevailing practices in the treatment of language. Sedley pointed out, first, that there are etymologies similar to the *Cratylus* in other dialogues of Plato, where there is no reason to assume their polemical purpose. Moreover, Plato's alleged criticism of the exegetical reliability of etymologies would be something unique: the etymologies of the *Cratylus* do not differ from those practiced in antiquity and in modern times until the advent of comparative-historical linguistics; there are no known ancient examples of criticism of individual etymologies or methods of etymologization from the point of view of their linguistic correctness, and it is in fact difficult to imagine such criticism in the absence of secure criteria of morphological analysis.

Based on these considerations, Sedley sees the etymological part of the dialogue as a natural continuation of Socrates' argument against Hermogenes' conventionalism. The etymologies aim to show that the most important vocabulary of the Greek language was created by the ancient "lawgivers" as concise definitions of the properties of things, rather than as arbitrary designations established by agreement. The final part of the dialog, Socrates' conversation with Cratylus, contains a coherent refutation of a number of positions of radical naturalism, i.e., the requirement

²³ It is well seen that scholars who consider Plato a conventionalist in the full sense have usually referred to the "lack of seriousness" of Socratic etymologies.

²⁴ Sedley 1998; 2003.

that names show an absolute similarity to the things they indicate; the thesis of Cratylus that etymologization is the main method of cognition of things is further refuted by proving that the opinions about things of the ancient creators of language cannot be considered infallible. At the same time, according to Sedley, the main stance of naturalism, which Socrates defended in the first part of the dialogue (that the purpose of names is to serve as “tools” for distinguishing the essential properties of things), is neither directly nor indirectly undermined by this criticism. Similarly, the *exegetical* correctness of Socrates’ etymologization, and thus his demonstration that the Greek language was created according to the principles of naturalism, is not questioned, although, as is shown in the final part of the dialogue, the very meanings of the words that the etymologization has decoded are not always successful definitions of things philosophically, since they reveal a one-sided, Heraclitean understanding of the world as being in a state of continuous and absolute change.²⁵

This balanced and insightful interpretation is attractive, because it makes a strong case in favor of the unity of the dialogue, arguing that in all relevant parts of the dialogue Socrates defends naturalism – arguing in the first part for the desirability of names that are appropriate to the nature of things; demonstrating in the etymological and “mimetic” sections what this appropriateness consists in; and last, limiting the claims of radical naturalism in the conversation with Cratylus, who posited such high standards of linguistic correctness that this threatens naturalism by staying in splendid isolation without any influence on the real language.

My disagreements with David Sedley are not of primary relevance for this paper. I entirely agree with him that the etymological section is a natural development of the argument in the first part, and that it is not refuted by Socrates’ arguments in his conversation with Cratylus. I am not convinced, however, that Plato considers Socrates’ etymological reconstruction of the views of the ancient creators of language to be unconditionally correct. Sedley is probably right that Plato, like his contemporaries, was not armed with secure criteria to distinguish sound from unsound etymologies, from a linguistic point of view. But Socrates points out that at least one word, ἐπιστήμη, can be etymologized differently than he had suggested earlier (437 a 2–8), since it can be seen as a positive evaluation of the idea of rest rather than Heraclitean motion. This suggests that, for Plato, the results of etymologizing are not entirely reliable, not

²⁵ Sedley 2019 argues that some passages in the later *Sophist* also confirm Plato’s commitment to linguistic naturalism.

because linguistic criteria are applied to them, but because he is aware that etymologizing is a quasi-philosophical enterprise of looking for empirical confirmation in language in favor of one or another philosophical view. In the passage already cited (414 b 10 – c 3),²⁶ Plato has Hermogenes react to Socrates' bold etymologizing as "strained": here we have other evidence that etymology can be criticized as unreliable, just because the restoration of the original form of the name entails too many changes and is thus not secure. This I would call a "common sense" criterion of etymological correctness.

These suspicions that Plato does not consider Socrates' etymologies entirely reliable does not undermine the whole defense of naturalism. On the contrary, the reconstruction of the past of language by etymologizing sufficiently demonstrates that most names are descriptive rather than arbitrary conventionalist designations. The accuracy and reliability of this reconstruction is less essential, since Plato is interested only to a limited extent in the views of its creators reflected in language; for him, unlike for Cratylus, their opinions, and opinions in general, cannot in themselves serve as a support in the search for truth.

Sedley's monograph, which relies primarily on Socrates' direct judgments and arguments in the dialogue, is followed by Francesco Ademollo's commentary on the dialogue, which uses a significantly different hermeneutic strategy.²⁷ Ademollo agrees with Sedley that Plato does not question the "exegetical" correctness of Socratic etymologies on the whole, although he doubts the seriousness of some etymologies, and he proposes that their goal is not only to restore the ideas of ancient name-givers, but also "pleasure and amusement" (p. 253). Anyway, for Plato, the presence in language of evidence that words are created as descriptions of the properties of the things they designate, as Ademollo argues, does not serve as an argument in favor of naturalism, that is in favor of "correct" descriptiveness as the norm for language. Like Robinson and Schofield, Ademollo believes that Socrates' argument against Cratylus leads to the complete victory of conventionalism and the refutation of the claims of naturalism. However, unlike these scholars, Ademollo agrees that Socrates' very statements summarizing his reasoning in this part of the dialogue (435 b 2 – c 6) point not to a refutation of naturalism, but merely to a concession that convention, along with resemblance, plays a role in designation. Ademollo therefore suggests that Socrates as a character

²⁶ See n. 3 above.

²⁷ Ademollo 2011.

in the dialogue in this part of the conversation is not yet conscious of what is clear to Plato himself and what should be clear to a competent reader. According to Ademollo, it is only in the finale, after Socrates has demonstrated that words cannot serve as a reliable source of knowledge of things, that conventionalism triumphs definitively: “for if a name may convey false information about its referent, then clearly it can only indicate its referent by convention”.²⁸

This hermeneutics that distinguishes Socrates' arguments and conclusions from the unspoken thoughts of Plato himself, who thereby stimulates the reader's independent philosophical search, certainly has the right to exist. At the same time, however, it is worth remembering that scholars of the dialogue do not unequivocally agree on the detection of defects in Socrates' arguments; they approach it with the full armor of modern logic and philology. We have, therefore, no certainty that Plato himself was conscious of these logical errors. Moreover, even if Plato was aware of the weakness of some of Socrates' arguments in defense of naturalism, this does not mean that he intentionally made them incorrect. He could have cited them for want of better ones because he was convinced of the truth of the theory they were defending.²⁹

Recent decades show not a waning, but rather a growing debate over Plato's position on naturalism and conventionalism.³⁰ Alongside those who, like Sedley, see Plato as a naturalist who shares Socrates' arguments in favor of naturalism, or as a conventionalist who disagrees with these arguments (Robinson, Schofield, Ademollo),³¹ there are scholars who find in Plato a more complex version of naturalism. David

²⁸ Ademollo 2011, 419; 2022, 41. The discussion in the final part of the *Cratylus* is beyond the scope of this article. Here I shall confine myself to the statement that, in my opinion, this part does not shed light on the outcome of the collision between naturalism and conventionalism in the dialogue (here I agree with Schofield 2013, 491 against Ademollo).

²⁹ It is worth recalling here that, until the end of his life, Plato was unable to find objections to the arguments refuting his theory of Forms and their relation to sensuous things, expressed by Parmenides in a one-name dialogue and apparently belonging to Plato himself. Some of these arguments were later used by Aristotle in his criticism of Plato. But the lack of convincing counterarguments did not prevent Plato from continuing to endorse the theory of Forms in dialogues later than *Parmenides*, including his last dialogue, the *Laws*.

³⁰ Proponents of both opposing views are named in Silverman 1992, 25–26; more recent literature is cited by Meißner 2023.

³¹ In favor of Plato's conventionalism, see also Smith 2008; 2014, 96 on the σκληρότης-argument.

Meißner develops the interpretation proposed earlier by N. Kretzmann and some other scholars: he argues that the radical theses of Cratylus in his discussion with Socrates (only the exact likenesses of the things they designate can be considered names) are a natural consequence of the hyper-naturalism that Socrates himself defended in the sections on the etymological and “mimetic” correctness of names; the refutation of these theses should demonstrate that the view that underlies the reasoning in these sections is erroneous, but the argument brought forward by Socrates in the first part in favor of naturalism that the name is a tool for designating things remains valid. I would call this the interpretation of the *Cratylus* as a plea in favor of naturalism without etymological and mimetic appropriateness.³²

T. Baxter believes that Socrates’ arguments against Cratylus prove only that the Greek language does not meet the standards of naturalism, but that an ideal language could be created by a “lawgiver” who would be guided by the precepts of a dialectical philosopher, in accordance with Socrates’ reasoning in the first part of the dialogue.³³ Rachel Barney suggests that Plato was in favor of a naturalistic correspondence between word and thing, but saw the impossibility of achieving this ideal and

³² Meißner argues (like Kretzmann and some other scholars before him), however, that the argument of names as tools defends naturalism to the degree that names are assigned to genuine classes of things and are thus appropriate for designating just these classes; but at the same time, he defends convention as a means for determining the phonetic composition of names, see Meißner 2022 forthcoming, esp. 14–18. According to Meißner, the protagonists of the dialogue fail to see that names are not identical to strings of sounds and for this reason are unable to reconcile both results of the discussion – that there is a natural correctness of names, on the one hand, and that “correct names need not be descriptions or imitations of their referents”, on the other (p. 18). According to him, Plato expects that readers of the dialogue should discover this truth themselves (p. 19). I have very strong doubts that Plato steers his readers to this final conclusion, but for the purposes of this paper it is sufficient that I hope to refute one of the assumptions of this line of interpretation, namely that the discussion of *σκληρότης* demonstrates that, according to Plato, “correct names need not be descriptions or imitations of their referents” (see p. 3). In this, Meißner agrees with the proponents of the conventionalist reading of the dialogue.

³³ See especially Baxter 1992, 80–85, 186. Baxter’s main predecessor was Theodore Benfey (Benfey 1866, 189–330); V. Goldschmidt and after him J. Derbolav were proponents of a modified version of the same understanding of the dialogue: that Plato sought to reform his own philosophical language in the spirit of naturalism, in accordance with the theoretical results of the *Cratylus* (Goldschmidt 1940; Derbolav 1972, 57). These judgments, in my opinion, still deserve attention.

therefore had to lean toward conventionalism (Platonic “pessimism”).³⁴ Some scholars, apparently unable to give preference to the arguments of either side in this scholarly debate, argue that the naturalism/conventionalism dilemma has no solution in the dialogue and was not even relevant for Plato.³⁵ I cannot agree with this, since through the mouth of Socrates the text definitely expresses an attitude toward this conflict. However difficult it may be to interpret this very passage because of its lapidary nature and the difficulty of relating it to the whole discussion in the dialogue, this interpretation is necessary, and an approximation to a correct understanding is possible.

Although in order to understand the results of Socrates' reasoning in the *Cratylus* it is of course necessary to consider all parts of the dialogue, in this article I will limit myself to the conversation between Socrates and Cratylus and first of all to that part of it in which there are direct statements by Socrates (and the last of them in the dialogue) about his attitude toward naturalism and conventionalism, which is controversial

³⁴ Barney 2001, 134–142.

³⁵ See Keller 2000, who believes that the issue of conventionalism and naturalism is of secondary importance for Plato, because he tries to demonstrate that whichever of the two views is correct, the things should be investigated directly, and not via names. But why should the importance of this stance for Plato rule out the importance for him of the subject that occupies the lion's share of the dialogue? For a more sophisticated variant of this position, see Schofield 2017, who argues (if I understand him rightly) that there is a certain discrepancy between the initial presentation of Cratylus in the dialogue as keeping silence on the true content of his doctrine (in the vein of Plato's standard picture of Heracliteans) and his cooperative attitude toward Socrates' questioning in the final part, where he becomes the bearer of important epistemological and metaphysical theories. According to Schofield, this double picture of Cratylus is a part of the authorial strategy of Plato, who wishes to transport his audience from the initial problem of the correctness of names to philosophically more important “logical, epistemological and metaphysical positions that might be taken to be implicit in linguistic naturalism” (p. 198). This broadening of the horizon of discussion in Cratylus' part of the dialogue is beyond doubt, and I entirely agree that in the final part of the discussion (after 435 c) the issue of conventionalism vs. naturalism is already not the matter of the discussion. But it is questionable whether the issue itself thus became less important. Rather, for good or bad, this issue is inherently connected with these philosophical problems, and its previously attained solution (the victory of naturalism, as I believe) is relevant for the discussion of these problems. For instance, the final part of the conversation may be taken as showing that linguistic naturalism that entails the existence of things' stable nature that is not relative to subjects (as Socrates earlier argued, 386 d 8 – e 4) does not fit well with Heraclitean flux, but rather implies permanent objects that do not change over time, that is of Forms.

among the researchers of the dialogue. The interpretation of these statements themselves is a matter for debate and is of key importance for understanding Plato's position. Yet one cannot limit oneself to the simple, albeit fair, statement that, taken by themselves, these words indicate a compromise between naturalism and conventionalism, for scholars often raised the question why this compromise does not imply a complete rejection of naturalism in favour of conventionalism. Socrates' reasoning, as I will argue, gives a clear and consistent answer to this question.

So, let us turn to the part of Socrates' argumentation against Cratylus in which the two interlocutors return to the question of the role of convention in the proper naming of things. In the previous part of the conversation, Socrates' arguments force Cratylus to soften the requirements of the correspondence of linguistic expressions to the reality they designate: Cratylus is now ready to agree that the ancient "name-givers", the creators of language, were not infallible and the words they created cannot be more or less exact likenesses of things (431 a 8 – 433 b 7); moreover, Cratylus is forced to admit that words cannot in principle be exact likenesses of things and it is necessary to consider their correspondence to things "in general terms" as the criterion of truth of words and utterances, despite the presence of superfluous elements that do not correspond to things in words and in speech as a whole (432 s 7 – 433 a 3). Such a view leaves room for the distinction between true and false words and statements, and within the true ones it allows us to distinguish between the more or less "beautiful" and the "bad", according to whether all their elements correspond to the things denoted or whether there are few such corresponding elements (433 a 4–6). At the same time, Socrates insists that excessive demands on the correspondence of words to things threaten to reject this correspondence itself as unattainable (433 a 6 – b 5).³⁶

³⁶ More precisely, the dilemma that Socrates formulates here is as follows: Cratylus must either recognize that words and statements indicate things, as long as they convey their essential features (τύπος), even if they contain elements that are not true of those things, and that they convey them better or worse, depending on how many inappropriate elements the speech contains, or to abandon the very principle that the word is the disclosure of the properties of a thing (δήλωμα πράγματος) by means of letters and syllables. In other words, the nature of imitating things by means of letters and syllables is such that the requirement of excessive exactness in the likeness renders this very imitation impracticable. The δήλωμα in the dialogue does not necessarily imply a naturalistic designation of things by means of similar parts of language, but has a more neutral meaning, corresponding to both naturalistic and conventionalist ways of denoting things (see immediately further 433 d–e.). Ademollo 2011, 386; 2022, 36, rightly maintains that by itself δηλοῦν,

Socrates' adherence to the principle of naturalism during this part of the discussion is thus not suspect. This is not the case with the part of the discourse to which we will now turn, and in which some scholars find Socrates' rejection of naturalism. Socrates now sums up for Cratylus the result they have just achieved: a perfectly established name should consist entirely of appropriate letters, viz. the letters resembling the thing this name indicates, while a name that deviates from this ideal will largely consist of appropriate letters, but will contain inappropriate ones (433 b 8 – c 7). Up to this point, in speaking of the correspondence of letters to things, Socrates had in mind the descriptive names that resemble things via their etymological meaning: the appropriate letters were those that participated in the description to which the word under analysis can be reduced and the inappropriate letters were the parasitic ones. Now, however, he prepares his discussion of the first names, which do not have any etymology and cannot be analysed into descriptive phrases. The letters and syllables themselves should imitate physical properties of things: the variance in the grade of perfection depending on the presence in such names of inappropriate letters should be valid for such names as well, but the inappropriate letters can now not only be redundant but, as the case of σκληρότης will demonstrate, may even paralyze the mimetic capacities of names.

Cratylus unwillingly agrees that there are different grades of perfection in the resemblance of names with their referents, although complaining that he is not fond of using the name that is not perfectly created.³⁷ Socrates' following argument proceeds in these steps: by asking for

as well as σημαίνειν, can be used for any kind of linguistic signification. However, up to 433 d–e, where δῆλωμα takes on a neutral meaning, the words δηλόω and δῆλωμα, though sometimes used neutrally, are usually used in the context of mimetic signification (see, e.g., 422 d 1–3, 423 a 2, a 5). At any rate, Cratylus still ignores designation on the basis of agreement in this part of the discussion. The dilemma that Socrates offers him, with the correct choice by Cratylus, should save the naturalistic theory from attempts to reduce it to absurdity.

³⁷ Socrates does not answer Cratylus' objection at 433 c 8–10 directly; but in developing his argument, Socrates thrice uses the word ἀρέσκειν (433 d 1, e 2, and e 9), which echoes the wording of Cratylus' objection. His indirect response appears to be that Cratylus ought to accept this varying degree of the perfection of names, if he approves that names perform the function of indicating things and the quality of this performance depends on the perfection of their resemblance. Otherwise, if he sticks to the view that names are invariably perfect, he has no option but to approve of Hermogenes' way of indication by agreement – only this way guarantees that all names thus assigned are invariably perfect.

Cratylus' approval, he obtains (1) that the name should be δῆλωμα, the indication of its referent; (2) that among the names there are ones that are composed from prior names, but also those that cannot be resolved to other names and are thus "first"; (3) that there is no better way of making the first names the indications of their referents than to make them as similar to these referents as possible; and (4) that this similarity cannot be attained in any other way than by making the constitutive elements of these "first names" as similar to these referents as possible.

The main components of this reasoning are already more or less known from Socrates' conversation with Hermogenes, but there are some points that were not emphasized before. First is Socrates' question whether Cratylus approves that the name is the δῆλωμα of its referent. The question seems redundant: Cratylus' positive answer is obvious because up to this point δῆλωμα and related words were used in the account of names that resemble their referents, and it meant primarily the disclosure of the referents' essential features through the etymology of names or the mimetic capacities of letters. However, having turned to the first names, Socrates asks Cratylus if there is a better way of making the "first names" the δηλώματα of their referents than by making them resemble these referents as much as possible, and he proposes the alternative – maybe Cratylus prefers Hermogenes' way of naming things: the names in this case are then a matter of agreement and they indicate (δηλοῦν) the relevant things only for those who have entered into this agreement and who know in advance the things that these words indicate (that is, they do not recognize the thing due to the descriptive properties of names, but know in advance which word is associated with which thing). The "correctness of a name" is then reduced to an agreement, and it makes no difference if the agreement would be changed and the thing now called "small" would be called "large" and vice versa (433 d 7 – e 9). Cratylus' preference of "resemblance" is quite obvious. The alternative Socrates proposes to him is, however, important because it shows that δῆλωμα and δηλοῦν are now used in the broad meaning that covers both indicating things by means of names that resemble these things and by conventional names that indicate only due to agreement of language-speakers. The two opposite theories thus have one point of agreement: that names should indicate things; the conventionalist way of indicating previously simply ignored by Cratylus is now considered the worse, but comparable to the naturalist one.³⁸

³⁸ The importance of this change of meaning of δηλοῦν and δῆλωμα is rightly emphasized by Barney 2001, 119–120; Ademollo 2011, 385 ff.

This reminder to Cratylus of two conflicting positions and the redundant question of which way of indicating things he prefers reminds us once again that there is no alternative to names resembling their referents other than that names are assigned by agreement; this will be important for Socrates' further argument.

Socrates now approaches the substance of the part of his reasoning with which we are occupied. He reminds Cratylus of the mimetic capacities of letters: the letter ρ is similar to movement and motion, as well as to hardness (φορᾶ καὶ κινήσει καὶ σκληρότητι), while λ is like smoothness, softness, and other similar "things". Socrates invites Cratylus to consider the implications of this theory, which Cratylus strongly endorses, for the word σκληρότης, "hardness", which has no etymology and is accordingly one of the "first" words, whose correspondence to the things they indicate is ensured by the mimetic properties of the letters that make up such words. Socrates recalls that in the Ionian dialect of Eretria (Euboea) the Attic σκληρότης corresponds to the form σκληροτήρ (the Eretrian rotacism)³⁹ and asks whether ρ and σ both resemble one and the same

³⁹ The mss of the *Cratylus* are divided between two kinds of accentuation of this word, σκληροτήρ (BW, accepted by Burnet and the OCT I), no accent (T), σκληρότηρ (Par. 1808, the descendant of T, see the app. of Méridier), see Ademollo 2011, 391 n. 14, who cautiously prefers σκληρότηρ, assuming that the alternative accentuation appeared due to a false assimilation to the *nomina agentis* in -της. The latter consideration is plausible, but, without being certain, I prefer to keep the accent on the ultimate syllable, just because this accentuation for the abstract nouns in -της was unusual. On the one hand, I reject, even more decisively than Ademollo, that the Eretrian dialect preserved the original accentuation of the word on the ultimate syllable, because there is no reason to think, *pace* Ademollo, that the words of this type "must have originally been accented on the last syllable". In fact, there are two Homeric examples of abstract nouns in -οτης with the accent on the ultimate syllable (ἀ(ν)δροτής, δηϊότης) against four nouns of the same type with the accent on the penultimate, and also two Homeric words in -υτης of this type that are both oxytona – βραδυτής and ταχυτής, as well as two later Attic examples – τραχυτής and κουφοτής. Practically all these cases were discussed or mentioned by Aristarchus and other ancient grammarians, who treated them as anomalies: all nouns of this type, which becomes very productive from the fifth century BC on, are proparoxytona. It is possible that for some of these words the accent on the ultimate syllable has a historical explanation, as proposed by Wackernagel (see the recent discussion of his hypothesis in Probert 2006, 38–45), but the ancient grammarians did not find any regularity in it. The unusual σκληροτήρ is thus hardly the relict of original accentuation in Eretria, and it also could not appear, say, because of someone's theory that this accentuation has an archaic tinge. I would suppose that if it is genuine, it reflects the analogical influence of the Attic τραχυτής, connected with the semantic similarity of the two words (Plato, who himself coined many

thing and whether the word in each of its variants indicates “hardness”, or whether for one of the two peoples, Athenians and Eretrians, it does not have that meaning.⁴⁰ Cratylus asserts that it has the same meaning for both peoples. And to Socrates’ next question “whether they have the same meaning because ρ and σ are similar to each other or because they are not”, Cratylus answers that “by virtue of their similarity”. “Are they similar in every respect?”, Socrates next asks. Cratylus answers that these letters are similar to each other, at least in that both equally “imitate” φopά, “movement”.

The absence of Socrates’ reaction to Cratylus’ last answer gives scholars the opportunity to evaluate this step in the argumentation in different ways. Schofield, Sedley, and Ademollo believe that Socrates asked the question in order to force Cratylus to recognize that the ρ and σ at the end of the two variants of the word denoting movement cannot indicate “hardness”, but they draw different conclusions from this. Schofield believes that Cratylus’ answer refutes the theory of the symbolic meaning of the sounds altogether, since it is clear to the reader of the dialogue that the ρ in the middle of the word then also means “motion” and not “hardness”.⁴¹ Sedley suggests that the question and answer are necessary for Socrates to prevent Cratylus from adducing the Eretrian form in order to show that it is more correct than the Attic one, since it has two ps indicating hardness that outnumber the λ that indicates softness; Cratylus now, having recognized that the ρ and σ in the final part of the word do not carry the idea of “hardness”, is then forced to accept that the word in both its forms contains only one ρ indicating “hardness”, the middle

new words of this type, may have been highly sensitive to the unusual accent). Of course it is problematic in this case, granted that Plato really had it in view, how this Eretrian accentuation could appear in the Platonic manuscripts when the writing of accents became usual (some signs for accents in the time of Plato cannot be definitely ruled out, but they were used on the margins of texts to avoid ambiguities, not regularly, see Laum 1928, 105–108; after Aristophanes of Byzantium introduced the later standard system of accent marks in the early second century BC, the first papyri with accentuation appeared later in the same century, see Probert 2006, 21–22, but the regular writing of accents on every word started only in minuscule manuscripts, from the ninth century AD on, *ibid.*, 48 f.). The preservation of the unusual accent of σκληροτήρ would be possible if the accentuation of this word in the Eretrian dialect was noticed by ancient grammarians and then became known to the Byzantine scholars and scribes of Plato’s text (see Probert 2006, 48–50). Unusual as it might appear, this possibility cannot be definitely ruled out.

⁴⁰ I follow Ademollo 2011, 392 n. 16 in understanding this sentence.

⁴¹ Schofield 1982, 75.

one, and one λ indicating the opposite property: the letters indicating opposite properties are thus in equal number, and the word ceases to be a semblance of hardness.⁴² This however begs the question why Cratylus does not argue in answer as, according to Sedley, Socrates expected he would, namely that ρ at the end of the Eretrian form is correct, while σ is imposed wrongly and that the idea of “hardness” dominates in the genuine form. Ademollo argues against Sedley that the numerical equality of ρ and λ is not of primary importance, because it is not even mentioned in the text, but agrees that Cratylus’ answer could have involved him in fatal difficulties for naturalism, if Socrates had not chosen to hit naturalism even harder with his next question.⁴³

Such judgments about Socrates’ question and Cratylus’ answer seem to me erroneous. It must be remembered that Socrates’ reasoning about the “mimetic” properties of letters is not a detailed theory, but only a sketch of one. From its exposition, it is clear only that the ancient creator of language assigned to each letter a specific symbolic function according to the specific movement that the organs of speech make when uttering it: letters symbolize different kinds of movement (or obstacles to movement) in nature, but also the properties of things by which they are able to carry out such movement. For example, the letter ρ , which when uttered least of all leaves the tongue is at rest but especially shakes it (426 e 4–5), was used in the word $\varphi\omicron\rho\acute{\alpha}$, which symbolizes movement in general, but also in a number of words that indicate a broad variety of notions – not only specific kinds of movement, like “flowing”, “trembling”, and “whirling”.

The underlying principle appears to be the use of a letter whose pronunciation can be associated with an intense and continuous movement, to symbolize the very idea of movement. Notice that it is sufficient to use this letter only once in a word that indicates the general idea of movement. We know the symbolic meaning of other letters that compose the word $\varphi\omicron\rho\acute{\alpha}$: taken by themselves, these letters do not convey anything appropriate to the notion of movement. What their function is, we can only guess, but they are not necessarily redundant:⁴⁴ they may somehow

⁴² Sedley 2004, 143–144.

⁴³ Ademollo 2011, 393.

⁴⁴ Some of these letters can be of course semantically redundant in accordance with Socrates’ general approach (393 d 3 – e 9; 432 d 11 – 433 a 2) – names inevitably resemble their referents with different degrees of appropriateness: some letters are added for convenient pronunciation (see, for instance, 426 d 1–2, in the section on mimetic properties of letters) and some are inserted falsely for this or that reason.

distinguish the word from other ones that have the same letter ρ as being the name of the generic idea of movement.

In the names that indicate various specimens of movement, the letter ρ is usually used also only once. Here we are entitled to suppose that the other letters of these words or their combinations symbolize the specific properties of the different kinds of φορά or of some derivative qualities associated with movement. In general, the creation of “first names”, according to Socrates, is *the progression through letters and syllables* (427 c 6–8), from which we can conclude that the meaning of a word is determined not only by the symbolic meanings of individual letters, but also of syllables as intermediates. We have secure evidence for the symbolic meaning of a combination of several letters, according to Socrates’ theory: since the pronunciation of the letter γ imposes a restriction on the free movement of the speech organ when it pronounces λ, the lawgiver used this pair of letters for words meaning “viscous”, “sweet”, “sticky” (γλίσχρον, γλυκύ, γλοιῶδες), i.e., corresponding to a liquid, but not freely flowing substance (427 b 4–7). Here we can see again how the basic ideas of movement and rest produce the new ideas of properties that only indirectly imply these ideas.

Yet beyond the movement itself and its specimens, ρ is used also for a group of notions that are related to movement only intermediately and more directly indicate such notions as “striking”, “crushing into pieces”, “breaking”, “crumbling”. Moreover, ρ, at first sight unexpectedly, participates also in the word that indicates the non-cinetic notion of “harshness” (τὸ τραχύ, 426 e 1, according to the majority of mss. versus τρέχειν of Q⁴⁵). This implies that ρ, which conveys the general idea of movement and of its specimens, can also convey the derivative idea of striking and crushing, perhaps because ρ itself is associated with an intense movement. Perhaps these “harsh” actions in turn yield a step in the direction of “harshness” as a static property. Quite similarly, the letter λ, which primarily symbolizes “gliding” because the tongue glides most in pronouncing this letter, has been chosen by a lawgiver to indicate not only “gliding”, but also non-kinetic properties like “smooth”, “oily”, “glue”, i.e., the properties of objects that are especially capable of “gliding”.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Cf. Ademollo 2011, 307.

⁴⁶ This difference between these two kinds of symbolic meaning is rightly noticed by Ademollo 2011, 307 f., but unlike him I believe that there is no need to suppose the corruption of the text or two redactions of it.

Let us now return to our interlocutors' discussion of the word σκληρότης. Socrates, in saying, with reference to his reasoning on the symbolic meaning of letters, that τὸ ῥῶ τῇ φορᾷ καὶ κινήσει καὶ σκληρότητι προσέοικεν (434 c 1–2), is not quite accurate, since σκληρότης was not mentioned there as one of the symbolic meanings of ρ. However, Socrates' wording suggests that the idea of “hardness” is closely associated with the more general idea of movement (φορά). In fact, as we have seen, already in the exposition of mimetic abilities of letters, ρ participated not only in words that are related to movement, like “striking”, “crushing”, etc., but also in the word that indicates the non-kinetic notion of “harshness”. It is thus quite natural that, in combination with other letters, this letter can indicate “hardness”, the property primarily involved in the actions related to striking.

The purpose of Socrates' question – whether ρ and σ at the end of the Eretrian and Attic forms of the word for “hardness” are similar to each other and indicate the same for inhabitants of Eretria and Athens – thus appears to be a peaceful one. With his affirmative answer that these letters are similar to each other, not in all respects, but insofar as both indicate φορά, “movement”, Cratylus draws the correct conclusion from Socrates' earlier reasoning that both ρ and σ symbolize movement, and in this they are similar to each other, although ρ symbolizes movement generally, while σ the particular kind associated with “breathing” (427 a 2–5). We do not know what semantic function the letters ρ and σ at the end of two forms of the word perform or whether they perform such a function at all. As we have seen from the exposition of Socrates' theory, one letter ρ in combination with some other letters is quite sufficient to convey a notion of movement and its derivatives, and the single ρ in the middle of σκληρότης can accordingly indicate “hardness”, together with some other letters. But the final ρ in the Eretrian version and the σ in the Attic version do not contradict the notion of hardness, because they indicate “movement”, from which “hardness” derives, as Cratylus rightly maintains. I believe, therefore, that Socrates' question does not purport to undermine Cratylus' naturalism (or to discredit Socrates' own theory of mimetic letters): it only emphasizes that the composition of names can be variable and that the same idea can be expressed successfully by different combinations of letters, as long as the symbolic meaning of these letters does not contradict the idea.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ Probably just because the letters at the end do not play a semantic role in the word, Socrates uses the substantive σκληρόν (434 e 2) on a par with σκληρότης.

But then Socrates asks whether λ, which appears in both versions of the word σκληρότης, doesn't indicate something opposite to what σκληρότης indicates ("softness", "smoothness", as opposed to "hardness"). Cratylus easily finds a way out of this difficulty by recalling that Socrates himself, etymologizing words where necessary, freely added and eliminated letters, restoring the true form of the word: λ is "inserted" in the word σκληρότης incorrectly and ρ should stand in this word instead of it.⁴⁸

Socrates is ready to concede to Cratylus that there is an erroneous letter in the word σκληρότης, but he asks: "What is it? When someone pronounces the word σκληρόν the way it is pronounced now (i.e., with λ), then don't we understand each other, and don't you know what I am talking about now [by pronouncing this word]?" Cratylus replies: "As for me, I understand the word beyond doubt because of habit" (Ἐγὼ γε τὸ ἔθος, ὃ φίλτατε).

Let us dwell for a moment on the difficulty that arises here for Cratylus. Socrates puts his finger on a problem that was not in focus previously. The question how we understand names was clearly formulated by Hermogenes: for a conventionalist, the meaning of a word is established by an agreement and is known to those who participate in this agreement. But both proponents of naturalism, Cratylus and Socrates, were occupied mostly by the problem of how to demonstrate that etymological or symbolic meaning of the names in discussion is appropriate (rarer: inappropriate) for properties of their referents. It was taken for granted that the referent of any name is transparent, or, in other words, that we all know what the current meaning is of any word in our everyday communication. Socrates' question, however, implies that there is a problem here for any naturalist. If according to naturalist principles the designation of a thing is based on the resemblance of a name and its referent, and not because one knows in advance the referent of this name due to agreement, then any communication is successful because we use names that resemble their referents and our partners understand us because they recognize that this name resembles this referent. Cratylus thus faces the problem of the conflict between the elements of the name that point to opposite referents,

⁴⁸ It is not quite clear from Cratylus' reply whether he is now prepared to admit that the "lawgivers", i.e., the original creators of language, could make mistakes in accordance with his previously forced consent (431 e 6–9), or whether he, continuing to dislike this imposed position (433 c 8–10), attributes the defect of the word σκληρότης to its subsequent "spoiling" by ordinary speakers. For Socrates' further argumentation, this distinction is irrelevant: he is not interested in the origin of the linguistic "error", but in the ways of overcoming it in speech communication.

“hardness” and “softness”, and is not able to solve the problem, because for him as a naturalist, resemblance is the last instance for a decision on the semantic of a name. Cratylus thus has no option but to appeal to a new authority that was not discussed before: to linguistic habit.⁴⁹

We do not know precisely what Cratylus understands by linguistic habit, but undoubtedly this answer testifies to the difficult position in which he finds himself. Socrates' next question, “And by habit do you understand something different from agreement (Ἐθὸς δὲ λέγων οἷε τι διάφορον λέγειν συνθήκης;”), implies that Cratylus advanced the new concept to avoid the unpleasant answer “by agreement”, which logically follows from the preceding discussion: both interlocutors recognize that there are only two ways of referring to things, either by means of words that bear a resemblance to the things being referred to, or by means of words arbitrarily assigned to things by agreement.⁵⁰

Socrates appears surprised that Cratylus understands “linguistic habit” as something different from agreement, but, without objecting, offers his definition of “habit”, which should be acceptable to Cratylus: “In speaking of habit, do you understand anything other than that when I utter a certain word I am thinking of a certain thing, and that you understand what I am thinking? (ἢ ἄλλο τι λέγεις τὸ ἔθος ἢ ὅτι ἐγώ, ὅταν τοῦτο φθέγγωμαι, διανοοῦμαι ἐκεῖνο, σὺ δὲ γινώσκεις ὅτι ἐκεῖνο διανοοῦμαι; οὐ τοῦτο λέγεις;”).

When Cratylus agrees with this interpretation of “linguistic habit”, Socrates asks whether in this given case the indication (δήλωμα) of the thing in question is realized, granted that Cratylus understands what

⁴⁹ The problem of names that lost their initial resemblance to their referents was touched on already during Socrates' etymologizing: the original form of some names has been so distorted by later users that it is now impossible to grasp their meaning, 414 c 4 – d 5, see n. 3 above. However, the problem here was of restoring their original form, and the obviousness of the reference of such names was taken for granted.

⁵⁰ The conventionalist implication of the concept of “habit” should be clear at first sight to Cratylus and to the readers of the dialogue: Hermogenes, expounding his theory, argued that “no word belongs to any thing by nature, but only by virtue of the law and habit of those who have instituted the habit and who use these names” (384 d 7, see above p. 197). But Socrates' discussion of the linguistic νόμος, which is transmitted from generation to generation, demonstrates that, contrary to Hermogenes, this νόμος is established by a competent lawgiver who created names that were “by nature” appropriate to the things to which he assigned them (388 d–e). Thus, ἔθος like νόμος may appear to Cratylus at this stage already quite compatible with naturalist premises (see pt. II on this point).

Socrates is thinking of when he utters the word σκληρότης. This seemingly innocent question serves as a reminder of the only two possible ways of indicating things: either through names similar to the things designated or arbitrary names established by agreement. Cratylus' affirmative answer allows Socrates to conclude immediately that indication in this case is achieved through agreement (435 a 5 – b 3):

Ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνομοίου γε ἢ ὁ διανοούμενος φθέγγομαι, εἴπερ τὸ λάβδα ἀνόμοιον ἐστὶ τῇ ἢ φῆς σὺ σκληρότητι· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, τί ἄλλο ἢ αὐτὸς σαυτῷ συνέθου καὶ σοι γίγνεται ἡ ὀρθότης τοῦ ὀνόματος συνθήκη, ἐπειδὴ γε δηλοῖ καὶ τὰ ὅμοια καὶ τὰ ἀνόμοια γράμματα, ἔθους τε καὶ συνθήκης τυχόντα; εἰ δ' ὅτι μάλιστα μὴ ἐστὶ τὸ ἔθος συνθήκη, οὐκ ἂν καλῶς ἔτι ἔχοι λέγειν τὴν ὁμοιότητα δῆλωμα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔθος· ἐκεῖνο γάρ, ὥς ἔοικε, καὶ ὁμοίῳ καὶ ἀνομοίῳ δηλοῖ.

(a) [So indication is accomplished] by means of what is dissimilar to what I thought when I pronounced the word, since λ is dissimilar to hardness, as you yourself assert? (b) If this is the case, then what else happens than that you have agreed with yourself and the correctness of the name turns out to be agreement for you – (c) for the indication takes place by means of letters both similar (to the thing) and dissimilar, which happens to be part of the habit and the object of the agreement. (d) But if, for goodness' sake, habit is not an agreement, then it will no longer be correct to assert that indication must be made on the basis of similarity, but [it will be correct to assert that it must be made] on the basis of habit: for habit seems to indicate by means of what is similar [to things] and what is not similar.

The logic of this reasoning is, at first glance, clear: Socrates seeks to prove to Cratylus that, in cases like σκληρότης, the similarity of a name to its referent is lost, and if a name nevertheless successfully designates that referent, then this is possible only through agreement. Socrates first states (a) that the designation is accomplished by means of a name that is not similar to its referent, because it contains the letter λ, which is the opposite of “hardness”. He then concludes (b) that an agreement, a linguistic convention, must then be in force, relying on the unspecified premise that designation is possible either because of the similarity of the name to its referent or because of an agreement on the meaning of the name.

Let us dwell on those aspects of Socrates' reasoning that did not receive sufficient attention from my predecessors and were, as it seems to me, not quite correctly understood by them. I mean Cratylus' appeal to ἔθος, linguistic habit (or custom, as some scholars render it). This is usually interpreted as an unsuccessful attempt on his part to avoid the

conclusion that the understanding of the meaning of the word σκληρότης is based on agreement. Socrates' argument is thought to cut short this attempt by proving that habit is nothing but agreement, and thus demonstrating that conventionalist claims are justified, with different further conclusions on the degree to which conventionalism wins in the result. There are seemingly clear indications for this in the text: Socrates expresses puzzlement that Cratylus considers habit to be something different from agreement, then quickly shows him that there *is* an agreement in the case under discussion, and then again cautions Cratylus against the claim that "habit is not agreement".

Yet in spite of this, I do not think that Socrates' purpose is to demonstrate that Cratylus' appeal to linguistic habit is only a failed attempt to escape yielding to conventionalism. First of all, Socrates cannot mean that "agreement" and "habit" are simply synonymous designations of one and the same thing. This can be seen already from Socrates' explication of what Cratylus should mean when he speaks about habit: speaking of habit, do you understand anything other than that when I utter a certain word, I think a certain thing, and that you understand what I think?⁵¹ Obviously, this definition does not include, at least not explicitly, any notion of agreement. Only as the next step does Socrates demonstrate to Cratylus that his understanding of a name like σκληρότης entails an agreement, an agreement with himself on the meaning of this word. Formally at least, "habit" and "agreement" are not synonymous terms. Socrates rather shows that Cratylus' attempt to avoid having agreement play a role in understanding a problematic word is unsuccessful: linguistic habit as Cratylus' source of knowledge of the word's meaning is necessarily connected with agreement, because resemblance in this case does not work.⁵²

⁵¹ Ademollo disagrees with the usual understanding of the words ἢ ἄλλο τι λέγεις τὸ ἔθος ἢ κτλ. as a definition of "habit" and suggests translating "or is the habit you're speaking of anything but the fact", since the following words are not a qualifier of the term "habit", but rather a description of what happens when habit is at work. He is right that Socrates' statement cannot be considered a precise definition of what habit is, but neither here nor hereafter is *habit* defined more precisely (see 435 a 9–10; b 2–3). Nevertheless, lacking a more precise definition, it can be a sort of provisional one; compare a similar definition via a description of a typical situation such as *Soph.* 248 c 4–5.

⁵² Schofield 1982, 77 f. also supposes that habit and agreement are distinct concepts, according to Socrates; he rightly maintains that Socrates uses Cratylus' appeal to habit to show that habit entails a stronger principle than itself, but he is not right that this principle is agreement by two speakers on the meaning of the word, which Schofield calls a "convention".

Let us now look more attentively at Socrates' definition of habit itself. It is remarkably neutral. Cratylus, true, appeals to habit just because the resemblance of σκληρότης to its referent was not sufficient to recognize what this referent is. Nevertheless, Socrates' definition does not point out that habit secures communication due to Hermogenes' agreement; the communication due to habit as Socrates depicts it corresponds both to the cases where there is an intrinsic correspondence between name and thing (the names resemble their referents) and those where the connection between them is arbitrary and based only on agreement.⁵³

This broad and vague understanding of habit corresponds to two further statements about habit in what follows:

(c) for the indication takes place by means of letters both similar (to the thing) and dissimilar, which happen to be part of the habit and the object of the agreement.

I will return soon to the question how the pair "habit/agreement" should be understood here. Let us notice that habit secures communication both by similar and dissimilar parts of language.

A bit further on, Socrates, having already shown to Cratylus that habit *is* agreement, issues a caveat against any further resistance (435 a 10 – b 3):

(d) But if, for goodness' sake, habit is not an agreement, then it will no longer be correct to assert that indication must be made on the basis of similarity, but [it will be correct to assert that it must be made] on the basis of habit: for habit seems to indicate by means of what is similar [to things] and what is not similar.

Once again, as above in the definition of it at 434 e 5–8, habit features here as a vague principle, one that combines both militating principles of indicating things, similarity of names to things, and lack of such similarity. This passage, in which Socrates seems to insist strongly on the identity of habit and agreement, shows in fact that they are different

⁵³ According to Sedley, Socrates' description of habit has in view only those cases in which the similarity of the name to its referent plays no role: both interlocutors know due to habit that a given name indicates a given thing, like "hardness" (Sedley 2003, 139–140 with n. 23). This however corresponds to the situation like that in the σκληρότης case, in which habit is appealed to, but not the definition of habit itself.

concepts: habit can, theoretically at least, compete both with similarity and agreement as the principle of linguistic correctness. Notice that while agreement in Hermogenes' sense simply ignores the similarity of the name to its reference, and is used by interlocutors as an alternative to resemblance, habit here features again as making use both of similar and dissimilar elements.

The significance of this passage for the outcome of the conflict between conventionalism and naturalism will be discussed further, in pt. II. For the time being, let me conclude that the proof that habit *is* an agreement should not be understood as the complete interchangeability of two notions: there are clear indications that habit is a broader notion, which, unlike agreement in Hermogenes' sense, does not rule out resemblance. If this is correct, Socrates does not deny the relevance of Cratylus' appeal to linguistic habit as something different from agreement in Hermogenes' sense. Rather, he accepts that it is necessary to assign to habit a certain role in designating things and that its relation to agreement should be clarified.

To be continued.

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The paper discusses the results of scholarly debates on Plato's own position on the issue of naturalism and conventionalism in the *Cratylus* and attempts to contribute to solving some problems. The author argues that there is no reason to suppose that Plato's position differs from the one Socrates stands for in the dialogue: it is a naturalism of a definite kind, as argued for in the first part of the dialogue devoted to the refutation of Hermogenes' conventionalism. Hermogenes, who treats a simple picking up of a referent by a name as sufficient for

a full-fledged communication, holds the view that the connection between a name and a referent rests on the arbitrary and changeable agreement of ordinary language-speakers. As it is argued, he one-sidedly stresses the moment of imposition and re-imposition of names, without consideration of how the assigned meanings of names are transmitted beyond the participants of an agreement and are preserved through generations of language-speakers. Socrates opposes to him the theory of a name-instrument, that is a name that in its highest function should be employed successfully in dialectical enquiry, and thus should be made to be appropriate for properties of its referent. The creator of such names thus cannot be an ordinary language-speaker, but must be a competent lawgiver, and he should be supervised by a philosopher-dialectician who would use the products of his name-giving.

This general view is further explicated and illustrated in Socrates' etymologizing and his hypothesis of mimetic capacities of mimetic sounds, which demonstrate that practically all names for various referents – from human proper names to the names of gods and physical, moral, and epistemological concepts – turn out to be meaningful descriptions of their referents. Although caveats are warranted by the text – the procedure of etymologizing is not entirely reliable and the opinions of name-givers are marred by a proto-Heraclitean teaching that all is in permanent motion, – this section demonstrates that the larger part of the philosophically relevant vocabulary consists of descriptive names that convey non-trivial, although not necessarily true judgments of their referents.

This result that Cratylus and Hermogenes applaud can be treated as the ultimate victory of naturalism. However, Socrates is not satisfied by his own reasoning and calls for its reexamination. In spite of this, he does not return to his own discourse, but turns to refuting Cratylus, who defends a more radical version of naturalism than that of Socrates. Some scholars treat this most debatable part of the dialogue as Socrates' partial yielding to conventionalism, but other scholars see it as a complete victory of conventionalism. Among these latter, some find in the text itself evidence for this victory, while others believe that, although Socrates explicitly maintains that agreement plays only a complementary role in naming, Plato steers the course of the discussion to a full victory. The author argues in the paper against both kinds of proponents of the latter view that naturalism ultimately wins both according to the text and to the character of Socrates' argument. Socrates assigns to agreement a certain role only in the communication, not in the assignment of names to their referents: in some cases, like that of σκληρότης, 'hardness', the resemblance of a name to its referent conveyed by a combination of σ and ρ is blocked by λ that conveys the opposite idea of 'softness'. In such cases, a competent language-speaker who normally understands the meaning of names due to their resemblance to referents has no option but to appeal to linguistic habit, 'to agree' with it, that is to follow those meanings that are habitual from childhood. Socrates' argument does not maintain that such meanings are arbitrary and based themselves on agreement, as according to Hermogenes. Rather it is implied that they correspond to the will of an ancient name-giver whose purpose was to make a name that resembles its referent, the

resemblance however not having been attained, either because of some initial mistake or because of later distortion. Anyway, Socrates' yielding to agreement in this sense thus does not amount to acceptance of Hermogenes' conventionalism even for these particular cases.

В статье дается обзор дискуссий относительно отношения самого Платона к коллизии натурализма и конвенционализма в *Кратиле* и делается попытка решить некоторые из вопросов. Автор статьи доказывает, что позиция Платона не отличается от той, которая представлена Сократом в диалоге: Платон – сторонник той разновидности натурализма, которую Сократ защищает в первой части диалога против конвенционализма Гермогена. Гермоген полагает, что простого указания при помощи слова на обозначаемый объект достаточно для полноценной коммуникации, и поэтому считает связь между именем и объектом произвольной, основанной на произвольном и изменчивом соглашении обычных носителей языка. Сократ противопоставляет этому воззрению теорию имени как “орудия”, которое в своем высшем применении может успешно использоваться в диалектическом исследовании истины и поэтому должно соответствовать свойствам обозначаемого объекта. Творцом подобного имени может быть лишь мудрый “законодатель”, действующий под руководством философа-диалектика, которому предстоит пользоваться созданными законодателем именами.

Это утверждение Сократа далее раскрывается и иллюстрируется в ходе этимологизации множества слов и в гипотезе о подражательных способностях звуков. И то и другое показывает, что практически все имена для различных объектов – от имен собственных людей до имен богов и обозначений физических, этических и эпистемологических понятий – оказываются осмысленными описаниями этих объектов. Хотя текст содержит некоторые предостережения – сократовская процедура этимологизации не вполне надежна, а сами мнения создателей имен несут отпечаток прото-гераклитовского учения о том, что все находится в состоянии непрерывного движения, – эта часть диалога показывает, что значительная часть философской лексики состоит из дескриптивных имен, которые несут нетривиальные, хотя и не обязательно истинные, суждения об обозначаемых ими предметах.

Этот результат, который одобряют Кратил и Гермоген, мог бы считаться полной победой натурализма. Однако Сократ не удовлетворен своим рассуждением и призывает к его критическому пересмотру. Несмотря на это, он не возвращается к собственным высказываниям, но вместо этого обращается к опровержению Кратила, который является сторонником более радикальной версии натурализма, чем сам Сократ. Некоторые ученые находят в этой, наиболее спорной, части диалога частичную уступку Сократа конвенционализму, а иные видят в нем даже полную победу конвенционализма, либо выраженную прямо в словах Сократа, либо имплицитно следующую из самой его аргументации. Автор статьи доказывает, напротив, что натурализм одерживает победу в соответствии как с выводами в самом тексте, так и с характером аргументов Сократа.

Сократ отводит соглашению определенную роль только в речевой коммуникации, но не в установлении имен в качестве обозначений: в некоторых случаях, как это рассматривается на примере слова σκληρότης, ‘твердость’, сходство имени с объектом, которое достигается благодаря комбинации σ и ρ, парализовано λ, которое является носителем противоположной идеи, ‘мягкости’. В подобных случаях компетентный носитель языка, который обычно понимает значение имен благодаря их сходству с обозначаемым объектом, может лишь сообразовываться с языковым узусом, “вступить в соглашение” с ним, то есть следовать тому значению слова, которое привычно для него с детства. Аргументация Сократа не предполагает, что значения подобных слов произвольны и сами основываются на соглашении, как в теории Гермогена. Скорее подразумевается, что эти значения согласны с волей древнего законодателя, который стремился создать имя, которое походило бы на обозначаемый объект, но либо сам допустил ошибку, либо имя было искажено позднее. Несомненно, во всяком случае, что уступка Сократа соглашению в этом смысле не означает его принятия конвенционализма Гермогена даже для таких исключительных случаев.

Sofia Egorova

HOW ANCIENT WERE VITRUVIUS’
VETERES ARCHITECTI (*DE ARCH.* 1. 1. 12–13)?

In book 1 *De architectura*, M. Vitruvius Pollio writes about the many – and varied – sciences that should be studied by future architects. In doing so, he mentions the most “radical” opinion of the Greek architect Pythius (with the Greek variant Pytheos in some translations) who lived in the fourth cent. BCE (1. 1. 12):

Ideoque de veteribus architectis Pythius, qui Prieni aedem Minervae nobiliter¹ est architectatus, ait in suis commentariis architectum omnibus artibus et doctrinis plus oportere posse facere, quam qui singulas res suis industriis et exercitationibus ad summam claritatem perduxerunt.

This is what led one of the ancient architects, Pytheos, the celebrated builder of the temple of Minerva at Priene, to say in his Commentaries that an architect ought to be able to accomplish much more in all the arts and sciences than the men who, by their own particular kinds of work and the practice of it, have brought each a single subject to the highest perfection.²

¹ In the passage under consideration, the author’s attention was initially drawn to the expression *aedem Minervae nobiliter est architectatus*. It is not clear whether we are talking about the architect’s fame due to the construction of this temple (e.g. in Russian translations by F. Petrovskiy 1936 [Ф. А. Петровский, *Витрувий, Десять книг об архитектуре*]) or the aesthetic commendation of the temple (Granger 1995, 19: “Pythius, who was the designer of the noble temple of Minerva”). K. Fensterbusch’s translation comes closest to conveying the author’s ambivalence: “Pytheos, der in Priene den Bau des Minervatempel vortrefflich als Architekt geleitet hat”. (J. J. Pollitt’s *The Ancient View of Greek Art: Criticism, History and Terminology* does not deal with adverbs, although the articles on the adjectives *felix*, *mirabilis*, etc. show that the peculiarities of meaning in an art historical context did exist. Of the adjective *nobilis* we are told that it also occurs frequently in Pliny the Elder, means ‘famous’ rather than ‘noble’, and can describe both the work of art and the author [Pollitt 1974, 409].)

² Morgan 1914, 11. Text quoted from the edition: Morgan 1914, if not otherwise stated.

So we are informed that in the lost to us *Notes*, Pythius³ bestows on the architect a kind of “super-powers”: having studied many sciences and arts, he must inevitably (so in my opinion the verb *oportere* is to be understood here) surpass those who have studied only one – for example, painting or sculpture.⁴ Vitruvius, however, briefly refutes such a possibility (*Id autem re non expeditur*, 1. 1. 13) and moves on to a series of examples of “good enough” skills: thus, although an architect need not be a painter like Apelles, it is required that he should be able to draw (*nec pictor ut Apelles, sed graphidos non imperitus*, etc., *ibid.*).

I. The Preposition *de*

My attention was initially⁵ drawn to the understanding of the preposition in the phrase *de veteribus architectis* – to my surprise, all available translations contained “one of the ancient architects” here.⁶

This raises two questions: (1) why was not *ex* used then, and (2) is this typical for Vitruvius?

Indeed, the preposition *e/ex* would not be quite the usual in this particular case: combined to *abl. pl.* (especially with *unus* and/or superlative), it was used for the most part if the singularity or exclusivity was emphasised (see e.g. Cic. *Att.* 3. 15. 7: ... *maxime laetere unus ex omnibus amicis*; Caes. *BG* 1. 41. 4: ... *itinere exquisito per Diviciacum, quod ex Gallis ei maximam fidem habebat*).

As we need another type of definition here (“some from the old masters”), the preposition *de* probably might seem to the translators to be the only possible expression for ‘of’, ‘of the category’.

However, in the whole work of Vitruvius⁷ we find only one instance where *de* was used to single out a person from a particular group of people: in Book 2 (2. 8. 12: *Postea de colonis unus ad eum fontem propter bonitatem aquae quaestus causa tabernam omnibus copiis instruxit*) one

³ Mentioned also also 1. 1. 15, 4. 3. 1 and 7 Praef. 12 (twice).

⁴ Vitruvius also mentions mathematics, philosophy, medicine, grammar, music, etc.

⁵ Egorova 2016 [С. К. Егорова, “Витрувий об образовании архитектора (Vitr. *De Arch.* I, 1, 12–13)”, *Индоевропейское языкознание и классическая филология. Материалы чтений, посвященных памяти профессора И. М. Тронского*].

⁶ Morgan, see above; Granger 1995, 19: “... one of the old architects”; Fensterbusch 1964, 33: “Deshalb sagt einer von den alten Architekten...”; the same meaning is in Russian translations (e. g. Petrovskiy 1936, 23).

⁷ *Index Vitruvianus* (= Nohl 1965) 41–42.

of the settlers is opposed to the local population who considered the spring water harmful, i.e. *de* denotes a categorisation of a person, rather than singling out one person from a group.⁸

Meanwhile Vitruvius is fond of using *de* meaning ‘about’, ‘concerning’, ‘with regard to’,⁹ and it can be noticed that he does not seek stylistic perfection (as he himself often admits) and puts prepositional constructions depending on the most different verbs and expressions, for example:

Non enim de architectura sic scribitur uti historia aut poemata (5 Praef. 1).

Itaque primum de lateribus, qua de terra duci eos oporteat, dicam (2. 3. 1).

Id autem licet animadvertere etiam de nonnullis monumentis ... (2. 8. 3).

Non minus est admirandum de cupresso et pinu... (1. 9. 12).

Explicatis aedium sacrarum compositionibus in hoc libro insequenti de communium operum reddemus distributionibus explicationes (4. 9. 1).

Although there are no parallels with the verb *aio*, it seems quite possible to assume that in this case, along with the usual infinitive construction, there is also an indication of *the group* to whom this statement refers. Then the translation will be as follows:

So (through the study of many arts as a system)¹⁰ about ancient architects / concerning ancient architects, Pythius says that an architect should have been able to achieve in all sciences and arts <even> more than those who studied only one art.

⁸ In the preface to Book 8 (*De septem sapientibus Thales Milesius omnium rerum principium aquam est professus, Heraclitus ignem, Magorum sacerdotes aquam et ignem...*, 8 Praef. 1) we also see a strictly limited group of persons, but the enumeration of all its members leaves no doubt about the meaning of the preposition: of the Seven Wise Men one ... the second ... etc. Thus, a parallel to our place would be: of the ancient architects Pythius affirmed ..., Philo ..., Satyros ... etc.

⁹ Along with the spatial sense ‘from what’, ‘of what’ (*OLD* 1, 2) and to denote material (*OLD* 8, ‘made of ...’). Some cases can be used to detect the significance of prepositions *de* and *ex*: *Sin autem non erunt harenaria, unde fodiat, tum de fluminibus aut e glarea erit excernenda, non minus etiam de litore marino* (2. 4. 2), while other show that they were used quite freely: <lateres> *faciendi autem sunt ex terra albida cretosa sive de rubrica* [a sort of clay, prob. the modern *terra rossa* *OLD* 4] (2. 3. 1); ...*ita conlocanda, uti, ex tepidario in caldarium quantum aquae caldae exierit, influat de frigidario in tepidarium ad eundem modum* (5. 10. 1).

¹⁰ Vitruvius argues above that the seemingly disparate sciences form a unified structure that helps in learning.

The word order of the sentence in question may suggest the same: the words *de veteribus architectis* are placed at the beginning of the sentence – immediately after *ideoque* that connects it to the previous phrase – and can be understood as denoting a topic or section within which a further statement will be valid, which type of transition was used by Vitruvius quite often (6. 6. 1: *Primum de salubritatibus, uti in primo volumine de moenibus conlocandis scriptum est, regiones aspiciantur et ita villae conlocentur*; 8. 5. 1: *Nunc de perdustionibus ad habitationes moeniaque, ut fieri oporteat, explicabo*).¹¹

II. Who Were *veteres architecti*?

However, it seems to me now that the main support for the proposed understanding should be sought in the field of meaning: can it not be supposed that, in referring to the work of Pythius, Vitruvius has in mind some old masters who were characterised by what is now recognised as impossible (*re non expeditur*)?

Then how old were these masters? In other words, were they Pythius' contemporaries (*veteres* to Vitruvius) or lived earlier (*veteres* to both)?

Although many experts on the history of ancient architecture note in this place a kind of dispute between Vitruvius and Pythius,¹² I see no oppositional markers here, and we get the impression that the author cites the predecessor's opinion as an example of comparable reasoning. Then the words *de veteribus architectis* possibly refer to Greek architects, *ancient* both for Vitruvius and Pythius.¹³

¹¹ This standard type of phrase construction was called “theme versus prepositional phrases with *de*” (Spevak 2010, 109–110). For pointing out works on word order, I thank my colleague Anna Kormilina.

¹² Vitruvius stood in favour of a long-term, but pragmatic and practically oriented training of those wishing to ascend to the sanctuary of architecture (*his gradibus scandendo ... pervenerint ad summum templum architecturae*, 1. 1. 11), whereas Pythius in his treatises had attributed to the Hellenic ideal a knowledge beyond anyone's reach (e. g. Lebedeva 2015 [Г. С. Лебедева, *Новейший комментарий к трактату Витрувия “Десять книг об архитектуре”*], 81).

¹³ A possible argument against this interpretation is that then the infinitive (*oportere*) would be perfect one (*oportuisse*). But in three instances this verb form indicates some discrepancy between reality and what might have been necessary: 2. 1. 8 (“that this book should have come first” i. e. not second, as it is now); 3. Praef. 1; 3. Praef. 3 (of Socrates' idea of visible human thoughts).

Let us turn to the word usage. The adjective *vetus* in Vitruvius is less frequent than the adjective *antiquus*¹⁴ and occurs mainly in the opposition *former – new*:

- a. *Salpia Vetus* of a settlement relocated because of bad location (1. 4. 12: *Salpia Vetus... progressi ab oppido veteri habitant in salubro loco*);
- b. *vetus ratio* (1. 4. 9) vel sim. as a practice distinct from modern;¹⁵
- c. *ex veteribus tegulis tecta structa*: of a brick that was already weathered by ice (2. 8. 19).

If the reference is to some epochs, then however we see no specific reference to the period; in one case it refers to the Classical period: *testimonium poetae veteris* of Euripides (9. 1. 14).

In one instance Vitruvius describes the habits of the primitive era: when men lived in forests and caves (*vetere more ut ferae in silvis et speluncis et nemoribus*, 2. 1. 1).

The most interesting example (5. 3. 8) is where the words *veteres architecti* denote the constructors of the first theatres:

Ergo veteres architecti naturae vestigia persecuti indagationibus vocis scandentis theatrorum perfecerunt gradationes...

Hence¹⁶ the ancient architects, following in the footsteps of nature, perfected the ascending rows of seats in theatres from their investigations of the ascending voice...¹⁷

It seems to me that in this case what is important is not so much the exact chronological definition of this event, but the picture of the

¹⁴ It is the basic word for the Greek architects, whereas the Roman architects are called *antiqui nostri* (e.g. 7 Praef. 18). The derived nouns *vetustas* and *antiquitas* have no difference (see e.g. 2. 1. 5).

¹⁵ The expression *veteribus parietibus* (7. 3. 10) is to be taken as referring to an old technique.

¹⁶ Preceded by a discourse on the properties of sound as a wave: “Therefore, as in the case of the waves formed in the water, so it is in the case of the voice: the first wave, when there is no obstruction to interrupt it, does not break up the second or the following waves, but they all reach the ears of the lowest and highest spectators without an echo” (5. 3. 7, tr. Morgan 1914, 139).

¹⁷ Tr. Morgan 1914, 139. Corso–Romano 1997, 670 understand it as calculation of the curvature.

construction of the very first theatres on the hill “by trial and error” and above all – the observation of nature. So, the opposition “*vetus* – modern” shows the difference between pathfinders and jack-of-all-trades of old times and nowadays specialists who, when necessary, can use experts’ advice along with written sources.

The same expression in the passage of the education may denote masters of the Classical period or even earlier: when the architect had to be responsible for all aspects of construction and studied a lot of things by necessity.¹⁸

In conclusion, I would like to note that in this case Pythius cannot be among these ancient architects: he lived and worked in second half of the fourth cent. BCE and his buildings were considered the pinnacle of the Ionic style,¹⁹ but were not part of the formation of classical order architecture.

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¹⁸ Note also that the discourse “about the old days” often contains a certain amount of idealisation, which is also common to us when we speak of the titans of the past. No one of our contemporaries is surprised by the diverse talents of Avicenna, Leonardo or Lomonosov. For the ancient mind, Phidias and Aristotle could have been an unreachable model of this kind.

¹⁹ Robertson 1929, 45.

H. Nohl, *Index Vitruvianus* (Stuttgart 1965).

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The modern translations of the Vetruvian *On Architecture* 1. 1. 12 translate *de veteribus architectis Pythius ... ait* as “one of the old architects Pythius ... says”. Meanwhile, some considerations of the usage of the preposition *de* offer an opportunity to understand it as *concerning* or *about*, the whole phrase being as follows: “That is why concerning the old architects Pythius – who designed brilliantly the temple of Athena in Priene – states in his work that an architect should be able to be <even> better in all kinds of art and science than those who reached with all diligence and practice an excellence in a single form of art”. Another argument is that the adjective *vetus*, as opposed to the closely related *antiquus*, means in Vitruvius not just ‘remote in chronology’, but ‘belonging to the concluded period’, ‘former’. Comparison with the passage 5. 3. 8 shows that the ancient architects mentioned here may be masters of the Classical or Archaic period, i.e. the predecessors of both Vitruvius and Pythius (4th cent. BCE).

Для Vit. *De arch.* I, 1, 12 предлагается следующее понимание: “Поэтому относительно древних архитекторов (de veteribus architectis) Пифей, который великолепно выстроил храм Минервы в Приене, утверждает в своих *Записках*, что архитектор должен быть способен во всех искусствах и науках <даже> превзойти тех, кто довел изучением и трудолюбием одно дело до величайшего блеска”. Такой перевод предлога *de* соответствует особенностям словоупотребления Витрувия; кроме этого, прилагательное *vetus* в отличие от близкого по значению *antiquus* означает у Витрувия не просто “хронологически отдаленный”, а “относящийся к завершённому периоду”, “прежний”. Сопоставление с пассажем V, 3, 8 показывает, что упомянутые здесь *древние архитекторы* – это, весьма возможно, мастера классического или архаического периодов, т. е. предшественники как Витрувия, так и Пифея (IV в. до н. э.).

Denis Keyer

TRIMALCHIO'S SUPERSTITIONS: TRADITIONAL CUSTOMS OR THEIR DISTORTION? I*

1. Introduction

In the *Cena Trimalchionis*, freedmen and their host, Trimalchio, are depicted with great attention to their social and psychological features, and the description of the feast gives ample detail on aspects of everyday life (Petronius' so-called "realism"). Not surprisingly, this text has attracted not only specialists on the social¹ or everyday history of imperial Rome, but also those studying ancient folklore and superstitions. Special studies on superstitions in Petronius evolved from short, compact surveys² at the beginning of the last century to more extensive works³ towards its end. Apart from that, the evidence for superstitions in the *Satyricon* have been the subject of many articles,⁴ and studies on superstitions in antiquity, relatively rare overall, often refer to the passages from the *Cena*.⁵

This paper focuses not on fairytale folklore motifs of the *Cena*, but rather on "impetrative" or "prohibitive"⁶ superstitions (i.e., common superstitious customs calling for or avoiding certain actions), as well as

* I am grateful to Prof. J. von Ungern-Sternberg and Dr. Petra Schierl for the possibility to read a guest paper based on this study at the *Forschungskolloquium Latinistik* of the Univ. of Basel on 17 March 2023 and to the audience for a friendly and fruitful discussion.

¹ Bodel 1984 (cf. idem 1999); Andreau 2012; Eigler-Lämmle 2017 (with literature).

² Stemplinger 1928; Rini 1929 gives many parallels to folktales of the *Cena* from different regions of Italy.

³ Pinna 1978; Grondona 1980.

⁴ Schmeling–Stuckey 1977 (index, s.v. *superstitions*); Vannini 2007 (passim).

⁵ For a bibliography on ancient superstitions, see McCartney 1947; ample material is provided in Deonna–Renard 1961 and recently Lelli 2014. Useful surveys are found in Stemplinger 1922; 1948 and Riess 1894, 29–93 (*RE* s.v. "Aberglaube"); 1939, 350–378 ("Omen").

⁶ The terminology of Wolters 1935.

“mantic” ones (i.e., established belief in certain omens). Scholars generally take references to these superstitions in the *Satyricon* as direct evidence that reflects common notions of the time. Their study is therefore aimed either at searching for parallels to the passages from the *Satyricon* in European folklore and in superstitious beliefs of the New Age, which were collected and catalogued in detail in the 19th and 20th centuries, or at tracing the origins of superstitious and religious beliefs by analyzing similar rites and customs in different cultures.

H. Petersmann’s close examination of the subject leads to a conclusion that runs counter to most researchers, who take superstitions in the *Cena* as direct evidence for the common practice. According to him, Trimalchio’s religious beliefs are grotesque and not traditionally Roman, while his superstitions show poor knowledge of traditional customs. Petersmann brackets Trimalchio’s (alleged) misinterpretation of superstition with his lack of elementary school knowledge and grotesque distortion of mythology and history:⁷

Our author, however, obviously mocks at these people not only by making them perform such practices [i.e., kissing the table – DK] and trust in their effectiveness, but with regard to the uneducated freedmen, also by exposing their complete unfamiliarity with the right customs. Thus, in most cases, Trimalchio and his illiterate companions surpass ordinary superstition by behaving in an exaggerated and silly manner. But what can one expect of these people who are totally ignorant of even the most common facts of mythology!

This conclusion met partly with cautious sympathy.⁸ Still, the very idea of “unorthodox” in this case may seem surprising. Religious practices that deviate from canonical models of religious cults due to unfamiliarity with the right customs, especially when it comes to ethnic minorities, are easy to conceive. As for “unorthodox” superstitions – however shaky the line between superstition and religion may be – their deviations from common practice are more likely to be taken for some peculiar individual beliefs than for errors or ignorance, and they can hardly be associated with lack of school knowledge. Superstitions are not taught; they are absorbed with the environment through natural imitation. Instead of ignorance, one would rather speak here of an alien ethnic background accustomed

⁷ Petersmann 1995, 79 = 2002, 42.

⁸ Schmeling 2011, 106 (ad 30. 5); 311 (ad 74. 4); Vannini 2007, 426–427.

to different rites. Petersmann, however, seems to think that Trimalchio deliberately tried to imitate (Roman) superstitious customs, but the lack of their knowledge let him down.

A detailed discussion of the passages considered by Petersmann, I hope, will evaluate his interpretation and raise some noteworthy questions on individual customs. The episodes under study are the following:

- 1) wearing finger rings while eating (ch. 32);
- 2) entering the triclinium with the right foot forward (ch. 30);
- 3) Trimalchio's reaction to early cock crowing (ch. 74):
 - a) pouring wine under the table;
 - b) sprinkling wine on the lamp;
 - c) putting the ring from one's left hand onto the right one;
- 4) Trimalchio's private religion: worshipping his *Lares* (ch. 60).⁹

2. Wearing Finger Rings at the Table

Trimalchio's first appearance at the table shows vulgar pomp and vanity. He wears expensive and, perhaps, effeminate scarlet pallium, and a fringed cloth with a wide border (*laticlavia*) is wrapped round his neck. He also flaunts his jewelry (32. 3–4):

habebat etiam in minimo digito sinistrae manus anulum grandem subauratum, extremo vero articulo digiti sequentis minorem, ut mihi videbatur, totum aureum, sed plane ferreis veluti stellis ferruminatum. et ne has tantum ostenderet divitias, dextrum nudavit lacertum armilla aurea cultum et eboreo circulo lamina splendente conexo.

He also had on the little finger of his left hand an enormous gilded ring, and on the last joint of the ring finger a smaller one of what seemed to me pure gold, but was really all set around with a kind of iron stars. And not to show off just this wealth, he bared his right arm, which was adorned with a golden bracelet and an ivory hoop held together by a glittering metal plate.

In imperial Rome, it was common to wear many rings on a hand and even several on one finger;¹⁰ however, gold rings were the privilege

⁹ Episodes (3) and (4) will be discussed in the forthcoming second part of the article.

¹⁰ Plin. *NH* 33. 24–25; Sen. *NQ* 7. 31. 2; Mart. 5. 61. 5; 11. 59. 1; etc.

of senators and equestrians *equo publico*. It was in the first century AD that social tensions associated with this restriction escalated:¹¹ golden rings were perceived as a privilege of the equestrian class, and the laments that the distinctions of the noble classes, including the right to golden rings, were being appropriated by freedmen, are frequent in textual sources.¹²

Thus, Trimalchio combines ostentatious luxury with formal respect for the law – that is why the ring on his little finger is only gilded, and the ring on his ring finger is set around with iron stars (curiously, when planning his tombstone monument, he calls for a sculpture of himself with five gold rings¹³).

Some scholars, including Petersmann, are of the opinion that iron stars here also serve as a kind of talisman against the evil eye.¹⁴ However, there are no convincing parallels for this: iron's protective power against the evil eye is well attested for antiquity, but usually it refers to objects made entirely of iron and not just set out with it, like iron rings worn by triumphators and brides.¹⁵

¹¹ For sources and secondary literature, see Bodel 1984, 240–245 (Appendix 3: The *ius annuli aurei* in the Julio-Claudian Period). Cf. also Zehnacker 1983, 141–144 (ad Plin. *NH* 33. 32–34). According to Plin. *NH* 33. 32, in 23 AD a senatorial decree was passed securing this right to equestrians who had a confirmed census of 400 000 sesterces, a freeborn father and paternal grandfather, and the right to sit in the first fourteen rows in the theater. In 24 AD, a special law (*lex Visellia de libertinis*) prescribed penalties for former slaves who usurped the rights of those born free and seems to have prescribed by imperial decree the possibility of conditionally equating freedmen with equestrians: *Cod. Iust.* 9. 21. 1; 9. 31; 10. 33. 1; *Cod. Theod.* 9. 20.

¹² Plin. *Epist.* 8. 6. 4 (on Pallas; cf. Sherwin-White 1966, 453–454 ad loc.); Plin. *NH* 33. 33 *passimque ad ornamenta ea etiam servitute liberati transilant, quod antea numquam erat factum*; Mart. 2. 29; 5. 14; 11. 37. The situation in which freedmen dare not wear gold rings serves as one of the arguments in defense of Petronius' traditional dating from Nero's times: Browning 1949, 12–13.

¹³ 71. 9: *facias... et me in tribunali sedentem praetextatum cum anulis aureis quinque*. Browning 1949, 13: “by that time he will be well beyond the reach of any sanctions”.

¹⁴ Petersmann 1995, 80 = 2002, 43; Smith 1975, 69 ad loc., referring to Marshall 1907, XXII–XXIII (catalogue of ancient rings from the British Museum, section “Rings used as charms”); however, there is no report of a ring similar to Trimalchio's (unless one is referring to silver rings with golden nails or pins, which according to Marshall had the power to ward off evil spirits, like rings made of iron nails).

¹⁵ See, e.g., Kroll 1897, 7–8; iron rings worn by brides and triumphators – Plin. *NH* 33. 11–12; Heckenbach 1911, 92–97; Frazer, *GB* III. 313; Wolters 1935, 64 n. 8.

More importantly, Petersmann has suspected two contradictions to the general practice here:¹⁶

But, what has not been observed up to now is, that according to another superstitious custom mentioned by Plin. *Nat.* 33, 24 one must never wear a ring on the *digitus medicinalis* as Trimalchio does, nor finger-rings at all during meals: these had to be taken off prior to the repast – probably for some religious reason – as we know from Plin. *Nat.* 28, 24 <...>. But in this respect too Trimalchio proves to be a total ignorant, since he wears his finger-rings during the entire meal and even displays them proudly along with other jewelry.

Thus, Trimalchio incurs blame for two alleged gaffes:

- 1) one must not wear a ring on one's ring finger (!);
- 2) one must not wear any finger rings at all at a meal.

The first rebuke is based on a misunderstanding. Pliny's passage in question states that no ring was worn on the *digitus medius*, i.e., the middle finger, because that finger had magical powers. *Digitus medicinalis* is the ring finger on which rings were normally worn (there is plenty of written and archeological evidence for this¹⁷).

The error comes from A. Jungwirth's article "Ring" in the *Handbuch des Deutschen Aberglaubens* cited by Petersmann: "der Ring darf nicht am *digitus medicinalis* getragen werden. Vgl. die Begründung bei Plinius 33,24: *ne vis eius occulta eo vinculo minueretur*" (col. 706). In reality, however, the words quoted by Jungwirth are not Pliny's: they are taken from Joseph Heckenbach's work *De nuditate sacra* (1911), written in Latin. Heckenbach refers to the aforementioned passage from Pliny 33. 24 (that no rings were worn on the middle finger, *digitus medius*) and offers his explanation in Latin,¹⁸ which Jungwirth mistakenly quotes as a passage from Pliny.

¹⁶ Petersmann 1995, 80 = 2002, 43.

¹⁷ Plin. 33. 24 *singulis primo digitis geri mos fuerat, qui sunt minimis proximi...*; Gell. 10. 10 (cf. Plut. *Quaest. conv.* 4. 8 [672 c]) *veteres Graecos anulum habuisse in digito accipimus sinistrae manus, qui minimo est proximus. Romanos quoque homines aiunt sic plerumque anulis usitatos*; Macr. *Sat.* 7. 13. 7 *cur sibi communis adsensus anulum in digito qui minimo vicinus est, quem etiam medicinalem vocant, et manu praecipue sinistra gestandum esse persuasit?* Many Roman sculptures depict a ring on a ring finger (e.g., the bronze statue of Tiberius from Herculaneum and the Etruscan bronze statue known as *L'arringatore*); the seated female figure depicted in the *Villa dei misteri* has a ring on her ring finger; and so on.

¹⁸ Heckenbach 1911, 84–85: "Eadem ex superstitione in digito medio, qui medicus nominabatur, anulum portare vetabatur, ne vis eius occulta eo vinculo minueretur".

In short: Petersmann followed Jungwirth, who confused Heckenbach with Pliny and in the footsteps of Heckenbach wrongly identified *digitus medicinalis* (*medicus*) with *digitus medius*.¹⁹ Here Trimalchio must be acquitted: wearing rings on a ring finger was common practice for both Greeks and Romans.

Petersmann's second rebuke, referring to Plin. *NH* 28. 24, is more important, as it is relevant for the study of everyday life in ancient Rome. It would be indeed noteworthy if Romans did remove their finger rings while eating, and Pliny's evidence – the text offers many textual difficulties – deserves a closer look.²⁰

¹⁹ Ample evidence leaves no doubt that the terms *medicus*, *medicinalis*, and *ιατρικός* refer to the ring finger: Isid. *Orig.* 11. 1. 70–71 ...*quartus anularis, eo quod in ipso anulus geritur. idem et medicinalis, quod eo trita collyria a medicis colliguntur* (idem *De diff. rerum* 2. 63 [Migne *PL* 83, col. 79–80] *quartus medicus, quod eo...*); Porph. ad Hor. *Sat.* 2. 8. 26; *Comm. Cornuti* in Pers. 2. 33; [Ps.-]Galen. *Introd.* XIV, p. 704 Kühn: ...ἐφεξῆς ὁ μέσος καὶ μετὰ τοῦτον ὁ παραμέσος, ὁ τοῖς ἱατροῖς ἀνακείμενος καὶ ἅπ' αὐτῶν τοῦνομα κεκληρωμένος; Macr. *Sat.* 7. 13. 7 (see n. 17 above); Marcell. 15. 11: *digitis tribus, id est pollice, medio et medicinali, residuis duobus elevatis*.

Earlier, some scholars erroneously claimed these terms referred to the middle finger (mainly misguided by Petr. 131. 4 and Pers. 2. 33, where the middle finger is used as a protection against spells): Bächtold-Stäubli 1930, 1492 f. (*HWDA* s.v. “Finger”, with lit.); Seligmann 1910, II, 183–184 with n. 113 on p. 390; Heckenbach 1911, 84–85; Sittl 1890, 123 with n. 6 (who, however, admits the possibility that it is the ring finger). Sometimes *medius* and *medicus* are confused in mss.

The problematic phrase *digitis medicinalibus* in Marcell. 2. 9; 25. 14; 32. 5 and the *Additamenta* to Theod. Prisc. (p. 284. 2 ff., 327. 14 ff. and 283. 27 Rose) was explained by Niedermann 1914, 329–330 as an “elliptic plural” that implies ‘*digito medicinali et pollice*’ (type: *Castores* = *Castor et Pollux*), which gained almost universal support. There are good arguments in favor of this, though this usage is still puzzling and parallels for it are hardly convincing. Gornatowski 1936, 30 n. 179 suggests that in this case the term *medicinalis* might be extended to the middle finger or the thumb; Fischer 1965, 22–23 with n. 32 and 27 with n. 72 argues for the former, and Corbeill 2004, 7; 45 (idem 1997, 4) for the latter.

In the late Greek-Coptic glossary by Dioscorus of Aphroditon (*P.Lond.* 1821. 300, see Bell–Crum 1925, 194; 213), ὁ ἱατρικός is surprisingly glossed as “forefinger” (lit. “a finger near the thumb”), which is followed by other Greek terms for the index finger glossed as “the same” (“likewise again”). This must be some kind of mistake: either Dioscorus mistakenly thought the term ἱατρικός referred to the forefinger or the text restored here is wrong.

²⁰ I quote the text from Ernout 1962 and apparatus also from Mayhoff 1897 and Wolters 1935. Ernout adopts in the text the form *tralaticium*.

(28. 24) quin et absentes tinnitu aurium praesentire sermones de se receptum est. Attalus adfirmat, scorpione viso si quis dicat “duo”, cohiberi nec vibrare ictus. et quoniam scorpio admonuit, in Africa nemo destinat aliquid nisi praefatus Africam, in ceteris vero gentibus deos ante obtestatus, ut velint. Nam si mensa adsit, anulum ponere translaticium videmus, quoniam etiam mutas religiones pollere manifestum est.

praesentire *Er* : praesentium *VR*¹ | aliquid nisi praefatus *Er* : nisi aliquid praefatus *VR*¹ | nam *codd.* : “an iam?” *Mayhoff in app.* | mensa *VRd* : mens *E* : si mens ad<flicta> sit *Detlefsen* | anulum : nullum *E*, *vulg. ante Harduinum* | translaticium *E* : tralatium *VR* : tralatitium *Harduinus* | mutas *V*², *Sillig* : multas *codd.* | religiones *R* (-legiones *V*) : religionesque *E* | quoniam etiam *VR* : etiam quoniam *E* : quin etiam *f*, *Harduinus*, *Sillig* | quin etiam mutas religiones pollere manifestum est. nam si mensa adsit... *Wolters* | nam si mensa – manifestum est *Sillig in app. transp. post iudicatur* (§ 26)

Yes, one even assumes that absentees recognize by the sound in their ears that they are the object of talk. Attalos claims that if you see a scorpion and speak “two” (*duo*), the animal is banished and does not sting. And in Africa, as the scorpion reminded me, no one does anything until they have said “Africa”; among the other peoples, however, one solemnly calls on the gods for help beforehand. For if one is at the table, it is customary, as we see, to take off the ring, since superstitious customs are obviously effective even without words.

Furthermore, the “silent” superstitious practices, i.e., the gestures, are listed:

(25) alius saliva post aurem digito relata sollicitudinem animi propitiat. pollices, cum faveamus, premere etiam proverbio iubemur. in adorando dextram ad osculum referimus totumque corpus circumagimus, quod in laevum fecisse Galliae religiosius credunt. fulgetras poppysmis adorare consensus gentium est.

alius *codd.* : manifestum est aliis “durch andere Beispiele” *Ulrichs 1857, 253* : alius <... alius> *Sillig in app.* : “an aliquis?” *Mayhoff in app.* | saliva *Er* : salivamus *VR*¹

Another soothes the anxiety of the mind by wiping saliva behind the ear with a finger. A proverb also lets us “press our thumbs”²¹ when we are in someone’s favor. When we pray, we bring our right hand to our mouth and turn our whole body around, which in Gaul is done to the left because it is considered more reverent. It is a common custom among the peoples to worship lightning with a smacking sound of the lips.

The *communis opinio* based on the passage above is that Romans did in fact remove their rings before the meal;²² this view, however, is little

²¹ Sittl 1890, 125 with n. 4 and others interpret it by analogy to the German gesture of thumbs enclosed in the fists (“j-m die Daumen drucken/halten”), but Corbeill 2004, 46–66 argues in favor of pressing the thumbs down on top of the fists (the gesture attested in Romania [“a ține pumni”]). Hor. *Epist.* 1. 18. 67 *fautor utroque tuum laudabit pollice ludum* seems to refer to the same gesture and confirm that it was performed with both hands. Wolters 1935, 71 rightly objects to [Orelli–Baiter–]Mewes 1892, 461, Kiessling[–Heinze] ⁴1914, 461 (ad loc.) and others that Alciph. 4. 16 Scheper [2. 4 Mein.] 5 τοὺς δακτύλους ἐμαυτῆς πιέζουσα καὶ τρέμουσα implies that Glycera “presses her nails into the flesh” and does not refer to the gesture in question (Fornés Pallicer – Puig Rodríguez-Escalona 2006, 969 are on the same lines with Wolters).

The opposite gesture (Iuv. 3. 36 *pollice verso*; Prud. c. *Symm.* 2. 1099 *converso pollice*; AL 415. 28 Riese *infesto pollice*) was used in gladiatorial games as a sign to deliver the deathblow (Corbeill 2004, 62–64 shows that, contrary to popular opinion, there are no grounds to believe that the thumb was pointed downwards; the objections by Fornés Pallicer – Puig Rodríguez-Escalona 2006, 967 f. leave me unconvinced). Hence it is universally assumed that *pollices premere* was also a mercy gesture for the *missio* of fallen gladiators (like waving handkerchiefs in Mart. 12. 29. 7–8), but this does not seem certain to me. Corbeill 2004, 52–61 discusses two gladiatorial representations: on the Nîmes medallion, the thumb is indeed pressed down on the fist, while on the relief from Munich’s Glyptothek, the thumb is pressed on the top of the palm, but the index and the middle finger are stretched out (and it is only the left hand that conveys the gesture).

²² Boehm 1905, 30; Heckenbach 1911, 86, with reference to the same practice in Jewish tradition attested in Haberland 1888, 259–260 (who refers to Buxtorf 1729, 270, on which see below); Ganschinetz 1914, 837; Wolters 1935, 67 (he adds that in southern Germany on the Rhine it is forbidden to sit cross-legged at the table, and Muslims cross their legs only at the end of the meal); Jungwirth 1936, 106; Deonna–Renard 1961, 73 with n. 1; Lelli 2014, 208 (S. 121. 2: “A tavola bisogna togliersi gli anelli”; this is accompanied by references to informants from southern Italy who answered “yes” when asked, “If you sit at the table, do you have to remove your rings?” One informant added, “lo facevano i ricchi, per far vedere quanto era grande” [Lelli, per litteras]; cf. n. 40 below).

known outside religious studies. Usually, this prohibition is explained in that rings, like knots and bands, were metaphorically perceived as holding obstacles. This idea was traced in detail by J. Frazer, who cites numerous examples of prohibitions on knots, bands, etc. in sacred acts or critical situations (such as childbirth, marriage, and death).²³ Such prohibitions are partially documented in Greek and Roman cult practices.

Thus, in Ovid, Numa is not allowed to wear rings before his incubation.²⁴ The Flamen Dialis is allowed to wear only cave or through-born rings.²⁵ There is a similar prohibition in the late Pythagorean regulations,²⁶ and a sacred inscription from Arcadia attests the same custom.²⁷ Taking this into account, one might suggest that Romans sacralized the meal or the table with a similar prohibition.

It is sometimes added that this alleged habit might be rooted in hygienic reasons, as well (after all, one should wash hands several times

Eitrem 1915, 62, “Der Ring weiht. Wie man sonst eine sakrale Handlung durch einen Rundgang einleitet, legt man nach Plin. XXVIII 24 einen Ring auf den Tisch, ehe man irgendetwas anfängt”, and Dölger 1930, 215, “in Rom lege man stillschweigend den Ring auf den Tisch”, possibly mean that Pliny's words do not refer to the meal, but to a prayer prior to some undertaking. The use of a table for a prayer is conceivable (see n. 31 below); however, (1) it is not clear why anyone should be near a table if not for a meal; and (2) the sense ‘if you happen to use the table for a prayer’ is very far from what the words *si mensa adsit* can possibly convey.

²³ Frazer *GB* III, 293–316 (“knots and rings tabooed”); cf. Heckenbach 1911, 70; Wolters 1935, 61–62; Nilsson² 1955, 114; Serv. ad *Aen* 4. 518 *in sacris nihil solet esse religatum*. For women's loose hair in sacred rituals, cf. Petr. 44. 18 and Heckenbach 1911, 83–84. Similar prescriptions with regard to rings are sometimes attested for healing practices (Plin. *NH* 23. 110 *solutus vinculo omni cinctus et calciatus a t q u e t i a m a n u l i*). Pace Ganschietz 1914, 837, Scrib. Larg. 152 (~ Marcell. 26. 10) *qui contundit, anulum ferreum non habeat* is different, as he specifically objects to iron (cf. 57 [~ Marcell. 12. 4] *quolibet vase dum ne aereo*).

²⁴ Ov. *Fast.* 4. 657 f. *usus abest Veneris, nec fas animalia mensis / ponere, nec digitis anulus ullus inest...* Cf. Frazer 1929, 321 f. ad loc.

²⁵ Gell. 10. 15. 6 *item anulo uti nisi peruio cassoque fas non est* (scil. *Dialem*); Fest. 72. 25 Lindsay *Sed ne anulum quidem gerere ei licebat solidum, aut aliquem in se habere nodum*.

²⁶ Iambl. *Protr.* 21 κβ'. Δακτύλιον μὴ φόρει (cf. Clem. *Strom.* 5. 5. 28. 4; [Ps.-]Plut. *De liberis educ.* 12e μὴ φορεῖν στενὸν δακτύλιον [= *Mant. Prov.* 2. 17, *CPG* II, p. 761]).

²⁷ Dittenberger *SIG*³ 999 (Lycosurae lex sacra): μὴ ἐξέστω / παρέρπην ἔχοντας ἐν τὸ ἱερόν τὰς / Δεσποίνας <...> μηδὲ ὑποδήματα μηδὲ δακτύλιον...

during a meal). Finally, this custom is reported to be documented in Jewish tradition.²⁸

If this is so, Petersmann's observation is of great value: those unfamiliar with this Roman custom should be ashamed of their ignorance, and Trimalchio should be ashamed of violating the universally recognized religious law. However, there are some reasons to doubt the accuracy of this opinion.

First, this passage from Pliny is the only source for it. This may not be a decisive argument per se, as many important customs of everyday life are attested in but one or two passages, yet it gives reason for caution.²⁹

Second, the text of the passage overall abounds with textual difficulties and very likely contains corruptions. I agree with Wolters and Sillig that *nam* is hardly comprehensible here (hence either emendation of *nam* or transposition seems necessary) and with Ulrichs and Sillig that the single *alius* is suspicious. It is noteworthy that *L* reads *mens* instead of *mensa* and *nullum* instead of *anulum*, the more so as in this passage *L* repeatedly offers correct readings against corruptions in *VR*: *praesentire* vs. *praesentium*, *aliquid nisi* vs. *nisi aliquid*, *translaticium* (thus Ernout's app.; -*titium* Mayhoff) vs. *tralatium*, *saliva* vs. *salivamus* (on the other hand, *religionesque* vs. *religiones* cannot be correct unless we assume

²⁸ See n. 22 above.

²⁹ According to Mart. 11. 59. 2–3, rings were usually taken off when sleeping and in baths (*nec nocte ponit anulos / nec cum lavatur*); meals are not mentioned there. It is also unclear where rings should be put if the usual practice was to take them off during meals. *Dactyliotheca* (Mart. 14. 123; Plin. *NH* 37. 11) or *loculus* (Ov. *Am.* 2. 15. 19, Iuv. 13. 139) are usually thought of as something too big to be carried in one's bosom (Kay 1985, 201 [ad Mart. 11. 59. 4], with reference to Daremberg–Saglio s.v. “Dactyliotheca” [E. Pottier]: “Perhaps we should imagine something more like a small cabinet than a modern jewelry case”).

Curiously, Plin. *NH* 33. 27 *gravatis somno aut morientibus anuli detrahuntur* was misinterpreted by Boehm 1905, 30, Heckenbach 1911, 86, Ganschietz 1914, 837, and Jungwirth 1936, 706 as a religious custom similar to the one mentioned by Frazer *GB* III, 313 ff. (“in the Greek island of Carpathus, people never button the clothes they put upon a dead body and they are careful to remove all rings from it”); they also refer to similar German and Austrian superstitions that concern burial as well as sleep (see Samter 1911, 129, who, however, rightly suspects a mistake in bracketing Pliny's passage together with these). In fact, Pliny deplores here the moral decline by contrast with the old times: “now food and drinks are protected from stealing with the help of a ring <...> and it is not enough to seal the keys themselves; the signet rings are taken off when one is asleep or dying”. It follows that at least signet rings were not always taken off before going to sleep.

further corruptions). Thus, *L*'s reading *si mens adsit* ('For if one is reasonable...', cf. Tac. *Ann.* 2. 14. 3 *si ratio adsit*) deserves attention as an alternative to *si mensa adsit* of the editorial vulgate. I cannot make sense of the following *nullum ponere tralaticium videmus* in *L*, but there remains a possibility that further emendations are required and putting rings off at the table is but a result of textual corruption.

Third, I find lexicological and certainly syntactic difficulties in the editorial vulgate. I have not found any examples of the phrase *mensa adest* in the sense of 'someone is at the table' (even if in theory it could be explained as referring to separate tables in front of each couch). Even more suspicious is the present subjunctive and *modus potentialis*. This type of conditional clauses suggests that the situation described is hypothetical and estimated as possible or probable; thus, it can hardly refer to ordinary regular events ("if one should happen to have a meal...") and is inappropriate for iterative use.³⁰ In this case one would expect something like *ante mensam / cenam / cenandum, cum cenamus, si cenandum est*, etc.

Fourth, three of the other examples of silent gestures listed later in the passage – propitiating anxiety, concern for the other (*faveamus* contains the idea of a possible failure), and worshipping lightning (the gesture is probably apotropaic) – deal with solicitude or danger. The prayer (*in adorando...*) does not necessarily imply troubles, but even so the meal does not seem to fit well in this context unless we assume that the table is regarded as sacred (cf. the apotropaic kissing of the table along with the prayer against *Nocturni* in 64. 1³¹).

³⁰ Cf. the other two examples of *si... adsit* in Pliny: *NH* 5. 38 *si locorum notitia adsit*: wells do not need to be dug deep if one has a knowledge of the localities; 11. 58 *si custos adsit*: if the beekeeper is present (at the battle of conflicting bee swarms), the swarm that feels that he favors them does not attack him.

³¹ This evidence for kissing the table is unique; for its sacralization in general, cf. Plut. *Quaest. conv.* 7. 4. 7 (704 b) ὁ Λεύκιος ἔφη τῆς μάμμης ἀκηκοὺς μνημονεύειν, ὡς ἱερὸν μὲν ἢ τράπεζα, δεῖ δὲ τῶν ἱερῶν μηδὲν εἶναι κενόν (likewise *QR* 64 [279e]), Riess 1894, 30 (*RE* s.v. "Aberglaube"), with reference to German customs, Courtney 1980 (2013), 117 (ad Iuv. 2. 110) and Dölger 1930, 213–216, who states that kissing the table was a regular ceremony and goes as far as to hypothesize that it could have influenced the Christian habit of kissing the altar. At any rate, it is noteworthy that sometimes the table was indeed used as a substitute for altars when praying at a meal: Ov. *Am.* 1. 4. 27 (quoted below, p. 253; see McKeown 1989, 88–89 ad loc., with lit.); Sen. *M. Contr.* 9. 2. 7 *utrisque manibus mensam tenens "di tibi" inquit "immortales parem gratiam referant"*.

Fifth, the examples of prohibiting ties and knots in antiquity cited above (n. 23–26) are confined to genuinely sacred acts that hardly match the entire process of a meal even if the table might be regarded as sacred. Moreover, in Pompeian frescoes with banqueting scenes (e.g., in *Casa dei casti amanti*), women are often seen wearing armbands or bracelets,³² which surely should have been forbidden along with finger rings, if the latter were prohibited.

Furthermore, it can be shown that the alleged parallel with a Jewish custom of taking rings off can be dismissed. I have found no mention of this in the Talmud, and the experts in Jewish culture whom I asked about it were unfamiliar with such a custom. All the references boil down to Johannes Buxtorf the Elder's "Synagoge Judaica". Haberland³³ refers to the edition of 1739, 270–271:

Sie halten sehr starck auf dieses Gebott von Waschung der Hände vor und nach dem Essen, daß man nicht bald einen Juden findet, der es vergisset. Sie halten ja so genau darauf, daß keiner kein Ring an den Fingern behalten soll, damit nichts unsaubers unter dem Ring verbleibe, und wann einer ihn anbehielte, wäre eben so viel, daß wann er gar mit ungewaschenen Händen esse.

With slight corrections, the same is to be found in the first German edition of 1603,³⁴ and it corresponds also to the posthumous Latin edition of 1641.³⁵ At first glance, this confirms that the ring was taken off while eating. Yet the wording allows an alternative interpretation, namely that the ring was taken off only when washing hands and then put on again (although this is not said *expressis verbis*, but tacitly implied).

Fortunately, in the first Latin edition of 1604,³⁶ which was supervised by Buxtorf the Elder himself, the wording is also more explicit, if a bit less elegant:

³² Cf. Fortunata's *armillae* and *periscelides* mentioned in ch. 67. Admittedly, I have not found finger rings in the banquet scenes from Pompeii. It is possible that this detail was too small to be depicted (cf., however, n. 17 above).

³³ See n. 22 above.

³⁴ Buxdorf 1603, 249.

³⁵ Buxtorf 1641, 180–181: "Praeceptum hoc de manum lotionem, sive ante cibum, sive a cibo, tanti faciunt, ut vix Judaeum reperias, qui illius obliviscatur, imo tam scrupulose et illud observant, ut nemo annulum in digito retinere audeat, ne quid sordis sub illo lateat: si quis vero annulum non detraxerit, idem valet, ac si illotis manibus comederet".

³⁶ Buxdorf 1604, 193.

Tanta, inquam, sollicitudine lotionem manuum observant, ut nemini se lavanti annulum in digito retinere liceat, ne quid forsani immundi sub annulo restet. Quam annuli de digito detractorem tam accurate observant quoque ipsam, ut si quis se lavans illum non detraxerit, eum perinde facere existiment, atque si manibus illotis ad mensam cibi capiendi gratia sessum se conferret.

The addition of *se lavanti* and *se lavans* makes it probable that taking rings off was prescribed not for the entire meal, but for when washing one's hands, and that they were subsequently put on again (to be taken off again when washing hands after the meal). The reference to Jewish custom is unreliable if not false.

Finally, and most importantly, there is direct written evidence – that went unnoticed in the discussion of Pliny’s passage – that Romans did not take off their rings during the meal.

Thus, in Ovid's *Amores* 1. 4 the poet negotiates with his mistress, among other things, the secret signs they are to exchange during the banquet in the presence of his rival (her husband or lover, who has certain rights over her³⁷), in order to lessen his agony. Among other things, the manipulation of the ring is mentioned (v. 23–28):

si quid erit, de me tacita quod mente queraris [v.l. loquaris],
pendeat extrema mollis ab aure manus;
cum tibi, quae faciam, mea lux, dicamve, placebunt, 25
versetur digitis anulus usque tuis.
tange manu mensam, tangunt quo more precantes,
optabis merito cum mala multa viro.

If you wish to reproach me secretly, let your ear be touched with your gentle hand. And if you, my love, approve of my speech or action, keep twisting the ring on your finger.³⁸ Touch the table with

³⁷ For the choice, see McKeown 1989, 77–78, who inclines to the latter.

³⁸ I side with McKeown 1989, 88, who takes *digitis* as poetic plural (citing 2. 15. 20) but does not exclude the alternative understanding ‘with your fingers’. Showing rings to a lover is also mentioned among other flirting tricks as a pretext for touching in Naev. (?) 78 Rib. *anulum dat alii spectandum (alii d. an. codd.; Isid. Orig. 1. 26. 2 Ennius de quadam impudica...; Paul. Fest. Epit. 29 M. on the preceding verse Naevius in Tarentilla); Plaut. Asin. 778 spectandum ne cui anulum det neque roget; Tib. 1. 6. 25–26 saepe, velut gemmas eius signumque probarem, / per causam memini me tetigisse manum*, quoted in Ov. *Trist.* 2. 451 f.; but these examples may not refer to banqueting.

your hand as one does in praying every time you wish the man many evils that he deserves.

Another example is from Macrobius (*Sat.* 7. 13. 6):

His dictis Avienus anulum de mensa rettulit, qui illi de brevissimo dexteræ manus digito repente deciderat, cumque a praesentibus quaereretur cur eum alienae manui [*Willis*; aliena manu *cod.*] et digito, et non huic gestamini deputatis potius insereret, ostendit manum laevam ex vulnere tumidiorem.

After he had said this, he took a ring from the table, which suddenly fell from the little finger of his right hand. And when those present asked him why he put the ring on the other hand and finger and not on those that were better suited to the purpose, he showed his left hand, which was swollen from the wound.³⁹

Thus, Romans did not take off their finger rings during a meal.⁴⁰ The text in Plin. *NH* 28. 24, which allegedly confirms the opposite, must be either corrupt (which I find more probable in view of the lexical, syntactical, and textual difficulties discussed above) or misinterpreted.⁴¹

³⁹ Further, the custom of wearing finger rings in earlier times, namely the reason for choosing the fourth finger of the left hand, is discussed. Rings slipping off fingers are mentioned in Ov. *Am.* 2. 15. 13 and Mart. 14. 123. 1 *saepe gravis digitis elabatur anulus unctis*, which Leary 1996, 188 (1993, 228) thinks refers to baths.

⁴⁰ Though Lelli's publication (see n. 22 above) contains an indispensable repertory of ancient superstitions and offers an important and ambitious attempt to prove that numerous Graeco-Roman superstitions have survived up to now in modern Italy, his method of offering direct questions to elderly informants and their testimony is not always reliable. E.g., kissing the nostrils of a (female) mule to relieve sneezing and hiccups (Plin. *NH* 28. 57) or a head cold (*gravedo*, *NH* 30. 31, *Med. Plin.* 1. 10. 5 and Marcell. 10. 61 [there *nares muli* for men, *nares mularum* for women]) is inaccurately given under the heading "mal di testa" (p. 206), yet four informants allegedly confirm belief in this remedy. So, it is possible that those who gave a positive answer to the question about taking rings off at the table did not attest to a real practice, but merely expressed their own attitude, being provoked by a loaded yes-no question.

⁴¹ One might, e.g., take *mensa* as a table for sacred offerings (*OLD* s.v. 2) or, if keeping to the idea of a simple table regarded as sacred (cf. n. 31 above), suggest that at some point rings were taken off and then put on again; either of these views entails substantial difficulties.

At any rate, Petersmann's second rebuke levelled at Trimalchio is unjust. Trimalchio's rings in ch. 32 have nothing to do with superstitions at all (if we do not consider possible superstitious connotations of iron stars in the golden ring, see n. 14 and 15 above).

3. Stepping with the Right Foot Forward

While entering the triclinium, the guests were prescribed to step in with the right foot forward, which is reported with irony (30. 5–6):

his repleti voluptatibus cum conaremur in triclinium intrare, exclamavit unus ex pueris, qui supra hoc officium erat positus: “dextro pede!” sine dubio paulisper trepidavimus, ne contra praeceptum aliquis nostrum limen transiret.

When we, overwhelmed with such delights, were endeavoring to enter the triclinium, one of the slaves who was assigned to that service exclaimed: “With the right foot!” We, of course, shuddered a little, fearing lest one of us should have crossed the threshold against the instruction.

Superstitions connected with the right and the left foot (or with the ‘favorable’ and the ‘unfavorable’ one, on which see below) abound in ancient texts.⁴² Note that prescriptive superstitions of this kind are manifold and do not always refer to entering a space with the right foot. Sometimes they refer to setting off on the right foot,⁴³ sometimes to putting on shoes,⁴⁴

⁴² See the detailed overview in Hijmans a.o. 1981, 275–278 (ad *Met.* 6. 26 *pessumo pede domum nostram accessit*); Wagener 1935, 73–91; Deonna–Renard 1961, 68–69; Grondona 1980, 77–81 (“I timori dell’ ingresso”). For literature on similar customs in modern times, see also Lelli 2014, 180 (S. 57. 4 “Se si entra da qualche parte, bisogna mettere prima il piede destro”). For getting up with the right foot and putting on the right stocking first, see Bächtold–Stäubli 1930/31, 227–228 (*HWDA* III s.v. “Fuß”).

⁴³ Ioann. Chrys. *In epist. ad Ephes.* cap. 4. Hom. 12. 94 (*PL* LXII, p. 92; quoted also in Haupt 1876 II, 255 f.) Ἐγὼ αὐτὸς ἐξιών, τῷ ἀριστερῷ προτέρῳ προύβην ποδί· καὶ τοῦτο συμφορῶν σημείον.

⁴⁴ Suet. *Aug.* 92. 1 *Auspicia et omnia quaedam pro certissimis observabat; si mane sibi calceus perperam ac sinister pro dextro induceretur ut dirum*; Plin. *NH* 2. 24: *Divus Augustus prodidit laevum sibi calceum praepostere inductum quo*

and quite often to crossing a threshold (it was considered a bad omen to stumble);⁴⁵ those limping on the right foot were of ill omen.⁴⁶

Finally, there are a number of expressions that refer to a ‘lucky’ or ‘unlucky’ foot in the sense of a favorable or unfavorable omen;⁴⁷ sometimes these are introduced by an interrogative pronoun (*quo pede?* – lit. ‘with what foot?’, i.e., ‘under what omens?’, ‘in a good or unkind hour?’).⁴⁸ Given that *dextro pede* and *sinistro pede* are attested in a similar metaphorical sense,⁴⁹ it is natural to assume that all these

die seditione militari prope adflictus est; Ioann. Chrys. *ibid.* (n. 43) νῦν ὁ οἰκέτης ὁ μῆρὸς τὰ ὑποδήματα ἐπιδιδούς, πρῶτον ὥρεξε τὸ ἄριστερόν· συμφοραὶ δειναί, καὶ ὕβρεις. At first sight there is a difference here: Augustus sees the unlucky omen in putting the boot on the wrong foot, while Chrysostomus sees it in putting on the left shoe first. Yet, it is important that Suetonius speaks of the left boot put on the wrong foot (*perperam ac sinister pro dextro*, “wrongly, and namely the left instead of the right”, not vice versa!). That is to say, Augustus was naturally putting the boot on the right foot first, but the boot turned out to be the left one; the same is probably meant in Chrysostomus.

⁴⁵ See Ogle 1911, 251–271; Meister 1925, 25–28; Pease 1977, 486 [= 1923, 304] ad Cic. *Div.* 2. 84; Bömer 1980, 155 ad Ov. *Met.* 10. 452; Hijmans a.o. 1981, 277–278; Weiser-Aall 1936, 1520 (*HWDA* VII s.v. “Schwelle”). Curious evidence is found in Aug. *De doctr. Christ.* 2. 31 (77) *limen calcare cum ante domum suam transit, redire ad lectum, si quis dum se calciat sternutaverit, redire domum si procedens offenderit*.

⁴⁶ Plin. *NH* 28. 35 *simili modo et fascinationes repercutimus dextraeque clauditis occursum* (in view of Luc. *Pseudologist.* 17 τοὺς χῶλους τῷ δεξιῷ ἐκτρεπόμεθα, H. Rubenbauer [*Th.l.l.* V. 922, 8–9 s.v. *dexter*] is mistaken in explaining “sc<ilicet> claudi a dextra venientis”).

⁴⁷ E.g., Verg. *Aen.* 8. 302 *pede secundo* (Serv. ad loc.: “*omine prospero*”; cf. 10. 255); Hor. *Epist.* 2. 2. 37 *pede fausto*; Ov. *Fast.* 1. 514 *felici pede*; Apul. 6. 26. 1 *pessumo pede*; further examples in Sutphen 1901, 361 f. (repr.: Häussler 1968, 200 f.).

⁴⁸ Ov. *Her.* 21. 71 f. *quo pede processi, quo me pede limine movi, picta citae tetigi / quo pede texta ratis?*; Prop. 3. 1. 5: *quove pede ingressi* (possibly alluding to the meaning of ‘verse foot’).

⁴⁹ Iuv. 10. 5 *quid tam dextro pede concipis...?* (see Mayor 1900, 66–67 ad loc. for further examples); Prud. *contra Symm.* 2. 79: *felicitet et pede dextro*; Sil. 7. 171–172 *attulit... pes dexter et hora Lyaeum*; Apul. 1. 5. 4: *sinistro pede profectum me spes compendii frustrata est* and Sen. *Ben.* 2. 12. 2 quoted below on p. 259. (Pace Mayor, *ibid.*, Le Bonniec 1961, 88 and Green 2004, 234 ad Ov. *Fast.* 1. 514 *ripaeque felici tacta sit ista pede*, Eur. *Bacch.* 943 does not refer to the beginning of the journey, but to the coordination of movements: one has to lift the thyrsus with one’s right hand and at the same time lift one’s right leg.)

expressions are explained by the idea that the first step should be taken with the right foot.⁵⁰

The passage from the *Cena* is most similar to that from Vitruv. 3. 4. 4:

gradus in fronte constituendi ita sunt, uti sint semper in pares; namque cum dextro pede primus gradus ascendatur, item in summo templo primus erit ponendus.

The steps in front of the temple should be built so that their number is always unequal; for since the first step upwards must be taken from the right foot, the first step at the top of the temple will be the same".⁵¹

Relying on Vitruvius, Petersmann sees in Trimalchio's prescript to enter the triclinium with the right foot a bold and ignorant claim to the divine nature of his house:⁵²

Trimalchio <...> attributed to his triclinium even more holiness than to a temple...

Now it becomes clear why on entering Trimalchio's *triclinium* the guests had to be more careful to step in with the right foot forward than at the entrance of a temple: since Trimalchio considers himself a divine being, his dining room, too, where he receives sacrifices and

⁵⁰ Thus Hijmans a.o. 1981, 275: "...it is likely that *dexter* and *laevus* are intended both in a literal and metaphorical sense" (with ref. to Ov. *Ibis* 101 *ominibusque malis pedibusque occurrite laevis* cum schol. ad loc. *in gaudio occurritur dextro pede, in funere laevo*). Additional argument for this is *pedem observare* in the short catalogue of pagan superstitious rites and customs in Martin of Braga's "*De correctione rusticorum*", cap. 16 (6th cent. AD), which obviously refers to the right and the left foot.

⁵¹ Hijmans a.o. *ibid.* n. 2 notice that the temple of Artemis in Tauris in Ov. *Pont.* 3. 2. 5 has 40 steps: *templa manent hodie vastis innixa columnis, / perque quater denos itur in illa pedes*.

⁵² Petersmann 1995, 79; 83 = 2002, 42; 46. Cf. Baldwin 1988, 39: "The point of *dextro pede* is to have Trimalchio's dining room treated as a temple <...>. The boy, then, functions as an acolyte in the present secular context". Sutphen 1901, 361 f. (repr.: Häussler 1968, 200 f.), though stating that this superstition "arose from the care to be observed in entering temples and other consecrated places on the right foot", does not regard its applying to entering the triclinium as unusual.

the worship of his guests, and furthermore, his entire house, has to be regarded as a place more sacred than an ordinary temple.

The scene with the Lares in ch. 60 that Petersmann here implies to be an analogy (to be discussed in the second part of this paper) does look like a travesty of an imperial cult. Yet, the prescript “*dextro pede!*” can well be explained otherwise than as a bold or ignorant sacralization.

It does not follow from Vitruvius’ text that only temples, and not private houses or rooms, were to be entered with the right foot forward. On the contrary, some examples of metaphorical usage (above all, Apul. *Met.* 6. 26: *pessumo pede domum nostram accessit* and Amm. Marc. 26. 6. 18 *Palatium pessimo pede festinatis passibus introiit*)⁵³ make it likely that it was important not only to leave, but also to arrive at a certain place with the proper foot, the ‘favorable’ and the ‘unfavorable’ foot being the right and left one, respectively.⁵⁴

The narrator does present the use of a separate servant to observe the entrance “on the right foot” as an eccentricity, but there is no need to suspect here a distortion of religious customs or even a claim to a special sacred status for the host (even though the honors requested by him do reveal comically exaggerated ambitions). Trimalchio regularly flaunts

⁵³ For ‘favorable/unfavorable foot’ on arrival, cf. also Sil. *Pun.* 7. 171–172 (above n. 49); Cat. 14. 21–23 *at vos interea valete, abite / illic, unde malum pedem attulistis, saeculi incommoda, pessimi poetae*; Prop. 3. 1. 5 (n. 48 above); Aug. *Epist.* 17. 2 (of the Punic name *Namfamo/Namphamo*, נַעַם פַּעַמֵּי) *quid aliud significat quam boni pedis hominem? id est, cuius adventus adferat aliquid felicitatis, sicut solemus dicere secundo pede introisse, cuius introitum prosperitas aliqua consecuta sit* (further, he cites *Aen.* 8. 302 *et nos et tua dexter adi pede sacra secundo*). Cf. also schol. in Aristoph. *Aves* 721 *θεράποντ’ ὄρνιν*: ἐπεὶ πολλάκις εἰώθαμέν τινας τῶν θεραπόντων καλόποδας λέγειν καὶ καλοϊωνίστους (thus Dübner 1883, 226; Rutherford 1896, 484 and Holwerda 1991, 114 prefer v.l. καλλιποδας <...> καλλοϊωνίστους); Haupt 1876 III, 596 refers to the name Ἀγαθόπους.

⁵⁴ See n. 50 above. According to Rini 1929, 85, in some regions of Tuscany the bride is believed to be cursed with bad luck if she steps over the threshold of the new house with her left foot (for omens at the threshold, cf. n. 45 above). Evidence for the lucky right and unlucky left foot in English folklore is found in Lean 1903 (mentioned by Wagener 1935, 87–88 with nn. 81–84), e.g., II. 1. 146–147: “To enter the house with the skir or left foot foremost – Bring down evil on the inmates. <...> Dr. Johnson held to this, and when he had done it, went out and re-entered right foot foremost. He seems to have had the same feeling as to making the first step out of doors. <...> [See Dr. Hill’s ed. of Boswell, i. 485.]”; cf. *ibid.* 260.

a wide scope and meticulous organization of all aspects of his life, and assigning single servants to peculiar one-time duties is a part of this.⁵⁵

The narrator's irony is aimed not only at the claims to an exaggerated social status, but also at the carefully planned stage management of the feast.⁵⁶ It is the simplemindedness of the host and his tireless persistence in what he believes to be a model of refined life and elegant taste that amuses the educated guests and the readers.

Along with stressing the luxury and creative household management, this might also aim at a sort of pun: "*dextro pede!*" in the sense of a metaphorical welcoming⁵⁷ reinterpreted literally.⁵⁸ If so, this joke would find a good parallel in Sen. *Ben.* 2. 12. 2, where Caligula is being chastised for making a person kiss his left foot after granting him life: *non hoc est rem publicam calcare, et quidem, licet id aliquis non putet ad rem pertinere, sinistro pede?* If not, the prescript might be just a way to involve the guests in his carefully planned performance from the very start.⁵⁹ It is hardly legitimate to see here a manifestation of Trimalchio's obsession with death⁶⁰ (this aspect will be discussed in detail in the forthcoming second part); for now, we only note that, like many other episodes, it is largely intended for the public.

⁵⁵ A trumpeter (*bucinator subornatus*; hardly an automaton, as sometimes believed) is assigned to the water clock to announce each hour "so that the master may know how much of his life he has lost" (26. 9); a special servant reads aloud the names of the *apophoreta* to the guests (56. 8 *puer* <...> *super hoc positus officium*; cf. the same wording in 30. 5 (unjustly deleted by Fraenkel [reported in Sullivan 1976, 108] as a gloss from 56. 8).

⁵⁶ See Keyer 2012, 273 with n. 42.

⁵⁷ Cf. Hor. *Epist.* 2. 37 *i pede fausto*; *Aen.* 8. 302 with Serv. ad loc. [see n. 47 and 53 above].

⁵⁸ Dölger 1930, 239 also sees here intended ambiguity between the metaphorical and the literal sense.

⁵⁹ I owe this idea to Petra Schierl. Hardly had the guests entered (30. 7 *ceterum ut pariter movimus dextros gressus*) when the slave who lost the steward's dinner dress at baths pleaded for their help, so that they had to repeat the entrance (*rettulimus dextros gressus*; Fraenkel [n. 55 above] deleted *dextros* in 30. 7 and 30. 9 as repetitive, but it helps to stress the guests' loyalty to the procedure) and petition for him; the steward reluctantly agrees (the dress had but sentimental value for him: *Tyria, sine dubio, sed iam semel lota*, 30. 11). In 31. 1–2 the protected slave turns out to be the butler, who promises his gratitude in return with a witty saying. It seems very likely that this whole scene, like many others in the *Cena*, was staged on purpose, so as to show off luxury and witticisms prepared in advance.

⁶⁰ Grondona 1980, 77–81.

At any rate, pace Petersmann, the episode of crossing the threshold gives no grounds to suspect Trimalchio of distorting popular customs.

To be continued.

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The author objects to H. Petersmann's view that Trimalchio's superstitious practice distorts common Roman customs and betrays his ignorance. The first half of the paper discusses two passages (Petr. 32. 3–4; 30. 5–6). (1) Petersmann erroneously states that Romans did not wear rings on their ring fingers and, relying on Plin. *NH* 28. 24, claims that Romans took off their rings during a meal. Yet, there is direct evidence for the opposite (Ov. *Am.* 1. 4. 26; Macr. *Sat.* 7. 13. 6), and for several reasons Pliny's words *nam si mensa adsit* are likely to have been corrupt or misinterpreted. (2) Relying on Vitruv. 3. 4. 4 (on entering temples), Petersmann presumes that entering with the right foot forward was confined to sacred places, so

that the prescript to enter Trimalchio's triclinium "*dextro pede*" renders divine honors to his house. Yet, passages like Ov. *Ibis* 101 with schol.; Apul. *Met.* 6. 26; Amm. Marc. 26. 6. 18 make it likely that not only temples, but also private houses were to be entered with the right foot forward.

Автор возражает против мнения Х. Петерсмана о том, что суеверные обычаи Трималххиона искажают общепринятую практику римлян и выдают его невежество. В первой половине статьи рассматриваются два эпизода (Petr. 32. 3–4; 30. 5–6). (1) Петерсман ошибочно считает, что римляне не носили кольцо на безымянном пальце, и, опираясь на Plin. *NH* XXVIII, 24, утверждает, что римляне снимали кольца во время трапезы. Между тем имеются прямые свидетельства, которые говорят об обратном (Ov. *Am.* 1. 4. 26; Macr. *Sat.* 7. 13. 6), и есть основания считать слова Плиния *nam si mensa adsit* искаженными или неверно истолкованными. (2) Опираясь на Vitruv. III, 4, 4 (о входе в храм), Петерсман предполагает, что обычай входить в помещение с правой ноги относился только к священным местам, так что предписание входить в триклиний Трималххиона "*dextro pede*" придавало его дому божественный статус вопреки обычаям. Тем не менее, на основании Ov. *Ibis* 101 cum schol.; Apul. *Met.* 6. 26; Amm. Marc. 26. 6. 18 и др. можно предположить, что с правой ноги входили не только в храмы, но и в другие помещения.

Tommaso Braccini

SULLA ROTTA DI TAPROBANE:
NUOVE ALLUSIONI GEOGRAFICHE NELLE
STORIE VERE

All'inizio delle sue *Storie vere*, Luciano cita espressamente solo due autori, oltre a Omero, tra i παλαιοὶ ποιηταὶ τε καὶ συγγραφεῖς καὶ φιλόσοφοι presi a bersaglio della sua parodia: si tratta (par. 3) di Ctesia, ὃς συνέγραψεν περὶ τῆς Ἰνδῶν χώρας καὶ τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς,¹ e del meno noto Giambulo, che scrisse περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ μεγάλῃ θαλάττῃ πολλὰ παράδοξα.² Il “grande mare” in questione è unanimemente identificato con l'Oceano Indiano, come mostra il sunto presente in Diodoro Siculo (II, 55–60) dell'utopica esperienza di viaggio di Giambulo in un'isola³ molto a oriente dell'Etiopia, e non troppo distante dalla città indiana di Palibotra.

Questi riferimenti nel proemio delle *Storie vere*, insomma, rimandano all'India, nonché alle isole favolose situate nel “grande mare” su cui si affacciava. Ciò non pare casuale.

1. Luciano e l'Oriente

Il lontano Oriente, infatti, viene evocato anche da altri riferimenti scherzosi presenti nelle opere lucianee.⁴ Nel *Cataplous*, per esempio, Cloto dichiara di doversi occupare di due defunti, Indopate ed Eramitre, che

¹ Ctesia viene tacciato di falso anche in seguito, insieme a Erodoto (II, 31).

² Su di lui cfr. in ultimo Zimmermann–Rengakos 2022, 1141–1144. In merito a questo passo proemiale e alle menzioni dei due autori, si veda almeno von Möllendorff 2000, 51–56.

³ Per quanto spesso si sia affermato che l'isola di Giambulo sarebbe un riflesso di Taprobane, ovvero l'attuale Sri Lanka, quest'assunto è stato categoricamente negato da Weerakkody 1997, 171–174; cfr. anche Faller 2000, 183–188.

⁴ Cfr. Sidebotham 1986, 142: “Lucian (c. 125 – c. 180) exhibits considerable interest in and knowledge of Indian products, geography, mythology, philosophy and religion. He also shows a keen interest in the Erythraean Sea region and in China”.

vengono qualificati come “Seri”, ovvero provenienti dalla remotissima landa della seta che noi identifichiamo con la Cina;⁵ nei *Fuggitivi*, invece, i Bramani vengono non banalmente ubicati (6) vicino τοῖς Νεχραίοις⁶ καὶ Ὁξυδράκαις. Questi ultimi, noti a partire dalla storiografia su Alessandro,⁷ sono menzionati anche nei *Dialoghi dei morti* 12, 5 e soprattutto in *Come si deve scrivere la storia* 31, dove si allude anche al porto di Muzirìs (sul quale si tornerà in seguito), a un immaginario “periplo del Mare Esterno” e ad altre fandonie sull’India che un non meglio specificato contemporaneo avrebbe avuto in animo di scrivere (*FGrH* 203 F 7 b).⁸ Quest’attenzione non deve stupire: le rotte commerciali che portavano verso l’India e oltre, come si vedrà anche in seguito, furono infatti interessate da un commercio sorprendentemente attivo in età imperiale, che le rese un argomento singolarmente attuale.⁹

Non stupisce, dunque, che nel concepire il viaggio fantastico delle sue *Storie vere*, teoricamente ambientato nell’Oceano occidentale oltre le Colonne d’Ercole, Luciano si sia divertito a effettuare una contaminazione tra estremo occidente ed estremo oriente. Da un lato ridicolizza le tradizioni di lunga data sulle Isole Fortunate¹⁰ e le informazioni favolose veicolate da Pitea di Marsiglia e dalle *Meraviglie oltre Tule* di Antonio Diogene.¹¹ Dall’altro, tiene presenti le tante testimonianze incredibili legate invece all’Oriente, in particolare quelle sui numerosi centri abitati dai nomi esotici e sulla lussureggiante fauna animale e umana che popolava coste

⁵ Cfr. *Cataplous* 21: ἐγὼ δὲ αὐτὴ ἐς τὸ ἀντιπέρασ ἀναπλευσοῦμαι Ἰνδοπάτην καὶ Ἡραμίθρην τοὺς Σήρας διάξουσιν· τεθνᾶσι γὰρ δὴ πρὸς ἀλλήλων περὶ γῆς ὄρων μαχόμενοι. Su questo passo si veda Sheldon 2012, 134.

⁶ Si può supporre che il nome di questa popolazione, altrimenti non attestato, sia da mettere in collegamento con quelli altrettanto privi di paralleli del paese di *Nebus* (il cui etnico greco potrebbe essere Νεβουσαῖοι), collocato nell’Estremo Oriente nell’*Expositio totius mundi et gentium*, 11 e 13, e con quello dei Νοκυμαῖοι menzionati tra Ἰνδοί e Ὁξύδρακες nella recensione β del *Romanzo di Alessandro*, I, 2.

⁷ Tra i testi che ci sono giunti, il nome della popolazione ricorre in questa forma a partire da Plutarco, *De Alex. Magni fort.* 343 D; Arriano, *Anab.* V, 22, 2; Appiano, *BC* II, 21, 152; cfr. inoltre Stein 1942, 2024.

⁸ Cfr. Parker 2008, 222–223.

⁹ Testimoniato anche dai recenti ritrovamenti archeologici a Berenice, uno dei principali porti egiziani sul Mar Rosso: cfr. Sidebotham 2011, 221–245, nonché 254–258 per gli scambi culturali che accompagnarono quelli commerciali.

¹⁰ Sulle quali cfr. almeno Manfredi 1996.

¹¹ Indicato come ipotesto da Fozio, *Biblioteca*, cod. 166, 111 b, e dagli stessi scolii alle *Storie vere*, par. 12. Sulla discussa questione degli effettivi rapporti tra Luciano e Antonio Diogene, si veda almeno von Möllendorff 2000, 104–109.

e isole lungo la rotta per l'India, e oltre.¹² Quanto fossero diffusi, nel II secolo, materiali di questo tipo è mostrato dal celebre passo di Aulo Gellio (*NA IX*, 4) in cui ricorda di essersi imbattuto sulle banchine del porto di Brindisi in libri, offerti a prezzo stracciato, rigurgitanti tra l'altro di *apud ultimas Orientis terras miracula*. Tra gli autori citati da Gellio c'è proprio Ctesia, al quale si può aggiungere Onesicrito, che aveva scritto della navigazione oceanica guidata da Nearco al tempo della spedizione di Alessandro.¹³

Luciano probabilmente aveva presente tutto questo, e altro.¹⁴ Oltre al rimando aperto a Ctesia e Giambulo (e a echi di altri autori, per esempio Megastene, che sono stati variamente rilevati¹⁵), nelle *Storie vere*, giustamente definite “d'une rare densité parodique”,¹⁶ sembrano infatti affiorare ulteriori, molteplici bersagli dell'umorismo dell'autore che rivelano la sua amplissima ricettività. Già in passato sono stati postulati contatti tra quest'opera e i celebri viaggi di Sindbad il Marinaio nelle *Mille e una notte*,¹⁷ e questa linea può rivelarsi ulteriormente produttiva.

Si può pensare in particolare a uno degli ultimi episodi, quello relativo all'approdo del narratore e compagni nell'isola delle Onoscelee (*II*, 46), bellissime e ingannevoli donne che accolgono fin troppo entusiasticamente e ospitalmente i nuovi arrivati. Sarà proprio la voce narrante a scoprire che si tratta di demoni dalle zampe d'asino, che intendono divorare i marinai non appena si saranno addormentati, spossati dal vino e dai piaceri d'amore. Luciano e i suoi, a quel punto, si salveranno con una rapida fuga.

È evidente lo scoperto richiamo alle vicende odissiache di Circe (con tanto di malva usata al posto dell'erba *μῶλυ*) e delle Sirene (come mostrano le ossa umane che si trovano sparse per la città delle diavolesse), e forse non

¹² Cfr. Parker 2008, 308, secondo cui dal punto di vista dei Romani l'India fu “a moveable site of exotic fantasy that drifted in and out of focus at different times and in different contexts”.

¹³ Per i frammenti si veda Whitby 2016; la testimonianza di Gellio è censita come T 12.

¹⁴ Cfr. Hall 1981, 347: “Lucian was drawing on a variety of those travelers' tales which so aroused Gellius' disapproval”.

¹⁵ Cfr. la classica e dettagliata rassegna di Bompaire 1958, 658–673; Hall 1981, 340–353; Georgiadou – Larmour 1998, 28 e Bompaire 1998, 42. Oltre a Megastene, sono stati fatti i nomi di Evemero con la sua isola di Pancaia nell'Oceano Indiano, e anche di Callistene, che pur non avendo trattato dell'India nelle sue incompiute *Ἀλεξάνδρου πράξεις*, potrebbe avervi accennato in altre opere autentiche o pseud-epigrafe: cfr. Rzepka 2016, F 59.

¹⁶ Cfr. Bompaire 1958, 672.

¹⁷ Cfr. Hall 1981, 578.

manca nell'episodio anche un richiamo all'Empusa aristofanea.¹⁸ Tuttavia l'operazione parodica, lucianea e non solo, si nutre di un *clash* tra richiami "alti" ai classici e allusioni scherzose a storie contemporanee dequalificate, anche di ambito subletterario o extraletterario.¹⁹ Si può ricorrere a un esempio contemporaneo per chiarire il concetto. Non si potrebbero capire i celebri *Promessi Sposi* televisivi del Trio (1990) rimanendo ancorati solo all'ipotesi dichiarato e ai modelli più aulici: il divertimento, per il pubblico, derivava dalle contaminazioni con tutta una serie di elementi "extracanonici", dalle fiabe, alle pubblicità, alle *telenovelas*, al calcio, a vari tormentoni di quegli anni.

Mutatis mutandis, la portata della parodia lucianea nell'episodio delle Onoscelee è dunque svelata appieno solo se si postulano anche allusioni extraomeriche ed extrascolastiche, tenendo presente quella che è stata definita "omnivorous passion for subliterate narrative traditions" di Luciano.²⁰ Nella creazione dell'episodio, dunque, probabilmente vengono riecheggiate anche la tradizione geografica sui favolosi *Ἰππόποδες* (variamente localizzati ai confini del mondo conosciuto²¹) e, soprattutto, materiale narrativo ampiamente circolante. La storia presenta infatti notevoli paralleli con storie di ambito orientale,²² in primo luogo quelle sulle seducenti diavolesse (tradite, o rivelate come tali, proprio dalle loro zampe d'asino) che risultano attestate in varie testimonianze tardoantiche e, soprattutto, nel mondo arabo dal medioevo a oggi.²³ Oltre a queste sembra poi produttivo accostare la narrazione lucianea a una vicenda ampiamente sovrapponibile presente nei *Jātaka*. Si tratta, com'è noto, di una raccolta buddhista di storie tradizionali indiane dal repertorio di monaci girovaghi e cantastorie

¹⁸ Per questi riferimenti cfr. Stengel 1911, 88–89; Ollier 1962, 97–98; Georgiadou–Larmour 1998, 229–231; Bompair 1998, 133; von Möllendorff 2000, 489–495.

¹⁹ Cfr. Jones 1986, 50–51, e soprattutto Camerotto 1998, 10, che nel trattare della contaminazione parodica di piani diversi attuata nella *μῦσις* lucianea ricorda il ricorso a "linguaggi e anche... componenti extra-letterarie". Cfr. anche ivi, pp. 106–107, per una discussione sulla *μῦσις* parodica attuata mescolando vorticosamente il *σέμνόν* e il *γελοῖον* a partire da molteplici generi e ipotesi.

²⁰ Cfr. ní Mheallaigh 2014, 95.

²¹ Menzionati da Pomponio Mela (*Chorographia* III, 56, ripreso da Plinio, *NH* IV, 95) e da Dionigi Periegeta (v. 310) come popolazione dell'estremo nord, si trasformano in una delle *insulae orientalis oceani* elencate insieme a Taprobane da Giulio Onorio, p. 24 Riese, a sua volta seguito da altri cosmografi tardolatini e da Giordane (*Getica* 1). Cfr. Parroni 1984, 355–356, e Faller 2000, 172–173.

²² Cfr. Rohde 1914, 204–210; Braccini 2018b, 108–110.

²³ Cfr. Braccini 2018a.

itineranti,²⁴ compilata nel V secolo d.C. ma contenente materiale anche di molto anteriore, come mostra la presenza di vari episodi in cicli iconografici del II e I secolo a.C.²⁵ Nella narrazione intitolata *Valāhassa-Jātaka*, la n. 196 della raccolta, compare così la menzione della “città di demoni” chiamata Sirīsavatthu, sull’isola di Tambapannī (la Taprobane delle fonti latine e greche²⁶). Li abitavano diavolesse cannibali (*yakkhini*) che, all’arrivo di naufraghi, si abbigliavano sontuosamente ed andavano ad accoglierli, raccontando di aver perso da anni notizia dei propri mariti. Le *yakkhini* finivano così per sedurre i nuovi arrivati, sposandone uno per ciascuna e portandolo a casa propria; passato qualche tempo, i malcapitati erano destinati a essere sbranati. Una volta però il capo di un gruppo di mercanti si accorse che la sua sposa, allontanatasi nottetempo, era una diavolessa antropofaga (a tradirla fu il corpo insolitamente gelido); il mattino dopo l’uomo radunò i compagni e organizzò la fuga, che ebbe successo grazie al provvidenziale sopraggiungere del futuro Buddha che portò via in volo i naviganti in pericolo.²⁷

2. Taprobane, un tema di attualità in età imperiale

Il parallelo tra l’episodio delle *Storie vere* e questa edificante storia di viaggi buddhista è meno sorprendente di quel che potrebbe sembrare. Non solo, come si vedrà anche in seguito, la frequenza di contatti tra mercanti e viaggiatori greco-romani, palmireni, arabi e indiani lungo le rotte e presso gli empori commerciali disseminati tra il Mar Rosso e l’India è ben attestata in età imperiale,²⁸ e non mancano attestazioni

²⁴ Cfr. Lüders 2001, 422–424.

²⁵ Cfr. Boccali–Piano–Sani 2000, 96–97.

²⁶ Cfr. Weerakkody 1997, 17–20.

²⁷ Cfr. D’Onza Chiodo 1992, 214–216. Si veda anche Braccini 2018a, 137–138.

²⁸ Si pensi per esempio alla descrizione della comunità arabo-indo-greca dell’isola di Socotra, al largo del Corno d’Africa, nel *Periplus Maris Erythraei* 30, confermata in anni recenti dal ritrovamento di centinaia di antichi graffiti indiani, sudarabici, axumiti, palmireni e greci (uno dei quali, databile al 230 d.C. circa, lasciato da un ναύκληρος chiamato Σεπτίμιος Πανίσκος) in una grotta sacra dell’isola: cfr. i vari saggi contenuti in Strauch 2012, in particolare quello di Bukharin. Per le possibilità di diffusione di materiale narrativo propiziate da questi contatti valgono le considerazioni, relative all’epoca bizantina, di Maltese 1993, 12, che ricorda “l’apporto vivo e assiduo di racconti ascoltati e riferiti, di storie, anche isolate, che passano di bocca in bocca, di corte in corte, di mercato in mercato, confluendo magari, per vie ignote, nelle redazioni letterarie”.

della conoscenza del buddhismo in Occidente nello stesso periodo,²⁹ ma proprio Taprobane sembra essere stata oggetto di grande interesse nell'impero romano da quando un'ambasceria proveniente da lì si recò presso l'imperatore Claudio. L'episodio è raccontato estesamente da Plinio il Vecchio,³⁰ che esordisce ricordando (*NH* VI, 81) come *Taprobanen alterum orbem terrarum esse diu existimatum est Antichthonum appellatione*, “a lungo Taprobane fosse stata ritenuta un altro mondo e chiamata ‘terra degli Antictoni’”.³¹ La situazione era cambiata quando una tempesta aveva fatto approdare sull'isola uno dei liberti di Annio Plocamo, incaricato di riscuotere le tasse nella zona del Mar Rosso.³² Il forestiero, dopo aver appreso la lingua del luogo, aveva informato il re del posto dell'esistenza dell'impero romano. Il sovrano, molto ammirato, l'aveva rimandato indietro insieme a quattro ambasciatori capeggiati da un certo Rachia, che giunti al cospetto dell'imperatore avevano descritto minuziosamente la loro patria fornendo dati geografici e raccontando una serie di storie, alcune plausibili, altre che alle orecchie di un razionalista come Luciano dovevano suonare abbastanza inverosimili.

Su alcune di queste notizie torneremo in seguito; certo è che a esse si andarono aggiungendo successivamente concrezioni ancora più stravaganti, fomentate dal fatto che, com'è stato osservato, in realtà anche in seguito Taprobane rimase un luogo quasi mitico, a causa delle difficoltà di raggiungerla da parte dei mercanti, che dovevano ottimizzare al massimo le stagioni dei monsoni e per i quali la costa occidentale dell'India era una destinazione nettamente più agevole. A questo si sommava il fatto che erano gli stessi Indiani, gelosi del proprio ruolo di intermediari, a dissuadere gli stranieri dal recarsi nell'isola.³³

Proprio a una delle più fantasiose tra le notizie su Taprobane che circolavano ai suoi tempi Luciano sembra rimandare in uno dei più celebri (e fortunati) episodi delle *Storie vere*, quello in cui la sua nave viene

²⁹ A partire dalla più esplicità, quella di Clemente Alessandrino, *Strom.* I, 15, 71, 6, dove si fa riferimento agli Indiani che seguono gli insegnamenti di quel Βούττα, che δι' ὑπερβολὴν σεμνότητος ὡς θεὸν τετιμῆκασιν.

³⁰ Cfr. Weerakkody 1997, 51–77; McLaughlin 2010, 117–120; Roller 2022, 354–359, nonché il dettagliato commento di André – Filliozat 1980, 110–119 e 150–153 e Faller 2000, 59–110.

³¹ Sulla conoscenza pregressa di Taprobane nel mondo antico, cfr. almeno Faller 2000, 26–51.

³² Su questa figura si veda De Romanis 2020, 299–300.

³³ Cfr. Weerakkody 1997, 2–3. Cfr. *ivi*, 144, per l'incremento degli effettivi contatti tra impero romano e Taprobane che sarebbe avvenuto nel V secolo, soprattutto per sviluppi politici inerenti agli Stati dell'India.

inghiottita tutta intera con l'equipaggio da una mostruosa balena (κῆτος). Per quanto singoli uomini inghiottiti da κῆτη di vario genere (a partire dal biblico Giona) e immensi leviatani non siano rari nella narrativa e nel folklore mondiale,³⁴ tuttavia non è il caso di fare sbrigativamente di tutta l'erba un fascio. L'idea che i mostri possano inghiottire navi intere non è banale né così diffusa,³⁵ ed è molto rilevante che ci sia un'attestazione antica precisa, coeva e geograficamente ben determinata. Nella *Descrizione del mondo* di Dionisio Periegeta, infatti, la menzione della μητέρα Ταπροβάνην Ἀσιηγενέων ἐλεφάντων (v. 593) è seguita subito dopo da queste romanzesche notazioni (596–605):³⁶

αὐτὴ δ' εὐρυτάτῃ μέγεθος πέλει· ἀμφὶ δὲ πάντα
κῆτεα θῖνες ἔχουσιν, Ἐρυθραίου βοτὰ πόντου,
οὖρεσιν ἡλιβάτοισιν ἐοικότα· τῶν δ' ὑπὲρ ἄκρων
τέτρηχεν νώτων περιμήκετος ὄλκος ἀκάνθης.
δυσμενέων τοι παῖδες, ἐλίσσόμενοι κατὰ πόντον,
κείνοις ἀντιάσειαν ἀλώμενοι· οὐ γὰρ ἐρωὴ
λυγροῖς ἐν στομάτεσσιν, ἐπεὶ μέγα χάσμα τέτυκται·
πολλάκι δ' ἂν καὶ νῆα σὺν αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσι νηὸς
κεῖνα καταβρόξειε τεράατα· τοῖς γὰρ ἀλιτροῖς
εἰν ἄλλι καὶ γαίῃ κακὰ μυρία θήκατο δαίμων.

Essa è d'ampiezza grandissima; e ovunque intorno le sue coste vedono balene, bestie del Mar Rosso, simili a torreggianti montagne, con la cima del dorso percorsa da una lunga sequenza di spine. Ai figli dei miei nemici, mentre percorrono il mare, auguro d'incontrarle nei loro vagabondaggi: non v'è scampo infatti da quelle terribili bocche, una volta che come voragine siano spalancate: spesso anche una nave con tutto l'equipaggio quei mostri sarebbero in grado d'inghiottire: per chi è condannato, in terra e in mare la divinità ha concepito mali infiniti.

³⁴ Sempre utile la rassegna di Coulter 1926.

³⁵ Coulter 1926 rimanda a un racconto dell'*Oceano dei fiumi dei racconti* di Somadeva, cap. 123 st. 171 D (2), per il quale cfr. Penzer 1924–1928, II, 193 sgg., n. 1, e IX, 51, e a un episodio dei *Gesta Romanorum* (251, app. 55 Oesterley). Thompson censisce il motivo come F 911. 4. 1 *Fish swallows ship*, rimandando a Somadeva. L'importanza dell'India per questo tipo di narrazione è stata evidenziata da Coulter 1926, 49–50.

³⁶ Su questo passo, gli scolii che lo corredano e le più tarde riprese latine di Avieno e Prisciano si veda Faller 2000, 166–171.

La rilevanza di questi versi per le *Storie vere* era stata ben rilevata da Stengel,³⁷ che aveva anche notato come la $\mu\tilde{\iota}\xi\iota\varsigma$ parodica in questo caso si alimentasse della contaminazione con l'episodio odissiaco di Cariddi. L'importanza risulta ancora più evidente se si nota come la notizia di Dionigi abbia precisi paralleli in antiche leggende buddhiste indiane.³⁸ Risulta confermata, insomma, l'importanza dell'orizzonte costituito dall'Asia meridionale e sudorientale per Luciano, e anche la possibile sponda parodica costituita dalla coeva letteratura geografica *lato sensu*, con le possibili riprese di materiale narrativo locale.³⁹

3. Luciano e Muziris: un riferimento trascurato

Quest'ultima possibilità però è stata finora pochissimo vagliata in tal senso, forse anche perché si è deciso di prendere troppo *at face value* la menzione classicistica dei $\pi\alpha\lambda\alpha\iota\omicron\iota$ da parte di Luciano, che sicuramente caratterizza gli autori (Omero, Erodoto, Ctesia...) più bersagliati nelle *Storie vere*, ma alla quale sembra eccessivo imputare un valore

³⁷ Cfr. Stengel 1911, 40, nonché Rohde 1914, 209 n., il molto cursorio Bompaigne 1958, 668 n. 3 e von Möllendorff 2000, 234–235.

³⁸ Cfr. Weerakkody 1997, 115, che rimanda in particolare alla raccolta di apologhi buddhisti nota come *Divyāvadāna*, compilata intorno al III sec. d.C. nell'India Nordoccidentale. Qui (XVIII, 228–234) compare la storia dei mercanti che, di ritorno dall'Isola dei Tesori sulla quale hanno fatto razzia di gemme, s'imbattono nel mostruoso pesce Timiṅgila, che risucchia tutto dentro le sue mostruose fauci. Il capitano della nave grida "Friends, look at that! What appears like a mountain rising from the water is his head. And look! Those dark ruby-red streaks are his lips. And see there! That dazzling white strip is a row of his teeth [cfr. Luc. *VH* 1, 30: ...τοὺς δόδοντας ἐκφαίνον πολὺ τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν φαλλῶν ὑψηλοτέρους, ὅξεῖς δὲ πάντας ὥσπερ σκόλοπας καὶ λευκοὺς ὥσπερ ἐλεφαντίνους]. And look at those two things that appear like suns from far away! Those are the pupils of his eyes" (la traduzione è ricavata da Rotman 2017). Quando la nave sta per essere inghiottita, uno dei mercanti invoca Buddha e il mostro marino, per evitare di compiere un sacrilegio, chiude delicatamente la bocca e risparmia l'imbarcazione. La storia era in circolazione da molto tempo, come mostra un medaglione scolpito dallo *stupa* buddhista di Bharhut, nell'India Centrale, che risale al II secolo a.C. e raffigura l'episodio, fornendo per giunta il nome del pio mercante che salva tutti gli altri, Vasuguta. Cfr. Barua 1934, 78–81.

³⁹ Per un quadro delle conoscenze relative all'India e a ciò che si trovava ancora più a Oriente in età imperiale, e della relativa letteratura, ancora utile la panoramica di Thomson 1965, 298–319.

rigidamente esclusivo⁴⁰ – tantopiù che in genere, a partire da Fozio, non si fa difficoltà a riconoscere un importante ruolo di ispirazione alle già citate *Meraviglie oltre Tule* di Antonio Diogene (databili con ogni verosimiglianza tra I e II sec. d.C.⁴¹). La familiarità di Luciano con scritti e autori contemporanei emerge peraltro anche altrove nella sua produzione, a partire per esempio da cenni presenti nel *Come si deve scrivere la storia*.⁴² Proprio in quest'ultima opera, in effetti, accanto alla menzione dell'India, di un "Periplo del Mare Esterno" e degli Ossidraci, compare il già citato riferimento al porto indiano di Μουζιρίς, dal quale si dice che invierà i suoi resoconti l'innominato autore preso a bersaglio. Non è forse stato notato a sufficienza come questa menzione non sia una ripresa dai consueti *loci* retorici,⁴³ ma risulti invece di stretta attualità.

Oltre a Luciano, infatti, questa località che tra I e II sec. d.C. diventò il principale emporio per il commercio indo-romano⁴⁴ è menzionata solo da Plinio (*NH* VI, 104) nella sua precisa descrizione della rotta attuale dei mercanti dall'Egitto all'India (di cui costituiva il primo approdo),⁴⁵ dal

⁴⁰ Così come sembra troppo schematico ritenere, come sembra fare Bompaire 1958, 223, che le conoscenze geografiche di Luciano non andassero oltre i toponimi e le località che cita espressamente nella sua opera e che, non sorprendentemente visti gli argomenti che tratta, sono molto pochi.

⁴¹ Cfr. in ultimo Zimmermann–Rengakos 2022, 1114.

⁴² Questo anche a prescindere dalla questione se i "frammenti" veicolati nell'opera, raccolti e commentati da Stronk 2016, siano autentici (così, più o meno esplicitamente, pensano tra gli altri Hurst 2010, XVI, e Montanari 2002, X) oppure si tratti di invenzioni *verosimili* di Luciano stesso, secondo la posizione di Strobel ripresa in ultimo anche da Brodersen 2018, 37–44.

⁴³ Per il carattere retorico e antonomastico di tanti riferimenti etnografici e geografici che ricorrono nell'opera di Luciano si rimanda alla rassegna di Bompaire 1958, 221–235.

⁴⁴ Non manca un importante papiro (*P. Vindobonensis* G 40822, noto come *Muziris Papyrus*, sul quale è adesso fondamentale il già più volte citato De Romanis 2020), datato alla metà del II secolo d.C., che documenta i rapporti commerciali tra l'impero romano e questa località indiana, elencando tra l'altro il carico soggetto a oneri doganali (pepe, avorio, nardo, malabatro...) di una nave che da lì aveva fatto ritorno in Egitto, la *Hermapollon*. Muziris compare poi nella *Tabula Peutingeriana*, contraddistinta dalla presenza di un *Templum Augusti* che pare evidenziare gli stretti legami che univano quest'emporio con l'impero romano. Su Muziris (Muciri in antichi testi tamil), forse da identificare con le attuali località di Kodungallur o di Pattanam, si veda innanzitutto Herrmann 1933, poi André–Filliozat 1980, 137 n. 7, e infine, anche per il tempio di Augusto, McLaughlin 2010, 20 e 49 e Fauconnier 2012, 90–93.

⁴⁵ Cfr. De Romanis 2020, 141–149.

Periplus maris Erythraei,⁴⁶ in genere datato alla metà del I secolo d.C. ma forse risalente all'inizio del II,⁴⁷ che la qualifica (54) come ἀκμάζουσα δὲ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀριακῆς εἰς αὐτὴν ἐρχομένοις πλοίοις καὶ τοῖς Ἑλληνικοῖς, e infine da Tolomeo (*Geografia* VII, 1, 8) che fornisce le coordinate precise di Μουζιρίς ἐμπόριον.⁴⁸ Si tratta di tre autori tecnici e recenti, se non addirittura contemporanei rispetto al retore di Samosata, che in questo riferimento evidentemente viene meno al manierato classicismo che gli viene talora imputato.

Non si tratta, verosimilmente, di un caso. L'interesse di Luciano per le nuove rotte verso l'Oriente pare infatti evidenziato anche dalla storia contemporanea, da lui narrata nell'*Alessandro* (44), del giovane galata che, mentre studiava ad Alessandria, aveva ben pensato dapprima di spingersi fino al porto di Clisma, sul Mar Rosso (ancora una volta, Luciano è uno dei primi a menzionarlo⁴⁹), e poi da lì si era imbarcato per l'India, per poi tornare molto tempo dopo, quando i familiari lo davano ormai per morto.⁵⁰ Il giovane tra l'altro si era recato da Alessandria a Clisma (non lontano da Suez) utilizzando il vecchio canale tolemaico recentemente riaperto da Traiano per facilitare gli scambi con Muziris e gli altri scali dell'Oriente, e che per questo aveva ricevuto il nome di Τραιανὸς ποταμός (Tolomeo, *Geografia* IV, 5, 54).⁵¹ Luciano, insomma, era informato sui più recenti sviluppi relativi alla navigazione verso l'India (è l'unico autore non tecnico, tra quelli che ci sono giunti, a menzionarne il porto più frequentato ai suoi tempi!), e questo autorizza a indagare su altre possibili

⁴⁶ Su quest'opera cfr. Parker 2008, 55 (dove si nota come sia il primo testo noto che tratta dell'India meridionale); Belfiore 2013; De Romanis 2016, 106 per l'ipotesi che l'autore possa essere il periplografo noto come Sosandro ὁ κυβερνήτης; De Romanis 2020, 135–141; Brodersen 2023 (con ampia bibliografia).

⁴⁷ Per questa proposta di datazione cfr. Chernyak 2012 [А. Б. Черняк, “Эскадра Траяна на Красном море: Евтропий, Дион Кассий и *Перипл Эритрейского моря*”].

⁴⁸ Cfr. De Romanis 2020, 150–155.

⁴⁹ Cfr. Thonemann 2021, 131.

⁵⁰ Sull'episodio, cfr. De Romanis 2020, 37–38, che propende per la sua veridicità, o almeno per una totale verosimiglianza.

⁵¹ Sul canale traiano (probabilmente oggetto di lavori anche sotto Adriano), menzionato esplicitamente anche in un *ostrakon* del 112 d.C. e poi in vari papiri fino all'VIII secolo, si vedano almeno Sijpesteijn 1963, 70–83; McLaughlin 2010, 33; De Romanis 2020, 36–42. L'interesse di Traiano per l'India è testimoniato anche da un frammento di Cassio Dione (LXVIII, 29, 1): l'imperatore, giunto al Golfo Persico e vedendo una nave salpare per l'India, avrebbe affermato che se fosse stato giovane si sarebbe recato là anche lui, Ἰνδοὺς τε γὰρ ἐνενόει, καὶ τὰ ἐκείνων πράγματα ἐπολυπραγμόνει. Cfr. Sidebotham 1986, 147; Parker 2008, 221–222.

allusioni parodiche, all'interno delle *Storie vere*, rispetto alla letteratura geografica e odoeporica recente in merito all'India, a Taprobane e a ciò che c'era ancora oltre.

4. L'isola e la città delle Onoscelee: difrazioni e congetture

In effetti, quest'orizzonte finora sostanzialmente negletto⁵² pare innanzitutto illuminante anche per un ulteriore dettaglio relativo all'episodio citato in precedenza, quello delle Onoscelee. La città e l'isola delle diavolesse, infatti, vengono indicate con due toponimi precisi, che hanno dato non poco filo da torcere dal punto di vista ecdotico.⁵³

Per quanto riguarda l'isola, il manoscritto più antico, Γ (Vat. gr. 90, del X secolo), seguito da φ (Laur. Conv. soppr. 77, del XIV–XV sec.), presenta Ἐκβαλοῦσα. Già l'antico correttore di Γ, il vescovo Alessandro di Nicea (attivo nel X secolo), segnala tuttavia la *varia lectio* (γράφεται) Καβαλοῦσα, che in effetti compare (talora come Καβαλλοῦσα o Καββαλοῦσα) negli altri manoscritti afferenti alle due classi principali in cui si divide la tradizione manoscritta luciana, γ e β, nonché nei “misti”, compresi gli antichi Ω (Marc. gr. 434, del X–XI sec.) ed S (Mutin. gr. α.V.8.15, dell'XI sec.). Gli editori spesso hanno stampato Καβαλοῦσα, a partire dall'*editio princeps* fiorentina del 1496, e così ancora Harmon; il senso potrebbe essere quello di “Isola del Massacro” (da καταβάλλω) o vi si potrebbe rintracciare un'allusione alla natura asinina delle sue abitanti, tramite un qualche collegamento con il latino *caballus*.⁵⁴ Nilén invece ha accettato il testo di Γ, al quale si potrebbe dare il senso di “Isola dello Scaricamento” o addirittura “del Divorzio”; Macleod e Bompaire hanno scelto di stampare, infine, il plausibile Κοβαλοῦσα di Guyet (Schwartz preferiva invece Κοβαλοῦσσα), che ha il vantaggio di rimanere molto

⁵² La stessa intuizione di Stengel relativamente a Dionisio Periegeta non è stata raccolta e valorizzata in seguito: Ollier 1962, 37, si limita a rimandare a Cariddi, e Georgiadou–Larmour 1998, 156–157, vanno invece a scomodare i miti di Esione e Andromeda, o la figura evanescente di Antifane di Berga.

⁵³ Per le lezioni dei manoscritti mi sono rifatto all'apparato di Bompaire 1998, tranne che nel caso di P, la cui lezione relativa al nome della città, ritenuta illeggibile da Nilén al quale si rifanno anche Macleod e Bompaire, risulta invece perspicua nella digitalizzazione del f. 244r presente all'indirizzo https://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Vat.gr.76. Sulla questione, cfr. anche von Möllendorff 2000, 494 n. 34.

⁵⁴ Cfr. Georgiadou–Larmour 1998, 230. Quest'ultima interpretazione è approvata anche da Raïos 2019, disponibile online all'indirizzo <http://books.openedition.org/pulg/17570>, qui n. 18.

vicino al testo tràdito introducendo un gioco di parole con il termine aristofaneo κόβαλος, “furbo, imbroglione” (οἱ Κόβαλοι in *Eq.* 635 sono scherzosamente i “demoni della truffa”).

La città invece è chiamata Ὑδαμαρδία in Γ e nei manoscritti più antichi; alcuni testimoni (C = Par. gr. 3011, del XIV sec., e O = Monac. gr. 490, del XV sec.) hanno Ὑδραμαρδία, una trasparente banalizzazione vista l’ambientazione marina della vicenda; Γ presenta poi la correzione Ὑδαμή a opera di Alessandro di Nicea, condivisa da φ e Z (Vat. gr. 1323, del XIII–XIV sec.). E ancora, P (Vat. gr. 76, del XIV secolo) ha Οὐδαμή, “da nessuna parte” (a quanto pare presente anche in Z = Vat. gr. 1323, del XIII–XIV sec.), corretto però in Ὑδραμαρδία. In genere gli editori hanno stampato Ὑδαμαρδία (così per esempio Harmon) o Ὑδραμαρδία; ultimamente però si è imposta la congettura Ὑδαμαργία di Mras, accettata da Macleod e Bompaire, che oltre a essere molto economica ha una valenza umoristica evidente: collega la radice di ὕδωρ, ancora una volta con un riferimento all’ambientazione marina (senza contare che alla fine una delle diavolesse si dissolve in acqua), a μάργος, attestato già nell’*Odissea* nel senso di “stolto” e “ingordo”, e in seguito anche in quello di “lussurioso”:⁵⁵ si tratta di significati senz’altro appropriati per le Onoscelee.⁵⁶

Qualunque assetto testuale si accetti, quel che sembra evidente, sulla base dell’*usus* luciano, è che nella formazione di questi nomi debba avere senz’altro un ruolo rilevante l’elemento umoristico. La diffrazione della tradizione manoscritta fa però comprendere come i due toponimi non dovessero suonare così chiari, e in effetti sembrano abbastanza distanti da altre denominazioni ben più trasparenti presenti nell’opera, inventate *ad hoc* come Λυχνόπολις (I, 29), Φελλώ (II, 4) o Τυρόεσσα (II, 25–26), e ancora le isole τῶν ἀσεβῶν, l’isola-città dei Sogni (entrambe II, 27) o l’isola dei Bucefali (II, 44), o tratte di peso dalla tradizione precedente come l’isola di Calipso (II, 27), l’aristofanea Νεφελοκοκκυγία (*ibidem*) ed ἡ νῆσος τῶν Μακάρων (II, 6). Non a caso, tutti questi nomi sono attestati pressoché univocamente nei codici, a differenza di quelli estremamente problematici dell’isola e della città delle diavolesse antropofaghe. Tutto ciò, insomma, lascia sospettare che questi due toponimi non siano scaturiti *ex nihilo*, ma siano stati innestati su una base preesistente, comicamente storpiata con assonanze e paronomasie. Tali “ipotonimi” dovevano risultare presenti e attuali a Luciano e al suo pubblico, ma molto meno ai

⁵⁵ Cfr. almeno Theogn. 581, Aesch. *Suppl.* 741, Eur. *El.* 1027.

⁵⁶ Si veda in ultimo Raio 2019, n. 19.

copisti dei secoli successivi.⁵⁷ Le incertezze di questi ultimi potrebbero derivare proprio dalla perdita di quel sottobosco di testi geografici o “fantageografici”, ἐμπορικὰ διηγήματα⁵⁸ e narrazioni di viaggio da lui stigmatizzati all’inizio delle *Storie vere*, dove come si è visto l’autore fa espresso riferimento a opere che trattano dell’India e dei mari e delle isole che la circondavano. La domanda, a questo punto, è però su cosa Luciano, con il consueto meccanismo della μῖξις parodica, abbia innestato la sua rielaborazione faceta.

5. *Barousai* e *Margana*: un ipotesto geografico?

Fermo restando che la “biblioteca” di cui sopra è andata quasi completamente perduta, c’è tuttavia un’opera che, per quanto in forma scheletrica, ci dà esattamente il quadro di quello che nel II secolo si sapeva, o si credeva di sapere, del globo terracqueo, comprese le isole più lontane e favolose. Il riferimento naturalmente è alla *Geografia* di Claudio Tolomeo, già citata in precedenza per il caso di Muziris. E se si va a consultare il VII libro della *Geografia*, dedicato all’Asia Orientale, nel capitolo in cui si tratta della topografia dell’India al di là del Gange (Ἰνδικῆς τῆς ἐκτὸς Γάργγου θέσις), ci si imbatte nella menzione, sintetica ma al tempo stesso eloquente, di un gruppo di isole (VII, 2, 28):

Βαροῦσαι πέντε, ἐν αἷς Ἀνθρωποφάγους εἶναί φασι κατανεμομένους,
τὸ δὲ μεταξὺ τῶν νήσων ἐπέχει μοίρας ρνβ°γο’ νότ. ε°γ’

Il cenno, per quanto eloquente, è scarno, ma si può senz’altro ritenere che Tolomeo attingesse a narrazioni più estese relative a queste remote isole *Barousai* abitate da antropofagi, come quella di un oscuro “Alessandro” che menziona in relazione a località dell’Indocina e dell’Indonesia;⁵⁹ del resto tutta la sezione sull’Estremo Oriente, insolitamente guarnita di cenni etnografici e persino paradossografici, mostra segni di derivazione da

⁵⁷ Forse addirittura della generazione immediatamente successiva alla sua, se è vero che già in età severiana si nota un netto calo delle conoscenze relative all’Oceano Indiano e all’India: cfr. Sidebotham 1986, 163.

⁵⁸ Come quelli discussi dallo stesso Tolomeo e dal suo predecessore Marino di Tiro, che se ne erano serviti per le loro rappresentazioni dell’Estremo Oriente: cfr. Parker 2008, 190; Marcotte 2016, 175.

⁵⁹ Cfr. *Geografia* I, 14; cfr. anche Berggren – Jones 2000, 75–76 n. 52 e Roller 2024, 10, 169 e 173–174.

resoconti scritti od orali di viaggiatori e soprattutto mercanti,⁶⁰ quella che lo stesso Tolomeo sembra definire ἱστορία περιοδική.⁶¹

Queste narrazioni potrebbero non essere state dissimili da quelle che si trovano nei geografi islamici, che a partire dalla metà del IX secolo con il loro apripista, il persiano Ibn Khurradādhbih,⁶² fanno riferimento nei medesimi mari a est dell'India all'isola di *Bālūs*, definita “one of the most famous islands of cannibals in Muslim literature”:⁶³

A gauche et à deux journées de Kilah est l'île de Bālūs habitée par des anthropophages. Elle produit du camphre excellent, des bananes, des cocos, des cannes à sucre et du riz.⁶⁴

Ed i medesimi geografi arabi fanno riferimento anche a un'altra isola che tende a sovrapporsi alla precedente, nota come *Langabālūs*. Lo fa, intorno al 1030, al-Biruni:

On dit, en effet, que si, par hasard, un marchand est abandonné dans cette île [de Langa], on n'en trouve jamais plus trace : ma conjecture [conclut Bīrūnī] s'appuie sur ce fait que, d'après le livre de Râma et le Râmâyana, derrière le pays bien connu du Sind, se trouvent des cannibales. D'autre part, les marins savent parfaitement que [le cannibalisme] est la cause de la sauvagerie des habitants de l'île de Langabālūs.⁶⁵

E ancora in una raccolta di meraviglie siriana della prima età moderna, che attinge tanto a fonti scritte arabe e persiane quanto a tradizioni orali provenienti anche dal Golfo Persico, il cannibalismo degli abitanti dell'isola è descritto per filo e per segno:

⁶⁰ Cfr. Sidebotham 1986, 142–143: “undoubtedly Ptolemy acquired some of this knowledge from travelers or merchants with an interest in the exploration, ethnography and geography of the East”; Weerakkody 1997, 86: “Ptolemy’s accounts of various regions are generally restricted to lists of place names with their coordinates. But in the case of Sri Lanka, India and Southeast Asia, he throws in a considerable amount of additional information. This material doubtless came from mariners and merchants familiar with the East whose oral and written accounts Ptolemy claims to have utilized”. Cfr. anche p. 89.

⁶¹ Cfr. Marcotte 2017, 47–48; Marcotte 2021, 63 e 65.

⁶² Su di lui, cfr. Hadj-Sadok 1986.

⁶³ Cfr. Minov 2021, 126.

⁶⁴ Cfr. Ferrand 1913, 27.

⁶⁵ Cfr. Ferrand 1913, 166.

There is an island whose inhabitants eat people while they are still alive. They do not slaughter him, but cut off his flesh and eat him while he is alive, without roasting or boiling. And the island is Balōs.⁶⁶

Sono state avanzate varie proposte d'identificazione sia per Bālūs sia per Langabālūs: la prima potrebbe essere una località dell'isola di Sumatra,⁶⁷ la seconda un riferimento alle attuali Nicobare.⁶⁸ Gli eventuali referenti reali per queste terre, tuttavia, non sono particolarmente rilevanti in questa sede: quel che conta, piuttosto, è che fin dal II secolo (ma Tolomeo attingeva sicuramente a materiali precedenti⁶⁹) si parlasse di queste isole lontane abitate da cannibali, il cui nome (Βαροῦσαι / Bālūs / Langabālūs) presenta evidentissime assonanze con l'isola delle Onoscelee in Luciano, sia che la si voglia chiamare *Kobalousa*, come sembra probabile, sia anche *Kabalousa* o persino *Ekbalousa*.

E per quanto riguarda la città delle Onoscelee (Idamargia / Idamardia / Idramardia), in Tolomeo compaiono moltissimi toponimi, sempre nell'Asia orientale, che anche solo per assonanza potrebbero aver costituito una sponda per l'invenzione luciana. Si pensi ad Ἀρμάγαρα (VII, 1, 7); Βραμάγαρα (VII, 18); Χονναμάγαρα (VII, 1, 50); Μάργαρα (VII, 1, 51); Σαγγάμαρτα (VII, 1, 68); Σιριμάλαγα (VII, 1, 83); Τάλαργα (Σαλαρίγα) (VII, 2, 14); Πανδαμαρκόττα/Πανδάμαρτα, ἐν ἧ νάρδος (VII, 2, 23), senza dimenticare la Μάργανα πόλις (VII, 4, 3) ubicata proprio sull'isola di Taprobane⁷⁰ che presenta, come si è visto, così tante assonanze con la storia luciana.

Non è naturalmente necessario postulare che Luciano o il suo pubblico avessero in mente proprio la *Storia naturale* di Plinio o la *Geografia* di Tolomeo: più probabilmente, questi nomi esotici circolavano, in forma più accessibile, in resoconti diegetici di ambito (para)geografico

⁶⁶ Cfr. Minov 2021, 77 § 23.

⁶⁷ Cfr. Drakard 1989, 53–82, qui 56.

⁶⁸ C'è chi identifica con le Nicobare anche le isole *Barousai*: cfr. Sheldon 2012, 112.

⁶⁹ Cfr. supra, n. 59, e De Romanis 2020, 153–154: “the pertinent sections of Ptolemy's *Geography* are the most eloquent testament to (and meagre compensation for) the now-lost geographical works on South India that were written in the first and early second centuries” (un'osservazione che può essere estesa anche alle altre parti relative all'Asia meridionale e sudorientale).

⁷⁰ Per l'importante trattazione sull'isola da parte di Tolomeo si veda Weerakkody 1997, 85–97.

e (para)etnografico (lo stesso Plinio, *NH* XXXII, 143, parla di *Taprobane insulaeque aliae* <at>*que aliae oceani fabulose narratae*) e ridondavano in opere decisamente “di consumo”, come il triviale mimo di *Charition*, i cui brandelli sono stati tramandati da un papiro ossirinchiato del I–II secolo d.C. Qui compaiono lacerti delle avventure della protagonista e della sua sgangherata banda di accompagnatori fatti prigionieri da selvaggi indiani che parlano una sorta di *grammelot* infarcito di termini effettivamente riconducibili ad antichi dialetti indiani.⁷¹ Non solo è assolutamente plausibile che nelle parti perdute fosse fornita una localizzazione precisa, ancorché fantastica, alla vicenda, ma soprattutto l’esistenza di questo mimo mostra come l’esotica India e i viaggiatori che vi si avventuravano (o che da essa giungevano) non fossero affatto estranei all’immaginario “popolare” di epoca imperiale.⁷²

6. L’ulteriore apporto dei testi geografici greci e latini

In effetti nel contesto delle *Storie vere* ci sono anche altri episodi o spunti che risulterebbero illuminati postulando che Luciano avesse ricavato la sua ispirazione da resoconti più o meno recenti sulle favolose terre e isole dell’India, particolarmente produttive per l’immaginazione.⁷³

Del resto, il già citato cenno allo scribacchino che τὰ δ’ ἐν Ἰνδοῖς παραθησόμενα ὑπέσχετο ἤδη γράψειν καὶ τὸν περίπλουν τῆς ἔξω θαλάττης, presente nel trattato *Come si deve scrivere la storia*, lascia intendere come Luciano avesse ben presente il genere del “periplo” dell’Oceano Indiano, e di quale scarsa stima gli tributasse.

Com’è noto, ne sopravvive un solo esempio antico, il *Periplus maris Erythraei* (tramandato, peraltro, da un *codex unicus*, il celebre Palat.

⁷¹ Cfr. Andreassi 2001, 56–57.

⁷² Cfr. Sidebotham 1986, 147, e Sidebotham 2011, 224, anche per i cenni di Dione Crisostomo (*Or.* 32, 36 e 40) al commercio contemporaneo tra Egitto e India, che aveva reso molto più noto il nome di quest’ultima, e per la presenza di Ἰνδῶν τινας ad Alessandria; su Dione e i mercanti indiani in Egitto cfr. anche McLaughlin 2010, 35–36 e 155. Si veda inoltre Parker 2008, 80–82, anche per le *Efesiache* di Senofonte Efesio, dove (III, 11–12) l’eroina Anzia viene comprata da un re indiano (descritto come un barbaro lascivo e superstizioso), giunto ad Alessandria κατὰ θεάν τῆς πόλεως καὶ κατὰ χρεῖαν ἐμπορίας (su quest’episodio cfr. anche *ivi*, 110–111).

⁷³ Cfr. Parker 2008, 110: “India has already emerged as a space onto which Mediterranean people could project thought-experiments... In addition, India was good to narrate”.

gr. 398). È stato sagacemente notato che la singolarità della sopravvivenza di questo testo, molto tecnico e nel complesso fededegno, deriva forse proprio dall'essere differenti dagli altri, probabilmente molto più letterari, divaganti e inattendibili.⁷⁴ Per cercare di recuperare questo materiale narrativo in larghissima parte perduto, occorre rivolgersi ancora una volta, in primo luogo, a Plinio e soprattutto a Tolomeo, nelle cui stringatissime notazioni si intuisce talora la presenza di modelli che dovevano motivare toponimi “parlanti” e decisamente peculiari.⁷⁵

Nell'India continentale, per esempio, lungo il fiume Nanaguna risultano attestate da Tolomeo (VII, 1, 66) le popolazioni dei Φυλλῖται e dei Βηπτιγοί, la cui assonanza con φύλλον (probabilmente anche etimologicamente connesso con il nome della tribù) e con il latino *beta* potrebbe costituire un *pendant* tanto delle donne-viti munite di pampini che compaiono all'inizio delle *Storie vere* (I, 8),⁷⁶ quanto dei λαχανόπτεροι, uccelli coperti di verdure (I, 13), e alle armature fatte di

⁷⁴ Cfr. Marcotte 2012, 14 e 17: “Si notre périple a survécu, plutôt que d'autres... c'est aussi parce que son information et sa méthode d'exposition ont été, de bonne heure, jugées crédibles”; sul *Periplus* come unico rappresentante di tutta una letteratura perduta cfr. anche De Romanis 2016, 105. Anche il *Periplus maris Erythraei*, peraltro, per quanto episodicamente contiene riferimenti ad avvenimenti soprannaturali, a *mirabilia* e a gruppi umani caratterizzati da stranezze e anomalie: si vedano per esempio i paragrafi 32–34, 62, 66.

⁷⁵ Ci si può chiedere quali narrazioni fossero legate, per esempio, a luoghi come le Σατύρων νῆσοι τρεῖς (VII, 2, 30), o all'isola Ἀγαθοῦ Δαίμονος (VII, 2, 27), che qualcuno identifica con una delle Laccadive (cfr. Sheldon 2012, 112): più che al generico concetto di “buona fortuna” o a un adattamento fonetico di un termine locale (cfr. Gerini 1909, 411–420), per quest'ultima si potrebbe forse pensare alla nota identificazione di Agathodaimon con un serpente, attestata dall'epoca ellenistica e ben presente anche sulla monetazione alessandrina di età imperiale: cfr. Dunand 1981, 278–280. Il richiamo potrebbe allora essere a una sorta di *wandering legend* affine a quelle che facevano di un enorme serpente, benevolo verso gli umani, il signore di una remota isola. La più antica sembra corrispondere all'egiziano *Racconto del naufrago*, tramandato da un papiro risalente alla XII–XIII dinastia (1991–1649 a.C.): si legge in Bresciani 1969, 173–177, ma un tipo analogo è attestato anche tra le leggende buddhiste confluite nei *Jātaka*, per la precisione il 190 (*Sīlānisamsajātaka*).

⁷⁶ Gli interpreti si sono limitati a indicare i paralleli, a dire il vero non particolarmente soddisfacenti, della vite che Astiage vede scaturire in sogno dal grembo della figlia Mandane (Erodoto I, 108) e della donna-serpente con cui si unisce Eracle in Scizia (Erodoto IV, 9): cfr. Stengel 1911, 17; Ollier 1962, 15; Georgiadou–Larmour 1998, 76; Bompaire 1998, 334.

gusci di fave e lupini utilizzate dai Seleniti (I, 14),⁷⁷ dotati per giunta di una coda in tutto e per tutto uguale a un cavolo (I, 23).⁷⁸

In maniera ancora più rilevante, sulla costa della più volte citata Taprobane viene collocato da Tolomeo un Πριάπιδος ο Πριάπιος λιμὴν (VII, 4, 3), che, insieme a una reminiscenza delle affermazioni di Ctesia sui genitali sproporzionati dei Pigmei,⁷⁹ potrebbe aver costituito una sponda per sviluppare la sfrenata fantasia dei “fallonauti” collocata quasi al termine dell’opera lucianea (II, 45):

μετ’ ὀλίγον δὲ καὶ ἄνδρας εἶδομεν καινῷ τῷ τρόπῳ ναυτιλίας
χρωμένους· αὐτοὶ γὰρ καὶ ναῦται καὶ νῆες ἦσαν. λέξω δὲ τοῦ πλοῦ
τὸν τρόπον· ὕπτιοι κείμενοι ἐπὶ τοῦ ὕδατος ὀρθώσαντες τὰ αἰδοῖα –
μεγάλα δὲ φέρουσιν – ἐξ αὐτῶν ὀθόνην πετάσαντες καὶ ταῖς χερσὶν
τοὺς ποδεῶνας κατέχοντες ἐμπίπτοντος τοῦ ἀνέμου ἔπλεον.

Sulle coste di Taprobane non mancavano poi una Δάγανα (Δαγίνα) πόλις ἱερὰ Σελήνης, un Ἡλίου λιμὴν (VII, 4, 5–6) e anche una *Solis insula* ricordata da Plinio (*NH* VI, 86), che potrebbero prefigurare i due regni in conflitto del Sole e della Luna, governati rispettivamente da Fetonte ed Endimione, presso i quali giunge Luciano con la sua nave trascinata nello spazio da una tromba d’aria (I, 9–27). E ci si può chiedere se anche l’isola di Φηλικός ο Φίληκος attestata al largo della stessa Taprobane (VII, 4, 12) non possa aver fornito un qualche spunto per la succitata e immaginaria Isola del Sughero, Φελῳ (II, 4).⁸⁰

Per quanto riguarda il mare intorno all’isola, Plinio (*NH* VI, 87) lo descrive *colore perviridi, praeterea fruticosum arboribus, iubas earum*

⁷⁷ Per la scelta dei vegetali, un referente importante è costituito senz’altro dalla *Batracomimachia*, vv. 124–132 e 160–165, come unanimemente indicato dagli interpreti: cfr. Stengel 1911, 25; Ollier 1962, 21; Hall 1981, 344; Georgiadou–Larmour 1998, 105; Bompaire 1998, 66; von Möllendorff 2000, 132.

⁷⁸ Sempre ai resoconti favolosi sull’India, peraltro, pare rimandare la menzione della coda, che Ctesia (in Fozio, *Biblioteca*, 72, 48 a = F 45, 43 Lenfant) attribuisce a certi abitanti del luogo: cfr. Stengel 1911, 35; Ollier 1962, 30–31; Georgiadou–Larmour 1998, 136; Bompaire 1998, 73, nonché von Möllendorff 2000, 168–169, che rileva anche una simbologia fallica.

⁷⁹ Il passo è tramandato da Fozio, *Biblioteca*, 72, 46 b = F 45, 21 Lenfant; cfr. Stengel 1911, 88; Ollier 1962, 96; Georgiadou–Larmour 1998, 228; Bompaire 1998, 337; von Möllendorff 2000, 487–488.

⁸⁰ Senza dimenticare altri paralleli toponimici, a partire dall’isoletta di Phellusa che Plinio (*NH* V, 140) colloca vicino a Lesbo: cfr. Georgiadou–Larmour 1998, 182; altri esempi sono elencati da von Möllendorff 2000, 279–280.

gubernaculis deterentibus, “di colore verdissimo,⁸¹ e inoltre coperto di *arbores*, le cui chiome vengono sfrondate⁸² dai timoni delle navi”. Il passo di Plinio, finora a mia conoscenza totalmente trascurato dagli interpreti delle *Storie vere*, a quanto pare fa riferimento alle alghie e alle barriere coralline.⁸³ Vista la quantità di richiami a Taprobane già rilevati, sembra plausibile che esso o più probabilmente una sua ripresa siano alla base, insieme a uno scarno cenno analogo riferito da Megastene al “mare indiano”,⁸⁴ della rielaborazione scherzosamente letterale di Luciano quando, poco prima dell’episodio delle Onoscelee, descrive (II, 42) il mare bloccato da una vera e propria foresta galleggiante, con pini e cipressi privi di radici, ma perfettamente dritti nell’acqua, che bloccavano il passaggio:

εἶδομεν ὕλην μεγίστην καὶ λάσιον πιτύων καὶ κυπαρίττων. καὶ ἡμεῖς μὲν εἰκάσαμεν ἡπειρον εἶναι· τὸ δ’ ἦν πέλαγος ἄβυσσον ἀρρίζουσιν δένδροις καταπεφυτευμένον· εἰσθήκει δὲ τὰ δένδρα ὁμῶς ἀκίνητα, ὁρθὰ καθάπερ ἐπιπλέοντα.

Alla fine il narratore aveva dovuto arrampicarsi sull’albero più alto per capire come fare: e scorrendo l’oceano nuovamente sgombro dopo la foresta, ci si era risolti a issare la nave sopra le chiome dei fittissimi alberi, dove poi aveva proceduto a vele spiegate sospinta dal vento:

ἐκδήσαντες γὰρ αὐτὴν κάλῳ μεγάλῳ καὶ ἀνελθόντες ἐπὶ τὰ δένδρα μόλις ἀνιμυσάμεθα, καὶ θέντες ἐπὶ τῶν κλάδων, πετάσαντες τὰ ἱστία καθάπερ ἐν θαλάττῃ ἐπλέομεν τοῦ ἀνέμου προωθοῦντος ἐπισυρόμενοι...

Sempre dal resoconto di Plinio emerge (*NH* VI, 88) la menzione, che sarebbe stata fatta dall’ambasciatore Rachia, del popolo dei Seri, *oris sono truci, nullo commercio linguae*, con i quali gli abitanti di Taprobane

⁸¹ Questa notazione è stata collegata con il toponimo di Πρασώδης κόλπος attestato per Taprobane da Tolomeo (VII, 4, 4): cfr. André-Filliozat 1980, 116, e Weerakkody 1997, 68.

⁸² Questo il senso letterale del verbo *detero* (ringrazio gli editori di *Hyperboreus* per aver attirato la mia attenzione su questo punto). Si può supporre, peraltro, che qui si alluda all’effetto di intralcio causato ai timoni dal continuo contatto con queste chiome: André-Filliozat 1980, 46 parlano di “arbres, dont les gouvernails accrochent les cîmes”.

⁸³ Cfr. Faller 2000, 83–84.

⁸⁴ Cfr. *FGrH* 715 F 25 = 18 Stoneman, ricavato dalle *Storie meravigliose* di Antigono, 132 Giannini: Μεγασθένην δὲ τὸν τὰ Ἰνδικὰ γεγραφότα ἱστορεῖν, ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὴν Ἰνδικὴν θαλάττῃ δένδρεα φύεσθαι. Il passo di Megastene è ricordato da Stengel 1911, 86–87; Ollier 1962, 92; Bompaire 1998, 128; Georgiadou-Larmour 1998, 225, che aggiungono anche un riferimento a Ps.-Aristotele, *De mundo* 396 a 23: Πολλάκις... γίνεται... ἐν τῇ θαλάσσει καὶ... δένδρων ἐκφύσεις; von Möllendorff 2000, 473.

intrattenevano un “commercio muto”:⁸⁵ *fluminis ulteriore ripa merces positas iuxta venalia tolli ab iis, si placeat permutatio*. Poco dopo la menzione degli “alberi” marini, e poco prima della menzione delle Onoscelee, Luciano accenna (II, 44) all’isola dei selvaggi e antropofagi Bucefali: il protagonista vi sbarca e, dopo aver sequestrato alcuni degli abitanti, li baratta in cambio di cibo in quella che potrebbe essere una parodia proprio del “commercio muto”, dal momento che gli indigeni sono capaci di esprimersi solo con cenni e muggiti: ἀφίκοντο παρὰ τῶν Βουκεφάλων πρέσβεις ἀπαιτοῦντες ἐπὶ λύτροις τοὺς συνειλημμένους· συνίμεν γὰρ αὐτῶν διανευόντων καὶ γοερὸν τι μυκωμένων ὥσπερ ἰκετευόντων.⁸⁶ Com’è stato notato, questa particolare modalità di baratto è stata frequentemente associata con Taprobane in testimonianze posteriori a Plinio.⁸⁷

Infine, la menzione da parte di Tolomeo di un Κηταῖον ἄκρον (VII, 4, 5) sembra collegabile alle mirabolanti disquisizioni di Dionisio Periegeta sulle terribili balene che infestavano i mari intorno all’isola,⁸⁸ che come si è visto hanno un preciso parallelo nelle *Storie vere*.

7. Le narrazioni arabe

Il terreno di indagine, peraltro, non si esaurisce con Plinio e Tolomeo. Altri possibili ambiti d’indagine sono i resoconti arabi (spesso collegabili ai toponimi tolemaici, come si è visto in precedenza) e le relazioni tardoantiche di pellegrini buddhisti. Questi materiali, infatti, potrebbero rispecchiare una sorta di tenace *vulgata* relativa ai mari orientali.⁸⁹

Per quanto riguarda le narrazioni arabe, sembrano produttive per un confronto con Luciano quelle relative a misteriosi castelli di cristallo, illuminati da candelabri soprannaturali, avvistati su isole dell’Oceano Indiano. La testimonianza più antica è forse quella del cosiddetto *Abrégé*

⁸⁵ Sul quale si rimanda all’importante trattazione di Bettini 2012, 144–175.

⁸⁶ Gli interpreti finora hanno accostato il passo, in maniera molto generica, all’episodio dei Lestrigoni e alla storia delle vacche del Sole nell’*Odissea*: cfr. Stengel 1911, 88; Ollier 1962, 95; Georgiadou–Larmour 1998, 228; Bompaire 1998, 130; von Möllendorff 2000, 483–487.

⁸⁷ Cfr. Weerakkody 1997, 73–74, che rimanda a Marziano Capella VI, 697, nonché a Legge 1886, 101, ad al-Biruni (XI secolo) e ad altre autorità.

⁸⁸ Cfr. Weerakkody 1997, 116.

⁸⁹ Quella stessa *vulgata* che Rohde aveva rintracciato collegando i motivi presenti nei celebri viaggi di Sindbad il Marinaio, confluiti nelle *Mille e una notte*, con un’ampia serie di testimonianze classiche e orientali: cfr. Rohde 1914, 192–196 n. 1. La ricorrenza di certi motivi, del resto, potrebbe avere un parallelo nella sostanziale stabilità di certe rotte e usanze commerciali nel corso dei secoli: cfr. Vallet 2012, 370–372.

des merveilles attribuito a Ibn Wasif Shah (X–XI secolo), che ne riporta ben due occorrenze, la seconda delle quali espressamente collegata ad Alessandro Magno:

On dit que cette mer renferme un château de cristal élevé sur un roc, éclairé par des candélabres qui ne s'éteignent jamais.

[...]

Continuant sa route, il [Alessandro Magno] vit une lumière brillant très haut; il mit le cap sur elle et atteignit l'île du château. C'est une île au milieu de laquelle s'élève un château de cristal, qui brille au-dessus de la mer voisine. Il voulut y descendre, mais un brahme, philosophe indien l'en empêcha, lui disant que quiconque mettait pied dans cette île perdait connaissance et, ne pouvant plus en sortir, y mourait. [...] On rapporte qu'il paraît, la nuit, aux créneaux de ce château, des lampes qui brûlent jusqu'au matin; leur lumière baisse alors jusqu'au soir; puis elles se rallument de nouveau.⁹⁰

Il confronto con racconti di questo tipo potrebbe dare ulteriore spessore, in effetti, a un'altra tappa del viaggio luciano delle *Storie vere*, ovvero la già citata Licnoli, la Città delle Lampade, sospesa nello spazio e incontrata durante la discesa dalla luna alla Terra (I, 29). Il nome fa riferimento in questo caso agli abitanti, costituiti da lampade identiche a quelle presenti nelle case terrestri (non a caso il narratore riconoscerà la lucerna di casa propria dalla quale apprenderà notizie sui familiari lontani), attive soprattutto durante la notte. Nel brano è riconoscibile la parodia (presente anche in *Cataplous* 27) del tipico *topos* ellenistico della lampada testimone dell'intimità, e potrebbe esservi un'allusione anche a diffuse narrazioni folkloriche;⁹¹ a queste si potrebbero forse ipoteticamente aggiungere precocissime varianti delle storie di viaggiatori relative ai castelli di cristallo e alla loro prodigiosa illuminazione che qualche secolo più tardi avrebbero circolato in merito alle isole dell'Oceano Indiano e del Golfo del Bengala.⁹²

⁹⁰ Cfr. Ferrand 1913, 141 e 148 (= Carra de Vaux 1984, 58 e 67–68).

⁹¹ Cfr. Braccini 2018b, 99–101. Von Möllendorff 2000, 193–201, diligentemente passa in rassegna tutta una serie di possibili riferimenti, spesso assai minuti, alla simbologia delle lampade nell'antichità, e poi nota che “die Beschreibung von Lychnopolis gehört zu den erstaunlichsten Passagen der *Wahren Geschichten*. Lukian hat hier ca. fünfzehn verschiedene Anspielungen zu einem sehr homogenen Ganzen kombiniert”.

⁹² Altri hanno pensato a possibili echi di concezioni pitagoriche e astronomiche, rimandando al nome di Λαμπαδίας con cui era nota la stella Aldebaran, e ad altre stelle e costellazioni in vario modo connesse ai λύχνα: cfr. Georgiadou–Larmour 1998, 150–151.

8. Le orme prodigiose di Taprobane

E per quanto riguarda l'ultima tipologia succitata, quella relativa ai pellegrini buddhisti di epoca tardoantica, si può citare almeno il resoconto del cinese Fuxian, che trattando di Taprobane agli inizi del V secolo d.C., ricorda come tra i *mirabilia* dell'isola vi fossero anche due prodigiose orme di Buddha. L'Illuminato le avrebbe lasciate piantando un piede vicino alla capitale e l'altro sulla cima di un monte, a decine di chilometri di distanza, a testimonianza della sua statura gigantesca.⁹³ La "sacra impronta" (*Sri Pada*) sulla montagna, lunga circa 170 cm e larga una cinquantina, è ricordata poi nel medioevo ed è oggetto di pellegrinaggio ancora oggi, da parte di adepti di diverse fedi: per gli induisti è stata lasciata da Shiva, per i musulmani da Adamo (e infatti il monte, alto più di duemila metri, è noto come Adam's Peak), per i cristiani dall'evangelizzatore dell'India, l'apostolo Tommaso.⁹⁴ Non sarebbe affatto impossibile che quest'antica tradizione si collochi a monte, insieme ad altre attestazioni greche relative a orme di Eracle,⁹⁵ delle impronte gigantesche che Luciano trova all'inizio del suo viaggio (I, 7) sull'isola delle donne-viti:

ἦν δὲ καὶ ἵχνη δύο πλησίον ἐπὶ πέτρας, τὸ μὲν πλεθριαῖον, τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον – ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν, τὸ μὲν τοῦ Διονύσου, τὸ μικρότερον, θάτερον δὲ Ἡρακλέους.

Premesso che Eracle e Dioniso erano tradizionalmente e notoriamente associati con l'India,⁹⁶ l'elemento delle orme sembra tuttavia costituire una peculiarità significativa. Le impronte di Eracle, come si è detto, sono attestate anche altrove, ma non su isole. In questo senso, Taprobane

⁹³ Cfr. Legge 1886, 102: "When Buddha came to this country, wishing to transform the wicked nâgas, by his supernatural power he planted one foot at the north of the royal city, and the other on the top of a mountain, the two being fifteen yojanas apart".

⁹⁴ Cfr. Legge 1886, 102 n. 2; Weerakkody 1997, 134.

⁹⁵ Cfr. Stengel 1911, 15; Ollier 1962, 14; Georgiadou-Larmour 1998, 72; Bompaire 1998, 60; von Möllendorff 2000, 79, che rimandano variamente a Erodoto IV, 82, per un'orma in Scizia, e Ps.-Aristotele, *De mir. ausc.* 97, 2, per altre impronte presso Pandosia in Iapigia. Per attestazioni dalla Grecia moderna di prodigiose impronte variamente attribuite ad Alessandro Magno, Digenis Akritas, Costantino XI Paleologo e san Giorgio, cfr. Rhomaïos 1973 [K. Ρωμαίος, *To Athánato Neró*], 128–133, num. 29.

⁹⁶ Cfr. Megastene, fr. 12–13 Stoneman; cfr. anche Hall 1981, 351–352.

potrebbe costituire ancora una volta un punto di riferimento importante per la costruzione parodica luciana. Il culto di Eracle sull'isola, in effetti, è l'unico a essere rimarcato espressamente da Plinio (*NH* VI, 89),⁹⁷ e per quanto riguarda Dioniso, il collegamento del dio con Taprobane pare attestato dal toponimo di Διονύσου πόλις riportato da Tolomeo (VII, 4, 5) per una città sulla costa meridionale; lo stesso Plinio afferma, sempre attingendo alle informazioni fornite dagli ambasciatori giunti al cospetto di Claudio, che il re dell'isola è abbigliato “come il Padre Libero” (*NH* VI, 91, *regi cultum Liberi Patris*). Infine, secondo gli interpreti moderni un riferimento “molto plausibile” a una di queste impronte sarebbe rintracciabile già nello stesso Tolomeo, che cita Οὐλίσπαδα come una delle *poleis* all'interno dell'isola (VII, 4, 10): il toponimo, infatti, sarebbe da ricollegare proprio all'attuale *Sri Pada* (dove *Pada*, naturalmente, significa “Piede, Orma”), e anche la sua collocazione nella geografia dell'isola risulterebbe coerente.⁹⁸

9. Conclusioni

Anche in questo caso, insomma, le pensate di Luciano per caratterizzare il suo viaggio fantastico potrebbero essere debitrice dell'immaginario contemporaneo relativo all'Oceano indiano e alle sue isole, prima tra tutte Taprobane, che pare l'epicentro di tante delle trovate parodiche dell'autore. Invenzioni come le orme prodigiose, dunque, ma anche la Città delle Lampade, il soggiorno dell'intera nave e del suo equipaggio dentro la balena, gli alberi che crescono nel mare, e ancora l'isola di Fellò, i regni del Sole e della Luna, i Fallonauti, il commercio muto dei Bucefali e l'insistenza sulle verdure usate come armi e vesti ricevono uno spessore ulteriore grazie al raffronto con resoconti ed ἐμπορικά διηγήματα più o meno fantasiosi. E non bisogna certo dimenticare il passo da cui si sono prese le mosse, l'episodio finale delle *Storie vere*. Non solo, infatti, nella sua trama è anch'esso reminiscenze di antiche narrazioni su Taprobane, ma per giunta risulta localizzato in una località il cui nome, *crux* per copisti e filologi, pare storpiare umoristicamente quello delle remotissime isole Barousai. Isole, ricordiamo, abitate da antropofagi menzionati già – a partire da resoconti anteriori – dal pur stringato Tolomeo e destinati ad acquistare un ruolo di primo piano nelle più tarde narrazioni arabe.

⁹⁷ Per varie proposte di identificazione, cfr. Faller 2000, 101.

⁹⁸ Cfr. Weerakkody 1997, 91–92 e 97, e Faller 2000, 121.

Questo non stupisce, se si tiene presente quanto Taprobane avesse colpito l'immaginazione degli antichi,⁹⁹ in particolare in seguito all'ambasceria giunta alla corte di Claudio e in concomitanza con l'esplosione del commercio tra impero romano e India nel I–II secolo. Oltre che all'onnipresente fondale omerico e a geografici ed etnografi del passato (Erodoto, Ctesia, Megastene...), Luciano sembra insomma aver tenuto ben presenti anche le testimonianze più recenti, quelle che informavano con mirabolanti novità i resoconti di Plinio e le liste di Tolomeo. I riferimenti non banali a Muziris, agli Ossidraci e alla rotta da Clisma all'India che compaiono in altre sue opere non fanno che corroborare quest'impressione. E se è vero, come scriveva Austin Morris Harmon in relazione alle *Storie vere*, che “it is unfortunate that we cannot enjoy the full bouquet of this good wine because so many of the works which Lucian parodies here are lost”,¹⁰⁰ recuperando qualche scampolo del patrimonio narrativo relative alle isole dell'Oceano Indiano riusciamo, perlomeno, a percepire un po' meglio il bouquet delle *beautiful lies* lucianee.

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⁹⁹ Ancora tra III e IV secolo, Lucio Ampelio nel suo *Liber memorialis* trattando delle *clarissimae insulae* (6, 12) ne elenca quattro situate in Oceano, e apre l'elenco proprio con Taprobane, seguita dalla Britannia, Thule e dalle Isole Fortunate. Cfr. Weerakkody 1997, 46. Altri lacerti di narrazioni favolose relative all'isola sembrano attestati nelle due versioni della *Geografia* attribuita all'armeno Anania di Širak (vissuto nel VII secolo), ricavata da fonti greche, in particolare dall'omonima opera di Pappo di Alessandria (IV secolo): cfr. Weerakkody 1997, 101–103. Vi si legge, per esempio, di una tribù di donne stanziata nell'interno che una volta all'anno si accoppiava con cani; da ognuna di queste unioni nascevano due gemelli, un cagnolino e una bambina; oppure vi si afferma che proprio su Taprobane sarebbe precipitato Satana: cfr. Hewsen 1992, 76–76A e 269 n. 227A. Quest'ultima storia è stata ricondotta ancora una volta all'impronta dello *Sri Pada*, ma ci si può chiedere se non ci sia una relazione con l'“Isola dell'Anticristo”, ubicata nell'Oceano Indiano, di cui fanno menzione vari autori arabi a partire da Ibn Khurradādhbih (IX secolo), dilungandosi sulle musiche di tamburi e strumenti a corda, sui battimani e sui canti misteriosi che vi si udivano la notte: cfr. Ferrand 1913, 29–30, 110, 144, 386 e, per una versione italiana, von Hees – Bellino 2008, 208. Sarebbe interessante capire se qualche precoce versione di queste tradizioni possa aver contribuito alla creazione delle lucianee Isole degli Empi, passando al largo delle quali si potevano udire (II, 29) καὶ μαστίγων ψόφον καὶ οἰμωγὴν ἀνθρώπων πολλῶν.

¹⁰⁰ Cfr. Harmon 1913, 247.

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Lucian of Samosata, within his works, demonstrates in more than one instance some attention to the routes between the Roman empire and India, and the localities that had come to prominence in his day, starting with the port of Muziris, of which he conveys one of the earliest records and the only one in a non-technical text. In many other respects (ship-swallowing whales in primis), Lucian seems indebted to the coeval literature on Taprobane. Particularly within the *True Histories*, various hitherto neglected parodic references to the travel literature circulating in his day seem to emerge, which can be recovered only in skeletal form from mentions by Ptolemy, Pliny, and later accounts of Arab and Oriental origin. Just to mention a few instances, the island of the Onoskeleai, whether Kobalousa, Kabalousa, or Ekbalousa, seems to refer in its name to the Barousai/Balus/Langabalus islands inhabited by cannibals; the forest of trees floating in the sea seems to recall the “sea trees” mentioned by Pliny; the prodigious footprints of Heracles and Dionysus may allude to traditions on the Sri Pada, the sacred imprint of a deity on a mountain of Sri Lanka/Taprobane, already attested in antiquity and perhaps also featured by Ptolemy. While not denying the importance of parodic references to the “classics”, primarily the *Odyssey*, this line of inquiry sheds light on another aspect of Lucian’s parodic *mixis*.

Лукиан из Самосаты неоднократно демонстрирует интерес к географическим объектам на пути из Римской империи в Индию, которые были на слуху в его время – в первую очередь к порту Музирис (его упоминание у Лукиана – одно из самых ранних и единственное дошедшее за пределами специальных трактатов). Во многих других отношениях (прежде всего по поводу китов, глотающих корабли) Лукиан, по-видимому, был обязан современной ему литературе о Тапробане. В частности, в *Правдивых историях* выявляются не замеченные ранее пародийные отсылки к рассказам о путешествиях, бывших в ходу в его время, которые лишь в самых общих чертах можно реконструировать по свидетельствам Птолемея и Плиния и по аналогии с более поздними арабскими и восточными рассказами. Например, название острова ослоногих женщин – Кобалуса, Кабалуса или Экбалуса – содержит аллюзию на острова Βαρῶσαι / Bālūs / Langabālūs, населенные каннибалами; плавающий лес вызывает в памяти “морские деревья”, описанные у Плиния; колоссальные следы Геракла и Диониса – возможно, отражение священного следа божества на горе Шрипада в Шри Ланке (Тапробане), засвидетельствованного уже в античности и, возможно, упоминавшегося у Птолемея. Не пытаясь отрицать важности отсылок к “классической” литературе, прежде всего к *Одиссее*, исследование проливает свет на еще одну составляющую пародийной смеси Лукиана.

Jan Shavrin

BEMERKUNGEN ZUM KONDOLENZBRIEF

*P. ROSS. GEORG. III 2**

Der Brief eines gewissen Serenus an seine Mutter Antonia ist in vielerlei Hinsicht interessant, nicht zuletzt aufgrund der Tatsache, dass er einem Familienarchiv entstammt und zusammen mit dem Brief seines Bruders Marcus (*P. Ross. Georg. III 1*) überliefert wurde. Beide Stücke sind der Schrift nach auf den Anfang des 3. Jh. n. Chr. datiert. Der Brief von Marcus ist zum Gegenstand mehrerer Aufsätze zur römischen Militärmedizin geworden, wobei der Brief von Serenus immer wieder berücksichtigt und kommentiert wurde, denn man hoffte dort zusätzliche Informationen gewinnen zu können.¹ Die Briefe werden zwar meistens gemeinsam betrachtet, sind dennoch allem Anschein nach zu unterschiedlichen Zeiten entstanden und lassen sich deswegen nur begrenzt ergänzen. Zusammen überliefert, gehörten die beiden Papyri erst zur Sammlung eines der bedeutendsten Ägyptologen des vorrevolutionären Russlands, Wladimir Golenischeff.² Später wurde der Brief von Serenus an Gregor

* Der vorliegende Beitrag entstand im Rahmen des bilateralen österreichisch-russischen Projektes “Vom Nil zum Kaukasus: G. Zereteli und seine Papyrussammlung”, welches von dem Österreichischen Wissenschaftsfonds (*FWF*) gemeinsam mit dem Russischen Fonds für Grundlagenforschung (*RFBR*) finanziert wird. Die russische Antragsnummer lautet: 20-59-14002. Für nützliche Hinweise und wertvolle Kritik der früheren Fassungen bedanke ich mich bei Charikleia Armoni und Elena Chepel. Außerdem möchte ich auch den Teilnehmern der virtuellen Kooperation zwischen der Bibliotheca Classica Petropolitana und dem Historischen Institut der Universität Bern danken, in deren Rahmen die hier behandelten Thesen im WS 2023/24 vorgestellt und diskutiert wurden. Mein herzlicher Dank für sprachliche Verbesserungen des Texts gilt Pascal Dewes.

¹ Siehe Roberts 1950, 112–113; Davies 1969, 93–94; id. 1970, 101; Wilmanns 1995, 97–101; Hirt Raj 2006, 148–156.

² Vgl. Zereteli 1900 [Г. Церетели, “Два греческих папируса коллекции В. С. Голенищева”, *ЖМНП, Отдел классической филологии*], 1. In diesem Artikel wurden die beiden Briefe erstmals ediert.

im Zeilenkommentar erwähnt und als unbefriedigend bezeichnet.⁶ Die erste Variante wird meistens als wenig wahrscheinlich angesehen, weil der Name in den Papyri vor dem 4. Jh. n.Chr. nur selten auftaucht.⁷ Außerdem stört auch die christliche Herkunft des Namens: Wenn wir diese Wiederherstellung annehmen würden, müssten wir davon ausgehen, dass der Verstorbene am wahrscheinlichsten Christ war, insofern er nach dem Apostel benannt wurde. Dies wäre zwar nicht unmöglich, passt aber nicht zu den im Brief vorhandenen Informationen, die eher auf eine heidnische Abstammung der Familie hindeuten (vgl. etwa θεῶν θελώντων in Z. 5).

Im Gegensatz dazu wird die andere Ergänzungsvariante üblicherweise als plausibler betrachtet, obwohl es in der Tat als merkwürdig empfunden werden kann, dass Serenus den Verstorbenen, anscheinend einen Familienangehörigen, bei seiner Berufsbezeichnung genannt hat.⁸ Die einzige Erklärung, die in meinen Augen für diese Ergänzung spricht, stünde unter der Annahme, dass es sich dabei um den Eigennamen bzw. Beinamen Ἰατρος handelt. Der Name war in den griechischen Papyri bis vor kurzem sonst unbelegt, ist aber nun nach dem Erscheinen des vierten Bandes der Papyri Yale durch eine Namenliste bezeugt. Vgl. *P. Yale IV* 165₄₆ (155/156 n.Chr.). Darüber hinaus müsste man in Betracht ziehen, dass es noch zwei koptische Bezeugungen dieses Namens gibt.⁹ Zusammen mit Chapas paläographischen Beobachtungen im Bezug auf die an der Stelle der Beschädigung erkennbaren Spuren eines Iota sowie eines Alpha, denen ich mich nach Sichtung des Papyrus anschließen kann, sind die aufgelisteten Belege m.E. überzeugend genug, sodass ich für die Wiederherstellung τοῦ Ἰατροῦ plädieren würde.¹⁰

Eine weitere Bemerkung betrifft die Gnome, die Serenus als Trost für Antonia eingesetzt hat.¹¹ In seinem Kommentar zur Stelle schrieb Chapa,

⁶ Vgl. Zereteli–Jernstedt 1930, 11.

⁷ Vgl. Chapa 1998, 109.

⁸ Vgl. Roberts 1950, 113; Chapa 1998, 109. Bemerkenswert erscheint in diesem Zusammenhang, dass ein gewisser Valerius im Brief von Marcus begrüßt und dabei nicht nur beim Namen, sondern auch zusätzlich bei seinem Beruf genannt wurde. Vgl. *P. Ross. Georg. III* 1₂₈: ἀσπάζου καὶ Γαίωνα καὶ Οὐαλέριον τὸν τῆς πίσεως.

⁹ Vgl. *P. Lond. Copt. I* 452₉: ἀνοκ ἱατρος πινοταρ (“Ich, Iatros, der Notar”); *O. Medin. Habu Copt.* 152_{13–14}: ἰωαννης ἱατρος (“Ioannes, (Sohn) des Iatros”).

¹⁰ Siehe Chapa 1998, 108–109. Eine digitale Abbildung des Papyrusstücks wurde fürs Projekt von dem Georgischen Nationalen Handschriftenzentrum bereitgestellt, wofür unser herzlicher Dank an den Direktor sowie Mitarbeiter des Zentrums geht.

¹¹ Zu Gnomen in Beileidsbriefen neben Chapas ausführlicher Einleitung zu seiner Ausgabe siehe auch Worp 1995; Papathomas–Tsitsianopoulou 2019, 130–132.

dass er für diesen Ausdruck keine Parallele im konsolatorischen Kontext finden konnte.¹² Ich habe nach Beispielen gesucht, in denen das Verb διώκω in Kombination mit dem einen oder anderen Substantiv verwendet würde, welches im Griechischen zur Bezeichnung des Todes diene, und glaube zwei vergleichbare Parallelstellen gefunden zu haben. Beide sind literarisch.¹³ Die erste stammt aus der Anthologie von Stobaios und geht auf Demokrit zurück: ἄνθρωποι τὸν θάνατον φεύγοντες διώκουσιν (Stob. III, 4, 77 = DK 68 B 203).¹⁴ Die andere Stelle ließ sich in den lukianischen Totengesprächen finden: οἱ τηλικούτοι φιλόζωοι εἰσιν, οὓς ἐχρῆν διώκειν τὸν θάνατον ὡς τῶν ἐν τῷ γήρᾳ κακῶν φάρμακον (DMort. 22, 9). In beiden Fällen findet sich eine gängige Bedeutung für das Verb, nämlich ‘verfolgen’ bzw. ‘hinterherlaufen’, welche wohl auch in unserem Falle passend ist. Ob Serenus sich beim Verfassen seines Briefes auf ein Florilegium stützte oder ob der Spruch von ihm zu diesem Anlass frei formuliert wurde, dazu kann man nur spekulieren.

Im letzten Satz dieses Abschnittes hat Serenus wieder versucht, die richtigen Worte zu finden, um seine Mutter in ihrer Trauer zu unterstützen. Diese Stelle kann tatsächlich einen seltsamen Eindruck hinterlassen, wenn sie so interpretiert wird, als ob Serenus damit gemeint hätte, dass Antonias Situation gar nicht so schlimm sei, solange sie noch Marcus habe.¹⁵ Dem Brief lässt sich entnehmen, dass der Verstorbene ganz unerwartet ums Leben kam, wohl bei einem Unfall. Die Stelle würde meiner Meinung nach nur dann wirklich Sinn ergeben, wenn sie so gedeutet wird, dass Marcus Zeuge des tragischen Ereignisses war und ebenfalls, zumindest aus der Perspektive von Serenus, hätte sterben können. Dann wäre das Verb περίειμι in der Bedeutung ‘überleben’ zu verstehen, welche sowohl in Papyri als auch in der Literatur gut belegt ist.¹⁶ Vgl. *P.Gen.* III 128₇₋₁₀ (2. Jh. v.Chr.): εἰς το[σοῦτ]ο τέλμης καὶ ἀπονοίας ἦλθεν ὥστε ἀπογράφεσθαι [εἰς τήν] κληρονομίαν τῶν Ἀμύντου τινὸς πεπτωκότος, [κατιδ]ὼν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ταραχὴν χρόνοις κατ’ ἀγχιστείας [μηδέν]α πε[ρ]ιῆναι;¹⁷ *P.Oxy.* XVI 1873₇ (5. Jh. n.Chr.): ὁρῶ πάλαι μὲν ἐμαυτὸν ὀλωλότα εἰ κέ (1. καὶ) παρὰ δόξαν περίειμι.¹⁸ Literarische Belege sind

¹² Vgl. Chapa 1998, 110.

¹³ Auf Papyri ist eine solche Wortkombination sonst unbezeugt.

¹⁴ Zu dieser Gnome siehe Warren 2002, 37.

¹⁵ Vgl. Chapa 1998, 110.

¹⁶ Zum Gebrauch des Verbs in Papyri siehe Chrysanthou–Papathomas 2010, 9–10.

¹⁷ Bei dem Text handelt es sich um eine Petition.

¹⁸ In diesem Brief wird von einem Aufstand in Lykopolis berichtet.

zahlreich. Ein gutes Beispiel liefert die wohlbekannte Stelle aus den *Historien* des Herodot: Nach dem Geständnis des Hirten teilte Astyages in dem darauffolgenden Gespräch mit Harpagos die Tatsache mit, dass Kyros am Leben geblieben ist, was eben auch mit περίεμμι wiedergegeben wurde (Hdt. I, 189).¹⁹ Es ist außerdem hinzuzufügen, dass der Nebensatz ὅτι οὐτός σοι περίεστιν als Erklärung des Hauptsatzes οὐδ[έ]ν[σ]ο[ι] ἐστιν φαῦλον zu verstehen wäre (kausal oder eher explikativ), wobei die Formel θεῶν θελόντων nicht konditional bzw. temporal, sondern kausal gemeint sein muss.²⁰ In gleicher Weise wird diese Formel im Privatbrief *BGU II 615*₃₋₅ (2. Jh. n.Chr.) verwendet: κομισάμενος (l. κομισαμένη) σου τὸ ἐπιστόλιον καὶ ἐπιγνοῦσα, ὅτι θεῶν θελόντων διεσώθης, ἐχάρην πολλά. Ist meine Interpretation korrekt, dann wäre die Stelle folgendermaßen zu übersetzen: “Aber dass er durch den Willen der Götter am Leben bleibt, ist dir nicht schlimm” (oder: “Aber, da er durch den Willen der Götter am Leben bleibt, steht es mit dir nicht so schlimm”). Anscheinend ist οὐδ[έ]ν[σ]ο[ι] ἐστιν φαῦλον als Litotes zu verstehen.

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¹⁹ Ἄρπαγος μὲν δὴ τὸν ἰθὺν ἔφαινε λόγον, Ἀστυάγης δὲ κρύπτων τὸν οἱ ἐνεῖχε χόλον διὰ τὸ γεγονός, πρῶτα μὲν, κατὰ περ ἤκουσε αὐτὸς πρὸς τοῦ βουκόλου τὸ πρῆγμα, πάλιν ἀπηγγέτο τῷ Ἀρπάγῳ, μετὰ δέ, ὥς οἱ ἐπαλλλόγητο, κατέβαινε λέγων ὡς περίεστι τε ὁ παῖς καὶ τὸ γεγονός ἔχει καλῶς.

²⁰ Vgl. Chapa 1998, 110. Zu dieser Formel in Papyri siehe Clarysse 2020.

- R. W. Davies, "The Medici of the Roman Armed Forces", *Epigraphische Studien* 8 (Bonn 1969) 83–99.
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The article focuses on the first six lines of the letter written by a certain Serenus to his mother Antonia, in which he expresses his condolences on the death of a loved one (probably her father or husband). Based on the paleographical considerations made by previous scholars as well as other papyrus attestations I suggest a restoration of the name of the deceased, which was partly lost due to the damages suffered by the papyrus. Furthermore I provide possible parallels to the gnome used in the letter and also offer an interpretation to the final part of the passage discussed.

В статье обсуждаются первые шесть строк из письма некоего Серена к матери Антонии, в котором тот приносит ей свои соболезнования в связи со смертью близкого человека (вероятно, ее отца или мужа). На основании палеографических наблюдений предшественников и свидетельств других папирусов предлагается восстановление имени умершего, частично утраченного из-за повреждения папирусных волокон. Кроме того, автор приводит возможные параллели к использованной в письме гноме, а также предлагает интерпретацию заключительной части обсуждаемого пассажа.

S. Douglas Olson

PHILOLOGICAL NOTES ON THE LETTER
LAMBDA IN A NEW GREEK-ENGLISH
DICTIONARY*

II. ΛΑΣΙΟΚΝΗΜΟΣ – ΛΗΜΨΑΠΟΔΟΣΙΣ

A κνήμη is a “shank”, i.e. the part of the leg between the knee and the ankle, and **λασιόκνημος** (a *hapax* at [Opp.] *Cyn.* 2. 186; of hares) is accordingly not “furry-pawed” but “hairy-legged” (thus LSJ s.v.). Cf. on **λεπτόκνημος** below.

As the *Dictionary* notes expressly, **λασιόκωφος** (“shaggy-deaf”, taken to mean “deaf owing to hair growing in one’s ears”) is a f.l. (attested nowhere else) at Pl. *Phdr.* 253 ε περὶ ὦτα λάσιος, κωφός (“shaggy around the ears, deaf”; of the problematic left-hand horse), and the word ought not to have been lemmatized.

Poll. 7. 73 cites not only Theopomp. Com. fr. 37 λάσιον ἐπιβεβλημένος for **λάσιον** in the sense “hairy fabric”, but also Sapph. fr. 100 ἄμφι δ’ ἄβροις’ ... λασίσις’ εὖ ἐπόκασσε several centuries earlier.¹

S.v. **λάσκω** (poetic), the *Dictionary* discriminates between (C) “of men, cry out, yell, shout”, including “with internal accusative”, as at A. *Ag.* 596 ὀλολυγμὸν ... / ἔλασκον, and (D) “with acc. say, announce,

* See *Hyperboreus* 29 : 1 (2023) 143–166. Thanks are due Benjamin Millis and David Sansone for criticisms and comments on an earlier draft of this material. In addition, I gratefully acknowledge support for my research in 2021–2023 carried out under an agreement for the provision of grants from the federal budget of the Russian Federation in the form of subsidies No. 075-15-2021-571, project “Digital commentaries to classical texts: Greek comedy” (IWL RAS, Moscow, Russia).

¹ Luc. *Prom.* 12 γῆ ... ὕλαις ἅπασα ... λάσιος (“a land completely covered with forests”; awarded a special sub-section “with dative”) tells us nothing about the meaning of λάσιος but is merely a common, unremarkable bit of Greek syntax.

proclaim”, as at A. *Ag.* 1426 περίφρονα δ’ ἔλακες, or “with double accusative”, as at E. *Andr.* 671 τοιαῦτα λάσκεις τοὺς ἀναγκαίους φίλους;. But ὀλολυγμόν, περίφρονα and τοιαῦτα are all internal accusatives, and the sense of the verb is more or less identical in all three cases.

The manuscripts offer **λασταυροκάκαβον** in Chrysipp. xxviii fr. 9 *ap.* Ath. 1. 9 c (a section of the text preserved only in the *Epitome*, which is full of crude, simple errors). But Eustathius and the *Suda* – the latter probably drawing on the complete version of the *Deipnosophists* – have **λασταυροκάκκαβον** (thus LSJ s.v.), which is obviously correct, since the second element in the word is < κάκκαβος (“casserole pan”). **λάσταυρος**, the first element, is glossed “*catamite*” (meaning a teenage boy kept by an older man for sexual purposes); Phryn. *Ecl.* 168 says that it actually means καταπύγων, i.e. any man who allows himself to be used sexually by other men. **λασταυροκάκαβον** is glossed “*catamite’s pot, aphrodisiac*”. The word is not a noun, however, but an adjective (τὸ παρὰ πολλοῖς **λασταυροκάκαβον** καλούμενον βρῶμα), and the sense is ~ “stewed in depravity”, which Athenaeus glosses οὗ ἡ κατασκευὴ περιεργότερα, “(food) the preparation of which is over-elaborate”.

According to Dicaearchus of Messene fr. 95 Wehrli = 106 Mirhady (*ap.* Ath. 15. 666 b–c), **λατάγη** – more often **λάταξ** (glossed “*drop of wine*”; often plural) – is τὸ ὑπολειπόμενον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐκποθέντος ποτηρίου ὕγρὸν (“the liquid that remains after a cup is drained”), i.e. “wine lees”, a sludgy combination of wine and grape- and stem-fragments. It was thrown at a target, which might be either a small disk balanced on top of a pole (= the game of κότταβος κατακτός) or small vessels floating in a basin of water (= the game of κότταβος ἐν λεκάνῃ); see in general Olson on Ar. *Pax* 343/4. It was not thrown “into a bowl”. **λαταγέω** (glossed “*set ringing*”) is a *hapax* at Luc. *Lexiph.* 3 ἀγρόνδε ὀχρόμην ψύττα κατατείνας· ... ὑμεῖς δὲ ἴσως ᾤεσθέ με λαταγεῖν κοττάβους (“I hurried rapidly off to the countryside; ... but you perhaps thought I *latagein kottabous*”), where με λαταγεῖν κοττάβους patently means “I was throwing *latages* in a game of *kottabos*”.

The high-style *hapax* **Λατογένεια** (“born of Leto”) at A. *Th.* 146 ὦ Λατογένεια κόυρα (“O maiden born of Leto”, i.e. Artemis; lyric) is not a noun (lemmatized Λατογένεια -ας, ἡ) but an adjective of a type used for goddesses in place of a combined masculine/feminine form in -γενής (e.g. ἀφρογένεια, ἡριγένεια, Τριτογένεια).

λατομία (“stone quarry”), cited from Strabo, is well-attested in the epigraphic record already in the 4th century BCE, e.g. *SEG* XXXX 263 (Attica); *IG* IV², 1. 102. 3, 15, 17 (Epidaurus); *FD* III 5. 19. 14 (Delphi).

At *IG* II² 13218. 5 Οὐαλέριος Ἀνδρόνεικος ... ἐποίησατο λατόμιον ἐμαυτῷ (“I, Valerius Andronicus, made a *latomion* for myself”; 2nd/3rd c. CE), λατόμιον (omitted) must mean “rock-cut tomb”, as also at e.g. *IK Byzantion* 381. 2 Αὐρηλία ... κατεσκεύασε τὸ λατόμιον ... ἐμαυτῇ.

λατομικός at D. S. 3. 12. 4 λατομικῷ σιδήρῳ is not “for carving stone” but “for cutting stone, for quarrying stones” (thus LSJ s.v.), in reference to an implement used to break soft rock in a gold-mining operation. Cf. Agatharch. 25, where a λατομικός σίδηρος is used to break rocks into smaller pieces (again as part of a mining operation), showing that this is a hammer rather than a pry-bar or the like. Agatharch. 29 mentions λατομίδες χαλκαῖ (“*latomides* made of bronze”) left behind in ancient mines, along with the bones of countless workers killed by cave-ins. LSJ glosses **λατομής** as “stone chisel” (i.e. a stone-carving tool), which is certainly wrong, while the *Dictionary* opts for the safely vague “tool for cutting rock”. The simplest conclusion is that this is another word for some variety of hammer.

πολύχρυσα ... **λατρεύματα** at E. *IT* 1275 (lyric) are not “golden cults of Apollo” but the “hired services that bring much gold (*sc.* as payment)”, in reference to the cult at Delphi and the rewards offered for prophecies.²

λάτρις is elevated poetic vocabulary (favored in particular by Euripides); not attested in prose until the late Roman period. Thgn. 302 seems to distinguish between λάτριδες and δμῶες, while Thgn. 486 references a κακὸς λάτρις ἐφημέριος (“bad *latris* employed for a single day”) and thus similarly appears to mean “hired servant” rather than “slave”;³ cf.

² S.v. λάτριος, Pi. N. 4. 54–56 λατρίαν Ἰαολκόν ... παρέδωκεν Αἰμόνεσσιν means not “he subjugated Iolkos and gave it over to the Haimones” but “he handed over Iolkos to the Haimones in a state of servitude”, the additional verbal ideas in the translation being drawn from the omitted Pindaric πολεμία χειρὶ προστραπών.

³ It is disturbing to find words such as this still glossed “servant”, suggesting voluntary paid service by free persons; cf. δοῦλος, glossed “servant, slave”, in that order. For all their talk of freedom and the like, the Greeks had slaves, and large numbers of them, and they often did not treat them well. This is a conspicuous black

Solon fr. 13. 49 εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν / λατρεύει (“he is a *latris* for a year”, of an agricultural laborer); A. *Supp.* 1011 **λάτρων** ἄτερθεν (“without compensation, free of charge”); Pi. *O.* 10. 28–29 **λάτριον** ... μισθόν (what Heracles should have got from Augeas). At E. *Hec.* 609, on the other hand, the word clearly means not “*hired servant*” but “*slave*” (of an anonymous old woman sent to fetch water), as routinely in Euripides. How one is to understand Hermes’ self-identification as δαιμόνων λάτρις at E. *Ion* 4 (stressing his similarity with and thus his sympathy for Ion?), or Lyssa’s as τὴν θεῶν λάτριν at E. *HF* 823 (stressing her lack of personal agency?), is unclear. But λάτρις is used with surprising frequency of slaves belonging specifically to gods, as at e.g. S. fr. **269 c. 35 Διὸς ... λάτρις; E. *Tr.* 450 τὴν Ἀπόλλωνος λάτριν; *Ion* 1343 ὁ θεὸς ἐβούλετ’ ἐν δόμοις <σ> ἔχειν λάτριν (“The god wanted to have you as a *latris* in his house”; addressed to the hero); *Ph.* 221 Φοῖβῳ λάτρις; fr. 955 Δήμητρος λάτριν; *IG* II² 3464. 13 ἐλάτρευσα θεῶι (3rd c. BCE).

λατυπικός (< λᾶς + τύπτω) means not “*sharp, for cutting*” but “*having to do with stone-cutting*”, as at Aristoxen. fr. 51 = Timae. *FGrH* 566 F 15 (omitted), where Socrates is said to have practiced πατρώα τέχνη ... τῇ λατυπικῇ (“his paternal stone-cutting trade”), i.e. sculpture. At Hsch. ε 7191, the word is not used “of a knife” but of a σμίλη (“chisel”).

A **λαύρα** is normally an “*alley*” *vel sim.* (including at Ar. *Pax* 99, 158, where the fact that people defecate in them does not mean that the word means “*latrine, sewer*”; see Olson on 99–100). Nothing suggests that it means “*covered street, bazaar*” at Clearch. fr. 44 Wehrli (where a red-light district is in question⁴).

λαῦρος (glossed “*violent*”) and **λαύρως** (glossed “*violently*”) are not lemmatizable words but simply late misspellings – less judgmentally put, ill-attested alternative spellings – of **λάβρος** and **λάβρως**, respectively.

Arist. *EE* 1232 a 16 defines a **λαφύκτης** not as a “*glutton*” but as a subcategory of ἄσωτος (“*wastrel, profligate*”), specifically ὁ ἐν τῷ ἀτάκτως ἀναλίσκειν (“the type who spends recklessly”).

mark on their record as a civilization – which is not to say that our own is likely to win any prizes – and lexicographic white-washing of this sort does no service to anyone.

⁴ Mistaken at LSJ s.v. for “an *alley* or *bazaar* at Samos, where women sold delicacies of all kinds”, whence perhaps the odd definition in the *Dictionary*.

λαφυραγωγία is an abstract noun (hence the ending in -ία) which at Epiph. *Haer.* 55. 9. 5 μετὰ τῆς πάσης σκυλεύσεως καὶ λαφυραγωγίας means not “booty” but “plundering”. The same is true at [Caes.] *Erato-pokriseis* 208. 11 εἰς καταπάτημα καὶ λαφυρία. S.v. **λάφυρον**, Plb. 4. 26. 7 τὸ λάφυρον ἐπεκήρυξαν κατὰ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν is translated “they decreed the sack of the Aetolians”, but the sense is really “they issued a decree of sacking against the Aetolians”, i.e. “they decreed that anyone who wished to raid Aetolian territory might do so with impunity”.⁵ While a **λαφυροπώλης** is properly a “seller of booty”, the real sense is “dealer in booty”, since the business involved buying prisoners and anything else that was captured from the enemy and then reselling the goods elsewhere. Despite LSJ s.v. (followed by the *Dictionary*), X. *Lac.* 4. 1. 26 ἦν δὲ λήϊδα ἄγων, πρὸς λαφυροπώλας (“if (someone comes to the king) with booty, (he sends him) to the *laphyropôlai*”) does not show that there were Spartan officials called λαφυροπῶλαι “in charge of supervising booty”, but only that dealers in booty followed the Spartan army on campaign, which is unsurprising.

P.Fam.Tebt. 49 is a list of simple household goods, and **λαχανάρ[ιον]** in fr. B. 2. 1 must accordingly mean not “vegetable market” but ~ “basket for vegetables”.⁶ Cf. **λαχάριον** (omitted) in fr. A. 2. 1.

Hippiatr. 130. 171 is from a section entitled περὶ **λαχανισμοῦ** that discusses how to get one’s horse to eat greens of some sort in the winter: one stews them, rolls them into a ball, adds oil and salt and cumin, etc., meaning that this is not a matter of “pasturing”. ἐὰν ... **λαχανίσαι** θέλης ζῶον accordingly means not “if you want an animal to pick vegetables” but “if you want an animal to consume greens”. At Th. 3. 111. 1, **λαχανισμός** is an activity parallel to looking for firewood that can be used as an excuse for leaving a city and wandering about in the open country, and the word thus means not “gathering, picking of vegetables” (as if work in a garden were in question) but “gathering greens”.

λαχανοθήκη (glossed “dish of vegetables”; better “vegetable case, vegetable storage vessel”; cf. LSJ s.v. “dish or pot for vegetables”) is not a “v.l.” but the paradosis at Ath. 11. 784 b (preserved only in the

⁵ Cf. LSJ s.v. ἐπικηρύσσω “issue letters of marque”, i.e. “open up to privateering”.

⁶ LSJ Supplement s.v. suggests “vegetable pan”.

Epitome), where this is an item in a list of fantastic gold and silver symposium vessels apparently confiscated from a Persian royal residence by Alexander's men. Kaibel emended to λαγυνοθήκη ("flagon-stand"), which is unattested (and omitted from the *Dictionary*) but at least makes tolerable sense, as the manuscript reading does not.

λάχανον is an umbrella term that covers "vegetables, herbs", both wild and cultivated, but seemingly not "legumes", which are instead a type of ὄσπριον ("pulse"; contrasted with λάχανα at e.g. Gal. 11. 238. 2–3 Κ. τῶν ὀσπρίων τινὰ μετὰ λαχάνων ἐνόμενα).

λαχανοπωλικός at *POxy.* lii 1416. 5–6 ἀπογράφομαι ἔχειν ἐργαστήριον λαχανοπωλ(ικόν) ("I attest that I have a *lachanopôlikos* workshop") means not "pertaining to a vegetable merchant" but "related to selling vegetables".

λαχανόσπερμον is attested repeatedly in papyri, and there is no reason to believe that it means "grass seed" (as in a modern garden store) rather than "vegetable seed" (LSJ s.v.).

A γυῖον is a "limb", and **λαχνόγυιος** – a high-style nonce-word at *E. Hel.* 378 (of wild beasts; lyric) – is accordingly not "that has a body covered with fur, hirsute, shaggy" but "with shaggy limbs" (LSJ s.v.).⁷

Whatever one makes of ἐν προτέροισι πόδεσσι (lit. "in its forefeet") at *Od.* 19. 228–229 ἐν προτέροισι πόδεσσι κύων ἔχε ποικίλον ἐλλόν, / ἄσπαιροντα **λάων** (translated "a dog had (between its paws) a dappled fawn, holding it fast while it struggled"; from the disguised Odysseus' description of the brooch he wore when he left for Troy), 19. 230 ὁ μὲν λάε νεβρὸν ἀπάγχων makes it clear that the dog is not holding the fawn with its paws, although it might be standing on it. Instead, its jaws are around the fawn's neck and strangling it. *h. Merc.* 306 οὐδέ κεν αὐτὸν / αἰετὸς ὁξὺ λάων ἐσκέψατο, where the sense of the verb could be "to see" ('catch, hold with eyesight', < λαμβάνω?) or even "to yell, make noise", may be relevant; see Chantraine, *Dict. étym.* s.v.

⁷ S.v. λαχνώδης (a *hapax*), ground that is covered with flowers or luxurious vegetation, as at *E. Cyc.* 541 λαχνῶδές γ' οὐδας ἀνθηρᾶς χλόης, is not "hairy" – an appallingly misguided image – but might reasonably be described as "downy" (thus LSJ s.v.) or "fleecey".

λεαίνω at Hdt. 4. 122. 1 τὰ ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυόμενα λεαίνοντες (of the Scythians, who have camped one day's march ahead of the invading Persian army) is not appropriately glossed “*uproot*”. Instead, the verb is factitive and the sense of the Greek is ~ “they removed everything that grew from the earth and thus made it smooth”, i.e. “they stripped the country of vegetation”.

Str. 2. 3. 6 ~ 3. 53. 2 claims that “some people” refer to “earth-digging leverets”, i.e. rabbits (see Part I s.v. **λαγώς**), as **λεβηρίδες**, and Erot. p. 93. 10–15 (citing the grammarian Polemarchus) says specifically that the Massaliotes – Greek colonists settled on what is today the southern coast of France – referred to rabbits this way. Cf. Latin *lepus*, on the one hand, and French *lapin* < Middle French *laperiau*, on the other. Varro RR 3. 12. 6 claims that **λεπορίς** (whence *lepus*, which he uses as a generic term for hares and rabbits), which must be the same word, is an old fragment of Aeolian Greek vocabulary. But it certainly looks like he is wrong and this is another Iberian loanword.

The **λεβίας** or **λεβίη** is not a “freshwater fish” but a sea-fish (e.g. Archestr. fr. 28 Olson–Sens = SH 158 καὶ λεβίην λαβὲ ... ἐν περικλύστῳ / Δήλῳ καὶ Τήνῳ, “Buy a *lebiê* in sea-washed Delos and Tenos!”).

Poll. 7. 63 ὅα δὲ τὸ ἐξωτάτῳ τοῦ χιτῶνος ἐκατέρωθεν, λέγνα δὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἱματίῳ ἐκατέρου μέρους, οὐχ ὅπου ἢ ὅα (discussing terms for various parts of garments) is obscure, but seems to be saying that *ôia* is a word for the hem of a tunic, whereas **λέγνα** (glossed “*edge, colored hem*”; cf. LSJ s.v. “*coloured edging or border of a garment parallel to the ὅα or selvage*”) is the term for the edge of a himation, since a himation lacks an *ôia*. Cf. Erot. p. 127. 3–4 λέγνα ... ἐκάλουν οἱ ἀρχαῖοι τὰς τῶν ἱματίων ὅας ... τὸ λέγνον τὴν ὅαν σημαίνει καὶ οἷον τὸ πέρας (“the ancients used the term *legna* for the *ôiai* of himations ... *legnon* means ‘*ôia*’ and as it were the edge”); Hsch. λ 493 λέγνη· τὸ παρυφαινόμενον τῇ παραστροφίδι, ὅπερ ἦν παχὺ περὶ τὴν ὅαν ἐκ ῥάμματος (“*legnê*: the portion that is edged with hemming, which was thick around the *ôia* due to the stitching”). Call. H. 3.12 ἐς γόνυ μέχρι χιτῶνα / ζώννυσθαι **λεγνωτόν** (“to wrap myself in a *legnôtos* tunic that extends to my knee”, glossed “*that has a colored edge*”) does not support the distinction between himation and tunic, and how the idea that a *λέγνα* is necessarily colored (i.e. decorative) has got into the lexica, is unclear.

λεγωνάριος (*Iaphrodias* 1 168. 6; 2nd/3rd c. CE) is omitted.

S.v. **λέγω**, *Od.* 24. 108 οὐδέ κεν ἄλλως / κρινάμενος λέξαιτο ... ἄνδρας ἀρίστους (Agamemnon in the Underworld reacts to the sight of the Suitors) means not “he could not have chosen the best men in any other way” but “if someone were selecting the best men, he would not do so otherwise”, i.e. “it is as if someone selected the best men in the city (for death)”. Pl. *Lg.* 737 d οὐκ ἄλλως ὀρθῶς γίγνται ἂν λεχθεῖς ἢ πρὸς τὴν γῆν does not mean “the only way to make the right choice was based on land” but “the choice could not be made properly except with reference to the land”. λέγεται at X. *Cyr.* 1. 2. 1 πατὴρ μὲν δὴ ὁ Κῦρος λέγεται γενέσθαι Καμβύσου is not impersonal, and the sense is thus not “it is said that Kambyes was Cyrus’ father” but “Cyrus is said to have been the son of Kambyes”.

ληλασία is an abstract noun that means not “*pillage*” but “pillaging” at X. *Hier.* 1. 36 τὸ δὲ ἀκόντων παιδικῶν ἀπολαύειν ληλασία ... ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ εὐκέναι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀφροδισίοις (“to make sexual use of a boyfriend who does not want it appears to me more like pillaging than romance”). S.v. **ληλατέω**, Long. 3. 2. 1 ἀγροὺς μὲν οὐκ ἐληλάτει τῶν Μηθυμναίων means not “he was not plundering the territory of the Methymnians” but “he was not plundering the fields of the Methymnians”.⁸

The *alpha* in **λειμαῖ** (glossed “meadow, grassland”) is marked long but is actually short, as the accent makes clear.

λειμών is clearly a figurative term for female genitalia at E. *Cyc.* 171 ψαῦσαι χεροῖν λειμῶνος (“to touch a meadow with my hands”; something the satyrs aspire to, along with “a handful of breast”). But “*graces of women*” is a strange and misleading translation, and the most obvious, basic connection between tenor and vehicle would seem to be a soft, smooth covering of grass ~ hair.

LSJ – followed elsewhere by the *Dictionary* – consistently treats adjectives in -παλης as barytone (e.g. δυσπαλής), but accents nouns on the penult (e.g. μονοπάλης). Either Doric **λειοντοπάλας** (glossed “adj. *lion-wrestler*” [*sic*]) ought to be defined as a noun (as in LSJ s.v.), therefore, or the lemma should be λειοντοπαλάς.⁹

⁸ The lemma λειβηθριάς (glossed “from Mt. Leibethrion”) should be printed Λειβηθριάς.

⁹ S.v. λείος, for “[Xen.] 2. 12” read “[Xen.] *Ath.* 2. 12”.

λειπογνώμων is glossed “toothless, of indeterminable age” but in fact means “that has lost its γνώμονες”, i.e. the teeth that allow one to determine the age of a horse or another domestic animal (X. *Eq.* 3. 1; *SEG* XXXIII 147. 34 αἶγα λειπεγνώμονα (early 4th c. BCE); Poll. 1. 182; 7. 184; Phryn. *PS* pp. 85. 19 – 86. 2). Lexiphanes’ use of the word at Luc. *Lexiph.* 6, along with its presence in Phrynichus, Pollux and others, leaves little doubt that it was regarded as an Attic colloquialism.

S.v. **λείπω**, E. *Hipp.* 1244 ὑστέρω ποδὶ / ἐλειπόμεσθα means not “as we slowed our steps, we were left behind” (of Hippolytus’ friends when his horses bolt) but ~ “we were left behind, since our pace was too slow”. Hdt. 8. 113. 2 οὗτος γὰρ οὐκ ἔφη λείψεσθαι βασιλέος (of the general Hydarnes, when Mardonius was choosing troops to take with him in 480 BCE) means not “indeed, he denied that he would have abandoned the king” but “for this man refused to leave the king’s side” (indirect discourse; what Hydarnes said was οὐ λείψομαι βασιλέος). The translation of S. *Ai.* 543 ἔρποντι φωνεῖς, ἣ λελειμμένω λόγου; (Ajax expresses puzzlement as to why his son has not been brought to him immediately in response to his wife’s command), “Do you speak to the one who is arriving, or to the one who has not understood your words?”) is so awkward as to be almost incomprehensible; what Ajax means is ~ “Is the man you summoned on his way? Or did he miss your order?”. Hdt. 9. 66. 1 οὐκ ἠρέσκετο ... λειπομένου Μαρδονίου ἀπὸ βασιλέος means not “he was not happy that the king had left Mardonius in Greece” (thus approximately Godley in the Loeb, as if the text read ὑπὸ βασιλέος) but “he was unhappy that Mardonius was left in Greece apart from the King”. σφι is a plural form, and Hdt. 9. 45. 2 ὀλιγέων γὰρ σφι ἡμερέων λείπεται σιτία accordingly means not “he has only a few days’ supply of food left” (thus again approximately Godley in the Loeb) but “they have only a few days’ provisions left”.

λειριοπολφανεμώνη is a comic nonce-word at Pherecr. fr. 137. 8. Poll. 6. 61 (citing Ar. fr. 701) thinks that πολφοί (normally plural) are something resembling pasta (πολφοὶ δέ τι ἐκαλεῖτο, μηρύματα ἐκ σταιτός, ἃ τοῖς ὀσπρίοις ἐνέβαλλον, “there was something referred to *polphoi*, which were strands of dough, which they added to pulse”, *sc.* when they were stewing it; cf. Hsch. π 2953 = Phot π. 1071 πολφοί· τὰ ἐκ τῶν χίδρων καὶ τῆς ἐρικτ)ῆς ἐψόμενα, “*polphoi*: a stewed dish made from wheat-groats and barley meal(?)”), while Erot. p. 111.13 believes they are bulbs. But nothing suggests that an “*omelet*” of any sort is in question in Pherecrates.

λειτορεύω (glossed “*make sacrifices*”) is not Attic vocabulary but seems to be restricted to Thessaly (attested in inscriptions already in the 4th c. BCE).

S.v. **λείτωρ** (glossed “*priest*”), the reader is referred to s.v. **λήτωρ**, but no such lemma exists.

λειψανδρία at Cyr. *Is.* 2. 678 e is not “*scarcity of people*” but “*scarcity of men*”, as what follows makes clear (seven women will seek to attach themselves to a single man, if he will only let them call themselves his wives). Cf. the gloss at Hsch. λ 563 λειψις ἀνδρῶν (“*a lack of men*”).

λείψανδρος at Σ E. *Or.* 249 is rightly lemmatized as a two-termination adjective but is glossed as a noun (“*she who abandons her husband*” rather than “*husband-abandoning*”, i.e. “*adulterous*”).¹⁰

λεκανίδιον and **λεκάνιον** are both formally diminutives of **λεκάνη** (glossed “*dish, bowl, pan*”). But Petersen suggests that the former is equivalent to its primitive (cf. s.vv. **λίσγον/λισγάριον** below), while the latter is sometimes a true diminutive and sometimes means “*a kind of λεκάνη, a λεκάνη-like object*”.¹¹

λεκανοσκοπία (a *hapax*) at Man. 4. 213 is literally “*examination of a bowl for purposes of divination*”. But the preceding line (σαφεῖς θ’ ὕδρομάντιας ἔρξε, “*he carried out reliable acts of water-prophecy*”), along with occasional references elsewhere to **λεκανομαντεία** and **λεκανομάντεις**, make it clear that what was actually looked at and manipulated was water that was poured into the bowl.

λέκιθος (glossed “*pureed beans*”) is actually a thick soup or porridge made of barley, beans, lentils or the like; cf. Arnott on Alex. fr. 260. 2. ἔτνος (glossed “*legume puree*”) appears to be very similar, and pureeing – i.e. mechanical reduction of the food in question to a paste – is again not obviously in question there. There is no reason to believe that the word is related to **λεκάνη** (“*dish, bowl, pan*”). A **λεκιθόπωλις** (glossed

¹⁰ Cf. **λεκτέος**, which is similarly lemmatized as a verbal adjective < λέγω but is nonetheless glossed as a noun (“*that which should be said*”). It is unclear why such forms require separate lemmata in any case.

¹¹ Petersen 1910, 83, 89, 92, 228.

“*woman who sells bean flour*”) is a woman who sells such soup/porridge on the street (Ar. *Lys.* 427, cf. 562); Poll. 7. 198 also knows masculine λεκιθοπώλης (omitted).

λεκτικός is glossed “*capable of speech, skillful at talking*”; but at Pl. *Pol.* 304 d τῆς πειστικῆς καὶ λεκτικῆς (τεχνῆς), the third passage cited as an example of this, the sense is in fact – as properly – “associated with speech”. The second definition offered of the adjective (“*suitable for discourse*”) is merely another way of expressing this in English rather than a separate sense of the word.

λελογισμένως ὅπως ἔσονται at Hdt. 3. 104. 1 ἐλαύνουσι ἐπὶ τὸν χρυσὸν λελογισμένως ὅπως καυμάτων τῶν θερμοτάτων ἐόντων ἔσονται ἐν τῇ ἀρπαγῇ is translated “figuring out how they might be”. But the crucial word is an adverb, and the Greek actually says “they drive out to gather the gold in a way calculated to ensure that they will be snatching it when the temperatures are at their height”.

At NT *Mark*¹² 15:34 ~ *Matt.* 27:46, the dying Jesus is reported to have said in Aramaic “My god, my god, **λεμα σαβαθθανι**,” which the Evangelists translate **ἵνατί με ἐγκατέλιπες**; “Why did you abandon me?” Aramaic **λεμα** ~ Hebrew לָמָּה, “for what reason?”; Jesus does not say “*because* you abandoned me”.

λέμβος at D. 32. 6–10 is glossed “*boat, dinghy that follows a ship*”; the text there, combined with Anaxandr. fr. 35. 7 ὀπισθεν ἀκολουθεῖ κόλαξ τῷ, λέμβος ἐπικέκληται (“a flatterer follows someone – he’s nicknamed *lembos*”) makes it clear that the vessel in question is what LSJ terms a “*cockboat*”, i.e. a small boat towed behind a larger ship and used (when untied) e.g. to get people or cargo back and forth to shore (cf. Lycurg. *Leocrat.* 17). There is no reason to believe that this is specifically a felucca (as in s.v. **λεμβώδης**), which is defined *inter alia* by its use of a triangular (“lateen”) sail of a sort seemingly first employed in the Mediterranean in the Imperial period. The **λιβυρνικά** (“Liburnian vessels”; better **Λιβυρνικά**) mentioned at Plu. *Cato min.* 54. 5 are likewise small ships of some sort, but there is no obvious reason to believe that they are specifically feluccas.

¹² Mistakenly abbreviated “Mar.”, as also s.v. **λαμά**.

The name used at Str. 4. 6. 6 for what is today called Lac Lemman (glossed “*Lake Geneva*”, an English calque of a term used in Geneva but – unsurprisingly – unpopular elsewhere in Switzerland) is not ἡ **Λεμέννα** λίμνη but ἡ Λημέννα λίμνη.

Pumpkin is a New World crop, and σικύης **λέμματα** at Hp. *Mul.* 2. 117 is accordingly not “pumpkin rind” but “gourd rind”.

The adjective **λέμφορ** seemingly means “*inept*” at Men. *Epir.* 561 λέμφορ, ἀπόπληκτος, οὐδαμῶς προνοητικός, and there is no reason to believe that it means anything different at Men. fr. 383 γέρων ἀπεμέμυκτ’ ἄθλιος λέμφορ (“a wretched, *lemphos* old man had wiped their/our/your nose”, i.e. “made a fool of them/us/you”; cf. Kassel–Austin 1998 *ad loc.*), where the word is glossed “*snotty, catarrhal*”.

For **λέξεις** meaning ~ “vocabulary items, glossed terms”, note in Athenaeus alone not just 11. 485 e Μόσχος δ’ ἐν ἐξηγήσει Ῥοδιακῶν Λέξεων (“Moschos in the explanatory notes to his *Rhodian Lexeis*”) but e.g. 3. 76 f Φιλήμων δ’ ἐν Ἀττικάῃς Λέξεσι (“Philemon in his *Attic Lexeis*”); 11. 494 f Πάμφιλος ἐν Ἀττικάῃς Λέξεσι (“Pamphilus in his *Attic Lexeis*”); 14. 619 b Ἀριστοφάνης δ’ ἐν Ἀττικάῃς ... Λέξεσιν (“Aristophanes in his *Attic Lexeis*”).

λεοντέη/λεοντή (glossed “*lion skin*” and lemmatized as a noun, following LSJ s.v.) is actually a substantive use (*sc.* δορά) of the adjective **λεόντειος**. Likewise, **λεοντήνη** (glossed “*the territory of Leontinoi [sic]*” and lemmatized as a noun) is a substantive use (*sc.* χώρα) of the adjective **λεοντίνος** (“of Leontini”).

λεοντηδόν (glossed “*like lions*”) at *II Macc.* 11:11 is a normal adverbial formation, as in e.g. ἱππηδόν, κυνηδόν, ταυρηδόν; the word is also attested in two late lexicographic notes, presumably referring to this passage. The v.l. **λεόντινον**, by contrast, is nonsense (and is therefore not printed by editors of *II Macc.*) and should not have been lemmatized.

Λεοντίς at *AP* 5. 201. 1 is correctly lemmatized as feminine but is nonetheless misdescribed as a “male name”.

LSJ s.v. **λεοντοβάμων** (glossed “*standing on lion’s feet*”; of a basin at A. fr. 225. 2) rightly notes that the second element in the adjective is

< βῆμα, not βαίνω; the *Dictionary*'s reference to Poll. 10. 77 is unnecessary, this merely being the place where the fragment is preserved (without comment). **λεοντόβασις** at *IG* II² 1425. 349 σκάφη λεοντόβασ[ις] is glossed “*pedestal in the form of the lion*”, which appears to represent a misunderstanding of LSJ s.v. “*base in form of a lion*” with reference to the same line of the inscription and others. But λεοντόβασις is clearly an adjective equivalent in sense to λεοντοβάμων there (thus “a basin with lion’s feet”), as also at e.g. *ID* 1417 face B. 11 ἐσχάραν λεοντόβασιν ἐπίπυρον ἔχουσιν π[υ]ρφόρον. Elsewhere, it seems to be a noun meaning ~ “lion foot”, as at e.g. *IG* II² 1544. 64]κρον λεοντοβάσεις ἔχων, or in the singular “base featuring lion feet”, as at e.g. *ID* 1441 col. II. 58 τρίποδα περιηργυρωμένον λεοντόβασιν ἔχοντα. See below on **λιθόβασις** (a seeming parallel but actually a ghost word).

Str. 16. 1. 24, 16. 4. 9 refers to various places as “nourishing lions”, i.e. “breeding lions”, and λεοντοβότος rather than **λεοντόβοτος** (unhelpfully glossed “*pertaining to food for lions*”) is accordingly printed there (despite LSJ s.v., which glosses “fed on by lions”). The proparoxytone form of the word (attested nowhere else) should be struck as a lemma.

λεοντοκόμος (glossed as a noun, “*one who raises lions*”) and **λεοντομάχος** (glossed as a noun, “*one who fights with a lion*”) are both adjectives and mean “lion-rearing” and “lion-fighting”, respectively. **λεοντοφόνος** is likewise not “*lion-killer*” but “*lion-killing*”.¹³

Despite the implication of “Stratt. fr. 87 etc.”, **λεπάζω** (glossed “*cook*”) is a *hapax*,¹⁴ hence the widespread sense among editors that the word (or the glosses on it) may be corrupt; see Orth 2009 *ad loc.* Part of the problem is that **λέπασμα** (glossed “*covering, skin*”) has a sense that does not match that of the verb from which it ought to be derived.

S.v. **λεπαῖος**, E. *IT* 324 φυγῇ λεπαίας ἐξεπίμπλαμεν νάπας appears to mean not “we hurled ourselves in flight along rocky crags” but “we filled rocky crags by means of flight”, i.e. “we fled and made the rocky crags crowded with our presence”.

¹³ S.v. λεοντόχοτος, the reference should be to “A. fr. 330” (unhelpfully cited by a Mette number).

¹⁴ Hsch. λ 604 λελεπασμένον· εἰς πέσιν ἦκον is merely another reference to the same fragment (cited at Phot. λ 174 λελεπασμένον· πεπεμμένον. οὕτως Στράτις).

Hsch. λ 661 = Phot. λ 192 maintains that the rare **λέπαργος** (glossed “white, whitish”) can mean not just “with an entirely white hide” but also “with white flanks” (τοῦ λαπάρας λευκάς ἔχοντος ἢ ὅλον τὸ δέρμα). The lemma there, **λεπάργου βοός**, = adesp. tr. fr. *231, the reason for the identification being that the adjective is otherwise attested only in poetry – but note that “A. fr. 304. 5” is a Nauck number, and that in modern editions this is S. fr. **581. 5 (of a hawk; corrected in the LSJ Supplement, which is ignored by the *Dictionary*). The word is in any case applied only to animals.

A **λεπαστή** (glossed “cup, jar, shaped like a λεπάζ”, i.e. like a limpet or more precisely a limpet shell) is certainly a cup rather than a jar and must be cognate with **λέπω** (“peel”), **λοπίς** (“fish-scale”), **λοπάς** (“stewing pan”) and **λεπάς**. Beyond this, the word is obscure; see Olson–Seaberg 2018 on Cratin. fr. 468.

λέπιδι is mentioned only at Ath. 3. 119 b κόττα καὶ λέπιδι, 9. 385 a κόττανα ἡμᾶς καὶ λέπιδιν; in the latter passage these are referred to by the speaker (a Syrian) as τὰ πάτριά μου νόμιμα βρώματα (“the traditional foods of my native country”). Neither word seems to be Greek, and there is accordingly no reason to believe that it is equivalent to **λεπίδιον** (glossed “pepperweed, medicinal plant” – scarcely a “traditional food”).¹⁵

S.v. **λεπιδόομαι**, “[B] subst. λεπιδωτός *lepidotos*, large scaled fish of the Nile, Hdt. 2. 72 | precious stone, Orph. *L.* 287” is out of place (repeated where it belongs below s.v. **λεπιδωτός**).

For “accusative of relation” s.v. **λεπρώω** as an explanation of Hp. *Epid.* VI 17 ἐλέπρα τὴν κύστιν, read “accusative of respect”.¹⁶ Herod. 3. 51 τὴν ῥάκιν λελέπηκε is likewise an accusative of respect and means not “he took the skin off his back” (i.e. in the course of a beating, and as if the verb were a secondary tense), but ~ “his back has grown rough, grown scaly” (of a boy who spends his time in the woods rather than in school).

Λεπρεῖτις (lemmatized as a noun and glossed “territory of Lepreon”) is in fact in that sense a substantive (*sc.* χώρα) of an exclusively feminine adjective comparable in form to Τεγεᾶτις and Σπαρτιάτις. Cf. **Λευκαδία**

¹⁵ This nonetheless seems to be the logic behind the claim at LSJ s.v. that pepperweed (i.e. *Lepidium latifolium*) is a specifically “Syrian plant”, which does not appear to be the case.

¹⁶ So too s.v. **λεπρώω**.

(lemmatized as a noun glossed “territory of Leukas” but in fact merely a substantive use of the adjective **Λευκάδιος**, “*Leukadian*”).

λεπταλέον at Call. *H.* 3. 243 ὑπήεισαν δὲ λίγεια / λεπταλέον σύριγγες is described as an “adverbial neuter” but is actually an internal accusative (“sing delicate accompaniment”) that can be translated adverbially (“sing delicately in accompaniment”). Ar. *Av.* 235 ἀμφιτιτυβίζεθ’ ... λεπτόν and Bion *Adon.* 9 λεπτόν ἀποψύχων (both quoted s.v. **λεπτός** and similarly described as “adverbial neuters”) are additional examples of internal accusatives that can be understood adverbially.

As LSJ s.v. – comparing **παππεπίπαπος** (“grandfather’s grandfather”) and **φανλεπίφανλος** (“bad-upon-bad, as bad as can be”) – notes, **λεπτεπίλεπτος** (clumsily glossed “*very subtle, very light*”) is literally “*thin-upon-thin*, i.e. *as thin as thin can be*”. Although the word is cited at Nicar. *AP* 11. 110. 1, it is also found at [Hero Mechanicus] *Mens.* 60. 1, suggesting that it and the formation strategy it represents are not poetic but colloquial. Cf. **πολλά** ... (ἐ)πὶ πολλοῖς (lit. “many upon many”, i.e. “again and again”) at e.g. Ar. *Eq.* 411 with LSJ s.v. ἐπὶ B. I. 1. d.

λεπτίτιδες κριθαί at *Gp.* 3. 3. 12 is reasonably translated (following LSJ s.v.) “very fine variety of barley”. What the note fails to make clear is that **λεπτίτις** (attested nowhere else) is an adjective (exclusively feminine).

ἡ λεπτὴ Γένεσις (“*Little Genesis*”), not ἡ **Λεπτογένεσις**, is the standard way of referring to the *Books of Jubilees* in the Greek Church Fathers. The latter appears as a variant in one manuscript of Epiphanius of Salamis *Haer.* 39. 6, which is insufficient reason for lemmatizing it, particularly without reference to the standard reading.

Arist. *PA* 657 b 2 ὁ ἄνθρωπος ... λεπτοδερμότατος is translated “man has very thin skin”, but **λεπτοδερμότατος** is a true superlative here: in comparison to other animals, human beings allegedly have skin around the pupils of their eyes that is the thinnest there is, and they accordingly blink more often.

λεπτοκάρυον is misleadingly glossed “*nut*”. This is instead a term for some specific variety of nut, presumably one with a thin shell. Gal. VI. 609. 14–15 K. claims that it is an alternative name for the κάρυον Ποντικόν (probably “hazelnut”).

λεπτόκνημος is glossed “*fine- or weak-legged*”, but the word means “thin-shanked” (LSJ s.v. “*spindle-shanked*”); cf. above on **λασιόκνημος**.

λεπτοποιητικός is an adjective (“thinning”) but is glossed as a noun (“*that which makes one thin*”).

Although the root-sense of **λεπτοσχιδής** at Cephisod. fr. 4 is patently “*with narrow slits*” *vel sim.*, Poll. 7. 85, 87 (quoting the fragment) reports that this was used as the name of some otherwise obscure style of fashionable, expensive sandals worn by women. Dioscurides uses the word repeatedly of leaves (2. 139. 1, 2. 176. 1; 3. 24. 1), presumably those in which the blade is dissected into multiple leaflets.

λεπτοτομέω at Str. 15. 2. 14 is used in the context of a description of how the Carmani eat tongues cut from the heads of their dead enemies. The verb must thus mean “*cut into small pieces*” rather than “*break into small pieces*” there.

λεπτότρητος (glossed “*that has small holes, perforated by small cavities*”) is used once by Dioscurides, of sponges (5. 120. 1). But the adjective is far more common in Galen (ignored), who applies it repeatedly to sieves (e.g. XIII. 635. 4 K. **λεπτοτρήτοις κοσκίνους**).

λεπτόφυλλος in botanical descriptions (e.g. Thphr. *HP* 3. 12. 7) probably means “*narrow-leaved*” (i.e. with long, thin leaves) rather than “*thin-leaved*” (i.e. with leaves that lack substance, that are not thick).

A husk (**λέπυρον**) is by its very nature – from a human perspective – a small and trivial thing, and there appears to be no difference in meaning between the primitive and its formal diminutive **λεπύριον** (glossed “*small husk, pellicle*”¹⁷); cf. Petersen 1910, 166.

λεπόχανον is used of the skin of an onion at Theopomp. Com. fr. 34. 3, which does not mean that this is “usually” the case (e.g. of a pomegranate husk at Dsc. 1. 74. 2; of lupine pods at Gal. XII. 445. 9 K.; of a nutshell at Gal. XIII. 256. 5 K.). There is no reason to believe that the word is cognate with **λάχανον** (“vegetable”).

¹⁷ But “*pellicle*” implies a membrane or skin, rather than a hard wrapper like a nutshell, eggshell, or beanpod, which is how both words seem to be used.

λέπω is normally “*husk, shell, peel*”, and Arnott on Alex. fr. 50. 3 argues that the idea at Antiph. fr. 133. 3 μάζης μελαγχρῆ μερίδα λαμβάνων λέπει (“he takes a swarthy piece of barley-cake and *lepei*”) must be that the subject “first removes the crust”, perhaps to save it for another meal. But barley-cake was not baked, so perhaps the man tears his food apart or the like. In any case, Casaubon’s claim (adopted by LSJ s.v., followed by the *Dictionary*) that **λέπω** has the unique meaning “eat” in the passage is merely a context-driven guess responding to the difficulty of getting the verb to mean what it should there.

Λεσβιάζω – unhelpfully, if in a very basic sense accurately, glossed “act like Lesbians” (see above s.v. **Λακεδαιμονιάζω**) – means “give blow jobs”.¹⁸

Λεσβιάς is glossed “from Lesbos, Lesbian” but without noting that this is an exclusively feminine form of the ethnic, like e.g. Ἀχαιῖάς (“Achaean woman”) or **Λημνιάς** (glossed “from Lemnos”, but with the restriction of the adjective to women similarly ignored).¹⁹ Cf. below s.v. **Λευκανίς**.

λεσχηνεύω (“be a chatterbox”; attested already in Hippocrates) assumes the existence of **λεσχίν** (“chatterbox”; first attested at Timo SH 820. 2); neither word is derived from **λέσχημα**, a dubious variant at [Hp.] Ep. 17. 294 (IX. 378. 7 Littré) that ought not to have been lemmatized. **λεσχηνεία** at [Pl.] Ax. 369 d²⁰ (an abstract, and thus “chattering” rather than “chatter”) is likewise not from **λέσχημα**.²¹

λευγαλέος is poetic and, despite the impression created by the note, is attested not just in Homer but in Hesiod (*Op.* 525, 754), Theognis (1174)

¹⁸ The *Dictionary*’s unwillingness to define the word further even via the use of euphemism seems odd in early 21st-century America. LSJ s.v. was at least brave enough to add “Latin *fellare*”.

¹⁹ S.v. Λέσβιος, the substantive use of the adjective to refer to some specific type of cup or jug (not “cup, jug”) at Hedyll. HE 1840 requires an initial capital.

²⁰ The *Axiochus* is today universally regarded as spurious; failure to acknowledge this distorts the history of the word and its cognates implicitly presented in these entries. The same is true of the Roman-era pseudo-Hippocratic *Epistles*.

²¹ Λευγαία (the name of one of the regiments of the Macedonian cavalry; mentioned at Arr. An. 2. 9. 3) is lemmatized. The name of the other regiment, Ἀνθεμουσία, is nonetheless ignored.

and Sophocles (fr. 785; 1062), and is subsequently picked up not just by Philotas but also by Aratus (1. 108), Timo (*SH* 840. 7), Apollonius Rhodius (e.g. 1. 295), and Oppian (e.g. *Hal.* 1. 375).

λευκάλφιτος at Sopat. fr. 3 is an epithet of Eretria and means not “*made of white flour*” but “*where the barley is white*” *vel sim.*

S.v. **λευκανθής**, the adverb ἄρτι is used specifically of time (“just now”) and not to express limitation generally. S. *OT* 742 χνοάζων ἄρτι λευκανθὲς κάρα thus means not “his hair was scarcely turning gray” but “he was just now getting the first sprinkles of gray on his head”.

The adjective **Λευκανίς** (glossed “*belonging to Lucania*”) is exclusively feminine, like e.g. Δαρδανίς.

λευκαντής is glossed “*person who dyes white, fuller*”. But fuller and λευκαντής appear to be separate occupations (specifically distinguished at e.g. *PGenova* 1 24. 5–7), and *POxy.* LIV 3743. 19 makes it clear that the latter handled linen, whereas the former dealt with woolen garments.

λευκαυγής (glossed “*shining white*”) is used of the body of a cuttlefish (not “a fish”) at Antiph. fr. 216. 20 (miscited by the old Kock-number as fr. 217. 20) and is a bit of mock-dithyrambic blather.

“*white fig*” is not a translation but a calque of **λευκερινεός**, and precisely what sort of tree is in question was obscure already in antiquity (Ath. 3. 76 c). An ἐρινεός is in any case a wild fig tree rather than a domesticated one.²² So too “*whitefish*” is a calque rather than a translation of **λευκίσκος** (seemingly a generic term for various gray mullet varieties) in Hicesius *ap.* Ath. 7. 306 d–e.²³ The latter gloss is particularly unfortunate given that English “whitefish” refers generically to a group of mild-flavored fish that includes e.g. salmon, trout and bass, but not mullet.

²² English “bough” refers to one of the main branches of a tree, and D. 18. 260 ἐστεφανωμένους ... τῇ λεύκη (cited s.v. λεύκη) accordingly means not “crowned with poplar boughs” but “crowned with poplar”, i.e. with poplar twigs woven into garlands.

²³ Cf. s.vv. λιθίασις and λιθιάω, where LSJ’s dated “*disease of the stone*” and “*suffer from the stone*” (referring to kidney stones and the like) are replaced by the even more obscure calques “*lithiasis*” and “*suffer from lithiasis*”.

ἡ λεύκη (lemmatized as **Λεύκη** and glossed “*Leuke*, place at Athens”) at And. 1. 133 (something beneath which Agyrrhius and his friends met) is clearly a recognizable spot in the city. The easiest explanation of the passage would seem to be that this was simply a well-known poplar tree.²⁴ “**Λευκή -ῆς ἡ** Demosth. 7. 40, see *Λευκή*” immediately after this appears to represent a garbled attempt to suggest that the place referred to in Demosthenes is the same as the one mentioned at Hdt. 7. 25. 2 (= **1. Λευκή, ἄκτῃ, ἡ** [*sic*]).

The high-style *hapax* **λευκήρετος** at E. *IA* 283 (of war and thus of warships; lyric) means not “*white-branched*” but “with white oars (*ἑρετμοί*)”.

λευκίππος (glossed “*of the white horses, who has or rides or guides white horses*”) is elevated poetic vocabulary attested already at Stesich. *PMG* 256; Ibyc. *PMG* 285. 1 (both omitted). The word modifies “streets” at Pi. *P.* 9. 83 *λευκίπποισι Καδμείων ... ἀγναιῖς*, and the *Dictionary* accordingly glosses it “*full of white horses*” there. As Slater 1969 s.v. observes, however, the intended sense is *λευκίππων Καδμείων ἀγναιῖς* (“the streets of Cadmeians mounted on white horses”; hypallage).

λευκογραφίς is glossed “*chalk, for writing*” with reference to Plin. *Nat.* 27. 103. In fact, this is a plant which Pliny reports can be used as a drug against spitting up blood and excessive menstrual flows and as part of a salve for various conditions (*utilis proditur sanguinem excreantibus tribus obolis cum croco, item coeliacis, trita ex aqua et adposita profluvio feminarum, oculorum quoque medicamentis et explendis ulceribus quae fiant in teneris partibus*). **λευκογραφία**, drawn from Plin. *Nat.* 37. 162, where the Loeb editor Eichholz glosses “white chalk”, has been omitted from the *Dictionary*, suggesting that portions of the two entries have been carelessly run together.

Α διφθέρα is a “skin” in the sense “piece of leather”, and **λευκοδίφθερος** (attested only in Hesychius, who offers the gloss **λευκοδέρματος**) thus probably means “covered in white leather” rather than “*white-skinned*”

²⁴ For a similar landmark, cf. Cratin. fr. 372 (an αἴγειρος – a different variety of poplar, a λεύκη generally being taken to be a white poplar rather than simply a “poplar” – located somewhere above the Theater of Dionysus) with Olson–Seaberg 2018 *ad loc.*

(as in “craftsmen tend to be white-skinned, in contrast to farmers, who are tan”; see below on λευκοπληθής).

λευκοθρακία at *Gp.* 5. 17 is not a “white vine” but a particular variety of vine that bears white grapes with a reddish blush; the vines themselves are said to be red (αὐτὰ δὲ τὰ κλήματα ἐρυθρὰ ἔχει).

λευκομήλινος is glossed “yellow”. But λευκέρυθρος is “pale red” (of a person’s complexion), i.e. “pink”;²⁵ λευκομέλας is “pale black” (i.e. “gray”); λευκόχλωρος is “pale green” (generally of complexions); and λευκόχρυσος is “pale gold” (of a stone); so λευκομήλινος must be “pale yellow”. Note also λευκορόδιος (omitted), which must mean “a pale rose color”, at *PPrinc.* II 82. 37; and the problematic λευκόσπανος (βέλος).

The Λευκὸν Τεῖχος in Memphis (some sort of citadel occupied by Persian troops) at *Hdt.* 3. 91. 3 is not the “White Rock” but the “White Wall”.

With reference to an individual item of clothing, “dress” is used in English only of female costume;²⁶ since λευκοπάρυφος refers to a man at *Plu. Mor.* 180 e, it cannot be glossed “with a white-hemmed dress”. In addition, the word is contrasted with ὀλοπόρυφος – in response to admiring comments about Antipater’s austere style of life, Alexander comments drily that he is λευκοπάρυφος on the outside, but “100% purple on the inside” – and the real sense of “white-bordered” is clearly that Antipater does not have a fancy purple border on his robe, i.e. he is not εὐπάρυφος/φοινικοπάρυφος.

λευκοπληθής at *Ar. Ec.* 387 means not “full of people dressed in white” (cf. *LSJ* s.v. “full of persons in white”) but “full of people with white complexions” (in reference to the women who have infiltrated the Assembly).

²⁵ Contrast λευκόπυρρος (of hair), which seems to mean ~ “ginger-colored”. Prefixes based on μέλας are used in a similar fashion to mean “dark-” (thus e.g. μελάγχλωρος, μελαμπόρυφος, μελανόφαιος, μελανόχλωρος).

²⁶ This is not to say that a man cannot wear a dress, but only that this is by definition an act of transvestism. Contrast the generic use of the word in “He wore formal dress for the occasion”.

λευκόπρωκτος at Call. Com. fr. 14. 2²⁷ is properly “with a white asshole” not “*white-bottomed*”.²⁸ The sense is patently abusive, combining notions of femininity (since white skin was ideally characteristic of women; see above on λευκοπληθής) and passive sexuality (see Part I on λακκόπρωκτος). Cf. λευκόπυγος (glossed “*white-buttocked*”) at Alex. fr. 322 (expressly identified by Eustathius, presumably relying on an older authority such as Suetonius, as meaning ἀνανδρος, “unmanly”). Contrast the heroic μέλαμπυγος Myronides at Ar. Lys. 802.

λευκόπτερυξ is not “dubious” at Ion PMG 745. 3 – unhelpfully cited as fr. 10 Bergk – but a conjecture by Bentley for the paradosis λευκῆ πτέρυγι (printed with Doric *alpha* by e.g. Page).

At Q. S. 12. 414, λευκαῖ ... ὀπωπαί are not “*eyes afflicted with glaucoma*” but “*eyes afflicted with cataracts*” (medically an entirely different phenomena and one that makes the eye seem to be covered with a large white spot). To “*know τὸ λευκόν*” (unhelpfully glossed “*white, the color white, whiteness*”) is apparently a colloquial expression ~ “*know up from down*” (thus Σ^{VEΓΘ} Ar. Eq. 1279); cf. Matro fr. 1. 35 Olson–Sens = SH 534 τὸ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν οἶδε (“*she knows white and black*”, i.e. “*white from black*”).

LSJ s.v. (followed by the *Dictionary*) takes λευκόσπανος – patently a color-word meaning “*pale [something]*”; see above s.v. λευκομήλινος – at PHamb. 1 10. 17 to mean “*pale grey*”. The text at that point in the papyrus is problematic, and a better reference would be to PHamb. 1 10. 19–20 φαινόλην λευκοσπανὸν τέλειον λακων[ό]σημον. LSJ’s reasoning is obscure, but the word is in any case not < σπάνις (“*scarcity, dearth, lack*”) but apparently < LSJ’s “σπᾶνός = Lat. *pullus*”.

λευκοσώματος (glossed “*white*”; of loaves of bread and thus conveying the idea “*made with the finest flour*”) at Antiph. fr. 174. 3 is another bit of para-dithyrambic language (cf. s.v. λευκανυγής above) that is intended to bear its full – openly absurd – sense “*having a white body*” there, as if e.g. a beautiful woman were being described. The obscure λευκόσωμοι at CCA 11(2) 136. 23 (in a list of personal physical characteristics) ought probably to be emended to λευκοσώματοι.

²⁷ Often regarded as corrupt; see Kassel–Austin 1983 *ad loc.*

²⁸ Cf. the similarly evasive “*having wide or broken buttocks*” (*sic*) s.v. εὐρύπρωκτος. Note also that cognate εὐρυπρωκτία (glossed “*having wide buttocks*”) is a noun.

λευκότης, first attested at Hdt. 4. 64. 3 (omitted), is not “white” but “whiteness”.

As Dunbar 1995 *ad loc.* observes, **λευκότροφα** (obscurely glossed “that grows white”) at Ar. Av. 1100 “may be either passive, ‘white-fed’, i.e. berries grown from the fragrant white blossom ..., or active (λευκοτρόφα) ‘white-feeding’, i.e. the white and nourishing berries”.

λευκουργέω is cited (following LSJ) by reference to CIG 2749; the proper modern reference is *Iaphrodisias* 12 914. 5. The verb is better translated “fit with white marble, face with white marble” than “furnish with white marble”. A **λευκουργός** (glossed “stone-cutter”) is distinguished from a **λατόμος** (glossed “quarry man, stone cutter”) at *IDidyma* 102. 61; a more specialized craft (“marble-worker”)?

λευκοφλέγματος is rightly lemmatized as an adjective but is translated as a noun (“patient suffering from leukophlegmatia”;²⁹ read “suffering from leukophlegmatia”). The condition **λευκοφλεγματία** itself is translated “dropsy” (following LSJ s.v.); this is an archaic term for what is today called “edema”, i.e. generalized swelling of the body due to retention of water (often resulting from congestive heart failure).

λευκόψαρος is a color-term for a donkey³⁰ at *Hippiatr.* 14. 5. The *Dictionary* glosses “grayish”, following LSJ s.v. “whitish grey”. But ψαρός appears to mean “with markings like a starling (ψάρ)” (of a horse at Ar. Nu. 1225; glossed “dapple grey” by LSJ s.v.), and **λευκόψαρος** ought thus to mean “with light markings like a starling” (cf. above on **λευκομήλινος** etc.), i.e. ~ “colored a light dapple gray”.

S.v. **λευκόω**, the ὅπλα in question at X. HG 2. 4. 25 ὅπλα ἐποιούντο are not “weapons” but “shields”, as what follows makes clear (some were of wood, others of wickerwork), and the shields are not the subject of the verb in the next clause (ταῦτα ἐλευκοῦντο) – unacceptable in Attic – but the object: “they were painting them white”.

²⁹ For the *Dictionary*’s tendency to translate by means of transliteration or obscure calques in such situations, rather than effectively explaining the term in question, see above s.vv. λευκερινεός/λευκίσκος.

³⁰ The *Dictionary* translates “asses”, a word used in colloquial American English almost exclusively to mean “buttocks”, and is thus unnecessarily confusing when the more common term is available.

Λευκτρίδες – which ought to mean “daughters of Leuktris” – at Plu. *Pel.* 20. 5 is confusingly glossed “*daughters of Skedasos*”. What Plutarch actually says is “The graves of the daughters of Skedasos are located in the Leuktros plain; they call them *Leuktrides* because of the place”.³¹

λευκώλενος (“white-armed”; always of women) is epic language, attested not just in Homer but in Hesiod (e.g. *Th.* 314), the *Hymns* (e.g. *hAp.* 95), Empedocles (31 B 3. 3 D.–K.), and Matro’s mock-epic *Attic Dinner-party* (fr. 1. 38 Olson–Sens = *SH* 534. 38), and found a number of times in both Pindar and Bacchylides (e.g. 5. 99).³² But the elegiac, iambic and other lyric poets never use it, nor does tragedy – making it out of place in Lucian’s mock-tragic *Podagr.* 93 – or comedy. It likewise never appears in Apollonius Rhodius. Nonnus has it, but only twice (4. 19; 15. 241).

Λεύκωμα is not a “*white tablet of gypsum*, used as a public register” but a piece of wood – generally referred to as a *πίναξ* or *πινάκιον* – painted white and used for posting public notices, maintaining public records, and the like (e.g. Ar. *Av.* 450; [Arist.] *Ath.* 48. 4; Poll. 8. 104).

λευκωματίζω (glossed “*to suffer from leucoma*”, i.e. from a white spot on the eye) is attested only once, in the aorist passive in a *scholion* on [A.] *PV* 499 τὰ λευκωματισθέντα, where the reference is metaphorically to sight and the sense is “made white” and thus “afflicted with cataracts”. Either the word must be defined “cause to suffer from cataract”, therefore, or it must be lemmatized as middle-passive λευκωματίζομαι, as in LSJ s.v.

λεύκωσις at Olymp. Alch. ii p. 88. 21 is not “*whiteness*” but “*whitening*”.

S.v. **λεύσσω**, *Od.* 9. 166 Κυκλώπων δ’ ἐς γαῖαν ἐλεύσσομεν means not “we looked toward the land of the Cyclops” but “we looked toward the land of the Cyclopes (pl.)”. μάταια at S. *Tr.* 407 εἰ μὴ κυρῶ λεύσσω μάταια is an internal rather than an external accusative, and the words mean

³¹ ἔστι γὰρ ἐν τῷ Λευκτρικῷ πεδίῳ τὰ σήματα τῶν τοῦ Σκεδάσου θυγατέρων, ὡς Λευκτρίδας καλοῦσι διὰ τὸν τόπον.

³² LSJ Supplement s.v. notes in addition a 6th-c. BCE inscribed finger-ring from Argos with the word (used of Hera) published by Tracy 1986.

not “if I don’t turn out to be looking at nothing” but “if I’m not looking in vain”, i.e. “unless I’m blind”. *Od.* 10. 30 πυρπολέοντας ἐλεύσσομεν means not “we saw fires being lit” but “we saw people tending fires”.

λεῦω (“pelt with stones, stone”) is attested already at Hippon. fr. 37 ἐκέλευε βάλλειν καὶ λεύειν Ἰππώνακτα and A. fr. **132 c. 1 λεύσουσι τοῦμὸν σῶμα (both ignored).

The Λεωκόρειον was not a “temple of the daughters of Leos, at Athens” but a shrine to them in the Agora; see Hornblower on Th. 1. 20. 2.

S.v. λέων, NT *Rev.* 5:5 ὁ λέων ὁ ἐκ τῆς φυλῆς Ἰούδα means not “the lion of the tribe of Judah” but “the lion from the tribe of Judah”.

λήθαιος/ληθαῖος is rightly lemmatized as an adjective but is glossed as a noun (“*that which makes one forget*”; read “causing forgetfulness”).

ληθαργία (glossed “*sleepiness*”) at *adesp. com.* fr. 910. 2 is part of a catalogue of diseases and thus probably a disease itself (~ “stupor, lethargic fever, depression”).

S.v. λήθη, Jos. *BJ* 4. 31 ἐν λήθῃ τοῦ καθ’ αὐτὸν ἀσφαλοῦς γενόμενος means not “forgetting their own safety” but “forgetful of his own personal safety” (of Vespasian in the Battle of Gamala).

ληϊᾶς is glossed “*prisoner*” (following LSJ s.v. “*taken prisoner, captive*”). But the sense of the Greek is much darker than this (“taken as plunder, taken as a slave”), and the fact that the word is exclusively feminine is ignored. A Homeric *hapax*, picked up insistently by Apollonius Rhodius (4 x) and Quintus Smyrnaeus (8 x).³³

³³ S.vv. ληϊβότειρα and ληϊβότηρ, read instead ληϊβότειρα and ληϊβότηρ. Why the words are lemmatized separately is unclear, the former simply being the feminine form of the latter (as LSJ is aware), even if seemingly treated as a noun, although without a definite article (ληϊβότειρα -ης). S.v. ληϊδῖος (glossed “*captured as booty, prisoner*”, for which read “taken as booty, taken prisoner”), the translation of Jul. *AP* 6. 20. 1–2 Ἑλλάδα ... θῆκεν ἐφ’ ἀλλεῖ ληϊδίην as “she captured Greece with her beauty” catches the sense of the Greek but not in a way that makes sense of the vocabulary (better “she took Greece captive with her beauty”). ληϊζω is in the imperfect at Th. 1. 5. 3 ἐλήζοντο δὲ καὶ κατ’ ἡπειρον ἀλλήλους (not “they plundered one another on dry land as well” but “they used to

ληκάω at Pherecr. fr. 253 and Ar. *Th.* 493 does not mean “*practice fellation*” (*sic*; better “perform fellatio”) but is a crude colloquialism for “have intercourse”; see Bain 1991, 70–72; Austin–Olson 2004 *ad loc.*

If **λήκημα** at Epic. fr. 414 Usener means “*din*”, it is < ληκέω rather than ληκάω. If it is in fact < ληκάω, it means not “*obscenity*” but “obscene behavior”.

The metrical term **ληκόθιον** is described as “trochaic dimeter catalectic” (i.e. the sequence – ◡ – × – ◡ –), “(name derived from the parody of Ar. *Ra.* 1200–47)”. But the term *lekythion* is also used for the unit – ◡ – × – ◡ – in iambic trimeter, as in the section of Aristophanes referred to, where what is meant is “name derived from the parody at Ar. *Ra.* 1200–1247”, the lines in question all being absurd reworkings of Euripides.

Photius λ 258 = *Suda* λ 437 in fact glosses S. fr. 1063 **ληκυθιστής** (a *hapax*) not “*who speaks or declaims in an emphatic or deep voice*” (actually a noun, “one who ...”) but ὁ μικρόφωνος (“one who speaks in a small voice”, whence LSJ s.v. “*one who declaims in a hollow voice*”). Meineke wanted to emend to μακρόφωνος, which must be the source of the error.

S.v. **λῆμα**, E. *Med.* 348 ἥκιστα τοῦμόν λῆμ’ ἔφν τυραννικόν means not “to be sure, my will is not tyrannical” but “my will/spirit is not tyrannical at all” (ἥκιστα adverbial). At Ar. *Ra.* 602 παρέξω ’μαυτὸν ἀνδρεῖον τὸ λῆμα, ἀνδρεῖον modifies not τὸ λῆμα (translated “manly courage”) but ἐμαυτόν, with τὸ λῆμα as an accusative of respect (lit. “I will furnish myself courageous in will”, i.e. “I’ll act brave”).

plunder one another etc.”), and in the perfect at E. *Hel.* 475 οὐ τί πον λελήσιμεθ’ ... λέχος; (not “surely I am not robbed of my wife?” but “surely I have not been robbed of my wife?”). D. S. 11. 88. 4 Τυρρηῶν ληζομένων τὴν θάλατταν means not “the Etruscans practiced piracy at sea” but literally “the Etruscans plundered the sea”, with the place where this was done specified in the immediately preceding phrase (κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν, “around Sicily”). That the imperfect active appears twice in Thucydides (3. 85. 2; 4. 41. 2) as a v.l. for the middle-passive is a point of no significance, since the verb is never used in the active except in very late sources, hence LSJ’s more sensible lemmatization as ληΐζομαι.

ληματίας is treated as an adjective at Ar. *Ra.* 494 ληματίας κἀνδρεῖος εἶ (thus e.g. Wilson's OCT). The *scholia ad loc.*, by contrast, take the text to read ληματιᾶς κἀνδρεῖος εἶ (thus Dover), as if from ληματιάω (omitted).³⁴

λήμη is a prosaic term for what in colloquial English is often referred to as an “eye booger”. The advice – attributed to Pericles at Arist. *Rh.* 1411 a 15–16, and to Demades at Ath. 3. 99 d, but in any case clearly to be understood as a lively, memorable image – Αἴγιναν ἀφελεῖν ... τὴν λήμην τοῦ Πειραιέως thus means not “to get rid of Aegina, which is an eyesore to the Piraeus (*sic*)” but ~ “to get the booger Aegina out of the Piraeus’ eye”. The more polite (because more oblique) alternative English word is “sleep” (by extension, this being something that occasionally accumulates in one’s eye while one is sleeping), which is what the *Dictionary* seems to be attempting to communicate by glossing **λημίον** as “*piece of sleep*”. **λημότης** (a *hapax*) at Σ^{Ald} Ar. *Nu.* 327 is glossed “*pain in the eyes*” but ought presumably to mean ~ “condition in which one has λήμη in one’s eye”.

For **Λημνιάς** (glossed “from Lemnos”, but used only of women), see above s.v. **Λεσβιάς**. **Λημνίς** (a *hapax* at Nic. *Th.* 865), **ληστρίς** (often used substantively of pirate ships), **Λοκρίς**, **λοξότροχis** and **λουτρίδες** are similarly restricted to use with feminines.

λημψαπόδοσις at *PLond.* I 77. 50 τὴν πᾶσαν λημψαπόδοσιν ὑπὲρ ἔμο(ῦ) ποιήσασθαι is the equivalent of a gerund that means not “*receipts and payments*” but “receiving and giving away”, i.e. “taking in money and paying it out”.

To be continued.

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³⁴ A peculiar omission, given the *Dictionary*’s seemingly firm and systematic ideological commitment to valorizing variant readings of all sorts even when they have no chance of being correct (e.g. s.vv. **λεόντινον**, **λέσχημα** and **ληϊζω** above).

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Part II. Two generations ago, Robert Renehan published a series of articles expanding, refining, and correcting entries in the 9th edition of the monumental Liddell–Scott–Jones *Greek-English Lexicon* (1940) as supplemented by Barber and his fellow editors (1968). These notes on the letter *lambda* in the new *Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek* are offered in a similar spirit.

Часть II. Полвека тому назад Роберт Ренеган опубликовал ряд дополнений, уточнений и поправок к девятому изданию монументального словаря Liddell–Scott–Jones, *Greek-English Lexicon* (1940), дополненного группой издателей во главе с Барбером (1968). Нестоящие заметки к леммам на букву *лямбда* призваны сыграть аналогичную роль по отношению к новому *Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek*.

KEYWORDS

BRACCINI

geography; India; Lucian; parody; Taprobane
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EGOROVA

античная архитектура; Витрувий; латинские предлоги; *Об архитектуре*;
Пифей/Пифий
ancient architecture; Latin prepositions; *On Architecture*; Pytheos/Pythius;
Vitruvius

KEYER

finger ring; Petronius; Pliny the Elder; right foot; superstitions
кольцо; Петроний; Плиний Старший; правая нога; суеверия

LIBERMAN

Greek grammar and language; Greek meter; Greek tragedy; Sophocles;
textual criticism
греческая грамматика; греческая метрика; греческая трагедия; Софокл;
критика текста

OLSON

definition; dictionary; lexicography; lexicon; philology
лексикография; лексикон; определение; словарь; филология

SHAVRIN

Greek papyrology; Gregor Zereteli; letters of condolence; private letters on papyrus; Russian-Georgian papyrus collections

греческая папирология; Г. Ф. Церетели; письма-соболезнования; русско-грузинские папирусные собрания; частные письма на папирусе

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