

RECOGNITION BASED ON PARALOGISM (ARISTOT. *POET.* 1455 a 12–16)*

I. The Context: Classifying the Recognitions

In Chapter 16 of the *Poetics* Aristotle gives a classification of recognitions used in constructing the plots of tragedy and of epos, and enumerates εἶδη ἀναγνωρίσεως in ascending order of merit. Recognitions by means of signs (διὰ τῶν σημείων), i. e. remarkable objects such as necklaces or physical tokens such as moles and scars, are the least artistic. Next are cases where a character declares his own identity and provides proof in the form of circumstances contrived by the poet that do not logically follow from the plot, including tokens (αἱ πεποιημένα ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ). Thirdly, we have emotions revealed at some sight or story (ἢ διὰ μνήμης).

Next comes the recognition ‘by syllogism’ (1455 a 4–12). Since it might appear, at first glance, that the kind ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ is related or opposed to the kind ἐκ παραλογισμοῦ, to which this inquiry is dedicated, it must be discussed in more detail:

- τετάρτη δὲ ἡ ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ, οἷον ἐν Χοηφόροις,
- 5 ὅτι ὁμοίως τις ἐλήλυθεν, ὁμοίος δὲ οὐθεὶς ἄλλ’ ἢ Ὀρέστης,
οὗτος ἄρα ἐλήλυθεν. καὶ ἡ Πολυίδου τοῦ σοφιστοῦ περὶ τῆς
Ἰφιγενείας· εἰκὸς γὰρ ἔφη τὸν Ὀρέστην συλλογίσασθαι ὅτι
ἢ τ’ ἀδελφὴ ἐτύθη καὶ αὐτῷ συμβαίνει θύεσθαι. καὶ ἐν τῷ
Θεοδέκτου Τυδεΐ, ὅτι ἐλθὼν ὡς εὐρήσαν τὸν υἱὸν αὐτὸς ἀπόλ-
- 10 λυται. καὶ ἡ ἐν τοῖς Φινεΐδαις· ἰδοῦσαι γὰρ τὸν τόπον συν-
ελογίσαντο τὴν εἰμαρμένην ὅτι ἐν τούτῳ εἴμαρτο ἀποθανεῖν
αὐτάις, καὶ γὰρ ἐξετέθησαν ἐνταῦθα.

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Only the first example comes from a surviving tragedy. The conclusion of Electra in the *Libation-Bearers* of Aeschylus is represented in the form of a syllogism: someone like herself has come; there is no one like her except Orestes; therefore the newcomer must be Orestes.

The following three examples deal with works unknown to us. Nevertheless it may be noticed that the characters' words are not examples of acceptable syllogisms.¹ As for Orestes of Polyidus, an odd inference "my sister has been sacrificed; *therefore* I am destined to be sacrificed too" would imply the premise "anyone whose sister is sacrificed will undergo the same fate", which is hardly good reasoning.² Yet the verb συλλογίσασθαι is applied to Orestes' inference. One might assume that the text is not sound in 1455 a 7: the example from the *Choephoroi* suggests that the reasoning suits those who recognize rather than those who are recognized, so one could expect Iphigenia to be subject of συλλογίσασθαι, and Orestes of a verb of saying. Yet an emendation would not remove the difficulties, considering that the same verb συνελογίσαντο is also applied to the unknown female characters who are recognized in the *Sons of Phineus* (1455 a 10–11). This latter plot is completely obscure, so it is impossible to say, whether they had any logical ground to identify the place of their exposition as the location of their approaching death. The case of Theodectus' *Tydeus* seems equally hopeless, since the utterance of the character "Instead of finding my son, I have to die myself" is not reducible to a syllogism in tripartite form.

Now, must we really extract characters' syllogisms from these examples? Harking back to the illustrations of other kinds, we must admit that *any* recognition requires an inference,³ such as:⁴ (1) "Odysseus had a scar on his leg; this man has a scar in exactly the same place; it follows that he is Odysseus" (Hom. *Od.* 19. 390–475); (2) "Orestes must remember how our home looked like; this man who declares himself Orestes remembers it; it follows that he is Orestes" (Eur. *IT* 808–827); (3) "a song about the events at Troy could deeply move a participant of those events; this man is deeply moved; it follows that he is Odysseus – the only hero who neither perished nor returned home" (Hom. *Od.* 8. 521–586).

¹ Valgimigli 1946, 121 n. 2.

² Susemihl 1871, 460; Pozdnev 2005, 451 n. 15.

³ Susemihl 1871, 460: "...ist ... überhaupt jede Art von Erkennung auch ein Schliessen". Cf. Cave 1988, 38: "can *sylogismos* not be derived from signs?"

⁴ Let us for the moment set aside the question as to whether the reasoning in these examples is correct from a logical point of view (we shall see below that this is not so, as was argued already in antiquity), and concentrate on its form as a syllogism.

It looks like no discovery could be possible without such reasoning.⁵ Consequently, a syllogism by the *recognizing* party cannot be a classifying attribute of a particular εἶδος ἀναγνώρισεως.

On the other hand, the thing that led to recognitions of the three previous types was something that a character *going to be recognized* had, did, or said. I conclude that in the fourth case as well the means of recognition was a συλλογισμός by those recognized,⁶ yet it was not a ‘syllogism’ in a technical sense – rather what they said was ‘putting together of observed facts’ (LSJ s.v. συλλογισμός II. 1).⁷ If any inference was drawn by the characters at all, it concerned the εἰμαρμένη. Thus Polyidus’ Orestes did not talk nonsense deducing his own mactation from that of his sister – he only reflected on the fatal similarity of their fates,⁸ which was indeed natural (εἰκός) in his case. Recognition ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ means almost the same as ‘by assertion, by utterance’. How a character is recognized is not hard to imagine: each time he reveals his identity by an assertion of some peculiar coincidence, for example with the fate of his relatives, so his companion deduces: “this man says he had suffered such-and-such unusual misfortunes; these events happened to X; consequently, this man is X”.

However, this conclusion does not work for the example from the *Libation-bearers*. Electra’s reasoning is clearly a logical syllogism, by which she recognizes (by σημεία⁹ and not by utterance) instead of being

⁵ This was noted already by the Renaissance scholars: Piccolomini 1575, 235; Riccoboni 1579, 380–383.

⁶ This was explicitly admitted also by Heath 1996, 75 n. 75; Pozdnev 2005, 450.

⁷ Cf. Bonitz 1870, 711 b 49–59: “συλλογισμός interdum latiore sensu usurpatur perinde ac συλλογίζεσθαι”, with examples from *Rhet.* 1. 11. 1371 b 9 and *Poet.* 1455 a 4; Susemihl 1871, 460: “nicht bloss ... den Schluss im eigentlichen Sinne ... sondern auch alle anderen Formen der Gedankenableitung, wie durch Analogie und Induction”; Gudeman 1934, 299: “Das συλλογίσασθαι bestand in einem Analogieschluß des Orestes”; Lucas 1968, 170: “in spite of ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that συλλογίζεσθαι bears the less specific sense of ‘reflect’, applying to O.’s meditations about his family’s misfortunes; he brought the two sacrifices together in his mind”.

⁸ Note τε ... καί (with no indication of cause-effect relationship) in 1455 a 8, cf. the summary of the same story in 1455 b 9–12: θύεσθαι μέλλων ἀνεγνώρισεν, εἶθ’ ὥς Εὐριπίδης εἶθ’ ὥς Πολύιδος ἐποίησεν, κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς εἰπὼν ὅτι οὐκ ἄρα μόνον τὴν ἀδελφὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸν ἔδει τυθῆναι, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἡ σωτηρία.

⁹ Hubbard 1972, 112 n. 3; Dupont-Roc – Lallot 1980, 274: “en effet, la reconnaissance d’Oreste dans le *Choéphores* – fruit d’un raisonnement qui se déploie à partir de signes matériels : traces de pas, mèches de cheveux – n’est pas très différente dans son principe de celle d’Ulysse qui devant les porchers utilise sa cicatrice comme preuve”; Cave 1988, 247; Pozdnev 2005, 450.

recognized.¹⁰ Thus this case runs contrary to the other three in every respect, as well as to Aristotle's approach to classifying previous kinds of recognition. Besides, the synopsis of the scene in the *Poetics* is strikingly imprecise (or at least overcompressed, as D. W. Lucas puts it). In Aeschylus, Electra's ἀναγνώρισις meant here (*Cho.* 166–211) is the discovery of Orestes' arrival rather than of his identity (which once again sets her case apart from all the other ἀναγνώρισεις in Chapter 16). Surprisingly, only the less satisfying of her arguments are referred to: Aristotle certainly understood that a shaky construction based on likeness of hair and footsteps falls far short of true reasoning (it must have been a famous and much discussed case,¹¹ given that Euripides made his Electra reject these arguments of Aeschylus' heroine, *El.* 508–546; cf. Aristoph. *Nub.* 536).¹² At the same time, a valid syllogism which she does actually make and which should please any teacher of logic is never mentioned: no one but a loving relative could honour Agamemnon's tomb with a curl; there are no loving relatives but Orestes and herself; consequently, Orestes has come. When Electra eventually meets him (*Cho.* 212–234), she does not dare to believe that he is her brother, so Orestes must appeal to the 'second kind' of recognition, declaring his identity and demonstrating σημεῖα as proofs.

M. Pozdnev is forced to conclude that Electra, according to the *Poetics*, was recognized herself by her brother on the base of her syllogism. However, he is well aware of the implausibility of this solution:¹³ Orestes did not struggle to identify his sister among other libation-bearers, and even if he was unsure at the start (*Cho.* 16–17: καὶ γὰρ Ἥλέκτραν δοκῶ / στείχειν), Electra's subsequent words, such as calling Agamemnon her father (88 etc.) and praying for Orestes' home-coming (131–139), must have soon removed any doubts.

I would suggest a more drastic solution, namely deleting ἐν Χοηφόροις ... καὶ (1455 a 4–6). Of course an imprecise reporting of Aeschylus' scene is hardly a sufficient argument for an athetese: Aristotle himself was capable of such imprecision.¹⁴ Yet the incompatibility of this episode

¹⁰ The fact that in the first example the 'syllogism' is by the recognizing party, and in the others by the recognized one has been underlined already by Piccolomini 1575, 235; Castelvetro 1576, 360.

¹¹ Valgimigli 1946, 120; Dupont-Roc – Lallot 1980, 273.

¹² The inconclusiveness of Electra's reasoning was noted also by Denores 1588, 16.

¹³ Pozdnev 2005, 450–451 (with a remarkable *cri de coeur*: "We can hardly take this version seriously").

¹⁴ For example, the synopsis in 1455 a 2–4 (Odysseus listening to Demodocus) is just as imprecise: actually Alcinous did not recognize Odysseus by display of emotions, but asked the stranger to name himself (cf. Pozdnev 2005, 449 n. 9).

with other examples and with the argument in general, which I have tried to demonstrate, makes it likely that an interpolator was misled – just like modern scholars – by the word συλλογισμός, since it was used not in the technical sense to which he was accustomed. Therefore he added a famous example of discovery, which suited his own conception, but not that of the Stagirite. This incompatibility,¹⁵ as well as a particular meaning of συλλογισμός and συλλογίζεσθαι,¹⁶ has been repeatedly stated, but the hypnosis of the term ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ in an Aristotelian text, back-to-back with ἐκ παραλογισμοῦ, precluded scholars from accepting all the consequences of this statement.¹⁷

Returning to the relative value of εἶδη ἀναγνώρισεως in Chapter 16, the best type of recognition is the one which logically follows from a course of events (ἡ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων). However, before addressing this last one Aristotle focuses on the type ἐκ παραλογισμοῦ. It has been considered to be either a species in its own right or, more often, as a subspecies of the recognitions ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ (no. 4) or αἱ πεποιημέναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ (no. 2).¹⁸ To my mind, regardless of its possible interpretation, we may postulate that Aristotle did not consider it to be a separate species: recognition by utterance is the fourth type (1455 a 4), and at the same time the second-best following the recognition arising from a sequence of events (1455 a 20–21), therefore recognition by paralogism does not have its own number.

¹⁵ Bywater 1909, 236–237: “in other instances of ἀναγνώρισις ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ the discovery is made by the party who overhears the reflection of the other”; Valgimigli 1946, 121; Pozdnev 2005, 449–451, esp. n. 14.

¹⁶ See above n. 7.

¹⁷ See e.g. Pozdnev 2005, 449: “The following class (55 a 3–12) is called ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ, which implies *prima facie* that there is no place for guessing left (συλλογισμός **cannot be misleading** [my emphasis. – N. A.]: *SE* 164 a 23)”; *ibid.* 451 with n. 16.

¹⁸ A separate species: Cooper 1918, 253; 256; 258 (cf. the heading: “the fifth form”); Quijada 2005, 492. A subspecies of (4): Hermann 1802, 157; Vahlen 1911, 27; *id.* 1914, 56; Tkatsch 1932, 90; 93; Rostagni 1945, 94; Cave 1988, 38; Guastini 2010, 282. Lucas 1968, 171 considers either solution possible; yet on p. 228 (ad 1460 a 20) he identifies this kind of recognitions as “a subdivision of ἀναγνώρισις ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ”. A subspecies of (2): Crönert 1913, 1443; Tkatsch 1932, 93; Valgimigli 1946, 122.

II. *Poet.* 1455 a 12–16: the Text¹⁹

12 ἔστιν δέ τις καὶ συν-
 13 θετὴ ἐκ παραλογισμοῦ τοῦ θεάτρου, οἷον ἐν τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ τῷ
 14 ψευδαγγέλῳ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τόξον ἐντείνειν, ἄλλον δὲ
 14¹ μηδὲνα, πεποιημένον ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ καὶ ὑπόθεσις,
 14² καὶ εἴ γε τὸ τόξον ἔφη γνῶσεσθαι ὃ οὐχ ἑωράκει·
 15 τὸ δὲ ὥς δι' ἐκείνου ἀναγνωριούντος διὰ τούτου ποιῆσαι
 16 παραλογισμός.

13 τοῦ θεάτρου ΠΒΣ : θατέρου Hermann : τοῦ θατέρου Bursian 14–14² ἐντείνειν ... τόξον B, similia in Σ : om. Π 14 τὸ τόξον ΠΒΣ : τῷ τόξον Merkelbach : τὸ<v> μὲν Tkatsch, de eodem cogitavit Cavallini | ἄλλον [δὲ] vel <ἐκείνον>, ἄλλον δὲ Sykutris : fort. <αὐτόν>, ἄλλον δὲ Kassel 14² post ὑπόθεσις lacunam suspicatus est et καὶ del. Pozdnev | εἴ γε B : fort. ἥ γε vel ἥδε Σ : ἐπεὶ γε Pozdnev | †τόξον†, fort. {τόξον} <λέκτρον> Merkelbach | γνῶσεσθαι ΠΣ : ἐντείνειν B | ἑωράκοι in B perperam legit et καὶ εἴ ... ἑωράκοι del. Hardy 15 δι' ΠΒ : δὴ Tyrwhitt | διὰ τούτου ΠΒ : δὴ τοῦτο Sykutris | ποιῆσαι ΠΒΣ : ἐποίησε Pr2038, Ald (Ducas 1508), R : ποιῆσθαι Vahlen 16 παραλογισμός ΒΣ : παραλογισμόν Π

Of the four main sources of the *Poetics*, the words ἐντείνειν ... τόξον in lines 14–14² are preserved only in B (Codex Riccardianus 46); the Arabic version confirms that they belong here, but punctuates differently and shows that the Greek text used for the Syrian translation (Σ) was evidently misunderstood and perhaps already corrupt.²⁰ In Π (coincidence of A – Codex Parisinus 1741 – with the Latin translation by Wilhelm Moerbeke) a mistake occurred by parablepsy: the scribe's eye slipped from τὸ τόξον in line 14 to τὸ τόξον in line 14². This lacuna served as the main argument for D. S. Margoliouth, who proved the independence of B in 1911.²¹ Earlier editions and commentaries did not pay proper attention

¹⁹ The text cited here is the same in Kassel 1965 and Tarán–Gutas 2012; *apparatus criticus* is extended.

²⁰ The Arabic translation (“The reason is that the stretching of the bow, he claimed that it is impossible [for] another man; the poet said that. Also, the report that has come about that, he reported in it the affair with the bow in order to recognize what he did not see”) allows reconstructing of the following Greek text: Τὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τόξον ἐντείνειν, ἄλλον δὲ μηδὲνα, πεποιημένον ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ. Καὶ ἡ ὑπόθεσις καὶ ἥ γε (or ἥδε?), τὸ τόξον ἔφη (ἴνα?) γνῶσεσθαι ὃ οὐχ ἑωράκει (Tarán–Gutas 2012, 396 ad loc.).

²¹ Margoliouth 1911, 83–84; see Kassel 1965, vi–ix.

to this codex and dealt with the lacunary text, which makes them of little help for analyzing the train of thought in the passage under review. In fact, commentators prior to 1911 considered the passage corrupt and incomprehensible,²² and even those who are aware of the lines missing in Π are seldom less skeptical.²³ Undeniably, information we now possess still falls short of enabling us to understand every detail. Still I believe there is good chance that the text as published by R. Kassel and L. Tarán – D. Gutas is what Aristotle actually wrote, and a convincing interpretation of his example can be proposed.

“Odysseus the False Messenger” is likely a tragedy,²⁴ otherwise unknown. We may suppose that the eponymous character represented himself as another person, and that his recognition had to do with a bow.²⁵

²² As is eloquently expressed by Twining 1812, 192–193: “I confess myself totally unable, from the short, perplexed, and probably *corrupt* words of the text, to make out. The reader may see, however, a great variety of different conjectures in the commentators; and I believe when he has read them all, he will find himself just where he was. For my part, I leave this bow of Ulysses to be bent by stronger arms than mine: ‘ὁ φίλοι, οὐ μὲν ἐγὼ τανύω, λαβέτω δὲ καὶ ἄλλος’”.

²³ Kassel 1965, 26: “obscura”. Lucas 1968, 171: “Almost everything here is obscure”; 172: “No clear meaning can be attached to the corrupt lines in which A. explains his example, and in the absence of other information it is idle to attempt to reconstruct the plot”. Halliwell 1995, 87 n. c: “the following clauses are irredeemably dark” (cf. id. 1987, 67: “the sense and reference of this passage are entirely unclear”).

²⁴ Odysseus was often chosen to be the protagonist of tragedies, see *TrGF* for Ὀδυσσεὺς Ἀκανθοπλήξ (fr. 453–461) and Ὀδυσσεὺς Μαινώμενος (fr. 462–467) by Sophocles, Ὀδυσσεὺς by Apollodorus (64 T 1), Sophocles II (62 T 8) and Chaeremon (71 F 13). Less plausibly, the reference could be to a section of an epic poem other than the *Odyssey* (Smith 1924, 166). Howald 1921, 1003, Gudeman 1934, 300 and Else 1957, 625 thought of a satyr play, but extracting examples from this genre has no parallels in the *Poetics*.

²⁵ According to Tyrwhitt 1806, 161–162, the title suggests that some person posed as Odysseus or as his messenger (and intended to prove his alleged identity by recognizing Odysseus’ bow), but Ὀδυσσεὺς ὁ ψευδάγγελος can only mean that the message was false, not that the messenger was an impostor assuming the identity of Odysseus (which would demand something like Ψευδοδυσσεύς, as noted already by Twining 1812, 192), and still less that he neither was nor pretended to be Odysseus. Thus reconstructions of the plot presupposing a “false Odysseus” (such as Hermann 1802, 157–158; Ritter 1839, 201–202; Howald 1921, 1003; Gudeman 1934, 301) are to be rejected *a priori*. That Odysseus was the object of false tidings (Castelvetto 1576, 363 “Ulisse di cui sono recate false novelle”, considered also by Vettori 1573, 162) is possible on the assumption that he was the messenger at the same time. Lucas 1968, 172, Janko 1987, 116 and Heath 1996, 75 n. 77 conjecture that Odysseus brought a report of his own death. Yet the possibility of recognizing him seems to have been discussed in advance (note the future ἀναγνωριούντος).

There is little doubt that the famous bow of Odysseus (*Od.* 19. 572 sqq.; 21. 1 sqq.) is implied, which the suitors tried in vain to draw. Thus the plot dealt with Odysseus' home-coming.²⁶

Παραλογισμός in Aristotle is (a) false reasoning, and (b) provocation of false reasoning, misleading by fallacious argument.²⁷ Aristotle seems especially taken with one particular kind of paralogism – the only kind mentioned and explained elsewhere in the *Poetics* (1460 a 20–25, on which see part III below) – that is, deducing a cause from its consequent (*fallacia consequentis*). Several examples of it are adduced in *Sophistical Refutations* (5. 167 b 1–12) and in the *Rhetoric* (2. 19. 1392 b 16; 2. 24. 1401 b 20). For example, while it is true that when it has rained, the ground is wet, it is a paralogism to inverse this statement and argue that if the ground is wet, it has rained, since the ground can also be wet for another reason, say, because someone spilt water on it (*Soph. el.* 5, 167 b 6–8). It is important to emphasize that a conclusion by paralogism may occasionally be – and often is – true, as examples in *Soph. el.* 167 b 1–12 and *Rhet.* 2. 19, 1392 b 15–33 show.²⁸ In practical life approximate reasoning frequently leads to a true discovery (*Rhet.* 2, 19, 1392 b 31–32: ἔστι δὲ τούτων ἀπάντων τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ δ' ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οὕτως ἔχοντα). In modern legal procedure the presence of a motive and an opportunity to commit a crime (εἰ ἐδύνατο καὶ ἐβούλετο, πέπραχε, 1392 b 19) does not prove that the charged person is guilty, but remains a reasonable ground for suspicion.

Commentators often suppose that the paralogism implied here are unreasonable expectations of either the spectators or the characters of the tragedy concerning what will provide the recognition. See, for example, R. Janko:²⁹ “Apparently the playwright led the audience to expect that Odysseus would reveal his identity by stringing the great bow that nobody else could bend (as seen in *Odyssey* XXI), but in fact Odysseus did so as a result of claiming that he would be able to recognize the bow. How exactly this worked is not clear”. J. A. Smith³⁰ (who kept the obsolete

²⁶ Smith 1924, 166: “seeing the use to which in the *Odyssey* the bow is put on the occasion of his return, it would have been tasteless in another poet to have invented a different but similar case of it upon another occasion”.

²⁷ See Bonitz 1870, 565 s.v.; Bywater 1909, 318 ad 1460 a 20. Παραλογίζεσθαι means (a) draw a false inference; (b) deceive or beguile by fallacy (+ *acc. personae*), and, in a passive sense, be so deceived or beguiled: Bonitz 1870, 565 s.v.; Bywater 1909, 319 on 1460 a 25.

²⁸ See Pozdnev 2005, 448.

²⁹ Janko 1987, 116; similarly Dupont-Roc – Lallot 1980, 275.

³⁰ Smith 1924, 167.

text variant³¹ and so considered the recognition of the bow and not its bending): “Someone who suspected that ‘the messenger’ was other than he seemed – i. e. was possibly Odysseus himself – devised what he thought would be a decisive test, which was accepted by ‘the messenger’, but was by his skill turned into a refutation of the suspicion, and so his incognito was preserved”. A similar story is suggested by R. Merkelbach (who calls the tragedy “Odysseus Promises the Impossible”³² and tentatively changes τόξον to λέκτρον in line 14²): according to his reconstruction, the hero was challenged by Penelope to prove that he was Odysseus by identifying his nuptial bed among three beds that would be brought out to him. Yet the hero did not want to reveal himself prematurely and, instead of saying “This is impossible”, cunningly promised to recognize one of the beds – which he had actually never seen.

Proceeding to particular exegetical problems of the passage, ἐκ παραλογισμοῦ τοῦ θεάτρον means that the false inference has to be drawn by the audience. Yet in the previous discussion of recognitions the reasoning of the public was not the factor, since the public knows in advance who is who and therefore makes no discoveries.³³ This led G. Hermann and C. Bursian³⁴ to the emendation θατέρον, in order to focus on the false inferences of the characters involved in recognition. Smith³⁵ tried to claim there was no difference: “The misleading here is not that of the audience by the poet, but that of one of the *dramatis personae* by another (τοῦ θατέρον). But though this should not escape notice, it is not important. Here as elsewhere in the *Poetics* it is assumed that the audience follows the processes of thought of the personages, and is misled (temporarily) where one of them is misled”. However, this is a strained interpretation: surely the audience of Greek drama need not share the characters’ fallacies.

It appears impossible for συνθετὴ ἐκ παραλογισμοῦ to mean ‘composed of a paralogism’,³⁶ since, firstly, the meaning ‘based on, resulting from’

³¹ Smith 1924, 167–168: “I am quite convinced by Mr. Garrod [in a paper read by him to the Oxford Philological Society] that neither the Arabic version nor the Riccardianus has any weight or supplies any help: both are negligible witnesses to the original text”.

³² Merkelbach 1969, 111: “Odysseus verspricht unmögliches”, with n. 4: “Man darf ψευδάγγελος wohl im Sinn von ψευδεπάγγελος verstehen”.

³³ Vahlen ³1895, 181; Lucas 1968, 171.

³⁴ Hermann 1802, 156–157; Bursian 1859, 756.

³⁵ Smith 1924, 165.

³⁶ Margoliouth 1911, 191: “There is another process compounded out of this and misleading the audience”. Tkatsch 1932, 93: “Es gibt auch eine Erkennung durch den Schluß (ή ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ 55 a 4), welche mit einem Fehlschluß einer anderen Person verbunden ist”. Albeggiani 1937, 44: “un riconoscimento combinato con un paralogismo”.

is supported by ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ (1455 a 4) and ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων (1455 a 16–17), and, secondly, ‘composed of’ would require two terms (συνθετὴ ἐξ A καὶ B).

Συνθετὴ (sc. ἀναγνώρισις) is for the most part interpreted as ‘compound, composite’. According to a popular view, the combination must be that of συλλογισμός and παραλογισμός.³⁷ Sometimes both are ascribed to the same person.³⁸ A reconstruction of this kind is suggested by Pozdnev (who is careful to take both *syllogism* and *paralogism* in their strict logical sense): as the hero, who allegedly had never been to Ithaca, said that he would know the bow, the other party concluded by paralogism that he would be able to bend it,³⁹ and hence by syllogism that he was Odysseus.⁴⁰ It was also supposed⁴¹ that the compound recognition arose from a true inference of one party and a false inference of another. J. Vahlen’s attempt at reconstructing the plot is as follows: Odysseus erroneously imagined that another character would recognize him by the bow. That was false reasoning, since the other had never seen the bow. However the false messenger took precautions and invented a story as to how he acquired Odysseus’ bow, but by doing so he betrayed to the other that the bow was that of Odysseus and provoked his actual recognition by true reasoning (συλλογισμός not meaning ‘syllogism’ as a technical term). It is now clear that this version is not acceptable, since the bending of the bow as a premise is not taken into account, and besides Vahlen proposed an impossible understanding of τόξον ἔφη γνῶσεσθαι implying that ἔφη and γνῶσεσθαι had different subjects: “er meinte nämlich, es werde der Andere den Bogen erkennen, der dieser doch nie gesehen hatte”. Nevertheless one might generally speculate that a logical error of one party stimulated the correct conclusion of the other, even if such a sophisticated intrigue in a plot of a Greek tragedy seems unattested, and at all events it could hardly occur often enough to create a separate type. Yet I wonder

³⁷ This is considered as the only likely possibility by Lucas 1968, 171 (he does not specify, whether the inferences should be by the same or by different parties).

³⁸ Ritter 1839, 201: “haec agnitio ita composita est, ut spectatores in agnoscenda persona quadam primo errant, mox eadem quae sit cognoscant”; Tkatsch 1932, 92–93 (see p. 92: “...die zweite Person durch ihre richtige ὑπόθεσις den Bogen erkannte, nicht aber dadurch auch Odysseus selbst, der sich auf andere Weise zu erkennen gab, wodurch sich der Schluß des anderen von dem Bogen auf Odysseus als Fehlschluß erwies”); Gudeman 1934, 301 (who imagines a ‘false Odysseus’).

³⁹ This is however not a blameless paralogism, for, if inversed, the inference does not become true: one who is able to manage the bow need not be familiar with it in advance (as proved by the protagonist of the *Ramayana*).

⁴⁰ Pozdnev 2005, 456–457.

⁴¹ Hermann 1802, 157; Vahlen 1895, 181–182; id. 1911, 28.

how the recognition based on both a true and a false inference could be labeled ‘ἐκ παραλογισμοῦ’.

R. Dupont-Roc and J. Lallot⁴² suggest that ‘composite’ recognition by false reasoning was provoked by a ‘combination of words’, i.e. an expression with double sense, which was wrongly interpreted (cf. a false inference *παρὰ τὴν σύνθεσιν*: *Soph. el.* 166 a 22 sqq.; 177 a 33 sqq.). Ingenious as it may be, to my mind, there is however too great a distance from *σύνθεσις* of words to calling a recognition *συνθετή*.

According to E. Howald and Janko,⁴³ combined recognition is a false inference from the combination of two premises. Howard supposed that the claim of an impostor that he would recognize the bow led the other party to conclude that he had already bent the bow in the past. Janko’s attempt to reconstruct the plot of Ὀδυσσεὺς ψευδάγγελος (Odysseus is recognized not by stringing the bow, as the audience expected, but by promising to recognize it) can hardly serve as an illustration, since the misexpectation of the audience can in no way help to “yield the recognition”.

For the most part these versions are culpable of mistakes in translation and/or imprecise correspondence to the hints at the plot of *Odysseus the False Messenger*. Some of these errors have been indicated above, while others may be clear from what follows. In general, I cannot side with any of these explanations, for I do not believe that *συλλογισμός* in Chapter 16 is a logical term meaning either ‘syllogism’ or ‘true reasoning’. Therefore I feel inclined to accept another possibility: that *συνθετή* means ‘fictitious’, ‘invented’ by the poet.⁴⁴

Ὑπόθεσις in line 14¹ is for the most part interpreted as having its usual meaning ‘premise’.⁴⁵ Its metonymic use for ‘syllogism’⁴⁶ is implausible. Crönert seems to understand this term as ‘contents’, as he argues that the *ὑπόθεσις* was killing of the suitors.⁴⁷

⁴² Dupont-Roc – Lallot 1980, 275.

⁴³ Howald 1921, 1002–1003; Janko 1987, 115.

⁴⁴ Cooper 1918, 253: “fictitious – otherwise fallacious or false, or perhaps ‘concocted’”; 258: “we need some term like ‘fictitious’ – one with no necessary connotation of what is morally wrongful”; Smith 1924, 165: “The point is not that what is said or told is necessarily a lie, but that it is untrue, baseless, not founded on fact” (with examples).

⁴⁵ Bonitz 1870, 796 b 41; 59–61.

⁴⁶ Tkatsch 1932, 92: “Hier bezeichnet *ὑπόθεσις* nicht allgemein nur eine Voraussetzung, Annahme, sondern nach Aristotelischem Sprachgebrauch im besonderen eine Annahme, welche bei einer indirekten (apagogischen) Beweisführung oder Schlussfolgerung (*συλλογισμός* ἐξ *ὑπόθεσεως*) verwendet wird, und ist hier synonym mit *συλλογισμός* (55 a 4, 7, 10) gebraucht”; accepted by Gudeman 1934, 301. Contra Gallavotti 1968, 257 n. 18.

⁴⁷ Crönert 1913, 1443, cf. Bonitz 1870, 795 b 42.

In line 14², καὶ εἴ γε τὸ τόξον ἔφη γνῶσεσθαι ὃ οὐχ ἐωράκει, it goes without saying that the infinitive depending of ἔφη cannot have a modal meaning “he said he wanted to examine the bow”.⁴⁸ I also find it impossible to admit that ἔφη and γνῶσεσθαι can have different subjects.⁴⁹

Interpreting this subordinate clause in general proved extremely problematical. Sometimes εἴ was taken as approximating to ὅτι (the clause would then be explaining the essence of one more ὑπόθεσις).⁵⁰ A natural meaning seems to be concessive: “even if indeed”.⁵¹ However, Pozdnev⁵² argues that the combination καὶ εἴ γε cannot be understood as a single expression, since elsewhere in pre-Aristotelian literature καί always belongs to the apodosis. His own solution is to postulate a lacuna between ὑπόθεσις and τὸ τόξον, delete καί, and change εἴ γε into ἐπεὶ γε (with a temporal or temporal-causal meaning).

As regards ὥς δι’ ἐκείνου ἀναγνωριούντος, the verb ἀναγνωρίζω in the *Poetics* means both ‘recognize’ (1452 b 5 οἶον ἢ μὲν Ἰφιγένεια τῷ Ὀρέστῃ ἀνεγνωρίσθη ἐκ τῆς πέμψεως τῆς ἐπιστολῆς; 1454 b 27 ἀνεγνωρίσθη ὑπὸ τῆς τροφῆς) and ‘reveal, make oneself recognized’ (1454 b 31–32 οἶον

⁴⁸ Tkatsch 1932, 93: “erklärt, den Bogen erkennen zu wollen”. Gallavotti 1954, 132: “aveva detto sulla scena di volere conoscere quell’arco mai visto”; id. 1968, 258–260: “volere conoscere, fare esperienza, e quindi provare l’arco”; id. 1974, 59: “aveva affermato di non avere mai visto l’arco di Ulisse e di volerlo esaminare”.

⁴⁹ Vahlen 1911, 28 “er meinte nämlich, es werde der Andere den Bogen erkennen”.

⁵⁰ Crönert 1913, 1443: “Vom Dichter geschaffen ist es, daß nur Odysseus den Bogen spannen kann <...> und daß er den Bogen, den er nicht gesehen hat, herauszufinden vermeint”; Howald 1921, 1002; Tkatsch 1932, 93: “...und ein darauf gebauter Schluß ist es, wenn der andere (ἄτερος) erklärt...”; Sykutris 1937, 140: “...εἶναι ἐπινόημα τοῦ ποιητοῦ, καὶ συλλογισμὸς ἐπίσης τὸ ὅτι ἰσχυρίζετο...”; Dupont-Roc – Lallot 1980, 91: “...est une donnée forgée par le poète et une prémisse du raisonnement, et pareillement qu’Ulysse dise...”; Halliwell 1987, 49: “...is a premise contrived by the poet, as is his statement that...”; Heath 1996, 27: “the fact that he can bend the bow is contrived by the poet as a premise, as is his claim...”.

⁵¹ Rostagni 1945, 95; Valgimigli 1946, 122; Gallavotti 1968, 260–261: “con quella battuta (“τὸ τόξον, ὃ οὐκ εἶδον, γνῶσομαι”, “ὄψομαι ὃ οὐκ ἔγνων”) l’araldo aveva allontanato da sé l’attuabilità dell’ἀναγνώρισις e del παραλογισμός, di cui sta parlando Aristotele; di qui l’impiego della concessiva καὶ εἴγε”; id. 1974, 59; Halliwell 1995, 87; Guastini 2010, 81. – Gallavotti 1956, 132; 133 paradoxically converts “anche se” into “tanto più che”, implying that a Homeric motif (only Odysseus could bend a bow) by no means followed from the plot of the tragedy – *still more so*, since the hero said that he wanted at last to get to know the bow which he had not seen before (with an impossible translation of ἔφη γνῶσεσθαι, see above n. 48). – The combination καὶ εἴ γε is not recorded in Denniston 1954, but there is εἴ γε ‘even if’ (p. 126), καὶ εἴ ‘even if’, with an effect of climax (p. 301), and καὶ ... γε ‘also, even’ (p. 158).

⁵² Pozdnev 2005, 454–455.

Ὁρέστης ἐν τῇ Ἰφιγενείᾳ ἀνεγνώρισεν ὅτι Ὁρέστης; 1455 b 9 ἐλθὼν δὲ καὶ ληφθεὶς θύεσθαι μέλλων ἀνεγνώρισεν).⁵³ I think the intransitive meaning is more plausible here,⁵⁴ for in this case we are dealing with the contextual omission of only the subject and not the object as well. As demonstrated by E. Cavallini,⁵⁵ ellipse of a subject is recurrent in the *Poetics* when the subject is a protagonist character easily supplied from the name of a tragedy just mentioned. She applies her observation to ἐντείνειν (therefore rejecting all emendations aimed at providing its subject), but I would extend it to ἔφη γνώσεσθαι, οὐχ ἑώρακει and ἀναγνωριῶντος, suggesting that in each case the subject is likely to be Odysseus.

Scholars felt it difficult to explain two indications of causes, δι' ἐκείνου and διὰ τούτου, close to each other in the same phrase. T. Tyrwhitt changed δι' to διῆ, thus making ἐκείνου the subject of ἀναγνωριῶντος: “that he will reveal his identity by means of it (sc. recognizing the bow)”.⁵⁶ I. Bywater accepted this conjecture, but implied τὸ τόξον as the object of ἀναγνωριῶντος, referred διὰ τούτου to ποιῆσαι and speculated that the false inference in the tragedy was due to misunderstanding γνώσεσθαι as ἀναγνωριεῖν: whereas the character said that he would ‘get to know’ the bow, which he had never seen, someone erroneously concluded that he would ‘recognize’ it.⁵⁷ In this instance ποιῆσαι is taken to mean ‘suppose’ or ‘assume’, but all the parallels Bywater manages to adduce (p. 238) are not from Aristotle.

On the contrary, J. Sykutris conjectured διῆ τοῦτο, making it the direct object of ἀναγνωριῶντος: “that the hero will recognize τοῦτο (the bow) δι' ἐκείνου (the premise that nobody else could string it)”.

⁵³ See Bonitz 1870, 43 b 53–56, Bywater 1909, 203–204 on 1454 b 5.

⁵⁴ The transitive meaning was defended by Bywater 1909; 47, 238; Sykutris 1937, 140; Gallavotti 1974, 159; Cavallini 1980–1982, 146 n. 7.

⁵⁵ Cavallini 1980–1982, 145–146.

⁵⁶ Tyrwhitt 1806, 161–162. He accepts the vulgata of his time (the text published already in the *Aldina* in 1508) at the end of the passage and reads: τὸ δὲ, ὡς δὴ ἐκείνου ἀναγνωριῶντος διὰ τούτου, ἐποίησε παραλογισμόν. – “Hoc vero (theatrum sc.) quasi revera se ipsum notum facturum esset per hoc (arcus sc. cognitionem) falsam fecit conclusionem”.

⁵⁷ See contra Cooper 1918, 258: Bywater was misled “by what is probably an accidental word-echo: γνώσεσθαι – ἀναγνωριῶντος. But here γνώσεσθαι is an indirect quotation of something uttered by a character in a poem of unknown authorship, while ἀναγνωριῶντος is a part of the technical language (cf. ἀναγνώρισις) of the *Poetics*”. Besides, what could the intention to “get to know the bow” actually mean? ‘See it’ or ‘try one’s strength with it’ would have required other verbs, such as ὁρᾶν or περᾶν; ‘know how to handle it’ (Pozdnev 2005, 454 n. 38) is rendered improbable by the future time, which would suggest an inappropriate meaning ‘learn how to handle it’.

According to C. Gallavotti, both pronouns imply the same act of bending the bow: διὰ τούτου ποιῆσαι (sc. ἀναγνώρισιν) refers to the recognition by the characters, and δι' ἐκείνου ἀναγνωριούντος, to the recognition (or rather its acceptance) by the spectators.⁵⁸

Another way of addressing the problem is understanding the pronouns as opposed to each other in the manner of *ille* and *hic*, e.g. “but the way he is expected to make himself known by the former means, but does so by the latter, is a [case of] false inference” (Janko).⁵⁹ However, this appears to be impossible Greek. I strongly doubt that a genitive absolute introduced with ὥς can have an adversative meaning (‘while, whereas’). In Kühner–Gerth *GG*³ II. 2, p. 93 only two cases are indicated: (α) subjective reason and (β) subjective opinion and utterance (with verbs of saying and thinking, analogous to an indirect discourse expressed by an objective clause with ὅτι or ὥς).⁶⁰ I also doubt that a *part. fut.* can occur in a *gen. abs.* in cases other than these two, and as an analog to an ὅτι-clause a *part. fut.* can hardly signify modality (“expected to”).⁶¹ It should also be noted that Aristotle does not feel it always necessary to distinguish the first and the second mentioned with the help of demonstrative pronouns (cf. e.g. 1454 b 32–33: ἐκείνη μὲν γὰρ διὰ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς, ἐκεῖνος δὲ αὐτὸς λέγει; 1460 a 20–21: ὅταν τοῦδὶ ὄντος τοῦδὲ ᾗ; *Soph. el.* 167 b 2–3: ὅταν γὰρ τοῦδε ὄντος ἐξ ἀνάγκης τόδε ᾗ).⁶² Besides, ποιῆσαι meaning ‘make himself known’ (sc.

⁵⁸ Gallavotti 1956, 133: “ma risulta un paralogismo il fatto di fare avvenire il riconoscimento attraverso (la scena del arco) nella previsione che attraverso questo sarà manifesto (agli spettatori il vero Ulisse)”; id. 1968, 259–260: “il successivo διὰ τούτου riprende esattamente il δι' ἐκείνου (per mezzo del arco, o della prova dell'arco)”.

⁵⁹ Janko 1987, 22. Compare Valgimigli 1946, 122: “l'avere immaginato che Odisseo si faccia riconoscere mediante questo mezzo [del tenere l'arco], mentre avrebbe dovuto mediante l'altro [del riconoscimento dell'arco]”; Dupont-Roc – Lallot 1980, 91: “si, sous prétexte que l'exploit de l'arc doit permettre la reconnaissance, on la fait résulter d'un dire”; Halliwell 1995, 87: “to have him recognised by this means, when he was expected to cause recognition in the other way”; Pozdnev 2005, 457: “Although the poet could make him recognized by means of the former, he actually did it by means of the latter”; Guastini 2010, 83: “il fatto che si abbia il riconoscimento grazie a quello, benché lo si costruisca grazie a questo”.

⁶⁰ See also Goodwin 1897, 365–366 § 917 and 918.

⁶¹ Kühner–Gerth *GG*³ II. 1, p. 185: “Rein temporal, eine zukünftige Handlung bezeichnend, erscheint es (sc. das Partizip des Futurs) nach den Verben der Wahrnehmung (§ 482), entsprechend einem Satze mit ὅτι, ὥς und dem Indikativ des Futurs”.

⁶² See Bonitz 1870, 227 a 21–22 s. v. ἐκεῖνος: “usurpatur etiam ἐκεῖνος ubi una modo est et proxima res, ad quam referatur”; id. 546 a 40–41 s. v. οὗτος: “pronomen οὗτος etiam ad ea quae sequuntur potest referri”.

ἀναγνώρισιν ποιῆσαι, as a substitution of the previous ἀναγνωριοῦντος) in the translation of Janko is clumsy, and to suggest an ellipse “to compose <that he was recognized> by the latter” is strained, given that the object of ποιῆσαι can be easily found. It seems most natural to understand ποιῆσαι as referring to the poet’s activity⁶³ and not to separate it from ὥς + *gen. abs.* (with a *part. fut.*), which in this case is equivalent to indirect discourse in an object-clause: “to compose that he will be recognized by it”. Δι’ ἐκείνου (sc. διὰ τοῦ τόξου or, still better, διὰ τοῦ τὸ τόξον ἐντείνειν) should come with ἀναγνωριοῦντος, and διὰ τούτου (probably referring to πεποιημένον ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ) with the main clause τὸ ... ποιῆσαι παραλογισμός (sc. ἐστίν).

III. Παραλογισμός as a Poetic Means of Introducing the Improbable

Let us now address the only other occurrence of the notion παραλογισμός in the *Poetics* (Chapter 24, 1460 a 18–26). As a rule, commentaries to 1455 a 12–16 include a reference to this passage, which does not presuppose that explaining the former would actually rest upon the evidence of the latter.

δεδίδαχεν δὲ μάλιστα Ὅμηρος καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ψευδῇ λέγειν ὥς δεῖ. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο παραλογισμός. οἴονται γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ὅταν τοῦδι ὄντος τοδὶ ἢ ἢ γινομένου γίνηται, εἰ τὸ ὕστερον ἔστιν, καὶ τὸ πρότερον εἶναι ἢ γίνεσθαι· τοῦτο δὲ ἔστι ψεῦδος. διὸ δεῖ, ἂν τὸ πρῶτον ψεῦδος, ἄλλο δὲ τούτου ὄντος ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι ἢ, προσθεῖναι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ τοῦτο εἰδέναι ἀληθὲς ὃν παραλογίζεται ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὥς ὄν. παράδειγμα δὲ τούτου τὸ ἐκ τῶν Νίπτρων.

As we remember, if *B* regularly or necessarily follows from *A*, people are inclined to suppose that there was *A* whenever they see *B*, although this is bad reasoning, since *B* can also occur independently of *A*. According to Aristotle, Homer skillfully provokes this kind of paralogism: when he needs to make his audience believe in something impossible, he represents it as *A* and describes a convincing *B* as its consequence, so that anyone persuaded by *B* would suppose that *A* is also true.

⁶³ See Bonitz 1870, 609 a 31 ff.; the motivation in Cooper 1918, 258; Tkatsch 1932, 93; Gallavotti 1968, 260.

It is not obvious what lines from τὰ Νίπτρα are implied. According to the most popular version,⁶⁴ the reference is to the error committed by Penelope (*Od.* 19. 164–260): beguiled by Odysseus, she concludes that if the stranger could make a correct description of her husband's clothes and companions, it follows that his story of meeting Odysseus is true, whereas it is not. A person who met Odysseus (*A*) can describe him (*B*), but so can Odysseus himself, as can one who knew the details from hearsay (*B* not following from *A*), and besides, the circumstances could be different: the stranger might not be the host who entertained the king of Ithaca, but, say, a slave waiting at table.⁶⁵ However, this interpretation of the reference has been disputed. The name Νίπτρα (“Wash-scene”) must in this case be extended from the episode of feet-washing to the whole Book 19 of the *Odyssey*, but other cases in the *Poetics* show an exact correspondence between conventional names applied to the parts of Homeric epos and the contents of relevant episodes (including the same Νίπτρα in 1454 b 30).⁶⁶ Besides, since it was Odysseus and not Homer who provoked the paralogism, and it was committed by Penelope instead of the audience, it may be argued that this case does not illustrate Homer's ability to introduce poetic lie in the right way.⁶⁷

Otherwise, false reasoning in the *Wash-scene* could be that of Eurycleia:⁶⁸ her recognition of Odysseus by the scar (mentioned in *Poet.* 1454 b 26–30 as an illustration of διὰ τῶν σημείων type) happened to be true, but nevertheless ancient commentators reference a piece of work by Aristotle (likely *Homeric Questions*) that criticizes the logic of

⁶⁴ Most Renaissance and neoclassical commentators (see Cave 1988, 42); Vahlen 1914, 296; Hardy 1932, 87; Gudeman 1934, 294; 413; Albeggiani 1937, 67; Valgimigli 1946, 179 n. 1; Butcher 1951, 172 n. 1; Gudeman 1934, 413; Sycutris 1937, 224; Rostagni 1945, 151; Lucas 1968, 171–172; 229; Hubbard 1972, 126 n. 2; Dupont-Roc – Lallot 1980, 80 (with an erroneous reference to *Od.* 20 instead of 19); Hutton 1982, 109; Halliwell 1995, 123.

⁶⁵ Lucas 1968, 229; 172.

⁶⁶ See Pozdnev 2005, 448 with n. 5. Cf. the segmented subdivision of episodes in *Schol. Od.* hypothesis 1. 30–31: Τ. Ὀδυσσέως καὶ Πηνελόπης ὁμιλία. Τὰ νίπτρα, ἢ ὁ ὑπὸ Εὐρυκλείας ἀναγνωρισμός. Cf. examples of pre-Alexandrian names for parts of Homeric epos in Aelian. *VH* 13. 14.

⁶⁷ Lucas 1968, 228; 229; Pozdnev 2005, 448. Janko 1987, 143 parries this objection: “It is wrong to complain that Aristotle should have chosen an example in which the audience is misled; his point is that Homer showed other poets how to mislead”.

⁶⁸ Gallavotti 1968, 255–257, though on questionable grounds that the “Paralogism of Penelope” would be too detailed to serve as a good example (he reads <μ>ἢ προσθεῖναι in 1460 a 24, see p. 249–250); id. 1974, 198; Pozdnev 2005, 448–449; considered by Cave 1988, 42.

her inference. The argument runs that it is a false premise to assume that anyone who has a scar is Odysseus:⁶⁹

Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ, φασίν, ἐπιλαμβάνεται τοῦ τοιοῦτου ἀναγνωρισμοῦ, λέγων ὡς ἄρα κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγῳ πᾶς οὐλὴν ἔχων Ὀδυσσεύς ἐστιν. τὸ δὲ ἐστὶν οὐχ ἀπλῶς τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ συμβάλλεται τι καὶ τὸ ποιὸν τῆς, ὡς ἐρρέθη, ἀξιολόγου οὐλῆς σύν γε τοῖς ἄλλοις· καὶ γὰρ κατὰ τὸν τῆς γραδὸς λόγον καὶ δέμας καὶ φωνὴν καὶ πόδας ὁ παρὼν ξένος ἐφίκει τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ.

Margoliouth suggested that the reference was to *Od.* 19. 361–362.⁷⁰ This example is adduced in *Rhet.* 3. 16. 1417 b 2–6, where orators are recommended to give as many trustworthy details as possible, in order to make their listeners believe in what they do not know by recognizing the truth of what they know. Homer says that Eurycleia put her hands to her face as she shed tears, and this detail adds cogency to his story. However, this version does not suit the context of Chapter 24 of the *Poetics*, which deals with introducing ἀδύνατα (things impossible in fact) and ἄλογα (things improbable to the reason), rather than with poetic fiction in general.⁷¹ Whereas the miraculous alteration of Odysseus' appearance, which led his own wife to believe that he was a Cretan stranger, is an ἀδύνατον, and the possibility of recognizing by a scar could seem an ἄλογον to Aristotle, there is of course nothing impossible or improbable in an old nurse crying.

A. Rostagni considered *Od.* 19. 572 sqq., implying the statement that no one but Odysseus could string the bow (the same as referred to in *Odysseus the False Messenger* in Chapter 16), yet in fact there is no such a statement in this passage, and this also does not exactly correspond to the reference “Wash-scene”. G. V. Else even thought of παράδειγμα δὲ

⁶⁹ Eustath. *Comm. ad Hom. Od.* 19. 467, vol. II p. 213 cites Porphyrius, *Quaetionum Homericarum ad Odysseam pertinentium reliquiae*, *Od.* 19. 467, p. 126 f. Lucas 1968, 229 doubts that the criticism was made by Aristotle himself: “This ignores the fact that not all scars are the same or on the same part of the body. A. cannot have been guilty of such simplicity, and φασίν suggests that the account is garbled. Other quotations from the *Homeric Problems* do not admit to any doubt as to what A. said. But probably A. did say something in that work criticizing the recognition, and the same point may be alluded to here”.

⁷⁰ Margoliouth 1911, 24–25.

⁷¹ See Butcher 1951, 171–172: “The fiction here intended is, as the context shows, not simply that fiction which is blended with fact in every poetic narrative of real events. The reference here is rather to those tales of a strange and marvelous character..., which are admitted into epic more freely than into dramatic poetry”.

τούτου τὸ ἐκ τῶν Νίπτρων as an interpolation, and F. Ritter athetized the whole passage διὸ δεῖ – τῶν Νίπτρων.⁷²

Asides from the *Wash-scene*, another example of Homer's use of paralogism may be the scene from the *Odyssey* (13. 116 sqq.) referred to at the end of Chapter 24 (1460 a 35–36 τὰ ἐν Ὀδυσσεΐᾳ ἄλογα τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐκθεσιν): it is absurd that Odysseus did not wake up as the Phaeacians set him ashore on Ithaca, but the consequences and the reactions of the main character are depicted with such cogency that the audience accepts the impossible premise to be true.⁷³

However enigmatic the reference to τὰ Νίπτρα may be, the exposition of Homeric paralogism is fortunately clear enough. Of course it is not guaranteed that in both cases in the *Poetics* Aristotle addressed exactly the same kind of παραλογισμός, but this is at least probable and, to my mind, helps support a plausible interpretation. So I suggest that in Chapter 16 Aristotle not only implied the same false inference of the cause from the consequent, but also had in mind the same situation – the poet beguiling his audience in order to introduce a poetic lie. This is backed up by the manuscript reading τοῦ θεάτρου as well as by mentioning πεποιημένον ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ and τὸ ποιῆσαι.

L. Cooper⁷⁴ proposed an interpretation of ἀναγνώρισις συνθετὴ ἐκ παραλογισμοῦ entirely based on the data of Chapter 24: a 'concocted' discovery is a mistaken one, that is, the case in which a character deceives others in Odysseus' manner and makes them believe in his lie by provoking an inference from a known *B* to an allegedly preceding *A*.⁷⁵ The main objection to this version is that in all other cases in the *Poetics* a discovery is a true one, that is, concerns the real state of affairs, so there is no reason to suggest that mistaken recognitions were also considered.⁷⁶ Besides, Cooper ignores the words missing in Π. It should also be taken into account that such a false inference in Greek theatre apparently would be made only by the characters and not by the audience.⁷⁷

⁷² Rostagni 1945, 151. Else 1957, 626. Ritter 1839, 260.

⁷³ Lucas 1968, 229.

⁷⁴ Cooper 1918, 258–261.

⁷⁵ One example is from *Gen.* 37: 31–33: the brothers show Joseph's coat, stained with blood, to their father, and he falsely concludes that Joseph is torn by a beast.

⁷⁶ Hardy 1952, 84 augmented illustrations of recognitions by paralogism as he bracketed the words καὶ εἴ γε τὸ τόξον ἔφη γνῶσσεσθαι ὃ οὐχ ἑωράκοι, considering them to be another example (probably added by Aristotle himself as an afterthought): an impostor pretending to be Odysseus would promise to recognize the bow and make a description of it without having seen it. This would certainly produce a mistaken recognition on behalf of the characters, of the type described by Cooper.

⁷⁷ Cooper tries to reject the difference by referring to "the illusion, which is shared by anyone who hears the story" (255).

The approach most close to the one I think true was aptly generalized by Lucas: “A<ristotle> may be saying that the audience is deceived into accepting a recognition between two characters which is based on a logical fallacy, just as the audience of the epic poet can be charmed into accepting an absurdity like the landing of Odysseus on Ithaca in his sleep”.⁷⁸

Several scholars have proceeded in this way. F. Albeggiani suggested that Odysseus, instead of being identified by bending the bow, was identified because he recognized his weapon; to be satisfied with such an ἀναγνώρισις was a paralogism on behalf of the spectators, because not everyone who can recognize a bow is its owner.⁷⁹ We may infer that in this case Aristotle will have mentioned Odysseus’ exclusive capacity of managing the bow as an alternative, perfect premise, which ought to be applied by the playwright instead.

Other interpreters, who attempt similar explanations, make the opposite evaluation of stringing the bow: they give no credit to such a premise and declare it a paralogism to believe that if a stranger proved able to bend the bow, he was Odysseus.⁸⁰ A logical mistake is ascribed not only to the audience, but also to the characters: they should have understood that not everyone who can strain the bow is necessarily Odysseus. J. Hardy underlined that the remark ἄλλον δὲ μηδένα was restricted to the characters’ milieu. Gallavotti supposed that the particular way of introducing the scene of recognition in *Odysseus the False Messenger* somehow added to its illogicality, making the syllogism a false one.

This way of addressing the problem might seem plausible, until we reconsider the examples of various types of recognition mentioned above. One cannot but notice that almost all the recognizing characters can equally be charged with *fallacia consequentis*. (1) As previously mentioned, not everyone who has a scar is Odysseus. (2) An impostor might learn the details of Iphigenia’s old home from hearsay or because he visited the palace in Argos; it is not correct to conclude that one who can name them is Orestes. (3) A person who cries listening to Demodocus’ song about the Wooden Horse need not necessarily be Odysseus. (4) Even a conclusion that one whose sister was sacrificed is Orestes is highly probable, but not inevitably correct. We could claim that in all these cases the spectators were involved in a paralogism,

⁷⁸ Lucas 1968, 171; however, he remained uncertain, whether to accept the reading θεάτρον or θατέρον.

⁷⁹ Albeggiani 1937, 44.

⁸⁰ Valgimigli 1946, 122; Hardy 1952, 84; Gallavotti 1968, 257; id. 1974, 158–159.

so far as they accepted recognitions not perfectly founded, since each time a guess concerning someone's identity proved correct in spite of invalid arguments.⁸¹ If so, what makes these examples different from an ἀναγνώρισις ἐκ παραλογισμοῦ?

IV. Recognition by Paralogism: an Interpretation

Apparently Aristotle does not insist that the recognition must result from undeniable evidence. Perhaps it would be desirable, if possible (cf. 1460 b 28–29: δεῖ γὰρ εἰ ἐνδέχεται ὅλως μηδαμῇ ἡμαρτηθῆναι), but the Stagirite is well aware that reasoning of common people in real life for the most part is not bulletproof, so the logical mistake of Eurycleia is, after all, a realistic psychological detail. Even if logically imperfect, an inference of the recognizing party is a probable guess which then leads to an attempt to find out whether it is true and thus to the actual recognition. The orators in court use to provoke false inferences in order to convince their audience (*Soph. el.* 167 b 8–12, cf. *Rhet.* 2. 24. 1401 b 23–24), so why not the poets?

It seems evident that neither the good nor the bad reasoning of the characters was a classifying factor. The classification of recognitions is based on the *means* – διαφέρουσι τῷ δι' ἐτέρων, or τῷ ἐξ ἐτέρων (paraphrasing the beginning of the *Poetics*, 1447 a 17): each discovery results from some particular feature or conduct of the recognized party. So in a recognition 'by paralogism' it is the means that must be special.

I believe the true solution was found for the first time by Rostagni in 1927, but slipped by almost unnoticed. For him the mark of the premise of recognition was its incredibility.⁸² It remains only to set aside the idea that the fourth kind of recognition, as well as its subspecies, was "by reasoning", and we come to my own proposal: recognition by paralogism is based not on a "logical fallacy" (*pace* Lucas), but on an "absurdity" (the

⁸¹ Pozdnev 2005, 448: "Here παραλογισμός is the operation of deducing the cause from the consequent <...>. It is, in fact, nothing more than guesswork, but in many cases it does succeed. Judging by similarity <...> one may occasionally, though not necessarily, reach the truth".

⁸² Rostagni 1945, 95: "che Odisseo solo e nessun altro al mondo sapesse tendere l'arco, era cosa incredibile: era un falso presupposto dato come vero dal poeta; ma poiché per quell mezzo Odisseo si fa *realmente* riconoscere, gli homini sono indotti ad ammettere come vero anche quell presupposto"; *ibid.*, 96: "Dunque il paralogismo consiste nel dar come vero il presupposto falso o incredibile, perchè com questo mezzo Odisseo (o chi altri) si farà *veramente* riconoscere"; *ibid.*, 151.

matter discussed in Chapter 24), i. e. something ἀδύνατον or ἄλογον, which, however, the audience will accept thanks to the poet's skilled deception.

As regards the previous examples, there is nothing supernatural in having a scar, or acquaintance with a king's palace in Argos, or being moved by a song, or even having one's sister sacrificed. Yet in the case of *Odysseus the False Messenger* we are dealing with an ἀδύνατον: in reality no bows exist that can be drawn only by one specific person (nor are there slippers which would fit only Cinderella). Nevertheless, the poet makes his Odysseus the only one capable of bending the bow and brings the audience to accept this false ὑπόθεσις as true.

The poetic lie concerns not the correctness or probability of the characters' argument, but the possibility of the premise. Once a marvelous circumstance is inserted into poetic reality as a ὑπόθεσις, the reasoning of the characters is correct and does not differ from a true syllogism:

- 1) no one but Odysseus can draw this bow;
- 2) there is a man who drew this bow;
- 3) it follows that he is Odysseus.

Yet the initial point of the reasoning is a thing impossible in the real world. Likewise, in the modern literary genre of fantasy it is conventional to build upon an ἀδύνατον, e. g. to introduce men with supernatural capacities or creatures taking possession of others' bodies, but once the "poetic lie" is accepted, consequent reactions, emotions and actions of the characters must be described as "realistically" as possible.

Πεποιημένον ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ might be said of Homer as well as his successors who worked on the same myth.⁸³ However, Homer does not emphasize that Odysseus is the only mortal able to string the bow – he simply turns out to be stronger (or more skilled) than the suitors;⁸⁴ neither is shooting an arrow through twelve axes the only and decisive way of recognizing the king of Ithaca – he identifies himself to the suitors after the first shot (*Od.* 22. 22–41), and eventually Penelope finds it necessary to make a further test of identity (*Od.* 23. 177–230). Probably the tragedian was cruder than the epic poet⁸⁵ in asserting the exclusive, indeed supernatural link of the bow with his eponymous character.

⁸³ Gallavotti 1956, 132 n. 1 insisted that Homer and not the playwright was implied. As proved by Scott 1922, 330, ποιητής need not always mean 'Homer'.

⁸⁴ *Od.* 21, 91–94 (words of Antinous): μνηστήρεσσιν ἄεθλον ἄατον· οὐ γὰρ δῖω / ῥηϊδίως τόδε τόξον εὖξοον ἐντανύεσθαι. / οὐ γάρ τις μετὰ τοῖος ἀνὴρ ἐν τοῖσδεσι παῖσιν, / οἷος Ὀδυσσεὺς ἔσκεν.

⁸⁵ Cf. Crönert 1913, 1443–1444: "In Nebendingen aber scheint der Dichter stark von Homer abgewichen zu sein, was dann den Tadel des Aristoteles hervorrief"; Gallavotti 1974, 159.

Unlike Homer, the author of *Odysseus the False Messenger* seems to be guilty of even further awkwardness: that is, he made his character affirm that he would recognize the bow, although he had never seen it before (τὸ τόξον ἔφη γνῶσεσθαι ὃ οὐχ ἑώρακει).⁸⁶ If this character was Odysseus, and οὐχ ἑώρακει is true, it follows that Homer's story of acquisition of the bow as a gift from Iphitus (*Od.* 21. 13–41) was not taken into account in the tragedy. One could tentatively speculate that the miraculous bow somehow appeared in Ithaca during the king's absence, only to serve as a means of proving his excellence and hence identity (according to a prophecy? to the design of Athena?). Otherwise, perhaps Odysseus betrayed himself by this promise, since the ability to recognize the bow contradicted the story invented by him (οὐχ ἑώρακει was then a circumstance implied by his misinformation⁸⁷), but nevertheless he was not unmasked prematurely. The details will likely remain unclear to us, but anyway, I suppose that the playwright committed a mistake like those described in Chapter 17 (1455 a 22–29), and this mistake made stringing the bow by none other than Odysseus still less believable.⁸⁸ Yet even such clumsiness (καὶ εἰ γε must be concessive) did not prevent the playwright from suggesting, and probably the spectators from accepting, the existence of the magical bow as a premise (ὑπόθεσις).

In this case ἀναγνώρισις ἐκ παραλογισμοῦ is clearly a subspecies, but not – or rather not only – of the kind ἡ ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ. Apparently poetic lie could deal with such means as tokens, both noticed by chance (no. 1) and referred to in self-declaration (no. 2), and also with a statement of extraordinary circumstances (no. 4) – I only find it difficult to imagine an impossible display of feelings (no. 3). Recognition by bending the bow most probably belongs to those “contrived by the poet” (the words πεποιημένον ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ in 1455 a 14¹ must refer to Aristotle's type 2 newly introduced in 1454 b 30–31).⁸⁹ It should be noted that, as Aristotle makes a short summary of the *Odyssey* in 1455 b 16–23, he does

⁸⁶ Cf. Merkelbach 1969, 112: “Wenn Odysseus tatsächlich daran erkannt wird, dass er den Bogen spannt, kann er unmöglich diesen selben Bogen noch nie gesehen haben”.

⁸⁷ According to Cooper 1918, 259, “which he had not seen” may imply “on this occasion”: e. g. Odysseus had not seen his nuptial bed since he returned to Ithaca, yet he was able to describe it to Penelope.

⁸⁸ Cf. Rostagni 1945, 95: “Qui Arist. si riferisce forse a qualche espressione del drama che aggravava l'incredibilità del presupposto”. Despite most attempts at reconstructing the plot, this scene may be not part of τὸ καθόλου, but an ἐπεισόδιον (see 1455 a 34 – b 23), like the example from Soph. *Ant.* 1226–1234 (1454 a 1–2).

⁸⁹ As suggested by Crönert 1913, 1443 and Gallavotti 1956, 132.

not include stringing the bow among substantial events, so this must be an ἐπεισόδιον that does not arise from the action itself. As for the fifth, and the best class, presumably it should preclude any imperfection, including ἄλογα;⁹⁰ that is why recognition ἐκ παραλογισμοῦ is mentioned before and not after it.

It is not ruled out that Aristotle called the recognition based on parallogism συνθετή because it was ‘combined’ with a parallogism of the audience, that is, with admitting an impossible matter.⁹¹ Yet I do not find it convincing that the miraculous nature of the premise could be regarded as something ‘put together’ with it. Rather this kind is called ‘fictitious’, i. e., based on a fictitious premise.

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⁹⁰ Pozdnev 2005, 449 n. 7.

⁹¹ Rostagni 1945, 94–95: “combinata con un falso ragionamento da parte degli spettatori” (although he meant only the fourth species, ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ). Crönert 1913, 1443 did assume that being ‘composite’ suggests such a combination: “Die zweite Art der Wiedererkennung, αἱ πεποιημένοι ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ [1454 b 30], ist mit einer Irreführung der Zuschauer verbunden”, but for him false reasoning consisted in the mistaken expectation of the audience that the bow will serve for recognition, whereas in fact it was used for the killing of the suitors.

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Classification of recognitions in Chapter 16 of the *Poetics* cannot be based on true or false inferences of the recognizing characters, since reasoning of the same kind (often imperfect from the logical point of view, but still plausible) is required for any discovery in all the examples. Rather it is based on the means of recognition, which is some feature, conduct or saying of the recognized party. Recognition ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ, as all examples but the first one show, is founded on a statement (‘enumerating together’) of some unique fatal coincidence by a character going to be recognized, made within hearing of the other. The example from Aeschylus’ *Choephoroi* (*Poet.* 1455 a 4–6) contradicts the context and must be an interpolation. Recognition ἐκ παραλογισμοῦ τοῦ θεάτρου is not a separate type, but a subspecies marked by an impossible or improbable premise (such as the existence of a bow which nobody but Odysseus can bend), which the poet however makes his audience accept, provoking a false inference of the cause from the consequent, as described in 1460 a 18–26. In *Odysseus the False Messenger* this impossibility was probably made still less believable by a slip on behalf of the author who made his character say that he would recognize the bow which he had never seen. The epithet συνθετή may mean either ‘combined’ with a paralogism of the audience or ‘fictitious’, i.e., based on a fictitious premise.

Классификация узнаваний в главе 16 *Поэтики* не может быть основана на умозакключениях узнающей стороны, будь то верных или ложных, поскольку для любого узнавания, во всех примерах, требуется один и тот же вид рассуждения (часто несовершенного с точки зрения логики, однако приводящего к вероятным выводам). Скорее в ее основе лежит то, по чему персонажа узнают: его отличительный признак, поведение или высказывание. При узнавании ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ, как показывают все примеры, кроме первого, узнающий персонаж слышит, как узнаваемый сопоставляет уникальные роковые события в своей судьбе. Пример из *Хэзфор* Эсхила (*Poet.* 1455 а 4–6) не соответствует контексту и, очевидно, является интерполяцией. Узнавание ἐκ παραλογισμοῦ τοῦ θεάτρου – это не отдельная разновидность, а подвид, специфика которого – невозможная или невероятная предпосылка (как, например, существование лука, который никто, кроме Одиссея, не может натянуть). Тем не менее, поэт добивается того, чтобы аудитория ее приняла, провоцируя ложное умозакключение о причине на основании следствия, как описано в 1460 а 18–26. В *Одиссее* – *ложном вестнике* промах автора, заставившего своего героя сказать, что он узнаёт лук, которого никогда не видел, по всей вероятности, усугублял неправдоподобие предпосылки. Эпитет узнавания συνθετή может означать либо ‘составное’ (соединенное с паралогизмом публики), либо – скорее – ‘вымышленное’ (основанное на небывалой предпосылке).

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